ML041660477

License Amendment 340 Regarding TS 3.6.5, Reactor Building Spray and Cooling Systems

ML041660477
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	06/04/2004
From:	Olshan L NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	Rosalyn Jones Duke Energy Corp
Olshan L N, NRR/DLPM, 415-1419
References
TAC MC3370
Download: ML041660477 (16)

Text

June 4, 2004 Mr. Ronald A. Jones Vice President, Oconee Site Duke Energy Corporation 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NO. MC3370)

Dear Mr. Jones:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 340, to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-47 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 4, 2004.

The amendment revises TS 3.6.5, Reactor Building Spray and Cooling Systems, to add a note that states that Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4 is not applicable for Unit 2. The amendment is issued as an emergency amendment to allow continued startup of Unit 2 while Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) 2A is being repaired. The amendment allows Unit 2 to enter MODE 2, with RCBU 2A inoperable, for no longer than the Required Action Completion Time of seven days.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Leonard N. Olshan, Sr. Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-270

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 340 to DPR-47

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

June 4, 2004 Mr. Ronald A. Jones Vice President, Oconee Site Duke Energy Corporation 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NO. MC3370)

Dear Mr. Jones:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 340, to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-47 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 4, 2004.

The amendment revises TS 3.6.5, Reactor Building Spray and Cooling Systems, to add a note that states that Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4 is not applicable for Unit 2. The amendment is issued as an emergency amendment to allow continued startup of Unit 2 while Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) 2A is being repaired. The amendment allows Unit 2 to enter MODE 2, with RCBU 2A inoperable, for no longer than the Required Action Completion Time of seven days.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Leonard N. Olshan, Sr. Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-270

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 340 to DPR-47

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC ACRS/ACNW PDII-1 R/F GHill(2)

WBeckner RHaag,RII OGC EHackett SCoffin LOlshan DClarke RidsRgn2MailCenter DLPMDPR Package Number: ML Amendment Number: ML041660477 TS Number: ML OFFICE PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA IROB/SC OGC PDII-1/SC NAME LOlshan DClarke TBoyce BPoole SCoffin DATE 6/4/04 6/4/04 6/4/04 6/4/04 6/4/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-270 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 340 Renewed License No. DPR-47 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated June 4, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 340, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Stephanie M. Coffin, Acting Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: June 4, 2004

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 340 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47 DOCKET NO. 50-270 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3.6.5-1 3.6.5-1 B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.5-5 B 3.6.5-5 B 3.6.5-6 B 3.6.5-6 B 3.6.5-7 B 3.6.5-7 B 3.6.5-8 B 3.6.5-8 B 3.6.5-9 B 3.6.5-9 B 3.6.5-10

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 340 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-270

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 4, 2004, Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise TS 3.6.5, Reactor Building Spray and Cooling Systems, by adding a note to the ACTIONS table that states that Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 is not applicable for Unit 2. The licensee requested an emergency amendment to allow Unit 2 to continue startup while Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) 2A is being repaired. The request would allow Unit 2 to enter MODE 2, with RBCU 2A inoperable, for no longer than the Required Action Completion Time (CT) of seven days.

The requested change would modify TS requirements for mode change limitations for TS 3.6.5 to adopt the provisions of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) change TSTF-359, "Increase Flexibility in Mode Restraints." The availability of TSTF-359 for adoption by licensees was announced in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).

On July 17, 2002, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed TS Task Force (RITSTF) submitted proposed change, TSTF-359, Revision (Rev.) 7, to the Standard TSs (STSs)

(NUREGs 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry. TSTF-359, Rev. 7, proposed to change among other things the STS LCO 3.0.4 requirements regarding mode change limitations by risk-informing limitations on entering the mode of applicability of an LCO. The Notice of Opportunity to Comment on the model safety evaluation (SE) using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process with respect to this change was published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2002. The NRC staff prepared a model SE incorporating changes resulting from public comments. The NRC staff has since made minor editorial changes to the SE. TSTF-359, Rev. 8, as modified, provides the complete approved change as discussed in the April 4, 2003, Federal Register notice. The RITSTF subsequently incorporated the modifications identified in the April 4, 2003, notice into TSTF-359, Rev. 9.

