Text

Application for Amendment to Change TS Supporting Activation of Trip Outputs of Previously-Installed Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Portion of Power Range Neutron Monitoring System
	ML040780073
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	02/27/2004
From:	Gallagher M; Exelon Nuclear
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML040780073 (197)
	v • d • e

Exekr5ns.

Exelon Nuclear www.exeloncorp.com Nuclear 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 10 CFR 50.90 February 27, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Subject License Amendment Request Activation of the Trip Outputs of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor Portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System

References:

(1)

NEDC-3241 OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Rance Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stability Trip Function," dated October 1995 (2)

NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power RFange Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stabiifty Trip Function," Supplement 1. dated November 1997 (3)

Letter from Keith R. Jury (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. c. NRC, "Schedule for Completing Actions to Implement Long-Term Stability Solution," dated December 19, 2003 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit,"

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), hereby requests a change to the Technical Spacifications (TS), Appendix A, of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, respectively.

The proposed change to TS supports the activation of the trip outputs of the previously-installed Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) system. Specifically, this proposed change will revise TS Sections 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation" and 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating Reporting Requirements" and their associated TS Bases, and TS Section 5.6.5, "Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)." In addition, the proposed change deletes the Interim Corrective Action (ICA) requirements from the Recirculation Loops Operating Technical Specifications.

Exelon has been following the industry approach for implementation/activation of the OPRM trip function in accordance with NRC approved Licensing Topical Reports. In addition, Exelon has been reviewing and incorporating industry operating experience, as appropriate, regarding OPRM trip activations at other utilities.

/DoI

Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System February 27, 2004 Page 2 Information supporting this License Amendment Request (LAR) is contained in Attachment 1 to this letter. The proposed changes to the PBAPS Unit 2 and Unit 3 TS are contained in Attachment 2 (marked-up TS pages) and Attachment 3 (typed TS pages). In addition, Attachment 4 provides plant-specific responses required by the generic NRC approved General Electric (GE) Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDC-3241 OP-A (including Supplement 1), "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stability Trip Function," (References 1 and 2). Attachment 4 also provides descriptions and justifications for each deviation from the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, and includes a discussion of changes not addressed in the LTR.

Exelon has concluded that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

Exelon requests approval of the proposed amendments by February 27, 2005. Once approved, the amendments shall be implemented within 60 days. However, as indicated in the schedule provided in Reference 3, the OPRM portion of the PRNM system will be declared operational on both Units 2 and 3 following NRC approval of this license amendment request, but no earlier than 30 days following the end of the next refueling outage for PBAPS, Unit 2, currently scheduled to be completed by the end of September, 2004.

There are no commitments contained within this letter.

The proposed changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board.

We are notifying the State of Pennsylvania of this application for changes to the TS and Operating License by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Glenn Stewart at 610-765-5529.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully, Executed on oN4 -7o Michael P. Gallagher Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments:

1. Evaluation of the Proposed Changes

2. Technical Specifications and Bases Markup Pages

3. Technical Specifications and Bases Typed Pages

4. Plant-Specific Responses Required by Licensing Topical Report NEDC-3241OP-A cc:

Regional Administrator - NRC Region I w/ attachments NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station NRC Project Manager, NRR - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection - Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

ATTACHMENT 1 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278 EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES

Subject:

Activation of the Trip Outputs of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor Portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 1 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES

1.0 DESCRIPTION

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit,' Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), requests a change to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A, of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, respectively.

The proposed change to TS supports the activation of the trip outputs of the previously-installed Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) system. Concurrent with the OPRM TS changes, some of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) related TS Bases will be changed to clarify issues that have arisen during the time since the installation of the PRNM system.

Exelon has been following the industry approach for implementation/activation of the OPRM trip function in accordance with NRC approved Licensing Topical Reports. In addition, Exelon has been reviewing and incorporating industry operating experience, as appropriate, regarding OPRM trip activations at other utilities.

As indicated in the schedule provided in Reference 1, implementation of this phase of the modification is planned for both Units 2 and 3 following NRC approval of this license amendment request, but no earlier than 30 days following the end of the next refueling outage for PBAPS, Unit 2, currently scheduled to be completed by the end of September, 2004.

The proposed changes to the PBAPS Unit 2 and Unit 3 TS are contained in Attachment 2 (marked-up TS pages) and Attachment 3 (typed TS pages). In addition, Attachment 4 provides plant-specific responses required by the generic NRC approved General Electric (GE) Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDC-3241 OP-A (including Supplement 1), 'Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stability Trip Function,' (References 2 and 3). Attachment 4 also provides descriptions and justifications for each deviation from the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, and includes a discussion of changes not addressed in the LTR.

