ML041060552

Issuance of Amendments Rets 3/4.7, Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System and NOED No. 04-6-001

ML041060552
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	04/15/2004
From:	Michael Webb NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4
To:	Sheppard J South Texas
Webb M, NRR/DLPM, 415-1347
References
04-6-001, TAC MC2352, TAC MC2357, TAC MC2358, TAC MC2359
Download: ML041060552 (19)

Text

April 15, 2004 Mr. James J. Sheppard President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.7, CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM (TAC NOS. MC2358 AND MC2359) AND NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION NO. 04-6-001 (TAC NOS. MC2352 AND MC2357)

Dear Mr. Sheppard:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 161 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 and Amendment No. 151 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 for the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 18, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 7 and 13, 2004.

The amendments revise TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.e.3 to add a footnote that allows use of alternate means to demonstrate that the requirements of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix A, General Design Criterion-19 are met when control room locations are found to be at positive pressures less than a 1/8 inch water gauge relative to adjacent areas. These amendments supersede Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)

No. 04-6-001, which the Commission staff granted to you on March 23, 2004.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael K. Webb, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 161 to NPF-76

2. Amendment No. 151 to NPF-80

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

April 15, 2004 Mr. James J. Sheppard President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.7, CONTROL ROOM MAKEUP AND CLEANUP FILTRATION SYSTEM(TAC NOS. MC2358 AND MC2359) AND NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION NO. 04-6-001 (TAC NOS. MC2352 AND MC2357)

Dear Mr. Sheppard:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 161 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 and Amendment No. 151 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 for the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 18, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 7 and 13, 2004.

The amendments revise TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.e.3 to add a footnote that allows use of alternate means to demonstrate that the requirements of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix A, General Design Criterion-19 are met when control room locations are found to be at positive pressures less than a 1/8 inch water gauge relative to adjacent areas. These amendments supersede Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)

No. 04-6-001, which the Commission staff granted to you on March 23, 2004.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael K. Webb, Senior Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 161 to NPF-76

2. Amendment No. 151 to NPF-80

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC RidsNrrDlpmLpdiv (HBerkow) RidsNrrDlpmLpdiv1 (RGramm)

PDIV-1 Reading RidsNrrPMMWebb RidsNrrLADBaxley GHill (4) RidsOgcRp RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter TBoyce MBlumberg RidsRgn4MailCenter (BJohnson)

CShulten RidsNrrDlpmDpr OEWEB NOED ACCESSION NO: ML041060552 *SE input provided - no major changes made ** See previous concurrence OFFICE PDIV-1/PM PDIV-1/LA DSSA/SPSB/SC IROB/Section A OGC PDIV-1/SC NAME MWebb DBaxley RDennig* TBoyce** TSmith(NLO) RGramm DATE 4/14/04 4/14/04 4/2/2004 4/12/2004 4/14/04 4/14/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 cc:

Senior Resident Inspector A. H. Gutterman, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Morgan, Lewis & Bockius P. O. Box 910 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Bay City, TX 77414 Washington, DC 20004 A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady Mr. T. J. Jordan, Vice President City of Austin Engineering & Technical Services Electric Utility Department STP Nuclear Operating Company 721 Barton Springs Road P. O. Box 289 Austin, TX 78704 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Mr. L. K. Blaylock S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing Mr. W. C. Gunst Nuclear Quality & Licensing Department City Public Service Board STP Nuclear Operating Company P. O. Box 1771 P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 San Antonio, TX 78296 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Mr. C. A. Johnson/A. C. Bakken Environmental and Natural Resources AEP Texas Central Company Policy Director P. O. Box 289 P. O. Box 12428 Mail Code: N5022 Austin, TX 78711-3189 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Jon C. Wood INPO Matthews & Branscomb Records Center 112 East Pecan, Suite 1100 700 Galleria Parkway San Antonio, TX 78205 Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Arthur C. Tate, Director Regional Administrator, Region IV Division of Compliance & Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bureau of Radiation Control 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Texas Department of Health Arlington, TX 76011 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756 D. G. Tees/R. L. Balcom Texas Genco, LP Brian Almon P. O. Box 1700 Public Utility Commission Houston, TX 77251 William B. Travis Building P. O. Box 13326 Judge, Matagorda County 1701 North Congress Avenue Matagorda County Courthouse Austin, TX 78701-3326 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, TX 77414 May 2003

