ML041480089

Calculation SM-1442, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments

ML041480089
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/05/2004
From:	John T, Song-Hua Shen Dominion
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
04-078A SM-1442
Download: ML041480089 (74)

Text

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Calculation SM-1442 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Surrv ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

t 5irDominion-Calculation Cover Sheet Page 1 of 71 I0-4 Calculation Title (Subject):

Response To NRC Request For Additional Information On Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments Key Words:

PRA, Fire, Halon, SPS1, SPS2 Reference Numbers:

Initiating Document:

Originator:

Discipline:

Dominion Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Firm Name:

Vendor Code:

iEDSN J

6

-;g l

Station Unit System Prefix Sequence Component Code Suffix

Purpose:

Develop analyses to provide responses to the NRC Request for Additional Information regarding the Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP comments.

==

Conclusions:==

- Fault Tree analysis shows a probability of failure to suppress an ESGR fire (either from the Halon system or by the fire brigade) of 5.1E-3 at Unit 1 and 7.0E-3 at Unit 2.

- The RCP Floating Ring Seal failure probability is 0.5.

- The frequency of welding in the ESGR is 1. 1E-1/yr for each Unit. The probability of a fire from ESGR door welding spreading to the cables in the ESGR is judged to be negligible due to the lack of combustible material.

-The mean fire brigade response time to the ESGR is 5 minutes.

Affected Calculation(s):

None.

Prepared By:

Si Date J. D. Leary (Sections 1-4, 6,7) nt of L, S. H. Shen (Section 4.2.7)

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At f

T. P. John (Section 5) 6r/s-l/. y Reviewed By:

Signature Date T. P. John (Sections 1-4, 6, 7) 0 Y

J. D. Leary (Section 5)

P.

P 4

Xi15/8O Y Approved By:

Signature A

evl TG le'4a Date

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S Is EIS12i L4 June 2001

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 2 of 71 Table of Contents 1

INTRODUCTION 2

DESIGN INPUTS AND COMPUTER CODES USED 3

ASSUMPTIONS 4

ANALYSIS 4.1 ESGR FIRE SUPPRESSION FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT - INTRODUCTION 3

3 3

5 5

4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.2.5 4.2.6 4.2.7 FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SYSTEM MODEL BOUNDARY AND SCHEMATIC SUCCESS CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS MODULARIZATION LOGIC LOOPS DATA DEVELOPMENT 6

6 7

8 8

12 12 12 4.3 UNIT DIFFERENCES 4.4 RISK MONITOR CONSIDERATIONS 4.5 SYSTEM MODEL EVALUATIONS AND SENSITIVITY STUDIES 5

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR RESPONSES TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 5.1 RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability 5.2 Welding Frequency In ESGR 5.3 Fire Brigade Response Time Data 6

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 7

REFERENCES 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 24 ESGR Fire Suppression System Simplified Schematic ESGR Fire Suppression System Fault Tree ESGR Welding Work Orders And Events Halon System Tests Sensitivity Analysis Results Files Reviewer's Comments Calculation Review Checklist

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 71 1

INTRODUCTION This calculation develops a fault tree for the ESGR fire suppression (Halon suppression system and fire brigade) in the Surry Power Station (SPS) Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ESGRs). The structure of this calculation is such that Section 4 presents the fault tree development in a manner consistent with the structure of the other fault tree notebooks for the SPS Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).

Section 5 presents information for other Requests for Additional Information (RAls) made by the NRC. The additional items addressed are: 1 )Failure probability of the RCP floating ring seal, 2)Probability of an ESGR fire caused by welding, and 3)Mean fire brigade response time to an ESGR fire.

2 DESIGN INPUTS AND COMPUTER CODES USED WinNUPRA Version 2.1, Service Release 3.

See the References section (Section 7) for a complete list of inputs.

3 ASSUMPTIONS

1.

General fault tree development assumptions are consistent with those of other fault trees in the SPS PRA notebooks (Reference 7.1 1).

2.

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Halon suppression systems differ in that Unit 1 has 8 Halon bottles (2-240 lb bottles in Area A, 3-335 lb bottles each in Areas B and C), while Unit 2 has 9 bottles (3-240 lb in Area A, 3-335 lb in Areas B and C).

The references in Section 6 are not explicit about the reason for the extra bottle in Unit 2, but the effect on the system failure probability would not be significant in any case. Unit 2 also requires a total of five dampers to close as part of the Halon actuation (Reference 7.19), compared to three at Unit 1 (Reference 7.8).

This calculation develops a Unit 1 ESGR Fire Suppression fault tree is, but an assessment of the Unit 2 failure probability is presented in Section 4.5.

3.

The ESGR Halon suppression system is a manually actuated system at SPS.

Upon receiving a trouble alarm, an operator is dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the situation. If warranted, the system is actuated from the main control room at the Halon System Remote Panel. If actuation from the main control room fails, the system can alternately be actuated outside the ESGRs from the Local Halon Discharge station. Should both of these alternatives fail, the system can still be manually discharged by pulling the pins on the Halon bottles, manually closing the area fire dampers and closing the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGR (Reference 7.7). Because of the redundancy in actuation, along with manual backup, the actuation logic circuitry for the Halon suppression is not modeled, as its failure probability would be many orders of magnitude lower than the failure of the system components.

4.

For operators to be aware of a fire in the ESGR, the fire is automatically detected and a signal sent to an annunciator in the main control room. The

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 71 ESGRs are equipped with heat detectors and ionization-type smoke detectors (Reference 7.2, pages 2-2 and 2-3). Because of the redundancy in detection, and the high reliability of the electronic equipment compared to Halon system mechanical equipment that does not have redundancy, the detectors are not included in the system fault tree. Similar to Assumption 3, the probability of such failures are negligible compared to the other failures modeled in the fault tree.

5.

For the 1 H and 1 J areas of the ESGR, the Halon suppression system is designed to initially discharge two tanks of Halon each, followed by discharge of a third tank to each 4 1/2 minutes later (Reference 7.6). The reason for the delay is so that Halon concentration can be maintained for the designed duration, but if all Halon were discharged initially, the concentration would be high enough to pose a health risk to anyone in the area. For the PRA, early discharge of the third tanks would not be considered detrimental to equipment, but the timer will still be modeled in the PRA because depending on its failure mode, the third tanks might never discharge, and Halon concentration might not be maintained for the design duration.

6.

The references in Section 7 do not present explicit success criteria for extinguishing fires, as each fire would present a different scenario. However, References 7.2 and 7.6 do present that when all the Halon bottles discharge as designed, the design concentration is maintained. Without evidence to the contrary, this calculation will assume that all bottles need to discharge for system success.

7.

Reference 7.2, page 6-26, presents that the Halon Subsystem provides signals to close the VS System dampers in the Emergency Switchgear Rooms to ensure and maintain the required Halon concentrations. However, the damper numbers and door number are not mentioned. Reference 7.8, the periodic flow test of the ESGR Halon system, has operators verify that a Halon actuation would successfully close dampers 1-VS-FDMP-14, 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 1-VS-FDMP-22A. Fire Door 18 is also verified to close. These dampers and the fire door are assumed to be the components required to close for system success. Failure of any of the dampers is conservatively assumed to fail the Halon function for the severe fire scenarios considered in the phase 3 SDP. If the door does not close, success is still possible if the Unit 2 Halon system is successfully discharged.

8.

Reference 7.10 is the semi-annual procedure to check Halon bottle capacities.

If a bottle has less than the allowable amount, the bottle is replaced. In one past instance, a 236 pound bottle was installed where a 335 pound bottle belonged (Reference 7.5), so a pre-initiator operator action is created to address the possibility in this system model. No data is available for the number of times a year bottle are replaced, but this analysis will assume that 2 bottles per year are replaced, and that installation of the wrong bottle fails the system.

9.

Reference 7.10 also involved disconnecting the Halon solenoid valves for each pilot cylinder in order to test the bottles. Consistent with the general SPS PRA models (Reference 7.1 1), the restoration faults of these valves is not modeled.

Reviewing the pre-initiator operator actions modeled in the SPS PRA, valve misalignments are modeled but not failure to reconnect the circuitry for valves.

Since the solenoid valves in the ESGR Halon system are normally closed, misalignment will not be modeled.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 71

10.

No data exists for the probability of the ESGR U1/U2 fire door to fail to close.

To approximate the failure probability, the probability of failure of a motor operated damper to close is assumed to be representative.

11.

The test lines in the Halon system (see Attachment 1) are not modeled in the fault tree. These lines are normally isolated by manual valves 1 -FP-450, 1 -FP-451 and 1 -FP-452. These valves are opened when the system flow test is performed to provide an injection path for the test air, Nitrogen or C02 (Reference 7.8). After the test is completed, the valves are closed and will not affect system operation. Consistent with Reference 7.1 1, normally closed manual valves that remain closed during an accident are not modeled in the PRA.

12.

The pressure switches in the test lines (1-PS-FPH-1/2/3) are not modeled in the system fault tree. These switches provide a signal to indicate that the Halon system has discharged, but they do not affect system operation.

13.

As mentioned previously, the Halon system can be discharged locally at the Halon tanks. This method allows the system to discharge regardless of whether or not the solenoid valves operate. However, in cases in which there is a partial discharge of the system (e.g., 7/8 tanks discharge but one solenoid valve fails to open), it is unlikely that operators would be aware that there has not been a full discharge. Without such information, no credit is given to a manual backup in cases in which a solenoid valve fails to open, essentially making the solenoid valve success criterion 8/8.

14.

If the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs fails to close automatically, it will likely be noticed by operations and/or fire protection personnel sent to the room in response to the fire alarms. Even if a failure of the door to close is not noticed by the personnel, smoke alarms would be triggered in the opposite Unit's control room, precipitating further opportunities to recognize the open door. Therefore, credit is taken for discharge of the Unit 2 Halon system should the door fail to close. If the Unit 1 AND Unit 2 Halon systems successfully inject their Halon supplies, the system is considered a success even if the door between the Units fails to close. Failure of the Unit 2 system is modeled as a single basic event with a conservative probability of 5E-2.

4 ANALYSIS This section is developed with a structure similar to other PRA system notebooks. The data analysis and quantification are included as well to achieve the objective of calculating a system unavailability.

4.1 ESGR FIRE SUPPRESSION FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT - INTRODUCTION The ESGR fire suppression system is not modeled in the SPS fire PRA. In the SPS IPEEE, no credit is taken in the detection or suppression of ESGR fires (Reference 7.4, Attachment 1, page 8 of 14). No additional credit has been given in any SPS fire PRA updates (Reference 7.12). However, a fault tree is developed for the system for the purpose of determining its overall unavailability.

Documenting reviewer comments and resolutions for this PRA function notebook have been included as Attachment 6.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 71 4.2 FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT The fault tree analysis was conducted as per the guidance of the PRA Manual (Reference 7.13),

which is a Nuclear Analysis and Fuel department engineering manual. WinNUPRA is the computer code used for this analysis. A Unit 2 fault tree was not developed (see Section 3, Assumption #2).

The fault trees developed is:

HA1 (HAl.LGC) - ESGR Fire Suppression - Failure of Fire Suppression to 1 of 3 ESGR areas -

SPS Unit 1 All Modes The ESGR Fire System fault tree is included in Attachment 2. Discussion regarding the quantification of the HA function fault tree is included in Section 4.5.

4.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ESGR Fire suppression at SPS can be accomplished by the manually actuated Halon system, or with successfully suppression by the Surry fire brigade.

The following description of the Halon system is taken from References 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, and 6.7.

The ESGR for each unit is equipped with a manually-actuated, total flooding Halon 1301 fire suppression system. Each Unit's ESGR is considered to be comprised of three areas protected by the Halon system. Area A is the Relay Room area. Area B is the 1 H equipment area, and Area C is the 1J equipment area. At Unit 1, Area A receives Halon discharge from two 240-pound Halon bottles (at Unit 2, it is from three 240-pound Halon bottles). Areas B and C each receive Halon discharge from three 335-pound Halon bottles.

The Halon subsystems contain a pilot cylinder and slave cylinders. The pilot cylinder has a pilot valve, which when actuated, allows the Halon pressure from the pilot cylinder to operate the slave cylinders, causing total discharge of the slave cylinders. The main bank of Halon storage bottles for each unit's ESGR Halon system is located outside the hazard area. One set of reserve Halon cylinders for both units are stored in the Unit 1 Turbine Building basement.

Smoke and heat sensors in the ESGRs would detect if a fire develops. A signal would then automatically be sent to the Main Control Room, triggering an Annunciator Response (Reference 7.7). An operator would then be dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the condition.

Once a fire is confirmed to exist by Operations personnel, the fire brigade would be summoned to the area and the designated scene leader would assume control of the fire scene (all scene leaders are operators). The Loss Prevention Coordinator or representative would go to the Control Room and function as an advisor to the shift supervisor. The scene leader would determine whether to utilize portable fire suppression equipment or to activate the Halon system, depending on the magnitude and nature of the fire.

Each Unit's ESGR Halon system is activated by either of two electric pushbuttons, one located in the Control Room and one located just outside the entrance of the ESGR. The system may also be activated by a manual trip at the Halon storage bottles located in the Turbine Building. If any one subsystem is manually tripped (e.g., at the Halon bottles), the remaining two subsystems will be automatically actuated electrically from the Halon control panel.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 71 Pressure switches are located in the discharge manifolds of each subsystem which sense Halon discharge and send a discharge signal to the Control Room. A separate discharge alarm is provided for each unit's system on the Control Room annunciator/control panel. A common discharge signal is provided on the main plant 96 point annunciator panel. In addition, Halon system trouble indication is provided on both the Control Room Halon control/annunciator panel and the main plant 96 point annunciator panel.

