ML040830160
| ML040830160 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/2004 |
| From: | Berkow H NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4 |
| To: | Sheppard J South Texas |
| Webb M, NRR/DLPM, 415-1347 | |
| References | |
| TAC MC2352, TAC MC2357 | |
| Download: ML040830160 (9) | |
Text
March 23, 2004 Mr. James J. Sheppard President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NOED) FOR STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY (STPNOC) REGARDING SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT (STP) UNITS 1 AND 2 - NOED NO. 04-6-001 (TAC NOS. MC2352 AND MC2357)
Dear Mr. Sheppard:
By letter dated March 18, 2004, you requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with the actions required in Technical Specifications (TSs) 3/4.7.7, "Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System" and 3.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources Operating" for STP Units 1 and 2. Your letter documented information previously discussed with the NRC on a telephone conference on March 17, 2004, beginning at 6:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). The principal NRC staff members who participated on that telephone conference included Herbert Berkow, Director, Project Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Arthur Howell, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region IV. You stated that at 12:42 p.m. Central Standard Time (CST) on March 17, 2004, you determined that the units were not in compliance with TS 3.7.7 because TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.e.3 was not met. Because TS SR 4.7.7.e.3 was not met, STPNOC was specifically making a one-time request for discretion for both STP Units 1 and 2 from taking the actions required by TS 3.7.7 ACTION c for Modes 1 - 4 and ACTION b for Modes 5 - 6. In addition, STPNOC was making a corresponding one-time request for discretion for both STP Units 1 and 2 from taking the actions required by ACTION d of TS 3.8.1.1 because the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was inoperable due to SR 4.7.7.e.3 not being met.
You requested that an NOED be issued pursuant to the NRCs policy regarding exercise of discretion for an operating facility, set out in Section VII.c. of the General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, and be effective for the period 12:42 p.m. CST on March 17, 2004, until such time that the NRC staff could approve a license amendment on an exigent basis to bring the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system back into compliance. You stated that the request satisfied the NOED criterion to avoid unnecessary transients as a result of compliance with the license condition.
This letter documents our telephone conversation on March 17, 2004, at 8:46 p.m. EST, when we orally granted this NOED. Your written request is consistent with the discussion and agreements reached during the March 17 teleconference.
On March 6, 2004, STPNOC completed testing to verify inleakage into the Unit 1 control room envelope in accordance with Generic Letter 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability." The testing
J. Sheppard method used was the component test method described in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Guidance." This test measures the pressure inside the control room envelope with respect to adjacent areas in a series of locations such that the test points represent the control room boundary. The test is conducted to verify that the pressure within the control room envelope with respect to adjacent areas is positive so that any leakage across the boundary should be outleakage. The test results from the component test method were planned to be compared to the test results from the tracer gas test method to attempt to validate the component test method as a valid test for determining control room envelope inleakage.
The component test method used appears to be more comprehensive than your current test used to satisfy TS SR 4.7.7.3.e to verify that the control room ventilation system can maintain a positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas. The component test measures 100 points in each of 3 train configurations (300 total test points), whereas the TS surveillance procedure measures 24 points in each of 3 train configurations (total of 72 points).
During the performance of the component test, 6 of 300 points tested (total of all 3 train configurations) for Unit 1 and 7 of 300 points tested for Unit 2 did not meet the test acceptance criterion (i.e., 0.125 inches water gauge (in wg) relative pressure). However, all points tested were positive with respect to adjacent areas. These points were not points measured by the TS surveillance procedure. The control room ventilation system is designed to maintain the control room at 0.125 in wg positive pressure relative to adjacent areas when aligned in the pressurization and cleanup filtration mode of operation. The test points less than 0.125 in wg demonstrate a degraded condition and non-compliance with TS. You have stated that this condition will be corrected under Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Appendix B corrective action process. You propose that the apparent cause of the failed test points is an air balancing issue and that air balancing will be part of the corrective action to resolve the degraded condition.
In addition, STPNOC submitted an exigent license amendment request, by letter dated March 18, 2004, that proposes changes to bring the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system back into compliance.
The function of the control room ventilation system in its emergency mode lineup is to maintain a positive pressure within the envelope with respect to adjacent areas in order to minimize unfiltered inleakage. This assures that the radiological dose to the control room operators remains within the limits of General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.
You have stated that the control room envelope pressure remains positive with respect to adjacent areas under the current degraded condition. In the current condition, no increase in unfiltered inleakage should occur since the differential pressure remains positive within the control room envelope with respect to adjacent areas. The STP Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room ventilation systems maintain their design function to minimize inleakage with a reduced differential pressure margin at some locations.
While the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system is not operable, you will have potassium iodide (KI) available to provide radiological protection to control room operators as a compensatory measure. In addition, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) equipment is
J. Sheppard also available as a compensatory measure. The emergency plan procedures require monitoring of control room personnel radiation exposure so that appropriate protective measures will be taken by the operators during accident conditions.
The control room envelope for each unit remains at a positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in the current degraded condition. The control room pressure meets acceptance criteria (i.e., 0.125 in wg positive) in all locations tested with the exception of a limited number of points described above. The relative pressure across these locations remains positive relative to adjacent areas. Although not meeting TS acceptance criteria, the positive relative pressure condition still assures that any leakage across these boundary locations would be outleakage.
