ML040860145

FEMA - Final Exercise Report, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

ML040860145
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	02/03/2004
From:	Burris K Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Reyes L NRC/RGN-II
Schneck D 415-3079 NRR/NUEPPO
References
Download: ML040860145 (61)

Text

U.S. D)epartment4or liomeland Seiacrili Rcgion IV 3(003 (ChamblebIce Tucker Rorad Atlanta. GA 3(J341 L'  ; FEMA Final Exercise Report Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Exercise Date: November 5-6, 2003 Report Date: February 3, 2004 ww~w.fenia.gov

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, GA 30341 FEMA February 3, 2004 Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator - RH Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Reyes:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the November 5-6, 2003, full participation ingestion pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee and the Counties of McMinn, Meigs and Rhea located within the I 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and Roane County, a host county. The final exercise report was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff. Copies of this report will be forwarded to the State of Tennessee and FEMA and NRC Headquarters by my staff.

The State of Tennessee and the counties successfully demonstrated knowledge of their plans and the capability to implement them. At the request of the State, the only Federal Agency involved in the ingestion pathway portion ofthe exercise was the Food and Drug Administration. The State also successfully demonstrated its ability to define impacted areas and take protective actions related to the ingestion pathway.

During this exercise, FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies and only one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). The ARCA concerned the lack of required information in the initial EAS message.

The State of Tennessee has provided FEMA with its schedule of corrective action that has been incorporated into the report The State and counties demonstrated the correction of the three ARCAs identified during the 2001 Watts Bar exercise. Those ARCA concerned: 1)The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency simultaneously communicating protective action decisions to the counties and the public; 2) McMinn County delayed taking action to support the evacuation order, and 3)evacuee monitors were not adequately trained at the Roane County mass care shelter.

Based on the results of the November 5 and 6, 2003 exercise and FEMA's review ofTennessee's Annual Letters of Certification for 2001 and 2002, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee and the affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate www.fema.gov

measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety ofthe public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the State of Tennessee's offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant granted on July 3, 1997, will remain in effect.

Should you have questions, please contact Robert Perdue at 770t220-5464.

Kenneth 0. Bunis, Jr. -

Regional Director Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters Radiological and Emergency Preparedness Branch-NP-TS-RP 500 C Street, SW, Room 202 Washington, D. C. 20472 s.`Debra A. Schneck, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics Section Operator Licensing, Human Performance and Plant Support Branch Division of Inspection Program Management Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation U.' S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chambicc Tucker Road Atlanta. GA 30341 0 FEMA Final Exercise Report Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Exercise Date: November 5-6, 2003 Report Date: February 3, 2004 wivi-As ni a.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. EXEC UTIVE

SUMMARY

....................................... 1 II. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................2 III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW ...................................... 4 A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description ...................................... 4 B. Exercise Participants ...................................... 4 C. Exercise Timeline ...................................... 5 IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS .......... ........................... 7 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 ................................... 7 B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated .................................... 9

1. STATE OF TENNESSEE .................. 11 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ............................ 11 1.2 Dose Assessment ........................... 12 1.3 Field Coordination Center ........................... 13 1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center ........................... 13 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ........................... 14 1.6 Joint Information Center ............................ 14 1.7 Central Emergency Control Center ........................... 15

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS......................................................................... 15 2.1 McMINN COUNTY .......................... 15 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................... 15 2.1.2 Traffic Control Points .......................... 16 2.2 MEIGS COUNTY .......................... 17 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................... 17 2.2.2 Traffic Control Points .......................... 17 2.2.3 Protective Actions for Schools .............. ............ 18 i

2.3 RHEA COUNTY ............................................. 18 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 18 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points ............................................. 19

3. HOST JURISDICTION . . ...............................19 3.1 ROANE COUNTY .......................................... 19 3.1.1 Mass Care ............................................. 19

4. INGESTION PHASE ............................................. 20 4.1 STATE OF TENNESSEE ..................................... 20 4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ....................................... 20 4.1.2 State Radiological Laboratory ........................................ 21 4.1.3 Dose Assessment ....................................... 22 4.1.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ............................. 22

5.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECIVE ACTION ..... 23 5.1 2003 ARCAs ASSESSED . . ..........................23 5.1.1 71-03-5.a.1 -A-01 State of Tennessee SEOC ................... 23 5.2 PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED . . ........................24 5.2.1 71-01-03-A-01 State of Tennessee SEOC ........................ 24 5.2.2 71-01-03-A-02 McMinn County EOC ............................ 24 5.2.3 71-01-18-A-03 Roane County Mass Care Shelter ........... 25 List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .27 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS .29 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT .31 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO .32 ii

List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise Timeline ........................ 6 Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation .........................X iii

I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On November 5 and 6, 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Region IV, conducted a full participation ingestion exposure pathway exercise for the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of Tennessee's Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) and associated procedures.

The previous evaluated exercise at this site was November 7, 2001. Tennessee's MJRERP for WBN was approved under Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 350, on July 3, 1997. The State of Tennessee, the Risk Counties of McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea and Roane County, a host county, participated in the exercise.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals from the State of Tennessee, and from the Counties of McMinn, Meigs, Rhea and Roane, who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an assigned responsibility for others. Additionally, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering their time and efforts to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) is commended for its exceptional efforts in coordinating the exercise emergency response activities. FEMA also commends the Division of Radiological Health (DRH) for its excellent use of time and resources during this exercise.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. No Deficiencies were identified, however, one Area Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA) was identified concerning the content of the initial EAS message.

Three ARCAs were corrected during this exercise, those ARCAs concerned: 1) TEMA simultaneously communicating protective action decisions (PAD) to the counties and public; 2) McMinn County delayed taking action to support the evacuation order; and 3) evacuee monitors were not adequately trained at the Roane County Mass Care Shelter.

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II. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 CFR Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by state and local governments;

• Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and

• Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- Department of Agriculture

- Department of Commerce

- Department of Energy

- Department of Health and Human Services

- Department of the Interior

- Department of Transportation

- Environmental Protection Agency

- Food and Drug Administration and

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

The Tennessee MJRERP for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant was formally submitted to FEMA Region IV by the State of Tennessee on April 12, 1996. Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval was granted by FEMA on July 3, 1997.

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A joint REP exercise was conducted on November 5 and 6, 2003, by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing the MJRERP and related procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the WBN Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by FEMA Region IV RAC Co-Chairperson and Chief Evaluator and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

• FEMA-REP-"'Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25, 2002 Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the ingestion pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise Criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in an issues-only format. This section also contains: (I) description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State of Tennessee's response, and (2) descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the ORO's efforts to resolve them.

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{II. EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the November 5 and 6, 2003, full participation ingestion exposure pathway exercise to test the offsite emergency response preparedness and capabilities in the area surrounding the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This section of the report includes a description of the ingestion pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence or acknowledgement of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The plant site, consisting of approximately 1,800 acres, is located in Rhea County in southeastern Tennessee. The site is located on the west shore of the Tennessee River, approximately 50 miles north-northeast of Chattanooga, and 54 miles southwest of Knoxville. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

The 10-mile EPZ for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant includes parts of McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea Counties. The land use within the 10-mile EPZ is predominately rural. The EPZ is divided into 5 large evacuation planning zones with subdivisions within those zones.

The 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ includes all or portions of 22 counties. The land use consists mainly of rural areas with agricultural interests. The Southwestern and Northeastern counties are mainly urban and a large national forest is included in the Eastern Sector.

B. Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6, 2003.

