ML041480089

Calculation SM-1442, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments

ML041480089
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/05/2004
From:	John T, Song-Hua Shen Dominion
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
04-078A SM-1442
Download: ML041480089 (74)

Text

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Enclosure 1 Calculation SM-1442 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Surrv ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

t 5irDominion- Calculation Cover Sheet Page 1 of 71 I0-4 Calculation Title (Subject):

Response To NRC Request For Additional Information On Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP Comments Key Words:

PRA, Fire, Halon, SPS1, SPS2 Reference Numbers:

Initiating Document:

Originator: Discipline:

Dominion Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Firm Name: Vendor Code:

iEDSN J 6 * $ -;g ,- l Station Unit System Prefix Sequence Component Code Suffix

Purpose:

Develop analyses to provide responses to the NRC Request for Additional Information regarding the Surry ESGR Phase 3 SDP comments.

Conclusions:

- Fault Tree analysis shows a probability of failure to suppress an ESGR fire (either from the Halon system or by the fire brigade) of 5.1E-3 at Unit 1 and 7.0E-3 at Unit 2.

- The RCP Floating Ring Seal failure probability is 0.5.

- The frequency of welding in the ESGR is 1.1E-1/yr for each Unit. The probability of a fire from ESGR door welding spreading to the cables in the ESGR is judged to be negligible due to the lack of combustible material.

- The mean fire brigade response time to the ESGR is 5 minutes.

Affected Calculation(s):

None.

Prepared By: Si Date J. D. Leary (Sections 1-4, 6,7) nt of L, ,"

S. H. Shen (Section 4.2.7) At /- f T. P. John (Section 5) 6r/s-l/. y Reviewed By: Signature Date T. P. John (Sections 1-4, 6, 7) 0 Y J. D. Leary (Section 5) P P. 4 Xi15/8O Y Approved By: . Signature TG A le'4a Date evl

_ _ A ) , _ _ _ ___ __ _ S EIS12i Is L4 June 2001

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 71 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 3 2 DESIGN INPUTS AND COMPUTER CODES USED 3 3 ASSUMPTIONS 3 4 ANALYSIS 5 4.1 ESGR FIRE SUPPRESSION FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT - INTRODUCTION 5 4.2 FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT 6 4.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 6 4.2.2 SYSTEM MODEL BOUNDARY AND SCHEMATIC 7 4.2.3 SUCCESS CRITERIA 8 4.2.4 ASSUMPTIONS 8 4.2.5 MODULARIZATION 12 4.2.6 LOGIC LOOPS 12 4.2.7 DATA DEVELOPMENT 12 4.3 UNIT DIFFERENCES 17 4.4 RISK MONITOR CONSIDERATIONS 18 4.5 SYSTEM MODEL EVALUATIONS AND SENSITIVITY STUDIES 18 5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR RESPONSES TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 19 5.1 RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability 19 5.2 Welding Frequency In ESGR 20 5.3 Fire Brigade Response Time Data 20 6 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 21 7 REFERENCES 24 ESGR Fire Suppression System Simplified Schematic ESGR Fire Suppression System Fault Tree ESGR Welding Work Orders And Events Halon System Tests Sensitivity Analysis Results Files Reviewer's Comments Calculation Review Checklist

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 71 1 INTRODUCTION This calculation develops a fault tree for the ESGR fire suppression (Halon suppression system and fire brigade) in the Surry Power Station (SPS) Emergency Switchgear Rooms (ESGRs). The structure of this calculation is such that Section 4 presents the fault tree development in a manner consistent with the structure of the other fault tree notebooks for the SPS Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).

Section 5 presents information for other Requests for Additional Information (RAls) made by the NRC. The additional items addressed are: 1)Failure probability of the RCP floating ring seal, 2)Probability of an ESGR fire caused by welding, and 3)Mean fire brigade response time to an ESGR fire.

2 DESIGN INPUTS AND COMPUTER CODES USED WinNUPRA Version 2.1, Service Release 3.

See the References section (Section 7) for a complete list of inputs.

3 ASSUMPTIONS

1. General fault tree development assumptions are consistent with those of other fault trees in the SPS PRA notebooks (Reference 7.1 1).

2. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Halon suppression systems differ in that Unit 1 has 8 Halon bottles (2-240 lb bottles in Area A, 3-335 lb bottles each in Areas B and C), while Unit 2 has 9 bottles (3-240 lb in Area A, 3-335 lb in Areas B and C).

The references in Section 6 are not explicit about the reason for the extra bottle in Unit 2, but the effect on the system failure probability would not be significant in any case. Unit 2 also requires a total of five dampers to close as part of the Halon actuation (Reference 7.19), compared to three at Unit 1 (Reference 7.8).

This calculation develops a Unit 1 ESGR Fire Suppression fault tree is, but an assessment of the Unit 2 failure probability is presented in Section 4.5.

3. The ESGR Halon suppression system is a manually actuated system at SPS.

Upon receiving a trouble alarm, an operator is dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the situation. If warranted, the system is actuated from the main control room at the Halon System Remote Panel. If actuation from the main control room fails, the system can alternately be actuated outside the ESGRs from the Local Halon Discharge station. Should both of these alternatives fail, the system can still be manually discharged by pulling the pins on the Halon bottles, manually closing the area fire dampers and closing the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGR (Reference 7.7). Because of the redundancy in actuation, along with manual backup, the actuation logic circuitry for the Halon suppression is not modeled, as its failure probability would be many orders of magnitude lower than the failure of the system components.

4. For operators to be aware of a fire in the ESGR, the fire is automatically detected and a signal sent to an annunciator in the main control room. The

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 71 ESGRs are equipped with heat detectors and ionization-type smoke detectors (Reference 7.2, pages 2-2 and 2-3). Because of the redundancy in detection, and the high reliability of the electronic equipment compared to Halon system mechanical equipment that does not have redundancy, the detectors are not included in the system fault tree. Similar to Assumption 3, the probability of such failures are negligible compared to the other failures modeled in the fault tree.

5. For the 1H and 1J areas of the ESGR, the Halon suppression system is designed to initially discharge two tanks of Halon each, followed by discharge of a third tank to each 4 1/2 minutes later (Reference 7.6). The reason for the delay is so that Halon concentration can be maintained for the designed duration, but if all Halon were discharged initially, the concentration would be high enough to pose a health risk to anyone in the area. For the PRA, early discharge of the third tanks would not be considered detrimental to equipment, but the timer will still be modeled in the PRA because depending on its failure mode, the third tanks might never discharge, and Halon concentration might not be maintained for the design duration.

6. The references in Section 7 do not present explicit success criteria for extinguishing fires, as each fire would present a different scenario. However, References 7.2 and 7.6 do present that when all the Halon bottles discharge as designed, the design concentration is maintained. Without evidence to the contrary, this calculation will assume that all bottles need to discharge for system success.

7. Reference 7.2, page 6-26, presents that the Halon Subsystem provides signals to close the VS System dampers in the Emergency Switchgear Rooms to ensure and maintain the required Halon concentrations. However, the damper numbers and door number are not mentioned. Reference 7.8, the periodic flow test of the ESGR Halon system, has operators verify that a Halon actuation would successfully close dampers 1-VS-FDMP-14, 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 1-VS-FDMP-22A. Fire Door 18 is also verified to close. These dampers and the fire door are assumed to be the components required to close for system success. Failure of any of the dampers is conservatively assumed to fail the Halon function for the severe fire scenarios considered in the phase 3 SDP. If the door does not close, success is still possible if the Unit 2 Halon system is successfully discharged.

8. Reference 7.10 is the semi-annual procedure to check Halon bottle capacities.

If a bottle has less than the allowable amount, the bottle is replaced. In one past instance, a 236 pound bottle was installed where a 335 pound bottle belonged (Reference 7.5), so a pre-initiator operator action is created to address the possibility in this system model. No data is available for the number of times a year bottle are replaced, but this analysis will assume that 2 bottles per year are replaced, and that installation of the wrong bottle fails the system.

9. Reference 7.10 also involved disconnecting the Halon solenoid valves for each pilot cylinder in order to test the bottles. Consistent with the general SPS PRA models (Reference 7.1 1), the restoration faults of these valves is not modeled.

Reviewing the pre-initiator operator actions modeled in the SPS PRA, valve misalignments are modeled but not failure to reconnect the circuitry for valves.

Since the solenoid valves in the ESGR Halon system are normally closed, misalignment will not be modeled.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 71

10. No data exists for the probability of the ESGR U1/U2 fire door to fail to close.

To approximate the failure probability, the probability of failure of a motor operated damper to close is assumed to be representative.

11. The test lines in the Halon system (see Attachment 1) are not modeled in the fault tree. These lines are normally isolated by manual valves 1-FP-450, 1-FP-451 and 1-FP-452. These valves are opened when the system flow test is performed to provide an injection path for the test air, Nitrogen or C02 (Reference 7.8). After the test is completed, the valves are closed and will not affect system operation. Consistent with Reference 7.1 1, normally closed manual valves that remain closed during an accident are not modeled in the PRA.

12. The pressure switches in the test lines (1-PS-FPH-1/2/3) are not modeled in the system fault tree. These switches provide a signal to indicate that the Halon system has discharged, but they do not affect system operation.

13. As mentioned previously, the Halon system can be discharged locally at the Halon tanks. This method allows the system to discharge regardless of whether or not the solenoid valves operate. However, in cases in which there is a partial discharge of the system (e.g., 7/8 tanks discharge but one solenoid valve fails to open), it is unlikely that operators would be aware that there has not been a full discharge. Without such information, no credit is given to a manual backup in cases in which a solenoid valve fails to open, essentially making the solenoid valve success criterion 8/8.

14. If the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs fails to close automatically, it will likely be noticed by operations and/or fire protection personnel sent to the room in response to the fire alarms. Even if a failure of the door to close is not noticed by the personnel, smoke alarms would be triggered in the opposite Unit's control room, precipitating further opportunities to recognize the open door. Therefore, credit is taken for discharge of the Unit 2 Halon system should the door fail to close. If the Unit 1 AND Unit 2 Halon systems successfully inject their Halon supplies, the system is considered a success even if the door between the Units fails to close. Failure of the Unit 2 system is modeled as a single basic event with a conservative probability of 5E-2.

4 ANALYSIS This section is developed with a structure similar to other PRA system notebooks. The data analysis and quantification are included as well to achieve the objective of calculating a system unavailability.

4.1 ESGR FIRE SUPPRESSION FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT - INTRODUCTION The ESGR fire suppression system is not modeled in the SPS fire PRA. In the SPS IPEEE, no credit is taken in the detection or suppression of ESGR fires (Reference 7.4, Attachment 1, page 8 of 14). No additional credit has been given in any SPS fire PRA updates (Reference 7.12). However, a fault tree is developed for the system for the purpose of determining its overall unavailability.

Documenting reviewer comments and resolutions for this PRA function notebook have been included as Attachment 6.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 71 4.2 FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT The fault tree analysis was conducted as per the guidance of the PRA Manual (Reference 7.13),

which is a Nuclear Analysis and Fuel department engineering manual. WinNUPRA is the computer code used for this analysis. A Unit 2 fault tree was not developed (see Section 3, Assumption #2).

The fault trees developed is:

HA1 (HAl.LGC) - ESGR Fire Suppression - Failure of Fire Suppression to 1 of 3 ESGR areas -

SPS Unit 1 All Modes The ESGR Fire System fault tree is included in Attachment 2. Discussion regarding the quantification of the HA function fault tree is included in Section 4.5.

4.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ESGR Fire suppression at SPS can be accomplished by the manually actuated Halon system, or with successfully suppression by the Surry fire brigade.

The following description of the Halon system is taken from References 6.1, 6.2, 6.6, and 6.7.

The ESGR for each unit is equipped with a manually-actuated, total flooding Halon 1301 fire suppression system. Each Unit's ESGR is considered to be comprised of three areas protected by the Halon system. Area A is the Relay Room area. Area B is the 1H equipment area, and Area C is the 1J equipment area. At Unit 1, Area A receives Halon discharge from two 240-pound Halon bottles (at Unit 2, it is from three 240-pound Halon bottles). Areas B and C each receive Halon discharge from three 335-pound Halon bottles.

The Halon subsystems contain a pilot cylinder and slave cylinders. The pilot cylinder has a pilot valve, which when actuated, allows the Halon pressure from the pilot cylinder to operate the slave cylinders, causing total discharge of the slave cylinders. The main bank of Halon storage bottles for each unit's ESGR Halon system is located outside the hazard area. One set of reserve Halon cylinders for both units are stored in the Unit 1 Turbine Building basement.

Smoke and heat sensors in the ESGRs would detect if a fire develops. A signal would then automatically be sent to the Main Control Room, triggering an Annunciator Response (Reference 7.7). An operator would then be dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the condition.

Once a fire is confirmed to exist by Operations personnel, the fire brigade would be summoned to the area and the designated scene leader would assume control of the fire scene (all scene leaders are operators). The Loss Prevention Coordinator or representative would go to the Control Room and function as an advisor to the shift supervisor. The scene leader would determine whether to utilize portable fire suppression equipment or to activate the Halon system, depending on the magnitude and nature of the fire.

Each Unit's ESGR Halon system is activated by either of two electric pushbuttons, one located in the Control Room and one located just outside the entrance of the ESGR. The system may also be activated by a manual trip at the Halon storage bottles located in the Turbine Building. If any one subsystem is manually tripped (e.g., at the Halon bottles), the remaining two subsystems will be automatically actuated electrically from the Halon control panel.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 71 Pressure switches are located in the discharge manifolds of each subsystem which sense Halon discharge and send a discharge signal to the Control Room. A separate discharge alarm is provided for each unit's system on the Control Room annunciator/control panel. A common discharge signal is provided on the main plant 96 point annunciator panel. In addition, Halon system trouble indication is provided on both the Control Room Halon control/annunciator panel and the main plant 96 point annunciator panel.