In Areas B and C (the 1 H and 1J areas), two of the Halon cylinders are released initially and the final one cylinder is discharged after a four and 1/2 minute time delay. The reason for the delay is that the concentration drops after a few minutes, but must be maintained above 5% per design. If all the Halon were released initially, it would require an initial concentration of approximately 10% to maintain the 5% concentration over time. A concentration of 7% is considered hazardous to any personnel in the area, so the timed release is more desired.

The ESGR is isolated by the automatic closing of the fire dampers upon actuation of the Halon system. Openings in the Unit 1 and 2 ESGRs boundary are sealed to ensure isolation of the ESGR.

The ESGR is part of the Control Room pressure boundary, and the only fresh air entering it is from a small duct that is provided with a fire damper. All dampers in the duct work entering or leaving the room are closed automatically prior to Halon discharge. The recirculating HVAC systems will remain in operation to help provide for continual mixing of Halon within the enclosure. Air movement patterns, ceiling configuration and equipment configuration have all been taken into consideration in locating the discharge nozzles.

The Halon system is normally in standby. It has no purpose to support normal plant operation, and would only be utilized in response to certain ESGR fires.

4.2.2 SYSTEM MODEL BOUNDARY AND SCHEMATIC Identification of system model boundaries and simplified system schematics used in the development of the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree model are described below.

4.2.2.1 System Model Boundary In general, the system model boundary for the ESGR Halon system is governed by simplified system schematic. Components shown in the schematics have been incorporated into the fault tree models. Credit for the fire brigade is considered as a recovery action, described in Section 4.2.7.4.

4.2.2.2 System Schematic The simplified schematics of the ESGR Halon system are the basis for its fault tree development. These schematics represent the ESGR Halon System drawings and documentation, but only includes the components modeled within the fault tree. The system schematics are included as Attachment 1.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 8 of 71 4.2.3 SUCCESS CRITERIA Successful fire suppression in the ESGR is achieved by success of the Halon system or of the fire brigade. The fire brigade is modeled as a recovery action in Section 4.2.7.4. The Halon system is discussed subsequently.

Because every fire is different, the best estimate success criteria of the Halon portion of the ESGR Fire Suppression System is not easy to define for the severe fire scenario considered in the phase 3 SDP. However, the design basis of the Halon system is to maintain a Halon concentration in the ESGRs of at least 5% for a 10 minute period (Reference 7.6). For Unit 1, the system is designed such that two Halon bottles will discharge to ESGR Areas A, B and C initially, with two additional bottles (one to area B and one to area C) discharging after a 4 1/2 minute delay. In addition, from Reference 7.8, fire dampers 1-VS-FDMP-14, 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 1 -VS-FDMP-22A, and fire door 18 are all designed to automatically close to help maintain the Halon concentration in the area.

Halon system tests have been performed for the conditions in which all components function as designed. Tests have not been performed for combinations of possible failures, so this analysis file adopts the assumption that all Halon bottles must discharge, the three fire dampers and the fire door must close to achieve system success. While it is likely that many fires could often be extinguished with one or more of the system components not functioning as designed, there is no basis for crediting such an assumption at this time.

4.2.4 ASSUMPTIONS Key assumptions are presented in Section 3 of this report. Some assumptions require further interface with other PRA Notebook Volumes, such as the HR Volumes that primarily quantify identified human reliability events. Additional discussion is provided to aid this interface, and to provide additional fault tree development information.

4.2.4.1 Assumptions - Equipment Operability Considerations The equipment in the ESGR Fire Suppression System are evaluated under the conditions for which they were designed. Equipment operability beyond such conditions is not considered here.

4.2.4.2 Assumptions - Human Actions The fault tree development documents human failure events representing the failure or unavailability of a component, system or function caused by human inaction, or by inappropriate action. Pre-initiator human actions cause the system or component to be unavailable when demanded (e.g., actions performed prior to the initiation of an accident). Post-initiator human actions occur during the operation of the system or component, performed in response to an accident initiator. Recovery actions are human actions performed to regain equipment or system operability from a specific failure or human error, with the intent to mitigate or reduce the consequences of the failure.

The following Human Actions are modeled within the ESGR Fire Suppression fault trees. The Human Actions discussion is separated into three tables, pre-initiator, post-initiator, and recovery actions, similar to the HR quantification Notebook Volumes.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 9 of 71 Pre-initiator Human Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE HA1 IMPROPER HALON BOTTLE IS INSTALLED (note 1)

Notes:

1)Reference 7.10, the Halon cylinder pressure and weight test, is performed once every 6 months (a total of 16 bottles per year are checked; assumed 2 bottle per year are replaced). If a cylinder is found to not be sufficiently charged, then it is replaced (step 6.3.4 of procedure). Step 6.3.6 is verification that the proper cylinder was used.

Reference 7.5 discussed an incident in which a 236 pound Halon bottle was installed where a 335 pound bottle should have been used. Therefore, this Human Action is created to consider the possibility that an improper bottle is installed, although credit is taken for the verification step of the procedure.

2)Reference 7.10 also involved disconnecting the Halon solenoid valves for each pilot cylinder in order to test the bottles. Consistent with the general SPS PRA models (Reference 7.1 1), the restoration faults of these valves is not modeled. Reviewing the pre-initiator operator actions modeled in the SPS PRA, valve misalignments are modeled but not failure to reconnect the circuitry for valves. Since the solenoid valves in the ESGR Halon system are normally 'closed' and their position is response to a fire is 'open', misalignment will not be modeled.

3)As in Reference 7.10, Reference 7.8 (ESGR Halon Flow Test procedure, performed once per 18 months) temporarily disconnects the solenoid valves. It also checks the operation of the area fire dampers and fire door to verify that they close as designed in a simulated Halon actuation. As in Note 2 for Reference 7.10, misalignment of the valves will not be modeled since their normal position is closed. Similarly, restoration of the dampers and door are not modeled because they also are normally open while their position after system actuation is closed (i.e., misalignment would be to the designed fire position)

Post-Initiator Human Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes N/A N/A N/A RecoverV Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes REC-FIRE-BRIGADE HA1 Fire brigade fails to control ESGR fire (given Halon failure)

REC-VSP-M2 HA1 Operator fails to initiate ESGR Halon suppression (note 1)

Notes: 1) The ESGR Halon suppression system is a manually actuated system at SPS. Upon receiving a trouble alarm, an operator is dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the situation. If warranted, the system is actuated from the main control room at the Halon System Remote Panel. If actuation from the main control room fails, the system can alternately be actuated outside the ESGRs from the Local Halon Discharge station. Should both of these alternatives fail, the system can still be

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 10 of 71 manually discharged by pulling the pins on the Halon bottles, manually closing the area fire dampers and closing the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGR (Reference 7.7). This basic event represents failure to initiate Halon via any of those three methods. Because of the redundancy in actuation methods (including manually at the bottles themselves), the circuitry is not modeled as its failure would be orders of magnitude lower than the operator action basic event.

4.2.4.3 Assumptions - System Dependencies Power is required for fire detection equipment to alert the control room of a fire in the ESGR.

Power is also required actuate the ESGR Halon system from the control room or from the panel outside the ESGR. Note that the system can also be manually actuated by pulling the pins locally to discharge the Halon.

From Section 3, Assumption #4, the fire detection equipment is not modeled within the Halon fault tree because its redundancy and high reliability make its function failures negligible compared to the mechanical equipment in the Halon system itself. Power however is modeled for the supply to the Halon Power Supply Module, 1 -FPH-PSM-1.

From Reference 7.15 and from Reference 7.2, page 6-32, the Halon system is normally powered by the 120V AC EL system, and backed up by the Halon 12V battery 1 -FPH-BATT-1.

These two power supplies are modeled within the Halon fault tree.

4.2.4.4 Assumptions - Component Spatial The ESGR Fire Suppression System is evaluated for its unavailability under fire conditions, and other spatial hazards such as floods do not apply to this analysis.

4.2.4.5 Assumptions - General Assumptions and Simplifications General assumptions and simplifications are presented in Reference 7.11. Other assumptions key to the development of this system fault tree are:

1 Test and Maintenance (TM) Unavailability: Reference 7.8 (ESGR Halon flow test) is performed at least once per 18 months, and renders the system inoperable. Reference 7.10 (ESGR Halon cylinder pressure and weight test) is performed semiannually, and renders the system inoperable. For both tests, when the system is inoperable, a fire watch is established in the ESGR.

2 Common cause failures in the ESGR Halon are not modeled because any single failure of the solenoid valves or dampers is assumed to fail the system.

3 All other assumptions are presented in Section 3.

4 The Unit 2 Halon Suppression system is modeled as a single, undeveloped basic event in the Unit 1 fault tree. The basic event is discussed in Section 4.2.7.7 4.2.4.6 Assumptions - Components And Failure Modes The fault tree development documents all components contained in the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree along with all of the component failure modes (reliability and unavailability).

All components contained in the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree are listed in the following table, along with identification of all of the failure modes modeled for each component.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 11 of 71 Components Contained In Fault Tree and Applicable Failure Modes (U

(U W

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I E

E c

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E LL IL L-co 0

0 )

Component Fault Trees 1 -FP-SOV-456 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-457 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-458 FC HA1 1-FP-SOV-459 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-460 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-461 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-462 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-463 FC HA1 1 -FP-456 FC HA1 1 -FP-457 FC

____HA1 1 -FP-458 FC HA1 1 -FP-459 FC HA1 1 -FP-460 FC

=

=

HA1 1 -FP-461 FC HA1 1 -FP-462 FC HA1 1 -FP-463 FC HA1 Timer for Halon LF HA1 discharge 1 -FPH-BATT-1 LF HA1 240 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area A 240 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area A 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area B 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area B 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area B 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area C 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area C 335 lb Halon bottle -

LF HA1 Area C 1-VS-FDMP-14 FO HA1 1-VS-FDMP-21 FO HA1 1-VS-FDMP-22A FO HA1 Fire Door 18 FO

=

HA1

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 12 of 71 4.2.5 MODULARIZATION No component/failure modularization is developed for the ESGR Fire Suppression system fault tree modeling.

4.2.6 LOGIC LOOPS Fault tree development logic loop resolutions are documented in Reference 7.1 1, Table 1, under category 8 - Logic Loop Resolution. However, for the ESGR Fire Suppression system fault tree modeling, no logic loops were identified.

4.2.7 DATA DEVELOPMENT The following basic events were created for the SPS Fire Suppression System fault tree:

IFPCKV-FC-lFP456 1FPCKV-FC-lFP457 IFPCKV-FC-lFP458 1FPCKV-FC-lFP459 1FPCKV-FC-lFP460 1FPCKV-FC-1FP461 1FPCKV-FC-1FP462 1FPCKV-FC-1FP463 1FPSOV-FC-SOV456 1FPSOV-FC-SOV457 1FPSOV-FC-SOV458 1FPSOV-FC-SOV459 1FPSOV-FC-SOV460 1FPSOV-FC-SOV461 1FPSOV-FC-SOV462 1FPSOV-FC-SOV463 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRB lFPTMR-LF-HATMRC 1HABAT-LP-BATT1 lHAHEP-TNK-BOTTL IHASYS-TM-HALON lHATNK-LF-TANKAl 1HATNK-LF-TANKA2 1HATNK-LF-TANKB1 lHATNK-LF-TANKB2 1HATNK-LF-TANKB3 1HATNK-LF-TANKC1 1HATNK-LF-TANKC2 1HATNK-LF-TANKC3 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A lVSMOD-FO-FDMP14 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 2HASYS-FAILURE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE FAILURE REC-VSP-M2 SYSTEM 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 9.680E-005 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 1.010E-003 7.990E-004 7.990E-004 1.150E-002 3.000E-004 2.280E-003 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 2.660E-006 1.980E-003 4.220E-003 4.220E-003 4.220E-003 5.000E-002 1.940E-001 6.400E-004 ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON HALON CHECK CHECK CHECK CHECK CHECK CHECK CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE 1-FP-456 1-FP-457 1-FP-458 1-FP-459 1-FP-460 1-FP-461 1-FP-462 1-FP-463 FAIL8 FAIL8 FAILE FAILS FAILS FAILE FAILS FAILE SOV SOV SOV SOV SOV SOV SOV SOV 1-FP-SOV-456 1-FP-SOV-457 1-FP-SOV-458 1-FP-SOV-459 1-FP-SOV-460 1-FP-SOV-461 1-FP-SOV-462 1-FP-SOV-463 FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO FAILS TO 3rd TANK 3rd TANK STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN STO OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN DISCHARGE FAILS DISCHARGE FAILS AREA B HALON TIMER FOR AREA C HALON TIMER FOR HALON SYS BATTERY 1-FPH-BATT-l FAILS MT=18 MONTHS SMALL BOTTLE (<3351b) INSTALLEDINSTEAD OF 335 lb ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR ESGR UNIT FIRE HALON SYSTEM AREA AREA AREA AREA AREA AREA AREA AREA A HALON A HALON B HALON B HALON B HALON C HALON C HALON C HALON IS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION U1/U2 FIRE DOOR (DOOR 18) FAILS TO CLOSE AREA FIRE DAMPR 1-VS-FDMP-22AFAILS TO CLOSE AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-14FAILS TO CLOSE AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-21FAILS TO CLOSE 2 HALON SYSTEM FAILURE (UNDEVELOPED EVENT)

BRIGADE FAILS TO CONT ESGR FIRE GIVEN HALON 3

OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE ESGR HALONSUPPRESSION Of those basic events, all components had failure data available in the SPS S03A Parametric Data file except 1 HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE, 1 HASYS-TM-HALON, REC-VSP-M2, REC-FIRE-BRIGADE, 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18, 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A, 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP14,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 13 of 71 1 VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 and 2HASYS-FAILIURE. The Following present the development of the probabilities/unavailabilities of each.