STATE OF TENNESSEE Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry Department of Environment and Conservation Bureau of State Parks Division of Air Pollution Control Division of Radiological Health Division of Solid Waste Management Division of Water Pollution Control Department of General Services Department of Health Department of Human Services 4

Department of Mental Health Department of Military Department of Safety Department of Transportation Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency FEDERAL AGENCIES Food and Drug Administration U. S. Coast Guard U. S. Corps of Engineers RISK JURISDICTIONS McMinn County Meigs County Rhea County HOST JURISDICTIONS Roane County PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross C. Exercise Timeline Table 1,on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5, 2003.

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I I  ; I f rI I I Ir I Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: November 5,2003- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Emergency I Tim Time That Nottifiction Was Received or Action Was Take_

Classificton Utility Level or Event Declared

._ _. SEOC DOSE RMCC JIC FCC McMINN MEIGS

_ _ .. .. COUNT RHEA COUNTY COUNTY Unusual Event Alert 0826 0841 0841 0859 0900 0901 0853 0858 Site Area Emergency 0944 0953 0953 0953 1005 0950 0954 0951 0957 General Emergency 1026 1032 1032 1039 1035 1039 1042 1040 1044 Simulated Rd.Release 1147 1145 1145 1116 1155 1304 1305 1259 Started I _ I Simulated Rad. Release END EX Terminated - n -

Facility Declared Operational 0924 0924 0815 1000 0917 0802 0815 0800 DeclarationofStateofEmergency 1150 1150 1205 1157 1152 1150 1154 Exercise Terminated 1340 1340 1550 1340 1355 1343 1400 1350 Early Precautionary Actions: 1011 0901 0940 0945 School Relocation V Protective Action Decision 0927 0925 0925 0924 Public Notification I Siren Activation 0930 0930 0930 0930 1 EAS Message - 4 0931 0930 0930 0930 2d Protective Action Decision Evacuate Zones: Near Site Area (A-I, B-l. 1003 1003 1015 1010 1002 1003 1003 C-l, D-l) 2" Siren Activation 1005 1005 1010 1005 1005 1005 2*dEASMessage-5 7,22 1006 1006 1010 1005 1005 1005 3'4 Protective Action Decision Evacuate: Add Quadrants B and C 1047 1047 1047 1047 1047 Shelter: Quadrants A and D 1103 _

3P Siren Activation - 1055 =_ - ._- 1103 _ 1055 1055 1055 EASMessage 1056 _ - 1103 1055 Kl Administration 1055 1055 Field Teams Ingest 0945 Emergency Workers within 10-mile Ingest 1151 1230 1215 1205 Public fron Quadrants Band C 1200 _ _

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities, which participated in the November 5 and 6, 2003 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in the REP "Exercise Evaluation Methodology," dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all FEMA-REP-Exercise Evaluation Methodology, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions. The exercise criterion are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criterion is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7

r r I I I r r I r r I I r r I Table 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: November 5, 2003 - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant ELEMENT/Sub-Element SEOC DOSE FCC RMCC/ FMT JIC CECC McMinn Meigs Rhea Roane LAB County County County County

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT I.a.l. Mobilization M M M M M M M M I.b.l. Facilities M M __ I M M M Ic. I. Direction and Control M M M _ ____ M M M M I.d. I. Communications Equipment M N M M N N M M I.e. I. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations M M M M M M M M M M

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING =

2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control M NIM M NM _MMM N N 2.b. 1, Rad Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Info M M 2.b.2. Rad Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public M M NI M _

2.c. 1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations NIM M M 2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure M M 2.e.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation. Re-entry & M M

3. PROTECTIVEReturn ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control . N N N M M M 3.b.1. Implementation of Kl Decisions M M M M 3,c. 1. Implementation of PADs for Specia Populations M M M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools 3.d.I . Implementation of Traffic and Access Control _ _

.M M M 3.d.2. Impedimentsto Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control M M M 3.e. 1. Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Info M _ M.

co 3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies and Instructional Materials M M 3.e.1I Implementation ofRelocation. Re-entry and Return A Decisions M

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment _M 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management N_____ _

4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analvsis Procedures N 4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis M M _

4.b.2. Laboratory Operations M

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO 5.a. I. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification A _ M M M 5.a2. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification 15-Minute(Fast Breaker) 5.a.3 Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and M M M Notification 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for the Public and the Media M N N M N

6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES .

6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of M Evacuees 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment 6.c1. Temporary Care of Evacuees M 6.d.I. Transport and Treatment ofM=Met Contaminated Injured Individuals _ _ _ _

LEED D*_ Defcic A _=ARC.A_.

LEGEND: M = Met D = Deficiency A - ARCA

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction, in an issues only format. A brief summation of the demonstration has been included for each jurisdiction to provide perspective. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to criterion demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

• Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

• Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise. Included is a description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises, which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises, which were not resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues, which are discussed in this report.

• A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

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An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering and tracking exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

• Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

• Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Criterion Number - A number, alpha, number combination corresponding to the criterion numbers in Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

• Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

• Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

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1. STATE OF TENNESSEE 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), in Nashville provided excellent direction and control to the State agencies and to the three risk counties. The use of the "Call Me" decision-making line allowed all agencies to discuss issues and come to a consensus. The county liaisons kept the risk counties informed of the State's activities.

Frequent briefings and staff feedback to the SEOC Director kept all agencies informed of current events. The Prompt Notification System (PNS) activation was timely and accurate. The Public Information Officer (PlO) staff did an excellent job of preparing the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages and amending the broadcasts as necessary.

However, the initial EAS message at 0931, did not in include a statement for the public to review emergency information in the Watts Bar calendar.

a. MET: Criteria 1.a.1, I.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1 and 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Issue No.: 71-03-5.a.1-A-0l Condition: The initial EAS message sent out to the public at 0931, did not contain one of the required elements as listed in the Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001. The EAS message sent out did not include a "reference to Radiological Emergency Preparedness specific information (e.g. brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency."

Possible Cause: The reference to the emergency information in the calendar had been inadvertently excluded during the last revision to the EAS messages.

Reference:

Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001.

Effect: The general public could have been better prepared for a possible evacuation using the information provided in the calendar.

Recommendation: Review and rewrite as necessary EAS messages to include a statement to review the emergency information found in the Watts Bar calendar.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: As was previously addressed in the preceding paragraph, revision of EAS messages are included in the 2003 SQN/WBN MJRERP per reference Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency in 11

concert with local governments and The Tennessee Valley Authority has a very aggressive training and plan distribution program. Enclosure # 3 is given to each plan document holder during annual revision distribution. Also, during annual training and exercise briefings an emphasis is placed on verbally making notification of plan revisions and distribution. In addition, a signature of receipt memo is issued to each document holder during plan distribution as confirmation for the FNF Planning Staff. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency along with the Governors Press Office will ensure remedial training is provided during preparation for the upcoming Watts Bar and Sequoyah Exercises to be conducted in 2004. Specific dates and times for remedial training are being coordinated with The Governors Press Office and will completed in the Spring of 2004.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:

Issue No.: 71-01-03-A-01, State of Tennessee SEOC

Description:

At 1055, the State activated sirens and the EAS to inform the public of the decision to evacuate the near plant area (Al and BI) and all of quadrants C and D. Simultaneously, the protective action decision (PAD) was communicated to the McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to implement their actions to support the evacuation. The counties did not have enough time to implement protective actions before the public began to evacuate.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: Excellent coordination with all counties was evident at this exercise. The use of the "Call Me" conference line assisted in assuring that the counties were kept informed of all State decisions prior to concurrence. It proved it's value when there was some confusion on KI issuance and a conference call was made to clarify the KI issue.

