ML18102A526

FEMA - After Action Report for V.C. Summer, Radio!Ogical Emergency Preparedness Exercise for October 31, 2017

ML18102A526
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	04/02/2018
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML18102A526 (59)

Text

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1 Final After Action Report I V.C. Summer Nuclear Station I Radio!ogical Emergency Preparedness Exercise

• . Exercise Date: October 31, 2017 I

_I April 2, 2018

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-1 V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

,_I Radiological Emergen~y Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: October 31, 2017 I

_I April 2, 2018 I FEMA I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 1..

After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I

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11 After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Table of Contents I Page Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 I Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............................................................................. 7 I

1.3 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 8 II Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ........................................................................................... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ...................................................................... ,................ 11 I

2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities ...................................................... 12 11 2.3 Exercise Scenario ........................... _. ............................................................................. 13 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 17 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 17 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 17 I 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 19 3.3.1 State Of South Carolina .................................................................. ;................ 19 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ...............................-............... 19 I 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.3 Emergency Operations Facility ..................................................... 21 Dose Assessment ........................................................................... 22 3.3.1.4 Field Team~ '.'.;.:::i ..... :.... :.:.:.*:.: .. :..................................................... 23 I 3.3.1.5 3.3.1.6 Mobile Operations Center.. ............................................................ 24 Joint Information Center ................................................................ 25 I 3.3.1.7 LP-1 (WCOS) ................................................................................ 26 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions ............................................................................................. 26 3.3.2.1 Fairfield County ............................................................................. 26 I 3.3.2.2 3.3.2.3 3.3.2.4 Lexington County .......................................................................... 30 Newberry County ........................................................................... 34 Richland County ............................................................................ 37 I Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 41 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 43 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders ................................................................. .45 I Appendix C: Extent-of-Play Agreement ..................................................................................... .47 I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Executive Summary I On October 31, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a full participation exercise for the plume exposure emergency planning zone of the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. V.C. Summer Nuclear Station is located in Fairfield County, approximately 26 miles north of Columbia, South Carolina and is operated by South Carolina Electric & Gas. The

1 V.C. Summer Nuclear Station emergency planning zone is divided into 13 emergency response planning zones. The plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone encompasses parts of Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland Counties, with a total population of approximately ii 14,175.

The evaluations of out-of-sequence activities for the risk counties are included in this report and I occurred August 15-17, 2017; October 25-27, 2017; and November 2, 2017. The out-of-sequence activities included: a medical services drill; protective actions for schools; reception 11 and congregate care centers; emergency worker and evacuee decontamination and monitoring; vehicle decontamination and monitoring.

One main highlight of the exercise jncluded the implementation of the joint information system.

I Public information officers from the state and risk counties coordinated and distributed all news releases from the state emergency operations center with input from key stakeholders and provided timely and accurate information' to the media.* '. ,

• I The Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess I the level of state and local preparedness in response to a radiological emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. This exercise was conducted in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local

I radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on September 22, 2015. The qualifying emergency I

preparedness exercise was conducted November 1981.

I The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, and support development of corrective actions. During the exercise, no findings were identified. The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success.

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness J:>rogram I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I

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I Radiological.Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Section 1: Exercise Overview I 1.1 Exercise Details I Exercise Name 2017 V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Evaluated Exercise . .

I Type of Exercise Full Participation Exercise I Exercise Date(s)

October 31, 2017 I Locations See the Extent of Play Agreement in Appendix D for a complete listing of locations.

Sponsors South Carolina Emergency Management V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 2779 Fish Hatchery Road 1162 State Hwy213 West Columbia, SC 29172 Jen.kinsville, SC 29065 I

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Program United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management 1

I Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program*

Mission I Response Scenario Type I 1.2 Plume Phase Full Participation Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Planning Team Leadership I Lawrence Robertson Central Section Chief I FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Surnrner Nuclear Station I

Joseph Harworth SC State Lead FEMA Region IV I 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I

Quintin Ivy Site Specialist FEMA Region IV I

3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I

Nathan Nienhius FNF Preparedness Manager SCEMD I

2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, South Carolina 29172 I Johnny Thomas FNF Preparedness SCEMD I

2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, South Carolina 29172 I 1.3 Participating Organizations The following agencies and organizations participated in the 2017 V.C. Summer Nuclear I

Station exercise:

State Agencies:

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South Carolina Emergency Management Division South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control I

3. South Carolina Highway Patrol 4.

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South Carolina Department of Social Services South Carolina Law Enforcement Division I

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South Carolina Department of Natural Resources South Carolina Department of Transportation I I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Risk Counties:

I 1. Fairfield County

2. Lexington County I 3.

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Newberry County Richland County I Private Organizations:

1. American Red Cross I 2. South Carolina Electric and Gas

3. Lexington Medical Center I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Section 2: Exercise *oesign Summary I 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design II The Federal Emergency Management Agency administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation parts 350, 351 and 352. Sixteen planning standards, codified in 44 Code of I Federal Regulations 350, form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for state, tribal and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory I Commission regulations also codify the sixteen planning standards for the licensee. 44 Code of Federal Regulations 350 sets forth the mechanisms foi the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and I procedures by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, I tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the nuclear power plant.

• I The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans, and verification of the* perio'clic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP~ 1, I along with supplements through the annual letter of certification and staff assistance visits, enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory I Commission, that the affected state, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite I in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the V.f;. Summer I Nuclear Station to the Federal Emergency Management Agency by the State of South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions occurred on April 18, 1981. Formal approval of the radiological emergency response procedures was granted by the Federal Emergency I Management Agency on November 13, 1981, under Title 44 CFR 350. r I A Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise was conducted on October 31, 2017, and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence activities held in August, October and November, 2017. This.full participation plume scenario exercise was held in accordance I with Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance as specified by the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual and the approved extent-of-play agreement. The design incorporated exercise objectives with preparedness doctrine to I include tbe National Preparedness Goal and related frameworks and guidance.

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2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities Core capabilities,..based plarining alloW:.s Jar: exercise planning. teams to :develop ,exeFcise I

objectives and observe exercise:outcomes :tmough a framework. of specifk.action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectiv:es meet the, Radiologi¢al: Emerg~ncy Preparedntyss Program *requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluatitm areas~- The critic;al tasks to. be I

demonstrated were negotiated with the State of South Carolina and the participating counties.

The _core capabilities s~heduledJor demons~ratioq dm:i1_1g_tqis ~xer~isy, w~r.e:,,, \' ; :. :, .

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I Operational J'.oq!'.dinaf!on_: ,,~Stc:tl:>~W:i; and: ni,aint.a~n. a -unified and coordinate,d .-, .\..

operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all:c;:ritical.st~ep.olclers and supports the execution of core capabilities. -

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Situ~.,tioqal .A.~~es,sment~ Pr9vid(?. all_ q~~i.si9µ Jp.a).cers with;de,cision-:~eleva11_t ,infqr,mation I regarding the nature and extent, of. th~ \iaz,arc;l, ililY ca~cading effects, and the ~tatus of the response.

I Pµblic 1nfoi;n;tation and :Warni~;t:p:~l~yei; cpordinated, prompt, relial:>1~ ~~( y.

0 actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent,

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• aq:essible, and.cultu~ally ,and liµ.guistically appropriate_Illethods to e:(fect_iyelyrel!ly I

, .i])f()rmation,regarding any threat_ or ,hazard ap.d,. as app~gp1;iat~, tpe actio.1,1s b~ing taken and the assistance ;_being made available. * *

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,Enviro11mental Response/Healt4 an4 Safety: Conduct aprn9priate measures, to. ensure the p.i;otection, of.the.health and s,afety,of the public ~ncl;workers,.arwell as the' .*

environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected I

communities.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure I

environment through law enf9rcement and related securitf and prot~ction oper~tic;ms for people and communities located within affected ar~as ~nd_also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations. ,

I Critical Transportation: . Prov~de transportati.on (including infrastructure. acc_e~s and accessible transportation sei-vic~s) for resporise priority obj~ctives_, includin,g tp.e I

evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas. I M.ass Care.~~rvice,s: Provide life-sustaining and ht:Jman servi~es. to the affecte4* 1 population, to include hydration, feeding,.sheltering, ~~mporary housing, ~vacue~

support, reunification, and distribution ofemergency supplies.

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• Radiological Emergency Prnparedness, Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Public Health, Healthcare; and Emergency Medical Services: Provide lifesaving I medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid

. addition.al disease*and injury :by,providing targeted public- health, 'medical and behavioral

.-health*support; and protluctsito aU affected populations*. , ,v , *, i '*

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These core capabilities, when sliccessfally demonstrated:; meet:the ex:ercise*objectives: The objective~ for this-exercise*were;as follows: . -' ;

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• Objective *1::* Dem6nstrai,tthea:bilityto'provide direction and control :and make'* ,

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!I protective action decisions through the state emergency operations centers, county emetgericy operations centers,. arid"field\1ctiv1tfos by' exet6ise:play arid 'discussion of plaris'ah:d ptocedures.*,"*.; . .i *, *.,:, ** *;,,,*1' i . . ., , ., ,*;** ,i,\,,

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I Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and make protective action decisions,.affecting 'state *ahd county emergency \\'orkers aiid'the general public through exercise'playand dis'cussions ofplans and pfocedures ..

'II I Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers' and the general-public through exercise' demonstration:

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.Objective 4:

• Demonstrate the ability fo activate the prompt alert and notification *system utilizing the'priirtary notification system ahdthe emergency alert systeni through exercise I. play. ., 1."  : * * , .* ,

Objective 5: Demonsfoate the effectiveness fjf plans, policies, 'and procedures in the joint I information cehtet- for public and private' sector emergenc'y information communications.

Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, decontaminate, register, and 'shelter I evacuees.

• Objective 7: Demonstrate the *ability to provide* dose projection an:d protective action I decision niakirig for the plume phase:

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Objective 8: Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate space, adequate resources, I

• and trained personnel to' provide transport; monitoring, decontamination, and inedical services to contaminated 1.njured ;individuals'. .

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I 2.3 Exercise Scenario I The*following is a summary of the sceriario developed by* South C.irolina:Electric*and Gas to drive:exercise play. All scenario events were si~lilated:and-tirries were approximate. '* i I Initial Conditions I 13 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedn~ss,Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear,Station I

• Meteorological forecast indicates a thunderstorm advisory until: 1100 for Aiken; Barnwell, Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, Orangeburg, Richland, arid Salud:a *Counties.

A strong cold front *is expected to move through the area during the morning. Current I wind directionis,from* 150°<at'10 mile's*perhoctr'(mph);*.withStability*Class'"D".

• Offsite power from Parr Hydro not available due to transformer winding failure. -

Replacement tr~sforll1;e~_exl?ec~ed on Novembe~ 9,,.~017:,

I VCSNS. pnit 1 is at 100%. po'Y~r. ~ 't J I

Exercise begins at 0800 EDT * * ' ' :,, ' ** * **

- At 0895, .vibrati()ns. . develqp_on a Reactm*<;o_olifilt:Prnup (RCP),* _,,m~.increase "':'ithin the I next fiye minutes resuHiqg in.an RCP ~igh viJJr/;ltion alar~. , .

,At;Q8_10, an Anticipated Transient,Witho4t._Syram (ATWS):occurs ..

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. , At O~lJ, a.Main SJea,m Sa(ety. Va)ve sticl<;s open: Estimat~d tiII1e to.c;:lose the;valye is 4 -

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

I A,t 0,812,,0perationsmanually trips the reaqtor. .**.

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I At 0814, during Safety Injection, the A-Emergency Diesel Generator (A-EDG) fails to start due to a broken fuel rack linkage;,,and.the B-EPG fails to stai;t, with.nq voltage or frequency indication. *

• I Based on automatic .or manual trip failure to shut down the reactor ,md subsequent unsuccessful manual actions to shut down the reactor (Emerg~ncy Action Level (EAL)

I SA6.1 ), an Alert ECL should be declar.ed by 0825.

