ML042190265

Final Outlines (Change Summaries - Optional)

ML042190265
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/19/2004
From:	Wilson M Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-423/04-301
Download: ML042190265 (27)

Text

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 Note:

1.

Ensure that at least two topics fiom every K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (i. e., the Tier Totals in each WA category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D. 1.c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 2 1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

Select topics from many systems and evolutions; avoid selecting more than two WA topics fkom a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.

The shaded areas are not applicable to the categoryher.

The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO WAS must also be linked to 10CFR55.43 or an SRO-level learning objective.

On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRO-only knowledge and non-A2 ability categories in the columns labeled K and A. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

For Tier 3, enter the WA numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form ES-401-3.

Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. *

7.

8.

9.

PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 procedures that require immediate ES-40 1 Emergency and A EIAPE # I Name I Safety Function 000007 Reactor Trip -

Stabilization - Recovery I 1 00000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 000009 Small Break LOCA 13 00001 1 Large Break LOCA I 3 0000 1511 7 RCP Malfimctions I 4 000022 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup 12 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I 3 000029 ATWS I 1 000040 (WIE 12) Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer I 4 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4

000055 Station Blackout I 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Elec.

Inst. Bus 16 000058 Loss of DC Power 16 000062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water 14 000065 Loss of Instrument Air I 8 WE04 LOCA Outside Containment I 3 WE05 Inadequate Heat Transfer -

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 14 WA Category Totals:

a1 Plan 3volutions - Tier 1 Ability to determinelinterpret 4.614.7 difference between steamline rupture and LOCA.

Ability to determinelinterpret proper 4.214.3 1

operation of AFW pumps and reg.

valves.

Knowledge of reasons for actions 4.314.6 1

contained in the EOP.

Ability to operatelmonitor feed pump 3.613.6 1

speed to control SG pressurellevel.

Operational implications of battery 2.U3.1 1

charger equipment and instruments Knowledge of automatic actions 3.613.9 I

within service water on ESFAS Ability to restore systems after 2.913.1 1

instrument air pressure is regained.

Interrelation between LOCA Outside 3.513.9 1

CTMT and components, interlocks, failures, auto and manual features.

Interrelation between loss of heat 3.713.9 1

sink and components, systems, instruments, signals, interlocks, failure modes, automatic and manual features.

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 000025 Loss of RHR System 14 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture 13 000040 (WIE 12) Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer 14 2

000056 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 WIE 1 1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malhnction I 3 000062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water 14 KIA Category Totals:

l 2 a1 Plant Evolutic versus pressure drop.

and make operational judgments.

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance 3.714.4 1

2.4.7 Knowledge of event based EOP 3.113.8 1

mitigation strategies.

Ability to determinelinterpret 3.414.2 1

adherence to appropriate procedures I and operations within limits.

I Ability to determinehterpret Tech-I 3.714.3 1 1

u J

ES-401 Emergency a EIAPE # I Name I Safety Function 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 dA K

1 -

000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI /

7 000036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000060 Accidental Gaseous Rad waste Rel.

/ 9 W/E06 Inad Core 3

W/E 15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High ontainment Radiation /

I PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 lant Evolutions - '

KIA Topic@)

IR Knowledge of interrelations between inoperable/stuck rod 2.5/2.5 and controllers/positioners.

Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of 3.3/3.6 each annunciator.

Ability to determinehnterpret indication of blown fwse.

2.W3.1 Knowledge of reasons for interlocks associated with fuel 2.9/3.6 handling equipment Knowledge of reasons for actions in the EOP.

3.W4.2 Knowledge of reasons for EOP responses.

3.5/4.0 Ability to operatelmonitor for desired operating results 3.W4.0 during. emergencies.

Ability to operatelmonitor components, systems, instruments, 2.9/3 -0 signals, interlocks, failure modes, automatic and manual features.

Ability to operate/monitor operating behavior 2.9/3.0 characteristics of the facility.

Group Point Total:

u ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 Emergency and Abnormal P E/APE #/Name I Safety I K I K I K Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod1 1 00059 Accidental Liquid Rad Waste Rel. 19 Integrity / 5 WE03 LOCA CooldodDepress. / 4 KIA Category Totals:

0 0

0 ons - Tic G =

2.4.30 2.4.1 1 2

I/Group 2 (SRO)

KIA Topic(s)

Knowledge of which events related to system operationslstatus should be reported to outside agencies.

Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Ability to determinelinterpret the occurrence of automatic actions as a result of a high PRM signal.

Ability to determinehnterpret facility conditions and select the appropriate procedure.

Ability to determinelinterpret adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within limits.

Group Point Total:

IR 2.213.6 3.413.6 3.613.9 3.313.8 3.514.1 1

1

PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 ES-40 1 System # I Name

) I SRO:

G WA Topic(s)

IR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump Physical connections or cause-effect between RCPs and CCW.

Ability to verify alarm setpoints and operate controls per ARP.

Predictlmonitor changes in VCT level associated with operating controls.

Effect of malfunction on RHR heat exchanger on RHRS.

Knowledge of power supplies to accumulator 3.013.3 3.313.3 3.013.2 2.512.6 2.512.9 3.413.8 2.712.9 004 Chemical and Volume Control 2.4.50 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling valves.

Ability to explain and 006 Emergency Core Cooling 2.1.32 apply all system limits and precautions.

Ability to monitor components which discharge to the PRT.

Ability to monitor automatic actions that occur on SIS.

007 Pressurizer Relieff Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 0 10 Pressurizer Pressure Control 1

1 -

3.613.7 4.114.2 Predict impadmitigate PORV failure.

Physical connectionlcause-effect between turbine and RPS.

0 12 Reactor Protection 3.113.1 I

0 12 Reactor Protection Knowledge of power supplies to RPS 3.313.7 1

channels.

Operational implications 0 13 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling of ESFAS logic and reliability.

Ability to perform system and integrated plant procedures in all modes of operation.

Knowledge of design featurelinterlock that provides adequate level in Containment sump for CSS suction Predict impactlmitigate malfunctioning steam dump.

2.913.3 1

1 2.1.23 3.914.0 026 Containment Spray 3.814.1 I

039 Main and Reheat Steam I

3.413.7

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline I

Form ES-40 1-2 I SRO)

G P

IR WA Topic(s)

Physical connections1 cause-effect between condensate and MFW.

Ability to monitor automatic Feedwater isolation.

2.612.6 059 Main Feedwater I

I 3.213.3 1

1 059 Main Feedwater Ability to operate or monitor feed control during power increase or decrease.

Operational implications of AFW flow and RCS heat transfer.

Physical connectionslcause-effect between AC distribution and offsite power.

Knowledge of power supplies for major system loads.

Predict impadmitigate ground.

2.912.9 061 Auxiliary Feedwater 3.613.9 062 AC Electrical Distribution 3.714.2 4

062 AC Electrical Distribution I l 1 3.313.4 2.513.2 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator Knowledge of effect of malfunction of EDG system on systems controlled by the sequencer.

Predict/monitor changes in rad levels to prevent exceeding design limits.

Physical connectionslcause-e ffect between Service Water and PRMS.

Knowledge of effect of loss of IAS on systems having pneumatic valves Knowledge of design featurelinterlocks which provides for containment isolation.

Predict changes in T-hot association with operation of ESFAS.

Group Point Total: -

3.814.1 1

073 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.213.5 076 Service Water I 3.612.7 I

l 078 Instrument Air 3.413.6 103 Containment 3.113.7 0 13 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.413.7

ES-40 1 System # I Name K

003 Reactor Coolant Pump 1

026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 064 Emergency Diesel Generator WA Category PWR Examination Outline SRO)

G 2.1.23 2.4.41 2.1.12 3

Form ES-40 1-2 WA Topic(s)

IR Ability to perform specific system and 3.9/4.0 integrated plant procedures during all modes of operation.

Predictlmitigate impact of failure of 4.114.4 ESF on containment spray.

Knowledge of EAL thresholds and 2.314.1 classifications Ability to apply technical 2.9/4.O specifications for a system.

Group Point Total:

_=

1 1

1

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-40 1-2 LO I SE G

System # I Name KIA Topic(s)

IR Knowledge of rod bottom light design andor interlocks Predict impact and mitigate high and low voltage to instruments.

0 14 Rod Position Indication 0 16 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 3.213.4 2.512.6 0 17 In-core Temperature Monitor Predict impact and mitigate the consequences of core damage.

3.614.1 027 Containment Iodine Removal Ability to manually operate or monitor CIRS controls.

Knowledge of design 3.313.3 2.513.3 034 Fuel Handling Equipment feature or interlock-which provides for fuel movement.