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Dose Assessment The Division of Radiological Health (DRH) Dose Assessment staff was able to maintain continuous communications with the Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) using commercial telephones and facsimile machines. The DRH Radiation Control Officer (RCO) successfully directed the activities of the dose assessment group. The RCO and his staff promptly performed dose assessments using their dose assessment software (RASCAL version 3.0.3). The DRH results were consistent with the utility's projections. The primary and back-up communication and dose assessment methods were operable and demonstrated during the exercise. The DRH Dose Assessment Staff operated in accordance with their plan, procedures and the extent-of-play agreement.

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a. MET: Criteria 2.a.1, 2.b.1 and 2.b.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Field Coordination Center The Director effectively managed the Field Coordination Center (FCC), located at the TEMA East field office. He discussed protective actions with the SEOC, and promptly communicated decisions to the FCC staff. Periodic briefings were conducted and input was requested from all agencies present. The staff knew their responsibilities, effectively implemented them and coordinated among themselves when required. All EAS messages and news releases were read to the staff upon receipt.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.b.l, l.c.l, I.d.1, l.e.1, 2.al, 2.b.1 and 2.b.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center The RMCC effectively managed the four Department of Radiological Health Radiological Monitoring Field Teams. They obtained radiological field monitoring data from the teams and provided it to the SEOC dose assessment group. The experienced RMCC Staffs coordination with the TVA Liaison was excellent, and they successfully performed all assigned duties.

a. MET: Criteria L.a.I, L.b.l, L.c.I, I.d.1, L.e.l, 2.a.I and 3.a.I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 13

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams The Tennessee DRH deployed four (4) radiological field monitoring teams (FMT). The teams were pre-staged at the RMCC. Fixed monitoring points have been identified within the Watts Bar 10-mile EPZ and were used by the teams. All personnel were well trained and deployed with appropriate and calibrated instruments. They demonstrated a thorough understanding of their mission and use of their equipment.

a. MET: Criteria 1.d.1, L.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.l, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.6 Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center (JIC) was declared operational at 10:00 a.m. and was staffed with representatives from the State of Tennessee, McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea Counties, and TVA. The State, TVA and JIC Coordinators worked well as a team, effectively managed the JIC operation, and coordinated staff involvement. Four well-planned media briefings were professionally conducted. PlOs from the State and counties answered questions thoroughly and accurately. The Mock Media personnel posed relevant questions. The JIC staff coordinated the development of five State and TVA news releases that were consistent with the PADs and the content of EAS messages.

Public inquiries were consistently logged and promptly answered. The AC personnel were well trained and performed their duties exceptionally well.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.l, 1.e. 1 and 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 14

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 Central Emergency Control Center The Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Corporate Office, Chattanooga, Tennessee, is an excellent facility from which all participating organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations. Communications, coordination, and the flow of technical information between the utility operator and applicable State officials were exemplary. The State officials deployed to the CECC were well trained, knowledgeable and followed applicable procedures. They performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.c.1, I.d.1 and l.e.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 McMINN COUNTY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Director maintained direction and control throughout the exercise. The staff, both paid and volunteer, were professional and performed all duties in an exemplary manner. Communications with personnel outside the EOC was maintained through several means including amateur radio services. When the County did not understand why the State made a decision to have emergency workers take potassium iodide (KI). The Director called the State and asked, thus prompting a conference call that clarified the decision for the counties.

a. MET: Criteria 1.a.l, I.b.l, 1.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 15

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:

Issue No.: 71-01-03-A-02, McMinn County EOC

Description:

At 1055, the TEMA liaison at the McMinn County EOC began receiving the message from the SEOC directing the evacuation of the near plant area (2-4 mile radius) and all of quadrants C and D. The receipt of this message was completed at 1058. However, EOC management and staff were unaware that they were to be supporting an evacuation directed by the State. The Declaration at approximately 1203 prompted McMinn County to implement its actions to support the evacuation that was in process.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State and Counties discussed directly all protective action recommendations and decisions on this "Call Me" line. Once the decision was made, McMinn County immediately implemented them.

However, when a confusing message was received concerning the ingestion of KI by both emergency workers and the evacuating public, the Emergency Director called the State, arranged for a conference call and received clarification regarding the decision and then promptly implemented the action.

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Traffic Control Points An interview was conducted with personnel from Athens Police Department (APD),

Clearwater Volunteer Fire Department (CVFD) and the McMinn 911 Center. They successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain both shelter information points (SIP) and traffic control points (TCP). Personnel from the APD and CVFD departments were knowledgeable of SIP and TCP procedures, evacuation routes, impediment removal and the location of shelters. The personnel were also knowledgeable of radiological exposure control including the use of dosimetry, KI, call-in and turn-back values. All personnel demonstrated excellent team skills and displayed professionalism.

a. MET: Criteria L.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.I and 3.d.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE 16

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 MEIGS COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC has a well-trained professional staff supplemented by individual volunteers and members of the Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP). The County Mayor and the Emergency Management Director competently directed and focused the staff's efforts.

They involved the functional representatives in the information gathering, assessment, and decision-making process. Representatives from the City and County agencies were empowered with decision-making authority and their performance not only reflected a detailed knowledge of their roles and missions, but a degree of pro-activeness rarely seen in county EOCs. The citizens of Meigs County are well served by this complement of concerned City and County officials and volunteers.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, I.b.l, L.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.2 Traffic Control Points The Meigs County Sheriff and members of the County Fire and Rescue Squad (FRS) participated in an interview on traffic and access control procedures at the EOC. The FRS team assists the Sheriffs deputies in staffing roadblocks to control traffic flow and conducting radiological monitoring at the location. The Sheriff and FRS team members were knowledgeable of TCP establishment and procedures, and were conversant on alternate evacuation routes. The FRS team also assists evacuees at shelter information points along the evacuation routes. The Sheriff would contact the Meigs County Road Department for assistance in removing impediments to traffic, erecting barricades and placing evacuation route signs at designated locations. All personnel were knowledgeable of their duties and radiological exposure control.

a. MET: Criteria L.e. I, 3.a. 1,3.b. 1,3.d. I and 3.d.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 17

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.3 Protective Actions for Schools An interview was conducted with the Meigs North Elementary School Principal and Vice-Principal. Their plan was very detailed and both were extremely knowledgeable of the plan and the importance of the evacuation of the 425 students. The District has 7 buses dedicated to the school for transfer of the students to McMinn Central School with a Sheriff's Department escort.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3 RHEA COUNTY 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC received notification of an Alert at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant at 0858. Rhea County Emergency Management Director, although new on the job and participating in his first Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise, performed superbly. His leadership, direction and control, and prompt decision-making ability enhanced a well-coordinated emergency response operation. Frequent briefings were conducted ensuring the exchange of vital information among all staff. Rhea County's Director of Schools and Transportation Supervisor are commended for their outstanding ability to coordinate and execute school evacuations. Their efforts were professional and epitomized the meaning of teamwork. Rhea County coordinated with the SEOC and promptly implemented protective action decisions.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.l, I.b.l, l.c.l, I.d.l, L.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1 18

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points The Rhea County Sheriffs Department, the County Highway Department, and the County Fire and Rescue Squad successfully demonstrated the capability to establish appropriate traffic and access control points. They were able to provide accurate instructions to traffic and access control personnel, and to assure that proper emergency information is provided to the evacuating public, such as the locations of reception/registration centers, evacuation routes, etc. Two Deputy Sheriffs and two Fire and Rescue Squad members were interviewed and were very knowledgeable of their duties concerning traffic and access control, the evacuation process, and radiological exposure control procedures.

