ML040990085
| ML040990085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/2004 |
| From: | Holthaus G Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| A.2-101, Rev 32 | |
| Download: ML040990085 (56) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE A.2-101, REVISION 32 55 pages follow
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT IA.2-101 Lii CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES IRevision 32 I
Pagel of55 O"
I EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE - TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE . ........................................................ 2 2.0 APPLICABILITY . .................................................... 2 3.0 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES ........................... 2 4.0 DISCUSSION ...................................................... 3 5.0 PRECAUTIONS .................. 6 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS ................ - 6 6.1 Emergency Classification, Declaration, and Notification ..... ...... 6 6.2 Event Termination or Recovery ................................. 7 7.0 FIGURES . ........................................................... 8 7.1 List of Initiating Conditions ..................................... 8 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines ........................... 9 7.3 Containment Monitor Response To Contained Source Curve ...... 54 Prepared By: J Reviewed By OC Review Req'd: YES OC Meeting Number: Date:
Approved By: Date:
.*, .. FOR ADMINISTRATIVE USEYN.-
This revision incorporates Volume F Memos: It_ i, 3087 (DOCUMENT CHANGE, HOLD, AND COMMENT FORM) incorporated:
Res Supv: EP ARMS: A.2-101 lAssoc Ref: A.2 lDocType:4 0- L() Admin Initials:
f 0 S-a0.353
_ f N Freq: 1 jvrs Date:3lS;lOy I
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 2 of 55 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure specifies conditions or groups of conditions that indicate an emergency exists and the actions to be taken by Operations personnel to verify and classify the type of emergency condition.
2.0 APPLICABILITY 2.1 An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in FIGURE 7.2 (Emergency Classification Guidelines) of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.
3.0 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 The Emergency Director (TSC) is responsible for:
3.1.1 Direction of overall site emergency response in accordance with A.2-213 (RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR).
3.1.2 Emergency classification, declaration and notification in accordance with Section 6.1 .1.
3.1.3 Event termination or recovery in accordance with A.2-602 (EVENT TERMINATION OR RECOVERY).
3.2 The Duty Shift Manager (Interim Emergency Director) is responsible for the following until relieved by a designated Emergency Director:
3.2.1 Direction of overall site emergency response and assuming the responsibilities of Emergency Director.
3.2.2 Emergency classification, declaration and notification in accordance with Section 6.1.2.
3.2.3 Implementing the EPIP which corresponds to the declared emergency.
3.2.4 Event termination or recovery in accordance with A.2-602 (EVENT TERMINATION OR RECOVERY).
3.3 The Duty Control Room Supervisor and Control Room Operators are responsible for:
3.3.1 Immediate notification of the Duty Shift Manager of any events that may be classified as emergency conditions.
3.3.2 Verification of emergency condition indications.
3.3.3 Assisting with assessment and determination of emergency classification.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 3 of 55 3.3.4 Taking immediate actions in accordance with plant procedures and directives to control the event and place the plant in a stable condition.
3.4 The Shift Emergency Communicator is responsible for:
3.4.1 The performance of emergency notifications and communications in accordance with plant procedures and directives.
4.0 DISCUSSION 4.1 Three distinct phases in the Emergency Classification. Declaration and Notification process 4.1.1 During the implementation of this procedure, the Emergency Director must consider the three distinct phases in the Emergency Classification, Declaration and Notification process.
A. Classification: The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification which the ongoing events are categorized. This may take a reasonable length of time (5 to 15 minutes for most situations) depending upon the complexity of the situation. This 15 minute assessment period is consistent with the NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2.
B. Declaration: The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs. This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 10CFR50, App. E 15 minute off-site notification clock starts.
C. Notification: The act of making the notification(s) to the State, Wright and Sherburne Counties, NRC, etc.
4.2 Definitions 4.2.1 Emergency Condition - An occurrence, or combination of events and indications that fall into one of the following classifications:
A. Notification of Unusual Event (NUE)
Unusual events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further'degradation of safety systems occurs.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 4of 55 B. Alert Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
C. Site Area Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near site boundary.
D. General Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site.
4.2.2 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - Numerical or qualitative values for the operational or radiological parameters, (radiological dose rates; water borne or surface deposited concentrations of radioactivity; specific instrument indications or changes in indications) used as thresholds for initiating procedures or actions to assess and verify plant conditions. EAL may require initiating specific emergency procedures as designated by a particular class of emergency.
4.2.3 Release - The release of radioactive material to the environment attributable to the event.
4.2.4 Gap (Gap Release) - The radioactive material released from the fuel pellets during normal operation that is trapped in the fuel pin. If the pin fails (cladding fails), this material will be released from the gap into the reactor coolant.
4.3 Recognition Attached to this procedure is FIGURE 7.2 (Emergency Classification Guidelines (1-30)). These guidelines identify the four emergency classifications, the possible initiating event(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency. The identified instruments and alarms are a representative listing of various instruments that may be used--
to verify an emergency condition. There are many process variables referred to in the guidelines.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - - A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OFEEMERGENCIES . Revision 32 -
Page 5 of 55 The instruments, indications, or alarms listed for any particular event are not necessarily a complete list of all those that-will show abnormal indications or be useful in classifying the event. There is typically more than one instrument or instrument channel that monitors a specific parameter. The redundant channels and coincident indicators should be used to-verify the emergency condition.
The emergency action levels specified in the guidelines do not necessitate initiation of any particular phase of the emergency plan but'rather signify a need for assessment and classification of conditions. 'In many cases, the proper classification will be immediately apparent from in-plant instrumentation.
In others, further assessment is necessary to determine the applicable emergency classification.
The plant operating staff should consider the effect that combinations of initiating events have, that if taken individually would constitute a lower emergency classification but collectively may exceed the criteria for a higher classification.
4.4 Technical Specification Shutdown Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10CFR50.72 (b)
Non-Emergency Events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications.
An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event Is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events such as Physical or Radiological Hazards, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, or Equipment Malfunction requires an immediate Notification of an Unusual Event.