South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 Susan M. Jablonski Office of Permitting, Remediation and Registration Texas Commission on Environmental Quality MC-122 P.O. Box 13087 Austin, TX 78711-3087 Mr. Terry Parks, Chief Inspector Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation Boiler Division P. O. Box 12157 Austin, TX 78711 Mr. Ted Enos 4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Ft. Worth, Texas 76109

STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-498 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 161 License No. NPF-76

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by STP Nuclear Operating Company* acting on behalf of itself and for Texas Genco, LP, the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, AEP Texas Central Company, and the City of Austin, Texas (the licensees), dated March 18, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 7 and 13, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• STP Nuclear Operating Company is authorized to act for Texas Genco, LP, the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, AEP Texas Central Company, and the City of Austin, Texas, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 161, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The STP Nuclear Operating Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 15, 2004

STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-499 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 151 License No. NPF-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by STP Nuclear Operating Company* acting on behalf of itself and for Texas Genco, LP, the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, AEP Texas Central Company, and the City of Austin, Texas (the licensees), dated March 18, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 7 and 13, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• STP Nuclear Operating Company is authorized to act for Texas Genco, LP, the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, AEP Texas Central Company, and the City of Austin, Texas, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 151, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The STP Nuclear Operating Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 15, 2004

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 161 AND 151 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499 Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 161 AND 151TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, ET AL.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated March 18, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040850488), as supplemented by letters dated April 7 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041040392) and 13, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML0410050126), STP Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee), requested exigent changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2. The supplements dated April 7 and 13, 2004, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on April 5, 2004 (69 FR 17718).

The proposed changes requests an exigent change to TS 3/4.7.7, Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System. The change requests to add a footnote to surveillance requirement (SR) 4.7.7e.3. The footnote would allow the use of alternate means to demonstrate that the requirements of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC)-19 are met when control room locations are found to be at positive pressures less than a 1/8 inch water gauge (in wg) relative to adjacent areas. The proposed changes are listed below in Section 1.1 and 1.2.

These revisions would supersede Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) No. 04-6-001, which the Commission staff granted to the licensee on March 23, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040830160).

1.1 TS 3/4.7.7, "Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System" Add a footnote that allows an evaluation for points that do not meet the 1/8 in wg criterion of the current TS. The footnote would read:

(1) Measured points at a positive pressure but less than 1/8 inch Water Gauge are acceptable if an evaluation, considering appropriate compensatory action, demonstrates that the condition meets the requirements of GDC-19. The provisions of this note expire at 0800 on September 19, 2005.

In addition the word "that" in the second line of the original text of SR 4.7.7e.3 is changed to "than" to correct an existing typographical error.

The effect of these proposed changes is to allow plant operation with positive pressure less than 1/8 in wg for the control room boundary.

1.2 Bases The proposed TS change will allow the licensee to operate under a degraded condition where the control room is not maintained at least 1/8 in wg positive relative to adjacent areas.

Conforming changes will be made to the TS bases. The licensee will implement increased testing to provide assurance against further degradation of the boundary and variances in pressure conditions external to the control room boundary. The Bases will include the following:

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.e.3 verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the Control Room HVAC [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning]. During the emergency mode of operation, the Control Room HVAC is designed to pressurize the control room to at least 1/8 inch water gauge (in-wg) positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The Control Room HVAC is designed to maintain this positive pressure with two trains at a makeup flow rate of 2000 cfm. The frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800. If the surveillance results are less than 1/8 in-wg and the pressure differential is not positive, the surveillance requirement is considered not met and the appropriate action of TS 3.7.7 must be applied.

The surveillance includes a footnote allowing an evaluation of conditions where the differential pressure is positive but less than 1/8 in-wg. The measured positive relative pressure condition still assures that any leakage across this boundary location would be outleakage. Therefore, the functionality of the control room HVAC system is maintained with the degraded pressure condition within the envelope. The use of the footnote for a condition where the points are less than 1/8 in-wg is intended to be a temporary application until the points are restored to the design 1/8 in-wg in accordance with the corrective action program.

Compensatory actions may be applied based on the results of the evaluation provision of SR 4.7.7.e.3. The evaluation, including appropriate compensatory actions, must demonstrate that the dose limits of GDC 19 of Appendix A of 10CFR50 are met, including a 30 rem limit to the thyroid. If compensatory measures include self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and potassium iodide (KI) tablets, then the requirements of Regulatory Position 2.7.3 of NRC Regulatory Guide, 1.196, "Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors" must be met.