This Attachment 1 provides a discussion and description of the proposed TS changes, a technical analysis, a regulatory analysis, including information supporting a finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration, and information supporting an Environmental Assessment.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S This proposed change revises TS Sections 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System [RPS]

Instrumentation" and 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating Reporting Requirements" and their associated TS Bases, and TS Section 5.6.5, "Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)." In addition, the proposed change deletes the Interim Corrective Action (ICA) requirements from the Recirculation Loops Operating Technical Specifications. A detailed description of the proposed TS changes is provided below.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 2 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES A.

RPS Instrumentation, Section 3.3.1.1, APRM Related Functions A.1 Functions This modification has no impact on any of the previously installed PRNM functions. The OPRM monitoring function is currently installed and fully functional but is not connected to the associated RPS or trip annunciator circuitry. The only change in this modification is connecting the existing OPRM trip outputs in series with the APRM trip outputs.

A new OPRM Upscale Function 2.f will be added.

A.2 Minimum Number of Operable OPRM Channels The required minimum number of operable OPRM channels will be three channels.

The OPRM Upscale Function will have operability requirements associated with OPRM cells of a minimum of 2 operable Local Power Range Monitors (LPRMs) per cell for an OPRM cell to be operable and a minimum of 25 OPRM cells per OPRM channel for channel operability. The specific numerical values for these two parameters are identified as "plant specific" in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs.

A.3 Applicable Modes of Operation The OPRM Instability Detect-and-Suppress Trip (new OPRM Upscale Function) is a safety-related function and will be required to be operable only with Reactor Power 2 25%

Reactor Thermal Power (RTP).

A.4 Channel Check Surveillance Requirements (SRs)

The new OPRM Upscale Function will have a Channel Check requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.1, of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

A.5 Channel Functional Test Surveillance Requirements The new OPRM Upscale Function will have a Channel Functional Test requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.1 1, with a frequency of every 184 days (6 months). The Channel Functional Test includes both the OPRM channels and the 2-out-of-4 voter channels plus the flow input function, excluding the flow transmitters. Note 2 of SR 3.3.1.1.11 will be modified to show that the flow transmitter exclusion also applies to Function 2.f. A notation will be added to the SR 3.3.1.1.11 Bases to clarify that the actual OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoints are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19 (a new SR added to support the OPRM Upscale function).

A.6 Channel Calibration Surveillance Requirements The new OPRM Upscale Function will have a Channel Calibration requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.12, with a frequency of every 24 months, and an LPRM calibration requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.8, with a frequency of every 1000 MWD/T. Channel Calibration of the recirculation loop flow channel will be included in the SR 3.3.1.1.12 Channel Calibration of this function (flow is an input to the auto-enable logic of the OPRM Upscale function), the

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 3 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES same as the current requirement for APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function at 24-month intervals. The only change required for OPRM Upscale is to modify Note 3 of SR 3.3.1.1.12 to include Function 2.f. The flow channel calibration requirements associated with the OPRM Upscale function are the same as those previously added for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function.

A.7 Response Time Testing Surveillance Requirements The new OPRM Upscale Function will have no Response Time Testing Surveillance Requirement. [Note: The NUMAC PRNM LTR describes response time testing as including the output relays for the 2-out-of-4 voter; however, the original PRNM installation licensing submittal justified response time testing from the PRNM panel terminals for PBAPS. This was based on the current response time testing commitments for PBAPS.

The OPRM implementation is consistent with that justification. Since the OPRM Upscale trip outputs are in series with the APRM trip outputs, no change is required to the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function response time testing requirements.]

A.8 Logic System Functional Testing (LSFT) Surveillance Requirements The new OPRM Upscale Function 2.f, similar to existing Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d, will have no LSFT Surveillance Requirement. However, the SR 3.3.1.1.17 Bases description, applicable to Function 2.e, will be modified to add "OPRM" to show that the simulated trip conditions must include the OPRM logic as well as the APRM High/Inop logic. This clarification is required because the 2-out-of-4 Voter, Function 2.e, votes the OPRM trip independently from the APRM High/lnop trip. The Bases description for Function 2.e will be modified to document the independent voting of the OPRM and APRM trips. In addition, some Bases discussion will be added to clarify that the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function does not need to be declared inoperable if plant interface portions of the 2-out-of-4 Logic Module that are not necessary to perform the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function are found to be inoperable.

A.9 Verify OPRM auto-enable setpoints The new OPRM Upscale Function will have a new surveillance requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.19, to confirm, with a frequency of every 24 months, that the OPRM auto-enable setpoints are correctly set.