4.5 Rapidly Escalating and/or De-escalatinq Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates in emergency
- classification or is initiated at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates,' the initial off-site notifications SHALL indicate the current emergency classification. In addition to the current emergency class, the off-site authorities and NRC SHALL be informed of the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event. This information should be included in the initial emergency notifications to the off-site authorities and NRC.
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I MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32
- ~Page 6of 55 l 4.6 Late Discovery of a Classifiable Event or Condition Late discovery of an event or condition which met the criteria for declaration of an emergency but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists at the time of discovery SHALL be reported to the NRC. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. NRC notification (or an NRC update if the event was previously reported but misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event SHALL be the reporting format (see 4 AWI-04.08.02 (10CFR50.72 AND 10CFR 73.71 IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION)). Notification of state and local emergency response organizations SHALL also be considered. An actual declaration of the event is not necessary.
5.0 PRECAUTIONS 5.1 There are many indications of an emergency condition that may occur either individually, in group events or sequentially. The operator must be careful not to rely on any one indication as being absolutely indicative of an emergency condition. Although the operator should believe indications and take action based on those indications, they SHALL attempt to verify indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators. Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions is necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.
6.0 INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Emergency Classification, Declaration, and Notification 6.1.1 Emergency Director (TSC) Instructions:
A. Refer to A.2-213, Section 6.11 (Emergency Classification Changes).
6.1.2 Duty Shift Manager (Interim Emergency Director) Instructions:
A. Classification - When informed of plant parameters, radiological release levels or events which indicate that an emergency classification may be appropriate, evaluate the emergency classification.
- 1. Confirm that the indications have been verified using redundant or coincident indications.
- 2. Refer to FIGURE 7.1 (List Of Initiating Conditions) and identify any guidelines applicable to the initiating condition.
- 3. Locate the applicable guideline in FIGURE 7.2.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT -A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 l
- Page 7of 55l
- 4. If multiple events and/or indications are involved, classify the emergency based on the event (or indication) that results in the highest (most conservative) emergency classification.
- 5. Consider the effect that combinations of events have; that, if taken individually, would constitute a lower emergency classification but collectively may exceed the criteria for a higher classification.
- 6. Summon the Shift Emergency Communicator(s) to the Control Room via the Site PA system (Access #305).
B. Declaration - Declare the emergency class.
- 1. Announce the emergency classification in the Control Room.
C. Notification - in accordance with the appropriate Emergency Classification Checklist and Emergency Call-List (included in each emergency classification folder), notify the SEC to make the required notifications (i.e., State & Locals: 15 min., NRC: 1 hr.,
etc....)
- 1. Review the completed form(s) and sign the form(s) in the space provided.
D. Implement the EPIP which corresponds to the declared emergency classification and complete the appropriate emergency classification checklist.
6.2 Event Termination or Recovery 6.2.1 Perform Event Termination or Recovery in accordance with A.2-602.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 8 of 55 7.0 FIGURES FIGURE 7.1 List of Initiating Conditions Initiating Condition Guideline Page Radioactive Effluents (high release rate or unmonitored) 1 9 In-Plant Radiation Levels (increase, loss-of-control) 2 13 Intentionally Blank 3 15 Reactor Coolant Leak 4 16 Main Steam Line Break 5 19 Fuel Cladding Degradation (high coolant or OG activity) 6 21 Safety Relief Valve Failure 7 23 Intentionally Blank 8 - 11 24 Reactor Protection System Failure 12 25 Loss of Plant Shutdown or Shutdown Cooling Capability 13 26 Loss of Instrumentation (indicators, annunciators) 14 28 Control Room Evacuation 15 30 Toxic/Flammable Gases 16 31 Security Compromise 17 33 Loss of AC Power 18 35 Loss of DC Power 19 37 Tornado or Sustained Winds 20 39 River Water Hi / Lo (flood or low water level) 21 40 Earthquake 22 41 Fire 23 42 Explosion 24 43 Aircraft or Missiles 25 44 Miscellaneous (train derailment, turbine failure) 26 45 Intentionally Blank 27 46 General Emergency (All GUIDELINES) 28 47 Other Plant Conditions 29 52 Major Damage to Spent Fuel 30 53 I/djm
IMONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT TITLE: - CLASSIFICATION OF'EMERGENCIES Revision 32 A.2-1 01 Page 9 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emerqencv Classification Guidelines lEGULINE 1 Radioactive Effluent UNUSUAL EVENT
-RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)
LIMITS EXCEEDED EALS 1a. Discharge Canal Monitor exceeds 400 CPS indicated by annunciator DISCHARGE CANAL Hi RADIATION (4-A-22) and recorder C-02-17.358. I OR 1b. Sampling identifies a liquid release to river which exceeds ODCM-02.01 limits.
OR 1c. Stack Effluent Monitor (Channel A or B) exceeds 90,000 [tCi/Sec indicated by annunciator STACK EFFLUENT HI HI RADIATION (C-259-A-1) and RECORDERS RR-7801A and RR-7801B on C-257/C-258 and computer point STACK NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE ALARM (PRM011).
OR 1d. Reactor Building Vent Effluent Monitor (Channel A or B) exceeds 4,500 uCi/sec indicated by annunciator RBV EFFLUENT HI Hi RADIATION (C-259-A-2) and RECORDERS RR-7801 A and RR-7801 B on C-257/C-258.
OR 1e. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed ODCM limits (4,500 [tCi/Sec).
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I MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 10 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 1l Radioactive Effluent - Cont'd ALERT RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS GREATER THAN 10 TIMES OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) LIMITS EALs 1a. Discharge Canal Monitor exceeds 4000 CPS.
OR 1b. Sampling identifies a liquid release to river which is 10 times ODCM-02.01 limits.
OR 1c. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.OE + 5 [Ci/Sec.
OR 1d. Reactor Building Vent Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 4.5E+4 pCi/Sec.
OR 1e. Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or expected to exceed 10 times ODCM-03.01 limits (4.5E+4 [tCi/Sec).