Therefore, the functionality of the control room ventilation system is maintained with the degraded relative pressure condition for portions of the envelope. STPNOC has stated that the analyzed radiological dose to the control room operator remains unaffected by this condition.
Therefore, the consequences of this condition remain consistent with the licensing basis analyses.
Although the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms have a degraded relative pressure condition for portions of both control room boundaries, the staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that both units currently meet and that they will continue to meet the operator dose limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A until approval of a license amendment to bring the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system back into compliance. SR 4.7.7.e.3 is utilized to limit unfiltered inleakage into the control room and to provide assurance that GDC 19 will continue to be met (i.e., the unfiltered inleakage will not increase beyond that assumed in the design analyses) between surveillances. The staff believes that reasonable assurance is provided based upon the following: 1) both control rooms measured only a limited number of degraded pressure points (6 out of 300 in Unit 1 and 7 out of 300 in Unit 2), all points are at least at 0.05 inches wg positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas, 3) the compensatory measures (utilizing KI and SCBA) available to control room operators to mitigate the radiological consequences of accident, and 4) the duration of the noncompliance is expected to be short (per the NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, the NRC staff should issue a licensee amendment to remedy the noncompliance within four weeks of the issuance of the NOED).
The STP Units 1 and 2 probablistic risk assessment (PRA) models the cooling function of the control room ventilation system. This function maintains environmental conditions that ensure the continued operation of safeguards relay racks, solid state protection, etc. and the control room environment. The pressurization function of the control room ventilation system is not modeled in the PRA. Although not meeting the TS acceptance criterion, there is a positive relative pressure condition at all points and the control room makeup and cleanup filtration system remains functional. If the licensee were forced to comply with the TS, they would have commenced a reactor shutdown while the staff concurrently processed an emergency TS change request. Based on the known facts, this request would have been quickly approved and would have permitted an immediate reactor startup. Given this sequence of events, the staff concluded that the increased risk associated with reactor mode transitions was greater than the risk associated with continued operation, because of the postulated short duration of the shutdown. Therefore, the staff concluded that the risk of continued operation for the duration of the NOED is no greater than that associated with compliance with the TS action statement.
J. Sheppard On the basis of the staffs evaluation of your request and your supporting documentation and justification, the staff concluded that an NOED is warranted because the staff is clearly satisfied that this action involves minimal or no safety impact, is consistent with the enforcement policy and staff guidance, and has no adverse impact on public health and safety. Therefore, it is our intention to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with TSs 3/4.7.7 and 3.8.1.1 for the period from March 17, 2004 (12:42 p.m. CST) until issuance of a license amendment in response to your exigent amendment request dated March 18, 2004. The staff plans to complete its review and issue the license amendment within 4 weeks of the date of this letter.
As stated in the enforcement policy, action will be taken, to the extent that violations were involved, for the root cause that led to the noncompliance for which this NOED was necessary.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 cc: See next page
J. Sheppard On the basis of the staffs evaluation of your request and your supporting documentation and justification, the staff concluded that an NOED is warranted because the staff is clearly satisfied that this action involves minimal or no safety impact, is consistent with the enforcement policy and staff guidance, and has no adverse impact on public health and safety. Therefore, it is our intention to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with TSs 3/4.7.7 and 3.8.1.1 for the period from March 17, 2004 (12:42 p.m. CST) until issuance of a license amendment in response to your exigent amendment request dated March 18, 2004. The staff plans to complete its review and issue the license amendment within 4 weeks of the date of this letter.
As stated in the enforcement policy, action will be taken, to the extent that violations were involved, for the root cause that led to the noncompliance for which this NOED was necessary.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 cc: See next page ACCESSION NO: ML040830160
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DATE 3/23/04 3/23/04 3/23/04 3/22/2004 OFFICE DIPM/IROB/BC RIV/DRP/D PDIV/D NAME CShulten for WBeckner AHowell*
HBerkow DATE 3/23/04 3/22/2004 3/23/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
May 2003 South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 cc:
Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 910 Bay City, TX 77414 A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 Mr. L. K. Blaylock Mr. W. C. Gunst City Public Service Board P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Mr. C. A. Johnson/A. C. Bakken AEP Texas Central Company P. O. Box 289 Mail Code: N5022 Wadsworth, TX 77483 INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 D. G. Tees/R. L. Balcom Texas Genco, LP P. O. Box 1700 Houston, TX 77251 Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, TX 77414 A. H. Gutterman, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 Mr. T. J. Jordan, Vice President Engineering & Technical Services STP Nuclear Operating Company P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483 S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing Nuclear Quality & Licensing Department STP Nuclear Operating Company P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Director P. O. Box 12428 Austin, TX 78711-3189 Jon C. Wood Matthews & Branscomb 112 East Pecan, Suite 1100 San Antonio, TX 78205 Arthur C. Tate, Director Division of Compliance & Inspection Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P. O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326
South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2 Susan M. Jablonski Office of Permitting, Remediation and Registration Texas Commission on Environmental Quality MC-122 P.O. Box 13087 Austin, TX 78711-3087 Mr. Terry Parks, Chief Inspector Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation Boiler Division P. O. Box 12157 Austin, TX 78711 Mr. Ted Enos 4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Ft. Worth, Texas 76109
DISTRIBUTION FOR NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FOR STP UNITS 1 AND 2 Dated: March 23, 2004 DISTRIBUTION:
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