In Areas B and C (the 1H and 1J areas), two of the Halon cylinders are released initially and the final one cylinder is discharged after a four and 1/2 minute time delay. The reason for the delay is that the concentration drops after a few minutes, but must be maintained above 5% per design. If all the Halon were released initially, it would require an initial concentration of approximately 10% to maintain the 5% concentration over time. A concentration of 7% is considered hazardous to any personnel in the area, so the timed release is more desired.

The ESGR is isolated by the automatic closing of the fire dampers upon actuation of the Halon system. Openings in the Unit 1 and 2 ESGRs boundary are sealed to ensure isolation of the ESGR.

The ESGR is part of the Control Room pressure boundary, and the only fresh air entering it is from a small duct that is provided with a fire damper. All dampers in the duct work entering or leaving the room are closed automatically prior to Halon discharge. The recirculating HVAC systems will remain in operation to help provide for continual mixing of Halon within the enclosure. Air movement patterns, ceiling configuration and equipment configuration have all been taken into consideration in locating the discharge nozzles.

The Halon system is normally in standby. It has no purpose to support normal plant operation, and would only be utilized in response to certain ESGR fires.

4.2.2 SYSTEM MODEL BOUNDARY AND SCHEMATIC Identification of system model boundaries and simplified system schematics used in the development of the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree model are described below.

4.2.2.1 System Model Boundary In general, the system model boundary for the ESGR Halon system is governed by simplified system schematic. Components shown in the schematics have been incorporated into the fault tree models. Credit for the fire brigade is considered as a recovery action, described in Section 4.2.7.4.

4.2.2.2 System Schematic The simplified schematics of the ESGR Halon system are the basis for its fault tree development. These schematics represent the ESGR Halon System drawings and documentation, but only includes the components modeled within the fault tree. The system schematics are included as Attachment 1.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 8 of 71 4.2.3 SUCCESS CRITERIA Successful fire suppression in the ESGR is achieved by success of the Halon system or of the fire brigade. The fire brigade is modeled as a recovery action in Section 4.2.7.4. The Halon system is discussed subsequently.

Because every fire is different, the best estimate success criteria of the Halon portion of the ESGR Fire Suppression System is not easy to define for the severe fire scenario considered in the phase 3 SDP. However, the design basis of the Halon system is to maintain a Halon concentration in the ESGRs of at least 5% for a 10 minute period (Reference 7.6). For Unit 1, the system is designed such that two Halon bottles will discharge to ESGR Areas A, B and C initially, with two additional bottles (one to area B and one to area C) discharging after a 4 1/2 minute delay. In addition, from Reference 7.8, fire dampers 1-VS-FDMP-14, 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 1-VS-FDMP-22A, and fire door 18 are all designed to automatically close to help maintain the Halon concentration in the area.

Halon system tests have been performed for the conditions in which all components function as designed. Tests have not been performed for combinations of possible failures, so this analysis file adopts the assumption that all Halon bottles must discharge, the three fire dampers and the fire door must close to achieve system success. While it is likely that many fires could often be extinguished with one or more of the system components not functioning as designed, there is no basis for crediting such an assumption at this time.

4.2.4 ASSUMPTIONS Key assumptions are presented in Section 3 of this report. Some assumptions require further interface with other PRA Notebook Volumes, such as the HR Volumes that primarily quantify identified human reliability events. Additional discussion is provided to aid this interface, and to provide additional fault tree development information.

4.2.4.1 Assumptions - Equipment Operability Considerations The equipment in the ESGR Fire Suppression System are evaluated under the conditions for which they were designed. Equipment operability beyond such conditions is not considered here.

4.2.4.2 Assumptions - Human Actions The fault tree development documents human failure events representing the failure or unavailability of a component, system or function caused by human inaction, or by inappropriate action. Pre-initiator human actions cause the system or component to be unavailable when demanded (e.g., actions performed prior to the initiation of an accident). Post-initiator human actions occur during the operation of the system or component, performed in response to an accident initiator. Recovery actions are human actions performed to regain equipment or system operability from a specific failure or human error, with the intent to mitigate or reduce the consequences of the failure.

The following Human Actions are modeled within the ESGR Fire Suppression fault trees. The Human Actions discussion is separated into three tables, pre-initiator, post-initiator, and recovery actions, similar to the HR quantification Notebook Volumes.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 9 of 71 Pre-initiator Human Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE HA1 IMPROPER HALON BOTTLE IS INSTALLED (note 1)

Notes:

1)Reference 7.10, the Halon cylinder pressure and weight test, is performed once every 6 months (a total of 16 bottles per year are checked; assumed 2 bottle per year are replaced). If a cylinder is found to not be sufficiently charged, then it is replaced (step 6.3.4 of procedure). Step 6.3.6 is verification that the proper cylinder was used.

Reference 7.5 discussed an incident in which a 236 pound Halon bottle was installed where a 335 pound bottle should have been used. Therefore, this Human Action is created to consider the possibility that an improper bottle is installed, although credit is taken for the verification step of the procedure.

2)Reference 7.10 also involved disconnecting the Halon solenoid valves for each pilot cylinder in order to test the bottles. Consistent with the general SPS PRA models (Reference 7.1 1), the restoration faults of these valves is not modeled. Reviewing the pre-initiator operator actions modeled in the SPS PRA, valve misalignments are modeled but not failure to reconnect the circuitry for valves. Since the solenoid valves in the ESGR Halon system are normally 'closed' and their position is response to a fire is 'open', misalignment will not be modeled.

3)As in Reference 7.10, Reference 7.8 (ESGR Halon Flow Test procedure, performed once per 18 months) temporarily disconnects the solenoid valves. It also checks the operation of the area fire dampers and fire door to verify that they close as designed in a simulated Halon actuation. As in Note 2 for Reference 7.10, misalignment of the valves will not be modeled since their normal position is closed. Similarly, restoration of the dampers and door are not modeled because they also are normally open while their position after system actuation is closed (i.e., misalignment would be to the designed fire position)

Post-Initiator Human Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes N/A N/A N/A RecoverV Actions Basic Event Identifier Fault Tree Description/Notes REC-FIRE-BRIGADE HA1 Fire brigade fails to control ESGR fire (given Halon failure)

REC-VSP-M2 HA1 Operator fails to initiate ESGR Halon suppression (note 1)

Notes: 1) The ESGR Halon suppression system is a manually actuated system at SPS. Upon receiving a trouble alarm, an operator is dispatched to the ESGR to evaluate the situation. If warranted, the system is actuated from the main control room at the Halon System Remote Panel. If actuation from the main control room fails, the system can alternately be actuated outside the ESGRs from the Local Halon Discharge station. Should both of these alternatives fail, the system can still be

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 10 of 71 manually discharged by pulling the pins on the Halon bottles, manually closing the area fire dampers and closing the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGR (Reference 7.7). This basic event represents failure to initiate Halon via any of those three methods. Because of the redundancy in actuation methods (including manually at the bottles themselves), the circuitry is not modeled as its failure would be orders of magnitude lower than the operator action basic event.

4.2.4.3 Assumptions - System Dependencies Power is required for fire detection equipment to alert the control room of a fire in the ESGR.

Power is also required actuate the ESGR Halon system from the control room or from the panel outside the ESGR. Note that the system can also be manually actuated by pulling the pins locally to discharge the Halon.

From Section 3, Assumption #4, the fire detection equipment is not modeled within the Halon fault tree because its redundancy and high reliability make its function failures negligible compared to the mechanical equipment in the Halon system itself. Power however is modeled for the supply to the Halon Power Supply Module, 1-FPH-PSM-1.

From Reference 7.15 and from Reference 7.2, page 6-32, the Halon system is normally powered by the 120V AC EL system, and backed up by the Halon 12V battery 1-FPH-BATT-1.

These two power supplies are modeled within the Halon fault tree.

4.2.4.4 Assumptions - Component Spatial The ESGR Fire Suppression System is evaluated for its unavailability under fire conditions, and other spatial hazards such as floods do not apply to this analysis.

4.2.4.5 Assumptions - General Assumptions and Simplifications General assumptions and simplifications are presented in Reference 7.11. Other assumptions key to the development of this system fault tree are:

1 Test and Maintenance (TM) Unavailability: Reference 7.8 (ESGR Halon flow test) is performed at least once per 18 months, and renders the system inoperable. Reference 7.10 (ESGR Halon cylinder pressure and weight test) is performed semiannually, and renders the system inoperable. For both tests, when the system is inoperable, a fire watch is established in the ESGR.

2 Common cause failures in the ESGR Halon are not modeled because any single failure of the solenoid valves or dampers is assumed to fail the system.

3 All other assumptions are presented in Section 3.

4 The Unit 2 Halon Suppression system is modeled as a single, undeveloped basic event in the Unit 1 fault tree. The basic event is discussed in Section 4.2.7.7 4.2.4.6 Assumptions - Components And Failure Modes The fault tree development documents all components contained in the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree along with all of the component failure modes (reliability and unavailability).

All components contained in the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree are listed in the following table, along with identification of all of the failure modes modeled for each component.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 11 of 71 Components Contained In Fault Tree and Applicable Failure Modes (U (U > W

.. co. I 4- L cow .: w I E E > c o0 u co E co LL 0

IL L-0)

Component _ Fault Trees 1-FP-SOV-456 FC _ HA1 1-FP-SOV-457 FC HA1 1-FP-SOV-458 FC HA1 1-FP-SOV-459 FC HA1 1-FP-SOV-460 FC HA1 1-FP-SOV-461 FC HA1 1 -FP-SOV-462 FC _ . HA1 1-FP-SOV-463 FC HA1 1-FP-456 FC HA1 1-FP-457 FC ____HA1 1-FP-458 FC HA1 1-FP-459 FC HA1 1-FP-460 FC = = HA1 1-FP-461 FC _ . HA1 1-FP-462 FC HA1 1-FP-463 FC HA1 Timer for Halon LF HA1 discharge .__

1-FPH-BATT-1 LF HA1 240 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area A _

240 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area A 335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area B _

335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area B _ _ .

335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area B 335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area C _

335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area C 335 lb Halon bottle - LF HA1 Area C _ _

1-VS-FDMP-14 FO _ __ HA1 1-VS-FDMP-21 FO HA1 1-VS-FDMP-22A FO HA1 Fire Door 18 FO = HA1

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 12 of 71 4.2.5 MODULARIZATION No component/failure modularization is developed for the ESGR Fire Suppression system fault tree modeling.

4.2.6 LOGIC LOOPS Fault tree development logic loop resolutions are documented in Reference 7.1 1, Table 1, under category 8 - Logic Loop Resolution. However, for the ESGR Fire Suppression system fault tree modeling, no logic loops were identified.

4.2.7 DATA DEVELOPMENT The following basic events were created for the SPS Fire Suppression System fault tree:

IFPCKV-FC-lFP456 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-456 FAIL8STO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-lFP457 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-457 FAIL8STO OPEN IFPCKV-FC-lFP458 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-458 FAILESTO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-lFP459 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-459 FAILSSTO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-lFP460 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-460 FAILSSTO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-1FP461 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-461 FAILESTO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-1FP462 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-462 FAILS STO OPEN 1FPCKV-FC-1FP463 9.680E-005 ESGR HALON CHECK VALVE 1-FP-463 FAILE STO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV456 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-456 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV457 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-457 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV458 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-458 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV459 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-459 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV460 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-460 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV461 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-461 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV462 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-462 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPSOV-FC-SOV463 1.010E-003 ESGR HALON SOV 1-FP-SOV-463 FAILS TO OPEN 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRB 7.990E-004 ESGR AREA B HALON TIMER FOR 3rd TANK DISCHARGE FAILS lFPTMR-LF-HATMRC 7.990E-004 ESGR AREA C HALON TIMER FOR 3rd TANK DISCHARGE FAILS 1HABAT-LP-BATT1 1.150E-002 HALON SYS BATTERY 1-FPH-BATT-l FAILS MT=18 MONTHS lHAHEP-TNK-BOTTL 3.000E-004 SMALL BOTTLE (<3351b) INSTALLEDINSTEAD OF 335 lb IHASYS-TM-HALON 2.280E-003 ESGR HALON SYSTEM IS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TM lHATNK-LF-TANKAl 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA A HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKA2 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA A HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKB1 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA B HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION lHATNK-LF-TANKB2 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA B HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKB3 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA B HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKC1 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA C HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKC2 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA C HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1HATNK-LF-TANKC3 2.660E-006 ESGR AREA C HALON TANK LOSS OF FUNCTION 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18 1.980E-003 ESGR U1/U2 FIRE DOOR (DOOR 18) FAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A 4.220E-003 ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPR 1-VS-FDMP-22AFAILS TO CLOSE lVSMOD-FO-FDMP14 4.220E-003 ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-14FAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 4.220E-003 ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-21FAILS TO CLOSE 2HASYS-FAILURE 5.000E-002 UNIT 2 HALON SYSTEM FAILURE (UNDEVELOPED EVENT)

REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 1.940E-001 FIRE BRIGADE FAILS TO CONT ESGR FIRE GIVEN HALON FAILURE REC-VSP-M2 6.400E-004 3 OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE ESGR HALONSUPPRESSION SYSTEM Of those basic events, all components had failure data available in the SPS S03A Parametric Data file except 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE, 1HASYS-TM-HALON, REC-VSP-M2, REC-FIRE-BRIGADE, 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18, 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A, 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP14,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 13 of 71 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 and 2HASYS-FAILIURE. The Following present the development of the probabilities/unavailabilities of each.