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT . A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 I Page 11 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 1 Radioactive Effluent - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO GREATER THAN 50 Mrem/Hr FOR 1/2 HOUR OR GREATER THAN 500 Mrem/Hr (Whole Body) For 2 MINUTES (Or Five Times These Levels For Thyroid) AT THE SITE BOUNDARY FOR ADVERSE METEOROLOGY. THESE DOSE RATES ARE PROJECTED BASED ON OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS (e.g., Radiation Level In Containment With Leak Rate Appropriate For Existing Containment Pressure) OR ARE MEASURED IN THE ENVIRONS, OR EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDE-LINES ARE PROJECTED TO BE EXCEEDED OUTSIDE THE SITE BOUNDARY.
EALs 1~. Efluna. MoioC Stc Oa.
Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 5.7E+6 pCi/Sec for 30 minutes.
OR 1b. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 5.7E+7 jtCi/Sec 2 minutes.
OR 1c. Stack release rate of radioiodines exceeds 5.7E+3 ,tCi/Sec for 30 minutes.
OR 1d. Stack release rate of radioiodines exceeds 5.7E+4 PCi/Sec for 2 minutes.
OR 1e. RB Vent Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 2.1 E+6 [LCi/Sec for 30 minutes.
OR 1f. RB Vent Effluent Monitor (Ch A-or B) exceeds 2.1 E+7 pCi/Sec for 2 minutes.
OR 1g. RB Vent release rate of radioiodines exceeds 3600 pCi/Sec for 30 minutes.
OR 1h. RB Vent release rate of radioiodines exceeds 3.6E+4 RCi/Sec for 2 minutes.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 lPage 12 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 1 Radioactive Effluent - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Cont'd) 1i. Whole body doses (TEDE) greater than 1000 mrem or thyroid doses (CDE) of greater than 5000 mrem are projected beyond the site boundary.
OR 5 . 7 * - , AI IFI^LI:-
A: : ; 5 7 bR I P.I'J Due to temperature-induced currents, the Containment Radiation Monitor (high-range radiation monitoring) circuits could initially produce spurious high Rem/hr signal during extreme temperature heatup transient conditions and indicate a false fail signal during extreme temperature cool down transient conditions (CR19980453) 1j. Containment Radiation Monitor reading indicates above the 0.01% curve when plotted versus time after shutdown in accordance with A.2-208 (CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT) Section 6.2 and associated FIGURE 7.1.
OR 1k. Measured Whole Body dose rates at the site boundary or beyond exceed 50 mrem/hr for 30 minutes or 500 mrem/hr for 2 minutes.
- 11. Radioiodine concentrations measured at the site boundary or beyond exceed 7.OE-8 ,uCi/CC for 30 minutes or 7.OE-7 [tCi/CC for 2 minutes.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT .. - A.2-101 TITLE: .- '.,CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIE S,- - Revision 32 -
- . OF EPage 13 of 55 FIGURE
- 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
.. GUIDELINE 2 n.a. R d i- L e
!n-Plant Radiation Levels UNUSUAL EVENT Not Applicable ALERT SEVERE DEGRADATION IN CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS EAL 1a. Increase by a factor of 1000 in plant radiation levels as indicated by Area Radiation Monitoring System:
NOTE. EALs shown as FULL SCALE indicate that an increase by a factor of 1000 is beyond the range of the particular monitor. In these cases, a full.scale reading combined with the Shift Manager's concurrence, SHALL meet the criteria for the ALERT classification. Reading in mrem/hr except as noted.
PANEL DESCRIPTION NORMAL EAL C-11 A-1 1027 RB NE Low 10 Full scale C-11 A-2 1027 RB N High 5 5000 C-11 A-3 1027 RB W Stairway 1 1000 C-11 A-4 1001 Source Storage 20 Full scale C-11 A-5 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tk Area 20 Full scale C-11 A-6 1001' Decon Area 3 Full scale C-11 A-7 985' Sample.Hood 5 Full scale C-11 A-8 Rx Cleanup System Access 0.25 250 C-11 A-9 962 RB East 0.8 800 C-11 A-10 East CRD HCU 3.. Full scale C-11 A-11 West CRD HCU 3 Full scale C-11 A-1 2 TIP Drive Area 2 Full scale C-11 A-13 TIP Cubicle 30 Full scale C-11 A-14 HPCI Turbine Area 2 .Full scale C-11 A-15 Rx Bldg Drain Tk Area 25 Full scale C-11 A-16 RCIC Pump Area 1 1000 C-11 A-17 East CS and RHR Area 20 Full scale I/djm
I MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 14 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l GUIDELINE2 l In-Plant Radiation Levels - Cont'd ALERT - Cont'd PANEL DESCRIPTION NORMAL EAL C-11 A-1 8 West CS and RHR Area 8 Full scale C-11 A-19 Hot Chemistry Lab .25 250 C-11 A-20 Control Room Low Range 0.02 20 C-11 A-21 Control Room High Range 3 3000 C-11 B-1 Turbine Operating Floor 90 Full scale C-11 B-2 Turbine Front Standard 70 Full scale C-11 B-3 Cond Demin Operating Area 3 1000 C-11 B-4 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Rm 9 Full scale C-11 B-5 Feedwater Pump Area 1 1000 C-11 C-1 Radwaste Control Room 0.2 200 C-11 C-2 Sample Tank Area 3 Full scale C-11 C-3 Conveyer Operating Area 0.2 200 C-11 D-1 Hot Machine Shop 0.2 200 C-252 E-1 Recombiner Instrument Room 1 Full scale C-252 E-2 Recombiner Pump Room 3 Full scale C-252 F-1 Off-gas Storage Foyer 0.3 100 C-11 F-2 Off-gas Storage Foyer High Range <100 100 I C-257/C-258 Containment Rad Monitor 3-5 Rem/hr 50 Rem/hr OR 1b. Direct measurement of radiation levels corresponding to an increase by a factor of 1000.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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-MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: -.- CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32
. - Page 15 of 55 FIGURE
- 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lDGUDELINE 3; This Page Intentionally Blank I/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 lPage 16 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDE Reactor Coolant Leak UNUSUAL EVENT PRIMARY SYSTEM LEAK RATE EXCEEDS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOTE: Under this GUIDELINE, an Unusual Event should be declared when the leak rate is confirmed to be in excess of the corresponding EAL value (i.e. 5 gpm unidentified leakage, 25 gpm total drywell leakage or 2 gpm increase in unidentified leak rate in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />).