At 1015, a strong microburst produces high winds that uproots trees and results in grid damage and loss of offsite power to VCSNS and Parr Hydro. Simultaneously, a 7% fuel failure occurs, but goes unnoticed by Operations due to the loss of power to radiation monitors. The onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) lose power, and meteorological data is lost. The repair and return to service of B-EDG is estimated within an hour.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Based on loss*of all onsite and offsite power for> 15 minutes (EAL SSl.l), a Site Area I

• Emergency ECL should be. declared by 1030.

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• At 1130; a repair team energizes B-:-EDQ. and. B-tra:in safety system power lo:ads .are I initiated.

At 1200, the B-EDG trips ~~d B-trafo safety s'ystem powei'-foads are lost'.

I At 1210, response teams indicate a long lead-time for B-EDG repair, and the TSC determines that onsite/offsite power cannot be restored 'Yithin 4. hc;n,irs ..

I Based on foss. of all *ohsite and offsite AC power and ESFbus~s AND restora'tiori >4 hours (EAL SG 1.1), a General Emergency ECLshould:be declared by 1220:

I By 1235, Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)from the utility are to-evacuate 2 miles around and 5 miles downwind of VCSNS (zones A-0, A-1, B-1 and C-1) and I sheltet10 miles'downwind (zones A-2 and B-2)and consider potassium iodide'(Kl) in accordance with State plans. '

I At 1235, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs.* 'Dtie to an existing-Main Sfoain Safety Valve stuck open, a radiological release begins.

I **The exercise will'ierminate completed.

at approximately 1330 after all'objectives have been I NOTE: The FMT data was pi-ovided throitgh 1435, and ilzdicates exercise tennination at 1445. -A Licensee sirnuldtion cell'continued to operate until 1445 in order to provide adequate tirne for FMT and dose assessment activities.

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I Radiolo'gical Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities I 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results I This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 31, 2017, plume exercise and out-of-sequence (OOS) interviews and demonstrations conducted on August 15-17, 2017, I October 25-27, 2017, and November 2, 2017.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of I capabilities and equivalent Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the I demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

• M: Met (no level 1 or level 2 Findings assessed and no unresolved findings from I

• prior exercises) 1: Level 1 Finding assessed I 2: Level 2 Finding assessed or an unresolved Level 2 Finding(s) from a prior exercise

• P: Plan issue ,.. ,,

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• N: Not demonstrated 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation I Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A I capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. The previously described core capabilities form the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability.

I Each jurisdiction's stand-alone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

I Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure, which provided effective and responsive direction and control. Critical stakeholders were appropriately integrated in the overall I decision-making process, which enabled protective action recommendations to be evaluated in a sensible and timely manner. This process included input from both I

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relevant critical stakeholders and support personnel and took into account the safety and well-being of the general public. From there, protective action*decisions as a whole were made. without unduf! delay, Officials at the .county level* played critical:rolesdn :µecision I making throughout the exercise.

. Situational Assessment:* South Carolina Department ofHea.lth*and Envimnmental I

.. Control successfully accomplished its mission in making recotnm~ndations to protect the public. Decision makers were provided ,withTelevant information,regarding, assessed radiological and plant conditions . , This information allowed decision;makers to: I understand the extent of the hazards, an(;! pascading effects and to make the appropriate protective action decisions .... i :* .

I Public Information and Warning: The jurisdictions demonstrated the ability, to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community. Alert and notification of the public and media was completed in a,timely manner:by.simulated I

sounding of sirens and emergency alert system messaging. Accmate information and follow...,oninstruotions were provided with the formulation of news -releases and press briefings being generated from the state e[llergency operations centerjoint information I

system.. All messages were reviewed by each county's emergency management director,

. ;and were released from the state emer.gency operations centerjointinformation.system.

The exercise was the.first demonstration of the state emergency operations center serving I

as the primary joint information center for a V.C. Summer Nuclear Station evaluated exercise. Public information was consistent with protective action decisions and contained applicable and specific instructions relative,to those*decisions. } ~ ..

I Environmental Responseffiealth and Safety: The availability of guidance and:

resources to address hazardous materials was integral in support of the responder I

operations. Emergency workers were issued the appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures, and properly managed their radiological exposure during out-of-sequence activities. The counties also demonsti:ated the.ability to monitoumd .

I decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and their vehicles.

On-Scene Security and Protection: State and local law enforcement agencies discussed I

the capability to ensure a,safe and secure.environment throughhw enforcement and related security and protection operations for people traveling within the emergency planning zone. The implementation of traffic and access control .p0ints was discussed I

during exercise play at the state emergency operations. center and hy risk county emergency operations center representatives who described the process by which traffic and access control points could be .established in a timely manner.

I Critical Transportation: School officials from Chapin High School and the Alternative Learning Center in Lexington County, ..Spring Hill High School in Richland County, Kelly I

Miller Elementary School .in Fairfield County, ..and Mid Carolina Middle. and High*

Schools in Newbep-y County effectively discussea implementation of-protective actions for affected local schools. The evacuation of students and staff;*.as well as the delivery of I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedn'ess Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station vital response personnel;*equipment, and services into the affected areas. to provide

,I transportation (including infrastructure access. ari'd accessible transportation services) for

.. response,pribrity objectives; were successfully discussed during out-of-sequence activities. * , , , *,.', : ,: *

• I 'Mass Care:, Congregate care centers in Lexington;*Fairfield,Richland(and Newberry

. :Counties provided Iifec.sustaihing services to the affected populations with a focus on I hydration, fee.ding; and ;sheltering as well as support for reunifying families. The, jurisdictions* denionsfrated.that the .centers had* resources to provide services and

, accommodations consistent with planning guidelines,. The shelter managers I demonstrated the procedures to assure that evacuees had been: monitored for contamination and decontaminated as appropriate before entering the congregate care facilities: ,r * ,)._ "

I :Public Health and:Medical Services: ,Qualified medical personnel simulated providing lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services *and related operations. The I transportation* and treatment of a contaminated injured patient was demonstrated * ,

successfully by Lexington County Emergency Medical Services paramedics and

• _Lexington Medical Center radiological emergency area staff. They effectively*

I .demonstratedradiolQgical monitoring, decontamination, and contamination avoidance and:injury by providing targeted*public health and medical support and products to

.**evacuees. ',1 I 3.3

', ' t Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.

I 3.3.1 State Of South Carolina

• 3.3;1.1 *State Em~rgency Operations Center , ,*

I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I The South Carolina Emergency Management Division emergency response staff and state

, _ . emergency response team members successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operationaLstructure and process while I 1 integrating-all critical stakeholders. The chief of operations kept staff aware ofoongoing incident status through frequent staff briefings. The state emergency response team I leaders used a conference bridge line to successfully coordinate status and protective

, actions with the,risk counties. Protective action decisions for emergency workers, and the general public,were made in an effective and timely manner.

'I Upon receipt bf an initial notification of an Alert emergency classification levelfrom the V.C,; Summer Nuclear Station personnel, the state warning poil'ltdispatch utilized I effective measures to ensure the chief of operations and.the technjcal officer received notification in a timely manner. The chief of staff approved the partial activation of the

• state emergency operations center through efficient coordination. Staff were notified I 19 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear.Station using a reverse calling system, and allowed to preposition in accordance with the extent-I of-play agreement.

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, Redundant communications sys*tems ,were utilized. and ireadily available to- support *

• • • .:*emergency operations: No communications- failures were* ol;>served,throughout the 1 *

• ev:aluation; however; staff were able to explain, through.interview, the alternate means of 0

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. comnmnications to: ensure minimal interruption in the event of a failure.* Equipment and supplies were sufficient to support operations withiffthe:state emergency operations center. *,

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I South Carolina Highway Patrol troopers were presented with multiple impediments to evacuation routes, during *the exercise.: Troopers .wer~ able to resolve impediments* and re-I

. ii0ute traffic accordingly by- coordinating with county representatives and the :South Carolina Department of Transportation. Traffic and access control.coordination and support was sufficient to support local emergency-response efforts as well.:'* .. *.

I All personnel were-professional, knowledgeable; and performed their:duties in accordance with their'plans,"procedlilres*, and the:extent-of-play agreement.: : .

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. *.For this capability, the following REP criteria were-MET: La,l, l.c.l; Ld.l, ;Le.1, 2.a.1,

-2.b.2,2.c.1', 3.d.1,-3.d.2. * **' ..

• I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I The ability to deliver coordinated, prompt;. reliable,, and actionable. information. to the whole community and effectively relay instructions to the public and media was successfully demonstrated at the state emergency: operations center.* -Emergency * '

I information to the public was provided through coordination among the utility, state, and risk counties. The demonstration was the first time the stateiemergency operp:tions center joint information center served as the primary joint information center for a V.C. Summer 1!

Nuclear Station evaluated exercise,* The state emergency operations center facility offered adequate space for public information officers from various agencies to perform II the duties required of them.  !

The joint information center was located adjacent to the state emergency operations I' center in secured rooms designated for the media briefings. These rooms served as the central point of contact for the distribution and release of state and local government information to the media and public throughout this event. I Activation of the joint information system staff was done in accordance with exercise extent-of-play agreements and individual jurisdictional plans following the declaration of the Alert emergency classification level. Multiple redundant communication systems I

were demonstrated, and no communications failures were observed during the exercise.

Additionally, sufficient equipment and supplies were available to support extended joint information center operations if required.

I 20 I I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station The state public affairs officer and public information officer assistants maintained I updated information in their computer based tracking program and by direct e-mails.

They coordinated the approval and release of emergency alert system messages. Joint information center media briefings were broadcast fore over .the intercom into other work

'I areas.in the state.emergency operations ,center.. ;Other web.:based internet systems used

, and referenced to enhance*ptovision of timely emergency information to the media and

. public coordination included: .TwitteF; Facebook; and frequent updates to each agency's I web,sit~; The public informatioffofficers stated thatthe overall,desired result was to provide one unified voice with timely and accurate information through the joint ..

information system structure.

I f *. ri *, . . *. 1 ' ~ " , . ,

• The joint information system generated a. total- of three ,emergency. alert system messages, six state news releases, which all contained. the required FEMA information; and three I county news releases; Information approved to;be,released through social media was posted on' the bottom of several news releases: ...

I A total of 18 public inquiry telephone calls were answered in the state emergency ._

operations center l;)y two experienced 'Staff members. The*public inquiry calls were politely answered with current and correct information. The staff was kept up to date on theJatest decisions. and protective actions. by the lead public information officer;, :The spokespersons documented all calls and were ready to address any trends and rumors as received.

• ' .. ' ) . . . .. ~

Activation of the fixed siren system and emergency alert system was demonstrated three times (all simulated).* No polling failures were indicated.

• I  : i'i For this capabilityj the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, and 5.b.l.

I 3.3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility.  :~ ~r .

I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control provided liaisons to the V.C. Summer I Nuclear Station's emergency operations facility. The presence*of the liaisons augmented the coordinated *operational structure of the entire response .. They helped facilitate information sharing between decisions makers of th.e South Carolina Electric and Gas I Company and the offsite response organizations. The liaisons followed applicable protocols and performed their duties in an efficient and professional manner, thereby I ensuring that state and county decision makers received accurate and timely incident information.

I I 21 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear .Station The liaisons,proactively worked with utility personnel to obtain the current plant I

• conditions, The South Carolina Emergency Management Division liaison closely.

monitored and contributed to all offsite coordination conference:calls ... Fol19wing,each I call, he briefed emergency operations facility leadership and staff on offsite response

.: * .actitlns* and.evacuation *route :status. ,He :also ptovided,offsite decision makers*with early,

• Unofficial notifications of,changes.in emergency.classification levels~._which provided I

.'..them extra.time to prepare for the official notifications. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental ControUiaison knowledgably interacted wit~ utilit¥, dose assessment personnel. to facilitate information shariag,about.radiological monitoring and I

the results of.dose projecti0n' modeling.'1He closel:x monitored the radio traffic ofthe

. state field monitoring. teams: as wellias.Jbeir inputs to:Rad Responder to .identify. the presence_of m1y offsite radiologicaJ:release.

• He consistentiy*provided the state dose I

assessment staff operating at the state emergency operations center with current data for input-into modeling software.* Both liaisons contributed greatly to the,coordinatiort of

onsite and offsite incident status a~d,response actions .. : ',, , * .-,,

I

~ ~ ; '

I For this capability, the following REP criteria, were MET: 2.b.2 .. . ,.,*

3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment Situational Assessment I

The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct dose assessment activities ,in order to.