4.2.7.1 Installation Of Improper Halon Tank 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTLE The probability of one bottle mis-replaced is evaluated as follows using the ASEP method:

Mean: 3.OE-04 Error Factor: 10

Engineering W'ork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 14 of 71 4.2.7.2 ESGR Halon System Maintenance Unavailability 1HASYS-TM-HALON The Halon system unavailability due to test and maintenance (TM) is obtained by reviewing the number of times the system functionalflow test, 1-LPT-FP-017, and Halon cylinder pressure and weight test,1 -LPT-FP-018, is performed. 1-LPT-FP-017 is performed every 18 months or is sometimes used for post maintenance testing (PMT). 1-LPT-FP-01 8 is performed semiannually and is also used periodically for PMT. Attachment 4 contains a listing of when these procedures were performed over the last 7 to 8 years. Each test takes approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In addition to the tests, the Halon system was considered unavailable during maintenance on doors if they were open during the maintenance. A review of work orders indicates approximately 5 additional hours per year for door maintenance. Therefore, the average annual unavailability is as follows:

Number of Unit 1 tests (both -017 & 018) = 28 Number of Unit 2 tests (both -017 & 018) = 31 Total number of Unit 1 and 2 tests = 59 Total number of hours unavailable in 8 years = 4 x 59 = 236 Average annual unavailability per unit = 236 / 8 / 2 = 14.8 Door corrective maintenance (hours) 5 Total average annual unavailability (hours) = 14.8 + 5 20 Basic event point estimate = 20/8760 = 2.28E-3 4.2.7.3 Operator Action To Initiate Halon REC-VSP-M2 Event

Description:

Operator Failed to Discharge the ESGR Halon System.

System: FPH - Fire Protection, Halon Component: Various Cue: Annunciator Alarm 0-VSP-M2 Procedures:

• 0-VSP-M2 EMERG SWGR RM HALON SYS FIRE/TRBL, Rev. 4.

• 0-AP-48.00 Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15.

Notes:

• Step 1 of 0-VSP-M2 checks if the Halon Control Panel is in test. If the operator justified the alarm is due to the control panel in test, he may fail to respond the fire alarm.

• Step 3 of 0-VSP-M2 dispatches an operator to investigate the ESGR for fire. If communication between the operator and the MCR not established within 5 minutes, the Halon system will be initiated.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 15 of 71

• Based on the analysis of ET-CEP-04-0001 (Ref. 7.18), the operator may have 10 minutes to initiate the Halon system to prevent significant damage of plant safety.

• The Halon system may be initiated from the from the following methods:

• From MCR Halon system remote panel unit 1 and/or unit 2

• From Local Halon discharge station(s). The Local Halon discharge station of unit 1 locates near automatic door between ESGRs. The Local Halon discharge station of unit 2 locates outside ESGR.

• Manually initiate Halon system per Attachment 1 of 0-VSP-M2.

HEP Calculation:

Pc Calculation by Annunciator Response Model (Table 20-23):

The major contribution of the cognitive error of REC-VSP-M2 is that the operator omit the alarm and he does not enter the alarm respond procedure (0-VSP-M2). The probability of that the operator mis-justifies the alarm is due to the control panel in test can be ignored (if the control panel is not in test). The failure probability of that operator does not enter the alarm respond procedure (O-VSP-M2) will be evaluated by the annunciator respond model (table 20-23 of THERP

[Ref. 7.17])

Once the fire developed in the ESGR, 0-VSP-M2 will be the first alarm. Based on the table 20-23 of THERP, the failure rate of responding the first alarm will be 1.OE-4.

Pc = 1.OE-4 with error factor 10.

M = EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2} = 2.664 (for EF=10)

Mean of Pc = Median of PC

• M = 2.66E-4 PE Calculation by THERP:

The action error PE includes two parts: the local operator does not communicate with the MCR within 5 minutes and the MCR operator does not initiate the Halon system from MCR Halon system remote panel correctly. Because to initiate the Halon system is a simple action inside the MCR, and it can be recovered from the local panel by the local operator if the action failed, the failure rate of this part can be ignored.

Step 4 of 0-VSP-M2 direct MCR operator to initiate the Halon system, if the MCR operator does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes. Based on the analysis of ET-CEP-04-0001, the engineering time window for the fire situation is 10 minutes (Ref. 7.18). The failure probability of the initiation of the Halon system strongly depends on the time. Hence, HCR model is the best choice to evaluate the failure probability of the communication error. The time window for the HCR model is evaluated as follows:

TE: 600 seconds (Reference 6.18)

Tb: 300 seconds (SRO will initiate the Halon system, even if he does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes.)

TA: 20 seconds (best estimate)

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 16 of 71 T,,: 600 seconds - 300 seconds - 20 seconds = 280 seconds T1/i2: 30 seconds (Assumed the SRO may delay 30 seconds to initiate the Halon system if he does not receive the local operator response within 5 minutes) a: 0.6 PE(Mean) = 1 - (I(1n(T,/Ti/2)/ a )

- 1 - (P(ln(280/30) / 0.6 )

- 1 - 0 (3.72)

- 1.OE-4 Error Factor 3 M EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2) = 1.25 (for EF=3)

Median of PE PE(Mean)/M = 8.OE-5 HEP (median) = PC + PE = 1.OE-4 +8.OE-5 = 1.8E-4 Error Factor = EXP{[In(1 0)]2 + [In(3)]21112 - 12.82 M = EXP { [ In (EF) / 1.645] 2 /2 1 - 3.33 (for EF=1 2.82)

HEP (mean) = HEP (median)

• M

- 6.OE-4 Summary:

Basic Event: REC-VSP-M2 Point Estimate (mean): 6.OE-4 Lognormal Median: 1.80E-4 Error Factor: 12.82 Fault Trees: HA1 4.2.7.4 Fire Brigade REC-FIRE-BRIGADE This recovery action represents the probability of the fire brigade failing to suppress the ESGR fire, given failure of the Halon system. From page 8 of Reference 7.18, the probability of this basic event is 0.1 94.

4.2.7.5 Motor Operated Dampers 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A- ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPR 1-VS-FDMP-22AFAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP14 - ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-14FAILS TO CLOSE 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 - ESGR AREA FIRE DAMPER 1-VS-FDMP-21 FAILS TO CLOSE MOD-FO is not modeled in the current Surry internal events PRA model and there is no data collected for this basic event. However, Surry PRA model has modeled MOD-FC and its failure

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 17 of 71 rate was adopted from MOV-FC. Hence, for instance, the failure rate of MOD-FO will adopt from MOV-FO.

Distribution: Lognormal Median: 1.60E-3 Error Factor: 2.93 Mean: 1.98E-03 A review of the Halon system test results shows that there were two damper failures during the last 8 years of performing the tests. Attachment 4 contains a summary of the test results as well as the Bayesian updating of the basic event value with the plant-specific failures. The final point estimate for these basic events is 4.22E-3.

4.2.7.6 Fire Door 1VSDR-FO-DOOR18 - ESGR U1/U2 FIRE DOOR (DOOR 18) FAILS TO CLOSE There is no data collected in the internal events PRA model for a door failed open on demand.

Therefore, the failure rate of MOD-FO will be adopted for the fire door failed open.

This failure rate has included the signal failure (referred to the MOV-EQ and MOD-FO).

Distribution: Lognormal Median: 1.60E-3 Error Factor: 2.93 Mean: 1.98E-03 The generic data is used without updating with the plant specific data from Attachment 4 (no door failures during the tests).

4.2.7.7 Unit 2 Halon System Failure In The Unit 1 System Fault Tree 2HASYS-FAILURE If the door between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs fails to close automatically, it will likely be noticed by operations and/or fire protection personnel sent to the room in response to the fire alarms. Even if a failure of the door to close is not noticed by the personnel, smoke alarms would be triggered in the opposite Unit's control room, precipitating further opportunities to recognize the open door. Therefore, credit is taken for discharge of the Unit 2 Halon system should the door fail to close. If the Unit 1 AND Unit 2 Halon systems successfully inject their Halon supplies, the system is considered a success even if the door between the Units fails to close. Failure of the Unit 2 system is modeled as a single basic event with an estimated probability of 5E-2.

4.3 UNIT DIFFERENCES The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Halon suppression systems differ in that Unit 1 has 8 Halon bottles (2-240 lb bottles in Area A, 3-335 lb bottles each in Areas B and C), while Unit 2 has 9 bottles (3-240 lb in Area A, 3-335 lb in Areas B and C). The references in Section 6 are not explicit about the reason for the extra bottle in Unit 2, but the effect on the system failure probability would not be significant in any case. Unit 2 also requires a total of five dampers to close as part of the Halon

Engineering W'ork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 18 of 71 actuation (Reference 7.19), compared to three at Unit 1. The Unit 1 fault tree is assumed to be representative of the Halon system failure probability, but an assessment of the Unit 2 probability is presented in Section 4.5.

In addition, some of the components have different mark numbers between the two units. This has no impact on the fault tree models.

4.4 RISK MONITOR CONSIDERATIONS The ESGR Fire Suppression system is not modeled in the Surry PRA or Safety Monitor.

Therefore, this fault tree development does not impact the Safety Monitor.

4.5 SYSTEM MODEL EVALUATIONS AND SENSITIVITY STUDIES The ESGR fire suppression fault tree, HA1 (see Attachment 2), is solved using the WinNUPRA "Solve Fault Trees" function to calculate the top event unavailability. The settings for the fault tree solution are:

1. Fault Tree to be analyzed: HA1 .LKC (HAl .LGC is first linked, and the LKC is then updated using S03AC30.BED and HOSA.BED)

2. Top gate: GHA1100

3. Truncate cutsets less than: 1E-10

4. Is solution to be a MODule?: No

5. Primary Name of solution files: GHA1 100

6. Method: DOS NURELMCS The resulting system unavailability is 5.12E-3.

The top 25 cutsets are:

1 8.1868E-004 1VSMOD-FO-FDMP21 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 2 8.1868E-004 1VSMOD-FO-FDM22A REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 3 8.1868E-004 lVSMOD-FO-FDMP14 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 4 4.4232E-004 IHASYS-TM-HALON REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 5 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV459 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 6 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV458 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 7 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV457 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 8 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV462 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 9 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV463 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 10 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV461 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 11 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV460 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 12 1.9594E-004 1FPSOV-FC-SOV456 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 13 1.5501E-004 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRB REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 14 1.5501E-004 1FPTMR-LF-HATMRC REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 15 1.1640E-004 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE REC-VSP-M2 16 5.8200E-005 1HAHEP-TNK-BOTTL REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 17 1.9206E-005 1VSDR--FO-DOOR18 2HASYS-FAILURE REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 18 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-1FP459 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 19 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-1FP463 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 20 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-1FP457 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 21 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-1FP462 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 22 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-1FP458 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE

Engineering Wtork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 19 of 71 23 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-lFP456 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 24 1.8779E-005 1FPCKV-FC-lFP461 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE 25 1.8779E-005 IFPCKV-FC-lFP460 REC-FIRE-BRIGADE The first 3 cutsets are failure of the ESGR area dampers to close and failure of the fire brigade to control the fire. These three cutsets comprise 48% of the overall system unavailability. Cutset 4 - system unavailability due to scheduled testing and maintenance (along with fire brigade failure) - adds 8%, and failure of any one of the eight Halon tank discharge solenoid valves along with fire brigade failure (cutsets 5 through 12) adds another 30%.

Unit 2 SensitivitV Study The Unit 2 ESGR Fire Suppression System differs from Unit 1 in that the Area A (Relay Room) suppression is supplied by 3 Halon cylinders instead of the 2 at Unit 1. Additionally, 5 ESGR area dampers are designed to close upon Halon initiation, compared to three at Unit 1.

If a Unit 2 ESGR fire suppression model were developed, there would therefore be extra failure possibilities from a ninth Halon cylinder, solenoid valve and check valve, and from two additional dampers failing to close. From Section 4.2.7, the probabilities of failure of a tank, solenoid valve or check valve are 2.66E-6, 1.01 E-3, and 9.68E-5, respectively. Probability of failure of a damper to close is 4.22E-3. As each cutset would also receive a credit of 0.194 for the Fire Brigade, the total additional probability of failure of ESGR Fire Suppression would be

[0.194 * (2.66E-6 + 1.01 E-3 + 9.68E-5 + 4.22E-3 + 4.22E-3)] = 1.85E-3 Adding this to the Unit 1 probability of 5.12E-3 would total 5.12E-3+1.85E-3 = 6.97E-3.

5 Additional Analyses For Responses To NRC Request For Additional Information 5.1 RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability In the assessment of the NRC SDP phase 3 evaluation, Dominion identified that the SDP analysis did not credit the success of the floating ring seals. The Surry RCPs contain an additional seal, the floating ring seal, that other Westinghouse RCPs do not have. Dominion estimated the failure probability of the floating ring seal to be 0.5, the source of which was in question by the NRC. The following provides the basis for the failure probability proposed by Dominion.

In the case where a category had no or very few event occurrences, the single constant model can be used to calculate the mean frequency [Ref. 7.20 - NUREG/CR-5750, page 9]. The single constant rate model applies a noninformative prior in a Bayes updated distribution. The mean of the distribution of the single constant rate model is

( n + 0.5 )/m where n is the observed number of events m is the total demands.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 20 of 71 Applying the Haddam Neck event with the single constant rate model, the mean of the floating ring seal failure will be:

(0+0.5)/i = 0.5 5.2 Welding Frequency in ESGR The frequency of welding events in the ESGR is calculated based on plant specific data as follows. This frequency is only applicable for the time period in question for the SDP.

A query of the Surry Work Order system for work orders that required flame permits identified 191 work orders since 1995. Of those work orders, 5 involved welding associated with the ESGR. Attachment 3 contains the list of work orders as well as e-mail from Mr. Barry Garber stating the number of ESGR welding events. Of the 5 work orders, only 2 involved welding inside the ESGR while the unit was at power. The other 3 work orders involved welding either outside the ESGR door or the welding was performed when the unit was shutdown.

Therefore, the frequency of welding events in the ESGR is calculated as follows:

ESGR Welding Frequency = Number of ESGR welding events / Number of Years ESGR Welding Frequency = 2 / 9 = 2.2 E-1/yr This welding frequency is for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs. The frequency of welding per ESGR is 2.1 E-1 /2 = 1.1E-1/year.