EALs 1a. Unidentified leakage exceeds 5 gpm as indicated by computer point PCT 509 (DW FLOOR DRAIN SUMP RATE OF CHANGE) or calculated from indicator LR-7409 on Panel C-04 in the Control Room.
OR 1b. Total drywell leakage exceeds 25 gpm as indicated by computer point PCT 507 (DW TOTAL LEAKAGE) or calculated from indicator LR-7409 on Panel C-04 in the Control Room.
OR 1c. Unidentified leakage rate increases 2 gpm within any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period as determined from Test 0381 (CONTAINMENT COOLANT LEAKAGE LOG).
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT -A.2-1 01 TITLE:l- CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES - Revision 32 l Page 17 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
- -:lGUIDELINE 4l Reactor Coolant Leak - Cont'd ALERT PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK RATE GREATER THAN 50 gpm NOTE: Failure of a SRV to close should not be classified using Guideline 4. The
- failure of a SRV to close should be classified using Guideline 7 (Safety Relief
-Valve Failure).
EAL 1a. Total leakage exceeds 50 gpm as indicated by computer point PCT 509 (DW FLOOR DRAIN SUMP RATE OF CHANGE) or computer point PCT 507 (DW TOTAL LEAKAGE) or as calculated from indicator LR-7409 on Panel C-04 in the Control Room.
OR NOTE: Unisolable - The leak is NOT isolable from the Control Room OR an attempt for isolation from the Control Room has been made and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to the accident classification. If isolable upon identification, this Initiating Condition is not applicable.
- 1b. Unisolable primary system leakage outside the drywell as indicated by area temperatures or ARM levels > maximum safe values in at least one area.
OR 1c. Shift Manager's judgement.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 l Page 18 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emerqencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l GUIDELINE 4 l Reactor Coolant Leak - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY KNOWN LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT GREATER THAN MAKEUP CAPACITY EAL 1a. Total leakage exceeds 50 gpm as indicated by computer point PCT 509 (DW FLOOR DRAIN SUMP RATE OF CHANGE) or computer point PCT 507 (DW TOTAL LEAKAGE) or as calculated from indicator LR-7409 on Panel C-04 in the Control Room.
OR NOTE: Unisolable - The leak is NOT isolable from the Control Room OR an attempt for isolation from the Control Room has been made and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to the accident classification. If isolable upon identification, this Initiating Condition is not applicable.
1b. Unisolable primary system leakage outside the drywell as indicated by area temperatures or ARM levels 2 maximum safe values in at least one area.
AND
- 2. Reactor water level decreasing below 1 foot above active fuel (-114inches) indicated by FUEL ZONE LEVEL INDICATOR (LI-2-3-91A/B) as a result of insufficient makeup capacity.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 19 of 55
- - FIGURE 7.2 Emergencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd M StGUIDELINE Be Main Steam Line Break UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK WITH MSIV MALFUNCTION CAUSING LEAKAGE TO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT EALS
- 1. Shift Manager's judgement that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam flow with evidence that the steam line break is outside primary containment (e.g. visual observation, radiation or temperature).
AND 2a. Annunciators MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW A/B ALARM (5-A-25/26) and RX WATER LEVEL HI/LO ALARM (5-B-24).
OR 2b. Annunciator MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE A/B ALARM (5-A-1 7/18)
OR 2c. Annunciator MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE ALARM (5-B-32).
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 20 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 5 Main Steam Line Break - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK WITH FAILURE OF MSIVs TO ISOLATE THE LEAK AND CAUSING LEAKAGE OUTSIDE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT EALs
- 1. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that MSIV is malfunctioning or continuing steam flow with evidence that steam line break is outside primary containment.
AND 2a. Annunciators MAIN STEAM LINE FLOW A/B ALARM (5-A-25/26) and RX WATER LEVEL HI/LO ALARM (5-B-24).
OR 2b. Annunciator MAIN STEAM TUNNEL HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM (5-A-1 7/18).
OR 2c. Annunciator MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE ALARM (5-B-32).
AND 3a. Annunciator TURBINE BUILDING HIGH RADIATION ALARM (4-A-21).
OR 3b. High airborne radioactivity levels in the Turbine Building indicated by Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) or direct measurement.
OR 3c. Visual observation that blow-out panels between the Steam Chase and Turbine Building have been ruptured.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - I A.2-101 TITLE: -CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES , lRevision 32 Page 21 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE Fuel Cladding Degradation UNUSUAL EVENT FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION EALs 1a. Off-gas Pretreatment Monitor exceeds 20,000 (2 x 104) rnrem/hr as indicated on Recorder RR-4902 or RM-17-150A and RM-1 7-150B.
OR 1b. Off-gas Pretreatment Monitor increases by 4,000 mrem/hr within 30 minutes at steady power as indicated by Recorder RR-4902 or RM-17-150A and RM-17-150B.
OR 1c. Reactor coolant 1-131 dose equivalent exceeds 5 jgCi/gram as determined by sample and analysis.
ALERT SEVERE LOSS OF FUEL CLADDING INDICATED BY HIGH OFF-GAS AT OFF-GAS PRETREATMENT MONITOR (greater than 5 Ci/ Sec corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes) OR VERY HIGH COOLANT ACTIVITY SAMPLE (e.g., > 300 [tCi/gm 1-131 dose equivalent).
EALs 1a. Off-gas Pretreatment Monitor exceeds 200,000 (2 x 105) mrem/hr indicated on Recorder RR-4902 or RM-17-150A and RM-17-150B.
OR NOTE: Resin intrusion or excessive hydrogen injection rates may cause high radiation without fuel cladding damage.
1b. Main Steam Line Monitor indicates 6000 mrem/hr due to high radiation.
OR I/dim
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 22 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l GUIDELINE6 1 Fuel Cladding Degradation - Cont'd ALERT (Cont'd) 1c. Reactor coolant >300 FtCi/gm 1-131 dose equivalent as determined by sample and analysis.
