ML040370477

FEMA, Final Exercise Report, Watts Bar Final Exercise for 11/05-06/03

ML040370477
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	02/03/2004
From:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML040370477 (41)

Text

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Final - Exercise Report Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Exercise Date: November 5 4 , 2 0 0 3 Report Date: February 3,2084

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. EXECUTIVE S U M W Y ............................................................................................. 1 I1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 2 IIH. EXERCISE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 4

h. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description ..................................................... 4 B. Exercise Participants ............................................................................................ 4 C. Exercise T h e h e ................................................................................................ 5 IV . EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ................................................................ 7 A. S u m w Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 .............................................. 7 B. Status ofJurisdictions Evaluated .......................................................................... 9

1. STATE OF TEmESSEE ...................................................................... 11 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ............................................ 1H 1.2 Dose Assessment ........................................................................ 12 1.3 Field Coordination Centeff ........................................................... 13 1.4 Radiological Monitoring Control Center ..................................... 13 I .5 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams ......................................... 14 1.6 Joint Information Center ............................................................. 14 1.7 Central Emergency Control Center ............................................. 15

2. RISK JU~SSDIC?IOh:S......................................................................... 15 2.1 McMINN COUNTY ................................................................... 15 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 15 2.1.2 Traffic Control Points ...................................................... 16 2.2 MEIGS COUNTY ...................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 17 2.2.2 Trafic Control Points ...................................................... 14 2.2.3 Protective Actions for Schools ........................................ 18 1

2.3 RHEA COUNTY ........................................................................ I8 2.3.1 Emergency Operatism Center ......................................... 18 2.3.2 Trafic control Points...................................................... 19

3. m s r JURISDICTION.......................................................................... 19 3.1 ROrWE CB3UNTP!..................................................................... 19 3.1.1 Masscare ....................................................................... 19

4. INGESTION PHASE ............................................................................. 20 4.1 STATE OF T E ~ E S S E ...........................................................

E 20 4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 20 4.1.2 State Radiological Labratory ......................................... 21 4.1.3 Dose Assessment ............................................................. 2%

4.1.4 hadlblogkd Field Monitoring Teams ............................. 22

5. SUMMAWY OF AREAS E Q U I N N G CORRECHVE ACTION ...........23 5.1 2083 M C A s ASSESSED .......................................................... 23 5.1.1 71-83-53.1-A-01 State ofTennessee SEOC ...................23 5.2 PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED ...................................................... 24 5.2.1 71-01-03-A-81 State ofTennessee SEOC........................ 24 5.2.2 71-01-03-A-02 M c h / % hCounty EOC ............................ 24 5.2.3 7 f -0E A-03 Rome County Mass Care Shelter ........... 25 List ob Appendices AFPENDIX B .ACRONYMS AND ~BREVltZ?'HQ>NS .............................................. 27 APPENDIX 2 .EXERCISE EVALIJATORS ................:............................................... 29 APPENDIX 3 .EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT .................................................... 31 APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO ......................................................................

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List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise Timelhe .................................................................................................

Table 2 ~

S u m a r y of Exercise Evaluation ......................................................................... 8 111

I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On November 5 and 6,2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Region HV, conducted a fiill participation ingestion exposure pathway exercise for the emergency planning ZQM (EPZ) around the Watts Bar Nuclea Plant ("BN). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of Tennessee's Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJREW) and associated procedures.

The previous evaluated exercise at this site was November 7,2001 Tennessee's M R E W for WBN was approved under Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations QCFR) Part 350, on July 3, 1994. The State ofTennessee, the Risk Counties ofMcMinn, Meigs, and Rhea md Rome County, a host county, participated in the exercise.

IFEM wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals Piom the State of Tennessee, md h m the Counties ofMcMinn, Meigs, Rhea and Rome, who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the h l l - t b e job of some ofthe exercise participants and an assigned responsibility for others. Additionally, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering their time and efforts to provide vital emergency services to their csmunities. Coopemtion and teamwork of ail the participants were evident during this exercise.

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) is commended for its exceptional efforts Incoordinating the exercise emergency response activities. FEMA also commends the Division of Radiological Health (DRII) for its excellent use oftime and resources during this exercise.

The State and local organbations, except where noted in this report. demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. No Deficiencies were identified. however, one Area Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA) was identified concerning the content of the initial EAS message.

Three ARCAs were corrected during this exercise, those ARCAs concerned: 1) TEMA simultaneously communicating protective action decisions (PAD) to the counties and public; 2) McMinn County delayed taking action to support the evacmtion order; 'md 3) evacuee monitors were not adequately trained at the Rome County Mass Care Shelter.

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 CFR Parts 350,351 md 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)Program that was established BoUowing the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEhaA's initid and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergcncy planning and preparedness fir c o m e r c i a l nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in partIpt, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiobgical emergency planning for k e d nuclear facilities include the following:

rn Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of REXPs m d procedures developed by state and Born1 governments:

. Detemnining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of obxrsatian and evaluation of exercises ofthe plans and procedures conducted by State rand local governments;

. Responding to requests hy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum OS Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, V d . 58, NQ. 176, September 14, 1993); and e (:ocardinathng the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

Department of Agriculture

- Department of Commerce Department of Energy Department of Health and Human Services Department ofthe Interior Department of Transportation Environmental Protection Agency

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Food and Drug Administration and

- Nuclear Reguhtory Conmission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region 1[V Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

The Tennessee MSRERP for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant was formally submitted to FEMA Region IV by the State of Tennessee on April 12, 1996. Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval was granted by FEMA on July 3, 1997.