To calculate the frequency of fires from welding events in the ESGR, this welding frequency is combined with the probability of fires started by the welding. Based on a qualitative assessment by the Surry Fire Protection Engineer, the probability of a welding fire at an ESGR door spreading to the primary combustion inventory in the room (i.e. cables) is essentially 0 due to the lack of combustibles near the door. The nearest cable tray is at least three feet away. In conclusion, the frequency of a welding fire is estimated to be negligible.

5.3 Fire Brigade Response Time Data In the NRC SDP assessment, no credit was taken for the fire brigade in extinguishing fires.

Dominion considers the fire brigade to be an effective means for fire mitigation that should not be ignored in best estimate risk analysis. The response time of the fire brigade for ESGR fires was questioned due to the time available to prevent damage of the second level cable trays.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 21 of 71 The response time of the fire brigade is measured periodically during the fire drills conducted in accordance with Loss Prevention Surveillance procedure 0-LSP-FP-004. The response time data was reviewed for all fire drills involving a postulated fire in the ESGR. Seventeen drills were performed from 1996 to 2003. The following table shows the response time for the fire brigade to respond to the alarm, arrive at the scene with appropriate protective gear. The mean response time is 5 minutes.

Response Time Date (minutes) Ops Shift 12/30/03 6 A 12/24/03 7 B 12/19/03 5 C 12/16/03 10 D 12/16/03 7 E 12/11/03 5 E 12/10/03 5 C 12/8/03 8 B 6/11/99 3 A 6/9/99 3 C 6/9/99 5 B 6/8/99 3 D 6/14/99 5 E 12/6/96 5 D 10/8/96 3 E 10/3/96 3 C 9/26/96 3 A Mean 5.06 Standard Dev. 2.05 95% Confidence 6.03 6 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ESGR Fire Suppression Probability The probability of failure of fire suppression in the Surry Unit 1 ESGR is 5.1 E-3. For Unit 2, the failure probability is 7.OE-3. These probabilities take credit for fire suppression by the manually actuated Halon system and the fire brigade.

Conservatisms In This Analysis Analysis of the Surry ESGR fire suppression involved many conservative assumptions regarding the Halon system. Because the system has never been tested or evaluated with any of its components failed, single failures of most of the significant components in the system were treated as total system failure in the fault tree shown in Attachment 2. A list of the dominant conservative assumptions follows:

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 22 of 71

1. This calculation assumed that all bottles (8/8 at Unit 1 and 9/9 at Unit 2) need to discharge for system success.

2. This calculation assumed that all ESGR room dampers that automatically close on Halon actuation (3/3 at Unit 1 and 5/5 at Unit 2) need to close for system success. Some of these dampers are at a high elevation in the room, as is a significant amount of the cables in the room. After a Halon discharge, a stuck open damper high above the floor would cause some Halon to escape the room.

However, since Halon is heavier than air, as time goes on, the Halon displaces air from the lower levels to the upper levels, and the gases escaping the room would increasingly shift towards air, which may even help maintain Halon concentration around the cable trays over time. Additionally, the damper success criteria is for maintaining the Halon concentration assumed in the design basis. However, for the severe fire scenario considered in the phase 3 SDP, a damper failure may be tolerable since the Halon suppression would mitigate further damage and provide time for the Fire Brigade to suppress the fire. In any case, this PRA analysis conservatively assumed that all dampers must close.

3. A human error was modeled for the possibility that the wrong Halon bottle is installed (i.e., one of the 240 lb bottles is installed where a 335 lb bottle should be). This instance occurred once in the past, but that was before the Testing procedure provided a drawing to show which bottles are to be installed for each area. Modeling this human error involves two conservatisms: One is that the chance of installation of the wrong bottle is now very small with the procedure improvement, and the other is the assumption that a 240 lb bottle release instead of 335 lb would fail the entire system, even if all other bottles were successfully discharged.

4. Halon system unavailability due to Testing does not take credit for the fire watch that must be established before the Halon system is disabled. In reality, the fire watch would improve the chance of successful fire brigade suppression.

RCP Floating Ring Seal Failure Probability The probability of failure of the RCP Floating Ring Seal is 0.5.

Welding Frequency In The ESGR The frequency of welding in one Unit's ESGR is 1.1 E-1/yr. The chance of a fire starting from the welding and spreading to the cables is judged to be negligible due to the lack of combustibles near the doors where the welding took place.

Fire Brigade Response Time Data The mean time for the fire brigade to reach the ESGR prepared to fight a fire is 5.1 minutes.

The standard deviation on the data is 2.1 minutes, and the 95% confidence level is 6.0 minutes.

Engineering XNNork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 23 of 71 Final Phase 3 SDP Risk Significance NAF calculation SM-1437 (Ref. 7.22) contains an evaluation of the NRC's Phase 3 SDP assessment. The calculation evaluated some of the conservatism identified in the Phase 3 SDP assessment. Sensitivities were performed to calculate new delta CDFs using more realistic values for ESGR fire suppression capability, failure probability of RCP seals with floating ring seals and revised welding fire frequency. Since calculation SM-1437 did not include certain combinations of the above credits and the specific values, the following table summarizes the new delta CDFs. Attachment 5 contains the MS Excel spreadsheets used in calculation SM-1437 but modified for the values and cases shown in the table.

Delta SDP Case Changes to NRC Phase 3 SDP CDF Color Base (NRC Phase N/A 2.3E-06 WHITE 3 SDP)

A. Credit for

• Non-suppression (Halon &fire Unit 1 GREEN negligible brigade) probability changed from 7.OE-7 probability of fire generic 0.09 to 0.0 for welding fires Unit 2 initiation due to

• Revised branch points RP2 and RP3 in 7.OE-7 welding and credit event trees from 0.20 to 0.10 for RCP floating ring seal (50%

failure probability)

B. Credit for

• Non-suppression (Halon & fire brigade) Unit 1 GREEN multiple means to probability changed from generic 0.05 3.8E-7 manually actuate to 0.005 (0.007 for Unit 2) for electrical Unit 2 Halon for all fires, cabinet and transformer fires 4.OE-7 credit Halon for

• Non-suppression (Halon & fire welding fires & brigade) probability changed from RCP floating ring generic 0.09 to 0.0 for welding fires seal (50% failure

• Revised branch points RP2 and RP3 in probability) event trees from 0.20 to 0.10

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 24 of 71 7 REFERENCES 7.1 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.10.2.2.9, Revision 35, Updated Online March 31, 2004.

7.2 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station System Design Basis Document - Fire Protection System, Revision 1, December 31, 2003.

7.3 RF-REPORT, Surry Power Station Operator Training Manual - Fire Protection System, NCRODP-6-S, November 5, 2003.

7.4 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-99-0030, Rev. 0, March 25,1999.

7.5 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-98-008, Rev. 0, October 22,1998.

7.6 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal CEP-99-001 1, Rev. 0, May 12,1999.

7.7 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Annunciator Response Procedure 0-VSP-M2, "EMERG SWGR RM HALON SYS FIRE/TRBL", Revision 4.

7.8 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1-LPT-FP-017, "FLOW TEST OF EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM", Revision 4.

7.9 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1-LPT-FP-024, "EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM VALVE ALIGNMENT', Revision 3.

7.10 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 1-LPT-FP-01 8, "EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM CYLINDER PRESSURE AND WEIGHT TEST", Revision 6.

7.11 RF-NB, PRA Model Notebook SY.2 Rev. 0, "System Analysis Assumptions and Fault Tree Success Criteria", Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, July 2003.

7.12 RF-CALC, Dominion Calculation SM-1438, "Update Of The Surry Fire IPEEE With The S03A Model Files," Revision 0, to be issued.

7.13 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Manual, Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Department.

7.14 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51 S, Revision 7.

7.15 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51T, Revision 8.

7.16 RF-DRWG, Virginia Power Drawing 11448-FE-51V, Revision 0.

7.17 RF-NUREG, USNRC, NUREG/CR-1278, "Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications", August 1983.

7.18 RF-CALC, Virginia Power Engineering Transmittal ET-CEP-94-0001, Rev. 0, 1/28/04.

7.19 RF-PROC, Surry Power Station Procedure 2-LPT-FP-01 7, "FLOW TEST OF EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM HALON SYSTEM," Revision 4.

7.20 RF-NUREG, J. P. Poloski, et. al., USNRC, NUREG/CR-5750, "Rates of Initiating Events at U S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1987-1995," February, 1999.

7.21 RF-CODE, ReDACS Code File.

7.22 RF-CALC, Dominion Calculation SM-1 437, "Sensitivity Study on NRC Phase 3 SDP of Surry Unit 1 ESGR Appendix R Finding," Revision 0, to be issued.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 25 of 71 Attachment 1 ESGR Fire Suppression System Simplified Schematic The following two pages present the simplified diagram developed to represent the ESGR Halon system.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 26 of 71 I.

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Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 28 of 71 Attachment 2 ESGR Fire Suppression System Fault Tree The following two pages present the ESGR Fire Suppression System fault tree.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 29 of 71 0 ' i1 2 r 3 I 4 1 5 I

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Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 31 of 71 Attachment 3 ESGR Welding Work Orders And Events The following pages contain the results of the welding work order search. The e-mail describing the review of the work order search is also included.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 32 of 71 From: Barry Garber To: Tom Hook 03/02/2004 03:59 cc: Jerry Ashley/NUC/VANCPOWER@VANCPOWER, Bob Lynch/NUC/VANCPOWER@VANCPOWER

Subject:

191 Flame Permitted Work Orders Tom, I wanted better verification for you, so I went back to the Planners and requested that they run a search on all Flame Permits issued for the Service Building, MER3, Emergency Switchgear & Relay Room, and Battery Room. The attached list is the result of this search.

I reviewed the list with Mike Small and we concluded that only 5 work orders were completed in the Unit 1 & 2 ESGRs during the past 5 years. This list includes all the work orders under the area "RELR" (ESGR and Relay Room) and one work order under the Service Building area:

- 401118-01

- 401118-05

- 438240-03

- 455173-02

- 455173-01 The database search of the Passport system is not easy, however, I believe the above conclusions are the best we can do to identify work in the area.

Please give me a call with questions.

Barry A. Garber Surry Power Station 8-798-2725 (tie line), (757) 365-2725 Beeper 7092 (1-800-272-5643)

Fax (757) 365-2724

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 33 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 WO* Craft UCR Pig MER3 Complted 26553901 WELD 0 02 SW 308 VALVE S1-90652 REPLACE VALVE 01125/00 Equipment Description SELFCLEANING STRIB SWINLET HDRVENT Location 1 FTNORTH OFSOUTH WALL, 6 FTWEST OFEASTWALL. 3 29094001 WELD 0 01 SWPH H1021A4.SUPORT REPAIR BASE PLATE 11122/9S Equipment Description HANGER IS2 ONLINE 4-WS-308-9107 Locaron, ONFLOOR NEXTTO 2-SW-309 43242401 WELD 0 02 SWP 10B PUMP S-00-1430 REPAIR BASE PLATE 07:02;02 Equwpment Description CHGPUMP SWPUMP Location 40 FTSOUTH OFNORTH WALL, 25 FTEASTOFWEST WALL, 45333002 WELD 0 01 VS 288 CKVALV S2001-2015 REPLACE VALVE 01/24!02 Equipment Description CONT & RELAY RMPUMP 2A DISCH CHKVALVE Location 9 FTOFFFLOOR, Ot TOPOF I*VS-E-4A, MER

• 3 48986802 WELD S 01 SW 262 CKVALV S2003-1888 PREFAB VALVE, PIPING ANDFLANGES 05105'03 Equipment Dscription CHGPUMP SWPUMP 10BDISCH HDRCHK Location 25 FTSOUTH OFNORTH WALL, 2 FTEASTOFWEST WALL.

50028701 WELD 5 02 SW 442 CKVALV 503-5141 REPLACECHECKVALVE 10131103 Equipment Descripvon CHGPUMP SWPUMP 100 DISCH HDRCHK Location 25 FTSOUTH OFNORTH WALL,1 FT EASTOFWESTWALL.

50028703 WELD 5 02 SW 442 CKVALV MAKE WELDREPAIRS TO VALVE 11101103 Equipment Description CHGPUMP SWPUMP 100 DISCH MDR CHK Location 2S FTSOUTH OFNORTH WALL,1 FT EASTOFWESTWALL.