A.10 Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Conditions and Actions LCO Condition A, and the associated Required Actions, apply to the OPRM Upscale function the same as for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b., 2.c and 2.d. Required Action A.2 and Condition B do not apply to Function 2.f. Therefore, the "Notes" for Action A.2 and Condition B will be modified to add "2.f' to the functions excepted.

New Conditions I and J with associated Required Actions and Completion Times will be defined. These new Conditions apply when the OPRM channel Condition A Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met. Required Action 1.1 allows a Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to initiate alternate methods of detecting and suppressing instabilities. Required Action 1.2 allows a Completion time of 120 days to restore the

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 4 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES OPRM Operability. Condition J applies if the Completion Times for Required Actions 1.1 or 1.2 are not met. The Required Action J.1 will allow 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to reduce power to less than 25 percent.

The alternate method for detection and suppression required by Required Action 1.1 is intended to be temporary re-establishment of the ICAs, but controlled by plant procedures rather than Technical Specifications. An exception to LCO 3.0.4 has been noted for Required Action 1.2. This exception note is not discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

This exception allows restarting the plant in the event of a shutdown during the 120-day Completion Time for Required Action 1.2, consistent with the original intent of the LTR which was to allow normal plant operations to continue during the recovery time from a hypothesized design problem with the Option IlIl algorithms or equipment.

A.1 1 Setpoints and Allowable Values There are no allowable values associated with the OPRM Upscale Function. The OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) upscale trip setpoints are determined based on the Option Ill licensing methodology developed by the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) and described in NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Applications," (Reference 4) previously approved by the NRC. The PBDA trip setpoints will be documented in the COLR. There are also TS related setpoints for the auto-enable (not-bypassed) region, which are established as nominal setpoints as described in the TS Bases markup, and defined in SR 3.3.1.1.19. The minimum operable OPRM cells setpoint (25) is defined by GE analyses based on PBAPS's selection of the OPRM cell assignments and a minimum of 2 operable LPRMs per cell. The setpoint is established to conform to the licensing bases defined in NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1), UBWR Owner's Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," (References 5 and 6) and NEDO-32465-A. This setpoint, along with the PBAPS selection of a minimum of 2 LPRMs per cell, is documented in the TS Bases. The PBDA algorithm includes several "tuning" parameters.

These are established in accordance with PBAPS procedures as part of the system setup, and are not defined in Technical Specifications.

Finally, there are also setpoints for the "defense-in-depth" algorithms discussed in the OPRM Upscale Function description in the TS Bases markup. These are treated as nominal setpoints based on qualitative studies performed by the BWROG and documented in Appendix A of NEDO-32465-A and NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1). Use of these LTRs as a basis for establishing these defense-in-depth settings is consistent with the approach used by previous Licensees for activating the OPRM trip function. These algorithms are not credited in the safety analysis and their settings are controlled by PBAPS procedures. A note will be added to Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the OPRM Upscale Function to state that the PBDA setpoint limits are defined in the COLR.

Some PRNM TS Bases changes, beyond those required for inclusion of the OPRM Upscale Function, are being implemented to clarify system requirements. Specifically, text has been added to the Bases discussion for Function 2.b (APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High) to clarify the basis for the "AW" flow offset, applicable to single loop operation (SLO). A minor change is being made to note (b) in Table 3.3.1.1-1 to show the SLO equation as "0.65(W-AW) + 63.7%" instead of "0.65W + 63.7% - 0.65AW". The

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 5 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES change, while mathematically equivalent, states the equation in the same form that is actually implemented in the equipment. This change is being made to clarify the system's calculation of this setpoint.

Bases discussion for Function 2.e (2-out-of-4 Voter) has been added to clarify that inoperability of those portions of the 2-out-of-4 Logic Module that do not affect the voter function does not require that the voter function be declared inoperable. The Bases discussion for SR 3.3.1.1.12 has been modified to clarify that the SR applies also to the recirculation flow loop, and includes once-per-cycle correlation adjustments between drive flow and core flow measurements.

B.

Recirculation Loops Operating, Section 3.4.1 B.1 Functions This modification has no impact on any of the recirculation loop functions. It does remove TS required prohibitions against operating in the "restricted region". These prohibitions and other restrictions were implemented as part of the "Interim Corrective Actions" (ICAs).

Present TS Section 3.4.1 requirements to operate outside the restricted region, and associated surveillances and actions will be deleted. Surveillance requirements related to monitoring LPRM and APRM indications for oscillations, will also be deleted. TS requirements not related to ICAs will be retained.