4.2.7.1 Installation Of Improper Halon Tank 1 HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE The probability of one bottle mis-replaced is evaluated as follows using the ASEP method:

Mean: 3.OE-04 Error Factor: 10

Engineering W'ork Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 14 of 71 4.2.7.2 ESGR Halon System Maintenance Unavailability 1 HASYS-TM-HALON The Halon system unavailability due to test and maintenance (TM) is obtained by reviewing the number of times the system functionalflow test, 1-LPT-FP-017, and Halon cylinder pressure and weight test,1 -LPT-FP-018, is performed. 1 -LPT-FP-017 is performed every 18 months or is sometimes used for post maintenance testing (PMT). 1 -LPT-FP-01 8 is performed semiannually and is also used periodically for PMT. Attachment 4 contains a listing of when these procedures were performed over the last 7 to 8 years. Each test takes approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In addition to the tests, the Halon system was considered unavailable during maintenance on doors if they were open during the maintenance. A review of work orders indicates approximately 5 additional hours per year for door maintenance. Therefore, the average annual unavailability is as follows:

Number of Unit 1 tests (both -017 & 018) =

28 Number of Unit 2 tests (both -017 & 018) =

31 Total number of Unit 1 and 2 tests =

59 Total number of hours unavailable in 8 years = 4 x 59 =

236 Average annual unavailability per unit = 236 / 8 / 2 =

14.8 Door corrective maintenance (hours) 5 Total average annual unavailability (hours) = 14.8 + 5 20 Basic event point estimate = 20/8760 =

2.28E-3 4.2.7.3 Operator Action To Initiate Halon REC-VSP-M2 Event

Description:

System:

Component:

Cue:

Operator Failed to Discharge the ESGR Halon System.

FPH - Fire Protection, Halon Various Annunciator Alarm 0-VSP-M2 Procedures:

0-VSP-M2 0-AP-48.00 EMERG SWGR RM HALON SYS FIRE/TRBL, Rev. 4.

Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15.

Notes:

Step 1 of 0-VSP-M2 checks if the Halon Control Panel is in test. If the operator justified the alarm is due to the control panel in test, he may fail to respond the fire alarm.

Step 3 of 0-VSP-M2 dispatches an operator to investigate the ESGR for fire. If communication between the operator and the MCR not established within 5 minutes, the Halon system will be initiated.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 15 of 71 Based on the analysis of ET-CEP-04-0001 (Ref. 7.18), the operator may have 10 minutes to initiate the Halon system to prevent significant damage of plant safety.

The Halon system may be initiated from the from the following methods:

From MCR Halon system remote panel unit 1 and/or unit 2 From Local Halon discharge station(s). The Local Halon discharge station of unit 1 locates near automatic door between ESGRs. The Local Halon discharge station of unit 2 locates outside ESGR.

Manually initiate Halon system per Attachment 1 of 0-VSP-M2.

HEP Calculation:

Pc Calculation by Annunciator Response Model (Table 20-23):

The major contribution of the cognitive error of REC-VSP-M2 is that the operator omit the alarm and he does not enter the alarm respond procedure (0-VSP-M2). The probability of that the operator mis-justifies the alarm is due to the control panel in test can be ignored (if the control panel is not in test). The failure probability of that operator does not enter the alarm respond procedure (O-VSP-M2) will be evaluated by the annunciator respond model (table 20-23 of THERP

[Ref. 7.17])

Once the fire developed in the ESGR, 0-VSP-M2 will be the first alarm. Based on the table 20-23 of THERP, the failure rate of responding the first alarm will be 1.OE-4.

Pc

=

1.OE-4 with error factor 10.

M

=

EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2}

=

2.664 (for EF=10)

Mean of Pc =

Median of PC

• M

=

2.66E-4 PE Calculation by THERP:

The action error PE includes two parts: the local operator does not communicate with the MCR within 5 minutes and the MCR operator does not initiate the Halon system from MCR Halon system remote panel correctly. Because to initiate the Halon system is a simple action inside the MCR, and it can be recovered from the local panel by the local operator if the action failed, the failure rate of this part can be ignored.

Step 4 of 0-VSP-M2 direct MCR operator to initiate the Halon system, if the MCR operator does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes. Based on the analysis of ET-CEP-04-0001, the engineering time window for the fire situation is 10 minutes (Ref. 7.18). The failure probability of the initiation of the Halon system strongly depends on the time. Hence, HCR model is the best choice to evaluate the failure probability of the communication error. The time window for the HCR model is evaluated as follows:

TE:

600 seconds (Reference 6.18)

Tb:

300 seconds (SRO will initiate the Halon system, even if he does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes.)

TA:

20 seconds (best estimate)

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 16 of 71 T,,:

600 seconds - 300 seconds - 20 seconds = 280 seconds T1/i2:

30 seconds (Assumed the SRO may delay 30 seconds to initiate the Halon system if he does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes) a:

0.6 PE(Mean)

=

1 - (I(1n(T,/Ti/2)/ a )

1 - (P(ln(280/30) / 0.6 )

1 - 0 (3.72) 1.OE-4 Error Factor M

Median of PE 3

EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2)

PE(Mean)/M

=

8.OE-5

=

1.25 (for EF=3)

HEP (median) =

PC + PE

=

1.OE-4 +8.OE-5 =

1.8E-4 Error Factor

=

EXP{[In(1 0)]2 + [In(3)]21112 12.82 M

HEP (mean)

=

EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2 1 3.33 (for EF=1 2.82)

=

HEP (median)

• M 6.OE-4 Summary:

Basic Event:

Point Estimate (mean):

Lognormal Median:

Error Factor:

Fault Trees:

REC-VSP-M2 6.OE-4 1.80E-4 12.82 HA1 4.2.7.4 Fire Brigade REC-FIRE-BRIGADE This recovery action represents the probability of the fire brigade failing to suppress the ESGR fire, given failure of the Halon system. From page 8 of Reference 7.18, the probability of this basic event is 0.1 94.

4.2.7.5 Motor Operated Dampers 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A-ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPR 1-VS-FDMP-22AFAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP14 - ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-14FAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 - ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-21 FAILS TO CLOSE MOD-FO is not modeled in the current Surry internal events PRA model and there is no data collected for this basic event. However, Surry PRA model has modeled MOD-FC and its failure

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 17 of 71 rate was adopted from MOV-FC. Hence, for instance, the failure rate of MOD-FO will adopt from MOV-FO.

Distribution:

Lognormal Median:

1.60E-3 Error Factor:

2.93 Mean:

1.98E-03 A review of the Halon system test results shows that there were two damper failures during the last 8 years of performing the tests. Attachment 4 contains a summary of the test results as well as the Bayesian updating of the basic event value with the plant-specific failures. The final point estimate for these basic events is 4.22E-3.

4.2.7.6 Fire Door 1VSDR-FO-DOOR18 - ESGR U1/U2 FIRE DOOR (DOOR 18) FAILS TO CLOSE There is no data collected in the internal events PRA model for a door failed open on demand.

Therefore, the failure rate of MOD-FO will be adopted for the fire door failed open.

This failure rate has included the signal failure (referred to the MOV-EQ and MOD-FO).

Distribution:

Lognormal Median:

1.60E-3 Error Factor: 2.93 Mean:

1.98E-03 The generic data is used without updating with the plant specific data from Attachment 4 (no door failures during the tests).

4.2.7.7 Unit 2 Halon System Failure In The Unit 1 System Fault Tree 2HASYS-FAILURE If the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs fails to close automatically, it will likely be noticed by operations and/or fire protection personnel sent to the room in response to the fire alarms. Even if a failure of the door to close is not noticed by the personnel, smoke alarms would be triggered in the opposite Unit's control room, precipitating further opportunities to recognize the open door. Therefore, credit is taken for discharge of the Unit 2 Halon system should the door fail to close. If the Unit 1 AND Unit 2 Halon systems successfully inject their Halon supplies, the system is considered a success even if the door between the Units fails to close. Failure of the Unit 2 system is modeled as a single basic event with an estimated probability of 5E-2.

4.3 UNIT DIFFERENCES The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Halon suppression systems differ in that Unit 1 has 8 Halon bottles (2-240 lb bottles in Area A, 3-335 lb bottles each in Areas B and C), while Unit 2 has 9 bottles (3-240 lb in Area A, 3-335 lb in Areas B and C). The references in Section 6 are not explicit about the reason for the extra bottle in Unit 2, but the effect on the system failure probability would not be significant in any case. Unit 2 also requires a total of five dampers to close as part of the Halon

Engineering W'ork Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 18 of 71 actuation (Reference 7.19), compared to three at Unit 1. The Unit 1 fault tree is assumed to be representative of the Halon system failure probability, but an assessment of the Unit 2 probability is presented in Section 4.5.

In addition, some of the components have different mark numbers between the two units. This has no impact on the fault tree models.

4.4 RISK MONITOR CONSIDERATIONS The ESGR Fire Suppression system is not modeled in the Surry PRA or Safety Monitor.

Therefore, this fault tree development does not impact the Safety Monitor.

4.5 SYSTEM MODEL EVALUATIONS AND SENSITIVITY STUDIES The ESGR fire suppression fault tree, HA1 (see Attachment 2), is solved using the WinNUPRA "Solve Fault Trees" function to calculate the top event unavailability. The settings for the fault tree solution are:

1.

Fault Tree to be analyzed: HA1.LKC (HAl.LGC is first linked, and the LKC is then updated using S03AC30.BED and HOSA.BED)

2.

Top gate: GHA1100

3.

Truncate cutsets less than: 1 E-10

4.

Is solution to be a MODule?: No

5.

Primary Name of solution files: GHA1 100

6.

Method: DOS NURELMCS The resulting system unavailability is 5.12E-3.

The top 25 cutsets are:

1 8.1868E-004 2 8.1868E-004 3 8.1868E-004 4 4.4232E-004 5 1.9594E-004 6 1.9594E-004 7 1.9594E-004 8 1.9594E-004 9 1.9594E-004 10 1.9594E-004 11 1.9594E-004 12 1.9594E-004 13 1.5501E-004 14 1.5501E-004 15 1.1640E-004 16 5.8200E-005 17 1.9206E-005 18 1.8779E-005 19 1.8779E-005 20 1.8779E-005 21 1.8779E-005 22 1.8779E-005 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A lVSMOD-FO-FDMP14 IHASYS-TM-HALON 1FPSOV-FC-SOV459 1FPSOV-FC-SOV458 1FPSOV-FC-SOV457 1FPSOV-FC-SOV462 1FPSOV-FC-SOV463 1FPSOV-FC-SOV461 1FPSOV-FC-SOV460 1FPSOV-FC-SOV456 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRB 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRC REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTL 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18 1FPCKV-FC-1FP459 1FPCKV-FC-1FP463 1FPCKV-FC-1FP457 1FPCKV-FC-1FP462 1FPCKV-FC-1FP458 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-VSP-M2 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 2HASYS-FAILURE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE

Engineering Wtork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 19 of 71 23 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-lFP456 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 24 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-lFP461 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 25 1.8779E-005 IFPCKV-FC-lFP460 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE The first 3 cutsets are failure of the ESGR area dampers to close and failure of the fire brigade to control the fire. These three cutsets comprise 48% of the overall system unavailability. Cutset 4 - system unavailability due to scheduled testing and maintenance (along with fire brigade failure) - adds 8%, and failure of any one of the eight Halon tank discharge solenoid valves along with fire brigade failure (cutsets 5 through 12) adds another 30%.

Unit 2 SensitivitV Study The Unit 2 ESGR Fire Suppression System differs from Unit 1 in that the Area A (Relay Room) suppression is supplied by 3 Halon cylinders instead of the 2 at Unit 1. Additionally, 5 ESGR area dampers are designed to close upon Halon initiation, compared to three at Unit 1.

If a Unit 2 ESGR fire suppression model were developed, there would therefore be extra failure possibilities from a ninth Halon cylinder, solenoid valve and check valve, and from two additional dampers failing to close. From Section 4.2.7, the probabilities of failure of a tank, solenoid valve or check valve are 2.66E-6, 1.01 E-3, and 9.68E-5, respectively. Probability of failure of a damper to close is 4.22E-3. As each cutset would also receive a credit of 0.194 for the Fire Brigade, the total additional probability of failure of ESGR Fire Suppression would be

[0.194 * (2.66E-6 + 1.01 E-3 + 9.68E-5 + 4.22E-3 + 4.22E-3)] = 1.85E-3 Adding this to the Unit 1 probability of 5.12E-3 would total 5.12E-3+1.85E-3 = 6.97E-3.

