ML040850642

Final Exercise Report V. C. Summer Nuclear Station

ML040850642
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	07/23/2003
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
schneck D 415-3079 EPPO/NRR
References
Download: ML040850642 (64)

Text

Final Exercise Report V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Exercise Date: July 23, 2003 Report Date: October 23, 2003 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 October 27, 2003 Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator, R II Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Ste. 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Reyes:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for July 23, 2003, full participation plume exposure pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of South Carolina and Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. In addition to State and County personnel, many volunteers, numerous elected officials, and the LP-1 radio station, WCOS, also participated in this exercise. The final exercise report was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff. Copies of this report will be forwarded to the State of South Carolina, FEMA Headquarters and NRC Headquarters by my staff.

During this exercise two Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were identified. One concerned the lack of direction and control for field teams and the second concerned the availability of a radiological laboratory for evaluation as specified in the extent-of-play agreement. Three ARCAs identified during the 2002 Oconee exercise were corrected. The corrected ARCAs concerned the organization of the field monitoring team kits, the lack of a high range meter for one deployed field team and sample preparation for transport to a radiological laboratory.

After the V. C. Summer exercise, DHEC presented a letter to FEMA indicating that they would not be able to provide field teams and/or a radiological laboratory capability either for exercises or in response to an event. In response to this identified potential shortfall, FEMA requested clarification of DHEC's position from the South Carolina Emergency Management Division.

The State of South Carolina proactively agreed to allay any concerns by demonstrating field teams and radiological laboratory capability during the October 7, 2003, H. B. Robinson exercise. The draft report for that event will be provided under separate cover.

Based on the results of the July 23, 2003, exercise and FEMA's review of the State's Annual Letters of Certification for 2001 and 2002, the offsite radiological emergency response plans for the State of South Carolina and the affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, can be implemented, and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the V. C.

Summer Nuclear Station, granted on December 29, 1981, will remain in effect.

Should you have questions, please contact Eddie Hickman at (770) 220-5370.

Sincerely, Kenneth 0. Burris, Jr.

Regional Director Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters Radiological and Emrgency Preparedness Branch - NP-TS-RP 500 C Street, SW, Roan 202 vshington, D. C. 20472 As. Debra A. Schneck, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics Section

- Operator Licensing, Human Perfonnance and Plant Support Branch Division of Inspection Program Managerrent Office of Nuclear Reactor Reglation U. S. Nuclear Regulatozy Cmimission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Final Exercise Report V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Exercise Date: July 23, 2003 Report Date: October 23, 2003 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

L TABLE OF CONTENTS i Page I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

....................................... 1 L I INTRODUCTION ...................................... 2 L III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW ....................................... 4 A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description ...................................... 4 B. Exercise Participants ..... 4..........................

L C. Exercise Timeline ...................................... 5 7 IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ..................................... 7 L

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 ...................................... 7 L B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ...................................... 9 L 1. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ................ I1.....................

1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ..................................... 11 1.2 Radiological Health ..................................... 11 1.3 Dose Assessment ...................................... 12 1.4 Field Monitoring Team ..................................... 14 1.5 Emergency Alert Operations Facility ..................................... .............. 15 16 1.6 Emergency System Station .......................

1.7 Joint Information Center .----...................................... 16 Ll 1.8 Traffic Control Points ..................................... 17

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS ..................................... 17 2.1 FAIRFIELD COUNTY ..................................... 17 L 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 17 18 2.1.2 Protective Action for Schools ......................................

2.1.3 Traffic Control Points ...................................... 19 L 2.1.4 Lake Warning ..................................... 19 2.1.5 Reception and Congregate Care ...................................... 20 2.1.6 Emergency Worker Decontamination ............................... 20 i

2.2 LEXINGTON COUNTY ...................................... 21 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 21 2.2.2 Protective Action for Schools ...................................... 21 2.2.3 Traffic Control Points ...................................... 22 2.2.4 Reception and Congregate Care ...................................... 22 2.2.5 Emergency Worker Decontamination .............................. 23 2.3 NEWBERRY COUNTY.............................................................24 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 24 2.3.2 Protective Action for Schools ...................................... 24 2.3.3 Traffic Control Points ...................................... 25 2.3.4 Reception and Congregate Care ...................................... 25 2.3.5 Emergency Worker Decontamination ............................... 26 2.3.6 Medical Drill ...................................... 26 2.4 RICHLAND COUNTY ...................................... 28 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center ...................................... 28 2.4.2 Traffic Control Points ...................................... 28 2.4.3 Reception Center ...................................... 29 2.4.4 Emergency Worker Decontamination ............................... 29

3.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ... 31 3.1 2003 ARCAs ...................................... 31 3.1.1 61-03-4.a.2-A-01 SEOC Dose Assessment ...................... 31 3.1.2 61-03-4.c.1-A-02 SEOC Dose Assessment (2) ............... 33 3.2 PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED ................................. 34 3.2.1 42-02-4.a.I-A-03 SEOC FMT ...................................... 34 3.2.2 42-02-4.a.1-A-04 SEOC FMT (2) ................................... 34 3.2.3 61-01-21-A-03 Medical Drill ...................................... 34 ii

List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................... 36 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS ....................................... 38 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT ...................... ................. 41 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO ....................................... 42 List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise Timeline .............................................. 6 Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation .............................................. 8 iii

I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On July 23, 2003, a full participation exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on July 18, 2001, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was held in November 13, 1981.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals from the State of South Carolina, and Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the following out-of-sequence activities: protective actions for schools, traffic and access control points, emergency worker decontamination, reception, temporary care for evacuees and a medical drio.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. No Deficiencies and only two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified during this exercise. These ARCAs concerned 1) Direction and Control of the field teams at the DHEC Command Center and 2) the lack of a laboratory for sample analysis as specified in the extent-of-play agreement. Also during this exercise three ARCAs identified during the 2002 Oconee exercise concerning the condition of the field team kits, deploying a field team without a high range instrument and sample preparation, transport and receipt were corrected. The correction of an ARCA identified during a 2001 medical drill concerning decontamination of the patient was also corrected.

1

II. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by state and local governments;

• Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by state and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993);

and

• Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- Department of Agriculture,

- Department of Commerce,

- Department of Energy,

- Department of Health and Human Services,

- Department of the Interior,

- Department of Transportation,

- Environmental Protection Agency,

- Food and Drug Administration and

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

2

Formal submission of the RERPs for the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station to FEMA Region IV by the State of South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 31, 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on November 13, 1981, under Title 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was conducted on July 23, 2003 by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. FEMA also evaluated protective actions for schools during the week of May 8, 2003. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offlite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the Chief Evaluator and Region IV RAC Chairman, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

• "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Area Methodology," April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the ORO's efforts to resolve them.

3

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the July 23, 2003 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station is located approximately 30 miles northwest of Columbia, South Carolina at the southern end of the Monticello Reservoir and near the western border of Fairfield County. The 10-mile EPZ includes portions of Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richliand Counties. The land use in the EPZ is rural in nature. The estimated permanent population in the EPZ is 10,880. Lake Monticello is the major recreational area in the EPZ. The State of South Carolina has divided the EPZ into 13 local planning zones.

B. Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station exercise on July 23, 2003.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Office of the Adjutant General, Emergency Preparedness Division Department of Health & Environmental Control, Bureau of Land Waste Management, Division of Health & Environmental Control Department of Social Services Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Protective Services and Highway Patrol Department of Natural Resources, Law Enforcement Division RISK JURISDICTIONS Fairfield County Lexington County Newberry County Richland County PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service Salvation Army 4

C. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station exercise on July 23, 2003. Included are times notifications were received or action was taken by the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

5

aF~ A - r- . 1 r oA - An1 An .- r,- ifi r WANI AEW Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: July 23, 2003 - V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Emergency Classifcatlon Time Utility 1 Time That Notifieation Was Received or Action Waa Taken Level or Event Declared SEOC DOSE nc FAIRFIELD LEXINGTON NEWBERRY RICHLAND

_ COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY Unusual Event Alert 0807 0831 0830 0807 0828 0829 0840 0840 Site Area Emergency 0923 0945 0942 0945 0946 0951 0938 0934 General Emergency 1041 1056 1045 1041 1054 1104 1050 1050 Simulated Rad. Release 1037 1056 1045 1040 1054 1040 1107 1037 Started Simulated Rad. Release 1144 1209 1203 1145 Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0845 0830 0812 0946 0953 0845 0905 Declaration of State of Emergeney State 0910 0910 0945 1012 0920 0934 Local 1015 0945 0951 Exercise Terminated 1233 1241 1237 1157 1212 1214 1206 Early Precautionary Actions:

Lake Clearance _ _ 1018 1 Protective Action Decision 0952 0952 0952 0952 0952 Stay Tuned Message _ ________

1st Siren Activation* 0958 0958 0958 0958 0958 Backup Route Alerting 1009 V EAS Message 1001 l_____1001 1001 1001 0oo1 2nd Protective Action Decision EvacuateZones: AOBIB2,CIC2 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 Shelter Zones: All others 2ndSirenActivation 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 Backup route alerting _ _ ______ 1145 2'EASMessage 1127 _ 1127 1 1127 1127 1127 K! Decson:

1) Distributetoemergencyworkers 1005 1018 1021 1020

2) Emergency workers in evacuation 1145 1146 1142 zone to ingest NOTE:

• Sirens are activated from the plant site

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the July 23, 2003 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria as delineated in exercise objectives contained in FEMA-REP- 14, REP Exercise Manual, September 1991. Detailed information on the exercise objectives and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page, presents the status of all exercise objectives from FEMA-REP-14 which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities.

Exercise objectives are listed by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 7

. -, it 11.

t id- 7 Table 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: July 23, 2003 - V. C. Summer Nuclear Station ELEMENT/Sub-Element STATE JIC RAD DOSE EOF LP-I FAIRFIELD LEXINGTON NEWBERRY RICHLAND HEALTH ASSESSMENT COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT _

Ial. Mobilization M M M M M M M M Ilb.l Facilities M M M M M M M M I.c.I. Direction andControl M M M M M M M I.d.l Communications Equipment M M M M M M M M I.e.l. Equipment & SuppliestoSupport Operations M M M M M M M M M

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.al. Emergency Worker Exposure Control M M M M M M 2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Info M _

2.b2. Rod Assessment and PARs and PADsfor the General Public M M M M M M 2.c._.Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations M 2.d.1. Rsd Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Expostre _

2.e.l. Rid Assessment & Decision Makig for Relocation. Re-entry & Return _

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation ofEmergency Worker Control M M M M M M M 3.b.-.implementation ofKl Decisions M M M M M M 3.c.l. Impleetion ofPADs for Special Populations _ _ M M M M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools M M M 3.d.1 Implementation ofTraffic and Access Control M = M M M M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control M _ M M M M 3.e.l. Implementation ofIngestion Decisions Using Adequate Info 3.e.2. Implementation ofIP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instructional Materials __.

3.f£ . Implementation of Relocation Re-entry and Retum Decisions _

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a. . Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment = A 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management _ _

4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures _ _

4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Anaysis . _

4.c.. Laboratory Operations ___ A

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO _

5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification M _ M M M M 5-al. Activation of Prompt Alet and Notification 15-Minute (Fast Breaker) 5.0.3. ification Bakup Alert and Notification _ _M M M M 5.b.l. 1 r the Public and the Media M M . M M M M M

6. SUPP( ES 6.a~l. I and EWs and Registration of Evacuees I I M M M M 6.b.1. 1 _WokrEienII M M M M 6.c.t. Temporary Co M M M 6.d.1. TprnsortandI ContaminSted Injured Individuals = _ . _ I IIfIiency I I A ARCA D == Deficicncy LEGENMMtD LEGEND: M = Mct A - ARCA

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction based, issues only format.

Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

• Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

• Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report.

• A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

9

• An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

• Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

• Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Objective Number - Numerical alpha identifier corresponding to the criterion numbers in Exercise Evaluation Area Methodology.

• Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

• Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

10

1. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) is an excellent facility, well designed and equipped for centralized management of emergency operations. The Operations Officer, supported by the Director of the Emergency Management Division, did an excellent job.

The SEOC staff and Emergency Support Function (ESF) representatives were well trained and worked as a team. The ESFs were actively involved in meeting the needs and requirements of the counties, the development of protective action decisions (PAD), and alerting the public. Communication systems worked well throughout the exercise.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, 1.b.l, I.c.1, I.d.l, I.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

£ PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Radiological Health The Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) Nuclear Response and Environmental Surveillance Section (NRESS) personnel, located at the SEOC, were responsible for the State's technical analysis of the situation at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. The Radiological Emergency Response Coordinator was in charge of the NRESS. The NRESS team provided oversight of the assessment and comparison of licensee and field team data and developed appropriate protective action recommendations (PAR). The team's technical knowledge and demonstrated direction and control of DHEC resources, resulted in an early PAD to issue potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers. They also conducted a detailed review of plant recommendations subsequent to a radiation release. The NRESS staff coordinated with appropriate SEOC ESF representatives on PARs affecting their functional areas and provided recommendations to the Chief of Operations.

a. MET: Criteria l.c.l, l.d.1, l.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.I and 2.b.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 11

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

£ PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Dose Assessment Dose assessment was performed by a competent staff at DHEC's Farrow Road Command _

Center. The dose assessments agreed with those of the utility within a factor of two. The direction and control of the single field team was impeded by a lack of support staff and difficulties in communicating with the team in the affected area. The field samples were delivered to the DHEC Command Center and were appropriately processed. However, no laboratory facilities were available although it was stated in the extent-of-play-agreement that they would be in use.

a. MET: Criteria la.l, l.b.l, l.c.1, 1.d.l, l.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.I and 2.b.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Issue No.: 61-03-4.a.2-A-01 Condition: Field team management was inadequate in several respects.

Additional staff members should have been assigned to the Field Team Director to assist in communications with the field team. This shortage of staff personnel resulted in the Field Team Director having to communicate with the field team.

This communication responsibility detracted from his ability to effectively conduct other duties. Additionally, reception problems with both radios and cell phones resulted in the inability to maintain timely and effective communications with the field team.

Because of these communications shortfalls, several problems resulted in the management of field team activities. Briefly, the field team misinterpreted a message to distribute KI, but rather team members ingested KI. Additionally, while the field team was advised to initiate radioiodine air sampling, the Field Team Director neglected to follow-up on the status of the air samples; consequently, no calculation of the I-131 concentration from the air samples was received.

The problems identified with measurement and analysis management resulted while managing only one field team. Managing more than one team would only have magnified these problems.

12

ll Possible Cause: The staff assigned to managing the field monitoring team was insufficient to provide and obtain all required information. One person, the Field Team Director, was not able to effectively manage field team attitudes and serve as the field team communicator. The field team was deployed to a geographically low-lying area where the radio and cell phone coverage was spotty.

Reference:

NUREG-0654H.12; 1.8, 11; JlO.a Effect: The State did not effectively manage the one field team dispatched and the plume they sought to define was relatively narrow. Management of multiple teams that would be required to define the boundaries of a more dispersed plume would have been more problematic because the Field Team Director was not given support staff and communications to the area was spotty. Even though the Field Team Director was able, at times, to relay information to the team through the runner, the information flow time was greatly increased and added to the demands on the Director. The breakdown in communication with the field team resulted in the misinterpretation of an important message and in the loss of potentially important information. The effectiveness of the field team was greatly reduced and could have been further impaired if more field teams had required direction.