B-1 LCO Conditions and Actions LCO restrictions on operating region (references to Figure 3.4.1-1) will be deleted from the LCO both for two loop and single loop operating conditions. Conditions A, B and C and their associated Required Actions, and Required Action F.1, each associated with operation in the Restricted Region and included previously as part of the ICA actions, will be deleted. These changes, along with deletion of the related Bases discussions, effectively delete the TS requirements for the ICAs. [Note: The NUMAC PRNM LTR does not address deletion of ICA related Technical Specifications. Therefore, all Specification 3.4.1 changes are beyond those covered by the NUMAC PRNM LTR.]

A change in the 'no loops operating" Completion Time (for Required Action F.2), unrelated to OPRM, is being implemented concurrently with the OPRM. Specifically, the Completion Time for Required Action F.2 will be increased from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The 12-hour Completion Time is more reasonable for an orderly shutdown of the plant, and more consistent with both the current Completion Time for Required Action E.1 and the improved Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants (BWR/4)," (Reference 7) equivalent Completion Time for the no loops operating Condition, both of which are 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . This change will be accomplished by combining the current Condition F as an "OR" with the current Condition E, and retaining the current Required Action E.1 and Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for Required Action E.1. The present Required Action F.2 and associated Completion Time will be deleted.

The Conditions D and E will then be renumbered as Conditions A and B, with references to deleted Conditions also deleted.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 6 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES C.

Reporting Requirements, Core Operating Limits, Section 5.6.5 The procedural method of controlling the limits used to establish the OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) upscale trip setpoints is not discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, but a required utility action is to identify the method that will be used. The requirements for cycle specific confirmation or change of the limits is established in the BWROG LTRs NEDC-32465-A and NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1) but not the specific method of documentation. The required information will be included in the reload licensing report. It has been determined that recording the PBDA limits in the COLR is the preferred method. This method is utilized at PBAPS for documenting similar cycle specific limits such as Rod Block Monitor limits, and has been utilized by other Licensees for the OPRM.

To document this requirement, a new item will be added under Specification 5.6.5.a to note that the OPRM limits associated with Specification 3.3.1.1 will be included in the COLR. Also, a new item has been added under Specification 5.6.5.b to identify the BWROG LTR NEDO-32465-A as the NRC approved documentation of the method for establishing the limits.

TS Bases Changes The discussion below provides a description of the proposed changes to the TS Bases to reflect the addition of the OPRM trip function and other unrelated Bases changes for clarification.

Where appropriate, deviations from the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, are also discussed below.

Function 2.b: APRM Simulated Thermal Power -- High The Bases text will be expanded to include specific discussion of the "AW" term in the simulated thermal power high equation, and the limits of applicability of the required adjustment. This is being added to document the basis for the 'offset" and to clarify that a hardware "clamp" limits the Allowable Value to 63.7% for flow values of W < AW.

Function 2.e: 2-out-of-4 Voter The Bases text for Function 2.e will be modified differently from that shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. The LTR discussion of 'partial operability" related to the separate voting of the APRM High/Inop and the OPRM Upscale function will not be included. Deletion of this discussion is conservative and provides simplicity based on the determination that the added alternatives discussed in the LTR are complicated to evaluate and are very unlikely to ever be applied. However, discussion will be added to clarify that the "plant interface" portion of the 2-out-of-4 Logic Module is separate from the voter functions, and that inoperability of plant interface only portion of the module does not necessitate declaring the voter function inoperable. Specific examples are inoperable plant interface output modules that might affect only annunciator functions or even rod block functions, but which do not affect any of the RPS functions and should not require entering an RPS LCO.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 7 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES Function 2.f: OPRM Upscale The specific number of LPRMs per OPRM cell, the minimum required number of OPERABLE LPRMs for an OPRM cell to be considered OPERABLE, and the minimum number of OPRM cells required to be OPERABLE for an OPRM channel to be considered OPERABLE are identified as plant specific values in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs with no specific criteria on selection or calculation of the values. The NUMAC PRNM LTR also does not discuss the specific assignment of LPRMs to OPRM cells or any criteria for those assignments. The NRC approved BWROG LTRs, NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1) and NEDO-32465-A, provide the criteria related to determination of those values.