OR CAUTION Due to temperature-induced currents, the Containment Radiation Monitor (high-range radiation monitoring) circuits could initially produce spurious high Rem/hr signal during extreme temperature heatup transient conditions and indicate a false fail signal during extreme temperature cool down transient conditions (CR19980453) 1d. Containment Radiation Monitor reading exceeds the Containment Monitor Response to Contained Source Curve (FIGURE 7.3).
SITE AREA EMERGENCY DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF COOLABLE GEOMETRY EALs
- 1. More than 1/3 of core uncovered as indicated by reactor water level below
-174 inches.
l AND 2a. Reactor coolant >3,000 [tCi/gm 1-131 dose equivalent as determined by sampling and analysis.
OR 2b. Inability to insert control rods fully.
OR 2c. Inability to position SRMs or IRMs within core.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 -
Page 23 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 7 Safety Relief Valve Failure UNUSUAL EVENT FAILURE OF A SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE FOLLOWING REDUCTION OF APPLICABLE PRESSURE EALs la. Annunciator AUTO BLOWDOWN RELIEF VALVE LEAKAGE (3-A-09).
OR 1b. Annunciator SRV OPEN ALARM (5-A-46).
ALERT Not applicable SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not Applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 I4 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 8 Intentionally Blank GUIDELINEiJ Intentionally Blank IGUIDELINE 10 I Intentionally Blank IGUIDELINE 11 I Intentionally Blank I/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: :-CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32
. O E RSPage 25 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 12 Reactor Protection System Failure UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A SCRAM WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL EALs
- 1. Valid Scram Signal.
AND
- 2. Neutron count rate indicates reactor critical.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH
-FAILURE TO SCRAM (continued power operation but no core damage immediately evident)
NOTE: Refer to Guideline 6 for Fuel Cladding Degradation determination.
- 1. Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods.
AND
- 2. Failure of the Standby Liquid Control System.
AND
- 3. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that a transient is in progress.
AND
- 4. No indication of core damage (if core damage Is indicated, declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY).
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 26 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 13 Loss of Plant Shutdown or Shutdown Cooling Capability UNUSUAL EVENT As specified in Guideline 29.
ALERT COMPLETE LOSS OF ABILITY TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN EALs 1a. Loss of core cooling capabilities needed to achieve plant cold shutdown.
OR 1b. Loss of core cooling capabilities required to maintain the Reactor Coolant Temperature < (less than) 212 0F.
AND
- 2. Shift Manager's judgement that the plant cannot reach or maintain cold shutdown.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES - Revision 32 l Page 27 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd I:.GUIDELINE I3 Loss of Plant Shutdown or Shutdown Cooling Capability - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY COMPLETE LOSS OF ABILITY TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN EALs
- 1. Inability to SCRAM and inoperable Standby Liquid Control System.
AND 2a. Loss of all Safety Relief Valve capability.
OR 2b. Inoperable RHR System.
OR 2c. Inoperable RHR heat sink.
AND 3a. Loss of main condenser cooling.
OR 3b. No makeup capability from either HPCI or RCIC Systems.
AND/OR
- 4. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that plant cannot reach or maintain hot shutdown.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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i .
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT I A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES IRevision 32 II Page28o if55 i FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd LossfIntrumenta Loss of Instrumentation UNUSUAL EVENT INDICATIONS OR ALARMS ON PROCESS OR EFFLUENT PARAMETERS NOT FUNCTIONAL IN THE CONTROL ROOM TO AN EXTENT REQUIRING PLANT SHUTDOWN ALERT LOSS OF MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS WHILE OPERATING ABOVE COLD SHUTDOWN. I EALs
- 1. Unplanned loss of most or all of annunciators on panels C-03, C-04, C-05, C-08.
I AND
- 2. Loss of plant computer alarm display, alarm typer and SPDS display.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: -I CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES .Revision 32
. OF E Page 29 of 55
-FIGURE
. 7.2 Emergencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd sI GUIDELINE
-.- - ... 14.:.- o Loss of Instrumentation - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS AND PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS EALs
- 1. Unplanned loss of most or all of annunciators on panels C-03, C-04, C-05, C-08.
I AND
- 2. Loss of plant computer alarm display, alarm typer and SPDS display.
AND
- 3. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that a transient has been initiated or is in progress.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32
- Page 30 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE L 15 Control Room Evacuation UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT EVACUATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM IS REQUIRED OR ANTICIPATED AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT LOCAL STATIONS. (If local control has not been established in 15 minutes, go to SITE AREA EMERGENCY)
- 1. As determined by Shift Manager.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN 15 MINUTES EAL
- 1. As determined by Shift Manager or Emergency Director.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: -CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 31 of 55
- FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd I GUIDELINE 16l ToIc/Flam,
- G I
-Toxic/Flammable Gases UNUSUAL EVENT NEAR OR ON-SITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE .
EAL Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected onsite (out-of-plant) as indicated by visual observation, physical measurement or notification. I ALERT ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF UNCONTROLLED TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES EAL 1a. Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within the plant as indicated by measured concentrations equal to or greater than:
- a. 50 ppm Ammonia I
- b. 3 ppm Chlorine I
- c. 5 ppm Vinyl Chloride
- d. 2000 ppm Butadiene
- e. 50 ppm Ethylene Dichloride
- f. 500 ppm Gasoline'
- g. 2100 ppm Propane
- h. 2000 ppm L.P.G.
Reference:
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards.
OR 1b. Explosive levels (as indicted by explosive meter). I I/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 32 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 16 Toxic/Flammable Gases - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY ENTRY OF UNCONTROLLED FLAMMABLE GASES INTO VITAL AREAS OR ENTRY OF UNCONTROLLED TOXIC GASES INTO VITAL AREAS WHERE LACK OF ACCESS TO THE AREA CONSTITUTES A SAFETY PROBLEM AND THE PLANT IS NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN EALs 1a. Gaseous hazards being experienced or projected within the vital areas of the plant as indicated by measured concentrations equal to or greater than:
- a. 50 ppm Ammonia
- b. 3 ppm Chlorine
- c. 5 ppm Vinyl Chloride
- d. 2000 ppm Butadiene
- e. 50 ppm Ethylene Dichloride
- f. 500 ppm Gasoline
- g. 2100 ppm Propane
- h. 2000 ppm L.P.G.