Recommendations: Sufficient staff should be provided to support field operations, support staff and field team members. Review communications coverage in the affected area and determine if improvements in reception can be achieved.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: The DHEC Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) will be staffed in accordance with established SOP's. This will provide the Field Team Director with sufficient support personnel to complete their duties effectively and should demonstrate a clear communication of sampling/protective action decisions and recording of collected sampling information.

Issue No.: 61-03-4.c.I-A-02 Condition: Samples were delivered from the field team to DUEC at the Farrow Road Command Center and were processed quickly and efficiently. However, a mobile laboratory or other laboratory was not available to perform the required radiological analysis as specified in the plans and the extent-of-play-agreement.

Possible Cause: Laboratory facilities were not available.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, C.3, 1.8, and .9, J.11 Effect: Sample analysis results needed to confirm or institute protective actions would be delayed until some other organization (government or commercial) could 13

perform the necessary analysis. This criterion could not be demonstrated. DHEC stated they would contract with a commercial laboratory, however, the contract was not presented. The ability of the contract laboratory to provide timely testing for the required sample types was not demonstrated.

Recommendation: Demonstrate a capability to have radiological laboratory analysis performed on collected samples.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: The Department's mobile radiological laboratory will be deployed to the FEOC for sample receipt and analysis. They will demonstrate the ability to screen samples at the exclusion zone, analyze accepted samples, and transmit data results to the FEOC field director and SEOC DHEC emergency response coordinator.

In response to FEMA letters dated September 4-5, 2003, all DHEC FEOC staff will be deployed from the Farrow Road Command Center to the Darlington Armory. Communications equipment will be pre-staged.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Field Monitoring Team Only one field monitoring team (FMT) was deployed by the State of South Carolina for this exercise. The team was composed of two members from the Division of Waste Assessment and Emergency Response, DHEC. The FMT inventoried its collection equipment and supplies, checked out proper dosimetry and prepared to go to their first assigned location. The FMT demonstrated the primary (radio) and backup (cellular phone) communications systems. Communications were spotty because of the terrain in the EPZ. They were able to communicate with the command center by relaying information through the runner team. The FMT knew their call back and turn back values.

The FMT demonstrated the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements. The FMT also collected air, vegetation and soil samples.

The samples were packaged and labeled in accordance with their procedures and transferred to the runner team for transport back to the command center. The FMT corrected two previous ARCA's identified during the 2002 Oconee Exercise.

a. MET: Criteria 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 4.a. 1, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 14

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:

Issue No.: 42-02-4.a. I -A-03

Description:

The field monitoring kits were not organized and labeled to indicate each kit's contents. The radiation monitoring instruments did not have information on the calibration label that identified the expected response value.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The field monitoring kits were well organized and each kit was labeled identifying the supplies and collection equipment in each kit. Each radiation monitoring instrument was labeled indicating the expected response value.

Issue No.: 42-02-4.a.1-A-04

Description:

The field monitoring team deployed to the field without a high-range gamma survey instrument.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: An Eberline Model RO 20 gamma survey instrument was available and operable for use by the FMT should the need arise.

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.5 Emergency Operations Facility The V. C. Summer Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), located on-site in the fitcility's training center, is a facility from which all participating response organizations can effectively manage ongoing emergency operations.

Communications and coordination among the State officials deployed to the EOF, as well as with the utility operator's response team, were outstanding. The availability and flow of technical information was timely and accurate. This allowed all response organizations to effectively conduct an independent accident analysis, and to develop appropriate protective actions.

All State officials who deployed to the EOF were well trained, knowledgeable, followed procedures, and overall performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria 1.a.l, l.b.1, l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.l and 3.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 15

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

£ PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.6 Emergency Alert System Station The Emergency Alert System (EAS) Coordinator and his staff were very knowledgeable and professional in performing their duties. The Coordinator is highly skilled in EAS operations and testing procedures. The manner and enthusiasm with which the Coordinator performed his duty is a credit to emergency preparedness.

a. MET: Criterion 5.b.I.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.7 Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center (JIC) staff successfully demonstrated the policies and procedures outlined in the State plan and the AC standard operating procedures (SOP).

The JIC was promptly activated and key County, State and utility personnel conducted the first of six news conferences within 15 minutes of activation. Continual coordination with State and County emergency operations centers (EOC) and the plant enabled the JIC staff to prepare and distribute vital information to the affected population. The information presented in news conferences was clear and detailed. In addition to the news conferences, eight State, nine county and two utility news releases were prepared and dispatched.

Utility and State personnel staffed the Public Information Center and rumor control phone lines, provided accurate responses to the public, and identified trends that could affect the success of ongoing response efforts. The JIC staff were competent and professional.

a. MET: Criteria L1a.1, 1.b.1, l.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 16

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.8 Traffic Control Points All five of the State traffic and access control points (STACP) associated with the VC Summer Nuclear Station were evaluated. Each STACP was staffed by a different South Carolina State Trooper at the on scene locations. The troopers had appropriate dosimetry, KI tablets (simulated) and written instructions on the use of each. They knew radiological exposure control procedures. Each trooper was also extremely knowledgeable of the procedures for setting up the STACP, including controlling and diverting traffic and who to contact to remove any impediments to evacuation.

a. MET: Criteria L.e.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 FAIRFIELD COUNTY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC, co-located with the County's 911 center, was activated following notification of an Alert at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The EOC's limited space was well configured to support emergency operations. Participation by County and elected officials was reflective of the County's commitment to selfless service and public safety.

Representatives from the State and utility provided valuable assistance to the County.

The Acting Emergency Management Director effectively managed EOC operations and the EOC staff was knowledgeable and performed their duties well. The County actively 17

participated in protective action decision-making and provided clear and concise guidance to emergency workers, special needs individuals, and the general population.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Protective Action for Schools School relocation interviews were conducted in Fairfield County on May 8, 2003.

McCorey-Listen Elementary School personnel were knowledgeable of the school safety plans and procedures. The school is notified of an incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station via telephone from the County EOC or over a tone alert radio activated by the V.C. Summer Station. A select number of buses are available at the school during the day and more buses are available at the high school in the event students need to be relocated.

School personnel are assigned to buses and ride with students to the relocation center.

Law enforcement personnel will escort the buses. Bus drivers are capable of communicating with the school and other buses. School staff receives annual training on the safety plans.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 18

2.1.3 Traffic Control Points Traffic control points (TCP) for Fairfield County were demonstrated through interview with an officer from the Fairfield County Sheriffs Department and inspection of the County Department of Transportation (DOT) material to assist with the set up of the TCPs. The officer was knowledgeable of the Fairfield County TCPs, how to request resources, reception center locations, dosimetry and KI. The officer was issued appropriate dosimetry and KI. Procedures for the ingestion of KI, the use of dosimetry and plans were also included in the go kit. The DOT has all the equipment and supplies needed to support the Sheriffs Department.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.4 Lake Warning The ability to clear Lake Monticello was demonstrated during interviews with an officer from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) at three of the public boat landings.

The officer was familiar with the area to be alerted and was well versed in the DNR Emergency Operation Procedures. He had appropriate dosimetry, KI and instructions for all equipment. The three landings had signs posted with emergency information for the boating public.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.1, 3.b.l and 5.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 19

2.1.5 Reception and Congregate Care The White Oak Conference Center was used for reception and congregate care. They were jointly operated by the Fairfield County EMA, the Fairfield County Department of Social Services (DSS), the Dutch Creek Volunteer Fire Department and the American Red Cross (ARC).

Fire Department personnel properly established and operated the portal monitor and directed evacuees either to the reception area or to a portable decontamination shower setup. Reception registration was well organized and staffed with trained DSS personnel.