I provide appropriate protective action recommendations to decision-makers.

',, .. l ,_;

The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control staff members I

were pre-positioned near the state emergen_cy operations center, ,in accordance with the extent of play agreement, and pron;iptly responded when notified of the incident, staffing the emergency support function 10. The facility had adequate equipment, supplies, plans, I

procedures, and communications c1;1pabilities to support dose assessment tasks.

The emergency response coordinator and dose.assessment.coordinator directed, I

emergency support function 10 staff to gather plant information: and field monitoring data to adequately assess radiological releases. Dose projections were performed using the Radiological Assessment Systems for Consequence Analysis version4.3.2; however, due I

tq the site loss of onsite and offsite power during the exercise, m;ily "what if: dose projecti9ns were possible since the' ,release source term could not,be determined from plant indicators. The emergency response co.ordinator and dose assessment coordinator I

worked closely with the. utility state government liaison regarding plant status, and coordinated with utility counterparts at the emergency operations facility.regarding dose assessment to ensure information accuracy and consistency in the development of I

protective action recommendations.

I 22 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After. Action Report 2017 VC SummerNuclear Station The emergency support function 10 personnel participated in conference calls with state I and county decision-niakers,:providihg appropriate technical information and advice during protective action:decision discussions: . '

• I The emergency support function eight public health physician made the recommendation for emergency workers to ingestlpotassiurniodide*since arelease:was in progress, but the

, relea*se duration and Composition we're unknown. A potassium iodide decision for the I general public was notnecessary'sirtce an evacuation: order had been put in place well in advance* 0£ the* radiologic-al: release'. At the end ofthe exercise, emergency support function 10 staff confirmed the presence ;of iodine in the radiological release upon I receiving, air Satnple data from state*fi~ld *nionitbringteams, and .calculated dos~ levels that were below the 5 Rem threshold requiring potassium iodide for emergency workers.

I Dose limits were in placeJor emergency worker exposure control, as well as* a: .'

• methodology ap.d approval process for* exceeding limits for life~saving activities or for protecting valuable property. State field monitoring teams and mobile operations center I staff routinely checked and reported personnel doses every thirty minutes .. The emergency support function IO-exposure control clerk monitored and recorded all personnel doses.*

I For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.l, 1.d.1, 1.e:1, 2.a.1; 2.b.l, 2.b.2, and 4.a.2.

I 3.3.1.4 Field Teams *

,*1 I Environmental Response and Health and Safety Capability

• South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control field monitoring teams I *.

• Bravo and Charlie demonstrated the capability to accomplish field monitoring and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Both teams were provided with equipment, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and I other supplies sufficient to support exposure control, field radiation surveys and sampling operations. Instrumentation and communications equipment were *checked for proper I operation prior to deployment.

The field team director issued appropriate.dosimetry, potassium iodide, and exposure I control forms and procedures, and ,briefed teams on management of their radiological exposure:. The teams read*their dosimeters at thirty-minute intervals throughout the exercise. Team members* described the proper use of dosimetry, administrative,dose I .* 1 limits, use ofpota,ssium iodide; and record keeping requirements. Radios and cellular telephones were sufficient .and operated effectively throughout the exercise.

I I 23-I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear_.Station I

• The teams followed their procedures to demonstrate their capability to take ambient radiation measurements to characterize the radioactive plume. Teams were-staged:east and west of the centerline of,the<projected.path of the plume;' and instructedtcrperform I

-.

• traversals'*while ttsing,their-m,0nitoring equipment to detect the arrival*'ofithe radieactive

, , **plume,: Team J3ravo detected' the plume at the boat landing on Route 215-, approximate! y

<25 miles down-'-wind of the:plant; and was directed to take an air sample at this location . *I

.: -* Team Charlie detected tJ:ie arrival of the plume at 736:-Fixed;Air Monitor Location. The team collected* an air sample-at this location. ;Both teams collected ,an -air sample,in accordance with their procedures. Open and-closed.window exposure reaqi1;1gs.were I

performed to ensure that the plume did not pass during the air sample collection period.

The teams m0vedto.a *background-locationto,purge,,bag;.label, and count:the.air!:

cartridge and particulate filter_. *Measures*were taken to minimize contamination. , ..

I Readings (in counts .per miqute) were promptlyTadioed to the mobile: operation center.

Teams,demonstrated the ,sampletran.sfer and chain of custody process-with a sample transfer to a:courier. ,; --  :'. . , .: ,.; *:i :

I For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.d.f, 1-.e.l, 3.a:1, and 4.a.3.

I 3.3.1.5 Mobile Operations Center I Environmental Response and Health and Safety CapabHity:: .. ,.. ,*

The South Carolina Department of Health_ and Environmental Control mobile operations I

center personnel were pre-positioned at Building 15 at the state park facility located at 8500 Farrow Road. Mobile operations, center personnel demonstrated their ability to

. : efficiently initiate response operations to support the exercise; and* successfully assemble 1

I and manage two field monitoring teams and mobile radiological laboratory vehicles and personnel.

II I

Mobile operations center personnel successfully demonstrated that equipment, maps, displays; monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide; *and 'other *supplies were I' sufficient to support emergency operations during the exercise. Communication Jinks were established and maintained with appropriate locations during the exercise. During the exercise, 800-Megahertz radios and satellite phones *served as primary and secondary communications, respectively. Cellular phones and landline telephones were also I

available as backup communications. The 800-Megahertz radios.were successfully used, and communications quality between the field team director and field monitoring teams was consistently clear throughout the exercise.-. The field team director and ,field*

monitoring teams routinely repeated key-information to verify accurate recording of key communications. The field team director successfully conducted radio:and cell phone checks with the field monitoring teams immediately prior,to their deployment.

t:

) -

24 Ii I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station The South; Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control site safety officer I . provided field monitoring team and mobile radiological laboratory personnel a thorough iiadiological briefing . prior to:field mcmitoring.teaq:i depl0yment... The teams were*.

J assigned'to*perform ra:diological surve.ys.by traversing ddwnwind.locations:within,the I plume emergency p1anning* zone: The assigned i:adiation monitoring locations,allowed

. the teams to ~ocate both the plume edges and obtain maximum readings at the plume centerline. Field radiation measurements }Vere immediately communicated to. the field I team,director *and dose assessment personnel for use in calculating dose projections and

• making:prntective,action teeommendations. , ,;

, :: . ( : ! i' ~

I The mobile operations center coordinator was:directed:by a representative at the state emergency operations center to have:.field monitoring,team.members ingest(lsimulated)

.*potassium iodide. *Field monitoring team personnel *exposure and potassium iodide I :in.gestion was recorded and. tracked by'the field team recorder. 'f.he. mobile operations center coordinator and field team director were knowledgeable regarding the use .of potassium iodide and in radiation exposure control methods, including the process for I . obtaining radiation exposure extensions, .if needed.

• For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.d.l, l.e.l, 2.a.1, 3.a.l and I 4.a.2. .,; *_:

3.3.1.6 Joint Information*Ceriter r ) * *" .*;.

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:,

I

• Public -information officers working; within the State ,of South Carolina Joint Information

• Center successfully demonstrated the ability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate

.accurate, and* timelf, emergency public information in support to the V.C. Summer I Nuclear Station.

Activation and mobilization of personnel was done in accordance with exercise I agreements and jurisdictional plans following the declaration. of an Alert emergency classification level. The facility was well equipped and had* redundancy in I

• communications, which included landline phones, facsimiles; and internet connectivity.

The primary means of communication for state and county personnel was .electronic mail, with commercial landline and.cell phone as backup. Equipm~nt and-supplies. were I sufficient to support operations. '.:

,r The public information function operated within a defined joint information system and I was supported* through the various agency's emergency operations centers and the licensee joint.information center. This joint information center served as the central point of contact fat the state and associated-risk counties for the distribution and release of I information to the media and public. Effective and unified emergency information for the public and media was achieved through coordination and collaboration.

I 25 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness.Program* I After Action Report Established protocols were followed when preparing, coordinating, and disseminating the 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Statio;n I

news releases. News releases were prepared by the state with input, coordination, and approyal frolll each risk. Gounty. 'I;hii; tPn:>ce.ss,,e.nhap.ced a "oi;ie.- messc1.ge, one yoiGe;' I public)t1Jorm,atio_natpr9cess .... * : 1 : . ",.;: *, ., _ , : * :* *

.. *., :* r:

Two media briefin.gs were. conduc~ed during. the exercise and prior to. each briefing, the agency spokespersons discussed and coordinated their message for the. bri~ijng. :The spokespersons answered all questions asked of them and were able to discuss what actioµs had been.taken by their. orgap.izations. ;. *:;; ,:, -.. *,'. ':*,-:.: ' . ,,, .

.! : < { .,* , i ' ... ' , : **:' *-. : I ,

• A critical. aspect .of eI).suring, ac.curat.e. i11f01:matio_n,was reJated c9rrectly. was. the. ability to

, correct-information-anq d.ispel.erroneous information'. The s.t~;te'.s pu)Jlic.inquiry_and rnmor co,nrrol function was performeq in the state eme,rgeqcy operati9ns ,center. , .

- .Jde.ntified rumors_.and trends werepoorpi11ated,with the.le'1.d spokesperson ~o disc-qs.s and dispel during the media briefings.,, , . *: * .i *. , .

I For this cap~bility, the following REP criteria were. MET: 1.a. l, 1.d. l, 1.e.1, an9 Sib.1.

\

I 3.3.1.7,LP~l {W,COS) .., *_,: *i

.PubH<:. Information ancl. Warning- Capability Summary:,

.:'., I I

.. ' -~ i *.

The public information and warning capability was successfully demonstrated by WCOS-FM 97 .5 and AM 1400 iHeartRadio/Clear .channel; w.hich served as the local primary

. source for emergency aler,t system messages: in the V.C. Summer Nuc;lear Station area, and also as the state primary emergency i11formation ra,dio,-station. St.;ttion personnel received and authenticated '1. simulated emergency alert system message from.the S9uth I

Carolina Emergency Management Division. They.pr:operlY:,demonstrated procedures for recording and broadcasting the. message over the ,emergency alert system at the. ti:rp.e reqqested by South Carolina Emergency Managementl)ivision. With new equipment I

installed, pers9nnel were l10t require_d to be atthe sta,tion to .sepd emergency alert system messages. The stations were equipped with sufficient e,mergency generators to allow the capability of broadcasting a,n emergency alert system message at any time.

I

. For this- capability, the foll0wing REP criteria were MET:* 1.a.l, 1.d,.1, 1.e. l, and 5 .a.1. 1.

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.2.1 Fairfield County I

Operational :Coordination Capability Summary: ' '*

I rhe Fairfield County Emergency Management Director and staff successfully

• demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency res*ponse, coordination, and decision:..making in support of a radiological emergency at the Vi.C. Summer Nuclear I

26 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report ** 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station

,station.

I Fafrfield* County emergency operations center staff wete prep6sitioned in* accordance with the extent of play agreement, and were notified of the emergency thrdagh ah '*

I automated notification system. Prepopulated call groups and simple activation procedures allowed the, flexibility to alert key staff prior to the planrred' activation* of the emergency operations Center.* . . '

I ' '., I : ' * :. ~ : *. .J ' , 1 j '. .

The "Emergency Management Network?? was* the primary communication ~ystem from the plant and the conference bridge line was used as the coordination system. Abundant I access' to cori:irriercial-service wired *and wfreless telephoiies augrriented theipriniary System. *Both radios and satellite*telephorieswere available 1f.rieces'sary.. A wide array of technology, including high-resolutfon electronic displays; provided key information and I current*status visibility throughout the emergency operations center. *Traditional maps and white boards were used to display more routine information. *

• I Leadership an:d guidance was excellent. The Fairfield County emergency management director demonstrated sound direction and control of key staff within the emergency operations center through the use of frequent staff briefings. All staff shared the re*sults

• I of actions taken and then discussed anticipated future actions. The emergency management director did not receive n.oiification before 'the start of the first conference bridge line call, but joined the call once notified, and attended all subsequent calls.