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A joint REP exercise was conducted on November 5 and 6,2003, by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State md local emergency preparedness orgmi7ations in irnpkmenting the M J E W and related procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the WRN Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and fmdings on the performance of the &sfsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluator team with fmal determkations made by FEMA Region HV IPAC Co-Chairperson and Chief Evaluator and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

. NUREG-0654/FEMA-BEP-BRev. I , "criteria for Preparation and Evahation of

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Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support ~f N ~ c k a Power Plants," November 1980;

. FEMA-REP-"Exercise Evaluation Methodology," April 25, 2002 Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section ofthe report contains a description of the ingestion pathway EPZ, a listing of all partkipathg jurisdictions and hmctional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation ofthe t h e of actual occurrence of key exercise events.

Section 1V of this report, entitled "Exercise ErTduatisn and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise Criteria at cash jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in an issues-only format. 'This section also contains: (1) description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise, recomnended corrective actions.

and the State ofTennessee's response, and ( 2 ) descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status ofthe 0WG)'s efTorts to resolve them.

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EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the November 5 and 6,2003, full participation ingestion exposure pathway exercise to test the offsite emergency response preparedness and capabilities in the area surrounding the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This section of the report includes a description o f the ingestion pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence or acknowledgement of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume Emergemy Planning Zbne Description The plant site, consisting of approximately 1,800 acres, is located in Rhea County in southeastern Tennessee. The site is h a t e d on the west shore of the Tennessee River, approximately 50 miles north-northeast of Chattanooga, and 54 miles southwest of boxville. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

The IO-mik EPZ for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant includes parts of M c M h ,

Meigs, mad Rhea Counties. The land use within the 1 @mile EPZ is predomhately rural. The EPZ is divided into 5 large evacuation plamhg zones with subaivisbm within those zones.

The 50-rnile ingestion pathway EPZ includes all or portions of 22 counties. The land use consists mainly of rural areas with agricultural interests. The Southwestern and Northeastern counties are mainly urban and a large national foresF is included in the Eastern Sector.

B. Exercise Participarsfs The following agencies, organbations, and units of go\wnment participated in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6, 2003.

STATE OF TENNESSEE Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry Department of Environment m d Conservation Bureau of State Parks Division of Ak Pollution Control Division of Radiobgical Health Division of Solid Waste Management Division of Water Pollution Control Qcpartmnt of General Services Department 0fHealth Department of Human Services 4

Department of Mental Health Department of Military Department of Safety Department of Transportation Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency FEDERAL AGENCIES Food rand Drug Admhistration

u. s. coast Guard U. S. Corps of Engineers RISK JURISDICTIONS M c M h County Meigs County mea county HOST JURISDICTIONS American Red Cross C. Exercise T i m e h e Table 1, on the following page, presents the fimcs at which key events and activities occurred during the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise QJI November 5 ,

2003.

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IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and Tidings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and fknctional entities, which participated in the November 5 and 6,2003 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the IO-mile EPZ surrounding the Walt§ Bar Nuckar Phnt.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in the REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology, dated April 25,2002. Detailed h f o m t i o n OR the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summamy Results of Exercise Evalurtion Table 2 -

The m t r b presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all FEMA-REP-Exercise Evaluation Methodology, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions. The exercise criterion are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criterion is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAS fr5m prior exercises)

D Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved AWCAQs)fkom prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in SUbSeCtiQnB) 7

Table 2. S ~ m m a r yo f Exercise Evaluation OATE AND SITE: November 5,2003 - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant EMENT/Sob-Elerncnt

B. Status of Jurisdictians Evaluated This suhsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction, in an issues only fornxit. A brief summation ofthe demonstration has been included for each jurisdiction to provide perspective. Presented below is a definition ofthe t e r n used in this subsection relative to criterion demomtration status.

Met Listing ofthe demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which na ARCAS assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

. Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended coreective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise. Included is a description of the ARCA assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Not Demonstrated - Listing ofthe exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

. Prior ARCAs - RBSQIW~ - Descriptions of ARCAS assessed during previous exercises, which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

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Prior ARCAS Uperesolved - Descriptions of AKCAs assessed during previous exercises, which were not resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues, which are discussed in this repoht.

. A Defisiency i s defined in FEM.4-REP-14 as "...anobserved or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

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. An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational perfomrace ira an exercise that is riot considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering and tracking exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAS). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following ekments, with each element separated by a hyphen (-1.

. Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number correspondkg to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

• Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

a Criterion Number - A number, alpha, number conmbination corresponding to the criterion numbers in Exercise Evahaticm Methodology.

a Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and f&CAs are included in exercise reports.

. Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or thrce) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

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1. STATE OF TENNESSEE 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Operations Center (SEW), in Nashville provided excellent direction and control to the State agencies and to the three risk counties. The use of the Call Me d e c i s i o n - d i n g line allowed ai1 agencies t~ discuss issues a d come to a consemus. The county liaisons kept the risk counties informed of the States activities.

Frequent briefmgs a d staff feedback to the SEQC Director kept all agencies informed of ciurent evemts. The Pmmpt Notificaaion System (PNS) activation was timely and accurate. The Public Information OfEcer (PIQ) s t a d i d an excellent job ofpreparing the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages and amending the bmdcasts as necessary.