Based on the criteria in the BWROG LTRs, PBAPS has selected an LPRM-to-OPRM Cell assignment pattern that includes either 3 or 4 LPRMs per OPRM cell, depending on where the cell is located in the core. This selection meets the criteria in the BWROG LTRs. Similarly, PBAPS has selected 2 LPRMs as the minimum required per OPRM cell for OPRM cell operability. Based on these two PBAPS selected aspects of the OPRM system, cell assignments and minimum number of LPRMs per cell, analyses will be performed in accordance with the methodology defined in the BWROG LTRs to establish the period based detection algorithm (PBDA) trip setpoint limit criteria. The setpoint values will be documented in the COLR prior to trip activation. Also, based on the PBAPS selected cell assignments and minimum number of LPRMs per cell, analyses have been performed to establish a recommended minimum of 25 OPRM cells required for OPRM channel operability. The minimum number of LPRMs per cell, and minimum required OPRM cells are included in the PBAPS specific TS Bases markups.

The Bases description of the OPRM power level for operability (25% RTP) and for "trip enable" (29.5% RTP, 60% rated flow) has been modified somewhat from the NUMAC LTR version for clarity. There is no technical change from the intent. These values are identified as plant-specific in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. Based on a BWROG Letter to the NRC providing background and guidance (the letter is included as a reference in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases),

PBAPS has selected the above values. The values will be treated as nominal values with no additional margin added to determine the actual setpoints to be entered in the equipment.

Action 1.2 The PBAPS Required Action 1.2 differs from that shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs in that an LCO 3.0.4 uexception" is identified. The LCO 3.0.4 exception is consistent with the intent of the original Required Action 1.2, which was to allow 120 days to resolve a significant OPRM design issue. However, as written in the LTR, plant restart during the 120-day Completion Time would not be allowed by LCO 3.0.4. The PBAPS TS Bases description has been expanded from that in the NUMAC LTR to address the inclusion of the LCO 3.0.4 exception.

Channel Functional Test, SR 3.3.1.1.11 The Bases description for PBAPS has been modified from that in the NUMAC LTR to clarify that this SR coverage of the recirculation flow loop function also supports the automatic trip enable function in the OPRM. A notation has been included to clarify that the actual OPRM trip auto-enable setpoints are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19, not 3.3.1.1.11.

In addition, the Bases will be

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 8 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES expanded to clarify the role of the internal self-test routine in meeting the requirements of the Channel Functional Test Surveillance Requirements as detailed in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

Channel Calibration, SR 3.3.1.1.12 The NUMAC PRNM LTRs identify no specific changes to the Channel Calibration Bases.

However, reviews associated with the OPRM Upscale TS changes identified a concern that the SR 3.3.1.1.12 Bases discussion of the flow channel calibration requirements previously added (to support the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High function channel calibration) was not clear. In addition, the Bases should identify that the flow channel calibration also applies to the OPRM Upscale function (auto-enable of the trip). To address these issues and assure that the flow channel calibration requirements are correctly and completely understood, the SR 3.3.1.1.12 Bases discussion related to flow channel calibration will be expanded. The expanded discussion will also clarify that SR 3.3.1.1.12 includes the once-per-cycle drive flow/

core flow correlation adjustment. [Note: The NUMAC PRNM LTR Bases discussion includes only the statement that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function channel calibration includes the flow channel. The NUMAC PRNM LTR Bases discussions do not address the applicability of the flow channel calibration to the OPRM Upscale, or include any additional discussion of the flow channel calibration specifics.]

The Bases section that includes SR 3.3.1.1.12 also includes three other non-related Channel Calibration SRs. The section has been reorganized somewhat to improve the flow of the discussion and reduce the risk of confusion.

Confirmation of OPRM trip enable setpoints, SR 3.3.1.1.19 The Bases description of this SR has been reworded somewhat from that in the NUMAC LTR to clarify that the surveillance is only a confirmation of setpoints, that the setpoints are considered "nominal" (reference to a BWROG letter supporting this position has been added), and that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power/THERMAL POWER and core flow/recirculation flow correlations are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.2 and SR 3.3.1.1.12, respectively. Some additional rewording has been done to clarify the intent of the SR and to identify alternate actions available to satisfy the SR.

Response Time Testing Surveillance Requirements The NUMAC PRNM LTR describes response time testing including the APRM "sensors."

PBAPS, per existing SR 3.3.1.1.18, is only required to verify response time testing of the RPS logic (Reference NRC Safety Evaluation Reports dated October 14, 1999 [Unit 3] and August 1, 2000 [Unit 2]; References 21 and 22, respectively). Therefore, the changes included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR that relate to response time testing of the PRNM electronics and logic are not applicable to PBAPS, and no change to SR 3.3.1.1.18 is required for the OPRM Upscale addition.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 94-02, "Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors" (Reference 8), which required PECO Energy Company to develop and submit to the NRC a

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 9 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES plan for long term stability corrective actions. In response to GL 94-02, by letter dated March 2, 1998, from G. D. Edwards, PECO Energy Company to the USNRC (Reference 9), PECO Energy (now Exelon Generation Company, LLC) committed to implement the long-term solution designated as Option IlIl in NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1).