035 Steam Generator Knowledge of the effect of a malfunction of a secondary PORV on the SG.

Knowledge of the effect of a malfunction of the MTIG system will have on the plant.

Knowledge of physical connections/cause-effect between circ water system and emergency service water.

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on sensors feeding into CRDS.

3.113.5 045 Main Turbine Generator 2.913.2 3.213.2 075 Circulating Water 001 Control Rod Drive 2.813.3 086 Fire Protection Ability to manually operatelmonitor deluge valves in the control room.

3.013.5 WA Category Totals:

Grour, Point Total:

ES-40 1 PWR Examination Outline System # I Name 002 Reactor Coolant 01 1 Pressurizer Level Control WA Category Totals:

) 2 (SRO)

A G

4 2.4.47 2.1.7 Form ES-40 1-2 I

WA Topic(s)

Ability to diagnose and recognize trends utilizing reference material.

Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments.

Group Point Total:

ES-40 1 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-40 1-3 2.4.1 1 2.4.45 2.4.36 2.4.40 Facility: Mil Category Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

3.413.6 1

Ability to prioritizehterpret significance of each alarm.

3.313.6 1

emergency operations.

Knowledge of SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

Knowledge of chemistrylhealth physics tasks during 2.012.8 2.3J4.0

1.

Conduct of Operations

2.

Equipment Control

3.

Radiation Control

4.

Emergency Procedures I Plan quires notification of nowledge of radiation exposure limits including NUREG-1 02 1, Draft Revision 9

Tier / I Randomly 1 Selected WA EPE.027.GEN.2.4.3 1 EPE.OII.A2.09 Reason for Rejection 1/1 111 APE.0151017.Kl.05 APE.056.GEN.2.4.3 1 APE.003.GEN.2.4.30 EPE.WlE06.EK3.4 003.GEN.2.4.30 111 211 2/ 1 21 1 I 013.A1.05 EPE. WlE04K3.02 005.K2.03 022.K3.01 Over-sample of Alarm Response Procedures. Also low difficulty. ARP simply directs operators to the AOP.

Poor KA (Ability to verify adequate natural circulation during a large break LOCA). The RCS rapidly depressurizes. Cooling is via injection flow, with heat removal out the break.

Generic Fundamentals.

Over-sample of Alarm Response Procedures.

Rejected based on lead examiner input. Over-sample of EOP bases. Low discriminatory validity.

Over-sample of power supplies.

Over-sample of Containment topics.

Similar to GEN.2.4.30, already randomly selected for APE.00 1.

Better tested during operating exam (Teamwork).

Similar to GEN.2.4.30, already randomly selected for APE.00 1.

Similar to topic covered in question 1. Predict changes in parameters associated with examiner inpu 1 12 I 003.GEN.2.4.30 1 /2 I 003.GEN.2.4.32 Not SRO specific.

Not SRO specific.

1 /2 I 060.GEN.2.1.24 I SRO task selected for RO portion of exam.

1 Page 1 of2 NUREG-102 1, Revision 8, Supplement 1

ES-4.01 Record of Reiected WAS FOJXII ES-40 1-4 112 2r1 Tier / 1 Randomly Grow Selected WA 060.GEN.2.1.33 010.GEN.2.1.28 022.GEN.2.4.6 022.GEN.2.4.49 GEN.2.1.8 311 I GEN.2.1.17 312 I GEN.2.2.8 Reason for Rejection SRO task selected for RO portion of exam.

Svstem Dumose. Not SRO mecific.

CTMT cooling de-energized during symptom based EOPs. Not SRO specific.

No immediate actions associated with CTMT cooling svstems.

Coordinating activities outside the control room. Better tested on operating exam.

Accurate communications. Better tested on oDerating exam.

Not part of SRO job function at Millstone 3.

312 I GEN.2.2.16 I KA<2.5.

312 I GEN.2.2.23 I Low discriminatory validity. LCOs tracked in shift log.

312 I GEN.2.2.31 312 I GEN.2.2.31 Selected for RO portion of exam. RO KA < 2.5.

Selected for SRO portion of exam. KA concerns initial core load, while Millstone 3 is in I core load #lo. Also, over-sample of refueling.