However, the initial EAS message at 0931, did not in include a statement for the public to review emergency infomation hn the Watts Bar calendar.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.19 1x.1, l.d.1, l.e.l,2.a1,2.b.2, 33.1 and 5.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Condition: The initial EAS message sent out to the public at 0931, did not contain one of the required elements as listed in the ABert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12, 2081. The EAS message sent out did not include a reference to Radiological Eniergency Preparedness specific information 4e.g. brochures and information in telephone boob) for use by the general public during an emergency.

Possible Cause: The reference to the emergency information in the calendar had been inadvertently excluded during the 1st revision to the EAS messages.

Reference:

Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September t 2, 2001.

Effect: The general public could have been better prepared for a passible evacuation using the information provided in the calendar.

Rewmmendatioaa: Review and rewrite as necessary EAS messages to include a statement to review the emergency information found in the Watts Bar calendar.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: As was previously addressed in the preceding paragraph, revision of EAS messages are included in the 2083 S Q N / W N IMJIZERp per reference Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12,2081. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency in

a. MET: Criteria2.a.l,2.b.l and2.b.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Field Coordination Center The Director effectively managed the Field Coordination Center (FCG), located at the T E M East field ofice. He discussed protective actions with the SEOC, md promptly communicated decisions to the FCG staff. Periodic briefmgs were conducted and input was requested fiom all agencies present. The staff h e w their responsibilities, effectively implemented them and coordinated aun~~lg themselves when required. All EAS messages and news releases were read to the stafTupon receipt.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, l.b.1, I.c.1, l.d.1, Z.e.l,2.s.1,2.b.l and2.b.2

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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The RMCC effectively managed the fo~nrDepartment of Radiological Health Radiological Monitoring Field Teams. They obtained radiological field monitoring data from the terns and provided it to the SEOC dose assessment group. The experienced M C @Staffs coordination with the TVA Liaison was excellent, and they successhlly performed all assigned duties.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, I.b.1, 1.c.l. 1.d.1, l.e.l,2.a.l md3.a.B

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 13

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. mrm ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 Central Emergency Control Center The Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Corporate Ofice, Chattmoogq Tennessee, is an excellent facility from which all participating organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations. Comanunicatioons, coordiation, and the flow of technical information between the utility operator and applicable State ofBicials were exemplary. The State officials deployed to the CEGC were well trained, knowledgeable and followed applicable pmcedwes. They performed their respective responlsibilitks k an efficient and professiormzp1 manner.

a. MET: Criteria B.a.1, l.c.1, 1.d.l 'and 1.e.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE e PRIOR ARGAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

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%. RISK JURISDPCTHONS 2.1 McMlI" COUNTY 2.1.1 Ernergenacy QBpesatisrasCenter The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Director maintained direction and control throughout the exercise. The staff, both paid and volunteer, were pmfessional and performed all. duties in an exemplary manner. Cornmimications with personnel autside the EBG was maintained through several means including amateur radio services. When the County did not understand why the State made a decision to have emergency workers take ptassium iodide (H). 'The Director called the State and asked, thus prompting a conference call that chrified the decision for the counties.

a. MET: Criteria 1 ~ ~ I .1b % ~ l 1? . ~ ld.1, 1 ~ I.e.I,2.a.I,2.b.%,2.c.l,3.a.1.3.b.1, 3 . ~ 1 5.a.1,

, 5.a.3 and 5.b.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 15

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 MEPGS COUNTY 22.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC has a well-trained professional staffsupplemented by individual v ~ k u n t and ~s members ofthe Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP). The County Mayor and the Emergency Management Director competently directed and focused the staffs efforts.

They involved the knctiomal representatives in the information gathering, assessment, and decision-making process. Representatives &om the City and County agencies were empowered with d e c i s i o n - d i n g authority and their performance not 0nIy reflected a detailed knowledge of their roles and missions, but a degree of pro-activeness rarely seen in county EBGs. The citizens of Meigs County are well served by this complement of concerned City and County oflicials and volunteers.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.b.1, I.c.1, I.d.1, I.e.F,2.a.B,2.b.2,2.c.193.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.zn.3 and5.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NQNE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: XONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE The Meigs County Sheriff and members of the County Fire and Rescue Squad (FRS) participated in arm interview on traffic and access contro! procedures at the EOC. The FRS team assists the Sheriffs deputies in staffing roadblocks to control traffic flaw a d conducting radiological monitoring at the location. The Sheriff and FRS team members were knowledgeable ofTCP establishment a d procedures. and were conversant on alternate evacuation routes. The FRS team also assists evacuees at shelter information points along the evacuation routes. The Sheriff would eontact the Meigs County Road Department for assistance in removing impediments to trafic, erecting bmicades and placing evacuation route signs at designated locatiom. AI! persome1 were knodedgcable ofthek duties and radiological exposure control.

a. MET: Cri~eriaI.e.l,3.a.1,3.b.1,3.d.l and3.d.2 lo. DEFICIENCY: NONE 17

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. h'OT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points The Rhea County Sheriffs Department, the County Highway Department, and the County Fire and Rescue Squad successfully demonstrated the capability to establish appropriate traffic and access control points. They were able to provide accurate instructions to traffic and access control personinel, and to assrare that proper emergency information is provided to the evacuating public, such as the bcatioms of reception/registra~ioncenters, evacuation routes, ete. Two Deputy Sheriffs and two Fire and Rescue Squad members were interviewed and were very knowledgeable of their duties concerning trafic and access c011tth01, the evacuation process, and radiological exposure control procedures.