The functionality required for the Option IlIl stability solution was implemented as part of the initial phase of PRNM system replacement modification P00507, which has been completed for both PBAPS, Units 2 and 3. That modification replaced the original PRNM system, including the APRM system, the Rod Block Monitor system and the LPRM system, except for the detectors and signal cables, with the GE NUMAC PRNM System.

The NUMAC PRNM System utilizes the OPRM detect-and-suppress function to implement Option l1l. The safety function of the OPRM function within the PRNM is to monitor its LPRM signals for signs of neutron flux oscillations. The OPRM also monitors power and recirculation flow conditions to automatically enable the OPRM trip when in a predefined region of the power to flow map. The OPRM initiates a trip whenever it detects an instability condition when in the predefined region of the power to flow map. Following installation of the new PRNM System, the OPRM has been fully operational except for the trip and associated trip alarm functions.

These OPRM trip functions have been de-activated (not connected to the Reactor Protection System logic) in order to allow evaluation of the performance of the OPRM algorithms without the risk of spurious scrams. During this evaluation period, in 2001, General Electric (GE)

Company initiated a report in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of defects and noncompliances," concerning stability reload licensing calculations that support the development of setpoints for the OPRM trip function. The OPRM trip functions were not armed pending resolution of this reportable condition. The reportable condition has now been resolved as described in Reference 10. Consistent with NRC Bulletin 88-07 Supplement 1 (Reference 11), as committed to in the letter dated September 9, 1994, from G. A. Hunger, PECO Nuclear to USNRC (Reference 12), Exelon has continued to implement the Interim Corrective Actions (ICAs) to detect and suppress power oscillations. During this time frame, the OPRM system has been tuned per recent GE criteria (Reference 13) to establish proper sensitivity. Performance of the system at PBAPS during this interim phase, as well as at other plants, has been reliable thus warranting activation of the trip outputs.

License amendments to support the activation of the trip outputs of the OPRM portion of the PRNM system have been approved by the NRC for Hatch Units 1 and 2 (Reference 14),

Browns Ferry Unit 2 (Reference 15), Browns Ferry Unit 3 (Reference 16), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (Reference 17), Fermi Unit 2 (Reference 18) and Brunswick Units 1 and 2 (Reference 19).

The final phase of this modification will accomplish the following:

Activate the OPRM trip (OPRM Upscale Function) and annunciator; Add OPRM Technical Specifications; Delete the Recirculation Loops Operating Technical Specification requirements associated with the Interim Corrective Actions; Implement equipment modifications limited to minor wiring changes in the PRNM Panel 2(3)0C037 and an annunciator window label change; and Implement appropriate procedures and training to reflect the OPRM system.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 10 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The technical bases for the requested TS changes are presented in Section 8.0 of the NRC approved NUMAC PRNM LTR NEDC-3241OP-A (including Supplement 1), and as described above in Section 2.0 of this attachment, including exceptions to the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, and below. In addition, Attachment 4 provides plant-specific responses required by the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, including a discussion of the justifications and deviations related to the Utility Required Actions specified in the LTRs.

Enabling the OPRM trip function of the GE NUMAC PRNM system implements the long-term stability solution required by Generic Letter 94-02. The PRNM hardware incorporates the Option IlIl detect and suppress solution reviewed and approved by the NRC. The OPRM meets 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 10, "Reactor design," and GDC 12, "Suppression of reactor power oscillations," requirements by automatically detecting and suppressing design basis thermal-hydraulic oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel MCPR Safety Limit.

The current plant design utilizing Interim Corrective Actions (ICAs) depends on operator action to, if possible, avoid regions where instability may occur, to exit such regions when necessary, and to detect an actual instability and take mitigating action by manual means. The modification replaces procedural actions (i.e., the ICAs) with an NRC approved automatic detect and suppress function (i.e., the OPRM trip function). The OPRM trip function includes sophisticated algorithms that can automatically detect an instability condition and provide a RPS trip input if the oscillation magnitude exceeds acceptable limits.

The OPRM trip function is capable of more quickly and reliably detecting a true reactor instability than was possible with the manual procedures. The OPRM also provides a reactor scram trip only if an actual instability is detected while the current ICAs require reactor shutdown if the plant is in a condition that may result in an instability, regardless of whether or not an instability occurs. Extensive analyses performed by the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) and reviewed and approved by the NRC demonstrate that the OPRM can detect reactor instabilities and initiate a scram trip before the MCPR safety limit is exceeded, thus maintaining the integrity of the fuel.