WO# Craft Dat PI# RELR ompleted 40111801 MECH 0 02 BS DR 21 ACCESS 500-0708 REPLACEACTIVESIDEOFDOUBLEDDOORS 04!06100 Equipment Description UNIT-2 EMERG SWGR ROOM Location TURBINE BUILDINGTORELAY RM

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 34 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 40111805 WELD 0 02 BS DR 21 ACCESS SDO-0708 WELDREPAIRDOOR 04/04100 Equipment Descriptinl UNiT*2 EMERGSWGRROOM Location TURBINEBUILDINGTO RELAYRM 43824803 WELD S 02 EP TRA8H-1 TRANSF FABRICATE/INSTALL WASHERS IAW ET 10114100 Equipment Descnpton 4160, 480V TRANSFORMER Location ON FLOOR,IN U-2 EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR 45517302 WELD 0 02 BS DR 20 ACCESS S-01-2315 WELDHINGES 08"16!01 Equipment Description UNiT-2 EMERGSWGRROOM Location RELAYROOMTO STAIRWELL WO# Caft UCR pig SERV completed 43249401 HVAC 0 01 VS SOV4245 VALVE REPLACE SOV 01103!01 Equipment DescriPtion l-VS-E-IB TROUGHMAKEUPWATERLEVEL Location ON WEST END OFTOWER 43405301 HVAC 0 02 VS AC 2-SOT UNIT REPAIROIL AND REFRIGERANT LEAKS 08103,00 Equipment Descrition UNIT-2 CABLESPREADING ROOM Location ON HER J2 ROOF,CENTEROF ROOF 43542901 WELD 0 01 BS DR 3 ACCESS WELDDOORFRAME 02/16101 Equipment Descripton 3 EMERGDIESELGENERATOR Location TURBINEBUILDING WALKWAYTO EMERGENCY GEIIERATOR 43708401 WELD 0 01 2A 1310 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 05/02101 Equipment Description MANHOLESUMPSUPHDRROOTVALVE Location 6 FT OFFFLOOR,8 FT SOUTHOF NORTHWAL. IN NO. I 43709203 WELD 5 02 FW RTD2IIC DETECT S-00-2032 REPLACE RTDWELL 10/11100 Equipment Description SGC FW RTD Location 45 FT SOUTH OF NORTh WALL, 122 FT EASTOF WEST 43709205 WELD 5 02 FW TI 254C INDREC REPLACE THERMOWELL 10/11500 Equipment Description SGC FWv TEMPIND Location 45 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 120 FT EASTOF WEST

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 35 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 44080602 WELD 5 02 FW 46 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 04111/02 Equipment Description SG B FW LINE Pl-2548 1SOL Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 100 FT EASTOF WEST 44419201 MECH 1 01 DS DR 527-13 ACCESS S-01-02B3 REMOVE DOORAND WELDHINGESASREQUIRED. 02/19101 Equipment Description AUX BOILERROOM Location NORTHACCESSTO HEATINGEOILER RM 44530001 HVAC 0 01 VS AC BSA UNIT INVESTIGATEREPAIR UNIT. 06106/01 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location ONlROOFOF MER 44009702 HYAC 0 01 VS E 3C UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSOR 04102101 Equipment Description CENTRALAC WATERCHILLER Location 3 FT OFFFLOOR,HER *1, SOUTH OF l-VS-E-IA 44611301 WELD 0 01 HS 223 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 01103,02 Equipment Description SULPHITECHEMPUMP12 sucr ISOL Location 6 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT WEST OF 18.25 ON 448S1401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPAIRREFRIGERANT LEAKS 04126/01 Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTHOF NORTHWALL,10 FT WESTOF EAST 44941402 WELD 5 01 Fw is VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10:23101 Equipment Description SG A FWUNE PI-154A ISOL Location 40FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 99FT EASTOF WEST WALL 4 45136901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC U6 UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSOR ANDTRANSFORMER 06/25!01 Equipment Description MERNO 2 AC UNIT Location ON ROOF 45325401 MECH 0 01 OS DR 1 ACCESS 52001-1835 REPLACE DOORWITH 3 HR. RATEDDOOR. 12:18:01 Equipment Descnption #I EMERG DIESELGENERATOR Location TURBINEBUILDING WAL(WAY TO EMERGENCY GENERATOR

Engineering XWork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 36 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 43D25403 WELD 0 0I FE EG 1 ENGINE CUT/RE-WELD COOLINGLINE 07/19!01 Equipment DescriPtion EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR Location EMERGEtNCYDIESELGENERATOR ROOI-1 45453501 HVAC 0 01 VS FL 100 FILTER INSTALL ADOITIONAL TEST PORTSPERET. 08/22i/0 Equipment Descriotion SERVICEBLDGFAN150 SUCTFILTER Location 5 FT SOUTHOF NORTHWALL, IN FILTERROOM,I FT OFF 45517301 WELD 0 02 85 DR 39 ACCESS 5-01-2315 WELDHINGES 08,'23101 Equipment Description UNIT-2A BATTERYROOM Locaton SWITCHGEAR TO BATTERYROOMUNIT 2 45629701 WELD 0 0I 8S DR 46 ACCESS S-01-2581 WELDHINGES 09/13/01 Equipment DescriptOonC 1 MECHANICAL EQPTROOM LocatiOn CABLETRAYSTO MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOMtlO. 1 45666901 WELD 0 02 DS DR 50 ACCESS S-01-2658 WELDHINGES 09/19/01 Equipment Description 52 MECHANICAL EQPTROOM Location CABLETRAYTO MECHANICAL EQUIPMENTROOMNO. 2 45869402 WELD 5 01 EE EG 1 GENERA WELDGENERATOR BALANCE WEIGHTS 10J29j01 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR aI Location IN EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR RM 1,4 FT OFFFLOOR 45869404 WELD 5 01 FE EG I GENERA FABRICATE,INSTALL ALIGNMENT JACKPLATES 11103;01 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR *1 Location IN EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR RM 1. 4 FT OFFFLOOR 46041401 WELD 0 01 MS 213 VALVE REPLACE PIPENIPPLE 06/03/02 Equipment Description HTG BOILER4B STM DRUMLT-l0G0 UPPER Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTHWALL, 20 FT WESTOF EAST WALL, 46051101 WELD 0 01 MS 114 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 06103/02 Equipment Descrpoon HTG BOILER40 ATOMIZING STM SUPHOR Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 8 FT EASTOF WEST WALL S

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 37 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 46129902 NSS 0 0I BS BLDSERV BLDG 2000-1716 CORBELREPAIRSTO COLUMNLINE I0 03/22/02 Equipment Description SERVICE BUILDING Location 46129903 NSS 0 01 BS BLDSERV BLDG 2000-1716 CORBELREPAIRSTO COLUMNLINE 14 03123j02 Equipment Description SERVICEBUILDING Location 46416105 WELD 0 01 EG P I PUMP REPLACE SUCTIONPIPING 02125/02 Eqzuipmvent DescriPtion LUBE OIL CIRCPUMP LoCation 2 FT SOUTH OF DIESEL, B FT EASTOF WEST WALL. 3.5 FT 46420301 HVAC 0 01 VS 401 VALVE CLEANIREPLACE BALLVALVE 05124102 Equipment Description 1-VS-E-IA TROUGH DRAIN Location EAST ENDOf I-VS-E-IA NEARFLOOR 46516901 NSS 0 01 BS BLDSERV BLDG 5-01-2981 TEST BASEPLATE METAL 04129i02 Equipment Description SERVICEBUILDING Location 46485003 WELD S 01 FW RTD111C DETECT S-02-0122 REPLACE WELL 05/23i03 Equipment Description SG C FW RTD Location 30 FT S OF N WALL, 105 FT E OF W WALL. 4 FT OFF FLOOR 46622301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT S-02-0674 REPAIRREFRIGLEAKSIREPLACE CONTACTORS 05/01h02 Equipment Description ND 1 SWrTCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST 46630301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 86 UNIT INVESTIGATE/REPAIR CHECKFOR LEAKS 04/14/02 Equipment Description MERNO 2 AC UNIT Location ON ROOF 46699401 WELD 5 02 FW 605 VALVE REPLACEVALVE 04/08/302 Equipment Description FW HDRVENTLINE ROOT VALVE Location 35FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL SOFTEASTOF WEST WALL 4

Engineering Wtork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 38 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 46699402 WELD 5 02 FW 606 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 04/08!02 Equipment Description FW HORVENT Location 35FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 4SFT EAST OF WEST WALL 4 45207702 WELD 0 01 VS AC 4 UNrIT FABRICATE PIPING FORNEWCOIL 10124/02 Equipment Description ASSEMBLY ROOMAC UNIT 4 Location MER1, 3 FT SOUTHOF NORTH WALL, 5 FT EASTOF 47058601 WELD 0 01 VS F 22A BLOWER S02-1984 RETACTANGLEIRON 06/12!02 Equipment Description EDGROOM1 EXHAUSTFAN Location SI DIESELROOM,8 FT NORTHOF SOUTHWALL,S FT 45936702 WELD 0 02 SA 64 VALVE 502-2114 REPAIRTUBINGLEAK 10124102 Equipment DescriPtion SA SUPHDRISCL Location 5 FT OFFFLOOR,IN HALLWALL,5 FT SOUTHOF EDG 47139801 HVAC 0 0I VS AC 4-S0T UNIT REPAIRUNITREFRIGERANTLEAKS 06/20102 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTHOF NORTHWALL, 30 FT WESTOF EAST WALL.

47246501 WELD 0 02 BS DR 2 ACCESS 502-2221 REPAIRDOORHINGES lAW ET. C6,'27/02 Equipment Description 52 EMERGDIESELGENERATOR Location TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAY TO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 47400201 WELD 0 01 6s DR 3 ACCESS S02-2291 REPAIRDOOR HINGESlAW ET. 07703;02 Equipment Description 93 EMERGDIESELGENERATOR Locatron TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAYTO EMERGENCY GENERATOR 47421102 WELD 0 02 BS DR 49 ACCESS S2002-2354 FIRE PROTECTION AND SENGTO EVALUATEDR. 07/12/02 Equipment Description UNIT-2 CABLETRAYROOM Location TURBINE RM TO CABLETRAYS 47055010 WELD 0 03 EG TK 1 ACCUMU S SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12/13!02 Equipment Description AIR TANK NOI Location 3 FT EASTOF WESTWALL. IS FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL.

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 39 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 470S5011 WELD 0 03 EG TK 2 ACCUMU 5 SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12113102 Equipment Description AIR TANKNO 2 Location 3 FT EASTOF WESTWALL, 20 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 47055012 WELD 0 03 EG TK 3 ACCUMU S SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12/13!02 Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 3 Location 3 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTHWALL, 47055013 WELD 0 03 EG TX 4 ACCUMU S-02* SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12113;02 Equipment Descrptifon AIR TANK NO 4 Location 3 FT EASTOF WESTWALL, 4OFT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 47055014 WELD 0 03 EG TX S ACCUMU 5 SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12/13/02 Eqipment Descr!ption AIR TANK NO S Location 2 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 28 FT NORTH OF SOUTHWALL, 47055015 WELD 0 03 EG TX 6 ACCUMU 5 SEALWELDTHREADEDCONNECTIONS 12113!02 Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 6 Location 1 FT EAST OF WESTWALL, 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL.

47512514 NSS 0 01 DS DR 14 ACCESS FAB AND INSTALL MAINTENANCE ENCLOSURE 12/15/03 Equipment Description DOOR FROMTURBINE BLDGWALKWAYTO Location TURBBLDGWALKWAYTO CONTROL ROOMANNEX 48380201 HVAC 0 01 VS 401 VALVE S-03-0927 REPLACE BALLVALVE 03/07103 Equipment Description 1-VS-E*IA TROUGHDRAIN Location EASTEND OF I-VS-E*IA NEARFLOOR 48S12601 WELD 0 01 SA 272 VALVE REPLACE VALVEAND TUBING 06'17!03 Equipment Description SACONN Location 3 FT OFFFLOOR.2 FT NORTHOF SOUTH WALL,80 FT 48640301 WELD 0 01 HS 212 VALVE S-03-0476 REPLACE VALVE 06!13/03 Equipment Description HTG BOILER4B VENT Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 20 FT WEST OF EASTWALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 40 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 48706702 WELD 5 01 FWTI 154N INDREC 5-03-0970 REPLACETHERMOWELL 05/23;03 Equipment Description SG B FW TEMPIND Location FVi HR 14-WFPD-13-601 3CFTS OF N WALL 9SFT E OF 50368807 WELD 0 01 VS 287 VALVE 504-0241 REPLACE VALVE;INSPECT LINE FORBLOCKAGE 01123104 Equipment Description CONT S RELAYRM PUMP2A DISCH Location 8 FT OFFFLOOR, 1 FT EAST OF l-VS-E-4A, IN 27304101 MECH 0 03 EG RV 35 VALVE TEST RV IAW RVISV PROGRAM. 02/03/97 Equipment Description AIR TANK NO 4 RELIEFVALVE Locaton 40 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL S rT OFFWEST WALL IS 27737901 MHEC 0 01 VS E 18 UNtT P,SW, REPAIRTOWER LEAKS. 01/23;96 Equipment Description CENTRALAC EVAPORATOR CONDENSER 1B Location AT NORTH WALL OF MER*I 29422001 MECH 0 01 VS 989 VALVE (P,W)REPLACE VALVE& FITTINGS 03/12/96 Equipment Description EVAPCNDSRIC INLET ISOL Location 1 FT EASTOF I *VS-E-lC 8 FT OFF 29554101 MECH 0 01 VS 994 VALVE S-96-0537 REPLACEVALVE 04:09/96 Equipment Description EVAPCNCSRIC RECIRClSOL Location 1 FT EASTCF l-VS-E-lC 5 FT OFF 30173402 WELD 0 02 SWPP 4.00-WS PIPE REMOVEPIPESUPPORT FORVLV REPLACEMENT 11103:95 Equipment Description 4.00-WS-310 9107 Location MER3 AT 1-VS-E-4C 31581501 MECH 0 01 VS E 1A UNIT REPAIRTOWERLEAKS. 01123:96 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC EVAPORATOR CONDENSER IA Location 7 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 9 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 1 31635601 MECH 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPLCOMPRESSORS/FILTERjADJ SWITCHES(-) 01(25196 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEARROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 41 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 32136701 WELD 0 01 WT 687 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 11/03/9S Equipment Description ELECTRICSHOPDISTILLED WATERSUPHDR Location TOP OF STAIRS. IN STOREROOM, 2 FT OFFFLOOR, 33110101 WELD 0 01 VS E 4C UNIT MODIFYPIPING 12/06!95 Equipmert Description CONTROOMCHILLER Location HER 3. 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 7 FT WESTOF 33189902 WELD 0 01 EG P 1 MOTOR FABI INSTALL NEWMOTOR BRACKET 05/07/97 Equipmert Description LUSEOIL CIRCPUMP Location S ENDOF I EDGVI SIDE 2 FTOFFFLOOR 33t90002 WELD 0 02 EG P 1 MOTOR RELOCATE AUXILUBEOIL PUMPMOTOR 0829!96 Equipment Description LUBEOIL CIRC PUMP(MOTOR) Location IS N OF SOUTH WALL 2D E OF VtEST WALL 33190102 WELD 0 03 EG P 1 MOTOR FABI INSTALL NEWMOTORBRACKET 02/09!97 Equipment Description WBE Ol CIRC PUMP(MOTOR) Location 18 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 33300701 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 17 UNIT REPLACE EVAPORATOR COILS PERDCP-9S-019 04130196 Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location ON FLOOR.MER SI, AT SOUTHWALL 33300801 HVAC 0 02 VS AC 17 UNIT REPLACE EVAPORATOR COILS PEROCP-9S-019 05J24'96 Equipment Description Location ON FLOOR.AT NORTH V/ALL, BESIDE2-VS-F*17 33325101 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1 UNIT 5195-2985 INSTALL ACCESSPANELS!CLEAN DUCTS 02/14/97 Equipment Description UNIT 1 CONT ROOMAHU Location IN AIR COND ROOM1. 4 FT NORTHOF SOUTHWALL. I FT 33627401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 2308 UNIT REPLACE UNIT CS;09;96 Equipment Description A/C UNIT (ROOF) FORP-250 COMPUTERROOM Location I FT OFF ROOF,3 FT S OF N WALL. 10 FT W OF E WALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 42 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 33680701 HVAC 0 01 VS E 3A UN1IT REPLACEHOTGASBY-PASSANDTXV VALVES 05/14/96 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATERCHILLER Location SRTSOUTHOF l-VS-E-1A. SFTWESTOF I-VS-E-38, 3FT 33689201 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3 UNIT REPAIRCOIL LEAK 05113i96 Equipment Description MERNO2 ACUNIT Location 3 FT SOUTHOF NORTH WALL, 6 FT EASTOF I-VS-HV-3. 1 33765401 WELD 0 01 SS C 20 HTEXCH PREFAB,REPLACE COOLER 09'18196 Equipment DesriHption FWSAMPLECLR2Z LoKtcon 6 F WESTOF I*FW-MOV-154A. 18 FT NORTH OF SOUTH 33824201 WELD 0 02 SWPP 4.00-WS PIPE S-96*0519 REPAIRLEAK 03/13196 Equipment Description 4.00-WS-310*9107 Locaticn MER3AT I-VS-E-4C 33928902 MECH 0 01 VS AC 150B UNItT REPLACE UNIT 0S106196 Equipment Description TSCLIBRARYAC UNIT Location ON ROOF,NORTH END OFROOF 34075401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT UNLT REPAIRWREPLACED UNIT DOORS OS/22196 EquwpmentDescription SERVICE BLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WESTOF EASTWALL, 34075601 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNtT REPAIR4'REPLACED UNIT DOORS 05S25196 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 33325102 HVAC 0 02 VS AC 9 UNIT S-95-2985 INSTALL ACCESSPANELS/iCLEAN DUCTS 12/19!96 Equipment Description UNIT 2 COrT ROOMAHU Location IN AIR CONDROOMUNIT 2, 5 FT WESTOF ENTRANCE. I FT 34118501 NSS 0 01 SS DR IS ACCESS REPLACE DOOR. 10,/15/96 Equipment Description CONTROLROON ANNEX Locatlon INSTRUMENT REPAIRSHOPTO CONTROLRM