The County Highway Department representative was well aware of the Department's roles and responsibilities.

a. MET: Criteria L.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.I and 3.d.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs- RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

3. HOST JURISDICTION 3.1 ROANE COUNTY 3.1.1 Mass Care The Roane County Health Department nurses, Harriman City Fire Department and the Knoxville Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC) successfully demonstrated the processing and care of evacuees at the Harriman High School. The fire department personnel were very familiar with proper monitoring techniques, personal protective equipment and contamination control. The health nurses successfully conducted a walk-19

through of the decontamination procedures and ARC personnel conducted a walk-through of the Mass Care facilities.

a. MET: Criteria l.e.l, 3.a.1, 6.a.l and 6.c.I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:

Issue No.: 71-01-18-A-03, Roane County Mass Care Shelter

Description:

The radiological monitors at the Roane County Mass Care Shelter did not know the contamination action level, so they would not know when to send an evacuee to be decontaminated or allowed to go to the mass care area.

They also did not cover the survey probe or wear gloves and booties as specified in their implementing procedures. The implementing procedures also state that the radiological monitors will be issued a dosimeter with a range of 0-20R. They were issued a 0-200R dosimeter.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Roane County Mass Care Shelter was successfully demonstrated at Harriman High School. All participants were knowledgeable of their personnel dosimetry, contamination action levels and contamination control procedures. The proper 0-20R dosimeters were issued to EWs at the shelter.

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE

4. INGESTION PHASE 4.1 STATE OF TENNESSEE 4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The SEOC opened the Day 2 activities with a briefing of overnight activities of the Radiological Health Field Team monitoring results. As a result of those measurements, there was a discussion and decision with all involved of the relocation of residents in the Hot Zones, to include most of the City of Sweetwater and the Sweetwater Hospital. Also based on the refined data, a determination was made to return previously evacuated residents to 8 zones outside the deposition area and to lift the shelter in place order in the remaining zones.

20

Additional shelters were opened to accommodate the relocated residents. After firther refinement of the ingestion zone from the Department of Energy (DOE) flyover data, an additional 6 zones were cleared for return of residents at 103 1.

Day 3 activities commenced at 1035 with field teams defining the hot spots and collecting water, soil, vegetation and milk samples for processing. TVA announced at 1042, that they had secured from the General Emergency (GE) and downgraded to normal recovery operations. Access control points were a major topic of discussion to allow temporary re-entry to farms and utilities.

The State agencies, county reps and Radiological Health effectively coordinated their activities and made timely decisions for the residents affected by the release. All activities were thoroughly thought through and implemented. The SEOC staff was extremely proactive in the decision-making process for ingestion issues.

a. MET: Criteria 2.d.1, 2.e.1, 3.e.1, 3.e.2 and 3.f.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

• . PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.2 State Radiological Laboratory The Tennessee Department of the Environment and Conservation Radiochemistry Lab is equipped with the survey instrumentation, laboratory equipment, and supplies necessary to sufficiently analyze field samples in a timely and efficient manner. Through an interview, the manager of the Radiochemistry Laboratory demonstrated his managerial style in directing personnel in the accomplishment of laboratory operations. The laboratory personnel were very professional and displayed knowledge of their plans and operational procedures. Through an interview, they explained the general laboratory and personal exposure control procedures. All criteria were successfully demonstrated.

a. MET: Criteria L.e. I, 3.a. I and 4.c. I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE 21

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.3 Dose Assessment The DRH Dose Assessment Staff was able to correlate analytical results with pre-determiined 1998 Food and Drug Administration Derived Intervention Levels (DIL) for agricultural products and drinking water. The DRH worked closely with the Tennessee Department of Agriculture staff in these assessments. The decision to relocate citizens within the plume footprint was made after careful analysis of data provided by the Department of Energy (DOE) flyovers. All affected persons were relocated, but this number was minimized by judicious selection of boundaries of the affected areas. The DRH promptly worked with the Operations Staff in authorizing persons evacuated during the plume phase to return if environmental conditions permitted. The DRH also analyzed radiological conditions to allow re-entry for 6-hour periods for essential duties.

a. MET: Criteria 2.d.1, 2.e.1, 3.e. I and 3.e.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams The Tennessee DRH deployed two field monitoring teams to collect milk, water, soil and vegetation samples at the University of Tennessee and Mack Pate Dairy Farms. These teams were pre-staged at the RMCC. Both teams were deployed with well-trained personnel, appropriate monitoring and sampling equipment, and demonstrated a clear understanding of their mission and successfully collected and transferred these samples.

a. MET: Criterion 4.b. 1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 22

5.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECIVE ACTION 5.1 2003 ARCAs ASSESSED 5.1.1 71-03-5.a.1-A-01 Condition: The initial EAS message sent State of Tennessee out to the public at 0931, did not contain one SEOC of the required elements as listed in the Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001. The EAS message sent out did not include a "reference to Radiological Emergency Preparedness specific information (e.g.

brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency."

Possible Cause: The reference to the emergency information in the calendar had been inadvertently excluded during the last revision to the messages.

Reference:

Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001.

Effect: The general public could have been better prepared for a possible evacuation using the information provided in the calendar.

Recommendation: Review and rewrite as necessary EAS messages to include a statement to review the emergency information found in the Watts Bar calendar.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: As was previously addressed in the preceding paragraph, revision of EAS messages are included in the 2003 SQN/WBN MJRERP per reference Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2001. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency in concert with local governments and The Tennessee Valley Authority has a very aggressive training and plan distribution program. Enclosure # 3 is 23

given to each plan document holder during annual revision distribution. Also, during annual training and exercise briefings an emphasis is placed on verbally making notification of plan revisions and distribution. In addition, a signature of receipt memo is issued to each document holder during plan distribution as confirmation for the FNF Planning Staff.

The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency along with the Governors Press Office will ensure remedial training is provided during preparation for the upcoming Watts Bar and Sequoyah Exercises to be conducted in 2004. Specific dates and times for remedial training are being coordinated with The Governors Press Office and will completed in the Spring of 2004.

5.2 PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED 5.2.1 71-01-03-A-01

Description:

At 1055, the State activated State of Tennessee sirens and the EAS to inform the public SEOC of the decision to evacuate the near plant area (Al and BI) and all of quadrants C and D. Simultaneously, the protective action decision (PAD) was communicated to the McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to implement their actions to support the evacuation. The counties did not have enough time to implement protective actions before the public began to evacuate.

Corrective Action Demonstrated:

Excellent coordination with all counties was evident at this exercise. The use of the "Call Me" conference line assisted in assuring that the counties were kept informed of all State decisions prior to concurrence. It proved it's value when there was some confusion on KI issuance and a conference call was made to clarify the KI issue.

24

5.2.2 71-01-03-A-02

Description:

At 1055, the TEMA McMinn County liaison at the McMinn County EOC began EOC receiving the message from the SEOC directing the evacuation of the near plant area (2-4 mile radius) and all of quadrants C and D. The receipt of this message was completed at 1058. However, EOC management and staff were unaware that they were to be supporting an evacuation directed by the State. The Declaration at approximately 1203 prompted McMinn County to implement its actions to support the evacuation that was in process.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State and Counties discussed directly all protective action recommendations and decisions on this "Call Me" line. Once the decision was made, McMinn County immediately implemented them. However, when a confusing message was received concerning the ingestion of KI by both emergency workers and the evacuating public, the Emergency Director called the State, arranged for a conference call and received clarification regarding the decision and then promptly implemented the action.