I in

• The emergency management director participated th:e development of all prbt~dive action decisions arid other*rdevaritdecision-inaking processesregardihg actions taken by I Fairfield County staff. Precautionary discussions resulted in the evacuation of students from two emergency plannirig zone schools, establishment of traffic control points, 11

• resolution of a traffic impediment', movement of aCcess/functibrial needs populations, the activation of the reception center and shelter at White Oak Conference Centet and the I

discussion regarding 'the deployment of dosimetry and potassium iodide for emergency

' workers.** Though primarily demonstrated by interview, staff members were able to I

• effectively e:Xplain'actions taken during previous' out-of-sequence demonstrations and how those actions integrated into and supported the overall response.

• I For this capability, the followil'1g REP criteria were MET: 1.a.1, l:c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Fairfield County public information and warning capability was successfuily I demonstrated by a public information officer in the emergency operations center and a public information liaison officer in the joint information center. The two public information officers maintained constant contact and exchanged relevant information with the state and other risk counties to assist Fairfield County leadership in receiving and disseminating accurate and.timely information from the joint information center and to the general *public.

Together, they provjded Fairfield County input into the development of news releases and 27

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

/

2017 VC SummerNuclear,Station I

media briefings at the joint information.center, which conveyed accurate, timely, and useful emergency information.

.r** ; ., .*. , .:  ;.,. I .... ;- * * ** , ! . *, - . . ,. *1; .,_

• I

• -~:For this capability, the.following REP ci;iteria were MET: 5.a.l,;andr5.b;L, *

,* *. .: ~ ; .

• i Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

I The representatives of the Kelly Miller Elementary School administration successfully discussed the implementation of protective actions in the event of a and staff I

radiological emergency at the V.C Summer Nuclear Station. Th~school p,rincipal*was able to thoroughly describe the school's procedures for receiving emergency notification fromJhe.district. -Jmplementation _of procedures for early dismiss.al, shelteu~in-place and I

. evacuation of s_tudents and staff were well planned .and ;in accordance witb the school and

-district plan:s .. The school procedures for notifying. parents. of protective actions for their childr~ri: placed emphasis on tbe S'1.fety of<the *children above parent or media notification.

I Dedicated. transportation .assets. were desjgnated to the eyacuation of the K~lly, Miller Elementar.y School students and staff, Accountability of students was stressed prior to evacuation, as well as at the shelter. Shelter-in-place procequres implement_ed aspects of I

the districts active shooter protocol to ensure staff and student safety.

For this capability, the following RijP crit~rionwas ME:r:- -3.c.2.

,. j .*

I Environme1,1tal Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary: I Fairfield County Fire Services and Fairfield County Sheriffs Office personnel, along with Fairfield County 911 operators, demonstrated the ability to monitor and decontaminate evacuees and emergency workers and their vehicles-in the event of an I

incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. 911 qispatchers as$isted in monitoring and d~c.ontamination activities. I Emergency workers were issu.ed appropriate dosimetry and,]JriefGd on exposµre limits, contamination limits, and how often to read their dosimeters. There were appropriate amounts of survey equipment and dosimetry. Workers knew how .to use the equipment I

and were familiar with their administrative limi.ts, Although i:adios were issu~d, they were not usedto their full extent,;such as to.remind workers to read their dosimeters. I The reception center area had sufficient space for evacuee vehicles and emergency vehicles to park. Vehicles were screened for contamination and were then directed to different areas depending on their contamination levels. Fire services personnel at,the I

emergency worker vehicle decontamination and monitoring station were properly dressed in protective clothing and demonstrated good decontamination :and mon~toring techniques.

I I

28 I 11

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station

. Emergency workers were able to demonstrate the process for monitoring and I decontaminating evacuees and emergency workers. Signs and posters were placed at all workstations to remind workers how to use their equipment, as well as exposure and contamination; limits.

• Based oh the demonstration performance,- the *county could process I the expected population in the required 12-hour time frame.

' ' 1 .'; ~ * ';. ( ~ * ~I *;

For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 6.a.l, and I 6.b:t, .. ,. , r. *: . . '

• * -,, : ; ,*I, )

Mass Care Capabilfiy Summary:,\ ,,,i .*. i1,'

I ., . *. ,,;! *,;_. . **;* :' '/ .

The Fairfield County Congregate Care Center attendants at White Oak Conference Center,demonstrated the,capability to provide life-siistainihg services to the ,affeoted I , : population with a focus* on ,hydration; feeding; :sheltering and* for reunifying families.

Fairfield *G::ounty representatives 'for the :American Red Cross demonstrated that the county. shelter was equipped with sufficient resources. (equipment, supplies; .

I communications, and signage) to provide* services and accommodations consistent' with American Red:Crossplanning guidelines.'** c.

I The American Red Cross registered evacuees and managed the shelter. The Fairfield County Department of Social Services was responsible for registering evacuees;* '

however, representatives were unable to participate in the mass care demonstration.

I Representatives from the South Carolina-Department of Health and Environmental Control were available to provide guidance, distribution, and recording of potassium iodide distribµtion: *

• I ,? .*

The American Rea*cross* shelter manager carefully instructed the registration staff on procedures fot determining if evacuees attempting to enter the shelter* had been monitored for contamination and decontaminated as appropriate. They were told to only register and allow shelter access to evacuees that presented paperwork affixed with a green dot.

The' green dot indicated that the evacuee had been monitored and.was clean The American Red Cross shelter manager explained that only evacuees with the proper paperwork should arrive*to the shelter, and if an evacuee were to*show up without it, he

• • • or she was to be directed back to the personnel decontamination station. Service animals

• would be allowed into the shelter; and all other animals would be managed by the local animal shelter.

All personnel were professional and performed their duties in accordance with

• .*

• established plans and procedures *and the extent of play.

• I For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET:' l.e.l:, 3.b.l, and 6.c.l..

I I 29 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC SummerNuclearStation I

3.3.2.2 Lexington County . 'I Operational Coordination Capability Summary: I Lexington County emergency management personnel demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain* a* unified* and:coordinated operational structure and process that I

• appropriately.integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the e:x.ecutioniofcote

• ,capabilities.

....... .* l'.i*

• . : *, ,* * '. 'L ... __ : .,, ,

11 The Lexington County Emergency Operations Center was a modern facility that was co-

, located.with the county 9H centei-.:The c:ompU:ter system and large displays.allowed the emergency;personnel to:display multiple-documents*, maps, television channels; or split 11 1

. r ; screens to -display multiple views., Communications equipment included the utility.

Emergency Management Network *system, commercial la'ndlines, and the*voice over internet protocol telephones. These systems throughout the center worked throughout the I

exercise. The center had sufficient supplies and equipment to support extended .*

operations. Plans and guides were located on each table and were displayed using pictures.of the guide~dn a hanging rolodex system. * **

I

. The emergency. management director exhibited good direction and control throughout the exercise. He frequently reminded staff to reviewplans*and make preparations*irt advance I

,of changes in plant conditions.* The emergencfmanageinentdirector coordinated all

. protective actions with the state al).d other counties: Decisions concerning activation of the county receptiori center and .traffic -control points led to discussions concerning,actual I

implei;nentation times, coordination with the school district, and.processes for relocating school students and staff. When protective actions were recommended for emergency workers, the emergency management director ensured that 0perations staff were *aware of I

the decision and conducted discussions on the distribution and use of dosimetry and potassium*iodide. Although no evacuation or protective actions ,affected Lexington 11 County directly, the emer:gency manager and staff discussed-how the actions would be implemented in the county and ways to improve the process ..

School relocation was discussed as part of the.need to activate ~he reception center; and I

led to good discussions on how actual implementation could be coordinated and improved. Staff also discussed that.no functional needs, day care centers, or nursing centers would be moved based on the wind direction and protective actions I

recommended. The staff was prepared to initiate protective actions for all personnel in

• the emergency planning zone if necessary. I Lexington Police.Department and Lexington County Sheriff's*Office personnel were proactive in making decisions concerning activating personnel and placing equipment on standby if it was necessary to implement traffic control *r>oints. 'The police and sheriff's I

personnel were knowledgeable of how to handle any impediments to evacuation and also how to assist in establishing the reception center. I 30 I II

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: l .a.1, 1.c.1, .Ld. l, l .e. l, 2.a. l, I 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, and 3.d.2.

• . r.:. *~ ~.

Public Information and Warning 'Capability Summary:

I .*The Lex:ington County Emergen~y Management Director and public information oJficers demonstrated the ability t© deliver.coordinated and reliable emergency information to the I whole community accurately and without undue delay. Emergency information was appropriate, addressed emergency actions taken, and assistance available to public.

I The Lexington County Emergency ,M:anagerparticipated in the. decision.,inaking and

, coordination of activating the primary alerting system for'the citizens-of Lexington County., The manager-was presentduring the siren activation .process and approved the I initial press -release from Lexington County public information office. All ell.lergency

-alert.system messages contained;the essential elements .of information as qutlined.in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual.

I , ... ,, **'(. ,' \"

The Lexington County Sheriff's Office public::-inforrnation officer 'Yas deployed to; the joint information center, and the Lexington County Emergency Management I . Department's public :information officerstaffed the emergency operations center: The

'public informatiqn officers maintained good communicatioq. and coordination for developing press'f.eleases, ke_eping the,emergency manager informed and obtained his I * -approval when necessary. One Lexington County standalone ,press release was prepared,

,:reviewed, and sent to the joint information.center for.simulated release. All news

• • 1..releases; that were county-specific were.reviewed and approved by the Lexington County I Emergency Manager in. accordance with county plans and procedures prior to release from the joint information centera -News .releases applicable to the State-of South Carolina were reviewed and approved at the joint information center prior to I dissemination to the counties: Subs(?quent public information instructions were dear and consistent with the.protective action decisions, and effectively relayed the necessary actions the public would need to take: **

I For this capability, the following REP .criteria were MET: 5.a.1, and 5.b.1.

I ..Critical Transportation Capability Summary: * : .

I School officials an.d staff from District Five of Lexington and Richland County,.

successfully discussed implementation of protective actions for schoolchildren.and staff during an interview. School officials from Chapin High School, Chapin Intermediate I School, and Chapin Elementary School attended the interview.-* Principals from the schools explain,ed how notification of an emergency would be received by their scl;lool

• and* how emergency information would be disseminated to parents. School .officials I

I 3T I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear.,Station I

discussed early release; shelter:-in-place, and evacuation procedures thoroughly, and specified staff and age11cy responsibilities during the ,implementation .. Communication

,and transportation' assets ahd- capabilities: were 'outlined.* School officials, -also dispussed I

car'e for functional and access needs children during implementation.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2. I

.*Environmental Response/Health and Safety CapabilitySummary,; * ::,;, ..

'*. "[,*":. -: .

I Lexington County successfully,demcmstrated,the county's capability to monitor ::ind decontaminate evacuees and emergency workers in the event-of a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The monitoring and decontamination team leader I

gave a thorough radiological brief;;which included exposure limits, *contamination action levels, reporting, potassium iodide issuance and ingestion, and personal protective equipment. Fire service personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to place. survey I

equipment into operation, read and document exposure levels, and were knowledgeable dn their assigned roles and responsibilities. *Monitoringanq decontamination techniques were performed in accordance with plans and manufacturer specifications.* :

I Communication was effective throughoutthe facility:

,: '*:. l Monitoring and decontamination stations were set up with sufficient resources and I

• supplies to support operations. -Cones were utilized to dfrectvehidetraffic; however, signage to direct unescorted personnel was Iackin*g; The open pathways and unmarked

'* do6rs allowed evacuees to* poteritia:lly*deviate from the most-efficient path, and could I

potentially create the need to rertiediate a larger area. -. **

• For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: Le.I~ 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 6.a.l, and I

6.b:1.

Mass Cate Core Capability*Sumrnary I

Lexington County Department of Social Services, American Red Cross Central Chapter, and the Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel successfully I

demonstrated that the Lexington County registration area and congregate care center were equipped with resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines.