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SMi-1442 Rev. 0 Page 43 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 33928903 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1508 uNIT INSTALL NEWTHERMOSTAT CONTROLS 05/25!96 Equipment Description TSCLIBRARYACUNIT Location ON ROOF,NORTHENDOF ROOF 32968703 WELD 5 02 SWPP 3.00-WS PIPE REMOVEIINSTALL HANGERCLIPSPEREN5T ET 05/16/96 Equipment Descript on 3.00 WS-326-9107 Locat:On 34167901 WELD 6 02 FW Tn 2545 PIPE 5-96-0996 REPLACE TI WELL 05120;96 Equipment Description SG 0 FWTEMPINDICATOR THERNOWELL Location MER J2 IN MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BETWEEN 34171401 WELD 0 02 VS 224 VALVE REPLACEVALVE 12109197 Equipment Description CONTROL ROOM2 AC 8 CW INLET Location 3 FT OFF FLOOR.5 FT NORTH OF 2-VS-AC-9, I FT WEST 34184501 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 230B UNIT INSTALL NEWRECEIVERREPLACE COMPRESSOR 08109196 Equipment Description A/C UNIT (ROOF) FOR P-2SOCOMPUTERROOM Location I FT OFFROOF,3 FT S OF N WALL, 10 FT W OFE WALL, 34196801 MECH 0 01 VS AC 4-S0T UNIT S-95-1071 REMOVEPRESSURE SWITCHESAS PERENGR. 05128/96 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WESTOF EAST WALL, 34196901 MECH 0 01 VS AC 3-80T LNINT S-96-1071 REMOVE PRESSURE SWITCHESAS PERENGR. 05129;96 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOMACUNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST 34313701 NDE 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT INSTALL OIL RECOVERY/VERIFY SWITCHESIDWG 10418,96 Equipment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOMACUNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WEST OF EAST 34313801 NDE 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT INSTALL OIL RECOVERY/VERIFY SWITCHES!DWG 04/13/97 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calic Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 44 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 34336401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T tINIT 5-96-1365 REPLACE TANDOM COMPRESSORS 06117196 Equipment Description SERVICE BLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WESTOF EAST WALL, 34479901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1505 UlNT REPAIRREFRIGERANT LEAK 09!17196 Equlpment Description TSCLIBRARYAC UNIT LocatimnON ROOF,NORTHEND OF ROOF 34639401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 86 tUIT REPLACE FANPRESSURE SWITCHES. 10,01196 Equipment Description MERtlO 2 AC UNIT Location ON ROOF 34730101 WELD 0 01 VS E 4C UNrIr REPAIRPIPINGMISALIGNMENT 06119197 Equipment Description COtlT ROOMCHILLER Location MER 3, 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTHWALL, 7 FT WESTOF 34873701 MECH 0 01 STRRSD3 ACCESS 5-96-1819 REPAIROR REPLACE HASPON DOOR 09103196 Equipment Description CONTROL ROOMEMERGEXIT TO TUJRDBLDG Location 35011901 MECH 0 01 VS E 4C WtlT LOCATEANDREPAIRREFRIGERANT LEAKS 09!14196 Equipment Description CONT ROOMCHILLER LocationFER 3, 6 FT SOUTHOF NORTHWALL,7 FT WESTOF 35021901 WELD 0 01 VS 366 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 11121100 Equipment Description MAIN AREAAC-B4 CD INLET ROOTVALVE LocationJANITOR CLOSETBESIDEFIRSTAID ROOM,I FT NORTH OF 35023001 WELD 0 01 VS 351 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 11121/00 Equipment Description PBXRM A.C-B3 CD INLET Location JANITOR CLOSETBESIDEFIRST AID ROOM.1 FT WESTOF 35090301 MECH 0 02 BS DR 2 ACCESS REPLACE DOORSWEEP 09113;96 Equipment Description 02 EMERGDIESELGENERATOR Location TURBINE BUILDING WALKWAYTO EMERGENCY GENERATOR

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 45 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 35164101 WELD 0 01 VS 354 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 12/05197 Equipment Descnpton MAIN AREAA,:C-B4CD INLET Location 3 FT WEST OF EAST WALL IS FT SOUTH OF l-VS-AC*BSB4 35184501 WELD 5 02 FW 46 VALVE REPLACEVALVE 09:25197 Equipment Description SGB FWLUNE Pl-2548 ISOL Location 40 FT SOUTHOF NORTH WALL. 100 FT EAST OFWEST 3520S801 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT UNtIT 5-96-2126 REPLACEDEFECTIVESWITCH&CONTROL. 04107;97 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Locat~on 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EASTWALL, 34313802 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNtT REPAIRREFRIGERATION LEAK. l0lls!96 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 35465601 WELD 0 01 HS 244 VALVE REPLACE PIPENIPPLE 02110;97 Equipment Description BOILERFD PUMPS14A.B DtSCHHDRVENT Locaton 6 FT OFFFLOOR,IN HEATING BOILERROOM.I FT EASTOF 35575401 MECH 0 01 HS LH 98 UNIT INVESTIGATE/REPAIR LEAKtIG HEATER 12/05,96 Equipment Description MER2 UNIT HEATER98 Location 4 FT WEST OF l-VS-AC-3. I1 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 35570204 WELD 5 02 FW RTD211B DETECT S-96-2567 REPLACE RTD WELL 12/20196 Equipment Description SG B FW RTD Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 11S FT EAST OF WEST 35609101 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1508 UWIT REPAIRREFRIGERANTLEAK 03123;97 Equipment Description TSCLIBRARYAC UNIT Location ON ROOF,NORTH ENDOF ROOF 36086902 WELD 0 01 HS 240 VALVE REPLACEVALVEANDDRAINUNE 05/07i97 Equipment Description PHOSPHATE CHEMTK-4 DRAIN Location 3 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL4 FT WESTOF 18.25 2 FT

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 46 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 36250901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 32 UNIT REPLACEUNIT. osf2g!97 Equipment Description MERNO 2 AC UNIT Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 62 FT WEST OF EAST 35001007 WELD 0 01 EE EG 1 ENGtNE INSTALL LIO UNE UNION 05;08!97 Equipment Description EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Location EMERGENCY DIESEL GEHERATOR ROOM-I 36505601 WELD 5 02 FW 77 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10D09/97 Equipment Description SGCFWUNE PI-254C ISOL Location 45 FTSOUTH OF NORTH WALL IIS FTEASTOF WEST 36363402 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 81 UNIT REPLACE UNIT 05116/98 Equipment Description INST CAL ROOMAC UNIT 31 Location IN INSTRUMENT CALLAB. I FT NORTH OF SOUTHWALL 36582701 YIELD 0 02 VS 208 VALVE S-97-1413 REPLACE VALVE 12109!97 Equip ent Description CONTROL ROOM2 A/C 9 CW INLET Location 1 FT OFFFLOOR, IN AC ROOMNO 2, 3 FT WESTOF 36586801 HVAC C 02 VS AC 2303 UNIT S-97-1647 REPLACE UNIT 07122/97 Equipment Description A/C FOR (ROOF)P-250 COMPUTER ROOM Location ON ROOFOF MER-2 35615701 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPAIRUNIT REFRIGERATION LEAKS 06/10/97 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM ACUNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 36663501 WELD 0 02 UA 558 VALVE 5-97-1729 REPAIR:REPLACE TEE 06;06,97 Equipment Description UNIT I VS SYSHX 48 IA SUPMDRISOL Location IN MECHEQUIPROOM3. ABOVEI-SW-PCV-101A, 7 FT OFF 36686901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1528 UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSOR. 06126!97 Equipment Descripton TSCBATTERYROOM AC UNIT Location 4 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 95 FT WEST OF EAST WALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 47 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders in Designated Areas since Aug,1995 36690401 WELD 5 01 Fw 46 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 04120;00 Equiprent Description SG B FWLINE P1-1540ISOL Location 30FT SOUTHOF NORTH WALL 90FT EASTOF WEST WALL 3 36801701 HVAC 0 01 VS E 3C UNIT 5-97-1760 REPLACECHILLERUNtT 06:15!98 Equipment Description CENTRAL AC WATERCHILLER Location 3 FT OFFFLOOR,MER* 1, SOUTHOF I -VS-E-IA 36844401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPAIRUREPLACE TANDOMCOMPRESSOR 06/I18/97 Equipment Description NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 10 FT WESTOF EAST 37034203 WELD 0 02 UA S59 VALVE MODIFY TUBINGASPERET 03/111/8 Equipment Description UNIT 1 VSSYSHX 4A IA SUPHDR ISOL Location IN MECHEQUt ROOM3,7 FTABOVE2-SW-PCV-IOOA, 7 FT 37045803 WELD 0 02 IA 558 VALVE MODIFYTUBING ASPERET 02127195 Equipment Description UNIT 1 VSSYSHi 4B IA SUPHDRISOL Location IN MECHEQUIP ROOM3. ABOVEI-SW-PCV-101A, 7 FT OFF 37046203 WELD 0 02 LA 557 VALVE MODIFYTUB NG ASPERET 02:23;98 Equiprwent Description UNIT I VSSYSHX4C IA SUPMDRISOL Location 7 FT SOUTHOF 1-VS-E-4C. 9 FT OFFFLOOR 37184001 WELD 0 01 HS TK 5 ACCUMU REPAIRLEAK 11:19!97 Equipment Description SULPHITECHEMTANK 5 Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EASTOF WEST WALL 3 37176302 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 23DB UNIT REPLACE CHECKVALVE/1NVESTIGATEiREPAIRt 08!29/97 Equipment Description AC UNIT (ROOF) FOR P-250 COMPUTERROOM Location 1 Fr OFF ROOF,3 FT S OF N VALL, 10 FT V OF E WALL.

37413301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-80T UNIT REPLACEFANDRIVEBELT,REPAIROILUNE 09/12197 Equipment Descnption NO 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTHOF NORTH WALL, I0FT WEST OF EAST

Engineering WVork Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 48 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 37457101 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT INVESTIGATEIREPAIR UNIT 10103;97 Equipment Description SERVICEBLOGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL.