The County Highway Department representative was well aware of the Department's roles and responsibilities.

a. MET: Criteria I.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l. 3.d.B and 3.d.2

b. DEFHCHENCY: NONE do NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE e PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.1 WOANE CQUNTY 3.1.1 Mass Care The Rome County Health Department nurses, H-Iarriman City Fire Department md the Knoxville Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC) successfdly demonstrated the processing and care of evacuees at the Harriman High School. The dire department persomel were very familiar with proper monitoring techniques, personal protective equipment and contarnination control. The health nurses successhlly conducted a walk-19

Additional shelters were opened to accommodate the relocated residents. After further rcfmement of the ingestion zone from the Department of Energy (DOE) flyover data, an additional 6 zones were cleared for return ofresidents at 1831.

Day 3 activities commenced at 1035 with field terns defining the hot swts and collecting water, soil, vegetation and milk samples for processing. TVA announced at 1042, that they had secured from the General Emergency (GE) and downgraded to normal recovery operations. Access control points were a major topic o f discussion to allow temporary re-entry to fagms and utilities.

The State agencies, county reps and Radiological Health effectively coordinated their activities and made timely decisions for the residents aRected by the release. All activities were thoroughly thought through and implemented. The SEOC staff was extremely proactive in the decisionmaking process for ingestion issues.

a. MET: Criteria2.d.1,2.e.1,3.e.1,3.e.2and3.f.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE p

f. PRIOR ARGAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 4.1.2 State Radiological Laboratory The Tennessee Department ofthe Envkoment and Coinsemation Radiochemistry Lab is equipped with the survey instrumentation, laboratory equipment, and supplies necessary to sufficiently analyze field samples in a timely and efficient manner. Through an interview, the manager of the Radiochemistry Laboratory demonstrated his managerial style in directing personnel in the acco~~lplkhrnent of laboratory operations. The labratory personnel were very professional and displayed knowledge of their plans and operational procedures. Though an interview, they explained the general laboratory and personal exposure control procedures. All criteria were successfdly demonstrated.

a. MET: Criteria 1.e. 1, 3.a.l and 4.c.l

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE 21

5.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUlRING GOWRECIVE ACTION 5.1 2003 ARCAs ASSESSED

5. I, I 7?-03-5.a.?-A-O1 Condition: The hitial EAS message sent State of Tennessee out to the public at 093 1 did not contain one SE06 of the required elements as listed ira the Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12,2001. The EAS message sent out did not include a reference to Radiological Emergency Preparedness specific informition (e.g.

brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the genera! public dmhg an emergency.

Possible Cause: The reference to the emergency information in the calendar had been inadvertently excluded during the last revision to the messages.

Reference:

Alert and Notification Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12,200t.

Effect: The general public could have been better prepared for a possible evacuation using the information provided in the calendar.

Recommendation: Review and rewrite a..

necessary EAS messages to include a statement to review the emergency informtion found in the Watts Bar calendar.

Schedule of Corrective Actioms: As was previously addressed in the preceding paragraph, revision of EAS messages we included in the 2003 SQN/WBN MJRIREW per reference Alert and Notifrcation Final Federal Register Notice, dated September 12.2001. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency in concert with local governments and The Tennessee Valley Authority has a very aggressive training and plan distribution program. Enclosure # 3 is 24

5.2.2 71-01-63-A-02 Bescriptism: At 1055, the TEMA McMinn County liaison at the M c M h County E8C began EOC receiving the message from the S E W directing the evacuation ofthe near plant area (2-4 mile radius) an$ all of quadrants C and D. The receipt of this message was completed at 1058. However, E 8 6 management and staff were unaware that they were to he supporting an evacuation directed by the State. The Declaration at approximately B 203 prompted Mchlinn County to implement its actions to s u p p a the evacuation that was in process.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State and Counties discussed directly all protective action reconmendations and decisions on this Call Me line. Once the decision was made, McMinn County immediately implemented them. However, when a confusing message was received concerning the ingestion of KI by both emergency workers and the evacuating public, the Emergency Director called the State, arranged for a conference call and received clarification regarding the decision and then promptly implemented the action.

5.2.3 71-81-88-A-03

Description:

The radiological monitors at R o m e Cotme the Rome County Mass Care Shelter did not Mass Case Shaker h o w the contamination action level. so they would not know when to send an evacuee to be decontanainated or a b w e d to go to the mass care area. They also did not covcr the survey probe or wear gloves and booties as specified in their implementing procedures.

The implementing procedures also state that the radiological monitors will be issued a dosimeter with a range of0-20R. They were issued a 0-2QQRdosimeter.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Rome County Mass Care Shelter was successfully demonstrated at Harriman High School. All participants were knowledgeable of their personnel dosimetry,

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ARC American Wed Crass AKA Area Requiring Corrective Action MD Athens Police Department CECC Central Emergency Control Center CFR Code of Federal Regulatiom CVFD Clemater Volunteer Fire Department DHS Department of Homeland Security BHHS Department of Health and N u m n Services DIL Derived Intervention Levels DOC Depastment of Commerce DOE Department of Energy BO1 Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation BWD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRH Division of Radiological IIealth EA§ Emergency Alert System ECE Emergency Classifimtion Level E m Emergency Management Agency EOC Emergency Operations Center EPA Environmental Protection Agency EFZ Emergency Planning Zone ESC Emergency Services Coordinator EWE) Emergency Worker Decontamination FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCC Field CoordinaFion Center FDA Food and Drug AdministraFion FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Field Monitoring Team K'F Fixed Nudear Facility FR Federal Register FRS Fire and R e s u e Squad GE General Emergency ICF HCF Consulting, Inc.