5 Additional Analyses For Responses To NRC Request For Additional Information 5.1 RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability In the assessment of the NRC SDP phase 3 evaluation, Dominion identified that the SDP analysis did not credit the success of the floating ring seals. The Surry RCPs contain an additional seal, the floating ring seal, that other Westinghouse RCPs do not have. Dominion estimated the failure probability of the floating ring seal to be 0.5, the source of which was in question by the NRC. The following provides the basis for the failure probability proposed by Dominion.

In the case where a category had no or very few event occurrences, the single constant model can be used to calculate the mean frequency [Ref. 7.20 - NUREG/CR-5750, page 9]. The single constant rate model applies a noninformative prior in a Bayes updated distribution. The mean of the distribution of the single constant rate model is

( n + 0.5 )/m where n is the observed number of events m is the total demands.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 20 of 71 Applying the Haddam Neck event with the single constant rate model, the mean of the floating ring seal failure will be:

(0+0.5)/i = 0.5 5.2 Welding Frequency in ESGR The frequency of welding events in the ESGR is calculated based on plant specific data as follows. This frequency is only applicable for the time period in question for the SDP.

A query of the Surry Work Order system for work orders that required flame permits identified 191 work orders since 1995. Of those work orders, 5 involved welding associated with the ESGR. Attachment 3 contains the list of work orders as well as e-mail from Mr. Barry Garber stating the number of ESGR welding events. Of the 5 work orders, only 2 involved welding inside the ESGR while the unit was at power. The other 3 work orders involved welding either outside the ESGR door or the welding was performed when the unit was shutdown.

Therefore, the frequency of welding events in the ESGR is calculated as follows:

ESGR Welding Frequency = Number of ESGR welding events / Number of Years ESGR Welding Frequency = 2 / 9 = 2.2 E-1/yr This welding frequency is for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs. The frequency of welding per ESGR is 2.1 E-1 /2 = 1.1E-1/year.

To calculate the frequency of fires from welding events in the ESGR, this welding frequency is combined with the probability of fires started by the welding. Based on a qualitative assessment by the Surry Fire Protection Engineer, the probability of a welding fire at an ESGR door spreading to the primary combustion inventory in the room (i.e. cables) is essentially 0 due to the lack of combustibles near the door. The nearest cable tray is at least three feet away. In conclusion, the frequency of a welding fire is estimated to be negligible.

5.3 Fire Brigade Response Time Data In the NRC SDP assessment, no credit was taken for the fire brigade in extinguishing fires.

Dominion considers the fire brigade to be an effective means for fire mitigation that should not be ignored in best estimate risk analysis. The response time of the fire brigade for ESGR fires was questioned due to the time available to prevent damage of the second level cable trays.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 21 of 71 The response time of the fire brigade is measured periodically during the fire drills conducted in accordance with Loss Prevention Surveillance procedure 0-LSP-FP-004. The response time data was reviewed for all fire drills involving a postulated fire in the ESGR. Seventeen drills were performed from 1996 to 2003. The following table shows the response time for the fire brigade to respond to the alarm, arrive at the scene with appropriate protective gear. The mean response time is 5 minutes.

Response Time Date (minutes)

Ops Shift 12/30/03 6

A 12/24/03 7

B 12/19/03 5

C 12/16/03 10 D

12/16/03 7

E 12/11/03 5

E 12/10/03 5

C 12/8/03 8

B 6/11/99 3

A 6/9/99 3

C 6/9/99 5

B 6/8/99 3

D 6/14/99 5

E 12/6/96 5

D 10/8/96 3

E 10/3/96 3

C 9/26/96 3

A Mean 5.06 Standard Dev.

2.05 95% Confidence 6.03 6

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ESGR Fire Suppression Probability The probability of failure of fire suppression in the Surry Unit 1 ESGR is 5.1 E-3. For Unit 2, the failure probability is 7.OE-3. These probabilities take credit for fire suppression by the manually actuated Halon system and the fire brigade.

Conservatisms In This Analysis Analysis of the Surry ESGR fire suppression involved many conservative assumptions regarding the Halon system. Because the system has never been tested or evaluated with any of its components failed, single failures of most of the significant components in the system were treated as total system failure in the fault tree shown in Attachment 2. A list of the dominant conservative assumptions follows:

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 22 of 71

1.

This calculation assumed that all bottles (8/8 at Unit 1 and 9/9 at Unit 2) need to discharge for system success.

2.

This calculation assumed that all ESGR room dampers that automatically close on Halon actuation (3/3 at Unit 1 and 5/5 at Unit 2) need to close for system success. Some of these dampers are at a high elevation in the room, as is a significant amount of the cables in the room. After a Halon discharge, a stuck open damper high above the floor would cause some Halon to escape the room.

However, since Halon is heavier than air, as time goes on, the Halon displaces air from the lower levels to the upper levels, and the gases escaping the room would increasingly shift towards air, which may even help maintain Halon concentration around the cable trays over time. Additionally, the damper success criteria is for maintaining the Halon concentration assumed in the design basis. However, for the severe fire scenario considered in the phase 3 SDP, a damper failure may be tolerable since the Halon suppression would mitigate further damage and provide time for the Fire Brigade to suppress the fire. In any case, this PRA analysis conservatively assumed that all dampers must close.

3.

A human error was modeled for the possibility that the wrong Halon bottle is installed (i.e., one of the 240 lb bottles is installed where a 335 lb bottle should be). This instance occurred once in the past, but that was before the Testing procedure provided a drawing to show which bottles are to be installed for each area. Modeling this human error involves two conservatisms: One is that the chance of installation of the wrong bottle is now very small with the procedure improvement, and the other is the assumption that a 240 lb bottle release instead of 335 lb would fail the entire system, even if all other bottles were successfully discharged.

4.

Halon system unavailability due to Testing does not take credit for the fire watch that must be established before the Halon system is disabled. In reality, the fire watch would improve the chance of successful fire brigade suppression.

RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability The probability of failure of the RCP Floating Ring Seal is 0.5.

Welding Frequency In The ESGR The frequency of welding in one Unit's ESGR is 1.1 E-1/yr. The chance of a fire starting from the welding and spreading to the cables is judged to be negligible due to the lack of combustibles near the doors where the welding took place.

Fire Brigade Response Time Data The mean time for the fire brigade to reach the ESGR prepared to fight a fire is 5.1 minutes.

The standard deviation on the data is 2.1 minutes, and the 95% confidence level is 6.0 minutes.

Engineering XNNork Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 23 of 71 Final Phase 3 SDP Risk Significance NAF calculation SM-1437 (Ref. 7.22) contains an evaluation of the NRC's Phase 3 SDP assessment. The calculation evaluated some of the conservatism identified in the Phase 3 SDP assessment. Sensitivities were performed to calculate new delta CDFs using more realistic values for ESGR fire suppression capability, failure probability of RCP seals with floating ring seals and revised welding fire frequency. Since calculation SM-1437 did not include certain combinations of the above credits and the specific values, the following table summarizes the new delta CDFs. Attachment 5 contains the MS Excel spreadsheets used in calculation SM-1437 but modified for the values and cases shown in the table.

Delta SDP Case Changes to NRC Phase 3 SDP CDF Color Base (NRC Phase N/A 2.3E-06 WHITE 3 SDP)

A. Credit for Non-suppression (Halon & fire Unit 1 GREEN negligible brigade) probability changed from 7.OE-7 probability of fire generic 0.09 to 0.0 for welding fires Unit 2 initiation due to Revised branch points RP2 and RP3 in 7.OE-7 welding and credit event trees from 0.20 to 0.10 for RCP floating ring seal (50%

failure probability)

B. Credit for Non-suppression (Halon & fire brigade)

Unit 1 GREEN multiple means to probability changed from generic 0.05 3.8E-7 manually actuate to 0.005 (0.007 for Unit 2) for electrical Unit 2 Halon for all fires, cabinet and transformer fires 4.OE-7 credit Halon for Non-suppression (Halon & fire welding fires &

brigade) probability changed from RCP floating ring generic 0.09 to 0.0 for welding fires seal (50% failure Revised branch points RP2 and RP3 in probability) event trees from 0.20 to 0.10

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 24 of 71 7

REFERENCES 7.1 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.10.2.2.9, Revision 35, Updated Online March 31, 2004.

7.2 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station System Design Basis Document - Fire Protection System, Revision 1, December 31, 2003.

7.3 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station Operator Training Manual - Fire Protection System, NCRODP-6-S, November 5, 2003.

7.4 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-99-0030, Rev. 0, March 25,1999.

7.5 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-98-008, Rev. 0, October 22,1998.

7.6 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-99-001 1, Rev. 0, May 12,1999.

7.7 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Annunciator Response Procedure 0-VSP-M2, "EMERG SWGR RM HALON SYS FIRE/TRBL", Revision 4.

7.8 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1-LPT-FP-017, "FLOW TEST OF EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM", Revision 4.

7.9 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1-LPT-FP-024, "EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM VALVE ALIGNMENT', Revision 3.

7.10 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1 -LPT-FP-01 8, "EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM CYLINDER PRESSURE AND WEIGHT TEST", Revision 6.

7.11 RF-NB, PRA Model Notebook SY.2 Rev. 0, "System Analysis Assumptions and Fault Tree Success Criteria", Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, July 2003.

7.12 RF-CALC, Dominion Calculation SM-1438, "Update Of The Surry Fire IPEEE With The S03A Model Files," Revision 0, to be issued.

7.13 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Manual, Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Department.

7.14 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51 S, Revision 7.

7.15 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51T, Revision 8.

7.16 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51V, Revision 0.

7.17 RF-NUREG, USNRC, NUREG/CR-1278, "Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications", August 1983.

7.18 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal ET-CEP-94-0001, Rev. 0, 1/28/04.

7.19 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 2-LPT-FP-01 7, "FLOW TEST OF EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM," Revision 4.

7.20 RF-NUREG, J. P. Poloski, et. al., USNRC, NUREG/CR-5750, "Rates of Initiating Events at U S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1987-1995," February, 1999.

7.21 RF-CODE, ReDACS Code File.

7.22 RF-CALC, Dominion Calculation SM-1 437, "Sensitivity Study on NRC Phase 3 SDP of Surry Unit 1 ESGR Appendix R Finding," Revision 0, to be issued.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 25 of 71 ESGR Fire Suppression System Simplified Schematic The following two pages present the simplified diagram developed to represent the ESGR Halon system.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 26 of 71 I.

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Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 28 of 71 ESGR Fire Suppression System Fault Tree The following two pages present the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 29 of 71 I

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Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 30 of 71 0

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Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 31 of 71 ESGR Welding Work Orders And Events The following pages contain the results of the welding work order search. The e-mail describing the review of the work order search is also included.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 32 of 71 From:

Barry Garber To:

Tom Hook 03/02/2004 03:59 cc:

Jerry Ashley/NUC/VANCPOWER@VANCPOWER, Bob Lynch/NUC/VANCPOWER@VANCPOWER

Subject:

191 Flame Permitted Work Orders Tom, I wanted better verification for you, so I went back to the Planners and requested that they run a search on all Flame Permits issued for the Service Building, MER3, Emergency Switchgear & Relay Room, and Battery Room.

The attached list is the result of this search.

I reviewed the list with Mike Small and we concluded that only 5 work orders were completed in the Unit 1 & 2 ESGRs during the past 5 years. This list includes all the work orders under the area "RELR" (ESGR and Relay Room) and one work order under the Service Building area:

401118-01 401118-05 438240-03 455173-02 455173-01 The database search of the Passport system is not easy, however, I believe the above conclusions are the best we can do to identify work in the area.

Please give me a call with questions.