313 I GEN.2.3.3 I KA <2.5.

313 I GEN.2.3.5 I KA < 2.5.

313 I GEN.2.3.6 I KA < 2.5.

313 I GEN.2.3.7 I KA < 2.5.

Page 2 of 2 NUREG-102 1, Revision 8, Supplement 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Millstone 3 Date of Examination:

19 - 23 Julv 2004 Examination Level (circle one): R8/-

Operating Test Number:

One I

Administrative Topic Conduct of Operations ll Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control l

i i

Type Code*

N N

N N

N Describe activity to be performed

==

Description:==

Administrative Requirements for Shift Manning Activities & Working Hour Limitations.

WA:

I O CFR Q 55.45 (12)

==

Description:==

Escalation and Control Rod Withdrawal (OP 3204,4.1.16).

WA:

2.1.25 (3.1) Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and table which contain performance data.

10 CFR Q 55.45 (5)

==

Description:==

Surveillance WA:

I O CFR Q 55.45 (13) 2.1.5 (3.4) Ability to determine working hour limits.

Determine the Maximum Rate of Power Review a Completed Technical Specification 2.2.12 (3.4) Knowledge of Surveillance Procedures.

~~

==

Description:==

a Radiation Monitor from Service (OP 3250.62, Att 3)

WA:

radiation control requirements.