27

JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide mR milliroentgen MJKERP h.lulti-Jlarisdictiona1 Radiological Emergency Response Plan NRC Nuclear Regulatory Comnission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654IFEMA-REI-1~Rev. 1, '%rr'teriuforPreparation untl

~vdp~aPion of Rodiologicul Emergency Response P h i s u r d Preparedness in Supporl of Nuclear Power Fjants, " h'ovember 1980 OR0 Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommcndation

$18 Public Information Officer PNS Public Notification System Roentgen Regional Assistance Committee Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service Radiation Control Oficee Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Radiological Monitoring Control Center Retired Senior Volunteer Program SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIP Shelter Information Point TCP Trafic Control Point TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency TVA Tennessee Valley Authority USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture W N Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 28

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list ofthe personnel who evaluated the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6, 2003. The organimtion represented by each evaluator is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHSIFEMA - Department of fomeland Security/

Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF ~ ICF Incorporated NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission Lawrenee A Robertson Co-RAC Chairman EVALUATIQN SITE EVALUATOR Chief Evaluitor Tom Reynolds STATE OF TENNESSEE SEOC Torn Reynolds DIISREMA Joseph Canoles DHSFEMA ICF Field Coordination Center r2arpy~ o b e ~ s o n Dose Assessment IIarry Hmison ICF Keith Earmshaw IGF I Iollis Barry ICF Thomas Brown ICF Edward Wojnas ICE Joint Bnformation Center Robert Perdue DI 1SiFEM.A Dm I m a n IGF Central Emergency Control Center Robert Trojanowski NRC MCMlNN COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Helen Wilgus DHS/FEMA Beth Massey DHSiFEMA R o s e m y Samsel ICF 29

Traffic Control Points Beth Massey IIHSIFEMA MEHGS COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Bill 1,arrabee Df ISiFEMA Pat Tennrio DMSFEMA Traffic Control Points Pat Tenorio RHEA COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Stan Copeland DHSiFEMA Henry Gbistiansan ICF Traffic Control Points Henry Christiansan ICF INGESTION PHASE - DAY 2 Emergency Operations Center Torn Reynolds DHS/FEMA Joseph Canoles DHSFEMA State Radiological Loborat01-y Thomas Brown ICF Dose Assessment ICF Radiological FMTs Deborah Blunt KF Keith E m s h a w ICF Advisors Tom Trout FDA 30

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the ibatts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5,2003 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region IV.

A. Exercise Criteria The specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria, which were to be demonstrated, have been consolidated with the extent-of-play for this event and are explained in Subsection B.

B. Extent-of-Play A g r ~ m e n t The extent-of-play agreement was submitted by the State of Tennessee and approved by FEMA Region IV. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each exercise criterion listed as referred to in Subsection A of this appendix.

31

THESTATEOFTENNESSEE TENNESSEE EMERGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MILITARY DEPARTMENT 0 6 TENNESSEE 3341 SlDCO DRIVE. P.Q. BOX 41502 NASHVUE. TENNESSEE 37204-1502 (615) 7414001 2883 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT I

GRADED EVALUATION STATE OF TENNESSEE PLUME EXPOSURE AND INGESTION PATHWAY XUW COALS, CIRITERIA, AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY A fidl participation exercise will be conducted durbg the week of November 5 - 6,2003 for the purpose of demonstrating an integrated radiological emergency response capability for the Watts Brpr Nuclear Plant ( W N ) . The exercise will be a two-day event (approx. 8 hs.per day),

encompasskg response capabilities md requirements of the State, local govements, and the I L

Tennessee Vdey Authority (TVA) h both the Emergency P l d g Zone (EPZ)Plume E x p ~ s ~ rZone

@ : and Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ).

The State of Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Authority have prepared goals addressing respective obligations. Both reflest the n e c e s s q interactions between the State and local g o v e m e n t s as well as the utility as set fo6th in the Mutti-Jurisdictional hd~ologicalEmergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the Watts Bar Nuc!ear Plant. The six evaluation areas coupled with spec& criteria to accomplish the following goals have been written in accordance Bith the Federal Emergency Management Agency ( F E M ) Federal Register Notice, RadEukigicaE Emergency Prepmedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

STATE AND IDCAL GOVERNMENT EXERCISE GOALS:

State md local government goals for this exercise are:

1. Test as well as evaluate the Watts Bat Nuclear Plant Multi-jurisdktional Radiologicd Emergency Response Plan concurrently with local government implementing procedures I

2. Demonstrate and assess the continued viability of the integrated radiological emergency response effort though state and local government ogssite personnel implement h ng response actions in accordance with established guidance

3. Ensure the safety of the general public through the issuance of protective action recomendations, as appropriate.

as required during exercise Day 2 to facilitate compress time for Days 3 , 4 , arid 5 of the scenario.

1 .b. Facilities Criterion I .b. 1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response (hKJREG-0654, H.3.)

MTHODOLOGY GUIBELIhTS .- Responsible QROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations.

Facilities must be set up based on the OROs plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEQC, FCC, R h K C , JIC, and Risk County EOCs (hfcWnn, Meigs and Rhea) will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures and remain finlly operational during the course of the exercise. The JIC will terminate operations at the close of Day 1 and the FCC and Risk County EOCs will be minimally staffed for Bay 2. Since the SEOC and JIC facilities were previously evaluated; Le., Baselined during Sequoyah 2002, and no changes have been made to them, _onl\L the FCCRh4CC and Risk County EOCs will be evaluated (See Definitions, Baseline).