Barry A. Garber Surry Power Station 8-798-2725 (tie line), (757) 365-2725 Beeper 7092 (1-800-272-5643)

Fax (757) 365-2724

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 33 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 WO*

Craft UCR Pig MER3 Complted 26553901 WELD 0 02 SW 308 VALVE S1-90652 REPLACE VALVE 01125/00 Equipment Description SELF CLEANING STR IB SW INLET HDR VENT Location 1 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 6 FT WEST OF EAST WALL. 3 29094001 WELD 0

01 SWPH H1021A4.SUPORT REPAIR BASE PLATE 11122/9S Equipment Description HANGER IS2 ON LINE 4 -WS-308-9107 Locaron, ON FLOOR NEXT TO 2-SW-309 43242401 WELD 0 02 SWP 10B PUMP S-00-1430 REPAIR BASE PLATE 07:02;02 Equwpment Description CHG PUMP SW PUMP Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 25 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 45333002 WELD 0 01 VS 288 CKVALV S2001-2015 REPLACE VALVE 01/24!02 Equipment Description CONT & RELAY RM PUMP 2A DISCH CHK VALVE Location 9 FT OFF FLOOR, Ot TOP OF I*VS-E-4A, MER *3 48986802 WELD S 01 SW 262 CKVALV S2003-1888 PREFAB

VALVE, PIPING AND FLANGES 05105'03 Equipment Dscription CHG PUMP SW PUMP 10B DISCH HDR CHK Location 25 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 2 FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

50028701 WELD 5 02 SW 442 CKVALV 503-5141 REPLACECHECKVALVE 10131103 Equipment Descripvon CHG PUMP SW PUMP 100 DISCH HDR CHK Location 25 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL,1 FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

50028703 WELD 5 02 SW 442 CKVALV MAKE WELD REPAIRS TO VALVE 11101103 Equipment Description CHG PUMP SW PUMP 100 DISCH MDR CHK Location 2S FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL,1 FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

WO#

Craft Dat PI#

RELR ompleted 40111801 MECH 0 02 BS DR 21 ACCESS 500-0708 REPLACEACTIVESIDEOFDOUBLEDDOORS 04!06100 Equipment Description UNIT-2 EMERG SWGR ROOM Location TURBINE BUILDING TO RELAY RM

Engineering WVork Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 34 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 40111805 WELD 0 02 BS DR 21 ACCESS SDO-0708 WELD REPAIR DOOR 04/04100 Equipment Descriptinl UNiT*2 EMERG SWGR ROOM Location TURBINE BUILDING TO RELAY RM 43824803 WELD S 02 EP TRA8H-1 TRANSF FABRICATE/INSTALL WASHERS IAW ET 10114100 Equipment Descnpton 4160, 480V TRANSFORMER Location ON FLOOR, IN U-2 EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR 45517302 WELD 0 02 BS DR 20 ACCESS S-01-2315 WELD HINGES 08"16!01 Equipment Description UNiT-2 EMERG SWGR ROOM Location RELAY ROOM TO STAIRWELL WO#

Caft UCR pig SERV completed 43249401 HVAC 0 01 VS SOV4245 VALVE REPLACE SOV 01103!01 Equipment DescriPtion l-VS-E-IB TROUGH MAKEUP WATER LEVEL 43405301 HVAC 0 02 VS AC 2-SOT UNIT Equipment Descrition UNIT-2 CABLE SPREADING ROOM 43542901 WELD 0 01 BS DR 3 ACCESS Equipment Descripton 3 EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR 43708401 WELD 0 01 2A 1310 VALVE Equipment Description MANHOLE SUMP SUP HDR ROOT VALVE 43709203 WELD 5 02 FW RTD2IIC DETECT S-00-2032 Equipment Description SG C FW RTD 43709205 WELD 5 02 FW TI 254C INDREC Equipment Description SG C FWv TEMP IND Location ON WEST END OF TOWER REPAIR OIL AND REFRIGERANT LEAKS Location ON HER J2 ROOF, CENTER OF ROOF WELD DOOR FRAME Location TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAY TO EMERGENCY GEIIERATOR REPLACE VALVE Location 6 FT OFF FLOOR, 8 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WAL. IN NO. I REPLACE RTD WELL Location 45 FT SOUTH OF NORTh WALL, 122 FT EAST OF WEST 08103,00 02/16101 05/02101 10/11100 REPLACE THERMOWELL Location 45 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 120 FT EAST OF WEST 10/11500

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 35 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 44080602 WELD 5 02 FW 46 VALVE Equipment Description SG B FW LINE Pl-2548 1SOL 44419201 MECH 1 01 DS DR 527-13 ACCESS Equipment Description AUX BOILER ROOM 44530001 HVAC 0 01 VS AC BSA UNIT Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT 44009702 HYAC 0

01 VS E 3C UNIT Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATER CHILLER 44611301 WELD 0 01 HS 223 VALVE Equipment Description SULPHITE CHEM PUMP 12 sucr ISOL 448S1401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 44941402 WELD 5 01 Fw is VALVE Equipment Description SG A FW UNE PI-154A ISOL 45136901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC U6 UNIT Equipment Description MER NO 2 AC UNIT 45325401 MECH 0 01 OS DR 1 ACCESS Equipment Descnption #I EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR REPLACE VALVE Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 100 FT EAST OF WEST S-01-02B3 REMOVE DOOR AND WELD HINGES AS REQUIRED.

Location NORTH ACCESS TO HEATING EOILER RM INVESTIGATEREPAIR UNIT.

Location ONl ROOF OF MER REPLACE COMPRESSOR Location 3 FT OFF FLOOR, HER *1, SOUTH OF l-VS-E-IA REPLACE VALVE Location 6 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT WEST OF 18.25 ON REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAKS Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST REPLACE VALVE Location 40FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 99FT EAST OF WEST WALL 4 REPLACE COMPRESSOR AND TRANSFORMER Location ON ROOF 52001-1835 REPLACE DOOR WITH 3 HR. RATED DOOR.

Location TURBINE BUILDING WAL(WAY TO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 04111/02 02/19101 06106/01 04102101 01103,02 04126/01 10:23101 06/25!01 12:18:01

Engineering XWork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 36 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 43D25403 WELD 0 0I FE EG 1 ENGINE CUT/RE-WELD COOLING LINE 07/19!01 Equipment DescriPtion EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Location EMERGEtNCY DIESEL GENERATOR ROOI-1 45453501 HVAC 0 01 VS FL 100 FILTER INSTALL ADOITIONAL TEST PORTS PER ET.

08/22i/0 Equipment Descriotion SERVICE BLDG FAN 150 SUCT FILTER Location 5 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, IN FILTER ROOM, I FT OFF 45517301 WELD 0 02 85 DR 39 ACCESS 5-01-2315 WELD HINGES 08,'23101 Equipment Description UNIT-2A BATTERY ROOM Locaton SWITCHGEAR TO BATTERY ROOM UNIT 2 45629701 WELD 0 0I 8S DR 46 ACCESS S-01-2581 WELD HINGES 09/13/01 Equipment DescriptOon C 1 MECHANICAL EQPT ROOM LocatiOn CABLE TRAYS TO MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM tlO. 1 45666901 WELD 0 02 DS DR 50 ACCESS S-01-2658 WELD HINGES 09/19/01 Equipment Description 52 MECHANICAL EQPT ROOM Location CABLE TRAY TO MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM NO. 2 45869402 WELD 5 01 EE EG 1 GENERA WELD GENERATOR BALANCE WEIGHTS 10J29j01 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR aI Location IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR RM 1,4 FT OFF FLOOR 45869404 WELD 5 01 FE EG I GENERA FABRICATE, INSTALL ALIGNMENT JACK PLATES 11103;01 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

• 1 Location IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR RM 1. 4 FT OFF FLOOR 46041401 WELD 0 01 MS 213 VALVE REPLACE PIPE NIPPLE 06/03/02 Equipment Description HTG BOILER 4B STM DRUM LT-l0G0 UPPER Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 20 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 46051101 WELD 0 01 MS 114 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 06103/02 Equipment Descrpoon HTG BOILER 40 ATOMIZING STM SUP HOR Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 8 FT EAST OF WEST WALL S

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 37 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 46129902 NSS 0

0I BS BLDSERV BLDG Equipment Description SERVICE BUILDING 46129903 NSS 0

01 BS BLDSERV BLDG Equipment Description SERVICE BUILDING 46416105 WELD 0

01 EG P I

PUMP Eqzuipmvent DescriPtion LUBE OIL CIRC PUMP 46420301 HVAC 0

01 VS 401 VALVE Equipment Description 1 -VS-E-IA TROUGH DRAIN 46516901 NSS 0

01 BS BLDSERV BLDG Equipment Description SERVICE BUILDING 46485003 WELD S

01 FW RTD111C DETECT Equipment Description SG C FW RTD 46622301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT Equipment Description ND 1 SWrTCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 46630301 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 86 UNIT Equipment Description MER NO 2 AC UNIT 46699401 WELD 5

02 FW 605 VALVE Equipment Description FW HDR VENT LINE ROOT VALVE 2000-1716 CORBEL REPAIRS TO COLUMN LINE I0 Location 2000-1716 CORBEL REPAIRS TO COLUMN LINE 14 Location REPLACE SUCTION PIPING LoCation 2 FT SOUTH OF DIESEL, B FT EAST OF WEST WALL. 3.5 FT CLEANIREPLACE BALL VALVE Location EAST END Of I-VS-E-IA NEAR FLOOR 5-01-2981 TEST BASEPLATE METAL Location S-02-0122 REPLACE WELL Location 30 FT S OF N WALL, 105 FT E OF W WALL. 4 FT OFF FLOOR S-02-0674 REPAIR REFRIGLEAKSIREPLACE CONTACTORS Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST INVESTIGATE/REPAIR CHECK FOR LEAKS Location ON ROOF REPLACE VALVE Location 35FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL SOFT EAST OF WEST WALL 4 03/22/02 03123j02 02125/02 05124102 04129i02 05/23i03 05/01h02 04/14/02 04/08/302

Engineering Wtork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 38 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 46699402 WELD 5 02 FW 606 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 04/08!02 Equipment Description FW HOR VENT Location 35FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 4SFT EAST OF WEST WALL 4 45207702 WELD 0 01 VS AC 4 UNrIT FABRICATE PIPING FOR NEW COIL 10124/02 Equipment Description ASSEMBLY ROOM AC UNIT 4 Location MER 1, 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 5 FT EAST OF 47058601 WELD 0

01 VS F 22A BLOWER S02-1984 RETACTANGLEIRON 06/12!02 Equipment Description EDG ROOM 1 EXHAUST FAN Location SI DIESEL ROOM, 8 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, S FT 45936702 WELD 0 02 SA 64 VALVE 502-2114 REPAIRTUBINGLEAK 10124102 Equipment DescriPtion SA SUP HDR ISCL Location 5 FT OFF FLOOR, IN HALL WALL, 5 FT SOUTH OF EDG 47139801 HVAC 0 0I VS AC 4-S0T UNIT REPAIRUNITREFRIGERANTLEAKS 06/20102 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL.

47246501 WELD 0

02 BS DR 2 ACCESS 502-2221 REPAIR DOOR HINGES lAW ET.

C6,'27/02 Equipment Description 52 EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR Location TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAY TO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 47400201 WELD 0

01 6s DR 3 ACCESS S02-2291 REPAIR DOOR HINGES lAW ET.

07703;02 Equipment Description 93 EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR Locatron TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAYTO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 47421102 WELD 0

02 BS DR 49 ACCESS S2002-2354 FIRE PROTECTION AND SENG TO EVALUATE DR.

07/12/02 Equipment Description UNIT-2 CABLE TRAY ROOM Location TURBINE RM TO CABLE TRAYS 47055010 WELD 0

03 EG TK 1 ACCUMU S

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS 12/13!02 Equipment Description AIR TANK NO I Location 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL. IS FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL.

Engineering WVork Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 39 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 470S5011 WELD 0

03 EG TK 2

ACCUMU Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 2 47055012 WELD 0 03 EG TK 3 ACCUMU Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 3 47055013 WELD 0 03 EG TX 4 ACCUMU Equipment Descrptifon AIR TANK NO 4 47055014 WELD 0 03 EG TX S

ACCUMU Eqipment Descr!ption AIR TANK NO S 47055015 WELD 0 03 EG TX 6 ACCUMU Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 6 47512514 NSS 0

01 DS DR 14 ACCESS Equipment Description DOOR FROM TURBINE BLDG WALKWAY TO 48380201 HVAC 0 01 VS 401 VALVE Equipment Description 1-VS-E*IA TROUGH DRAIN 48S12601 WELD 0

01 SA 272 VALVE Equipment Description SA CONN 48640301 WELD 0

01 HS 212 VALVE Equipment Description HTG BOILER 4B VENT 5

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS Location 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 20 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, S

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS Location 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, S-02*

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS Location 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 4OFT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 5

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS Location 2 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 28 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 5

SEAL WELD THREADED CONNECTIONS Location 1 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL.

FAB AND INSTALL MAINTENANCE ENCLOSURE Location TURB BLDG WALKWAY TO CONTROL ROOM ANNEX S-03-0927 REPLACE BALL VALVE Location EAST END OF I-VS-E*IA NEAR FLOOR REPLACE VALVE AND TUBING Location 3 FT OFF FLOOR. 2 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 80 FT S-03-0476 REPLACE VALVE Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 20 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 12113102 12/13!02 12113;02 12/13/02 12113!02 12/15/03 03/07103 06'17!03 06!13/03

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 40 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 48706702 WELD 5

01 FWTI 154N INDREC 5-03-0970 REPLACETHERMOWELL 05/23;03 Equipment Description SG B FW TEMP IND Location FVi HR 14-WFPD-13-601 3CFT S OF N WALL 9SFT E OF 50368807 WELD 0

01 VS 287 VALVE 504-0241 REPLACE VALVE;INSPECT LINE FOR BLOCKAGE 01123104 Equipment Description CONT S RELAY RM PUMP 2A DISCH Location 8 FT OFF FLOOR, 1 FT EAST OF l-VS-E-4A, IN 27304101 MECH 0 03 EG RV 35 VALVE TEST RV IAW RVISV PROGRAM.

02/03/97 Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 4 RELIEF VALVE Locaton 40 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL S rT OFF WEST WALL IS 27737901 MHEC 0 01 VS E 18 UNtT P,SW, REPAIR TOWER LEAKS.

01/23;96 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC EVAPORATOR CONDENSER 1B Location AT NORTH WALL OF MER *I 29422001 MECH 0 01 VS 989 VALVE (P,W)REPLACE VALVE & FITTINGS 03/12/96 Equipment Description EVAP CNDSR IC INLET ISOL Location 1 FT EAST OF I *VS-E-lC 8 FT OFF 29554101 MECH 0 01 VS 994 VALVE S-96-0537 REPLACE VALVE 04:09/96 Equipment Description EVAP CNCSR IC RECIRC lSOL Location 1 FT EAST CF l-VS-E-lC 5 FT OFF 30173402 WELD 0

02 SWPP 4.00-WS PIPE REMOVE PIPE SUPPORT FOR VLV REPLACEMENT 11103:95 Equipment Description 4.00-WS-310 9107 Location MER3 AT 1-VS-E-4C 31581501 MECH 0 01 VS E 1A UNIT REPAIRTOWERLEAKS.