37230002 WELD 5 01 RD MG 1-2 GENERA WELD SUPPORT 10/28198 Equipment Descrlption CONTROL RODMOTOR GENERATOR Location IN UNIT I SWGEARRM ACROSSfROM 4160V F TRANSFER 36039902 HVAC 0 01 VS E IC UNWT REMOVEEXISTING TOWERPREPARE FOR NEW 12/11/97 Equipment Description CENTRALAC EVAPORATORCONDENSERIC Location AT NORTH WALL OF MERS*

37854401 WELD 0 01 HS TK 5 ACCUMU FABRICATEIINSTALL TANK 07111!98 Equipment Description SULPHITE CHEMTANK S Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 37869701 HVAC 0 01 VS E 4B UNIT S-97-3337 REPLACE SERVICEVALVESASREQUIRED 06r10198 Equipment Description CONT ROOMCHILLER Location MER3. 6 FT SOUTH OF NORTH V:ALL. 15 FT EASTOF 38131104 WELD S 01 FWRTD11IC DETECT S98-0113 REPLACE RTD WELL 03125198 Equipment Description SG C FW RTD Location 30 FT S OF N WALL, 105 FT EOF W WALL, 4 FT OFF FLOOR 38220602 MECH 5 02 FW FCV 2498 VALVE S97-2825 INSPECT I REPLACE BODYTO BONNETSTUDS 05:04/99 Equipment Defription SG C FEEDREG Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 125 FT EAST OF WEST 38225901 MECH 5 02 FW FCV2478 VALVE S97-3204 REPAIRVALVE 05/04!99 Equipment Description SG A FEEDREG Locat:on 3S FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 75 FT EASTOF WESTWALL 38225902 MECH 5 02 rW FCV2478 VALVE S97-282S INSPECTI REPLACE BODYTO BONNETSTUDS 04/24199 Equipment Description SG A FEEDREG Location 3S FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 7S FT EASTOF WEST WALL

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 49 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 38226102 MECH S CI FW FCV 1478 VALVE S97-2825 REPLACEBODY/ BONNETSTUDS 04/21/00 Equipment Desa4PtiOn SG A FEEDREGVALVE Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 35 FT WEST OF EASTWALL.

38226702 MECH 5 01 FW FCV 1488 VALVE 597-2825 REPLACE BODYI BONNET STUDS 04128/00 Equipment Descrliton SG B FEEDREGVALVE Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 55 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 38226902 MECH S 01 PW FCV 1498 VALVE S97-282S REPLACEBODY I BONNET STUDS 04120/00 Equipment Dscription SG C FEEDREGVALVE Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 75 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 38612301 WELD S 02 PW FE 2476 IDTECT S-9B-0428 REPAIR SUPPORTS 05/12/99 Equipment DescripVon SG A FW FLOW ELEM Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 65 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 38612302 WELD S 02 VW FE 2486 DTECT S-98-0428 REPAIRSUPPORTS 05J12/99 Equipment DescriVton SG B Fw FLOW ELEM Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 65 FT EAST OF WEST WALL, 38612303 WELD S 02 PW FE 2496 DETEaC 598-0428 REPAIRSUPPORTS CS/12/99 Equipment DescrtWon SG C FW FLOW ELEM Location 40 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALLU OS FT EAST OF WEST 38695201 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT REPLACE TANDOM COMPRESSORS 04102/98 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT LocatIon 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 38697401 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 1-50T 3U4T REPAIR REFRIGERANT LEAK. 04/02/98 ROOM Equipment Descripton UNIT-I CABLESPREADING Locatbin 7 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 20 FT EASTOF WEST WALL 1 38706501 MECH 0 02 EG P 1 PUMP CTS 4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP 05/06198 Equipment Descri0pon LUBEOIL CRC PMP Location 15 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EAST OF WEST WALL,

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 50 of71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 38706502 WELD 0 02 EG P I PUMP FABRICATElINSTALL SUPPORTS 05/06t98 Equipment Desclption LUBEOn. aRC PiUM1P Location 15 rTNORTH OF SOUTHWALL, 20 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 38710801 HECH 0 01 EG P 1 PUMP CTS4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP 02117/9 Equipment Descipton LSE OIL CRC PilIP Location 2 FT SOUTH OF DIESEL. 8 FT EASTOF WEST WALL. 3.5 PT 38710802 WELD 0 01 EG P 1 PUMP FASRICATE/INSTALL SUPPORTS 02/161n Equipment Description LUBEOIL CRC PiiMP Location 2 FT SOUTHOF DIESEL. 8 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 3.5 FT 38711101 MECH 0 03 CG P 1 PUMP CTS4109 RELOCATE LO PUMP 08/11/98 Equipment Description LUBEOIL CRC Pi iMP iocation 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, IS FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

38711102 WELD 0 03 Ic P 1 PUMP FA8RICATEANSTALL SUPPORTS 08110t98 Equipment Description LUSEOIL CRC Pi iMp Location 35 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 18 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 38695202 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT WT REPLACE 40 TON COMPRESSOR 04/20198 Equipment Description SERVICE8LDG Ai UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EASTWALL, 38943801 WELD 0 01 LA 1362 VALVE REPAIRJREPLCE TUBING 06118198 Equipment Description I-VS-AC-4 IA IStOLVALVE Location 8 FT EASTOF WEST WALL 70 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 8 39058201 WELD 0 01 EG C 1 DLOWER S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES 08/12tn Equipment Desciptin AM COMPRESSO, R NO I Location 3 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 2 FT OFFWEST WALL, ON 39058301 WELD 0 01 EG C 2 SLOWER S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES 12tl7/98 Equipment DecrPtion AIR COMPRESSO R NO 2 (ENGINE) Location 25 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 51 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 39055401 WELD 0 02 EG C 2 SLOWER 5-98-1376 INSTALL ENDPLATE 02112/99 Equipment Description AIR COMPRESSOR NO 2 Location 35 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL. 3 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 39058601 WELD 0 02 EG C I SLOWER S-98-1376 INSTALL END PLATES 03/08199 Equipment Desciption AM COMPRESSOR NO I Location 4 FT NORTH or SOUTH WALL. 4 FT OFF WEST WALL, ON 39057o01 WELD 0 03 EG C 2 SLOWER S498-1376 INSTALL ENDPLATE 08/21/98 Equipment DeSciption AIR COMPRESSOR NO 2 Location 50 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT OFFWEST WALL, ON 39058801 WELD 0 03 EG C 1 SLOWER S4841376 INSTALL ENDPLATE 09/24/99 Equipment Descripton AM COMPRESSOR NO I Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, 4 FT OFFWEST WALL, ON 39136101 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT UtOT REPAIRUNIT REFRIGERATION LEAKS 0611S/98 Equipment Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EASTWALL, 39587001 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3-00T tOaT REPAIRREFRIGERANT LEAKCS) 08/28198 Equpfment Description NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 39670201 MECH 0 01 tS DR 17 ACCESS S-982190 REPLACE DOUBLEDOORSAND FRAME 11n21/98 Equipment Descriptxn TSC HVACROOM Location HVACROOM8ESIDE TSC 40049901 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-SOT tUhT REPAIRUNIT REFRIGERATION tEAKS 11/24198 Equipment Desatptton SERVICE 8LDG AC UNIT Location 10 PT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 30 FT WEST OF EASTWALL.

40145502 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 153A UN[IT S98-3292 REPLACE COMPRESSOR 01107199 Equipment Description TSC COMPUTER ROOMAHU Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTHWALL, IS FT EASTOF WEST

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 52 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 40376601 NSS 0 01 VS E 1 8 UNtT FABRICATE AND INSTALL DRIP TRAY 12(06/99 Equipnent Description CENTRAL AC EVIAPORATORCONDENSER18 LocatIon AT NORTH WAL. OF MER I 40380201 HVAC 0 01 VS ACC 153A UNIT 5-99-0147 INVESTIGATE REPAIR UNIT. 01(29/99 Equipment Descriptin TSCCOMPUTER ROOMAHU Location 4 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL, IS FT EASTOF WEST 40525301 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 153 WlaT INVESTIGATEJREPAIR UNIT WATER LEAK. OStl6/99 Equb*xnt Descrioptin MECHE4UIpE*Nr ROOMACUNIT LocatIon 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, ON EASTWALL. ON FLOOR 39939304 WELD 0 02 EG P 1 PUMP MODIFYPIPING 02/26/99 Equipmwnt Description LBE OIL CIRCP UMP Location 1 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 40555101 HYAC 0 01 VS ACc3 I 1NI (P,W.NSS)REPLACE PREHEATER COIL 10/099 EquiPfent Desalptibn IER NO 2 AC UNNIT Location 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 6 FT EASTOF I-VS-HV-3, 1 40573001 HVAC 0 01 VS ACC 3-80T UNIT REPAIRREFRIGERANT LEAK(S) 03110/99 Equipment Desciption NO I SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST 40555102 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 3 UInT PERFORM TEMPORARY COIL LEAKREPAIR 02D2S/t Equipment Descipt0n MERNO 2 AC Ut IT' Location 3 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL, 6 FT EASTOF I-VS-HV-3, 1 40730801 HVAC 0 01 VS ACC 440T UwrN REPLACE COMPRESSORS 05/06(99 Equipment DeXrIpton SERVICEBLDG AC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EASTWALL, 40730901 HVAC 0 01 VS ACC 3-80T UNIT REPLACE COMPRESSORS 04t07/99 Equipnent Description No I SWITCHGEAR ROOMAC UNIT Location 30 FT SOUTH O NORTH WALL. 10 FT WEST OF EAST

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 53 of 71 Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 41149201 MECH 0 01 BC RV 130 VALVE PM:TESTRELIEFVALVEIAWSV/RVPROGRAM. 11/17/00 Eaulprnert Description SAMPLECaR20 OUTLET RELIEFVALVE LocatIon 6 FT WEST OF 1-FW-MOV-154A, 18 FT NORTH OF SOUTH 41240001 WELD s 02 rW` is VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/09100 Equir-et Description SG A fW LINE DRAIN Location 35 FT SOUTH Of NORTH WALL 98 FT EASTOf WEST WALL 41240003 WELD 5 02 FW 17 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/09/00 EquipMt Description SG A FW UNE DRAIN LINE ROOT VALVE Location 35 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 9sFT EAST OF WEST WALL 41362501 HVAC 0 01 VS AC 4-80T UNIT REPLCOMPRESSORS/FILTERIAD) SWITCHES 10/06/99 Equiprent Description SERVICEBLDGAC UNIT Location 10 FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL. 30 FT WEST OF EAST WALL, 41472001 WELD 0 01 HS 118 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 07/25/00 Equipet Description HTG BOILER 4A ATOMIZING STM HDR IOL Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 3 FT EAST OF WEST WALL 6 41555501 WELD S 02 FW 48 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10/08/00 EquIPment Description SG B FW LINE DRAIN LINE ROOT VALVE Location 40FT SOUrH OF NORTH WALL 85FT EASTOF WEST WALL 2 41555502 WELD S 02 FW 49 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 10108/00 Equipt Description SG B FW LINE DRAIN Location 40FT SOUTH OF NORTH WALL 85FT EASTOF WEST WALL I 41595801 WELD 0 01 HS 132 VALVE REPLACE VALVE 07/17/00 EquiPent Description HTG BOILER 40 STH OUTLET Location 30 FT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL 2s FT WEST OF EASTWALL 41868701 WELD 0 02 SS E 20 HTEXCN S-99-2319 REROUTETUBING 01/20/00 Equipment DescriPbt FEEDWATER SAMPLECOOLER Location IN MER*2, BETWEENFEEDWATER LINES, WEST OF Flame Permit Issued Work Orders In Designated Areas since Aug,1995 41369201 WELD 0 01 STRRSD3 ACCESS S-992404 REPLACE HASPON DOOR 11/24/99 Equipment Description CONTROL ROOMrMERG EXIT To TURBBLDG Location IN CONTROL ROOM,SOUTHWEST CORNER.

40566807 WELD 0 02 EG P 1 PUMP WELDINLET PIPING 10/1J99 Equipment Desciption LUBEOIL CIRCPUMIP Location I SFT NORTH OF SOUTH WALL. 20 FT EASTOF WEST WALL, 43140101 HVAC 0 01 VS E 3C Warr S-1287 REPAIRREFRIGERATION LEAJL 06/08/00 Equipment Description CENTRALAC WATERCHILLER Location 3 FT OFf FLOOR,MER41, SOUTHOF I*VS-E-IA

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 54 of 71 Attachment 4 Halon System Tests

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 55 of 71 ESGR Halon Tank Pressure and Weight Tests Surry surveillance procedure 1-LPT-FP-018 and 2-LPT-FP-018 checks the Halon tank pressure and weight. These tests are performed on a semiannual basis or are sometimes used to control post maintenance testing. All tests were completed SAT. One cylinder was swapped on 10/27/1999 due to the weight being lower than the test acceptance criteria. This was not included as a cylinder loss of function.

1-LPT-FP-018 2-LPT-FP-018 9/23/2003 9/30/2003 4/3/2003 4/4/2003 10/22/2002 10/24/2002 6/13/2002 6/13/2002 5/31/2002 5/31/2002 5/8/2002 3/20/2002 3/20/2002 10/4/2001 3/19/2002 4/4/2001 10/3/2001 3/6/2001 4/4/2001 9/13/2000 9/13/2000 4/12/2000 4/12/2000 10/26/1999 10/27/1999 4/14/1999 4/14/1999 10/2/1998 10/21/1998 9/17/1998 9/17/1998 4/29/1998 4/29/1998 11/13/1997 11/13/1997 5/8/1997 5/16/1997 11/12/1996 8/20/1996 8/16/1996 5/14/1996

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 56 of 71 ESGR Halon System Function and Flow Tests Surry surveillance procedure 1-LPT-FP-017 and 2-LPT-FP-017 tests the function of the Halon system every 18 months. The tests are also used to control post maintenance testing. The following shows the tests performed from 1996 to 2003 and their results.

Date Test Results Comments 7/30/2003 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 00494856-01 to test 1-VS-FDMP-21 and 2-VS-FDMP-15. Two damper functional failures. Two damper demands during retest.

8/15/2002 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/8/2001 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 00446257-01 to test 1-VS-FDMP-22A, which was found failed in the closed position. Not a functional failure. One damper demand.

2/22/2001 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 8/18/1999 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/4/1998 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/26/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/12/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Performed as part of PMT for WO 0034479301 to test Halon panel trouble alarm. Failed zone

.pressure switch.

7/11/1996 1-LPT-FP-017 SAT Used for troubleshooting only. No system testing performed. Not counted as demand.