1.c. Direction and Control Criterion B.e.1: Key persomnel with leadership roles for the BRO provide direction and contrul to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsibte (NUREG-0654, A. 1.d; A.2.a, b.)

hfETHODQLOGY GUIDELlSES - Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential knctions of the response effort, for example keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - The SEBC Director will asstime primary responsibility for direction and control; working in concert with the FCC, JIG, and Risk County EO@Directors.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 70-01-03-A-01 (State Emergency Operations Center) - At 1055, the State activated sirens and the EAS to inform the public of the decision to evacuate the near plant area (Al, B1, C i , and D1) and all1 of quadrants G and D.

Simultaneously, the protective Action Decision (PAD) was communicated to the h4cMinn7 Meigs, and Rhea County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to implement their actions to support the evacuation. The counties did not have enough time to implement protective actions before the public began to evacuate.

WBN 03 Page 3 August 25,2003

authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides @UREG-0654, K.4; J. 10.e, f.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELNES - OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate:

a. A capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures

b. the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization af exposure levels in excess o f pre-authorized levels.. .

c. the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure STATE EXTENT-QP-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the S E W . (See Criterion 2.b.2, STATE EXTENT OF PLAY)

2. b. Radiological assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase ofthe Emergency:

Criterion 2.b. I : Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information and plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and O R 8 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions @lUU6-0654,1.8, 10 and Supplement 3.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OW6s should demonstrate the capahility to use appropriate means, described in the pian andlor procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitorin!: data, if available.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration will be scenario driven and accomplished by appropriate staff in the SEOC, EPMCC, and GECC Division of Radiological Health (DRII) personnel at the SEOC, in concert uith T\A counterparts in the CECG, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections Radiological data for the field teams will be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the B h K C Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements Criterion 2 b 2. A decision-making process involving consideration o f appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use QFKI, i f O R 8 policy (NUREG-0654, J 9, 10 f, rn 1 METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to make initiai PADS in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARS from the utility and O R 0 staff.

WBN 03 Page 5 August 25,2003

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the State Emergency Operations Center will he scenario driven and based on field data. SEOC staff will demonstrate Ingestion Pathway timely precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accurdance with their respective plans and procedures Affected local OROs will be kept appraised of protective action decisions. Assessment of the radiological analysis of representative samples of food, water and other ingestible substances from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the release/$ from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release will be demonstrated through discussion 2 .e. Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return:

Criterion 2.e. 1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654, A.l.b; 1.10; M. 1.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - (Relocation) OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PA&, apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

(Re-entry) Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to enter the evacuated area temporarily to perform specific tasks or missions (Retur~i) Decisions are to be based on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geographicaI features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staE group discussions in the State Emergency Operations Center n i i l be scenario driven and based on field/projected data Demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, applying decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general puhhc wtho Rave not been evacuated but where projected doses are En excess of relocation PACs and control access to evacuated and restricted areas Relocation decisions will be made fur members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs Return to evacuated are& decisions will be relayed to the afTected local EOUs and the JIC A geographic description of the cleared areds will accompany the notificatiomls Evaluation Area 3 - Protective Action Implementation 3 .a. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

WBN 03 Page 7 August 25, 2003

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional faciiities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). 0 R 0 s should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORQs plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations, reception centers, and transportation providers may be actual or simdated.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by approprjate staff in the SEOC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected local E0Cs for understanding and implementation. (See Subparagraph 2 c. 1)

Implementation of protective actions and contact with the special populations/reception centers will be simulated however, procedural discussions between appropriate staff in the Stateiaisk County EOCs and the evaluators will be conducted.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/school oficiais implement protective actions for schools

( h W 6 - 0 4 5 4 , J. 1 O.C, d, 8)

METHODOLOGY GUHDELN3 - Public school systemsidistricts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for students At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - County school superintendents and transportation supervisors or designees will be available at respective EOCs for interviews by evaluators. For the purpose of ascertaining stafT knoHledge of relocation plans and procedures, an out-of-scenario sequence interview with the foollowing school principal/staff will be conducted, but contact by telephone with the school will occur on Exercise Day 1 ENDANCERED Meigs North Meigs North Elementary September 29,2003 Elementary 22015 State Hwy 58 North Decatur. TN 37322 3.d. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control:

Criterion 4.d. 1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to trafic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654, J.lO.g,J) hlETH0DOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent WBM 03 Page 9 August 25, 2003

the evaluators. A list of teams and members identified for evaluation will he provided.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instnictional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production (NUREG-0654,E.5, 7,J.9, 11.)

haETI1QDOLOGY GUIDELINES - OROs should demonstrate by formulation of protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed public information material in the IPZ or the capabiiity for the rapid distribution of appropriate pre-printed andior carnera-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEBC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on projected exposure. Demonstration of the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors should be clearly coordinated however, actual comniunications with food producers will be simulated.

3. f. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions:

Criterion 3.f I : Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented (hWMG-0654, M 1. 3 )

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - (ReEosation) OWOs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate and irnpsernent decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relacation PAGs. (Re-entry) OROs should demonstrate the capability to con[rol re-entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area. (Return) OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. QRQs should demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days. and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Demonstration of this process by appropriate staff in the SEOC and local EOCs will be scenario driven and based on prsjectedkeported contamination lei~elels.Appropriate staff, through discussions with evaluatorh will demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas having residua! radiation levets WBN '03 Page 11 August 25,2003

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - (See Subparagraph 4.a. 1 .) All field teams will be under the direction ofthe RMCC.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams must move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan andior procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media (NUREG-0654, 1.9 1 METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. OWOs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Four (4) field-monitoring teams will be evaluated. Each field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum sample volume of l Q cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bagged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data wil! be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and be transmitted by the teams to the M C C over the normal communications network (portable hand-held radios). Cellular telephones will be utilized for back-up communications.