5.2.3 71-01-18-A-03

Description:

The radiological monitors at Roane County the Roane County Mass Care Shelter did not Mass Care Shelter know the contamination action level, so they would not know when to send an evacuee to be decontaminated or allowed to go to the mass care area. They also did not cover the survey probe or wear gloves and booties as specified in their implementing procedures.

The implementing procedures also state that the radiological monitors will be issued a dosimeter with a range of 0-20R. They were issued a 0-200R dosimeter.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Roane County Mass Care Shelter was successfully demonstrated at Harriman High School. All participants were knowledgeable of their personnel dosimetry, 25

contamination action levels and The contamination control procedures. to proper 0-20R dosimeters were issued EWs at the shelter.

26

APPENDIX I ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action APD Athens Police Department CECC Central Emergency Control Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations CVFD Clearwater Volunteer Fire Department DHS Department of Homeland Security DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DIL Derived Intervention Levels DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRH Division of Radiological Health EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMA Emergency Management Agency EOC Emergency Operations Center EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ESC Emergency Services Coordinator EWD Emergency Worker Decontamination FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCC Field Coordination Center FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Field Monitoring Team FNF Fixed Nuclear Facility FR Federal Register FRS Fire and Rescue Squad GE General Emergency ICF ICF Consulting, Inc.

27

JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide mR milliroentgen MJRERP Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- I, Rev. 1, "Criteriafor Preparationand Evaluation of RadiologicalEmergency Response Plansand Preparedness in Support ofNuclear Power Plants," November 1980 ORG Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PNS Public Notification System R Roentgen RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCO Radiation Control Officer REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RMCC Radiological Monitoring Control Center RSVP Retired Senior Volunteer Program SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIP Shelter Information Point TCP Traffic Control Point TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency TVA Tennessee Valley Authority USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 28

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6, 2003. The organization represented by each evaluator is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHS/FEMA - Department of Homeland Security/

Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF - ICF Incorporated NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lawrence A Robertson Co-RAC Chairman EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Chief Evaluator Tom Reynolds DHS/FEMA STATE OF TENNESSEE SEOC Tom Reynolds DHS/FEMA Joseph Canoles DHS/FEMA RMCC Deborah Blunt ICF Field Coordination Center Larry Robertson DHS/FEMA Dose Assessment Harry Harrison ICF Radiological FMTs Keith Earnshaw ICF Hollis Barry ICF Thomas Brown ICF Edward Wojnas ICF Joint Information Center Robert Perdue DHS/FEMA Dan Inman ICF Central Emergency Control Center Robert Trojanowski NRC MCMINN COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Helen Wilgus DHS/FEMA Beth Massey DHS/FEMA Rosemary Samsel ICF 29

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5, 2003 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region IV.

A. Exercise Criteria The specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria, which were to be demonstrated, have been consolidated with the extent-of-play for this event and are explained in Subsection B.

B. Extent-of-Play Agreement The extent-of-play agreement was submitted by the State of Tennessee and approved by FEMA Region IV. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each exercise criterion listed as referred to in Subsection A of this appendix.

31

I THE STATE OF TENNESSEE TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MIUTARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE 3041 SIDCO DRIVE. P.O. BOX41502 NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37204-150 (615) 741-001 2003 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT GRADED EVALUATION STATE OF TENNESSEE PLUME EXPOSURE AND INGESTION PATHWAY ZONES GOALS, CRITERIA, AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY A full participation exercise will be conducted during the week of November 5 - 6, 2003 for the purpose of demonstrating an integrated radiological emergency response capability for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The exercise will be a two-day event (approx. 8 hrs. per day),

encompassing response capabilities and requirements of the State, local governments, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in both the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)/Plume Exposure Zone and Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ).

The State of Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Authority have prepared goals addressing respective obligations. Both reflect the necessary interactions between the State and local governments as well as the utility as set forth in the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The six evaluation areas coupled with specific criteria to accomplish the following goals have been written in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Register Notice, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology."

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISE GOALS:

State and local government goals for this exercise are:

I. Test as well as evaluate the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan concurrently with local government implementing procedures

2. Demonstrate and assess the continued viability of the integrated radiological emergency response effort through state and local government offsite personnel implementing response actions in accordance with established guidance

3. Ensure the safety of the general public through the issuance of protective action recommendations, as appropriate.

4. Demonstrate continued integration of Field Monitoring Teams in the Ingestion Pathway Zone and their sampling capabilities.

5. Demonstrate access control on day two and out-of-sequence days of re-entry and non re-entry areas in the Ingestion Pathway.

6. Ensure all agencies' capabilities and inadequacies are noted and corrected as well as pertinent recommendations for improvement implemented.

Evaluation Area I - Emergency Operations Management l.a. Mobilization Criterion l.a.l: Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E. 1; H.4.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - The ORO will demonstrate the capability to receive the emergency notification from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by the mobilized personnel.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY- The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will receive the emergency notification from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the SEOC in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP. Facilities will be considered operational at START EX with assigned personnel to the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC),

Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (to include Field monitoring teams), and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) pre-positioned and in-place no later than 7:00 AM Ccntrall8:00 AM Eastern time. The Risk County EMA Directors will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.

The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel, State/local and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 8:30 AM Eastern time and remain in place for Day I only. SEOC, FCC, RMCC, and Risk County EOC assigned personnel will remain on duty until END EX however, the FCC and Risk County EOCs will maintain only minimum staffing for Day 2. Roane County is the only Host County participating in this exercise with all activities occurring at the Harriman High School. At the beginning of Day 2, a thirty minute "Time Bridge" briefing will transition the Extent-of-Play participants from the Plume Exposure Pathway (10-Mile) to the Ingestion Pathway (50-Mile) scenario. Controller radiological data injects will occur as the result of overnight transition to exercise Day 2 and WBN '03 Page 2 August 25, 2003

as required during exercise Day 2 to facilitate compress time for Days 3, 4, and 5 of the scenario.

I.b. Facilities Criterion L.b. 1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response (NUREG-0654, H.3.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations.

Facilities must be set up based on the OROs plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC, RMCC, JIC, and Risk County EOCs (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures and remain fully operational during the course of the exercise. The JIC will terminate operations at the close of Day I and the FCC and Risk County EOCs will be minimally staffed for Day 2. Since the SEOC and JIC facilities were previously evaluated; i.e., Baselined during Sequoyah 2002, and no changes have been made to them, only the FCC/RMCC and Risk County EOCs will be evaluated (See Definitions, "Baseline").

I.c. Direction and Control Criterion I.c.I: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A. .d; A.2.a, b.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example:

keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC Director will assume primary responsibility for direction and control; working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County EOC Directors.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 70-01-03-A-01 (State Emergency Operations Center) - At 1055, the State activated sirens and the EAS to inform the public of the decision to evacuate the near plant area (Al, B1, Cl, and DI) and all of quadrants C and D.

Simultaneously, the protective Action Decision (PAD) was communicated to the McMinn, Meigs, and Rhea County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to implement their actions to support the evacuation. The counties did not have enough time to implement protective actions before the public began to evacuate.