Good procedures, using control lines and green or red stickers, were in place to ensure no evacuees were permitted to enter without having been monitored for contamination. ARC personnel were on site to operate the shelter. The Conference Center is an excellent ficility to conduct reception and congregate care operations.

The majority of the County personnel, in particular the Fire Department and ARC, are volunteers, and are to be commended for their support and the level of training and proficiency which they have achieved. All personnel were proficient, pleasant and professional.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 6.a.I and 6.c.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.6 Emergency Worker Decontamination The Dutch Creek Volunteer Fire Department demonstrated its capability to conduct emergency worker decontamination (EWD) operations. Setup and operation of the portal monitor, and the issue and operation of dosimeters and instruments were correctly performed. The fire department also set up and operated the portable shower facility for personnel decontamination, as well as the site for emergency vehicle decontamination.

Both designated areas provided for drainage and runoff of water for contamination control. All personnel were knowledgeable of radiological exposure control.

20

a. MET: Criteria 1.b.1, l.e.1, 3.al, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 LEXINGTON COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC is a small, but efficient, facility with all the necessary equipment, maps and communications to effectively manage any incident. The Emergency Management Director provided excellent direction and control during the exercise. The staff was frequently briefed and provided feedback to the rest of the staff on their current activities. The County Administrator was present to assist in the decision-making process. All activities were conducted in a professional and expeditious manner.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, l.b.1, l.c.1, 1.d.l, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.2 Protective Action for Schools School relocation interviews were conducted in Lexington County on May 8, 2003 with the Assistant Principal from Chapin High School, Director of Transportation, and a Sheriff's Deputy assigned to the school. Personnel were very knowledgeable of the school safety plans and procedures. A school would be notified of an incident at V.C. Summer Station by the County EOC Director and by tone alert radio activated by the station. The Director of Transportation indicated that the required buses are available to relocate 21

students. Parents are provided information annually on school relocation plans and procedures. School staff is trained annually on specific duties for relocation of students to the host school.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.3 Traffic Control Points Two Lexington County Sheriffs Deputies demonstrated superior knowledge and familiarity with the plans, operation of traffic control locations, communication capability and personnel dosimetry. The deputies were also very knowledgeable about the procedures to remove impediments to evacuation.

a. MET: Criteria3.a.l,3.d.l and3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.4 Reception and Congregate Care Monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees was demonstrated at the Lexington Fire Department Training Center. Separate areas were available for parking clean and contaminated vehicles. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of monitoring procedures, exposure control, KI, and dosimetry as well as how to avoid contamination.

Fire department personnel were well prepared for evacuees and successfully monitored and decontaminated evacuees according to current SOPs. A boy scout troop volunteered to provide personnel for decontamination, registration and processing into the congregate care center once they were cleared for entry. The congregate care center was staffed by 22

the local chapter of the ARC and was evaluated by interview and a walkthrough. The shelter manager was knowledgeable of shelter operations. All essential services were represented in the facility. Lexington County Police Department provided security for the facility.

a. MET: Criteria l.b.1, L.e.1, 3.a.l, 6.a.l and 6.c.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.5 Emergency Worker Decontamination EWD was accomplished at the Lexington Fire Department Training Center. The EWD staff was competent in the use of the Ludlum Model 3 monitors. Workers exited their vehicle and entered the EWD site that was marked with yellow tape and safety cones. At the first station emergency workers removed any contaminated equipment and placed it on a table to be cleaned. Each contaminated emergency worker was decontaminated by being processed through a portable shower tent and was then monitored again.

Replacement clothing was available following successful decontamination and monitoring.

a. MET: Criteria le.l, 3.a.l, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 23

2.3 NEWBERRY COUNTY 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center The new EOC for Newberry County is located in the Sheriffs Office. The Director of Public Safety provided positive and professional leadership and involved his competent and cooperative staff in the decision making process. The dutiful PIO, State liaison, utility representative and amateur radio personnel provided vital support. The State and the counties coordinated all PADs. The new EOC and equipment supported this successfil emergency response operation.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, l.b.l, l.c.l, l.d.1, L.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.2 Protective Action for Schools School relocation interviews were conducted in Newberry County on May 8, 2003, with the Principal of Little Mountain Elementary School and Transportation Coordinator. The Principal had a plan and was knowledgeable of action required in response to an incident at V.C. Summer. Several school buses are left at the school with qualified staff to operate them. The transportation coordinator discussed plans and procedures for providing additional buses to relocate students to the host county.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 24

2.3.3 Traffic Control Points Two Newberry County Sheriffs Officers demonstrated the capability to establish TCPs through an interview. The officers were knowledgeable of their locations and the logistics of operating a TCP as well as dosimetry requirements, call in and turnback values and when to take KI.

a. MET: Criteria L.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.I and 3.d.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.4 Reception and Congregate Care Monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees was demonstrated at the Newberry County High School. Separate areas were available for parking clean and contaminated vehicles. Helpful signs were placed outside to aid in directions to each location and for parking. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of monitoring procedures, dosimetry, exposure control, KI, and how to limit cross contamination. The Newberry Fire Department personnel were well prepared and successfully monitored and decontaminated evacuees. A senior citizens volunteer group acted as "evacuees."

Personnel appropriately registered and tracked evacuees. Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) provided communications for the center.

ARC successfully demonstrated congregate care through interview and a walkthrough.

The shelter manager was knowledgeable of shelter operations. All essential services were represented in the facility. Personnel responsible for health, food, mental health counseling and sleeping services were knowledgeable of their duties. The facility has a capacity to care for over 600 evacuees. Newberry Police Department and National Guard soldiers provided security. The shelter manager indicated that additional resources are available to accommodate more evacuees.

a. MET: Criteria l.b.l, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.I and 6.c.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 25

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

£ PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.5 Emergency Worker Decontamination EWD was accomplished at the Newberry Fire Station. The decontamination staff was knowledgeable and successfully monitored and decontaminated emergency workers.

Replacement clothing was available following decontamination.

a. MET: Criteria I.e. 1, 3.a 1, 3.b. 1, 6.a. and 6.b. 1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.6 Medical Drill The V. C. Summer Medical Service Drill was conducted on July 22, 2003. Organizations involved in the medical drill included Newberry County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Newberry County Memorial Hospital. The drill was initiated when EMS personnel were dispatched by the 911 center to care for a solid waste supervisor who was involved in a recycling trailer accident where she suffered a broken right leg. The accident occurred in an area where there had been a release of radioactive iodine and noble gases into the environment, exposing the patient to radioactive contamination.

EMS personnel used appropriate contamination control methods at the accident site.

They spread a sheet on the ground and placed the backboard on the sheet. Medical supplies and equipment were also placed on the sheet to prevent them from becoming contaminated. EMS personnel promptly assessed the medical condition of the patient, placed bandages on the patient's left leg, and moved the patient to the backboard. After placing the patient on the backboard, EMS personnel covered her with a sheet. She was loaded on the ambulance and transported to Newberry County Memorial Hospital. EMS personnel notified the emergency room (ER) staff at the hospital of the medical condition and contamination levels found on the patient. They also provided an estimated time of arrival (ETA).

26

EMS personnel had well insulated the ambulance to prevent contamination. EMS personnel carried appropriate direct-reading and permanent-record dosimetry, were knowledgeable of its use, and performed operational checks on monitoring equipment.

They also wore fill protective clothing and were familiar with exposure limits and the purpose of KI.

The hospital prepared well for the arrival of the patient. Plastic had been placed on the area where the patient was to be unloaded. After backing the ambulance up to the covered entrance to the ER, EMS personnel provided a thorough briefing to ER staff on the condition of the patient. The patient was then transferred to a clean gurney which was rolled into the ER. ER personnel used appropriate monitoring, contamination control, and decontamination procedures. This was done repetitiously until the contamination was completely removed. The staff took nasal, wound, and saliva samples. After the decontamination process was completed, the patient was thoroughly surveyed.

