ML041190075

Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League'S Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration April 8, 2004, Order

ML041190075
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/19/2004
From:	Curran D Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Byrdsong A T
References
50-413-OLA, 50-414-OLA, ASLBP 03-815-03-OLA, RAS 7662
Download: ML041190075 (6)

Text

RAS 7&o2-April 19, 2004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOCKETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC April 27, 2004 (11:08AM)

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of: )

Docket Nos. 50-413-OLA DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION ) 50-414-OLA (Catawba Nuclear Station, )

Units 1 and 2) )

BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OR RECONSIDERATION APRIL 8, 2004, ORDER Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League ("BREDL") hereby requests that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB") clarify or reconsider paragraph 6 of the ASLB's April 8, 2004, Order (Confirming Matters Addressed at April 6 Teleconference) (hereinafter "April 8 Order"), because statements in paragraph 6 appear to limit or confuse the scope of Contentions I and II in a manner not intended by the ASLB.

As admitted by the ASLB, Contention I asserts that:

The LAR is inadequate because Duke has failed to account for differences in MOX and LEU fuel behavior (both known differences and recent information on possible differences) and for the impact of such differences on LOCAs and on the DBA analysis for Catawba.

LBP-04-04, Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Standing and Contentions), slip op. at 41 (March 5, 2004). Contention II asserts that:

The LAR is inadequate because Duke has (a) failed to account for the impact of differences in MOX and LEU fuel behavior (both known differences and recent information on possible differences) on the potential for releases from Catawba in the event of a core disruptive accident, and (b) failed to quantify to the maximum extent Tereplte - s-ec y-c sccY-o

practicable environmental impact factors relating to the use of MOX LTAs at Catawba, as required by NEPA.

Id. at 42.

As formulated in LBP-04-04, Contention I appears to be restricted to the adequacy of Duke's analysis of design basis accidents ("DBAs"). 1 Contention II appears to be restricted to the adequacy of Duke's analysis of potential severe accidents, i.e., beyond-design-basis accidents, with respect to compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and NRC safety regulations.

Two sentences in the ASLB's April 8 Order, however, appear to confuse the distinction between the scope of Contentions I and II. In paragraph 6, the ASLB states as follows:

With respect to Contention I, this contention encompasses those calculations involved in the determination of events up to and including LOCAs and DBAs, but does not include analyses related to any releases either in containment or offsite. In Contention II, on the other hand, the term 'core disruptive accident' refers to any core melt, whether contained in vessel or not, resulting from LOCAs, DBAs, or severe accidents, and thus Contention II encompasses any consequences thereof, including releases into containment or offsite.

Id. at 2-3.

First, the ASLB's statement that Contention I "encompasses those calculations involved in the determination of events up to and including LOCAs and DBAs, but does not include analyses related to any releases either in containment or offsite," is confusing because Duke's LOCA analysis does, in fact, involve consideration of releases in containment. NRC regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 100 require that in its LOCA analysis, Duke must show that releases to containment from a DBAs do not exceed certain limits. Thus, the adequacy of Duke's 1 In fact, BREDL seeks to litigate the adequacy of Duke's analysis with respect to only one type of DBA, a loss of coolant accident ("LOCA").

2

compliance with Part 100 limits in the event of an in-containment release is at issue in Contention I. Therefore, BREDL requests that the ASLB modify this sentence to read:

"With respect to Contention I, this contention encompasses those calculations involved in the determination of events up to and including LOCAs and DBAs, including the Part 100 DBA analysis." 2 BREDL is also confused by the ASLB's statement that in Contention II, "the term 'core disruptive accident' refers to any core melt, whether contained in vessel or not . . ." To BREDL's knowledge, the term "core disruptive accident" is not defined in NRC regulations.

Based on the manner in which the ASLB used the term in Contention II, however, it appears to relate to a severe or beyond-design-basis accident, i.e, an event in which a LOCA or other initiating event occurs but emergency core cooling systems are unable to terminate core damage, leading to a loss of coolable core geometry, core melt, melt relocation and vessel melt-through.

Under this definition, a "core disruptive accident" could not be contained by the vessel. Thus, BREDL requests that the ASLB change the sentence to read as follows: "In Contention II, on the other hand, the term 'core disruptive accident' refers to any core melt associated with a severe accident."

BREDL respectfully submits that these proposed modification will clarify that Contention I addresses design basis issues, and Contention II addresses beyond-design-basis issues relating to safety and NEPA compliance.

2 BREDL recognizes that consideration of Part 100 compliance issues in Contention I could lead to some overlap between Contentions I and II regarding evidence related to radionuclide release fractions during core damage, since the "design basis" core-to-containment source term is included within the "severe accident" core-to-containment source term. This degree of overlap is manageable, however.

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Respectfully submitted, eCuffan Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.

1726 M Street N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036 202/328-3500 e-mail: dcurran(aharmoncurran.com April 19, 2004 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 19, 2004, copies of Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League's Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration of April 8 Order were served on the following by e-mail and/or first-class mail, as indicated below. In addition, copies of the exhibits were served by FAX.

Ann Marshall Young, Chair Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

Administrative Judge Antonio Fernandez, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Kathleen A. Kannler, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: T-3F23 Mail Stop 15 D21 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: AMY~nrc. gov Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E-mail: slu@nrc.gov axf2@nrc gov, Anthony J. Baratta KAK1@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mary Olson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Southeast Office, Nuclear Information and Mail Stop: T-3F23 Resource Service Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O Box 7586 E-mail: AJB5@nrc.gov Asheville, NC 28802 E-mail: nirs. se@mindspring. com Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lisa F. Vaughn, Esq.

Mail Stop: 0-16C1 Legal Dept. (PBO5E)

Washington, D.C. 20555 Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street (ECI lX)

Thomas S. Elleman Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Administrative Judge E-mail: l fVaughn@duke-energy. cor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 4760 East Country Villa Drive Janet Marsh Zeller, Executive Director Tucson, AZ 85718 Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League E-mail: elleman@eos.ncsu.edu P.O. Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 E-mail: BREDL@skybest. com David A. Repka, Esq.

Anne W. Cottingham, Esq.

Winston & Strawn, LLP 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 E-mail: drepka@winston. com acotting@winston.com

2 Office of the Secretary (original and two copies)

ATTN: Docketing and Service U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: 0-16C1 Washington, D.C. 20555 E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc. qov Diane Curran