01123:96 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC EVAPORATOR CONDENSER IA Location 7 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 9 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 1 31635601 MECH 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPL COMPRESSORS/FILTERjADJ SWITCHES(-)

01(25196 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 41 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 32136701 WELD 0

01 WT 687 VALVE Equipment Description ELECTRIC SHOP DISTILLED WATER SUP HDR 33110101 WELD 0

01 VS E 4C UNIT Equipmert Description CONT ROOM CHILLER 33189902 WELD 0 01 EG P 1

MOTOR Equipmert Description LUSE OIL CIRC PUMP 33t90002 WELD 0 02 EG P 1

MOTOR Equipment Description LUBE OIL CIRC PUMP (MOTOR) 33190102 WELD 0

03 EG P 1

MOTOR Equipment Description WBE Ol CIRC PUMP (MOTOR) 33300701 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 17 UNIT Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 33300801 HVAC 0

02 VS AC 17 UNIT Equipment Description 33325101 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 1 UNIT 51 Equipment Description UNIT 1 CONT ROOM AHU 33627401 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 2308 UNIT Equipment Description A/C UNIT (ROOF) FOR P-250 COMPUTER ROOM REPLACE VALVE Location TOP OF STAIRS. IN STOREROOM, 2 FT OFF FLOOR, MODIFY PIPING Location HER 3. 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 7 FT WEST OF FAB I INSTALL NEW MOTOR BRACKET Location S END OF I EDG VI SIDE 2 FT OFF FLOOR RELOCATE AUXILUBE OIL PUMP MOTOR Location IS N OF SOUTH WALL 2D E OF VtEST WALL FAB I INSTALL NEW MOTOR BRACKET Location 18 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL REPLACE EVAPORATOR COILS PER DCP-9S-019 Location ON FLOOR. MER SI, AT SOUTH WALL REPLACE EVAPORATOR COILS PER OCP-9S-019 Location ON FLOOR. AT NORTH V/ALL, BESIDE 2-VS-F*17 95-2985 INSTALL ACCESS PANELS!CLEAN DUCTS Location IN AIR COND ROOM 1. 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. I FT REPLACE UNIT Location I FT OFF ROOF, 3 FT S OF N WALL. 10 FT W OF E WALL, 11/03/9S 12/06!95 05/07/97 0829!96 02/09!97 04130196 05J24'96 02/14/97 CS;09;96

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 42 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 33680701 HVAC 0

01 VS E 3A UN1IT REPLACEHOTGASBY-PASSANDTXV VALVES 05/14/96 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATER CHILLER Location SRT SOUTH OF l-VS-E-1A. SFT WEST OF I-VS-E-38, 3FT 33689201 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3 UNIT REPAIR COIL LEAK 05113i96 Equipment Description MER NO 2 AC UNIT Location 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 6 FT EAST OF I-VS-HV-3. 1 33765401 WELD 0 01 SS C 20 HTEXCH PREFAB, REPLACE COOLER 09'18196 Equipment DesriHption FW SAMPLE CLR 2Z LoKtcon 6 F WEST OF I*FW-MOV-154A. 18 FT NORTH OF SOUTH 33824201 WELD 0 02 SWPP 4.00-WS PIPE S-96*0519 REPAIRLEAK 03/13196 Equipment Description 4.00-WS-310*9107 Locaticn MER3 AT I-VS-E-4C 33928902 MECH 0 01 VS AC 150B UNItT REPLACE UNIT 0S106196 Equipment Description TSC LIBRARY AC UNIT Location ON ROOF, NORTH END OF ROOF 34075401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT UNLT REPAIRWREPLACED UNIT DOORS OS/22196 Equwpment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 34075601 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNtT REPAIR4'REPLACED UNIT DOORS 05S25196 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 33325102 HVAC 0 02 VS AC 9 UNIT S-95-2985 INSTALL ACCESS PANELS/iCLEAN DUCTS 12/19!96 Equipment Description UNIT 2 COrT ROOM AHU Location IN AIR COND ROOM UNIT 2, 5 FT WEST OF ENTRANCE.

I FT 34118501 NSS 0

01 SS DR IS ACCESS REPLACE DOOR.

10,/15/96 Equipment Description CONTROL ROON ANNEX Locatlon INSTRUMENT REPAIR SHOP TO CONTROL RM

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SMi-1442 Page 43 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 33928903 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1508 uNIT Equipment Description TSC LIBRARY AC UNIT 32968703 WELD 5

02 SWPP 3.00-WS PIPE Equipment Descript on 3.00 WS-326-9107 34167901 WELD 6

02 FW Tn 2545 PIPE 5-96-0996 Equipment Description SG 0 FW TEMP INDICATOR THERNOWELL 34171401 WELD 0

02 VS 224 VALVE Equipment Description CONTROL ROOM 2 AC 8 CW INLET 34184501 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 230B UNIT Equipment Description A/C UNIT (ROOF) FOR P-2SO COMPUTER ROOM 34196801 MECH 0 01 VS AC 4-S0T UNIT S-95-1071 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT 34196901 MECH 0 01 VS AC 3-80T LNINT S-96-1071 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 34313701 NDE 0

01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 34313801 NDE 0

01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT INSTALL NEW THERMOSTAT CONTROLS Location ON ROOF, NORTH END OF ROOF REMOVEIINSTALL HANGER CLIPS PER EN5T ET Locat:On REPLACE TI WELL Location MER J2 IN MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BETWEEN REPLACE VALVE Location 3 FT OFF FLOOR. 5 FT NORTH OF 2-VS-AC-9, I FT WEST INSTALL NEW RECEIVERREPLACE COMPRESSOR Location I FT OFF ROOF, 3 FT S OF N WALL, 10 FT W OF E WALL, REMOVE PRESSURE SWITCHES AS PER ENGR.

Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, REMOVE PRESSURE SWITCHES AS PER ENGR.

Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST INSTALL OIL RECOVERY/VERIFY SWITCHESIDWG Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST INSTALL OIL RECOVERY/VERIFY SWITCHES!DWG Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 05/25!96 05/16/96 05120;96 12109197 08109196 05128/96 05129;96 10418,96 04/13/97

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calic Number: SM-1442 Page 44 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 34336401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T tINIT 5-96-1365 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT 34479901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1505 UlNT Equlpment Description TSC LIBRARY AC UNIT 34639401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 86 tUIT Equipment Description MER tlO 2 AC UNIT 34730101 WELD 0 01 VS E 4C UNrIr Equipment Description COtlT ROOM CHILLER 34873701 MECH 0 01 STRRSD3 ACCESS 5-96-1819 Equipment Description CONTROL ROOM EMERG EXIT TO TUJRD BLDG 35011901 MECH 0 01 VS E 4C WtlT Equipment Description CONT ROOM CHILLER 35021901 WELD 0 01 VS 366 VALVE Equipment Description MAIN AREA AC-B4 CD INLET ROOT VALVE 35023001 WELD 0 01 VS 351 VALVE Equipment Description PBX RM A. C-B3 CD INLET 35090301 MECH 0 02 BS DR 2 ACCESS Equipment Description 02 EMERG DIESEL GENERATOR REPLACE TANDOM COMPRESSORS Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAK Locatimn ON ROOF, NORTH END OF ROOF REPLACE FAN PRESSURE SWITCHES.

Location ON ROOF REPAIR PIPING MISALIGNMENT Location MER 3, 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 7 FT WEST OF REPAIR OR REPLACE HASP ON DOOR Location LOCATE AND REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAKS Location FER 3, 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 7 FT WEST OF REPLACE VALVE Location JANITOR CLOSET BESIDE FIRST AID ROOM, I FT NORTH OF REPLACE VALVE Location JANITOR CLOSET BESIDE FIRST AID ROOM. 1 FT WEST OF REPLACE DOOR SWEEP Location TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAY TO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 06117196 09!17196 10,01196 06119197 09103196 09!14196 11121100 11121/00 09113;96

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 45 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 35164101 WELD 0 01 VS 354 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 12/05197 Equipment Descnpton MAIN AREA A,:C-B4 CD INLET Location 3 FT WEST OF EAST WALL IS FT SOUTH OF l-VS-AC*BSB4 35184501 WELD 5 02 FW 46 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 09:25197 Equipment Description SG B FWL UNE Pl-2548 ISOL Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 100 FT EAST OF WEST 3520S801 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-SOT UNtIT 5-96-2126 REPLACEDEFECTIVESWITCH&CONTROL.

04107;97 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT Locat~on 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 34313802 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-80T UNtT REPAIR REFRIGERATION LEAK.

l0lls!96 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 35465601 WELD 0

01 HS 244 VALVE REPLACE PIPE NIPPLE 02110;97 Equipment Description BOILER FD PUMPS 14A.B DtSCH HDR VENT Locaton 6 FT OFF FLOOR, IN HEATING BOILER ROOM. I FT EAST OF 35575401 MECH 0 01 HS LH 98 UNIT INVESTIGATE/REPAIR LEAKtIG HEATER 12/05,96 Equipment Description MER 2 UNIT HEATER 98 Location 4 FT WEST OF l-VS-AC-3. I1 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 35570204 WELD 5

02 FW RTD211B DETECT S-96-2567 REPLACE RTD WELL 12/20196 Equipment Description SG B FW RTD Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 11S FT EAST OF WEST 35609101 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 1508 UWIT REPAIR REFRIGERANTLEAK 03123;97 Equipment Description TSC LIBRARY AC UNIT Location ON ROOF, NORTH END OF ROOF 36086902 WELD 0

01 HS 240 VALVE REPLACEVALVEANDDRAINUNE 05/07i97 Equipment Description PHOSPHATE CHEM TK-4 DRAIN Location 3 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 4 FT WEST OF 18.25 2 FT

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 46 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 36250901 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 32 UNIT REPLACE UNIT.

osf2g!97 Equipment Description MER NO 2 AC UNIT Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 62 FT WEST OF EAST 35001007 WELD 0

01 EE EG 1 ENGtNE INSTALL LIO UNE UNION 05;08!97 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Location EMERGENCY DIESEL GEHERATOR ROOM-I 36505601 WELD 5

02 FW 77 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10D09/97 Equipment Description SG C FW UNE PI-254C ISOL Location 45 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL IIS FT EAST OF WEST 36363402 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 81 UNIT REPLACE UNIT 05116/98 Equipment Description INST CAL ROOM AC UNIT 31 Location IN INSTRUMENT CAL LAB. I FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 36582701 YIELD 0

02 VS 208 VALVE S-97-1413 REPLACE VALVE 12109!97 Equip ent Description CONTROL ROOM 2 A/C 9 CW INLET Location 1 FT OFF FLOOR, IN AC ROOM NO 2, 3 FT WEST OF 36586801 HVAC C

02 VS AC 2303 UNIT S-97-1647 REPLACE UNIT 07122/97 Equipment Description A/C FOR (ROOF) P-250 COMPUTER ROOM Location ON ROOF OF MER-2 35615701 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPAIR UNIT REFRIGERATION LEAKS 06/10/97 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 36663501 WELD 0

02 UA 558 VALVE 5-97-1729 REPAIR:REPLACE TEE 06;06,97 Equipment Description UNIT I VS SYS HX 48 IA SUP MDR ISOL Location IN MECH EQUIP ROOM 3. ABOVE I-SW-PCV-101A, 7 FT OFF 36686901 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 1528 UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSOR.

06126!97 Equipment Descripton TSC BATTERY ROOM AC UNIT Location 4 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 95 FT WEST OF EAST WALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 47 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 36690401 WELD 5

01 Fw 46 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 04120;00 Equiprent Description SG B FW LINE P1-1540 ISOL Location 30FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 90FT EAST OF WEST WALL 3 36801701 HVAC 0 01 VS E 3C UNIT 5-97-1760 REPLACECHILLERUNtT 06:15!98 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATER CHILLER Location 3 FT OFF FLOOR, MER

• 1, SOUTH OF I -VS-E-IA 36844401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPAIRUREPLACE TANDOM COMPRESSOR 06/I18/97 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST 37034203 WELD 0 02 UA S59 VALVE MODIFY TUBING AS PER ET 03/111/8 Equipment Description UNIT 1 VS SYS HX 4A IA SUP HDR ISOL Location IN MECH EQUt ROOM 3,7 FT ABOVE 2-SW-PCV-IOOA, 7 FT 37045803 WELD 0

02 IA 558 VALVE MODIFY TUBING AS PER ET 02127195 Equipment Description UNIT 1 VS SYS Hi 4B IA SUP HDR ISOL Location IN MECH EQUIP ROOM 3. ABOVE I-SW-PCV-101A, 7 FT OFF 37046203 WELD 0

02 LA 557 VALVE MODIFY TUB NG AS PER ET 02:23;98 Equiprwent Description UNIT I VS SYS HX 4C IA SUP MDR ISOL Location 7 FT SOUTH OF 1-VS-E-4C. 9 FT OFF FLOOR 37184001 WELD 0

01 HS TK 5 ACCUMU REPAIR LEAK 11:19!97 Equipment Description SULPHITE CHEM TANK 5 Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 3 37176302 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 23DB UNIT REPLACE CHECK VALVE/1NVESTIGATEiREPAIRt 08!29/97 Equipment Description AC UNIT (ROOF) FOR P-250 COMPUTER ROOM Location 1 Fr OFF ROOF, 3 FT S OF N VALL, 10 FT V OF E WALL.