The results of the evaluation for areas with differential pressure that is positive but less than 1/8 in-wg and the appropriate compensatory action are as described below.

STPNOC performs increased testing as a compensatory action to provide assurance against further degradation of the boundary and variances in pressure conditions external to the control room boundary.

1. Within 60 days of approval of the proposed Technical Specification change that provided for compensatory action in SR 4.7.7.e.3., and on a quarterly frequency thereafter, each train combination (e.g., A-B, B-C, or A-C) will be tested on a staggered test basis in the pressurization and recirculation cleanup mode of operation (i.e., the emergency mode).

2. If all test points for a train combination are greater than or equal to 1/8 in-wg positive relative to adjacent areas, that train combination will be removed from the increased testing. However, retest of the removed combination will be required if rebalancing is performed on one of the other train combinations.

During the period where increased testing is required because some test points are positive but are not greater than or equal to 1/8 in-wg positive pressure relative to adjacent areas, the following personnel protective compensatory measures will be in place.

1. For degraded conditions across walls with sealed penetrations where the likelihood of any inleakage condition resulting from changing conditions between testing would be minimal (i.e., a few cfm), potassium iodide (KI) tablets will be credited as the compensatory measure.

2. For degraded conditions across doors where seals have the potential for degradation and the inleakage condition resulting from changing conditions between testing would likely be more than minimal, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) will be credited as the compensatory measure.

In both cases, crediting the compensatory action will only be required until the surveillance demonstrates that the differential pressure is greater than or equal to 1/8 in-wg. Conditions with positive differential pressure, but less than 1/8 in-wg will be addressed in the Corrective Action Program.

The procedural infrastructure to apply the compensatory actions is in place. KI is available to the Control Room crews and SCBA units are staged and ready for use by Control Room personnel. STPs emergency plan implementing procedures require that personnel radiation exposure in the control room be monitored so that appropriate personnel protective measures will be taken by the operators during accident conditions.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Applicants for license amendments are required by 10 CFR 50.91 to provide an analysis of significant hazards considerations, including increases in the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. These evaluations are performed to demonstrate that, in the event of an accident, that radiation doses to persons onsite and offsite will continue to meet applicable

acceptance criteria. Regulatory guidance for these evaluations is provided in the form of regulatory guides and standard review plans. The regulatory requirements for which the NRC staff based its acceptance are the criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC-19, "Control Room," as supplemented by Section 6.4, "Control Room Habitability System," of the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. Except where the licensee proposed a suitable alternative in performing this review, the staff utilized the regulatory guidance provided in SRP Section 6.4 and Regulatory Guide, 1.196, Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors, (Regulatory Position 2.7.3 only).

The staff also considered relevant information in the STP Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and TSs.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff reviewed the regulatory and technical analyses, as they relate to the radiological consequences of design basis accidents, performed by the licensee in support of its proposed license amendment. Information regarding these analyses was provided in the submittal and a supplementary letter dated April 7, 2004. The NRC staff reviewed the assumptions, inputs, and methods used by the licensee to assess these impacts. The safety finding of this safety evaluation (SE) is based on the descriptions of the licensees' analyses and other docketed information.

This SE addresses the impact of the proposed changes on previously analyzed design-basis radiological consequences and the acceptability of the revised analysis results. Although considered in the NRC staff's evaluation the proposed changes have no impact on accident dose guidelines in 10 CFR 100.11. Therefore, the NRC staff based its acceptance on only the accident dose criterion in GDC-19.

The proposed change was reviewed against Review Procedure III.3.d.3 of the SRP, Section 6.4 which states:

The makeup flow rate should have adequate margin to assure that the control room will be maintained at a pressure of at least 1/8-inch water gauge.

The proposed change would allow less than 1/8 in wg, but still require positive pressure relative to adjacent areas. In the NRC staff's review, consideration was given to the licensees current assessment of the control room boundary. The licensee stated that:

Both Unit 1 and 2 have undergone a test of 100 points within each control room. The tests are performed three times to include each of the possible two train HVAC combinations (STP has three 50 percent capacity ventilation trains). During the performance of these tests, 6 of 300 values measured in Unit 1 and 7 of 300 values measured in Unit 2 were found to not meet the test acceptance criterion (i.e., 1/8 in water gauge (wg) relative pressure). However, all test points were positive with respect to adjacent areas. This positive pressure condition from these tests indicates that there is no unfiltered inleakage across these test points.