10 CFR Q 55.45 (9)

Determine Appropriate Response to Remove 2.3.1 (3.0) Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility

~~~

==

Description:==

Emergency Plan Classification and Protective Action Recommendation for General Emergency WA:

thresholds and classifications.

10 CFR Q 55.45 (11).

2.4.41 (4.1) Knowledge of the Emergency Action Level Note: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

I(

~~

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (5 3 for ROs; 5 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (2 I )

(P)revious 2 exams (5 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator NUREG-1021, Revision 9 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES301-1.wpd

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Millstone 3 Examination Level (circle one): @ SRB Operating Test Number:

One Date of Examination: 23 Julv 2004 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Conduct of Operations

~~

Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code*

N N

P N

Describe activity to be performed

==

Description:==

Administrative Requirements for Shift Manning Activities -Working Hour Limits & Fitness for Duty.

WA:

during all modes of plant operation.

2.1.2 (3.0) Knowledge of Operator responsibilities 10 CFR Q 55.45 (1 2)

==

Description:==

Escalation and Control Rod Withdrawal (OP 3204,4.1.16).

WA:

2.1.25 (2.8) Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and table which contain performance data.

10 CFR Q 55.45 (5)

==

Description:==

Checklist.

WA:

during all modes of plant operation.

10 CFR Q 55.45 (1 2)

Determine the Maximum Rate of Power Complete a Shutdown Safety Assessment 2.2.1 8 (3.0) Knowledge of Operator responsibilities

==

Description:==

a Radiation Monitor from Service (OP 3250.62, Att 3)

WA:

radiation control requirements.

10 CFR § 55.45 (9)

Determine Appropriate Response to Remove 2.3.1 (2.6) Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility None Note: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank & 3 for ROs; 5 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (2 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (5 1; randomly selected)

(S)imulator NUREG-1021, Revision 9 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES301-I.wpd

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

a.

Respond to a dropped control rod (AOP 3552)

b.

Vent Unisolated SI Accumulators (ES-1.2, GA-7) (RO Only)

Facility: Millstone Generatinn Station, Unit 3 Exam Level (circle one):-

SW(-Uj Operating Test No.:

One Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U)

Date of Examination: 19-23 July 2004 A, M, S 1

A, D, L, P, S 2 (RO)

System / JPM Title

d.

Steam Generator Level Control with Feedwater Level Control Bypass Valve in Auto and Feedwater Flow Control Valve Open in Manual (OP 3321, § 4.1 7).

Safety Function Type Code*

N, S

g.

Respond to Main Steam Pressure Transmitter MSS-PT20D Failure to 100% Causing SG Atmospheric Relief Valve MSS-PV20 to Open. (OP3353.MB5C 5-7)

I D, P, S

c.

Subsequent Actions in Response to Auxiliary Building Radiation Monitor 3HVR-RE13 Alarm

/I N, S l 9

j.

Process Radiation Monitor DAS50-1 Alarm (AOP 3573)

Respond to Potential Steam Binding of AFW Pumps 3FWA*PlA

k.

and 3FWA*P2 (OP 3322)

E, N 9

E, N, R 4

4

e.

Respond to Clogged Containment Sump (Loss of Cold Leg Recirculation).

(1 f.

Start, Parallel, and Load the B EDG from MB8 7

1 A,N,S I

8

h.

Swap from RPCCW Train B to Train C - fouled RPCCW Heat Exchanger.

ll IIn-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U) 11 I.

Establish Alternate Charging Pump Cooling (EOP 3501)

I D,E,R I

8 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES301-2.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-30 1 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Type Codes

~ _ _ _ _ _

@ All control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

I RO SRO-I I

Type Codes II (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant Criteria for RO I SRO-I I SRO-U 5

4 0

0 3

2 3

3 (A)ltemate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (L)ow Power (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)

(P)revious 2 exams (WCA (S)imulator (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)

(P)revious 2 exams

( W A 4-6 14-6 12-3

~

~

~~

a 8

2 I

2 2

2 2

(S)imulator I

a I

7 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES301-2.wpd NUREG-I 021, Revision 9

Appendix D Form ES-D-I Event Malf.

Event No. I No.

1 TvDe*

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.:

One Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators: SRO Surroaate Harrv Balian / John Caruso Stephen P. Lambert Gill Johnson Michael R. Frechette Initial Conditions:

Turnover: The plant is at 81% Dower and returninq to full power followinq a refuelinq outaqe. However, CONVEX has directed the crew is to rapidly reduce Dower.

Motor drive auxiliarv feedwater pump. 3AFW*PIA is out of service for emeraent maintenance. 3AFW*PIA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> aao and expected return to operabilitv is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limitina condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

81 % Power, Steady State Event Description 1

2 R (RO)

CONVEX orders rapid power reduction to -65%

RXOSA I(R0)

PZR Press Xmtr. 3RCS*PT455 Fails Low 3

RX16A 4

RC07B 5

RX15 6

FW08B 7

RD16 8

FW20 I (RO, BOP)

C(R0)

I (BOP)

C C(R0)

C (BOP)

Turb Imp Press Xmtr, 3MSS-PT505, Fails Low 3RCS*PCV456 (B PZR PORV) leak MS Hdr Press Xmtr, 3MSS*PT507, fails low 3FWC-FCV520 (B FRV) fails open forcing trip 5 Control Rods fail to insert, Immediate Boration AFW Pumps fail to auto start