Appropriate exit procedures were followed in carrying the patient out of the ER EMS personnel and the vehicle were properly surveyed and released. The monitor knew to survey the ambulance around the tire area, inside of the vehicle, and under the hood.

The ambulance and personnel are actually decontaminated at a location away from the hospital. The ARCA from the 2001 exercise was corrected during this demonstration.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, l.c.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.I and 6.d.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs- RESOLVED: YES Issue No.: 61-01-21-A-03

Description:

The hospital's RRT did not adequately demonstrate decontamination of the patient. Only a minimal amount of sterile water was used to cleanse the wounds (less than a quart) and some of the water ended up on the floor. Injects from the controller to the RRT indicated that contamination on the patient had been reduced to background. At termination, the patient was still laying on the sheet that she had been placed on at the Cannon's Creek Public Boat Landing. Both the sheet and the patient still had freshly cut grass clippings on them from the pick up location.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: In the ER, the staff used appropriate monitoring, contamination control and decontamination procedures. The patients clothing and covering from the accident area were removed before the cleaning of 27

the wound was started. The staff appropriately monitored the area and used an abundance of water to remove contamination. This was done repetitiously until the contamination was completely removed. The staff took nasal, wound, and saliva samples. The staff changed gloves frequently, dried the patient's wound before each monitoring, carefully controlled the flow of water and placed drapes around the injured leg wound to prevent the spread of contamination.

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4 RICHLAND COUNTY 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Management Agency Deputy Director effectively managed the EOC. The staff was well trained and worked effectively together. Instructions were given at the initial briefing regarding forms and processes used in the EOC operation. Several individuals monitored exercise communications, which were received from various sources. The EOC was well run and professionally staffed.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, l.b.l, 1.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.I.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.2 Traffic Control Points TCPs were evaluated by interview with a Sheriffs' deputy at the EOC. The deputy had the required dosimetry and KI (simulated), knew the call-in and turn-back values and was flimiliar with the procedures for TCPs. He was also knowledgeable of the procedures used for backup route alerting, if needed.

a. MET: Criteria l.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.d.I and 5.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 28

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.3 Reception Center The reception center was located at Dutch Fork High School and was jointly operated by Columbia/Richland Fire Service, Richland County Emergency Management Division (EMD), EMS, DSS, Sheriffs Office and the ARC. The Richland County EMD Coordinator was clearly in charge and effectively ran the operation. The instruments were issued and logged per the operations plan. EMD personnel properly set up, operated the portal monitor and directed evacuees to the reception area or the decontamination shower.

Registration was well organized and staffed with trained DSS personnel. Good procedures, using control lines and green and red stickers, were in place to ensure no evacuees were permitted to enter without having been monitored for contamination. DSS counselors and ARC personnel were on site to provide counseling and support. Since Richland County does not provide shelters, evacuees would be lodged in area motels. All personnel were proficient, pleasant and professional.

a. MET: Criteria L.e. 1, 3.a.1 and 6.a. 1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.4 Emergency Worker Decontamination The Columbia/Richland Fire Service successfully demonstrated their capability to conduct EWD operations. Issue and operation of dosimeters and instruments were correctly performed. Personnel operating a Model 52 portal monitor and those equipped with the Ludlum Model-3 portable instruments were proficient, well trained and took exceptional care to prevent cross-contamination by good use of protective film wrap. The area designated for emergency vehicle decontamination provided for drainage and runoff of water. Actual traffic control of vehicles entering the area was well demonstrated by the Richland County Sheriffs Office in segregating contaminated vehicles. All personnel displayed an understanding of radiological exposure control.

29

a. MET: Criteria 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 and 6.b. 1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE _

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: NONE 30

3.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 3.1 2003 ARCAs 3.1.1 61-034.a.2-A-01 Condition: Field team management was SEOC inadequate in several respects. Additional Dose Assessment staff members should have been assigned to the Field Team Director to assist in communications with the field team. This shortage of staff personnel resulted in the Field Team Director also having to communicate with the field team. This communication responsibility detracted from his ability to effectively conduct other duties.

Additionally, reception problems with both radios and cell phones resulted in the inability to maintain timely and effective communications with the field team.

Because of these communications shortfalls, several problems resulted in the management of field team activities. Briefly, the field team misinterpreted a message to distribute KI, but rather team members ingested KI.

Additionally, while the field team was advised to initiate radioiodine air sampling, the Field Team Director neglected to follow-up on the status of the air samples; consequently, no calculation of the one to I-131 concentration from the air samples was received.

The problems identified with measurement and analysis management resulted while managing only one field team. Managing more than one team would only have magnified these problems.

Possible Cause: The staff assigned to managing the field monitoring team was insufficient to provide and obtain all required information. One person, the Field Team Director, was not able to effectively manage field team attitudes and serve as the field team communicator. The field team was 31

deployed to a geographically low-lying area where the radio and cell phone coverage was spotty.

Reference:

NUREG-0654H. 12; 1.8, 1; J10.a.

Effect: The State did not effectively manage the one field team dispatched and the plume they sought to define was relatively narrow.

Management of multiple teams that would be required to define the boundaries of a more dispersed plume would have been more problematic because the Field Team Director was not given support staff and communications to the area was spotty.

Even though the Field Team Director was able, at times, to relay information to the team through the runner, the information flow time was greatly increased and added to the demands on the Director. The breakdown in communication with the field team resulted in the misinterpretation of an important message and in the loss of potentially important information. The effectiveness of the field team was greatly reduced and could have been fuirther impaired if more field teams had required direction.

Recommendations: Sufficient staff should be provided to support field operations, support staff and field team members.

Review communications coverage in the affected area and determine if improvements in reception can be achieved.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: The DHEC Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) will be staffed in accordance with established SOP's. This will provide the Field Team Director with sufficient support personnel to complete their duties effectively and should demonstrate a clear communication of sampling/protective action 32

decisions and recording of collected sampling information.

3.1.2 61-03-4.c.1-A-02 Condition: Samples were delivered from the SEOC field team to DHEC at the Farrow Road Dose Assessment (2) command center and were processed quickly and efficiently. However, a mobile laboratory or other laboratory was not available to perform the required radiological analysis as specified in the plans and the extent-of-play-agreement.

Possible Cause: Laboratory facilities were not available.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, C.3, 1.8, and .9, J.l1.

Effect: Sample analysis results needed to confirm or institute protective actions would be delayed until some other organization (government or commercial) could perform the necessary analysis. This criterion could not be demonstrated. DHEC stated they would contract with a commercial laboratory, however, the contract was not presented. The ability of the contract laboratory to provide timely testing for the required sample types was not demonstrated.

Recommendation: Demonstrate a capability to have radiological laboratory analysis performed on collected samples.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: The Department's mobile radiological laboratory will be deployed to the FEOC for sample receipt and analysis. They will demonstrate the ability to screen samples at the exclusion zone, analyze accepted samples, and transmit data results to the FEOC field director and SEOC DHEC emergency response coordinator.

In response to FEMA letters dated September 4-5, 2003, all DHEC FEOC staff 33

will be deployed from the Farrow Road command center to the Darlington Armory.

Communications equipment will be pre-staged.

3.2 PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED 3.2.1 42-02-4.a.1-A-03

Description:

The Field Monitoring Kits SEOC were not organized and labeled to indicate Field Monitoring Team each kit's contents. The radiation monitoring instruments did not have information on the calibration label that identified the expected response value.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The field monitoring kits were well organized and each kit was labeled identifying the supplies and collection equipment in each kit. Each radiation monitoring instrument was labeled indicating the expected response value.