Reference:
NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards.
OR lb. Explosive levels (as indicated by explosive meter).
AND
- 2. Plant IS NOT in cold shutdown.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 33 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd eui..t...C.omprom.s
- Securitv' Compromise UNUSUAL EVENT SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE EAL la. Security determines the threat to be credible. I OR 1b. Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the protected area.
OR 1c. Security confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment.
OR 1d. Low credible security threat notification received.
ALERT ON-GOING SECURITY COMPROMISE EAL 1a. Security Safeguards Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the protected area, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas.
OR 1b. Bomb device discovered within plant protected area and outside of any vital area.
OR 1c. High credible security threat notification received.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 34 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emercencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 17l Security Compromise (Cont.)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY IMMINENT LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT EAL 1a. Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary shutdown panels, and any other vital areas.
OR 1b. Bomb device discovered within a vital area.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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IMONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT TITLE: -.-.CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
- -Page Revision 32 A.2-101 35 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd Loss of AC Power UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER OR LOSS OF ON-SITE AC POWER CAPABILITY EALs 1a. Verified zero voltage on bus voltage meters or breaker indicators for Bus 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14, and 1AR transformer on Panel C-08.
OR lb. Loss of 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications and inoperability is not due to surveillance testing.
ALERT LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ON-SITE AC POWER (STATION BLACKOUT) (see Site Area Emergency for extended loss)
- 1. Verified zero voltage on bus voltage meters or breaker indicators for Bus 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14, Bus 15, Bus 16, and 1AR transformer on Panel C-08.
AND
- 2. Loss of 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 36 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUID E INE 18C Loss of AC Power - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ON-SITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES EALs
- 1. Verified zero voltage on bus voltage meters or breaker indicators for Bus 11, Bus 12, Bus 13, Bus 14, Bus 15, Bus 16 and 1AR transformer on Panel C-08.
AND
- 2. Loss of 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators when they are required to be operable by Technical Specifications.
AND
- 3. Failure to restore power to at least one emergency bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both off-site and on-site AC power.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - l A.2-101 TITLE: l CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES, Revision 32 I Page 37 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
- GUIDEL11k.19 1 Loss of DC Power UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER (see Site Area Emergency for extended loss)
- 1. Loss of both 125 VDC power sources and loss of both 250 VDC power sources as indicated by annunciators:
DIV. I 250V DC HI-LO VOLTAGE (8-A-20); and DIV. 11125 & 250V DC TROUBLE (20-B-09); and NO. 12 125V DC BUS VOLTAGE HIGH/LOW (8-B-13); and NO.11 125V DC BUS VOLTAGE HIGH/LOW (8-C-14)
AND
- 2. Shift Manager's judgement that all vital DC power is lost or degraded voltages are measured at battery terminals.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 38 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 19 so CI Loss of DC Power - Cont'd SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF ALL VITAL ON-SITE DC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES EALs
- 1. Loss of both 125 VDC power sources and loss of both 250 VDC power sources as indicated by annunciators:
DIV. I 250V DC HI-LO VOLTAGE (8-A-20); and DIV. 11125 & 250 VDC TROUBLE (20-B-09); and NO. 12 125 VDC BUS VOLTAGE HIGH/LOW (8-B-13); and NO. 11 125 VDC BUS VOLTAGE HIGH/LOW (8-C-14)
AND
- 2. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that all vital DC power is lost or degraded voltages are measured at battery terminals.
AND
- 3. 15 minute time lapse.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: .- CLASSIFICATION'OF- EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 39 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emernencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
' GUIDELINE20.,l Tornado or Sustained Winds UNUSUAL EVENT TORNADO ON-SITE EALs 1a. Tornado observed to touch down within the site boundary.
OR 1b. Sustained winds above 75 MPH for greater than 10 minutes at the site.
ALERT TORNADO STRIKING THE FACILITY EALs 1a. Tornado strikes a vital plant structure.
OR lb. Sustained winds above 90 MPH for greater than 10 minutes at the site.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY SUSTAINED WINDS OR TORNADO IN EXCESS OF DESIGN LEVELS EALs la. Tornado causes damage to vital plant equipment or plant structures.
OR 1b. Sustained winds above 100 MPH for greater than 10 minutes at the site.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 40 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 21 l River Water Hi/Lo UNUSUAL EVENT RIVER WATER LEVEL IN EXCESS OF 918 FEET OR RIVER FLOW BELOW 240 CFS (approximately 902.4 FT river level)
ALERT RIVER WATER LEVEL BETWEEN 921 AND 930 FEET OR RIVER FLOW BELOW 220 CFS (about 902.3 FT) I SITE AREA EMERGENCY RIVER WATER LEVEL EXCEEDS 930 FT OR RIVER WATER LEVEL BELOW 899 FT OR FLOOD OR LOW WATER CAUSES DAMAGE TO VITAL EQUIPMENT GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28, I/djm
.MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 l
. Page 41 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
- - ,ibELINE 22-'
Earthquake UNUSUAL EVENT ANY EARTHQUAKE FELT IN-PLANT OR DETECTED ON STATION SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY ONE OR MORE OFF-SITE SOURCES EALs 1a. Annunciator EARTHQUAKE ALARM (6-C-8).
OR 1b. Shift Manager's judgement.
ALERT CONFIRMED EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OBE LEVELS EAL
- 1. Annunciator OPERATIONAL BASIS EARTHQUAKE ALARM (6-C-13).
SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONFIRMED EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN DBE LEVELS AND PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN EALs
AND
- 2. Plant not in cold shutdown.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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i MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 42 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emerqencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE237 Fire UNUSUAL EVENT FIRE WITHIN THE PLANT NOT EXTINGUISHED WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF DETECTION.
EAL NOTE: Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the Control Room to determine that the Control Room alarm is not spurious.