~

9 SGOIB 10 S107B G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 1.wpd M

C(R0)

SGTR of 340 gpm in B SG 3SIS*P1 B Fails to Auto Start NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 11 I SRO classifies the event

Appendix D Form ES-D-1 Event Type*

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.:

One Op-Test No.: One Examiners :

Operators: SRO Surrogate Harry Balian /John Caruso Gill Johnson Christopher S. Chatman Michael A. Fortner Event Description Initial Conditions:

81 % Power, Steadv State R (RO)

I (RO)

I (RO, BOP)

C (RO)

Turnover: The plant is at 81 % power and returnins to full power followina a refueling outaqe. However, CONVEX has directed the crew is to raPidlv reduce power.

CONVEX orders rapid power reduction to -65%

PZR Press Xmtr, 3RCS*PT455 Fails Low Turb Imp Press Xmtr, 3MSS-PT505, Fails Low 3RCS*PCV456 CB PZR PORV) leak Motor drive auxiliarv feedwater pump, 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emeraent maintenance. 3AFW*PIA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> aao and expected return to operabilitv is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limitina condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

11 Event Malf. x I SRO classifies the event

+P= RC07B 6

7 8

9 10 RX15 FW08B RD16 FW20 SGOl B S107B I (BOP)

C c (RO)

C (BOP)

M C (RO)

MS Hdr Press Xmtr, 3MSS*PT507, fails low 3FWC-FCV520 (73 FRV) fails open forcina trip

~~

5 Control Rods fail to insert, Immediate Boration AFW Pumps fail to auto start SGTR of 340 apm in B SG

~~

3SIS*PI B Fails to Auto Start G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\MiIlstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 1.wpd NUREG-1 021, Revision 9

Appendix D Form ES-D-1 Event Malf.

Event No.

No.

Type*

1 R (RO)

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.:

One Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators: SRO Surrosafe Harry Balian /John Caruso Gill Johnson James A. KelIv Wavne A. Harrelson Event Description CONVEX orders rapid power reduction to -65%

Initial Conditions:

81 % Power. Steadv State 2

3 Turnover: The plant is at 81 % power and returnins to full power following a refuelinq outaae. However, CONVEX has directed the crew is to rapidlv reduce Dower.

RXOSA I (RO)

PZR Press Xmtr, 3RCS*PT455 Fails Low RX16A I (RO. BOP) Turb Imp Press Xmtr, 3MSS-PT505, Fails Low Motor drive auxiliarv feedwater pump. 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3AFW*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> aao and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limitinq condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

4 5

6 RC07B C(R0) 3RCS*PCV456 (B PZR PORV) leak RX15 I (BOP)

MS Hdr Press Xmtr, 3MSS*PT507, fails low FW08B C

3FWC-FCV520 (B FRV) fails open forcing trip 7

8 9

10 11 RD16 FW20 SGOI B S107B 5 Control Rods fail to insert, Immediate Boration AFW Pumm fail to auto start SGTR of 340 gpm in B SG 3SIS*P1 B Fails to Auto Start SRO classifies the event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\MilIstone 3\\Outline\\MSS ES-D-I Scenario 1.wpd NUREG-1 021, Revision 9

Appendix D Page 1 of 4 Form ES-D-1 Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Two Op-Test No.: - One Examiners: Don Jackson Operators: Richard M. Viqneau Gil Johnson Michael R. Frechette RO Surroqate as BOP

~ Initial Conditions:

100% Power, Steady State Turnover:

3AFW*PlA out of service for emerqent maintenance. The crew is to maintain full Millstone Unit 3 is at 100% Dower with one MDAFW Pump, I.

2.

3.

Event Malf. No. 1 Event I 11 No. 1 Twe*

Description N107A I (RO)

Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-41 fails high CVO4B I (RO)

Letdown Temperature Instrument fails low FW16C R (BOP) Heater Drain Pump Trip

~

Event

4.

5.

SWOIC RC1 I D RPOSA & B C (RO)

ATWS: Crew performs FR-S.1.

RPIOA & B C (RO)

SW Pump Trips. STBY Pump fails to auto start.

3RCS-PI D Locks Up (Trips). Auto RX Trip fails.

RTBs opened manually -2 minutes later.

7.

a.

TC03 Automatic turbine trip fails.

TC04 RC03D M

Manual trip succeeds while performing FR-S.1 Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LB LOCA).

SRO Classifies the Event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 2.wpd NUREG-I 021, Revision 9

ADDendix D Paae 2 of 4 Form ES-D-1 Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Two Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Don Jackson Operators: Brian S. Koshmerl Gil Johnson Christopher S. Chatman RO Surrouate as BOP Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

3AFW*PIA out of service for emeraent maintenance. The crew is to maintain full 100% Power. Steadv State Millstone Unit 3 is at 100% power with one MDAFW Pump.

power.

11

1.

I N107A 11

2.

I CV04B II

3.

I FW16C II

4.

I SWOIC RCIID

5.

RPOSA&B RPIOA&B TC03 11 6* 1 TC04 11

7.

I RC03D ll I

• (N)ormal, (R)eactiv M

Event Description Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-41 fails high Letdown Temperature Instrument fails low Heater Drain Pump Trip SW Pump Trips. STBY Pump fails to auto start.

3RCS-PI D Locks Up (Trips). Auto RX Trip fails.

ATWS: Crew performs FR-S.1.

RTBs opened manually -2 minutes later.

Automatic turbine trip fails.

Manual trip succeeds while performing FR-S.l Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA).

SRO Classifies the Event I,

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone S\\Outline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 2.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Page 3 of 4 Form ES-D-1 I (RO)