37413301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPLACEFANDRIVEBELT,REPAIROILUNE 09/12197 Equipment Descnption NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, I0FT WEST OF EAST

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 48 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 37457101 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT INVESTIGATEIREPAIR UNIT 10103;97 Equipment Description SERVICE BLOG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL.

37230002 WELD 5

01 RD MG 1-2 GENERA WELD SUPPORT 10/28198 Equipment Descrlption CONTROL ROD MOTOR GENERATOR Location IN UNIT I SWGEAR RM ACROSS fROM 4160V F TRANSFER 36039902 HVAC 0

01 VS E IC UNWT REMOVE EXISTING TOWER PREPARE FOR NEW 12/11/97 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC EVAPORATOR CONDENSER IC Location AT NORTH WALL OF MERS*

37854401 WELD 0

01 HS TK 5

ACCUMU FABRICATEIINSTALL TANK 07111!98 Equipment Description SULPHITE CHEM TANK S Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 37869701 HVAC 0

01 VS E 4B UNIT S-97-3337 REPLACE SERVICE VALVES AS REQUIRED 06r10198 Equipment Description CONT ROOM CHILLER Location MER 3. 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH V:ALL. 15 FT EAST OF 38131104 WELD S

01 FWRTD11IC DETECT S98-0113 REPLACE RTD WELL 03125198 Equipment Description SG C FW RTD Location 30 FT S OF N WALL, 105 FT E OF W WALL, 4 FT OFF FLOOR 38220602 MECH 5 02 FW FCV 2498 VALVE S97-2825 INSPECT I REPLACE BODY TO BONNET STUDS 05:04/99 Equipment De fription SG C FEED REG Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 125 FT EAST OF WEST 38225901 MECH 5 02 FW FCV 2478 VALVE S97-3204 REPAIR VALVE 05/04!99 Equipment Description SG A FEED REG Locat:on 3S FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 75 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 38225902 MECH 5 02 rW FCV 2478 VALVE S97-282S INSPECT I REPLACE BODY TO BONNET STUDS 04/24199 Equipment Description SG A FEED REG Location 3S FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 7S FT EAST OF WEST WALL

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 49 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 38226102 MECH S CI FW FCV 1478 VALVE S97-2825 REPLACE BODY / BONNET STUDS 04/21/00 Equipment Desa4PtiOn SG A FEED REG VALVE Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 35 FT WEST OF EAST WALL.

38226702 MECH 5 01 FW FCV 1488 VALVE 597-2825 REPLACE BODY I BONNET STUDS 04128/00 Equipment Descrliton SG B FEED REG VALVE Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 55 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 38226902 MECH S 01 PW FCV 1498 VALVE S97-282S REPLACE BODY I BONNET STUDS 04120/00 Equipment Dscription SG C FEED REG VALVE Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 75 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 38612301 WELD S

02 PW FE 2476 IDTECT S-9B-0428 REPAIR SUPPORTS 05/12/99 Equipment DescripVon SG A FW FLOW ELEM Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 65 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 38612302 WELD S

02 VW FE 2486 DTECT S-98-0428 REPAIR SUPPORTS 05J12/99 Equipment DescriVton SG B Fw FLOW ELEM Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 65 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 38612303 WELD S

02 PW FE 2496 DETEaC 598-0428 REPAIR SUPPORTS CS/12/99 Equipment DescrtWon SG C FW FLOW ELEM Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALLU OS FT EAST OF WEST 38695201 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT REPLACE TANDOM COMPRESSORS 04102/98 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT LocatIon 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 38697401 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 1-50T 3U4T REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAK.

04/02/98 Equipment Descripton UNIT-I CABLE SPREADING ROOM Locatbin 7 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 1 38706501 MECH 0 02 EG P 1

PUMP CTS 4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP 05/06198 Equipment Descri0pon LUBE OIL CRC PMP Location 15 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL,

Calc Number: SM-1442 38706502 WELD 0

02 EG P Equipment Desclption LUBE On. aRC Pi 38710801 HECH 0 01 EG P Equipment Descipton LSE OIL CRC Pi 38710802 WELD 0 01 EG P Equipment Description LUBE OIL CRC Pi 38711101 MECH 0 03 CG P Equipment Description LUBE OIL CRC Pi 38711102 WELD 0 03 Ic P Equipment Description LUSE OIL CRC Pi 38695202 HVAC 0

01 VS AC Equipment Description SERVICE 8LDG Ai 38943801 WELD 0

01 LA Equipment Description I-VS-AC-4 IA ISt 39058201 WELD 0 01 EG C Equipment Desciptin AM COMPRESSO, 39058301 WELD 0

01 EG C Equipment DecrPtion AIR COMPRESSO Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Page 50 o Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 I

PUMP FABRICATElINSTALL SUPPORTS UM1P Location 15 rT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 1

PUMP CTS 4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP lIP Location 2 FT SOUTH OF DIESEL. 8 FT EAST OF WEST WALL. 3.5 PT 1

PUMP FASRICATE/INSTALL SUPPORTS iMP Location 2 FT SOUTH OF DIESEL. 8 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 3.5 FT 1

PUMP CTS 4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP iMP iocation 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, IS FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

1 PUMP FA8RICATEANSTALL SUPPORTS iMp Location 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 4-SOT WT REPLACE 40 TON COMPRESSOR UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 1362 VALVE REPAIRJREPLCE TUBING OL VALVE Location 8 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 70 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 8 1

DLOWER S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES R NO I Location 3 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 2 FT OFF WEST WALL, ON 2

SLOWER S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES R NO 2 (ENGINE)

Location 25 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

f71 05/06t98 02117/9 02/161n 08/11/98 08110t98 04/20198 06118198 08/12tn 12tl7/98

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 51 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 39055401 WELD 0

02 EG C 2

SLOWER Equipment Description AIR COMPRESSOR NO 2 39058601 WELD 0

02 EG C I

SLOWER Equipment Desciption AM COMPRESSOR NO I 39057o01 WELD 0

03 EG C 2

SLOWER Equipment DeSciption AIR COMPRESSOR NO 2 39058801 WELD 0

03 EG C 1

SLOWER Equipment Descripton AM COMPRESSOR NO I 39136101 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-SOT UtOT Equipment Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT 39587001 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-00T tOaT Equpfment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOM AC UNIT 39670201 MECH 0 01 tS DR 17 ACCESS Equipment Descriptxn TSC HVAC ROOM 40049901 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-SOT tUhT Equipment Desatptton SERVICE 8LDG AC UNIT 40145502 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 153A UN[IT Equipment Description TSC COMPUTER ROOM AHU 5-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATE Location 35 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL. 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES Location 4 FT NORTH or SOUTH WALL. 4 FT OFF WEST WALL, ON S498-1376 INSTALL END PLATE Location 50 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT OFF WEST WALL, ON S4841376 INSTALL END PLATE Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT OFF WEST WALL, ON REPAIR UNIT REFRIGERATION LEAKS Location 10 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAKCS)

Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST S-982190 REPLACE DOUBLE DOORS AND FRAME Location HVAC ROOM 8ESIDE TSC REPAIR UNIT REFRIGERATION tEAKS Location 10 PT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL.

S98-3292 REPLACE COMPRESSOR Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, IS FT EAST OF WEST 02112/99 03/08199 08/21/98 09/24/99 0611S/98 08/28198 11n21/98 11/24198 01107199

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 52 of 71 40376601 NSS 0

01 VS E Equipnent Description CENTRAL AC EVI 40380201 HVAC 0

01 VS AC Equipment Descriptin TSC COMPUTER 40525301 HVAC 0

01 VS AC Equb*xnt Descrioptin MECH E4UIpE*

39939304 WELD 0

02 EG P Equipmwnt Description LBE OIL CIRC P 40555101 HYAC 0 01 VS AC EquiPfent Desalptibn IER NO 2 AC UN 40573001 HVAC 0 01 VS AC Equipment Desciption NO I SWITCHGE 40555102 HVAC 0

01 VS AC Equipment Descipt0n MER NO 2 AC Ut 40730801 HVAC 0 01 VS AC Equipment DeXrIpton SERVICE BLDG A 40730901 HVAC 0

01 VS AC Equipnent Description No I SWITCHGE Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 1 8 UNtT FABRICATE AN D INSTALL DRIP TRAY APORATOR CONDENSER 18 LocatIon AT NORTH WAL. OF MER I C 153A UNIT 5-99-0147 INVESTIGATE REPAIR UNIT.

ROOM AHU Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, IS FT EAST OF WEST 153 WlaT INVESTIGATEJREPAIR UNIT WATER LEAK.

Nr ROOM AC UNIT LocatIon 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, ON EAST WALL. ON FLOOR 1

PUMP MODIFY PIPING UMP Location 1 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, c3 I

1NI (P,W.NSS)REPLACE PREHEATER COIL NIT Location 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 6 FT EAST OF I-VS-HV-3, 1 C 3-80T UNIT REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAK(S)

AR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 3

UInT PERFORM TEMPORARY COIL LEAK REPAIR IT' Location 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 6 FT EAST OF I-VS-HV-3, 1 C 440T UwrN REPLACE COMPRESSORS C UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, C 3-80T UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSORS AR ROOM AC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH O NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 12(06/99 01(29/99 OStl6/99 02/26/99 10/099 03110/99 02D2S/t 05/06(99 04t07/99

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 53 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 41149201 MECH 0 01 BC RV 130 VALVE PM:TESTRELIEFVALVEIAWSV/RVPROGRAM.

11/17/00 Eaulprnert Description SAMPLE CaR 20 OUTLET RELIEF VALVE LocatIon 6 FT WEST OF 1-FW-MOV-154A, 18 FT NORTH OF SOUTH 41240001 WELD s

02 rW`

is VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/09100 Equir-et Description SG A fW LINE DRAIN Location 35 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL 98 FT EAST Of WEST WALL 41240003 WELD 5

02 FW 17 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/09/00 EquipMt Description SG A FW UNE DRAIN LINE ROOT VALVE Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 9sFT EAST OF WEST WALL 41362501 HVAC 0

01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT REPL COMPRESSORS/FILTERIAD) SWITCHES 10/06/99 Equiprent Description SERVICE BLDG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 41472001 WELD 0

01 HS 118 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 07/25/00 Equipet Description HTG BOILER 4A ATOMIZING STM HDR IOL Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 6 41555501 WELD S

02 FW 48 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/08/00 EquIPment Description SG B FW LINE DRAIN LINE ROOT VALVE Location 40FT SOUrH OF NORTH WALL 85FT EAST OF WEST WALL 2 41555502 WELD S

02 FW 49 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10108/00 Equipt Description SG B FW LINE DRAIN Location 40FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 85FT EAST OF WEST WALL I 41595801 WELD 0

01 HS 132 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 07/17/00 EquiPent Description HTG BOILER 40 STH OUTLET Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 2s FT WEST OF EAST WALL 41868701 WELD 0

02 SS E 20 HTEXCN S-99-2319 REROUTETUBING 01/20/00 Equipment DescriPbt FEEDWATER SAMPLE COOLER Location IN MER *2, BETWEEN FEEDWATER LINES, WEST OF Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 41369201 WELD 0 01 STRRSD3 ACCESS S-992404 REPLACE HASP ON DOOR 11/24/99 Equipment Description CONTROL ROOM rMERG EXIT To TURB BLDG Location IN CONTROL ROOM, SOUTHWEST CORNER.

40566807 WELD 0

02 EG P 1

PUMP WELD INLET PIPING 10/1J99 Equipment Desciption LUBE OIL CIRC PUMIP Location I SFT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 43140101 HVAC 0

01 VS E 3C Warr S-1287 REPAIR REFRIGERATION LEAJL 06/08/00 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATER CHILLER Location 3 FT OFf FLOOR, MER 41, SOUTH OF I*VS-E-IA

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 54 of 71 Halon System Tests

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 55 of 71 ESGR Halon Tank Pressure and Weight Tests Surry surveillance procedure 1-LPT-FP-018 and 2-LPT-FP-018 checks the Halon tank pressure and weight. These tests are performed on a semiannual basis or are sometimes used to control post maintenance testing. All tests were completed SAT. One cylinder was swapped on 10/27/1999 due to the weight being lower than the test acceptance criteria. This was not included as a cylinder loss of function.

1-LPT-FP-018 2-LPT-FP-018 9/23/2003 9/30/2003 4/3/2003 4/4/2003 10/22/2002 10/24/2002 6/13/2002 6/13/2002 5/31/2002 5/31/2002 5/8/2002 3/20/2002 3/20/2002 10/4/2001 3/19/2002 4/4/2001 10/3/2001 3/6/2001 4/4/2001 9/13/2000 9/13/2000 4/12/2000 4/12/2000 10/26/1999 10/27/1999 4/14/1999 4/14/1999 10/2/1998 10/21/1998 9/17/1998 9/17/1998 4/29/1998 4/29/1998 11/13/1997 11/13/1997 5/8/1997 5/16/1997 11/12/1996 8/20/1996 8/16/1996 5/14/1996

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 56 of 71 ESGR Halon System Function and Flow Tests Surry surveillance procedure 1-LPT-FP-017 and 2-LPT-FP-017 tests the function of the Halon system every 18 months. The tests are also used to control post maintenance testing. The following shows the tests performed from 1996 to 2003 and their results.