WBN '03 Page 3 August 25, 2003

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 71-01-03-A-02 (McMinn County EOC) At 10:55, the TEMA liaison at McMinn County began receiving the message from the SEOC directing the evacuation of the near plant area (2-4 mile radius) and all of quadrants C and D. The receipt of this message was completed at 10:58. However, EOC management and staff were unaware that they were to be supporting an evacuation directed by the State. The declaration of the General Emergency and a news release received from the PIO at approximately 1203 prompted McMinn County to implement its actions to support the evacuation that was in progress.

L.d. Communications Equipment Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654, F. 1, 2.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of the exercise.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC/RMCC, and Risk County EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems at START EX. The communications network between the DRH field teams and RMCC and the RMCC and SEOC/CECC will be evaluated at the RMCC.

I.e. Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion L.e. 1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),

and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; 1.IOa, b, e; J.I1; K.3.a.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the OROs plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEOC, FCC, RMCC, JIC, and Risk County EOCs (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.

Evaluation Area 2- Protective Action Decision Making 2.a. Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.I: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to WBN '03 Page 4 August 25, 2003

authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides (NUREG-0654, K.4; J.10.e, f.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate:

a. A capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures

b. the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels...

c. the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the SEOC. (See Criterion 2.b.2, STATE EXTENT OF PLAY) 2.b. Radiological assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information and plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the SEOC, RMCC, and CECC. Division of Radiological Health (DRH) personnel at the SEOC, in concert with TVA counterparts in the CECC, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections. Radiological data for the field teams will be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC. Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy (NUREG-0654, J.9, I0.f, m.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

WBN '03 Page 5 August 25, 2003

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the local EOCs and if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. Prior to implementation, decisions will be coordinated in a timely manner with the Risk County EOC Directors to ensure understanding/implementation.

2.c. Protection Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations:

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10d, e.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be considered by the OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff, i.e., DRH, EMS, TEMA, etc., in the State Emergency Operations Center will be scenario driven and based on projected exposure. Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk County EOCs for understanding and implementation. Lists of the special needs as well as the resources necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors and, when requested, will be provided to the evaluator. Organizational procedures for executing protective actions will be discussed with evaluators. Contact with the Public School System will be actual. (See Criterion 3.c.216.c. 1) 2.d. Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway:

Criterion 2.d. 1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J. 11.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs will take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food in accordance with their respective plans and procedures.

WBN '03 Page 6 August 25, 2003

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the State Emergency Operations Center will be scenario driven and based on field data. SEOC staff will demonstrate Ingestion Pathway timely precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans and procedures. Affected local OROs will be kept appraised of protective action decisions. Assessment of the radiological analysis of representative samples of food, water and other ingestible substances from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the release/s from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release will be demonstrated through discussion.

2.e. Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return:

Criterion 2.e. 1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654, A.l.b; I.10; M.I.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - (Relocation) OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

(Re-entry) Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to enter the evacuated area temporarily to perform specific tasks or missions. (Return) Decisions are to be based on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geographical features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff group discussions in the State Emergency Operations Center will be scenario driven and based on field/projected data. Demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, applying decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. Relocation decisions will be made for members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Return to evacuated area/s decisions will be relayed to the affected local EOC/s and the JIC. A geographic description of the cleared area/s will accompany the notification/s.

Evaluation Area 3 - Protective Action Implementation 3.a. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

WBN '03 Page 7 August 25, 2003

Criterion 3.a. 1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of K!.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Emergency workers with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued Emergency Worker Dosimetry Kits. Two (2) emergency workers in each of the Risk County EOCs (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeded.

3.b. Implementation of KI Decision:

Criterion 3.b. 1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of K! for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained (NUREG-0654, E.7; J. 10.e, f)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to make K! available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration by appropriate staff in the State Emergency Operations Center will be: scenario driven and based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC and, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the local EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of K! to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Officer and other appropriate staff in the SEOC will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.

3.c. Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations:

Criterion 3.c. 1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions (NUREG-0654, J.I0.c, d, g.)

WBN '03 Page 8 August 25, 2003

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations, reception centers, and transportation providers may be actual or simulated.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected local EOCs for understanding and implementation. (See Sub-paragraph 2.c.1)

Implementation of protective actions and contact with the special populations/reception centers will be simulated however, procedural discussions between appropriate staff in the State/Risk County EOCs and the evaluators will be conducted.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/school officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.c, d, g)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for students. At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - County school superintendents and transportation supervisors or designees will be available at respective EOCs for interviews by evaluators. For the purpose of ascertaining staff knowledge of relocation plans and procedures, an out-of-scenario sequence interview with the following school principal/staff will be conducted, but contact by telephone with the school will occur on Exercise Day 1:

ENDANGERED LOCATON DATE SCHOOL Meigs North Meigs North Elementary September 29, 2003 Elementary 22015 State Hwy 58 North Decatur, TN 37322 _

3.d. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control:

Criterion 3.d.I: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654, J.I0.g, j)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent WBN '03 Page 9 August 25, 2003

with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated however, two (2) Emergency Workers tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed at each of the Risk County EOCs.

This activity may be in sequence with the scenario; i.e., at the point when a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover such points as:

responsibilities, personal dosimetry, turn-back values, and KI procedures.

Specific interview times will be negotiated between the evaluator/s and Risk County Director.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are Identified and Resolved (NUREG-0654, J.IO.k.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of impediments, if any, will be scenario driven. Regardless, appropriate staff personnel at the SEOC and Risk County EOCs will be available for discussions with the evaluators.

3.e. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions:

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to secure and utilize current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ). OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC will be scenario driven and based on projected contamination levels, for the establishment of the embargo area. Integration of Agriculture Extension Team resources with State and Federal resources will be discussed with WBN '03 Page 10 August 25, 2003

the evaluators. A list of teams and members identified for evaluation will be provided.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, J.9, 11.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate by formulation of protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed public information material in the IPZ or the capability for the rapid distribution of appropriate pre-printed and/or camera-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected exposure. Demonstration of the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors should be clearly coordinated however, actual communications with food producers will be simulated.

3. f. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions:

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented (NUREG-0654, M. 1, 3.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - (Relocation) OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. (Re-entry) OROs should demonstrate the capability to control re-entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area. (Return) OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected/reported contamination levels. Appropriate staff, through discussions with evaluator/s will demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas having residual radiation levels WBN '03 Page 11 August 25, 2003

above the PAGs, the capability to communicate with OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of the procedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination (monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.)

Demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase, to include demonstrating through discussion the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities, i.e. public works, etc. responsibilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration through discussion between the Dose Assessment Group, RMCC and the SEOC Director.

Evaluation Area 4 - Field Measurement and Analysis 4.a. Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates (NUREG-0654, H. 10; 1.7, 8, 9.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than IR/hr). High range instruments should be checked by an operational procedure, if no source is available. Instruments should be capable of measuring a range of exposure to include radiological protection/exposure control of team members.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Field teams will utilize appropriate instrumentation and guidelines as established in DRH Standard Operating Procedures.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, I1;J.I0.a.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure procedures before deployment. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

WBN '03 Page 12 August 25, 2003

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - (See Sub-paragraph 4.a. 1.) All field teams will be under the direction of the RMCC.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams must move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media (NUREG-0654, 1.9.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Four (4) field-monitoring teams will be evaluated. Each field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum sample volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bagged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data will be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and be transmitted by the teams to the RMCC over the normal communications network (portable hand-held radios). Cellular telephones will be utilized for back-up communications.

4.b. Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling:

Criterion 4.b.1: Field teams will demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.11.)

NETHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Field teams should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. Ingestions pathway samples should be secured from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Two (2) field teams will visit specified dairies and explain the procedure while simulating the taking of a milk sample. Each field team will demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. Samples (water, soil, and crop/forage vegetation) will be collected and transported to a central collection point and readied for shipment to a laboratory. Actual transport WBN '03 Page 13 August 25, 2003

of the samples will be simulated. Procedural demonstrations may be accomplished through actual performance or discussion.

4.c. Laboratory Operations:

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analysis to support protective action decisions (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.I 1.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - The laboratory staff should demonstrate, through interview and discussion, the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (for example, milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the staff should demonstrate, through interview and discussion, the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The laboratory staff at the State Health Department in Nashville will demonstrate, through interview and discussion, the simulated arrival, handling, and analysis of samples. (See Criterion 4.b. 1, STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY)

Evaluation Area 5- Emergency Notification and Public Information 5.a. Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System:

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initiation instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5,6,7):

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner. (See Definitions)

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will be activated simultaneously with the initial activation (SILENT TEST) of the Watts Bar (PNS) sirens with the broadcast of a test message (EAS Message #1). After the initial activation of the PNS sirens and broadcast of the special test message, subsequent PNS activations and contact with the LP- 1 EAS control station will be simulated. Should there be a difference between the State and TVA System Status Monitors (SSMs) or if siren failure/s is/are indicated, backup route alerting for the affected coverage areas will be simulated. Risk County personnel will be WBN '03 Page 14 August 25, 2003

available to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation.

Criterion 5.a.2: Reserved at this time. (NUREG-0654)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs with FEMA approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not Applicable 5.b. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media:

Criterion 5.b. 1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, 4.c.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline.

OROs should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. Also, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans and/or procedures.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Emergency Instructions/information will originate from the SEOC prior to JIC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JIC (Day I Only) while emergency instructions will continue to be disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS (SEOC will be responsible for both information and instructions on Day 2). Appropriate SEOC staff will be available to discuss with evaluators other means of rapid information dissemination; i.e., agricultural, etc.).

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Evaluation Area 6 - Support Operations/Facilities:

6.a. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers (NUREG-0654, J.1O.h, 12; K.5.a.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent of play. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base with about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the six simulated evacuees will be timed by evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - See Sub-paragraph 6.c. 1, STATE EXTENT OF PLAY NOTE: There are no "Reception Centers" per se in the WBN MJRERP.

Relocation Center/Congregate Care Center activities are combined and designated as 'Mass Care Shelters."

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 71-01-18-A-03 (Roane County Mass Care Shelter) The radiological monitors at the Roane County Mass Care Sheltcr did not know the contamination action level, so they would not know when to send an evacuee to be decontaminated or be allowed to go to the mass care area.

The also did not cover the survey probe or wear gloves and booties as specified in their implementing procedures. The implementation procedures also state that the radiological monitors will be issued a dosimeter with a range of 0-20R. They were issued a 0-200R dosimeter.

.6.b. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment:

Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in WBN '03 Page 16 August 25, 2003

accordance with the (ORO's) plans and procedures. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and procedures. The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place.

Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable 6.c. Temporary Care of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.c. 1: Managers of congregate care facilities will demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures through discussion to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.h, 12.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Congregate care will be demonstrated, out-of-scenario sequence, at the following location. The shelter will be staffed with trained personnel, and at least six (6) monitoring demonstrations will be accomplished. A walk-through of decontamination procedures will be conducted for the evaluators. School may be in session so demonstrations of monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering activities should be held to a minimum in order to lessen disruption of regular school activities. However, the staff will be available for interviews by evaluator/s. (See 6.a. 1, METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES and NOTE)

SHELTER LOCATON DATE "Harriman High School 920 N Roane Street TBD Harriman, TN 37748

• • Denotes Baseline 6.d. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance WBN '03 Page 17 August 25, 2003

should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, any vehicle (for example, car, truck, or van) may be used to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstrated out-of-scenario sequence during MS-I Drills at the following locations:

FACILITY LOCATION DATE Roane County Medical 412 Devonia Road June 12, 2003 Center Harriman, TN 37748 Bradley Memorial 2305 Chambliss Avenue July 30, 2003 Hospital NW Cleveland, TN 37311 ACCRONYMS:

ARCA Areas Requiring Corrective Action DRH Division of Radiological Health EMA Emergency Management Agency EMS Emergency Medical Services END EX End Exercise EOC Emergency Operations Center EOP Extent of play EPZ Emergency Planning Zone EW Emergency Worker FCC Field Coordination Center FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan JIC Joint Information Center IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone MJRERP Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan OES Office of Emergency Services ORO Off-site Response Organization PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protection Action Recommendation PAD Protective Action Decision RMCC Radiological Monitoring Control Center SEOC State Emergency Operations Center START EX Start Exercise DEFINITIONS:

Baseline - The Federal Emergency Management Agency data base for support facilities in compliance with revised Evaluation Methodology.

Direct Reading Dosimetry - Dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation WBN '03 Page 18 August 25, 2003

of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Embargo Area - A designated area subject to legal prohibition on agricultural commerce.

Timely - Responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.

WBN '03 Page 19 August 25, 2003

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events (Exercise Scenario),

which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6, 2003.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Authority, and approved by FEMA Region IV.

32

SM-1 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) 2003 NRCIFEMA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE DAY I CONFIDENTIAL Rev. Date: 9/04/03 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

UNIT- 1:

• 100% power for the last 200 days. The core is at EOL. The Boron concentration is 6 ppm.

. lB Centrifugal Charging pump (CCP) is O.O.S. for repairs.

• 240 TPBARs have been in the core since the last outage.

UNIT-2:

• As is.

COMMON:

EVENTS: Note: Times are in scenario elapsed time (hr: min). While the Scenario has certain EALs listed which the SED is expected to make declaration of the emergency classifications (ALERT, SAE, GE), it is possible that the SED may declare an emergency classification based on judgment or some other set of EALs which the Scenario did not expect. If any of these situations arise the Controllers must be ready to evaluate the accuracy and timeliness of these unexpected emergency declarations.

At fifteen minutes (T=O0: 15) into the exercise, a RCS leak occurs on the U-l loop 3 hot leg equivalent to about .015% of a full break. This exceeds the capacity of one charging pump in normal alignment.

At about twenty five minutes (T=00:25) Operations should trip the reactor and initiate an SI.

At about forty minutes (T=00:40) into the exercise, an ALERT should be declared based on EAL 1.2.2P (Non isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one CCP in the normal alignment).

At about fifty minutes (T=00:50) into the exercise, phase "B" occurs when the Containment pressure exceeds 2.81 psig. The I B Containment Spray (CS) pump motor trips out upon start up. About nine minutes later when the Air return fans are to start, the "A" fan fails to start.

At about one hour thirty minutes (T=0 1:30) into the exercise, the RCS leak on U- 1 loop 3 hot leg increases to about 30% of a complete severance. EAL 1.2.2L conditions are met. Some fuel clad and TPBARs are damaged due to rapid depressurization and thermal shock. The accident monitors I-RM-90-273, 274 exceed their EAL 1.1.5 values in about 10 minutes.

At about one hour forty-five minutes (T=01:45) into the exercise, when sump recirculation is required for ECCS pump operation due to low RWST level, none of the sump suction valves (I -FCV-63-72. 73) will open. If Operations attempts to align the IA CS pump to refill the RWST from the containment sump then valves 72-503 and 72-502 will be very difficult to open.