4.b. Post Plume Phase Field 14easurements and Sampling:

Criterion 4 b 1 Field teams will demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e g food crops, milk, water,

~

vegetation, and soil) to suppofi adequate assessments and protectiie action decision-making (NLWG-0654, I 8, J 11 1 METIIODOLOGY GUIDELTNES - Field teams should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions Ingestions pathway samples should be secured from agricultural products and water Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Two (2) field teams will visit specified dairies and explain the procedure while simulatinq the taking of a milk sample Each field team will demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e g , food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making Samples (water, soil, and cropiforage vegetation) will be collected and transported to a central collection point and readied for shipment to a laboratory Actual transport WBN 03 Page 13 August 25,2003

available to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation.

Criterion 5.a.2: Reserved at this time. (NUREG-8654)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the p u b k is completed within 45 minutes f O l b W k I g the detection by the OR0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c.)

METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES - ORQs with FEMA approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s> within 45 minutes following the initial decision authorized offsite emergency ofticids to noti@ the public of an emergency situation.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not Applicable 5.b. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media:

Criterion 5.b. 1: OWOs provide accurate emergency information and instructions t0 the public and the news media in a timely manner (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, 4.c.)

METHBDBLOGY GUIDELINES - Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquir?,hotiine.

ORQs should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. Also, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination cif ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the OWO's plans and/or procedures.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Emergency Instrustionsiinformatian will originate from the SEOC prior to JBC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JfC (Day 1 Qnly) while emergency instructions will continue to be disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS (SEBC will be responsible for both information and instructions on Day 2). Appropriate S E W staff will be available to discuss with ev&ators other means of rapid information dissemination; i.e., agricultural, etc.).

WEN '83 Page 15 August 25.2003

accordance with the (OROs) plans and procedures. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and procedures. The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place.

Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle.

STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Not applicable 6 c. Temporary Care ofEvacuees.

Criterion A c. 1 Managers of congregate care facilities will demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines Managers demonstrate the procedures through discussion to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities (NUWEG-0654, J 10 h, 12 }

METHOBOLOGY GUIDELTNEiS - Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure tRat evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility STATE EXTENT-OF-PLAY - Congregate care will be demonstrated, out-of-scenario sequence, at the following location The shelter will be staffed with trained personnel, and at least six (6) monitoring demonstrations will be accomplished A walk-through of decontamination procedures will be conducted for the evaluators School may be in session so dernonstrations of monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering activities shouEd he held to a minimum in order to lessera disruption of regular school activities However, the staff uill be available for interviews by evaluator/s (See 6 a 1 , METHODOLOGY GUIDELINES and NOTE)

• Denotes Baseline 6.d. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:

Criterion 6.d. 1 : The faciiity/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals (NUREG-0654, F.2; H. IO; K . 5 . q b; L.l, 4.)

h,ETHQDOLBGY GUIDELINES - 8ROs should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance WBN 03 Page 17 August 25, 2003

of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency woikers invslvcd in life saving activities) contained in the QRO's plans and procedures.

Embargo k e a - A designated area subject to legal prohibition on agricultural commerce.

Timely - Responsible O R 0 personnelirepresentatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate informatisn/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.

WBN '04 Page 19 August 25,2003

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a s u m a r y of the simulated sequence of events (Exercise Scenario),

which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise on November 5 and 6,2003.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of 'Tennessee and Tennessee Valley Authority, and approved by FEMA Region IV.

32

SM-1 WATTS BW NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) 2003 N R C R M A GRADED EXERCISE SCEN.4RIO NARRATIVE DAY 1 CONFIDENTIAL Rev. Date: 9/04/03 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

UNIT-I:

e 0

100%power for the last 200 days. The core is at EOk. The Boron ccncenuation is 6 ppm.

IB Centrifugal Charging pump (CCP) is O.Q.S. for repairs.

240 TPBARs have been in the core since the last outage.

UNIT-2:

• As is.

COMMON:

EVF2NTS: Note: Times are in scenario elapsed time (tu:min). While the Scenario has certain EALs listed whichthe SED is expected to make declaration of the emergency classifications (ALERT. S A E , GE), it is possible that the SED may declare an emergency classification based on judgment or some other set of EALs which h e Scenario did not expect. I f any of these situations arise the Controllers must be ready to evaluate &e accuracy and timeliness of these unexpected emergency declaratioms.

At fifteen minutes (T-==:lS)into the exercise, a WCS leak occurs on the U-1loop 3 hot leg equivalent to about ,01556 of a furs break. This exceeds the capacity of one charging pump in normal alignment.

At about twenty five minutes fT=0:25) Operations should 'pip the reactor and initiate an SI.

At about forty minutes ( T a : 4 0 ) into the exercise, an ALERT should be declared based on EAL 1.2.2P (Non isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one CCP in the normal alignment).

At about fifty minutes (T=00:50) into the exercise. phase '73 occurs when the Containment pressure exceeds 2.81 psig. The 1B Containment Spray (CS) pump motor h'ips out upon start up. About nine minutes later when the Air return fans are to start, the "A' fan fails to start.

At about one hour thirty minutes (T=01:30) into exercise, the RCS leak on U- 1 loop 3 hot leg increases to a b u t 90% of a complete severance. EAL 1.2.2L conditions are met. Some fue%ciad and TPBARs are damaged due to rapid depressurizaticn and thermai shock. The accident monitors 1-RM-90-273.274 exceed their EAL 1.1.5 values in about 10 minutes.