This proposal is one of the industrys initiatives under the risk-informed TSs program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety while reducing unnecessary burden and to make TS requirements consistent with the Commissions other risk-informed regulatory requirements, in particular Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants," or the maintenance rule.

The current TSs specify that a nuclear power plant cannot go to higher modes (i.e., move toward power operation) unless all TS systems, normally required for the higher mode, are operable. This limitation is included (with several exceptions for some plants) in LCO 3.0.4.

LCO 3.0.4 in the STSs currently state, in part, that when an LCO is not met, "entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time." The industry believes that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive and can unduly delay plant startup while considerable resources are being used to resolve startup issues that are risk insignificant or low risk. A maintenance activity that takes longer than planned can delay a mode change and adversely impact a utilitys orderly plant startup and return to power operation. The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety.

The proposed changes to TS 3.6.5 would allow, for systems and components, mode changes into a TS condition that has a specific required action and CT. The licensee will utilize this allowance only if the licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the LCO CT, after the mode change. This change is in addition to the current mode change allowance when a required action has an indefinite CT.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) LCOs; (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plants TSs. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), "Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification..." By convention, the LCOs and related SRs are contained in Sections 3.1 through 3.10 of the TSs. STS Section 3.0, "LCO and SR Applicability," provides details or ground rules for complying with the LCOs and related SRs. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 address requirements for LCO compliance when transitioning between modes of operation.

TSs have taken advantage of risk technology as experience and capability have increased.

Since the mid-1980's, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been reviewing and granting improvements to TSs that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on TS improvements of July 22, 1993, the Commission stated that it expects that licensees will utilize any plant-specific PRA or risk survey in preparing their TS-related submittals. In evaluating these submittals, the staff applies the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,"

dated July 1998 and in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision making: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. The staff has appropriately adapted this guidance to assess the acceptability of upward mode changes with equipment inoperable.

The review of the generic change, TSTF-359, Rev. 9, had the following objectives:

To ensure that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the actual implementation of the proposed change (e.g., when the plant enters a higher mode while an LCO is not met). This risk increase is referred to as "temporary."

To compare and assess the risk impact of the proposed change to the acceptance guidelines of the Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174. The risk impact, which is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change, aims at minimizing the "cumulative" risk associated with the proposed change so that the plants average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range.

To assess the licensees ability to identify risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other operational activities and take appropriate compensatory measures to avoid such configurations.

The NRC staff reviewed the reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the non-higher-risk systems and components, and related guidance to assess and manage the risk of upward mode changes. The Commission has found that compliance with the industry guidance for implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as endorsed by RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," satisfies the configuration risk management objectives of RG 1.177 for TS surveillance interval and CT extensions. Reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes that are consistent with the provisions of the NRC-endorsed industry guidance were also found adequate for managing risk of missed surveillances as described in the Federal Register on September 28, 2001 (66 FR 49714).

The NRC staff review also had the objective of ensuring that existing inspection programs have the necessary controls in place to allow the NRC staff to oversee the implementation of the proposed change and reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes or programs. The inspection program allows the staff to adequately assess the licensees performance associated with risk assessments. The review encompassed inspection procedures (IPs) (i.e., NRC IP 62709 (12/28/00), "Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process," and NRC IP 71111.13 (1/17/02), "Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control"), the significance determination process (SDP) (i.e., draft "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process"), enforcement guidance (i.e., draft Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.11, "Actions Involving the Maintenance Rule"), and the associated reactor oversight process.

Currently, LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entrance into a higher mode (or other specified condition) in the applicability when an LCO is not met, except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in that mode or condition indefinitely or a specific exception is granted. Similarly, when an LCOs surveillances have not been met within their specified frequency, entry into a higher mode (or other specified condition) is not allowed by SR 3.0.4.