- 1. Fire in buildings or areas contiguous to any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room alarm: Reactor, Turbine, Radwaste, Plant Administrative, Intake Structure, Diesel Generator, Heating Boiler, Recombiner, EFT, Condensate Storage Tanks.
ALERT FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEM EALs
- 1. Observation that fire could affect a safety system.
AND
- 2. Shift Manager's judgement.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY FIRE COMPROMISING THE FUNCTIONS OF A SAFETY SYSTEM EALs
- 1. Observation of fire that affects safety systems or functions.
AND
- 2. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF. EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 43 of 55
. FIGURE
- 7.2 EmeraencV Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
- GUIDELINE 24,I Explosion UNUSUAL EVENT NEAR OR ON-SITE EXPLOSION EALs
- 1. Visual observation or notification received.
AND
- 2. Shift Manager's judgement.
ALERT' KNOWN EXPLOSION DAMAGE TO THE FACILITY AFFECTING PLANT OPERATIONS EALs
- 1. Shift Manager's judgement.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY SEVERE DAMAGE TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT FROM MISSILES OR EXPLOSION EALs
- 1. Plant not in cold shutdown.
AND
- 2. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 324 Page 44 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l GUIDELINE25 l Aircraft and Missiles UNUSUAL EVENT AIRCRAFT CRASH ON-SITE OR SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY OVER THE FACILITY EAL
- 1. Visual observation or notification is received.
ALERT AIRCRAFT CRASH ON THE FACILITY OR MISSILE IMPACT ON FACILITY EAL
- 1. Visual observation.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY AIRCRAFT CRASH AFFECTING VITAL STRUCTURES BY IMPACT OR FIRE, OR SEVERE DAMAGE TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT FROM MISSILES OR EXPLOSION EAL
- 1. As determined by Shift Manager or Emergency Director with plant not in cold shutdown.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: l CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 55 l Page 45 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
-.lGUIDELINE 26l Miscellaneous UNUSUAL EVENT TRAIN DERAILMENT ON-SITE OR TURBINE ROTATING COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN EALs 1a. Visual observation.
OR lb. Shift Manager's judgement.
ALERT TURBINE FAILURE CAUSING CASING PENETRATION EALs 1a. Visual observation OR 1b. Shift Manager's judgement.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY Not applicable GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 46 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l GUIDELINE27 l This Page Intentionally Blank I/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: -CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 32 PeRevision
. - .Page 47of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emerrency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 28 General Emergency-- All GUIDELINES A. EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM/HR (whole body) or 5 REM/HR (thyroid) AT THE SITE BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. DOSE RATES ARE PROJECTED BASED ON OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS (e.g., radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) OR ARE MEASURED INTHE ENVIRONS.
EALs 1a. Stack Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 2.4E+8 JCi/Sec.
OR 1b. RB Vent Effluent Monitor (Ch A or B) exceeds 9.3E+7 pCi/Sec.
OR 1c. Stack radioiodine release rate, as determined by sampling and analysis, exceeds 1.95E+5 [0Ci/Sec.
OR 1d. RB Vent radioiodine release rate, as determined by sampling and analysis, exceeds 2.OE+5 [iCi/Sec.
- . Al I I39n 1..' l.. - a-;
.MU L I IJU .'-
Due to temperature-induced currents, the Containment Radiation Monitor (high-range radiation monitoring) circuits could initially produce spurious high Rem/hr signal during extreme temperature heatup transient conditions and indicate a false fail signal during extreme temperature cool down transient conditions (CR19980453) hi ... I. - - I. .-
I NOTE: MIDAS User Manual -06 (CONTAINMENT RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS) provides instruction for using MIDAS to perform release rate projections based on containment radiation monitor readings.
1e. Release rate projection based on Containment Radiation Monitor or Containment Sampling exceeds any of the values in 1a, 1b, 1c, or 1d above.
OR I/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32
_ Page 48 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 28 General Emergency - All GUIDELINES - Cont'd if. Dose rates of 1000 mrem /hr (whole body) are measured at the site boundary or beyond.
OR 1g. Radioiodine concentrations measured at the site boundary or beyond exceed 7.OE-6 [iCi/CC.
OR 1h. Dose projection calculations, based on actual or expected meteorological conditions and source term, indicates dose rates equal to or exceeding 1000 mrem/hr (whole body) or 5000 mrem/hr (thyroid) at the site boundary or beyond.
OR B. LOSS OF 2 OF 3 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 3RD BARRIER CLAD/COOLANT BOUNDARY FAILURE, POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT LOSS EALs NOTE: Failure of MSIVs to isolate constitutes a loss of both primary coolant boundary and containment. When this is combined with cladding failure, all three barriers have been lost.
- 1. Evidence of Fuel Cladding Degradation per Guideline 6, Alert or Site Area Emergency level.
AND
- 2. Failure of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by:
- High Drywell pressure; or
- High Drywell temperature; or
- Failure of MSIVs to isolate; or
- Safety Relief Valve stuck open; or
- GAP activity in primary containment atmosphere; or
- Failure of Scram Discharge Volume valves to isolate AND Il/djm
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT . - A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 49 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd l ,G,,UI*,DELI.NE 2,8,l General Emergency - All GUIDELINES - Cont'd
- 3. Potential loss of containmrent as evidenced by:
- Containment temperature or pressure approaching design limits (281 'F and 56 psig) and increasing; or
- Loss of containment cooling; or
- Failure of MSIVs to isolate; or
- Failure of Scram Discharge Volume valves to isolate; or
'--Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that loss of containment is likely.
OR C. LOSS OF 2 OF 3 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 3RD BARRIER CLAD/CONTAINMENT FAILURE, POTENTIAL COOLANT BOUNDARY LOSS NOTE: In either of the following situations loss of containment should be judged to be
--likely:
- Small or large LOCA with failure of ECCS to perform, or
- Loss of requisite decay heat removal systems (RHR and other heat sinks) following shutdown.
- 1. Evidence of Fuel Cladding Degradation per Guideline 6, Alert or Site Area Emergency level.
AND 2a. Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment penetrations required for isolation not valved off or closed.
OR 2b. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that containment has failed.