• I The Department of Social Services managed the registration area, along with American Red Cross representatives, in order fo register evacuees as they entered1the facility:

I Evacuees, though required to verbally confirm they had been properly processed through the monitoring and decontamination area, were not required to provide a physical means, which*indicated they had been monitored, and either found not to be contaminated or sent I

through the decontamination process. Lack of proper signage leading to the registration area caused confusion among multiple-evacuees, which could add to evacuee stress and improper registration. Upon registration, evacuees were* offered the opportunity to I

32 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station shelter at nearby White Knoll High School. Through interview, it was determined that I * . *sufficient transportation capabilities existed to support transpo,rt to the shelter. A representative o'n behalf 6f the Department of Health and Environmental Control was available to explain the distribution of potassium iodide and recording .of potassium I iodide distribution.

The Disaster Program Manager from the Central Chapter of the American Red Cross,

,I through intervjew, was able to successfully demonstrate the capability to sustain.long-1, term shelter operations. Appropriate staffing and supplies would be provided and adequate accommodations f.or the expected portion. of the emergency ,planning zone population would be available. *. * * ::*:.:.J' .. **:. .. '.i , ,

• For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: 1.e.l, 3.b.l and*6.c.1.

I ',j I

,Public* Health and Medical Services Capability Summary:

I ... Lexington County Emergency Medical Services personnel successfully demonstrated their ability to care for an injured, contaminated patient during an out-:of-sequence;medical, services drill conducted on October 25, 201.7. The demonstration begqn at Lexington County I Fire Station 30, and concluded at Lexington Medical Center.

Lexington C,ounty:Eme;gen~y.Medical Servi~es .paramedi~s utilized their pl~ns ~nd I pmcedures to ensure a thm:ough rad.iological *and safety brief was given and proper dosimetry and,instru~tions w~re utilized... The. briefings were conducted by the deputy chief of operations. Paramedics wereknowledgeaple regarding.the use of dosimetry; I reporting requirements; donning and doffing of personal protective equipment; issuance and ingestion of potassium iodide; and contamination control. Dosimetry was checked periodically and the team communicated well to ensure the proper care of the patient and I prevent the spread of contamination.

Lexington Medical Center staff demonstrat,ed their capability to provide lifesavi,ng measures for receipt of a contaminated patient due to a radiological event at the V.C.

I * "Summer Nuclear Station. The medical center staff demonstrated contamination control and* decontamination measures throughqut the evalu;itipn and emphasized medical care was a priority over decontamination.

I The medical center had sufficient equipment, supplies, aq.d space to handle a contaminated injured patient. They placed a great importance on medical care and I patient well-being, The emergency preparedness coordinat.or and.the radiation safety officer conducted a staff briefing covering safety, dosirp.etry, and patient care.

I The,radiatiop response team demonstrated very good decontamination .techniques

,throughout the drill .. 'l'he doctor used a large volume syringe with a spray guard to I effectively decontaminate a de_ep wound. The. nurses displayed effecti;ve contamination control methods when removing exterior sheets and patiept' s clothing and u.sing wet wipes toreI?ove loose contamination. Nuclear medicine technician,s performed I 33 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer NuclearBtation I

instrument operability checks successfully,and demonstrated good monitoring

. techniques.

1'.*. ,., .' :.,; .....  : ..*,';**..-, I For this capability,1 the'following.criterionwas l\1EF: 6.d.'1: *

• 3.3.2.3 Newberry County . 1:; *

• I

• Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

. { : , *

• 1', J .',.' i._: l - I; I: :,, j * \  ; f ' \

.. . .~;_,,,.. .

i : : [ \, ;. * ):, , -~l

.11.":'.:

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Newberry County emergency services ,staff, jn coordination ,with the staffof the State of South Carolina and the counties of Fairfield, Lexington, and Richland, adeptly demonstrated: the ability td establish arid maintain a unified and coordinated op*erational I

structure and process that approp.riately integrated criticaF.stakeliolders and enabled the execution of core capabilities.

• I I*.:

I Upon receipt of an emergency notification form from V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

notifying the county of ati Alerfemergency*classification level,- the ditectofutilized electro'nic mail and text messaging* to rapidly alert, notify, and mobilize the emergency I

operations center staff.'*,

• 1 :*

I

• .'C .. -~

Communications in the emergency operations ,c:enter were redundant. Commercial landlines, cellular phones, county radio, and the Emergency Management Net\\;ork were utilized during the* exercise to' plan: artd coordinate actions both internally and with* other responding state and county agencies.' Nu commlinication*system failures were observed.

I Office space, furnishings;- automation equipment, *and supplies were sufficient to support emergency operations for an extended period of time. Backup *generators capable,.of I

providing emergency electricity for the facility were in place and operational. Radiation monitoring instruments, dosimetry and potassium iodide were 'inspected during a site

• assistance visit on 15 March 2017.

• I The director displayed excellent leadership skills and maintained situational awareness through continuous communications with the state and neighboring risk :counties. He I

maintained his staff's awareness through numerous briefings. He also utilized the liaison from the utility to brief plant technical information at every staff briefing or whenever the liaison was made aware of a change to the plant status. He maintained communications I

1 with the county public information officer in the joint informationceiiter.

The director kept the staff planning anc:i coordinating for the next step. He ensured I

individuals at schools, *day cares, and medical facilities, as well'as access and functional needs populations, were moved from harm's way. He*particip*atea'in all conference calls

. with the state and othet risk counties relating to information *sharing and coordination of

• I I

34 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station.

protective action decisions and messaging .. The.director was involved in discussions with*

I the county radiation protection officer relating to dosimetry and radiation exposure limits to emergency workers. Potassium iodide was discussed and issued in the dosimetry kits to emergency workers with a warning not to consume until directed.i , , , .__

I Traffic control points were established at control points near the ccmnty line .to control traffic entry into the evacuated zones and assist residents froin other counties evacuating I out. A traffic impediment on a mc1jor,evacuc:ttiori route also used by schoolbuses was introduced by inject early in the exercise. The sheriff's office immediately provided officers to reroute traffic :around, the, impediment. . ,,

I *: . ,; ... *. ,,;.- p *

• I; ** l

~ *, * *. ; ; ( . ,** ~' *-

For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: La.1/1.o.J', .hd. l, I.e. I, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.J, 3.a;l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l,3.c.2,,3;d.l; and 3:d.2.

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

'i:'

I The Newberry County Emerge])cy Opyrations C~nt~r:_st::iff demonstrated the c~pability to

• deliver coordinated, prompt; reliable, and action.able information to the whole. community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically_, : -_

I appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate,- the ,ac:tions- being talc.~ll anc;l the.,assistance being n;iade available,-,

I

• Newberry County Emergency Operatipns Center leadersm,p participated in the. _

- ,coordination ;;ind concurrenc~ of siren ,activations and emergency alert system messages to alert and notify the public in a timely manner. The circumstances that initiated backup I - ,route alerting, routes, and the proc~ss of,hqw Newberry C.ounty would clear designated

,,areas and inform the public was c;lemonstrated by interview. Press releases and responses

.to public inquii:ies provided accurate emergency information and instructic~ms to the I . public and news media. Informatiorixelea,s_ed to the public and media was coordinated, reviewed, appropriately routed, and approved in accordance with procedures and without undue delay.

I For this capability, th~ follo\Ving REP criteria w,ere ME1;':, 5.a.1, 5.a.3 and_ 5.b.l.

I --. Critical .Transporta,tion Cap~bility Summary:

Administrators, staff personnel, tp.e transportation director, and-safety officers from the I Newberry County school district successfully described, through interview, the ability to implement protectiye, actions Jar school children and staff. School officials artiGu~ated ii th~ district pi;ocess fm: implementing early rvlease, shelter-in-place, and evacuation

,procedurys foi; bo,th Mid .C.arolina Middle School and Mid Carolina High School. .,The county transportation director explained the allocation of bus assets for each school, to I include lift capable assets for functional needs children. Redundant means of I 35 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

• 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I

communications was available between the district, schools, buses and the county emergency operations center. School officials also explained the *implementation of a rapid notification smart phone application within the county that allows for expedited I notification of emergency ;events. to emergency personnel.; . .... *  :.*: ,.,:< " ,

. \. , (, *:  :. / '. i.

• Forthis:c'apability;:the following:REP criterion was; MET: *3.c.2.

• I Environmental Respon*se/Health and Safety Capability Summary: . r,_, {'*; *;:,

I Newberry County emerg~ncy response agendes 'aemonstrated the: capability c*onduct to*

personnel and vehicle decontamination and monitoring operations in response to a radiological event at.the V:C. Summer Nuclear,Station. The agencies involved in the I

demonstration were: Newberry County Emergency Services and Public Safety

• Department; Newberry County Sheriff's* Offi<;.:e; Newberry.City Police Department; and

' *Newberry Cm;mty Hazardous MaterialResponse. ,, ' I*,*::.,:,

I Emergency workers were briefed on contaµiinatidn limits, exposure limits; and reading of dosimetry. Appropriate equipment and plans were available to support operations and I

emergency workers sufficiently demonstrated the abilit,y,to place su:rvey:meters info operation.* *:,:.

) /. i : .

• • , I

, *County emergency workers were issued appropriate dosimetry and were briefed on exposure limits, contamination actiondevels, and how* often to read their. dosimeters.

Appropriate amounts of survey* equipment and dosimetry were available during the I

demonstration. Workers were *knowledgeable of how to use th'e equipment and:knew their exposure limits and contamination *action levels.

• Radioswei:e available and used at each station to communicate reading'ofdosimeters and*recording ofreadings.

I Newberry High School and the Newberry County Career Center had sufficient space for parking evacuee and emergency vehicles utilizing adjacent football and baseball fields.

I Sufficient signage was available to direct evacuees. Vehicles were monitored*for contamination and directed to the appropriate location if contaminated. I Emergency personnel each wore sufficient protective equipment and dosimetry for monitoring and decontaminating vehicles and personnel. Emergency personnel were knowledgeable of administrative limits and who to contact to incur additional exposure if I

required.

Emergency workers successfully demonstrated the process of monitoring evacuee I

vehicles, as well as monitoring and decontaminating evacuees, emergency workers, and emergency worker vehicles. Emergency workers successfully demonstrated :the ability monitor and decontaminate 20% of the. population in a 12-hour time frame:

I

• For this capability; the following REP criteria were MET: , 1.e:V,,.3.a.1, 3.b. l, 6.a.l, and I 6.b.L 36 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I *Mass Care C~pability Su~mary:

Jf:*>,1* ****.:~!:".~ ,; * ,*i, V  ;;1* ,;:.

1

• r ,*~* ***~

• The Newberry County Congregate*Care Center ,representatives, at Newberry.High ,

I School successfully demonstrated the capability to provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration.,tfeeding and sheltering for reunifying families. Newberry County representatives for the American Red Cross and the I Department of S.ocial Ser.vices demonstrated thatJhe county shelter was. equipped with sufficient resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American

.Red Cross planning guidelines. Therewere;sufficient equ.ipment, supplies, I communications, and: signage .to support)an emergency. shelter:operation. *Shelte.r *,

security would be provided by local law.enforeement personnel. * * '. ,.. *.

I The Bepartmerit of Social Ser.vices registered:evacuees only after ensuring they had.been decontaminated. The American Red Cross.managed the shelter. RepresentativesJrom the Department of Health and Environmental Control were available to provide I * : guidance, distribution, and recording of potassium iodide* distribution.

'I i

The American Red Cross shelter manager car.efully instructed the registration staff on I procedures for determining if evacuees attempting to enter the shelter had been '.

monitored for contamination and decontaminated as appropriate. They were told to only register* and*allow shelter access. to ~vacuees that pre..sented a shelter,pass*given to I .them at the personnel monitor:ing station: This pass indicated that the evacuee had been monitored and was. clean. The. sh~lter manager explained that only evacuees wit~ a

• shelter pass shc;iuld arrive toJhe shelter, and if *an evacuee were, to show up without it, I .they were to be .directed back to the personnel decontamination station. Service animals would be:allowed into. the shelter and ~l other animals would be.managed by the local animal shelter.

I ) i I All personnel were, professional and performed their duties in accordance with

• established plans and procedures and the extent-of-:play.