Although the condition described above does not meet Review Procedure III.3.d.3 of the SRP, the SRP allows for judgement and ultimately the acceptable control room design is based upon

specific General Design Criteria. The NRC staffs review of this proposed change is limited to the impact of the proposed change to the requirements of GDC-19.

As describe in Section 1 above, the proposed TS change represents a decrease in the pressure margin allowed across the control room boundary. This margin is traditionally used to assure that unfiltered inleakage is minimized. The licensee states that the proposed footnote is intended to be a temporary application until the points are restored to the design 1/8 in wg in accordance with their corrective action program. The proposed footnote is applicable until 8:00 a.m. central standard time (CST) on September 19, 2005, to allow sufficient time to address the current STP conditions. To provide additional assurance that the control room continues to meet GDC-19 during times of decreased pressure margin the licensee has proposed that compensatory measures be used.

The compensatory measures credited are described in Section 1.2 above. They include increasing the surveillance testing frequency and crediting KI and SCBA as personnel protective measures. The NRC staff reviewed these compensatory measures to determine if they provided adequate assurance that the control room envelope will continue to meet GDC-19 with the proposed change.

The licensee has proposed a quarterly frequency for testing all three train combinations. Each train combination (e.g., A-B, B-C, or A-C) will be tested on a staggered basis in the pressurization and recirculation mode. This compensatory measure is acceptable to the NRC staff because this testing will provide additional assurance that any further degradation will be detected in a timely manner. The proposed testing frequency is a factor of six times (every three months as opposed to every 18 months) more frequent than the current TS requires.

Furthermore, during the period of increased testing the licensee has proposed that KI tablets and SCBA be credited as compensatory measures. The licensees analysis showed that with these compensatory measures in place unfiltered control room inleakage could be as high as 720 cfm for the spectrum of postulated accidents in UFSAR Chapter 15. The licensee stated that for degraded conditions such as walls with sealed penetrations, the KI tablets provide reasonable assurance that GDC-19 will be met.

The NRC staff compared the proposed compensatory measures with Regulatory Position 2.7.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.196. The licensee stated that the provisions of Regulatory Position 2.7.3 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.196 will be met. Based upon the licensees statement that Regulatory Position 2.7.3 will be met and the limitations on applicability of the compensatory measures stated in the footnote (until 8:00 a.m. CST on September 19, 2005), the compensatory measures of KI and SCBA are acceptable to the NRC staff.

The NRC staff reviewed the results of the licensees calculation that determined that with credit for KI and SCBA in place that the STP control rooms could have 720 cfm of unfiltered inleakage during a loss-of-coolant accident and still meet GDC-19. The staff reviewed the licensees assessments and performed confirmatory calculations. The values used to make this determination are contained in Table 6.4.2 of the STP Units 1 and 2 UFSAR and Table 1 of this SE. The staffs independent evaluation confirms the licensees 720 cfm value is conservative.

The licensee was requested to justify why the current degraded condition does not invalidate their hazardous chemical assessment used to justify control room habitability. The licensee

stated that since the function of the control room pressurization system is not to mitigate against hazardous chemicals, the degradation of the 1/8 in wg margin does not impact the licensees hazardous chemical assessments. The hazardous chemical analysis currently assumes the normal control room ventilation flow rate of 4000 cfm, although the control room will be isolated rather than pressurized as a response to a chemical hazard. Therefore, given the scope of the proposed change, the NRC staff agrees that the change does not impact the licensees hazardous chemical assessments.

The licensee was requested to state whether the limiting points measured that failed the 1/8 in wg surveillance will be included in future 4.7.7e.3 surveillance tests. The licensee stated that the limiting points for the Component Test will be included in the more frequent testing program proposed by the bases of the surveillance. The NRC staff finds this acceptable since these points currently represent the most vulnerable points to unfiltered inleakage. The licensee also stated that to account for instrument uncertainties, the licensees implementation procedure will consider a measurement to be positive only if it is greater than the accuracy of the measurement process. The staff finds this acceptable since it will provide assurance that the control room remains positive with respect to adjacent areas.