AND
- 3. Potential loss of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by reactor pressure near design limits (121 0 psig measured in the steam dome @ 5750 F) and increasing or loss of all ECCS.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 50 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd lGUIDELINE 28 l General Emergency - All GUIDELINES - Cont'd D. LOSS OF 2 OF 3 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH A POTENTIAL LOSS OF 3RD BARRIER CONTAINMENT/COOLANT BOUNDARY FAILURE, POTENTIAL CLAD FAILURE EALs NOTE: Failure of MSIVs to isolate constitutes a loss of both primary coolant boundary and containment. When this is combined with cladding failure, all three barriers have been lost.
1a. Failure of containment as evidenced by all containment penetrations required for isolation not valved off or closed.
OR 1b. Shift Manager or Emergency Director's judgement that containment has failed.
AND
- 2. Failure of primary coolant boundary as evidenced by:
- High Drywell pressure; or
- High Drywell temperature; or
- Failure of MSIVs to isolate; or
- Safety Relief Valve stuck open; or
- GAP activity in primary containment atmosphere; or
- Failure of Scram Discharge Volume valves to isolate AND 3a. Potential loss of cladding as evidenced by loss of all ECCS OR 3b. Reactor water level <TAF (-126") and decreasing.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - A.2-101 TITLE: -CLASSIFICATION OF.EMERGENCIES. - Revision 32 Page 51 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emeraencv Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
.FGUIELINE 28 General Emeraencv - All GUIDELINES - Cont'd E. LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT F. OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, THAT MAKE RELEASE OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVITY IN A SHORT TIME PERIOD POSSIBLE (e.g. any core melt situation, see example BWR sequences).
EXAMPLE BWR SEQUENCES
- 1. Transient (e.g., loss of off-site power) plus failure of requisite core shutdown systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.
- 2. Small or large LOCAs with failure of ECCS to perform, leading to core degradation or melt in minutes to hours. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent.
- 3. Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.
- 4. Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable.' Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
G. ANY MAJOR INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL EVENTS (E.G., FIRES, EARTHQUAKES, SUBSTANTIALLY BEYOND DESIGN BASIS) WHICH COULD CAUSE MASSIVE COMMON DAMAGE TO PLANT SYSTEMS RESULTING IN ANY OF THE ABOVE (A-F).
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-1 01 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 52 of 55 FIGURE 7.2 Emergency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd GUIDELINE 29 Other Plant Conditions UNUSUAL EVENT NOTE: For plant conditions which require plant shutdown under Technical Specifications, the Unusual Event SHALL be declared no later than the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses. The Unusual Event may be declared earlier at the discretion of the Shift Manager or Emergency Director.
PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST REQUIRING SHUTDOWN UNDER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED OPERATING MODE WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TIME LIMITS.
OR PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT INCREASE AWARENESS ON THE PART OF PLANT OPERATING STAFF OR STATE AND/OR LOCAL OFF-SITE AUTHORITIES.
OR OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SHIFT MANAGER OR EMERGENCY DIRECTOR INDICATE A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE PLANT.
ALERT PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVATION OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY AND OTHER KEY EMERGENCY PERSONNEL ON STANDBY SITE AREA EMERGENCY OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTERS AND MONITORING TEAMS OR A PRECAUTIONARY NOTIFICATION TO NEAR SITE PUBLIC I GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 A.2-101 Page 53 of 55 I
FIGURE 7.2 Emeraency Classification Guidelines - Cont'd
- GUIDELINE 30 Malor Damaae to SDent Fuel UNUSUAL EVENT Not applicable ALERT FUEL DAMAGE ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO CONTAINMENT EALs
- 1. Dropping, bumping or otherwise rough handling of a spent bundle or individual fuel rods.
AND
- 2. Annunciator FUEL POOL RADIATION MONITOR CH A or B (5-A-1 or 5-A-2) exceeds 50 mrem/hr.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY MAJOR DAMAGE TO SPENT FUEL IN CONTAINMENT (e.g., large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level)
EALs 1a. Decrease in fuel pool level below 36'9" indicated by LS-2787, SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL HI/LO ALARM on Panel C-65.
OR 1b. Dropping a heavy object onto spent fuel confirmed by direct observation.
AND
- 2. Annunciator FUEL POOL RADIATION MONITOR CH A or B (5-A-1 or 5-A-2) exceeds 50 mrem/hr.
GENERAL EMERGENCY As specified in GUIDELINE 28.
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 54 of 55 FIGURE 7.3 Containment Monitor ResDonse To Contained Source Curve Containment Monitor Response To Contained Source 300 uCi/gm DEl 100% NG and 50% Halogens Containment Monitor (Ch B) Response to Contained Source 300 uCi/gm DEI 100% NG and 50% Halogens 100 More than 300 uCi/grn DEI possible C"
U 0
c- 10 Ir 2- f uEi4Lgrni<]I T -
t~~II~ III Less than 300 I
ltI-0.1 10 100 Time Post Shutdown (Hr)
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MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT A.2-101 TITLE: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES Revision 32 Page 55 of 55 Basis for Containment Monitor Response Curve Containment radiation monitoring is accomplished with two detectors. Each is located near one of the 28" recirc suction lines. The A Containment Monitor (azimuth 1800) response is complicated by its proximity to the steam lines which exit the drywell directly below it.
Therefore, the B channel geometry (azimuth 00) was used to generate the response curve.
The purpose of the response curve is to show the minimum Containment Monitor response to a fuel clad degradation condition indicated by a coolant concentration of 300 uCi/gm DEI.
Assumptions:
- The only radiation source is an 18-foot vertical section of the 28" diameter "A" Recirc suction line (933' to 951' level).
- The source is totally contained, i.e., no significant airborne radioactive material.
- Noble gases would be present in proportion to the radioiodine concentration (300 uCi/gm DEI), assuming that for each fuel rod with cladding damage, 100% of the noble gases and 50% of the radioiodines are released to the coolant.
Givens:
- The detector-is located 110 inches horizontally from the outer diameter of the A Recirc suction line. Distance used in calculation is 124 inches from detector to center of source.
- The detector is located at 944' level.
- Shielding consists of 1" of steel (pipe wall).
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