3.2.2 42-02-4.a.1-A-04

Description:

The field monitoring team SEOC deployed to the field without a high-range Field Monitoring Team (2) gamma survey instrument.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: An Eberline Model RO 20 gamma survey instrument was available and operable for use by the FMT should the need arise.

3.2.3 61-01-21-A-03

Description:

The hospital's RRT did not Medical Drill adequately demonstrate decontamination of the patient. Only a minimal amount of sterile water was used to cleanse the wounds (less than a quart) and some of the water ended up on the floor. Injects from the controller to the RRT indicated that contamination on the patient had been reduced to background.

At termination, the patient was still laying on the sheet that she had been placed on at the Cannon's Creek Public Boat Landing. Both the sheet and the patient still had freshly cut grass clippings on them from the pick up location.

34

Corrective Action Demonstrated: In the ER, the staff used appropriate monitoring, contamination control and decontamination procedures. The patients clothing and covering from the accident area were removed before the cleaning of the wound was started. The staff appropriately monitored the area and used an abundance of water to remove contamination. This was done repetitiously until the contamination was completely removed. The staff took nasal, wound, and saliva samples. The staff changed gloves frequently, dried the patient's wound before each monitoring, carefully controlled the flow of water and placed drapes around the injured leg wound to prevent the spread of contamination.

35

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ANI American Nuclear Insurers ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHEC Department of Health and Environmental Control DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DHS Department of Homeland Security DNR Department of Natural Resources DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMA Emergency Management Agency EMD Emergency Management Division EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Extent-of-Play EPA Environmental Protection Agency EMD Emergency Management Division EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room ESF Emergency Support Functions ETA Estimated Time of Arrival FAA Federal Aviation Agency FCC Federal Communications Commission FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FMT Field Monitoring Team FR Federal Register 36

FTC Field Team Coordinator GE General Emergency RC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NRESS Nuclear Response and Environmental Surveillance Section NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "CriteriaforPreparationand Evaluation of RadiologicalEmergency Response Plansand Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 OEM Office of Emergency Management ORO Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PRT Planning and Response Team RAC Regional Assistance Committee REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure STACP State Traffic Access and Control Points TCP Traffic Control Point TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WP Warning Point 37

APPENDIX 2 L EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station exercise L on July 23, 2003. The organization represented by each is indicated by the following abbreviations:

Li DHS/FEMA - Department of Homeland Security EPA - Environmental Protection Agency L FDA ICF

- Food and Drug Administration

- ICF Consulting, Incorporated NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Lawrence A. Robertson Co-RAC Chainnan L EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION L Eddie L. Hickman Chief Evaluator DHS/FEMA L

L STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA State Emergency Operations Center Eddie Hickman DHS/FEMA L Bill Larrabee ICF Radiological Health (SEOC) William Neidermeyer ICF L Dose Assessment Charles Phillips ICF L Field Teams #1 Field Teams #2 Eddie Fuente Robert Young ICF ICF Mobile Laboratory Neil Gaeta ICF L Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski NRC L EAS Station WCOS Dee Mauldin DHS/FEMA Joint Information Center Doug Stutz ICF State Traffic Control Point Craig Fiore DHS/FEMA L

38

FAIRFIELD COUNTY - Mike Kirkland Emergency Operations Center Joseph Canoles DHS/FEMA Lauren DeMarco DHS/FEMA Stan Copeland DHS/FEMA Traffic Control Points Lauren DeMarco DHS/FEMA (Interview at EOC)

Reception Center Mike Dolder DHS/FEMA (White Oaks Conference Center)

Congregate Care Center Mike Dolder DHS/FEMA (White Oaks Conference Center)

Emergency Worker Decontamination Mike Dolder DHS/FEMA (White Oaks Conference Center)

Lake Clearing Lauren DeMarco DHS/FEMA LEXINGTON COUNTY - Neil Ellis Emergency Operations Center Tom Reynolds DHS/FEMA Beth Massey DHS/FEMA Tom Trout FDA Traffic Control Points (EOC) Tom Trout FDA Reception Center Don Cornell DHS/FEMA Emergency Worker Decontamination Don Cornell DHS/FEMA NEWBERRY COUNTY - Tom Barber Emergency Operations Center Robert Perdue DHS/FEMA Pat Tenorio DHS/FEMA Traffic Control Points (EOC) Pat Tenorio DHS/FEMA Reception Center Don Cornell DHS/FEMA Congregate Care Center Don Cornell DHS/FEMA Emergency Worker Decontamination Don Cornell DHS/FEMA 39

RICHLAND COUNTY - Greg Sox Emergency Operations Center Helen Wilgus DHS/FEMA Rick Button EPA Traffic Control Points (EOC) Rick Button EPA Reception Center Mike Dolder DHS/FEMA Emergency Worker Decontamination Mike Dolder DHS/FEMA Out of Sequence Activities FAIRFIELD COUNTY Protective Actions Schools 5/8/03 Eddie Hickman - DHS/FEMA LEXINGTON COUNTY Protective Actions Schools 5/8/03 Eddie Hickman - DHS/FEMA NEWBERRY COUNTY Protective Actions Schools 5/8/03 Eddie Hickman - DHS/FEMA Medical Drill Newberry County Memorial Hospital 5/22/03 Robert Perdue - DHS/FEMA Eddie Hickman - DHS/FEMA 40

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the V. C.

Summer Nuclear Station exercise on July 23, 2003 and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region IV.

A. Exercise Objectives Attached are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

B. Extent-of-Play Agreement The extent-of-play agreement on the following pages was submitted by the State of South Carolina, and was approved by FEMA Region IV in preparation for the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station exercise on July 23, 2003. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration ofeach exercise criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix.

41

Extent of Play Agreement VC Summer Nuclear Station REP Exercise July 23, 2003

1. Emergency Operations Management Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned. Alert rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators and a discussion of call-down procedures will be conducted.

Sub-element 1.b, Facilities Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG -0654, H)

Counties will be evaluated to establish a baseline for exercise evaluation criteria. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Sub-element 1.c, Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d., 2.a., b.)

Direction and Control will be at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). County Direction and Control will take place at the Fairfield County, Lexington County, Newberry County and Richland County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's). State Emergency Response Team (SERT) participants include the Emergency Management Division (EMD); ESF 6, Mass Care (Department of Social Services); ES.F 8, Health and Medical Services (Department of Health & Environmental Control); ESF 10, Hazardous Materials, (Department of Health and Environmental Control);

ESF 13, Law Enforcement (State Law Enforcement Division); and ESF 16, Emergency Traffic Management, (Department of Public Safety). A simulation cell will represent the Office of the Governor, Office of the Adjutant General, FEMA Region IV, Georgia, and North Carolina. All simulated telephone calls will be made by calling the simulation cell.

Sub-element I.d, Communications Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1., 2.)

The Electronic Switch System Exchange (ESSX) is the primary means of communication to notify off-site response forces. Backup to the ESSX are commercial telephone lines, satellite telephone and the Local Government Radio (LGR).

Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),

and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.1 0.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

Potassium Iodide for emergency workers will be simulated by candy or other means (empty envelope marked KI). A 14-day supply of KI for 7000 Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Individuals is stored at FNF County EOCs, and Health Departments and at DHEC headquarters in Columbia, SC.

Advance rosters of emergency workers are not maintained. KI is stockpiled for the general public and may be distributed prior to the exercise.

All radiation detection equipment will be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Equipment will be calibrated or leak tested in accordance with existing plans by the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Radiological Lab.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, the availability of appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc,) will be described by law enforcement personnel.

2. Protective Action Decision Making.

Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4.)

2

Dose limits for emergency workers are pre-determined. Emergency workers may voluntarily exceed dose limits only after being fully informed by DHEC of the biological effects of radiation and possible consequences of excessive exposure.

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8., 10., I1. and Supplement 3.)