The current LCO 3.0.4 reads:

When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The proposed change to TS 3.6.5 adds a note that states, LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable for Unit

2. The proposed change to TS 3.6.5 Bases addresses the need for a risk assessment prior to entry into the MODE of applicability and the need to restore RBCU 2A to operable status within the TS 3.6.5 Required Action Completion Time.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff did a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the proposed TSTF-359, Rev. 9, change in LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances by evaluating how the licensees implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach is expected to meet the guidance of the applicable RGs.

The staff referred to the guidance provided in RG 1.174 and in RG 1.177. RG 1.177 provides the NRC staffs recommendations on using risk information to assess the impact of proposed changes to nuclear power plant TSs on the risk associated with plant operation. Although RG 1.177 does not specifically address the type of generic change in this proposal, the staff considered the approach documented in RG 1.177 in evaluating the risk information provided in support of the proposed changes in LCO 3.0.4.

The NRC staffs evaluation of how the implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify the TS 3.6.5 allowances, agrees with the objectives of the guidance outlined in RG 1.177 is discussed in Section 3.1. Oversight of the risk-informed approach associated with the allowances is discussed in Section 3.2.

3.1 Evaluation of Risk Management Both the temporary and cumulative risk of the proposed change are adequately limited. The temporary risk is limited by the CT limits contained in TSs (Section 3.1.1). The cumulative risk is limited by the temporary risk limitations and by the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment. Adequate NRC oversight of the licensees ability to use this provision under appropriate circumstances (i.e., to identify risk-significant configurations when entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO) is provided by NRC inspection of the licensees implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as applied to the proposed change.

3.1.1 Limited Time in TS Required Actions Any temporary risk increase will be limited by, among other factors, duration constraints imposed by the TS CTs of the inoperable systems. For the systems and components which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that CTs associated with the majority of TS systems and components were developed for power operation and pose a smaller plant risk for action statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes of operation as compared to power operation.

The TS 3.6.5 allowance will be used only when the licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change. This will minimize the likelihood of additional temporary risk increases associated with the need to exit a mode due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. In most cases, the licensee will enter into a higher mode with the intent to move up to Mode 1 (power operation). As discussed in Section 3.2, the revised reactor oversight process monitors unplanned power changes as a performance indicator. The reactor oversight process, thus, discourages licensees from entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of an LCO, and moving up in power, when there is a likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. Another disincentive for licensees to enter a higher mode when an LCO is not met is related to reporting requirements. It clearly states in 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors," that a report is required when the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown is required by TSs. The NRCs oversight program will provide the framework for inspectors and other staff to follow the history at a specific plant of entering higher modes while an LCO is not met, and use such information in assessing the licensees actions and performance.

3.1.2 Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Mode Changes With all safety systems and components operable, a plant can transition up in mode to power operation. With an RBCU inoperable, this change permits a plant to transition up in mode to power operation if a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment is performed prior to the mode transition, and the requisite risk management actions are taken. The proposed TS Bases state,

..., this allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. The risk assessment may use quantitive, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. It should be noted that the risk assessment must take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the licensees normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by RG 1.182.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. A risk assessment and establishment of risk management actions, as appropriate, are required for determination of acceptable risk for entering MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. Elements of acceptable risk assessment and risk management actions are included in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," as endorsed by RG 1.182, which addresses general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, gives quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and provides example risk management actions. These risk management actions include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, actions to increase risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the conditions, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable.

The guidance references state that a licensees risk assessment process should be sufficiently robust and comprehensive to assess risk associated with maintenance activities during power operation, low power, and shutdown conditions (all modes of operation), including changes in plant conditions. NUMARC 93-01 states that the risk assessment should include consideration of: the degree of redundancy available for performance of the safety function(s) served by the out-of-service equipment; the duration of the out-of-service condition; component and system dependencies that are affected; the risk impact of performing the maintenance during shutdown versus at power; and, the impact of mode transition risk. For power operation, key plant safety functions are those that ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, ensure the capability to shut down and maintain the reactor in safe shutdown condition, and ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potentially significant offsite exposures.