Date Test Results Comments 7/30/2003 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 00494856-01 to test 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 2-VS-FDMP-15. Two damper functional failures. Two damper demands during retest.

8/15/2002 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/8/2001 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 00446257-01 to test 1-VS-FDMP-22A, which was found failed in the closed position. Not a functional failure. One damper demand.

2/22/2001 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 8/18/1999 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/4/1998 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/26/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/12/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 0034479301 to test Halon panel trouble alarm. Failed zone

.pressure switch.

7/11/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Used for troubleshooting only. No system testing performed. Not counted as demand.

7/30/2003 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/30/2003. Not counted as a demand.

8/15/2002 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/8/2001 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 3/8/2001 2/22/2001 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 8/18/1999 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/4/1998 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/26/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/12/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/12/1996. Not counted as a demand.

7/11/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/11/1996. Not counted as a demand.

Notes:

During the Unit 1 surveillance test, 1-LPT-FP-017, three dampers are verified to actuate.

During the Unit 1 surveillance test, 2-LPT-FP-017, five dampers are verified to actuate.

During Post Maintenance Testing (PMT), dampers specified tested using both Unit 1 and 2 surveillance procedures (i.e. 2 demands).

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 57 of 71 Total number of damper actuation demands:

Unit 1: 5 surveillance tests - 15 demands 2 Post Maintenance Tests - 3 demands Unit 2:: 5 surveillance tests - 25 demands 2 Post Maintenance tests - 3 demands Total Demands = 46 Total damper failures = 2 This failure data is used to update the failure point estimate for the IVSMOD-FO-FDMP 14, 21 and 22A basic events. Using the program REDACS (ref. 7.21) to perform the Bayesian updating, the 2 failures in 46 demands are used as inputs to the prior distribution of Median 1.60E-3 and error factor of 2.93. The resulting posterior mean is 4.22E-3.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 58 of 71 ESGR Door Corrective Maintenance To capture the unavailability of the Halon system due to unavailability of doors in the ESGR due to corrective maintenance, a review of the plant work orders indicates some additional unavailability time that should be included with the system test unavailability. The following is an email from the System Engineer that summarizes the results of the review.

I totaled the Work Orders that were performed on the ESGR Ul & U2, as follows:

Unit 1 ESGR had 16 events that affected the latching, closure devices, ect... of the doors in the Fire Area. The TRM requires a compensatory measure of staging a fire watch. Years ago it was the attachment of a sign to ensure the door latched after usage. Some of the doors were dead bolted close upon finding the deviating condition.

Unit 2 ESGR had 14 events.

If you total the two rooms (30 events) and divide by 8 years (some of these events may go back to 1990) you have 4 events a year.

Considering the TRM and old TS required a comp in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that would mean 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> a year.

Therefore, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> yearly for testing and 4 for events for a total of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. (previous # was 15)

The aforementioned numbers do not include door 2-BS-DR-21 which was evaluated by W.W. Cox have having no contribution to affecting the Halon system.

In addition, it does not included door 2-BS-DR-19 which goes to MER 3. This door was excluded because the MER 3 entrance has two doors (water tight door).

I would add a 25% margin and use 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> yearly.

T.S. Gunning F.P. System Engineer

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 59 of 71 Sensitivity Analysis Results Files

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 60 of 71 The following MS Excel spreadsheets contain the calculations of the delta CDFs for the additional sensitivities summarized in section 6. Reference 7.22 contains further information on the contents and calculations performed in the spreadsheets. The spreadsheet names are based on the case names in the summary table in section 6.0. The icons below are links to the actual file. The remainder of this attachment contains a printout of the spreadhseets.

"SDP Phase 3 NRC "SDP Sensitivity Case "SDP Sensitivity Case "SDP Sensitivity Case Results.xis" A.xIs" B Unit 1.xis" B Unit 2.xIs"

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 61 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A Scenario

3. Water Spray on Bc

4. Water Spray on Bc

5. Severe Switchgeai Results Summary - Applicable for Both Units 1 and 2 Frequency CCDP CDF

,th Buses - Room 1 H 1.1 E-06 1.8E-01 2.i oth Buses - Room 1J 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 3.

r Fire in 1J 2.7E-05 1.7E-02 4.,

Total 2.8E-05 7.1 DE-07 4E-08 7E-07 DE-07 28%

5%

67%

Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1 H Fire Source Frequency Severity Factor Adjusted Freq.

Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Fire Protection 2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 0.12 0.09 0.09 3.OE-04 6.8E-06 2.7E-05 4.9E-05 1.3E-03 1.6E-04 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.12 Panels Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 Total 5.4E-03 Water Spray on Both Buses Scenario Frequency 4.4E-06 1.3E-04 1.9E-05 1.2E-04 6.1 E-04 1.8E-03 1.1 E-06 49%

1%

4%

1%

21%

3%

20%

Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1J Fire Source Frequency Severity Factor Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Battery Chargers Ventilation Systems 2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 0.12 0.09 0.09 Adjusted Freq.

3.OE-04 6.8E-06 2.7E-05 4.4E-06 1.OE-04 1.2E-04 1.6E-05 52%

1%

5%

1%

17%

21%

3%

4.9E-05 1.OE-03 1.OE-03 2.OE-04 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.08 Total 5.1 Water Spray on Both Buses Scenario Frequency E-03 5.7E-04 3.3E-04 1.9E-07

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 62 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A Scenario Freq 5 -

Fire Source Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Battery Chargers Ventilation Systems Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Factor Factor x Non-Supp.

Adjusted Freq.

3 1.5E-05

)9 6.8E-06 D

O.OE+00 2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 4.9E-05 1.OE-03 1.OE-03 2.OE-04 0.12 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.001 0.0' 56%

25%

0%

0%

19%

0%

0%

0 O.OE+00 0.005 5.OE-06 0

O.OE+00 0

O.OE+00 Total Scenario Frequency 5.1 E-03 2.7E-05

Engineering Work Sheet Page 63 of 71 Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 SDP Sensitivity Case A CCDP Scenarios 1-4 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculation Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2)

Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq #

Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1

OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 2

OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 3

CD O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 4

CD 8.2E-02 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 5

OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+0O 7.8E-02 6

CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 7

CD 1.1E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8

CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9

N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 12 CD 9.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 15 CD 1.2E-03 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+00 I

1.8E-01

Engineering Work Sheet Page 64 of 71 Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 SDP Sensitivity Case A CCDP Scenario 5 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Faliure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculation Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2)

Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq #

Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 2

OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 3

CD 6.4E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 4

CD 1.6E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 5

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 6

CD 8.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1 E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 7

CD 2.2E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8

CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+0O 9

N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD 7.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 12 CD 1.8E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD 9.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 15 CD 2.4E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.0E-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+OO 1.7E-02

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 65 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B for Unit 1 Scenario

3. Water Spray on Both Buses - Roc

4. Water Spray on Both Buses - Roc

5. Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J Results Summary for Unit 1 Frequency CCDP CDF im 1H 1.1E-06 1.8E-01 Im 1J 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 8.8E-06 1.7E-02 Total 1.OE-05 2.OE-07 3A4E-08 1.5E-07 3.8E-07 51%

9%

40%

Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1 H Fire Source Frequency Severity Factor Adjusted Freq.

Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Fire Protection 2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 0.12 0.09 0.09 3.OE-04 6.8E-06 2.7E-05 4.9E-05 1.3E-03 1.6E-04 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.12 Panels Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 Total 5.4E-03 Water Spray on Both Buses Scenario Frequency 4.4E-06 1.3E-04 1.9E-05 1.2E-04 6.1 E-04 1.8E-03 1.1 E-06 49%

1%

4%

1%

21%

3%

20%

Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1J Fire Source Frequency Severity Factor Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Battery Chargers Ventilation Systems 2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 0.12 0.09 0.09 Adjusted Freq.

3.OE-04 6.8E-06 2.7E-05 4.4E-06 1.OE-04 1.2E-04 1.6E-05 52%

1%

5%

1%

17%

21%

3%

4.9E-05 1.OE-03 1.OE-03 2.OE-04 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.08 Total 5.1 E-03 Water Spray on Both Buses Scenario Frequency 5.7E-04 3.3E-04 1.9E-07

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 66 of 71 SDP Sensitivitv Case B Scenario Freq 5 -

Fire Source Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Battery Chargers Ventilation Systems Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J for Unit 1 Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Factor Factor x Non-Supp.

2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 0.12 0.0051 0.00061 O.C I

Adjusted Freq.

2 1.5E-06 19 6.8E-06 D

O.OE+00 D

O.OE+00 1

5.1 E-07 O

O.OE+00 O

O.OE+00 17%

77%

0%

4.9E-05 1.OE-03 1.OE-03 2.OE-04 0.1 0.0051 0.0005, 0%

6%

0%

0%

Total Scenario Frequency 5.1 E-03 8.8E-06

Calc Number: SM-1442 Engineering Work Sheet Page 67 of 71 Rev. 0 SDP Sensitivity Case B CCDP Scenarios 1-4 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculatlon Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2)

Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq #

Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 2

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 0.OE+00 7.8E-02 3

CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 4

CD 8.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 5

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 6

CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 7

CD 1.1E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.0E-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8

CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9

N/A O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK 0.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 12 CD 9.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 15 CD 1.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+00

_ _1.8E-01

Engineering Work Sheet Page 68 of 71 Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 SDP Sensitivity Case B CCDP Scenario 5 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculatlon Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2)

Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq #

Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 2

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 3

CD 6.4E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 4

CD 1.6E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 5

OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 6

CD 8.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.0E-03 1.OE+00 7

CD 2.2E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1 E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8

CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9

N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD 7.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 12 CD 1.8E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD 9.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 15 CD 2.4E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+O0 1.7E-02

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 69 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B for Unit 2 Results Summary for Unit 2 Scenario

3. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2H

4. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2J

5. Severe Switchgear Fire in 2J Frequency CCDP 1.1 E-06 1.8E-01 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 9.6E-06 1.7E-02 Total 1.1 E-05 CDF 2.OE-07 3.4E-08 1.7E-07 4.0E-07 49%

9%

42%

Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2H Same as Unit 1 Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2J Same as Unit 1 Scenario Freq 5 -

Fire Source Electrical Cabinets Transients Welding/Ordinary Combustibles Welding/Cables Transformers Battery Chargers Ventilation Systems Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J for Unit 2 Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Factor Factor x Non-Supp.

2.5E-03 7.5E-05 3.OE-04 4.9E-05 1.OE-03 1.OE-03 2.OE-04 0.12 0.007 0.000M 0.t)

Adjusted Freq.

4 2.1 E-06 9

6.8E-06 0

O.OE+00 0

O.OE+00 7

7.OE-07 0

O.OE+0O 0

O.OE+00 22%

71%

0%

0%

7%

0%

0%

0.1 0.007 0.00(

Total Scenario Frequency CCDP Scenarios 1-4 Same as Unit 1 CCDP Scenario 5 Same as Unit 1 5.1 E-03 9.6E-06

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 70 of 71 Reviewer's Comments The reviewers of this calculation reviewed the calculation detail and performed a general review of the model development and results. This work is satisfactory in attaining its stated objectives.

In areas where some flexibility exists in determining terms and strategies, the authors made acceptable choices which are based upon sound engineering judgment. Certain issues have been discussed and they have been resolved to our satisfaction prior to the printing of the final copy of this calculation. No additional changes are required.

Engineering Work Sheet Rev. 0 Calc Number: SM-1442 Page 71 of 71

) Dominion-CALCULATION REVIEW CHECKLIST ATTACIHMENT 7 Calculation No. SM-1442 Rev.O Page 1 of _1_

NOTE: If Yes" is not answered, an explanation shall be provided below.

Reference may be made to explanations contained in the calculation or addendum.

fQuesunitoA**.>.,.+-.

1. Have the sources of design inputs been correctly selected and El M

referenced in the calculation?

2. Are the sources of design inputs up-to-date and retrievable/attached El l

to the calculation?

3. Where appropriate, have the other disciplines reviewed or provided D

the design inputs for which they are responsible?

4. Have design inputs been confirmed by analysis, test, measurement, field walkdown, or other pertinent means as appropriate for the configuration analyzed?

5. Are assumptions adequately described and bounded by the Station Li S

Design Basis?

6. Have the bases for engineering judgments been adequately and 1

clearly presented?

7. Were appropriate calculation/analytic methods used and are outputs 1

reasonable when compared to inputs?

8. Are computations technically accurate?

EF 9.Has the calculation made appropriate allowances for instrument 0

errors and calibration equipment errors? (Reference STD-EEN-0304)

10. Have those computer codes used in the analysis been referenced 0

0 in the calculation?

11. Have all exceptions to station design basis criteria and regulatory Li requirements been identified and justified in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11-1974?

Commnents: (Attach additional pages if needed)

1. 1-4: This is not a design calculation.

1. 5: The substance of this calculation is not addressed by the DBD. Assumptions are adequately described.

1. 9: There are no applicable instrument/calibration errors for this calculation.

1. 11: This calculation does not make any exceptions to station design basis or regulatory requirements.

Prepared By (Print Name)

Signature Date J. D. Leary 1i;!5

,t

$. 1.

L-fti co^

s/D S. H. Shen T.P. John Reviewed By (Print Name)

Si'ature Date T.P. John Gag

/

so J. D. Leary k

vy Do col June 01

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Completed Halon System Surveillance Tests Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Halon System and Emergency Switchgear Room Drawings Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)