I ' (  ;

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: .l.e.l, 3:b,J and 6;c.l.

I 3.3.2.4 Richland County I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I Richland County emergency management staff successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a *unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the. execution. o:f-core I capabilities in response to a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

Senior county leaders participated througliour:the exercise, 'providing key guidance and timely decisions. A variety of automated electronic notification methods were available I 37 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

• 2017 VC Summer.Nuclear Station I

to alert the emergency operations center staff, who were incrementally notified based on the situation using a combination of cell phone texting and electronic*mail messages, with manual calling as a backup.

• " ' , ,, *, ,' i*:* : '. ', *.:. ~ ~ 1.":

tJ ' '\ :*

I F *.

I Emergency communications among Richland County, and emergency planning zone stakeholders was achieved using a dedicated* line for.initial and significant status changes, I and a*conference bridge line circliit'for coordination;' 'Internal county communication capabilities were robust and effective. *The county'emergency operations centet'was well equipped.to support emergency operations in respo*nseto a;radiofogi:cal eveht anhe V.C.

I SummerNuclearStation. .\;, .,*,.:: .. ,._, ,~-, * 'i :- ,

-Richland 1County Emergency Services leadership worked together efficiently.to ensure I

that proper emergency response actions were taken.for public safety and to.facilitate coordination and situational awareness.* Leadership held several briefings to, Update the operations center staff and the county officials. County officials maintained a continuous I

presence in the operations center-throughout the exercise. Officials who*participated included the Chairman of the County Council, the assistant county administrator, the county attorney, arrd the tax assessor: *. ,***

• I Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropriate dosimetry, potassium-iodide, and procedures for controlling tadi(')logical exposure of emergency.workers: Law' I

enforcement representatives provided details on traffic control *points and determining the impact of impediments 'on' roads and the effects ori county ~raffic flow. All staff members were knowledgeable-and effectively used prepared checklists:from agency plans to I

ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.. . ..

For this capability, the following REP criteria were'MET: l.a.l, 1'.c.1, l.d.l, l.e.1-, Zia.l, I

2.c.1; 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, '3.c.2, 3.d:l, 3.d.2.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I Richland County emergency management officials delivered coordinated, prompt, and accurate information to the media and the general public. The primary notification I

system of outdoor sirens and emergency alert system messages were effectively .

coordinated from the state emergency operations center, with county concurrence. In the event of a siren failure, vehicle backup route alerting would have been used, in addition I

to an automated-call notification system. This timely alert and dissemination of emergency-information to the public and media would have, enabled the implementation of protective actions.

I The establishment of two public inquiry telephone lines, staffed by personnel from the county Ombudsman's Office, provided professionally trained personnel who deal with I

the public on a daily basis as a routine part of their jobs. Their presence led to accurate information to the public, in addition to the press releases from the public information I officers in both the emergency operations center and the joint information center.

38 I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I *For this capability*the following REP criteria were MET: .5.a.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1 Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

I . . ~  : ' * ! . ; ~.

• • School officials ~nd staff from District Five of Lexington and Richland .County:

. successfully discussed implementation of protective actions for school children and staff.

I School .officials {romSpring Hill Bigh School attended the interview. The Principal from Spring, Hill High S.choot .explaine1 how notificaHon .of.an emergency, would be. re.ceived by their school and how emergency information would be disseminated to parents.

I School officials discussed early release, shelter-in-place, and evacuation procedures thoroughly, and*speci:tied staff and. agency responsibilities during the implementation .

.Communication and transportation assets and capabilities wer~ outlined., ..School officials I I ' ' ~ '

also,discussed care.for functional and ac:cess needs children during.implementation.

i ,*

For:this,capability, the following REP criterion was MET: 3.c.2 ..

I Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary: .,'

I Richland County Emergency Service Division staff and leadership successfully demonstrated the capability to conduct personnel and vehicle decontamination and

. monitoring operations in.response to a radiological ev:ent at theV.C::. Summer Nuclear I Station.* The agenoies :in.volved in the demonstration included: Richland County Emergency Services Division; Columbia Fire, Department; Richland County Sheriff's Department; and the Department of Health and Environmental Control.

I Emergency workers were briefed on.contamination. action limits, exposure limits, reading of dosimetry, and potassium iodide instructions. Appropriate equipment and plans were I available to support operations, and emergency workers demonstrated the ability place survey meters into operation.

I * ., *Co,unty, emergency workers were issued appropriate dosimetry and less knowledgeable emergency.workers received guidance from team leaders:and more experienced staff.

Radios were available ~nd used at each staticm to communicate reading of dosimeters and I , recording of readings.

I Muller Middle School had sufficient space for parking evacuee and emergency vehicles

• utilizing adjacent athletic fields for contaminated *and clean vehicle parking. Sufficient signage was available to direct evacuees and stations were clearly marked. .,

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I

Emergency workers demonstra,ted _their ability ,to monitor and decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and their vehicles. Emergency workers at each station conducted monitori!-}g.?ln~ decontaµrinatio~jq, .acyor4al:1Gy 'Yith cou9ty pl.ans .an.<;l pr9.c~d11rys.,"'. '; 1 , I

.Ye.hicks.*wrre_,monitqrectJor c;:onti;uni:nation, pia*ed apprpprjately;: and.dirycted to th.e

.~pprop,riate. lqcation. ' ; -

.. :*: ** . t . '; .., ! '. ; ; '. ! )

~

I For this capability, the following REP crit~ria were l\fET:. i*.e.1 1 3.aJ,,3.b), (\a.l,:and 6.b.l.

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I Mass Care Capability Summ~y:,, :,; , , ... . ; ~ -~ :  ; . . ':: '

, ~

• _ . , * *: ,. ..

• i ,-, : , * ,.__. * *. ! 1( , -**.* ... ~ : *, *; , ,

The R,ichlancJ- Coµnty :pepartment of ~ocial Syrvi~e.s,personnel a11d the Central So,uth.

1* , - * , r_.  :, * . * *,, . r -

I Carolina Chapter.of the Arp.erican.~~d,Cr6s$ pe,r.so.nn,eJ,with <J.~ditic;mal suppoi;t frqm tpe _*

Department of Environmental Control, successfully demonstrated the capability to

.. , pr;ovide services. and coordinate acyomrµodatioµs.Jor 1t;va'.cue~s arriving at the Muller..

I Middle School reception center. Richland County does not provide mass-care _fi:i.c;:ilities for evacuees, but has made arrangements through letters of agreement and contracts with local motel~/hotels,. businesses, and, th.e Sa,lvation .~n;iy. Prncedures were effectively in .

I

. , 1 pl.aqe to en-'?ure :thatevacuees,were IllO.Q.i~ored'<tnd/or decontaminat~d by_ e,n1erge.ncy_ ,

wm;k.ers prior to ent.ering .the registration area.. I The Richland County Department of Social Services director was responsible for the notification and mobilization of all Department of Social Services staff, American Red Cross congregate care center staff, and registration of evacuees. The Department of I

Health and Environmental Control staff would receive notification from the county emergency operations center and provide potassium iodide to evacuees if required. The American Red Cross addressed evacuee needs for food, medical and mental health needs, I

and provisions for service animals. The county also had the capability to decontaminate and shelter pets. In addition, the county utilized student veterinarians from an ongoing training program at the University of South Carolina to accomplish animal I

decontamination.

All personnel were professional, knowledgeable, and performed their duties in I

accordance with local plans, procedures, and the extent of play.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were MET: 1.e. l, 3.b. l and 6.c.1.

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.I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Section 4: Conclusion I .:),-

Emergency response adi viti~s arid -impleniehfatiori' of protective actions' by emergency responders \n' respohs'e to a radi6lbgfcal erhefgei:J.cy. at 'the' V .C: Suririher'Nuc1ear 'St~tiori 'Was I successful. Officials and representatives from the State of South Carolina; the/ risk c*ounties of Fairfield, Lexington, Richland, and Newberry; South Carolina Electric & Gas; and numerous I I volunteer organizations participated in the exercise. '. ) ' . .

State and local emergency response organizations effectively demonstrated the core capabilities identified for the exercise, as well as their knowledge of.their eniergericy response plans and I procedures. State, county, private, and volunteer personnel implemented their plans, maintained coordination; and made decisions to*protect the' public without delay.*'. The statb Jnd:county leadership provided effective di~ectiori ahd control thtohghout the exercise:\ ;.: ' * . . .

I The Federal Enietgency Management 'Agehcy:did not identify *ahy Level 1 or'Level 2 Findings

• r,: ..

duringthisexercise. ,* . ' .* '"* *, '.  ;* ,* : 1 : '  ; ,* ,. 1* '  ;

I The cooperation and teaniworkof the participants'was evident throughout all'phases*of'the exercise. The FederaI,Emergency Management Agency wishes to acRnowledge* the efforts of the I many individuals who dedicated their time and effort, 'and niade this exercise a success\

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program* I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclea_r Station I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Emergen':Y Classification Level or Event

,L* ;J.

SEOC/

Time Notification Was Received Or Action Taken Fairfield Lexington Newberry Richland

• 2017,V.C. Summer REP Exercise JIC Dose County County County County Unusual Event NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Alert 0820 0833 0859 0832 0842 0842 0842 Site Area Emergency 1019 1036 1024 1026 1026 1022 1027, General Emergency 1212 1222 1222 1219 1222 1220 1219 <

Simulated Rad. Release Began 1248 1325 . 1325 1320 1311 1335 1311 Simulated Rad. Release Ended Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing. Ongoing Ongoing Facilitv Declared Operational 0904 0905 1032 - 0846 1033 Declaration of State of Emergency .,

State: 1310 1315 1346 - 1345 1346 Local: 1328 - 1040 1109 Exercise Terminated 1443 1443 1443 1441 1440 1440 Early Precautionary Actions:

NIA, NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 1'1 Protective Action Decision: Ban hunting and fishing, place livestock on stored feed and ,P.;.

water, school evacuation, waterway clearance, stay tuned 1057 1118 1057 1057 1057 1057 1" Siren Activation II 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115 1115 l '1 EAS Message : 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 2nd Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate Zones: AO, Al, Bl, Cl 1243 1315 1243 1243 1243 1243 Shelter Zones: A2, B2 2nd Siren Activation 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 2nd EAS Message 1303 1303 1303 1303 1303 1303 3,d Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate Zones: add A2, B2 1415 1437 1415 1415 1415 1415 Shelter Zones: NIA 3,d Siren Activation II 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 3,d EAS Messa2e 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433 1433

\

KI Decision:

Emergency Workers: issue, ingest 1046 General Public: 1415 1437 - 1415 1413 1412 43

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer,Nuclear Station I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report. 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair: Randall L. Hecht I L<>'ca~on Section Chief: Lawrence Robertson

~. ~ :,

Evaluation Team Site Specialist: Quintin Ivy CQre ~apabil~tY.

./'

I EOF Matt Bradley

.State,of South CaroliI~~: Director-;:"~im St~nson.

Operational Coordination I SEOC Ron Shaw Elizabeth Adkins Roy Smith Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning I JIC Robert Spence JT Ackermann Public Information and Warning Environmental Response/Health and Safety Dose Assessment BradMcRee I Mobile Lab (Courtesy Evaluation~.

Reggie Rogers Situational Assessment Environmental Response/Health and Safety MOC Keith Earnshaw Environmental Response/Health and Safety I Field Teams Debra Blunt Mike Henry Environmental Response/Health and Safety TCPs Elizabeth' A'.dla.ns On-Scene Security and Protection I (SCHP Discussion)

LP-1 (WCOS) Robert Nash Fairfield. Cminty: Dhector -Pliyllis .Watldns Public Information and Warning I BOC John Simpson Alex Sera Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Le~ingt~n forinty: 'Director :__ Bo Davenport. ',

I Joseph Harworth Operational Coordination BOC Andrew Seward Public Information and Warning Newberry* County: Director - Tommy Long " ., ,. .