While the inoperabilities permitted by the CTs of TS required actions take into consideration the safety significance and redundancy of the system or components within the scope of an LCO, the CTs generally do not address or consider concurrent system or component inoperabilities in multiple LCOs. Therefore, the performance of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment which looks at the entire plant configuration is essential (and required) prior to changing operational mode. The 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment will be used to confirm (or reject) the appropriateness of transitioning up in mode given the actual status of plant safety equipment.

The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking this allowance will be assessed and managed through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This program is consistent with RG 1.177 and RG 1.174 in its approach. The implementation guidance for paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule addresses controlling temporary risk increases resulting from maintenance activities. This guidance, consistent with guidance in RG 1.177, establishes action thresholds based on qualitative and quantitative considerations and risk management actions.

The thresholds of the cumulative (aggregate) risk impacts, assessed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated implementation guidance, are based on the permanent change guidelines in RG 1.174. Therefore, licensees will manage the risk by exercising this allowance in conjunction with the risk from other concurrent plant activities to ensure that any increase, in terms of CDF and LERF will be small and consistent with the Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement.

3.2 Oversight The reactor oversight process (ROP) provides a means for assessing the licensees performance in the application of the proposed mode change flexibility. The adequacy of the licensees assessment and management of maintenance-related risk is addressed by existing inspection programs and guidance for 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Although the current versions of that guidance do not specifically address application of the licensees Section 50.65(a)(4) program to support risk-informed TSs, it is expected that, in most cases, risk assessment and management associated with risk-informed TSs would be required by Section 50.65(a)(4) anyway because maintenance activities will be involved.

Adoption of the proposed change will make failure to assess and manage the risk of an upward mode change with inoperable equipment covered by TSs, prior to commencing such a mode change, a violation of TSs. Further, as explained above in general, under most foreseeable circumstances, such a change in configuration would also require a risk assessment under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Inoperable systems or components will necessitate maintenance to restore them to operability, and, hence, a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment would be performed prior to the performance of those maintenance actions (except for immediate plant stabilization and restoration actions if necessary). Further, before altering the plants configuration, including plant configuration changes associated with mode changes, the licensee must update the existing Section 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment to reflect those changes.

The Federal Register Notice issuing a revision to the maintenance rule (Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 137, Monday, July 19, 1999, page 38553) along with NRC IP 71111.13 and Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, indicate that to determine the safety impact of a change in plant conditions during maintenance, a risk assessment must be performed before changing plant conditions. The bases for the proposed TS change mandate that the risk assessment and management of upward mode changes will be conducted under the licensees program and process for meeting 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Oversight of licensee performance in assessing and managing the risk of plant maintenance activities is conducted principally by inspection in accordance with ROP Baseline IP 71111.13. Supplemental IP 62709 is used to evaluate the licensees process, when necessary.

The ROP is described in overview in NUREG-1649, Rev. 3, "Reactor Oversight Process," and in detail in the NRC Inspection Manual. IP 71111.13 provides for verification of performance of risk assessments when they are required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and in accordance with licensee procedures. The procedure also provides for verification of the adequacy of those risk assessments and verification of effective implementation of licensee-prescribed risk management actions. The rule itself requires such assessment and management of risk prior to maintenance activities, including preventive maintenance, surveillance, and testing (and promptly for emergent work) during all modes of plant operation. The guidance documents for both industry implementation of Section 50.65(a)(4) and NRC oversight of that implementation indicate that changes in plant configuration (which would include mode changes) in support of maintenance activities must be taken into account in the risk assessment and management process. Revisions to NRC inspection guidance and licensee implementation procedures will be needed to address oversight of risk assessment and management required by TSs in support of mode changes that are not already required under the circumstances by Section 50.65(a)(4). This consideration provides performance-based regulatory oversight of the use of the proposed flexibility, and a disincentive to use the flexibility without the requisite care in planning.

In addition, the staff is in the process of developing detailed SDP guidance for use in assessing inspection findings related to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This guidance was issued in draft for comment and is anticipated to become final during 2004. The ROP considers inspection findings and performance indicators in evaluating licensee ability to operate safely. The SDP is used to determine the significance of inspection findings related to licensee assessment and management of the risk associated with performing maintenance activities under all plant operating or shutdown conditions. Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power changes are two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the ROP utilizes to assess licensee performance and inform the public. The ROP will provide a disincentive to entering into power operation (Mode 1) when there is a significant likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT.