I (RO)

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Two Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Don Jackson Operators: Paul A. Russell Gil Johnson James A. Kellv RO Surroqate as BOP Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

3AFW*PlA out of service for emeraent maintenance. The crew is to maintain full 100% Power, Steady State Millstone Unit 3 is at 100% power with one MDAFW Pump, Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-41 fails high Letdown Temperature Instrument fails low power.

2.

3.

4.

5.

II I. I N107A CV04B FWI 6C SWOIC RCI 1 D RPOSA & B RPlOA& B R (BOP)

C (RO)

C (RO)

M Heater Drain Pump Trip SW Pump Trips. STBY Pump fails to auto start.

3RCS-PI D Locks Up (Trips). Auto RX Trip fails.

ATWS: Crew performs FR-S.1.

RTBs opened manually -2 minutes later.

Automatic turbine trip fails.

Manual trip succeeds while performing FR-S.l Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident f LBLOCA).

~~

Event TvDe*

6-

7.

8.

Event DescriQtion TC03 TC04 RC03D I SRO Classifies the Event

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\Outline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 2.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Page 1 of 4 Form ES-D-1 R (RO)

I (BOP)

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Three Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators: SRO Surroaafe Don Jackson Richard M. Vianeau Harrv Balian / John Caruso Michael R. Frechette Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

service for emerqent maintenance.

9% Power. Steadv State Unit is at 9% Dower with one MDAFW Pump (3FWA*PIA) out of Raise power from 9% to 1 I

%. P-IO Fails.

SG "B" LT529, fails to 0 over 5 mins.

Event I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

I O.

I (RO)

Malf. No.

Letdown Press Xmtter, PTI 31, fails low.

RXl2F C (ROY BOP)

CV05 Loss of VIAC-I (3VBA*INV-1 Deenergized)

ED08A MSO6A FWIOD M

C (BOP)

MS12B, Cy D FW Rupture on "D" feedwater line.

MSlVs "B". "C". "D" stick oDen RP07A & B C

FW18B, 21B No flow from 3FWA*PI B SRO Classifies the Event Event Type*

Event Description I

I C

I MSlV " A closes inadvertentlv.

SI Fails to Actuate, can be manually actuated.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-I Scenario 3.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Page 2 of 4 Form ES-D-1 11 'i:nt I

Malf. No.

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Three Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators: SRO Surrocrafe Don Jackson Brian S. Koshmerl Harry Balian /John Caruso Michael A. Fortner Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

service for emeruent maintenance.

9% Power, Steadv State Unit is at 9% power with one MDAFW Pump (3FWA*PIA) out of Event Type*

I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

I R (RO)

I (BOP)

Raise power from 9% to I 1 %. P-I 0 Fails.

SG "B" LT529, fails to 0 over 5 mins.

RX12F CV05 I (RO)

Letdown Press Xmtter, PTI 31, fails low.

ED08A C (RO, BOP)

Loss of VIAC-I (3VBA*INV-I Deenergized)

MSOGA C

MSlV " A closes inadvertently.

FWIOD M

FW Rupture on "D" feedwater line.

MS12B, C, D C (BOP)

MSlVs "B", "C", "D" stick open SI Fails to Actuate, can be manually actuated.

I

8. I RP07A&B I C(R0)

SRO Classifies the Event I O.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-I Scenario 3.wpd NUREG-I 021, Revision 9

AoDendix D Paae 3 of 4 Form ES-D-1 Event No.

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Three Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators: SRO Surroaafe Don Jackson Paul A. Russell Harry Balian / John Caruso Wavne A. Harrelson Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

service for emergent maintenance.

9% Power, Steady State Unit is at 9% power with one MDAFW Pumr, (3FWA*PIA) out of Malf. No.

Event Type*

I.

R (RO)

Raise power from 9% to I I

%. P-I 0 Fails.

2.

I RX12F I I (BOP)

I SG "B" LT529, fails to 0 over 5 mins.

I I

I

3.

4.

5.

CV05 I (RO)

Letdown Press Xmtter, PTI 31, fails low.

ED08A C (RO, BOP)

Loss of WAC-1 (3VBA*INV-1 Deenergized)

MSOGA C

MSlV "A" closes inadvertentlv.

11

6.

I FWIOD I M I FW RuPture on "D" feedwater line.

I

7.

MS12B,C, D C(BoP)

MSlVs "B", "C", " D stick open SI Fails to Actuate, can be manually actuated.

I I(

8. I RP07A&B I C(R0)

9.

I O.

FWl8B,21B C

No flow from 3FWA*P1 B SRO Classifies the Event G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 3.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Page 1 of 1 Form ES-0-1

1.

2.

Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.:

Four Op-Test No.: One Examiners:

Operators:

I FXOIOA I (RO)

Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails high.

ED04C C (RO, BOP)

Loss of 4160 Volt Bus 34D Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

Maintenance, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO 100% Power. Steadv State Unit is at 100% Dower with the Turbine Driven AFW PumD 00s For FWOI

, FWOI TC03 Event Malf' Event Type*

/I No. 1 No.

1 R (RO, BOP)

M C (BOP)

Loss of Cond Vacuum, Rapid Load Reduction Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Reactor Trip Failure of Turbine To Trin MSlV Isolation FW18B

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

~

C(BoP)

M Trip of AFW Pump (3FWA*PlA)

Loss of All Feed, Core Cooling restored by feeding SG with Condensate Bypass or Bleed and Feed Cooling.

SRO Determines the EAL G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Millstone 3\\0utline\\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 4.wpd NUREG-I 021, Revision 9