I Walt Cushman Operational Coordination BOC Glenda Bryson Public Information and Warning . ,,

, Ri~liland County: \Manager ..,. Michael J. Kalec -,.-. "*

I Quintin Ivy Operational Coordination BOC

• Mike Dolder Public Information and Warning I

I I

I 45 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nudear Station I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After.Action Report , 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Appendix C: Extent-of-Play Agreement I PLUME PHASE PARTIAL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE I All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures, as they would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive.these plans, guides and procedures I NLT 60 days before the exercise). This Extent of Play Agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play I may b.e re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Controller and FEMA I Evaluator.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination - State and County Emergency Operations I Centers (EOCs) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders l

and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Critical Task: Alert, Notify,, Mobilize** , *: .i 1:

I OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.La, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, I 2; H.3, 4; Criterion l.a.l).

All participating state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned in the area I and will only respond after notification in accordance with plans and procedures as the scenario dictates.

I Critical Task: Direction and Control Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; I A.2.a, b; A.2; C.4, 6; Criterion l.c.l).

State direction and control will occur at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

I Local ~irection and control will occur at each county's Emergency Operations C2nter (BOC).

I Critical Task: Communications Equipment At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

I Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.l, 2; Criterion l.d.l). .

I 47 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station State and county decision makers will use a conference bridge line to conduct protective I

action discussions/decision making: The .conference bridge will be the primary means of *

• communication and.Em~rgencyManagement:t'Jetwor:k (EMNET),will*be. the:backup.:,

• I

. <EMNET wilL be lised.to.cqbrdinate,:sirelf activation in accordance with plans and ,r c **:,/_procedures.: -.

I Critical Task: Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NVREG.:.0654/FEMA;-REP,- 1:,. H.J,. 10;, I. 7, 8; 9; I J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l).

Quantities of KI,were,verified during Staff Assistance.Visits (SAV). : : ,, , ,,

I

'J .1*

Quantities of equiprilent,,their calibratiori/testing were *ve.rified during SAVs ..

I

,SAV locations, dates, and times were as follows:

Fairfield County: County EOC: Date/Time: 08 March 17 - 1000 I

Lexington. County: Courity BOC:., Date/Time: .,15 March,17, _: 1000 . , ,

Newberry County: .County EOC: Dateffinie: ;. 15 March:17 ~, 1400

. Richland County: Gills Creek Fire :station:, Date/Time: 08 .March 17 .,_ BOO: ,

I Critical Task: Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, I

to ensure that an exposure control system, including the _use of KI, is in place* for Emergency Workers (EWs) including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10.e,:f;-K.4 Criterion 2-.a.l) ..

I Critical Task: Protective Action Decisions for the General Public ,

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary I

coordination is used to make PADs:for.the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6;,D.4;J.9; J.10.f, m Criterion 2.b.2).

I Critical Task: Protection Action Decisions for ;Access/Functional Needs

• Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and , ..

I access/functional needs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4;-*J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion-2.c:l). * . "

Phone calls* to the *district/schools will be* simulated but the process will be discussed at I

the EOC during the exercise.

Fairfield; Lexington *and Richland Counties *will not'have a schoohepresentative in the I

EOC during the exercise. The County EMs will discuss the process of commun:icating with the district/schools during the exercise. Newberry County will have a school representative in the EOC during the exercise.

I 48 I I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Critical Task:.,* Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control OROsissue~appropriate d0simetry, KI; and procedu,res,. and_ marrnge radiological exposure to EW s in ac'cordance with the plans/procedures.,

• EW s periodieall y and aUhe end of each mission I read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record*or charL*; OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP.; 1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1).. * ** ,

I !i *';,,:;,*,._

PRDs iand KI will be .*simulated by-separate props identified* as such I ; ' ' : , ' ; '. : - ! :

I Critical Task: Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized and General Public KI and appropriate instructfons*aie available if a decision to recommend use'ofK:I:is:made.

Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the I general public is maintained (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.i.O.e, f~ Criterion 3.b.l).,;,,

• KI distribution and record keeping for institutionalized individuals will be discussed at I county EOCs during the exercise.

Critical Task: Implementation of:PADs for Access/Functional Needs I P ADs are implemented for persons with disabilities arid access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject-to protective actions (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, J.10.c; d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.l).

I  ;:!' .

.The processes for contacting persons with disabilities* arrd access/functional needs will be

• cliscussed during the exercise (if-applicable);

I .:) ,.

Critical Task: Implementation of PADs for Schools OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.2).

Implementation of protective actiorndor Bchools will be conducted by discussion in each I county BOC during the exercise (if applicable). 1 .

I Critical Task: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Appropriate traffic and.access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and. access control personnel (NUREG-I 0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.l, 4; J.10.g,j; Criterion 3.d:l). ,--

Implementation of traffic and access control will be discussed during the exercise.

I Critical Task: Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control Impediments to'evacuation are identified and*resolved (NUREG~0654/FEMA-REP-1, LlO.k; I Criterion 3.d.2).

I 49 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station Impediments to evacuation,will be discussed at the TCP interviews during the exercise with State and local law enforcement agencies *at each State and,county EOG during

• exercise play, as the-scenario dietates. * ,.

I i ' ... :;:* .. .-'

• i ., . '* * ,.. *L, :*'. : c:* : : *L" * *

".:*:l *.*.*.,;

I Core Capability:* Public Information and Warnfog-State!Couiity'EOCs and Joint.

Jnformation-Ceider (JIC), LP~ !Radio*St{j.tion . . I Definition: Deliver c6ordinated,,prompt;reliable, and actionable information,tothe whole community through the *use of clear, :consistent, accessible; and 'culturally .an:dlinguist.ioally appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any thre:at*or,hazard.an.d,,as I appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Critical Task:* Alert; *Notify,, Mobilize, * ,

I OROs use effective, procedures to,alert, notify,,and mobilize emergency:personnel*and:activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.l.a, e; A.3, '4; C.1, 4; 6; DA; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion l.a.1).

I

~** .... ;

Public Information staff will be pre-positioned in the area of SCE&G JIC (11 J Ballentine Crossing Ln, Irmo, SC) and will only respond after notification in accordance with plans I

and procedures, as the*scenario dictates. Public -inquiry.for the State will be demoristrated

• at the State EOC.: County public inquirienvill: be demonstrated 'at the respective county EOCs. ,Public inquiry personnel will'provide' the FEMA evaluator- with a oalllog; ..

• I I

Critical Task: Communications Equipment , , : _. **: ,

At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations:

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-i 0654/FEMA-REP-l, F.l, 2; Criterion l.d.1).

I Communications with real-world media will be simulated. I'I Critical Task: Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; Ii J.10:a, b, e; J;ll, 12;'K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l).

Critical Task: Initial Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification System I

Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency .. The initial instructional message to the pu~lic-mqst include,as a .

I minimum the elements required by current FEMAREP Guidance (Timely: The responsible* .

ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instrqctions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-I 0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7; Criterion 5.a.l).

I SQ I I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station

. The State will coordinate P ADs with Fairfield, Newberry; Lexington, and Richland I Counties' ehiefelected officials or de.signee;' as scenario dictates .. The first siren activation will be demonstrated by "poll all". All ,subsequentsiren act~vations will be simulated. A "test message" EAS message will be transmitted to the Local Primary (LP-I 1) EAS station*(WCOS,*Columbia, S,C);_Btc:Ya~c.as~ gfanJ3,AS te~t'_IIiess~ge. ~ill be.*.** *,

simulated and the process will be discussed. Only one EAS message win be *sent, and.

• others will be,simulated via the JIS email distributi.on list.developed by SCEMD PIOs, .

• I Copies; of.the* simulated EAS messages and news releases will be provided to the FEMA .

evaluator atthe.SEOG. *:" . : ;

' ! (, .'

I Critical Task: Backup Alert and Notification Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within' a reasonable* time following the detection by the ORO of a faHure of the primary aler;t and notification system (NUREG-,

I 0654/FEMA-REP:-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c;*Ctiteri'oh5.a.3). . :

• Backup route alerting procedures will be completed via interview at each county EOC I . during the exercise ..

Critical Task: Emergency Info-and Instructions for Public and the Media I Ensure OROs provide. accurate emergehcy'informatiop and instructions to the public and the news media.in a timely rnanner-(The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and I without undue delay) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5,; 7; (J.3.a; G.4.a, c;*Criterion 5.b.l).

Communications. with,and distribution ,of messages to real-world media will be I simulated.

Core Capability: Situational Assessment-ESF-10/Dose Assessment and Emergency I Operations Facility (EOF)

Definition: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, andthe status of the response.

I Critical Task: Protective Action Recommendations I Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 I and Supplement 3; Criterion 2.b.1) :

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety-ESF-10/Dose Assessment,

• I I Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD ), Reception Center Congregate' Care (RCCC) .

Definition: Ensure the iiyailability of guidance-and resources to address all hazards including.*

hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder

• I operations and the affected communities.

I 51

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Prqgram I After Action Report Facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP:-1, A.La, e;.A.3, 4; C.l, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2017 VC Summer Nuclear.Station I

2; H.3, 1; Criterion La.l).

I  ; .  :.:*,,:*,

\,*,*: ,,'f '.'* ;,,. ,);:,::.::

Field Teams (2) will l;>epre-:ppsit_ioned in: th~ '<11'ea: agd wihl only: respond after notificcttion i .'*:1 ****. ~,'

.'(t) /**-~,;

1

)"'i:_., : 1 ; . : , * , *,_;"  ;:

I its briefing at 0830 at 8500 Farrow Road, Bldg #15, Columbia, SC c~}ti~a~ tas~: c'~~u~ic,ations pqµipme~t :* .

I At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates_ propei:ly,,an,d 1; **

• communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. I Co:m,muni_cations _capabilitie.s are ,manag<:?~ .~1,1 sqppprt pf ~rnergency. opeJatiOilS ,* (NU:l;IB.Q- *. -

0654/FEMA-REP-1, r.l,2;-~)~terion).£lrl).:, . -.. ':

, , , ; *, ~; *

• r * .' *

• 1 i -~ : * - ' 1 L. .. ' . r ** 1 *

,,.. .. . ,*( .. ,.

I ,

I Critical Tf:1:ik: I;<:quipment & Suppli.es tp ,S,upport Qp~ratiqps,. . : .: ...

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring*instruIT:1ents;; dosimetry, KI,.and other supplies are.*

sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; 1.7, 8, 9; I J.10.a, b, e; J.11, l'.4,; K.3.a; ,K.5.b;, Criterio11: .1.e.1) .. : ,, ,

I

\; ** ,, * * ** " ' ' r

.j .

Critical Task: EW Exposure Control ORqs, use a _decision-making process, considyr!i;ig relevant factors an~l appropria\e coordination, to ensure,, that an exposure control system, tpclticling t~e use of l(l, is in place for EWs i.ncluding provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or Protective Action I

Guides (PAGs) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.4 Criterion 2.a.l).

Critic.al Task: hnplemeq.tation of Em.ergency Worker,Expos,urY. Ccmtrol

- :  :,: ;  ; I ORQs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedUFes,, and manage r~diolagical exposure to,.* -

EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and &t the eq.d.of ea~h mission

• read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs I

maintain appropric!-te, r~cord ,keepiµg of the aciministration of KI to EW s (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, {10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.l). _. . . 11 . I Emergency Worker exposure control will be demonstrated at the ~ounty Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD) and Reception Center/Congregate Care (RCCC) sites (see schedules on pages 8 & 9).

I PRDs and KI will be simulated by separate props identified as such. , _.

I Newberry C~unty will discuss the process of sending EW exposure records to ESF-10 Exposure Control during their EWD out-of-sequence.activity. ESF-10.Exposure .Control will discuss their ability to track and follow through 0~ these' exposure_ 'records during the I

out-of-sequence activity. (Courtesy Evaluation) _ **

• I I

52 I I

II Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

• Critical Task: Kl Distribution to Institutions 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station ii KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made.

Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individual_s i~

maintaihed. (NUREGr0,6,54/FE~A:.REP-l; J}_Q'*_e,., f ;: 'C~itefibri ~ t:1:) >,* *

I Critical Task: Field teams (2) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP~1, C.l; H.12; i.7, 8,

'I 11; J.10.a; Ctiterion4.a'.2).

-*i!*: 'i *.; : *.,!._.. - ",'." *;:  ;

Critical -tii:sfl: Ambient radiation measurements- are made and tecorded *at appropriate locations,.