The licensee included in its application the revised TS Bases to be implemented with the TS change. The NRC staff finds that the TS Bases Control Program is the appropriate process for updating the affected TS Bases pages.

3.3 Summary The licensee has submitted a proposed TS change to allow entry into a higher mode of operation, while relying on the TS conditions, and associated required actions and CTs, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action. The proposal revises TS 3.6.5 by adding a note that LCO 3.0.4 does not apply for Unit 2. The NRC staff review finds that the process proposed by the licensee for assessing and managing risk during the implementation of the proposed TS 3.6.5 allowance meets Commission guidance for TS changes.

The NRCs reactor oversight process provides the framework for inspectors and other staff to oversee the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements at a specific plant and assess the licensees actions and performance.

The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety.

4.0 STATEMENT OF EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES 10 CFR 50.91 provides special exceptions for the issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day public notice cannot be met. One type of special exception is an emergency.

Specifically, 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) provides that where the NRC finds that an emergency situation exists, in that (as here) failure to act in a timely way would result in prevention of resumption of operation, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or public comment. In this situation, the NRC will publish a notice of issuance under 10 CFR 2.106, providing for opportunity of a hearing and for public comment after issuance.

The licensee requested that the NRC issue this amendment on an emergency basis to allow Unit 2 to continue its startup from a refueling outage. On June 2, 2004, while in MODE 3, RBCU 2A unexpectedly failed. This failure prevents entry into MODE 2 since LCO 3.6.5 requires that all three RBCUs be operable in MODES 1 and 2, and LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entry into a MODE when an LCO is not met. The requested amendment adds a note to LCO 3.6.5 that states that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable in Unit 2, thus allowing entry into MODE 2 while RBCU 2A is being repaired.

Because the equipment failure was unexpected, the licensee could not have anticipated the need for a license amendment that would allow for a 30-day comment period. Additionally, the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards as specified in 10 CFR 50.92. Further, the licensee stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that failure to issue this emergency amendment would have prevented the resumption of operation.

On the basis of the above discussion, the NRC staff has determined that emergency circumstances exist and that the licensee used its best efforts to make a timely application and could not avoid the emergency situation.

5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DETERMINATION The licensee has determined that the following proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, which was published in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579),

applies:

Criterion 1The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a TS condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as allowed by proposed TS change, are no different than the consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS allow operation of the plant without the full complement of equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS LCO.

The risk associated with this allowance is managed by the imposition of required actions that must be performed within the prescribed completion times. The net effect of being in a TS condition on the margin of safety is not considered significant. The proposed change does not alter the required actions or completion times of the TS. The proposed change allows TS conditions to be entered, and the associated required actions and completion times to be used in new circumstances. This use is predicated upon the licensee s performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The change also eliminates current allowances for utilizing required actions and completion times in similar circumstances, without assessing and managing risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (68 FR 68671; December 9, 2003). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: T. Tjader W. Reckley Date: June 4, 2004

Oconee Nuclear Station cc:

Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn Duke Energy Corporation Mail Code - PB05E 422 South Church Street P.O. Box 1244 Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1244 Anne W. Cottingham, Esquire Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035 Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7812B Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Mr. Henry Porter, Director Division of Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201-1708 Mr. Michael A. Schoppman Framatome ANP 1911 North Ft. Myer Drive Suite 705 Rosslyn, VA 22209 Mr. B. G. Davenport Regulatory Compliance Manager Oconee Nuclear Site Duke Energy Corporation ON03RC 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, South Carolina 29672 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General North Carolina Department of Justice P. O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. R. L. Gill, Jr.

Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Issues and Industry Affairs Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street Mail Stop EC05P Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection North Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Mr. Peter R. Harden, IV VP-Customer Relations and Sales Westinghouse Electric Company 6000 Fairview Road 12th Floor Charlotte, North Carolina 28210 Henry Barron Group Vice President, Nuclear Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer P. O. Box 1006-EC07H Charlotte, NC 28201-1006