Currently, the NRC staff is reviewing responses to a generic issue regarding control room habitability (Generic Letter (GL) 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability"). As result of the GL 2003-01, licensees have proposed long term methods for resolving the issues identified in GL 2003-01. Acceptance of this proposed TS change does not provide an endorsement or acceptance of the STARS component testing method proposed by the licensee, nor does it necessarily provide an acceptable method for resolution of the proposed TS Task Force (TSTF) change request entitled TSTF-448, "Control Room Habitability." These generic issues are being reviewed separate from this TS change request.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.e.3 is used to limit unfiltered inleakage into the control room and to provide assurance that GDC-19 will continue to be met (i.e., the unfiltered inleakage will not increase beyond that assumed in the design analyses) between surveillances. Based upon the above technical evaluation, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that with the proposed change to SR 4.7.7.e.3 that both STP units will meet the operator dose limits of GDC-19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A until the proposed TS change expires at 8:00 a.m. CST on September 19, 2005. The staff believes that reasonable assurance is provided based upon the following: 1) both control rooms measured only a limited number of degraded pressure points (6 out of 300 in Unit 1 and 7 out of 300 in Unit 2), 2) the control room will remain at a positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas, 3) the proposed change will increase the testing frequency of the surveillance to quarterly testing for all three train combinations, and 4) the compensatory measures (using KI and SCBA) available to control room operators to mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident.

4.0 EXIGENT AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES The licensee requested exigent approval of this license amendment request in accordance with NOED No. 04-6-001, which stated that the NOED was granted until such time that the NRC staff could approve a license amendment on an exigent basis. A Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for Hearing was published in the Federal Register on April 5, 2004. In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), comments were requested within 14 days from the date of

publication and hearing requests within 60 days from the date of publication. However, that notice provided that the Commission could issue the subject amendment prior to the expiration of the 14-day comment period if circumstances changed so that prompt action was required by the Commission.

By letter dated April 13, 2004, the licensee has provided a basis with respect to the change in circumstances related to the amendment request. The licensee has stated that it submitted the request for an exigent change to the TSs with the expectation that the NRC would make a determination on the request before STP Unit 2 entered Operational MODE 4 during the startup from its current refueling outage. However, the licensee recognized that the 14-day Federal Register Notice period started on April 5, 2004, and would therefore expire after the scheduled entry into Operational MODE 4, which, at the time of its letter dated April 13, 2004, was forecasted for late on April 18 or early on April 19, 2004. Therefore, the licensee requested NRC approval of the exigent change by April 16, 2004, in order to meet the schedule for startup from the outage.

The licensee could not have foreseen the changed circumstances. The NRC staff has evaluated the changes in circumstances related to the amendment request and has determined that a valid need exists for issuance of the TSs under consideration to allow resumption of power operation of STP Unit 2 prior to expiration of the 14-day comment period.

5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DETERMINATION The regulations at 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations, if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

These amendments have been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92. They do not involve a significant hazards consideration because:

(1) The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. The Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System has no significant role as a potential accident initiator. The Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System continues to remain functional and provides positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas. In addition, the increased testing frequency and compensatory measures available to control room operators to mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident provide reasonable assurance that the operator dose limits of GDC-19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A are met.

(2) The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new of different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No new accident precursors will be created by adding a provision to allow compensatory action to mitigate the margin lost if the control room envelope is degraded. The Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System continues to remain functional and provides positive pressure with

respect to adjacent areas and to limit inleakage so that the operator dose limits of GDC-19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A are met.

(3) The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Three trains of Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System remain functional and continue to provide positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas. The operator dose limits of GDC-19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A are met.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that this amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration (69 FR 17718, April 5, 2004), and there has been no public comment on such finding as of the date of issuance. As stated in Section 5.0, above, the Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to these amendments. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. M. Blumberg Date: April 15, 2004

Table 1 STP Unit 1 and 2 Accident Analysis Parameters Loss-of-Coolant Accident Control room unfiltered infiltration, cfm 7201 Control room filtered makeup, cfm 2200 Control room filtered recirculation, cfm 9500 Control room makeup charcoal filter efficiency, %

inorganic and organic 98.5 particulate 99.0 Control room recirculation charcoal filter efficiency, %

inorganic and organic 95.0 particulate 99.0 Minimum Personnel Protection Factor for Iodine for the compensatory measures credited (KI - 10 , SCBA -100) 10 1

Includes 10 cfm for ingress and egress from the control room.