I and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.* 'Teams \vilfrriove to *an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified)n the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. \

I (NUREG.:0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.l;*R12~' . - *.

I.8,-

9;'. J.10*:a;

_J .. * '

Criterion 4.a.3):

• t*' -'

Critical Task: The laboratory is capable of perforirung requir~d radiological analyses to support I protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.l, 3; J.11; Criterion 4.c.l).

,ffhe air, liquid and environmental sampling demonstration*will be co'tirtesy e\raluatiod a I

• during the exercise: This-*deinonstratioil will take place ~t 8500 Farrow Road, Blcig #15, *

• ' Columbia, SC.  ! * . .

' *I :, ' I' . *. . 5 . ' . .; 1 ' ~

I Critical Task: Monitor Decontamination/Registration of Evacuees .

The reception center facility has appropriate space', adequate :resburces, and trained personnel to provide- monitoring, decontamination,* and registration of evacuees* (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- *:'

I 1, k3; C.4; J.10.h; J'.12; Criterion 6.a:l). * * *  !

• The* Reteption Center processes will be demonstrated in accordance whh plans and I procedures during out-of-sequence activities at the RC/CC sites. Amiriimum of six evacuees and two vehicles will be processed through the facility with at least one I contaminated*male and one contaminated female. Decontamination of personnel will be verbalized. RC/CC site OOS demonstrations are as follows:

• I

• Fairfield County: White Oak Conference Center (633 Mobley H\\'.Y, Winnsboro, SC) Date/Time: 14 Sep 17 -* 1830

• Lexington County: Crossroads ~iddle School (6949 St Andrews Road, Columbia,

. SC) Date/Time: 17 Aug 17 ~ 0900 I

• Newberry County: Newberry High School (3113 Main St, Newberry, SC)*

Date/Time: 27 Oct 17 - 1000 .'

I

• Richland County: Muller Road Middle S~hool (1031 Muller Road; Blythewood, SC) Date/Time: 02 Nov 17 - 1600 I

I 53 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I'

Critical Task: Monitor/Decontamination of Emergency W orke':rs, Equipment and Vehicles The, facility/ORO has ~dequate procedures and:resources td accomplish monitoring and decontamination of en:iergency ,workers* a~d'thekequiph1ent and vehicles*(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP'-l,  ! **

• K.5.a;b; ,* ,

• c*

• ntenorr***-** '6.. .b.-1}:

I

. ; Eiri~rgericy Worker ;Decbntamfnation; (EWD} wiil'be evalua:te&dur1ng. out of sequence

'. i' I

activities. A minimum of two'emei:gency workers and their vehicle and equipment must be processed through the facility. Decontamination of vehicles will be demonstrated.

Decontamination of personnel. will be -V~rbalized.: .. OOS,deihonsttadoiis' are -~s'. foliews:

~ ..

I f ** '.* * ,* \ ***!.-. "(' ,.:,.,*,.* i *. '* .

Fairfi,eld Cqunty:***WhiteOak'Conferehce Ceriter(633 Mobley Hwy; Winnsboro,

• sc) 6ar.e1Time:* 14 s*ep 11 -:- 1s30 *, *.- * * . .,

I

"*. Lex'i~gton County: . Ci:ossroads'Middle School (6949 St Andrews Ro~d, *:.

• Columbia, SC) Date/Time: 17 Aug 17 - 0900

• Newberry County: Newberry High School (31 q Main St, Newber_ry,. S~)

. -.: r *

• I Date/Time: 27 Oct 17 - 1000

• Rich~and County: Mullei: Roa_d M~~dle School(1031 Muller Road; Blytliewood,'

SC) Date/Time: 02 Nov.17 - 1600

• * *' * ,I i'

II

' .J . .' ~ * '~' ' '

Core Capability: Critical Transportation - Protection Aciions}or'.Schools Definition: Provide transportation (includin,g infrastr~cture acces~ and accessible transp9rtation

• * *J ; .; I services) for responsy priority objectives, 'including the evacuation of people arid animals; and '

the *ct~livery ofvital.resppnse . .

perso~~e(equipment, and services 1~to th~ affected 11 areas.:: ...,. ' . I Critical Task: Implementation of PA.Ds for Schools ;

OROs/School officials implement precautionary and/or protective actions for schools, (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1,0.c, d, ~' g;*: 'criteriori 3.c.2) : ' . . , .. . *1' I

Implementation of PADs f~r Schools will be coridu~ted by interview' as follows:

• Fairfield County- Kelly Miller Elementary School (255 Kelly Miller Rodd,:

I Winnsboro, SC) Date/Time: 16 August 17 - 1000

• Lexington County-_Chapin High School (Conducted at Center for Advanced Tech Studies, 916 Mt. Vernon Church Road, Chapin, SC) Date(fime: 15 August I

17 -1300 .

Alternative Learning Center (Conducted at Center for Advanced Tech Studies, ..

I 916 Mt. Vernon Church,Road, Chapin, SC) Date/Time: 15 August 17 -1300

• New~erry County - Mid Carolina High School (Newberry County EOC, 520 Wilson Road, Newberry, SC) DateiTime: 15 August 1i- 1000 . . I Mid Carolina Middle School (Newberry County EOC, 520 Wilson Road, Newberry, SC) Date/Tim<?: 15 August 17 - 1000

• Richland County- Academy for Success (Conducted at C~nter for A1v~nced I

Tech Studies, 916 Mt. Vernon Church Road, Chapin, SC) Date/Time: 15 August 17 - 1300 *' .*-; I 54 I I

I Raqiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station

. Center for Advanced Technical Studies (916 Mt, Vernon Church Road,. Chapin, I *., S_C) Dc!-tefl)me:. 15 August J7-:- 1300 (Courtesy__Evaluation)

C}1~pin J\1ip,c;Ue S.chqql (Cow:l~cte_d ,at (;:~qter forA1:v;m.ced .'];'ech Stuqies, 916 l\1t. >'

Vernon Church Road, Chapin, SC) Date/Tim~~ 1~.August 17;- .1300.** *. : :. .,

I

* *

• 1 {,. * * ** t * *. I , r ** \ , .

• j * , I

• f , ) ) ;'"

(Courtesy Evaluation) * *

• Spring Hill High .Sc;hool(Cc;md~ct_ed at C~,ntyr f,or ~dyan,c~d Tee~ Stu~ies, 916

.... Mt. Vern.on Chur;ch Road, Chapin, SC).... Date/Tirne: . 15 .August 17 ~ 1300, , .

I Core Ca~a~ilit~.~:* O~~Sc,ine.Security,and Protection- Traffic Control Points (TCPs) a~d Access Control Points (ACPs) * * * * *. , * '

• I D~finitioµ: . En,su~e a safe; ~n,d -~e~ure. en;v~ro~,meµt. tl;rroug~ J;1w ,enfor,ce~ent ,and .r~lat~d security and protection operations for people and communities located, withiriaf~ected. areas and also for all tradition~} aIJ,d.atrpical respors,e l?y~s.ormel _engag~d in lifes,avi_ng' a~d i_i:fe'-s'ust~ning I operations. ** * * ** * *

• Critical Task: ,Communications Equip~ent ' .* :*.. '

I At least two .communication sy~tems. are available, atieast one operates.prcipetly, and cornm~nica'tion links are establi'shed' and inJiiitained'with appropriate locatioi).s. .

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-I 0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1,2; .Crjterion l.d.l).

' .'. * . * . ' t *  ; * ~ ' \ ; *. ":.' ~ ' ': '. ' :. \

Critic~(tJsk.; Equipment & Supplies to Suppciit Operations ' .. ': . .* . "- ,,. ; '

I Equipme~t (to inclµde c6,rp.rµunicationsj,_Inaps, displays,, monitdring instruments; dosimetry, ki,.

1 and other suppfres are sufficierit to support einer'gency'oper~tions (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP'..l, H.7, 10; 17, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l).

I Critical Task: Impiementatlon;of Einergehcy Wor~er EX:p()sure,Co6trol'

• , ' .  ;, f OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to' I EWs in accorda,nce with the.plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters ~nd record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart'. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the adIIiinistration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-I REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a'.1).

, I ...

PRDs and KI wiil be simulated by separate props identified as such I Critical T~sk'.* Iniplem~ntation df Traffic an'd Access Control I Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C:l, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3.d.l).  :  ! . ,, '

I TCPs _and ACPs_ ~ill be evaluated by di~cussion during the exercise at the County EOC

'as follows: ' . .  !

I

• Fairfield County: SC215/SC213 (S2), SC34/SC215 (Fl)

• Lexington County: Amicks Ferry Road/Sandbar Road (IA), US176/Skylark Ln (L6)

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I

• Newberry County: SC34/Broad River Road (N4), US176/Capers Chapel Road (N7)

• Richland County: Broad River Road & Harbison Road (RS), Blythewood Road & I-77 (R6) -*- . . . . . . :; ,. ;'_ :, ., I I

Waterway Warning: Waterway warning will be discussed during the exercise at t?e SEOC.

I Critical Task: Irilpedimerits to Evacuation and*Traffic arid Access Control -

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG~0654/FEM:Ac:REP-i, J.10.k; I

Criterion3.d.2): ,,, .. *,.. ., - -,*;,: .-*

'{

Impediments to evacuation will be evaluated by discussion during the exercise at the I

County EOC. , -

Core Capability: Mass Care - Reception Center/Congregate Care I

Definition: Provide life-sustaining-services to the affected.population with a focus cm hydration, feedihg'and sheltering to thdse\:vho'have the most heed as well as support foi'reunifying families.

I L ., :

Cr'iticalTask:, Implementation of KI Decision* fot* Institutionalized *and Geiieral Public ** -::

• KI and appropriate iristnictions are made avaifable in ctise a decisfon to recommend use of KI is I

1 made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for 1.nstittitionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f; Criteri_on 3.b.l). I

-. PRDs and Kl will be simulated by separate props identified as such.

Critical Task: Temporary Oare of Evacuees*

I Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been I

decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1; J.10.h; J.12; Criterion 6.c.l). I Congregate Care will be demonstrated during out-of-sequence activities at RC/CC sites (see schedule on page 7). I

\

Core Capability: Public Health and Medical Services - Medical Services Drill Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related I operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.

I Critical Task: Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; I J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.l).

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 VC Summer Nuclear Station I 1 *.

• Medical Serv:i.ce Drill: Date(Time: .25 October. 1_7 ~ 1,000.. The Medical Servi_ce Drill will commence at 6949 St Andrews Road, Columbia, SC and end at Lexington Medical Center located at 2720 Sunset Boulevard, West Columbia, SC 29169.

I Critical Task: Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

' ~- *.' :

• 1. *-

• OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to I EW s in accordance with the ,plans/prqcedures. EW s P.eriodically and at the end of each rrµssion read their;dosimete:i;s,arntrecord:the. r~adin_gs on tpe appropr.iate e~posure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-I REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.l) .

! : . ., ' . . ' ;,~* *, .. i . _ .. - I. '  ; ~ f < I * ' ~

• I* )' > > ' > '

Emergency personnel will use a prop to simulate Permanent Record Dosimeter~ ;(PRDs)

I to monitor and control radiation exposure.

~ , ,:;  ; ~ , '

. Po~;;tssium Iqdide CK.I) for emergency worker_s. w_ill b~ sim;ulatecf by using*a pr0p I idep,tifie,d as KI if necessary:' PPB will be in. ~ccordance with the plans and procedures ..

Critical Task: Transportation and Treatment of Injured/Contaminated Personnel

,I The facility/ORO ;has tp.e appropric.ite. spa_ce., .adequate r,esources, and trained personnel to *provide.

transp()rt,*monitoring, decon~aminati.Qn, and medic;;al services.to contaminated injured individuals*

(NUI{E(J,0~54/F.EMA_-REB-J, E2; B.10; KSa, q;,L),;4; Cri.terion 6_.d.l).

I One FEMA evaluator will travel in the ambulance carrying the patient in order to listen to communications betw.een the ambulance crew,anq the hospital while patient is !3n-route.

I In the event that the ambulance has to respond to real life events, another county owned vehicle will be used to transport the contaminated, injured person to the hospital.

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