At about one hour fifty-five minutes (T=0 1:55) into the exercise, a SAE should be declared based on EAL 1. I.5L (Valid reading greater than 59 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 274) and EAL 1.2.2L (RCS leak results in loss of subcooling (< 65'F indicated)).

At about two hours five minutes (T=02:05) into the exercise, the reactor RVLIS has lowered to < 33%.

At about two hours thirty minutes (T=02:30) into the exercise, the IA CCP motor trips.

At about three hours (T=03:00) into the exercise, after the core exit thermocouples read 1050 'F (< I % fuel over temperature occurs) then the valves 72-503 and 72-502 will be opened and Operations may begin to transfer water from the Containment Sump to the RWST. When this transfer occurs, a release of radioactivity to the enviromnent occurs from the RWST vent.

Additionally, a leak of this sump water begins to occur in the pipe chase from the orifice OR 1000. About 60 gpm is spraying into the pipe chase.

At about three hours five minutes (T=03:05) into the exercise, when the cold water quenches the hot fuel, clad failures occur due to thermal shock. The containment Accident monitors exceed their EAL 1.3.5 values.

SM-1B WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) 2003 NRC/FEMA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE DAY I CONFIDENTIAL Rev. Date: 9/04103 At about three hours twenty minutes (T=03.20) into the exercise, a GE should be declared based on EAL 1.1.5L, EAL 1.2.2L.

and EAL 1.3.5P (Valid reading greater than 86 R/hr on l-RE-90-273 and 274).

At about three hours thirty minutes (T=03:30) into the exercise, the IA CS pump motor trips.

At about four hours fifteen minutes (T=04:15) into the exercise, the reactor RVLIS has lowered to < 33% again.

At about four hours forty five minutes (T=04:45) into the exercise, the ice has been depleted. Containment pressure begins to rise again. Before Thermocouples reach 1100 'F. one of the sump suction valves (1-FCV-63-72, 73) will be opened and RHR sump recirculation can be started. Additional clad failures occur when cold water is pumped onto the hot fuel rods.

The exercise will terminate at about six hours (T=06:00) into the exercise or when off site environmental monitoring objectives have been demonstrated.

The importance of scenario events:

lB CCP is O.O.S. for repairs. Provides an OSC task. Also as the Scenario progresses allows an opportunity for the TSCIOSC to prioritize tasks.

RCS leak occurs on the U-I loop 3 hot leg Provides the initiating event for the Alert declaration. Later when the leak increases to a LOCA it provides part of the SAE.

IB CS pump motor trips Provides an OSC task. Also reduces containment spray capabilities.

"A' Air return fan fails to start Provides an OSC task. Also reduces containment cooling capabilities.

Fuel Damage Results in the EAL 1.1.5 event for the SAE declaration. After further damage occurs it provides the GE classification.

I-FCV-63-72. 73 will not open Results in uncovery of the fuel due to loss of cooling water and Fuel Damage.

IA CCP trips Provides the initiating event for the Alert declaration and also takes out a makeup Pump to the Primary System.

Release of radioactivity to the environment Allows the Ingestion Pathway objectives to bc met.

SM-11D WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) 2003 NRCFEMA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE DAY 2(11/06/03)

CONFIDENTIAL Rev. Date: 9/5/03 During the afternoon on 11/0512003 while WBN Operators were keeping the core covered with the I B RHR pump on sump recirculation, the pressure inside containment continued to rise due to the depletion of the ice. At about 14:30, before the coolant temperature was below the boiling point of water, the IB RHR pump motor began to experience bearing vibration that became so severe that the motor tripped. Operations had not been able to start the IA RHR pump due to the inability to open the sump suction valve I-FCV-63-72. Operations tried to align the IA RHR pump so that it could take suction from the open sump line but the valve l-FCV-74-21 which had been closed for sump recirculation would not open remotely. The radiation levels in the room were too high to send any one in to try to manually open the valve. The fuel became uncovered and incore thermocouples exceeded 1200'F. The site implemented their Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG).

At about 15:30 the incore thermocouples had exceeded 2200'F. Due to the increasing containment pressure from hydrogen burning and continued hydrogen production without the availability of Containment Spray, SCG-2 of the SAMG indicated that to ensure the overall containment integrity that venting was necessary. At 15:35 venting of containment began into the annulus through EGTS to the Shield building exhaust. Release rates for noble gases reached 2E+7puC/sec out the Shield building exhaust to the environment.

At about 16:50 Operations and maintenance managed to repair the lB CS pump motor which allowed Operations to begin to transfer water from the sump to the RWST again and reflooding of the Vessel began again. Containment reached safe conditions at 17:00 and venting was terminated. With the RWST refilled and the core recovered the containment was sprayed for several minutes to reduce any further adverse containment conditions. Some building flood alarms began to come indue to the leak in the pipe chase from the CS recirculation line to the RWST. Late in the evening, WBN plant personnel managed to open 1-FCV-63-72 and begin sump recirculation with the IA RHR pump. the RWST was injected into Containinent inorder to reduce radiation levels around the site.

Based on projected doses for the Sweetwater area and adverse weather conditions the State decided to administer Potassium Iodide to the people of Sweetwater and shelter them until the plume had passed.

The leading edge of the plume was detected by State monitoring teams on 11/05/2003 in the Sweetwater vicinity at 17:45 readings varied from 100 JLRhr to 900 liRhr until 19:45 when an increase was observed. The measured radiation level in the Sweetwater area reached a maximum of 8 mR/hr around 2010. Some air samples were taken at that time that indicated maximum 1131 concentrations of 6.0 E-8 yC/cc. From 19:45 to about 20:45 a light rain was reported by environmental monitoring teams in Sweetwater. The trailing edge of the plume left the Eastern part of Sweetwater about 2100. Radiation levels were less than 1000 pRIhr in most of the Sweetwater area except for the area where rain had occurred. In that area some readings were as high as 1000-3000 ILR/hr.

The State environmental monitoring teams continued to track the plume until 2400 where at a distance of about 50 miles E from WBN the plume crossed into the Great Smoky Mountain National Park South of Maryville Tn.

During the early to late evening of 11/05/2003, approximately 20 soil samples and additional radiation readings from ground contamination were taken within the 10 mile radius of the plant by TVA monitoring teams and in the Sweetwater vicinity by State environmental monitoring teams after the release had stopped and the plume had passed out of the areas to be surveyed.

The DOE had arrived in the late evening of 11/05/2003 and began performing an aerial survey out to a 50 mile radius from WBN. They indicated that their aerial survey data should be analyzed and a report available later today.

Data analysis and Decision making for Day 2 will be given 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before proceeding to Day 3 activities.

Note: Controller will provide Day 2 sample results in a spread sheet format.

SM-1E WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) 2003 NRCIFEMA GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE DAY 3(11/07/03)

CONFIDENTIAL Rev. Date: 9/5/03 During the day on 11/06/2003 Operators continued to maintain the Reactor Coolant System below the boiling point of water with the IA RHR pump. Plant personnel continued to repair and assess repairs on damaged equipment. The IACS pump motor fault was determined. The RWST was flushed with clean water to reduce dose rates from it. Additionally, clean water was added to the RWST to begin a refill of the Tank. A plan was devised to enter the I B RHR pump room to assess the motor bearings.

The environmental monitoring teams began to take foliage samples, and samples of leafy vegetables and other farm produce, and farm ponds in the contaminated area as well as soil samples. Samples of various types were taken from 30 different locations and analyzed during 11/06/2003. -

Data analysis and Decision making for Day 3 will be given 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before proceeding to Day 4 activities.

Note: Controller will provide Day 2 sample results in a spread sheet format.

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