7/30/2003 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/30/2003. Not counted as a demand.

8/15/2002 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/8/2001 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 3/8/2001 2/22/2001 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 8/18/1999 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 3/4/1998 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/26/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT 18 month surveillance 7/12/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/12/1996. Not counted as a demand.

7/11/1996 2-LPT-FP-017 SAT Same as Unit 1 test on 7/11/1996. Not counted as a demand.

Notes:

During the Unit 1 surveillance test, 1-LPT-FP-017, three dampers are verified to actuate.

During the Unit 1 surveillance test, 2-LPT-FP-017, five dampers are verified to actuate.

During Post Maintenance Testing (PMT), dampers specified tested using both Unit 1 and 2 surveillance procedures (i.e. 2 demands).

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 57 of 71 Total number of damper actuation demands:

Unit 1: 5 surveillance tests - 15 demands 2 Post Maintenance Tests - 3 demands Unit 2:: 5 surveillance tests - 25 demands 2 Post Maintenance tests - 3 demands Total Demands = 46 Total damper failures = 2 This failure data is used to update the failure point estimate for the IVSMOD-FO-FDMP 14, 21 and 22A basic events. Using the program REDACS (ref. 7.21) to perform the Bayesian updating, the 2 failures in 46 demands are used as inputs to the prior distribution of Median 1.60E-3 and error factor of 2.93. The resulting posterior mean is 4.22E-3.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 58 of 71 ESGR Door Corrective Maintenance To capture the unavailability of the Halon system due to unavailability of doors in the ESGR due to corrective maintenance, a review of the plant work orders indicates some additional unavailability time that should be included with the system test unavailability. The following is an email from the System Engineer that summarizes the results of the review.

I totaled the Work Orders that were performed on the ESGR Ul & U2, as follows:

Unit 1 ESGR had 16 events that affected the latching, closure devices, ect... of the doors in the Fire Area. The TRM requires a compensatory measure of staging a fire watch. Years ago it was the attachment of a sign to ensure the door latched after usage. Some of the doors were dead bolted close upon finding the deviating condition.

Unit 2 ESGR had 14 events.

If you total the two rooms (30 events) and divide by 8 years (some of these events may go back to 1990) you have 4 events a year.

Considering the TRM and old TS required a comp in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that would mean 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> a year.

Therefore, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> yearly for testing and 4 for events for a total of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. (previous # was 15)

The aforementioned numbers do not include door 2-BS-DR-21 which was evaluated by W.W. Cox have having no contribution to affecting the Halon system.

In addition, it does not included door 2-BS-DR-19 which goes to MER 3. This door was excluded because the MER 3 entrance has two doors (water tight door).

I would add a 25% margin and use 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> yearly.

T.S. Gunning F.P. System Engineer

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 59 of 71 Attachment 5 Sensitivity Analysis Results Files

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 60 of 71 The following MS Excel spreadsheets contain the calculations of the delta CDFs for the additional sensitivities summarized in section 6. Reference 7.22 contains further information on the contents and calculations performed in the spreadsheets. The spreadsheet names are based on the case names in the summary table in section 6.0. The icons below are links to the actual file. The remainder of this attachment contains a printout of the spreadhseets.

"SDP Phase 3 NRC "SDP Sensitivity Case "SDP Sensitivity Case "SDP Sensitivity Case Results.xis" A.xIs" B Unit 1.xis" B Unit 2.xIs"

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 61 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A Results Summary - Applicable for Both Units 1 and 2 Scenario Frequency CCDP CDF

3. Water Spray on Bc,th Buses - Room 1H 1.1 E-06 1.8E-01 2.iDE-07 28%

4. Water Spray on Bcoth Buses - Room 1J 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 3.4E-08 5%

5. Severe Switchgeair Fire in 1J 2.7E-05 1.7E-02 4.,7E-07 67%

Total 2.8E-05 7.1DE-07 Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1H Fire Source Frequency Severity Adjusted Factor Freq.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 3.OE-04 49%

Transients 7.5E-05 0.09 6.8E-06 1%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 0.09 2.7E-05 4%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0.09 4.4E-06 1%

Transformers 1.3E-03 0.1 1.3E-04 21%

Fire Protection 1.6E-04 0.12 1.9E-05 3%

Panels Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0.12 1.2E-04 20%

Total 5.4E-03 6.1 E-04 Water Spray on Both Buses 1.8E-03 Scenario 1.1 E-06 Frequency Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1J Fire Source Frequency Severity Adjusted  %

Factor Freq.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 3.OE-04 52%

Transients 7.5E-05 0.09 6.8E-06 1%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 0.09 2.7E-05 5%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0.09 4.4E-06 1%

Transformers 1.OE-03 0.1 1.OE-04 17%

Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0.12 1.2E-04 21%

Ventilation Systems 2.OE-04 0.08 1.6E-05 3%

Total 5.1E-03 5.7E-04 Water Spray on Both Buses 3.3E-04 Scenario 1.9E-07 Frequency

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 62 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A Scenario Freq 5 - Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J Fire Source Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Adjusted  %

Factor Factor x Freq.

Non-Supp.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 0.05 0.0013 1.5E-05 56%

Transients 7.5E-05 0.0')9 6.8E-06 25%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 D O.OE+00 0%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0 O.OE+00 0%

Transformers 1.OE-03 0.1 0.05 0.005 5.OE-06 19%

Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0 O.OE+00 0%

Ventilation Systems 2.OE-04 0 O.OE+00 0%

Total 5.1 E-03 Scenario 2.7E-05 Frequency

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 63 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A CCDP Scenarios 1-4 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculation Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2) Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq # Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 2 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 3 CD O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 4 CD 8.2E-02 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 5 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+0O 7.8E-02 6 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 7 CD 1.1E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8 CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 12 CD 9.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+0O 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 15 CD 1.2E-03 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+00 I 1.8E-01

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 64 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case A CCDP Scenario 5 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Faliure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculation Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2) Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq # Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 2 OK O.OE+0O 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 3 CD 6.4E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 4 CD 1.6E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 5 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 6 CD 8.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1 E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 7 CD 2.2E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8 CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+0O 9 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD 7.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 12 CD 1.8E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD 9.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 15 CD 2.4E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.0E-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+OO 1.7E-02

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 65 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B for Unit 1 Results Summary for Unit 1 Scenario Frequency CCDP CDF

3. Water Spray on Both Buses - Roc im 1H 1.1E-06 1.8E-01 2.OE-07 51%

4. Water Spray on Both Buses - Roc Im 1J 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 3A4E-08 9%

5. Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J 8.8E-06 1.7E-02 1.5E-07 40%

Total 1.OE-05 3.8E-07 Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1H Fire Source Frequency Severity Adjusted Factor Freq.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 3.OE-04 49%

Transients 7.5E-05 0.09 6.8E-06 1%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 0.09 2.7E-05 4%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0.09 4.4E-06 1%

Transformers 1.3E-03 0.1 1.3E-04 21%

Fire Protection 1.6E-04 0.12 1.9E-05 3%

Panels Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0.12 1.2E-04 20%

Total 5.4E-03 6.1 E-04 Water Spray on Both Buses 1.8E-03 Scenario 1.1 E-06 Frequency Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1J Fire Source Frequency Severity Adjusted  %

Factor Freq.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 3.OE-04 52%

Transients 7.5E-05 0.09 6.8E-06 1%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 0.09 2.7E-05 5%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0.09 4.4E-06 1%

Transformers 1.OE-03 0.1 1.OE-04 17%

Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0.12 1.2E-04 21%

Ventilation Systems 2.OE-04 0.08 1.6E-05 3%

Total 5.1 E-03 5.7E-04 Water Spray on Both Buses 3.3E-04 Scenario 1.9E-07 Frequency

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 66 of 71 SDP Sensitivitv Case B Scenario Freq 5 - Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J for Unit 1 Fire Source Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Adjusted Factor Factor x Freq.

Non-Supp.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 0.0051 0.00061 2 1.5E-06 17%

Transients 7.5E-05 O.C19 6.8E-06 77%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 ID O.OE+00 0%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 D O.OE+00 0%

Transformers 1.OE-03 0.1 0.0051 0.0005,1 5.1 E-07 6%

Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 O O.OE+00 0%

Ventilation Systems 2.OE-04 O O.OE+00 0%

Total 5.1 E-03 Scenario 8.8E-06 Frequency

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 67 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B CCDP Scenarios 1-4 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculatlon Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2) Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq # Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 2 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 0.OE+00 7.8E-02 3 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 4 CD 8.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 5 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 6 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 7 CD 1.1E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.0E-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8 CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9 N/A O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK 0.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 12 CD 9.2E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 O.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 15 CD 1.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+00

__1.8E-01

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 68 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B CCDP Scenario 5 High RCP No RCP Establish No RCP Turbine Maintain Recover 1H Pressure Fire Shutdown In Seal Failure Connect Seal Failure Driven AFW Makeup Bus Recirculatlon Initiation 5 minutes (1) with Unit 2 (2) Pump Integrity Functions Cooling Seq # Status CCDP F1 RP1 RP2 U2X RP3 AFW U2M R1H HPR 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 2 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 3 CD 6.4E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 4 CD 1.6E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 5 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.0E-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 6 CD 8.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1E-01 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.0E-03 1.OE+00 7 CD 2.2E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.OE-01 1.1 E-01 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 8 CD 1.6E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 9.OE-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+O0 9 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 10 OK O.OE+O0 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1 E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 11 CD 7.2E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 9.9E-01 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 12 CD 1.8E-04 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 9.2E-01 13 OK O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 1.OE+00 7.8E-02 14 CD 9.4E-05 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 9.8E-01 1.3E-02 2.OE-03 1.OE+00 15 CD 2.4E-06 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.OE-01 1.OE+00 1.9E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 16 CD 1.8E-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.1E-01 9.6E-02 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.0E+00 1.OE+00 17 N/A O.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE-03 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 1.OE+00 18 N/A O.OE+O0 1.7E-02

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 69 of 71 SDP Sensitivity Case B for Unit 2 Results Summary for Unit 2 Scenario Frequency CCDP CDF

3. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2H 1.1 E-06 1.8E-01 2.OE-07 49%

4. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2J 1.9E-07 1.8E-01 3.4E-08 9%

5. Severe Switchgear Fire in 2J 9.6E-06 1.7E-02 1.7E-07 42%

Total 1.1 E-05 4.0E-07 Scenario Freq 3 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2H Same as Unit 1 Scenario Freq 4 - Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 2J Same as Unit 1 Scenario Freq 5 - Severe Switchgear Fire in 1J for Unit 2 Fire Source Frequency Severity Non-Supp. Severity Adjusted Factor Factor x Freq.

Non-Supp.

Electrical Cabinets 2.5E-03 0.12 0.007 0.000M 4 2.1 E-06 22%

)

Transients 7.5E-05 0.t 9 6.8E-06 71%

Welding/Ordinary 3.OE-04 0 O.OE+00 0%

Combustibles Welding/Cables 4.9E-05 0 O.OE+00 0%

Transformers 1.OE-03 0.1 0.007 0.00( 7 7.OE-07 7%

Battery Chargers 1.OE-03 0 O.OE+0O 0%

Ventilation Systems 2.OE-04 0 O.OE+00 0%

Total 5.1 E-03 Scenario 9.6E-06 Frequency CCDP Scenarios 1-4 Same as Unit 1 CCDP Scenario 5 Same as Unit 1

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 70 of 71 Attachment 6 Reviewer's Comments The reviewers of this calculation reviewed the calculation detail and performed a general review of the model development and results. This work is satisfactory in attaining its stated objectives.

In areas where some flexibility exists in determining terms and strategies, the authors made acceptable choices which are based upon sound engineering judgment. Certain issues have been discussed and they have been resolved to our satisfaction prior to the printing of the final copy of this calculation. No additional changes are required.

Engineering Work Sheet Calc Number: SM-1442 Rev. 0 Page 71 of 71

) Dominion-CALCULATION REVIEW CHECKLIST ATTACIHMENT 7 Calculation No. SM-1442 Rev.O Page 1 of _1_

NOTE: If Yes" is not answered, an explanation shall be provided below.

Reference may be made to explanations contained in the calculation or addendum.

fQuesunitoA**.> .,.+-.

1. Have the sources of design inputs been correctly selected and El M referenced in the calculation?

2. Are the sources of design inputs up-to-date and retrievable/attached El l to the calculation?

3. Where appropriate, have the other disciplines reviewed or provided D the design inputs for which they are responsible?

4. Have design inputs been confirmed by analysis, test, measurement, field walkdown, or other pertinent means as appropriate for the configuration analyzed?

5. Are assumptions adequately described and bounded by the Station Li S Design Basis?

6. Have the bases for engineering judgments been adequately and 1 clearly presented?

7. Were appropriate calculation/analytic methods used and are outputs 1 reasonable when compared to inputs?

8. Are computations technically accurate? EF 9.Has the calculation made appropriate allowances for instrument 0 errors and calibration equipment errors? (Reference STD-EEN-0304)

10. Have those computer codes used in the analysis been referenced 0 0 in the calculation?

11. Have all exceptions to station design basis criteria and regulatory Li requirements been identified and justified in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11-1974?

Commnents: (Attach additional pages if needed)

1. 1-4: This is not a design calculation.

1. 5: The substance of this calculation is not addressed by the DBD. Assumptions are adequately described.

1. 9: There are no applicable instrument/calibration errors for this calculation.

1. 11: This calculation does not make any exceptions to station design basis or regulatory requirements.

Prepared By (Print Name) Signature Date J. D. Leary 1i;!5 $.L-1. ,tfti co^ s/D S. H. Shen T.P. John Reviewed By (Print Name) Si'ature Date T.P. John / Gag so J. D. Leary k vy __ ___

Do col June 01

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Enclosure 2 Completed Halon System Surveillance Tests Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

Serial No. 04-078A Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 Enclosure 3 Halon System and Emergency Switchgear Room Drawings Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)