Protective action recommendations by DHEC will be based on an evaluation of information received from the licensee, independent dose assessments and simulated field monitoring data input.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9., 1O.M.)

The Governor or his designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions (PADs) based on recommendations from DHEC.

PADs that require sheltering or evacuation of residents or transients in the 10-mile EPZ will be coordinated with the chief county elected official or designee.

Sub-element 2.c, Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.c.d.e.g.)

3. Protective Action Implementation.

Sub-element 3.a, Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

3

Emergency Workers or emergency worker teams will use Self Reading Dosimeters (SRDs) and simulated Permanent Record Dosimeters (PRDs) to monitor and control their radiation exposure. Emergency workers in low exposure rate areas will use PRDs and may use direct reading dosimeters or place them in centralized areas.

Dosimeters are distributed through county emergency operations centers.

Each county has an adequate inventory to support first-shift personnel.

Supplemental dosimeters will be provided in accordance with the South Carolina Dosimetry Redistribution Standard Operating Procedures, and will be discussed at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol maintains and distributes their own SRDs.

Emergency workers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation exposure limits.

Sub-element 3.b, Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.,f.)

KI is distributed to Emergency Workers prior to their being dispatched. KI is taken by emergency workers on order by the State Health Officer or designee. Record keeping will be discussed at risk county EOCs.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c.d.e.g.)

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland counties will demonstrate the ability and resources to implement appropriate protective actions for special population groups. A list of people with special transportation needs will be provided to evaluators. Evacuation assistance will not take place.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J. 1 .c., d., g.)

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland counties will simulate school evacuations by out-of-sequence interviews with key school staff members on May 8, 2003.

4

Fairfield County school to be evaluated is McCorey-Liston Elementary School.

Lexington County school to be evaluated is Chapin High School.

Newberry County school to be evaluated is Little Mountain Elementary School.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.1O.g., j., k.)

Traffic and Access Control Points (TACP's) are pre-determined. The South Carolina Highway Patrol will demonstrate Traffic and Access Control on-scene at TACP 5, SC 213 and Broad River Road and TACP 1, SC 215 and New Hope Road. Lake clearing operations will immediately follow TACP demonstration at Fairfield County Public Boat Landing 8, Lake Monticello East; 9, Lake Monticello West; and 10, Subimpoundment Ramp.

Fairfield County TACP to be evaluated at the county EOC is TACP 4, SC 269 and US 321 South.

Lexington County TACPs to be evaluated at the county EOC are TACP 3, Old Lexington Highway and Murry Lindler Road; TACP 5, Saint Peters Church Road and Westwoods Drive; and TACP 7, Meadowlark Road and Dreher Island Road.

Newberry County TACPs to be evaluated at the county EOC are TACP 1 US 176 and SC 213; and TACP 5, US 176 and SC 34.

Richland County TACPs to be evaluated at the Dutch Fork High School are TACP 3, Old Hilton Road and Three Dog Road and TACP 4, Mount Vernon Church Road and Stone Hill Road.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.,k.)

Actions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation will be demonstrated by discussion with officers manning TCPs.

4. Field Measurement and Analysis.

Sub-element 4.a, Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 5

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10., 1.8., 9., 11.)

Zeolite filters will be simulated with charcoal filters.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654,1.8., 11., J.10.a.)

Command and Control of DHEC Field Teams and mobile lab will take place at the DHEC Farrow Road Command Center, Columbia, SC.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified by the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, -

1.8., 9., 11.)

Dose Assessment will take place at the DHEC Farrow Road Command -

Center, Columbia, SC.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food, crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654,1.8., J.1 1.)

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3., 1.8., 9.,

J.11.)

The DHEC Mobile Lab will be located at the DHEC Farrow Road Command Center, Columbia, SC.

5. Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a, Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a 6

minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)

The State will coordinate Protective Action Decisions (PAD) with the Chief South Carolina county elected officials or designees. At Site Area Emergency, the siren system and the Emergency Alert System will be activated. A pre-scripted "Stay Tuned" EAS message and follow-on news release will be transmitted from the SEOC to the Local Primary (LP-1) EAS station WCOS, Columbia, S.C. A "test" EAS message will be simulated and an appropriate EAS message will be transmitted to the LP-1 station. The LP-1 station will have staff available for interview during the demonstration. At General Emergency, activation of the sirens and broadcast of EAS will be simulated.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the pubic is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6., Appendix 3.B.2.c)

If there is a siren failure, counties will describe back-up alerting system.

Sub-element 5.b, Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5., 7., G.3.a., G.4, a., b., c.)

The State, Fairfield County, Lexington County, Newberry County and Richland County will demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the news media at the Joint Information Center (JIC). Rumor control for the State will be demonstrated at the JIC. Rumor control for Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland counties will be demonstrated at the appropriate county EOC.

Rumor control personnel will provide a rumor calls log to the FEMA Evaluator.

6. Support Operations/ Facilities Sub-element 6.a, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide 7

monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h.; K.5.b.)

Reception Centers will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. At least six people will be monitored and registered. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. All necessary supplies will be -

on-hand. Walkways will not be covered with barrier material. A monitoring productivity rate will be developed by the FEMA evaluator. Demonstration will include the necessary portable portal monitors and monitoring teams required -

to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. At least two vehicles will be monitored and one vehicle decontaminated in accordance with local SOPs. Water will be used to demonstrate vehicle -

decontamination procedures.

Reception Centers to be evaluated are:

Fairfield County: White Oak Conference Center.

Lexington County: Crossroads Middle School Complex.

Newberry County: Newberry High School.

Richland County: Dutch Fork High School.

Sub-element 6.b, Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated out of sequence. Two emergency workers will be monitored. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-thru and discussion. One emergency vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with local SOPs.

Emergency Worker Decontamination Points to be evaluated are:

Fairfield County: White Oak Conference Center.

Lexington County: Crossroads Middle School Complex.

Newberry County: Adult Vocational School.

Richland County: Dutch Fork High School.

Sub-element 6.c, Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent 8

with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

County shelters will be demonstrated out-of-sequence and concurrently with Evaluation Area 6.a, above. Procedures that assure that only non-contaminated persons enter shelters will be demonstrated.

Sub-element 6.d, Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

(NUREG-0654, F.2, H.10., K.5.a.,b., l.1., 4.)

A Medical Services Drill (MS-1) will be conducted out of sequence and with a separate scenario. The drill will commence at the Newberry County Recycling Center, Pomaria, SC and conclude at the Newberry County Memorial Hospital on July 22, 2003.

9

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events -- Exercise Scenario --

which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the V. C.

Summer Nuclear Station exercise on July 23, 2003.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of South Carolina and South Carolina Electric and Gas Company and approved by FEMA Region IV.

42

2003 Evaluated Evercise VC Siummner Nuclear Station EPP-03-01B Narrative Summary The exercise begins with VC Summer Station operating at 100% power.

It is a B2 Maintenance week.

The weather forecast for today is for the high temperature to reach 100 degrees. The wind is from the W at 276 degrees at a speed of 5 mph. A chance of severe thunderstorms is predicted for the evening.

Wateree Generating Station is off line due to maintenance. McMeekin Generating Station is offline due the construction activities with the dam. This is a peak demand day with the high temperatures, therefore the plant is in an error likely situation so the Human Performance flags are yellow.

The plant has been experiencing elevated vibration on Reactor Coolant Pump A for the past 2 days, engineering has been evaluating the high vibration on the RCP A. Also, Westinghouse has been contacted to begin evaluating the pump vibration. Pump vibrations are currently stable.

Valve XVG-9606-CC has a small leak coming from the packing. The rework of this valve has been added to the trip package.

RMA-3 Gas channel was taken out of service due to a failed detector during a channel operations test.