At about one hour forty-five minutes (T=O1:45) into the exercise, when sump recirculation is required for ECCS pump operation due to low RWST level. none of the sump suction valves (I-FCV-63-72.73) will open. If Operaticns attempts to align the EA CS pump lo refill the RWST from the containment sump b e n valves 72-503 and 72-502will be very difficult to open.

At about one hour fifty-five minutes (T=OI:55) into the exercise. a SAE should be declared based on E& 1.1.X (Vdid reading greater than 59 R/hr on I-RE-90-273 and 274) and EAL 1.2.X(RCS leak results in loss of subcooling (< 65°F indicated)).

At about two hours five minutes (T-02:05) into the exercise, the reactor RVLIS has lowered to < 33%.

At about two hours thi.ty minutes (T=02:30) into the exercise. the 1A CCP motor @ips.

At about three hours (Td03:OQ)into the exercise, after the core exit thermocouples read 1050 "F (< 1 % fuel ovu temperature occurs) then the valves 72-503 and 42-502 wiil be opened and Operations may begin to aansfer water from the Containment Sump to the RWST. When this transfer occurs. a release of radioactivity to the environment occurs From h e RWST vent.

Additionally, a leak of this sump water begins to occur in the pipe chase from the orifice OR 1800. About 60 gpm is spraying into the pipe chase.

At about thee hours five minutes (T=O3:05) into the exercise. when the cold water quenches the hot fuel, clad failures occur due to thermal shock. The containment Accident monitors exceed their EAL 1.3.5 values.

SM-10 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBh9 2003 ICTCIFEM.A GRADED E E R C I S E SCENARlO NX?RATlVE DAY 2(11/06/03)

CONFFDENTlAL Rev. Bate: 9/5/03 During the afternoon on 11105/2003while WBN Operators were keeping the core covered with the I B RHR pump on rump recirculation, the pressure inside containment continued to rise due tc the depletion of the ice. At about 1430. before the coolant temperature was below the boiling point of water. the IB RHR pump motor began to experience bearing vibration that became so severe that the motor tripped. Operations had not been able to start the I A RbIR pump due to the inabili?y M open the sump suction valve 1-FCV-63-72. Operations tried to align the 1A RllR pump so that it could take suction f r m the open sump line but the valve 1-FCV-74-21 which had been closed for sump recirculation would not open remotely. The radiation levels in the room were too high to send any one in to uy to manually open the valve. The fuel became uncoverdsnd incore thcrrnocouples exceeded 1200°F. The site implemented their Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG).

At about 1 5 : X the incore thermocouples had exceeded 22QQ"P.Due to the increasing containment pressure fromhydmgen burning and continued hydrogen production without the availability of Containment Spray, SCG-2 of the SAMG indicated h a t to ensure the overall containment integrity that venting was necessary. At 1555 venting of containment began into the annulus though EGTS to the Shield building exhaust. Release rates for noble gases reached 2E+7pC/sec out the Shield building exhaust to the environment.

At about 1650 Operations and maintenance managed to repair the 1B CS pump motor which allowed Operations to begin to transfer water from the sump to the RWST again and reflooding ofthe Vessel began again. Containment reached safe conditions at U : O O and venting was terminated: With the RWST refilled and the core recnvered the containment was sprayed for several minutes to reduce any further adverse containment conditions. Some building flood a h m s began to some in due to the leak in the pipe chase from the CS recirculation line to the RWST. Late in the evening, WBN plant personnel managed to open 1-FCV-63-72 and begin sump recirculation with the 1A ewR pump. the RWST was injected into Containment in order to reduce radiation levels around the site.

B a d o n projected doses for the Sweetwater area and adverse weather conditions the State decided to administer Pctassium Iodide to the people of Sweetwater and shelter hem until the plume Rad passed.

The leading edge of the plume was detected by State monitoring teams on 11/05/2003 in the Sweetwater vicinity at 17:45 readings varied f i ~ m1 0 0 p W to 900 pRhr until 19:45 when an increase wns observed. The measured radiation level in the Sweetwater area reached a maximum of 8 mff/hr around 2010. Some air samples were taken at that time that indicated maximum 1131 concentrations of 6.0 E-$ pclcc. From 1 9 4 5 to about 20:45 a light rain was reported by environmental monitoring team in Sweetwater. The trailing edge of the plume left ~e Eastern part of Sweetwater aboue 2100. Radiation leveEs were less than loo0 pRihr in mme of the Sweetwater area except for the xca *here rain had occwed. In that we3 snme readings were as high as IOOO-NO0 p W .

The State environmental monitoring teams continued to track the plume until 2400 where at a distance of about 50 d e s E &om WEN the plume crossed into the Great Smoky Mountain National Park South of M q v i l l e Tn.

During the earsly 10 late eveming of 11/05/2003, approximately 20 soil samples and additional radiation readings kom ground contamination were taken within the 10 mile radius of the p h K by TVA monitoring teams and in the Sweetwater vicinity by State environmental monitoring teams after the release had stopped and the plume had passed CUI of the areas to be surveyed.

The DOE had arrived in h e late evening of Il/Q5/2003 and began performing an aerial survey out to a 50 mile r a d i u from W E " They indicated that their aerial survey data should be analyzed and a report available later today.

Data analysis and Decision making for Day 2 will be given 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before proceeding to Day 3 activities.

Note: Controller will provide Day 2 sample results in a spread sheet format.