At T=-35 during the 7:30 maintenance meeting, the Plant Manager will discuss with Engineering, Operations and Maintenance personnel the RCP A issue and the progress on the investigation into the elevated vibration.

At T=-40 the Operations Manager will contact the on-duty Shift Supervisor and direct him to review applicable procedures, as a precautionary measure for a possible shutdown.

At T=0, a small reactor coolant system leak approximately 70 GPM occurs.

The Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert Due to RCS leakage greater than 50 GPM. An announcement is made Io man the Emergency Response Faciiities. The State and local governments will be notified within 15 minutes of the declaration. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified as soon as possible after the State and counties but within I hour.

At T=35 a medical emergency will occur in the 436 Auxiliary Building. This medical emergency will involve two plant employees. One will suffer a head injury during a fall and the second employee will suffer a fractured lower arm. See the medical section of the scenario package for details.

4-1

20(03 Enahialted E.verli.

VC Summer Nuc lear Station EPP-03-O1-At T=75 the vibration levels begin to increase on Reactor Coolant Pump A along with pump amperage due to bearing failure. RCP A #1 seal leakage starts to increase.

At T=76 Reactor Coolant Pump A experiences a catastrophic failure resulting in the pump tearing apart. Part of the pump's impeller hits the core barrel and is driven down to the lower internals causing a loose parts monitor alarm. The Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier experiences a double ended shear resulting in a 50 GPM intersystem LOCA. A Reactor Trip occurs due to the loss of RCS A loop flow Valve XVT-9593A-CC has failed to close on high flow of 65 GPM. The operating crew should attempt to close the valve. Valve XVT-9593A will fail to close when the Main Control Board switch is taken to the close position due to motor problem.

Control Room personnel should attempt to close valve MVG-9605, CCW from RB Loads, when the Main Control Board is taken to the close position, MVG-9605 will close

-5% and its associated breaker will trip on thermal overload. Control Room personnel may close MVG-9606 stopping the intersystem LOCA.

At approximately T=76, the Reactor Coolant Pump A leakage increases to -500 GPM.

The Emergency Director should declare a Site Area Emergency based on a Known Loss-of-Coolant greater than Charging Pump Capacity. The State and local governments will be notified of the Site Area Emergency declaration. No Protective Action Recommendations are required at this time. The plant will request permission to activate the Alert and Notification System from the State Emergency Operations Center.

V C Summer Station shall activate the sirens when the State and local government agencies direct.

At T=85 the Control Room will receive RML-2 indications warning of high radiation.

At approximately T=121, fuel damage will start to occur. Containment radiation monitors, RMG-7 and RMG- 18 should increase to -2Rlhr.

At approximately T=151, Valve XVG-9606-CC will experience a large packing leak to the 436 West Penetration Area and a monitored unfiltered release will occur. The Control Room will receive an indication of the release when the Waste Processing Panel alarms. Control Room Operators should note an increase in the floor drain tank level and increased radiation level out the plant vent.

4-2

200)3 EraIhtatedu E.xercise VC Suammer NuIKcleor Stltion EPP-03-OIB The Emergency Director should declare a General Emergency based on Loss of Two of Three Fission Product Barriers with Potential Loss of the Third. The State and local governments will be notified of the General Emergency declaration. Protective Action Recommendations to evacuate the two-mile radius and five mile downwind should be provided to the State and local governments at this time. (The PAR should include the evacuation of zone C-1, the EOF and News Media Area (NMA) are located in this zone.

The evacuation to the EOFand NMA is beyond the scope of this exercise and will be simulated. Credit will be given for this decision and the discussion to activate the back-upfacilities.) The plant will request permission to activate the Alert and Notification System from the State Emergency Operations Center. V C Summer Station shall activate the sirens when the State and local government agencies direct.

At T=180 Electrical Maintenance repairs to XVT-9605 breaker and the crew MVG-9605 breakers terminating release.

The exercise will terminate when all objectives are met.

4-3

200J Evaluate'd c Ixerrise VC Sainier Nuclear Station EPP-03-OlB Timeline Initial Conditions 100% Power B2 Train Maintenance Week Reactor Coolant Pump A has been experiencing high vibration for the since July 21, 2003. Engineering has been evaluating the high vibration on RCP A. Westinghouse has been contacted to begin evaluating the pump vibration. The RCP A vibration is currently stable.

Valve XVG-9606-CC has a small leak coming from the packing. The rework of this valve has been added to the trip package.

RMA-3 Gas channel has been taken out of service due to a failed detector during calibration.

Time T=- 10 The Operations Manager will contact the on duty Shift Supervisor and direct him to review applicable procedures. for possible shutdown.

T=0 A small reactor coolant leak approximately 70 GPM occurs.

T=7 The Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert due to Reactor Coolant System exceeding 50 GPM.

The SS initiates EPP-00l.2 Alert checklist:

• Announcing the emergency to the site.

• Directing the Shift Communicator to activate the beepers per EPP-002 to Notify the Emergency Response Organization.

The SS initiates EPP-002 Communication and Notification, by initiating the Emergency Notification Form to notify State and local Governments.

T=22 Fairfield, Newberry, Richland, Lexington Counties and South Carolina State Warning Point are notified of the emergency classification.

T=35 Medical Emergency is reported to the Simulator Control Room (See Medical Section of the scenario for details.)

T=40 NRC notified of the event using the ENS.

T=55 ERDS activated and sending plant data to the NRC.

5-1

'20t) Aiaa:ltrei1t Eurciuse VC Switmer Nucl ear Su~ition EPP-03-OIB T=75 The vibration level in RCP A begin to increase due to the bearing failure.

RCP A #I seal begins to leak.

T=76 RCP A experiences a catastrophic failure.

A loose parts monitor alarm is received when the pumps impeller is driven down to the lower internals.

T=76 Reactor Coolant System leakage will increase to -575 GPM total leakage.

(500 GPM RCS leak, 25 GPM RCP "A" seal leakage, 50 GPM intersystem LOCA RCS to CCW)

T=80 Si will occur.

T=82 The Emergency Director shall declare a Site Area Emergency based on a LOCA greater than Charging Pump Capacity.

T=84 A site evacuation shall be announced to the plant.

T=85 RML-2 will alarm indicating high radiation.

T=99 Fairfield, Newberry, Richland, Lexington Counties and South Carolina State Warning Point are notified of the emergency classification by the EOF. The plant will recommend no PARs. The communicator will request permission to activate the Emergency Warning Siren System.

T=l 13 Accountability of plant personnel shall be complete.

T=121 Fuel damage will start to causing Containment Radiation Monitors to increase. RMG-7 and RMG-18 should increase to- 2 rlhr.

T= 151 MVG-9606, CCW from RB loads, will experience a large packing leak causing a RCS leak to the 436 West Penetration Area and a monitored, unfiltered release. Operators should note an increase in the floor drain level tank and increased radiation level outside the main plant vent.

RM-A3 and RM-A13 High Radiation Alarms received.

T= 160 The Emergency Director shall declare a General Emergency based on Loss of two of Three Fission Product Barriers with Potential Loss of the Third Barrier.

5-2

2003 EvAi lwaitcd E.erecise 1" Sutiner MideairStatio, EPP-0 IB T=170 Fairfield, Newberry, Richland, Lexington Counties and South Carolina State Warning Point are notified of the emergency classification by the EOF. The EOF shall make Protective Action Recommendations. (The PAR should include the evacuation of zone C-l, the EOFand News Media Area (NMA) are located in this zone. The evacuation to the EOF and NMA is beyond the scope of this exercise and will be simulated. Credit will be given for this decision and the discussion to activate the back-up facilities.)

T=180 Electrical Maintenance repairs XVG-9605-CC breaker and Control Room Personnel closes the valve terminating the release.

T-240 The exercise will be terminated when all objectives are demonstrated.

5-3