The only hardware impact for the proposed activity is a "disconnect and tie back" of a few terminations to remove connections which ljumpered out" the OPRM trip outputs, the addition of jumpers to connect the OPRM trip to the annunciator and plant computer inputs, and minor re-labeling of one annunciator window. All jumper removal/addition is accomplished in Panel 2(3)0C037.

The OPRM trip actuation phase of PBAPS Modification P00507 and its associated TS changes will not adversely affect the ability of the RPS to perform its intended function. The significant change in this phase of the modification involves removing jumpers across the existing OPRM trip outputs to RPS. The Surveillance Requirements and their frequency of performance will assure reliability of the OPRM portion of the PRNM systems. The modification replaces procedural actions (ICAs) with an NRC approved automatic detection and suppression function which provides an RPS trip input if acceptable reactor operational limits are exceeded.

Therefore, the proposed modifications and associated TS changes will not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 11 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) proposes changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The proposed changes support the activation of the trip outputs of the previously-installed Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) system. The OPRM system monitors neutron flux signals for signs of neutron flux oscillations and initiates a reactor trip whenever it detects an instability condition when in the predefined region of the power to flow map. Activation of the OPRM will replace manual methods for avoiding instabilities and for detecting and suppressing potential instabilities.

Exelon has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No. This modification has no impact on any of the previously installed PRNM functions. Plant operation in portions of the former restricted region may potentially cause a marginal increase in the probability of occurrence of an instability event. This potential increase in probability is acceptable because the OPRM function will automatically detect the condition and initiate a reactor scram before the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit is reached. Consequences of the potential instability event are reduced because of the more reliable automatic detection and suppression of an instability event, and the elimination of dependence on the manual operator actions.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No. The modification replaces procedural actions that were established to avoid operating conditions where reactor instabilities might occur with an NRC approved automatic detect and suppress function.

Potential failures in the OPRM Upscale function could result in either failure to take the required mitigating action or an unintended reactor scram. These are the same potential effects of failure of the operator to take the correct appropriate action under the current procedural actions. The net effect of the modification changes the method by which an instability event is detected and by which mitigating action is initiated, but does not change the type of stability event that could occur. The effects of failure of the OPRM equipment are limited to reduced or failed mitigation, but such failure cannot cause an instability event or other type of accident.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 12 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES Therefore, since no radiological barrier will be challenged as a result of activating the OPRM trip function, it is concluded that this proposed activity does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No. The current safety analyses assume that the existing procedural actions are adequate to prevent an instability event. As a result, there is currently no quantitative or qualitative assessment of an instability event with respect to its impact on MCPR.

The OPRM trip function is being implemented to automate the detection (via direct measurement of neutron flux) and subsequent suppression (via scram) of an instability event prior to exceeding the MCPR Safety Limit. The OPRM trip provides a trip output of the same type as currently used for the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM). Its failure modes and types are identical to those for the present APRM output. Currently, the MCPR Safety Limit is not impacted by an instability event since the event is "mitigated" by manual means via the procedural actions, which prevent plant operating conditions where an instability event is possible. In both methods of mitigation (manual and automated), the margin of safety associated with the MCPR Safety Limit is maintained.

Therefore, since the MCPR Safety Limit will not be exceeded as a result of an instability event following implementation of the OPRM trip function, it is concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of 'no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 10, "Reactor design," requires that the reactor core be designed with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences. GDC 12, 'Suppression of reactor power oscillations,' requires assurance that power oscillations which can result in conditions exceeding specified acceptable fuel design limits are either not possible or can be reliably and readily detected and suppressed.

Enabling the OPRM Upscale trip implements the long-term stability solution required by Generic Letter 94-02. The PRNM hardware incorporates the Option IlIl detect and suppress solution reviewed and approved by the NRC in Licensing Topical Reports. The OPRM meets the GDC 10 and 12 requirements by automatically detecting and suppressing design basis thermal-hydraulic oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 13 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, and (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement, or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from Keith R. Jury (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. NRC, "Schedule for Completing Actions to Implement Long-Term Stability Solution," dated December 19, 2003.

2. NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stability Trip Function," dated October 1995.

3. NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option IlIl Stability Trip Function," Supplement 1, dated November 1997.

4. NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Applications," August 1996.

5. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owner's Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," dated November 1995.

6. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owner's Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," Supplement 1, dated November 1995.

7. NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants (BWR/4)."

8. Generic Letter (GL) 94-02, "Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors," dated July 11, 1994.

9. Letter dated March 2, 1998, from G. D. Edwards, PECO Energy Company to the USNRC.

PBAPS-LAR: Activation of the Trip Outputs of the OPRM Portion of the PRNM System Page 14 of 15 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES

10. Letter from K. S. Putnam (Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group) to U. S. NRC, "Resolution of Reportable Condition for Stability Reload Licensing Calculations Using Generic Regional Mode DIVOM Curve," dated September 30, 2003.

11. NRC Bulletin 88-07, "Power Oscillations In Boiling Water Reactors (BWR)," Supplement 1, dated December 30, 1988.

12. Letter dated September 9, 1994, from G. A. Hunger, PECO Nuclear to USNRC.

13. Letter dated October 4, 2003, from J. S. Post, GE Nuclear Energy, to USNRC, "Part 21 Notification: Stability Option IlIl Period Based Detection Algorithm Allowable Settings.'

14. Letter dated August 20,1998, from L. N. Olshan, USNRC to H. L. Sumner, Hatch Plant, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., "Issuance of Amendments - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. M99066 and M99067)."

15. Letter dated March 5,1999, from L. Raghavan, USNRC, to J. A. Scalice, Tennessee Valley Authority, "Amendment No. 258 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-52: Oscillation Power Range Monitor Upscale Trip Function in the Average Power Range Monitor - Technical Specification Change TS-354 (TAC No. MA3556)."

16. Letter dated September 27,1999, from W. 0. Long, USNRC, to J. A. Scalice, Tennessee Valley Authority, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Oscillation Power Range Monitor (TAC No. MA5976)."

17. Letter dated March 2, 2000, from P. S. Tam, USNRC, to J. H. Mueller, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Nine Mile Point Station, "Nine Mile Point Station, Unit No. 2 - Issuance of Amendment RE: Oscillation Power Range Monitoring System (TAC No. MA7119)."

18. Letter dated March 31, 2000, from A. J. Kugler, USNRC, to D. R. Gipson, Detroit Edison company, "Fermi 2-Issuance of Amendment RE: Enabling the Oscillation Power Range Monitor Upscale Trip Function (TAC No. MA6267)."

19. Letter dated March 8, 2002, from A. G. Hansen, USNRC, to J. S. Keenan, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Carolina Power & Light, "Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2-Issuance of Amendment to Incorporate the General Electric Digital Power Range Neutron Monitoring System (TAC Nos. MB2321 and MB2322)."

20. Letter dated March 1, 1999, from G. D. Edwards, PECO Energy Company, to USNRC, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, License Change Request ECR 98-01802."

21. Letter dated October 14,1999, from B. C. Buckley, USNRC, to J. A. Hutton, PECO Energy Company, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment RE: GE NUMAC PRNMS Upgrade (TAC No. MA4978)."

22. Letter dated August 1, 2000, from B. C. Buckley, USNRC, to J. A. Hutton, PECO Energy Company, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2-Issuance of Amendment RE: GE NUMAC PRNMS Upgrade (TAC No. MA9135).'

License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Activation of the Trip Outputs of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor Portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System Marked-up Technical Specifications and Bases Pages for Proposed Changes UNIT 2 UNIT 2 UNIT 3 UNIT 3 3.3-1 B 3.3-32 3.3-1 B 3.3-32 3.3-3 B 3.3-33 3.3-3 B 3.3-33 3.3-5 B 3.3-34 3.3-5 B 3.3-34 3.3-6 B 3.3-35 3.3-6 B 3.3-35 3.3-7 B 3.3-35a 3.3-7 B 3.3-36 3.4-1 B 3.4-3 3.4-1 B 3.4-3 3.4-2 B 3.4-4 3.4-2 B 3.4-4 3.4-3 B 3.4-5 3.4-3 B 3.4-5 3.4-4 B 3.4-6 3.4-4 B 3.4-6 3.4-5 B 3.4-7 3.4-5 B 3.4-7 B 3.3-7 B 3.4-8 B 3.3-7 B 3.4-8 B 3.3-8 B 3.4-9 B 3.3-8 B 3.4-9 B 3.3-12 B 3.4-10 B 3.3-12 B 3.4-10 B 3.3-24 5.0-21 B 3.3-24 5.0-21 B 3.3-25 5.0-22 B 3.3-25 5.0-22 B 3.3-27 B 3.3-27

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 paige 6253 TECH SPEC MARKUP TECH SPEC MARKUP for Stability (PRNM) OPRM Trip Activation MOD at PEACH BOTTOM UNIT 2

PB ECR 17 °°/-)

Rev Attachment Page rlY of Dwg 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION S

Rev 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation RPS instrumentation 3.3.1.1 LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function shall be OPERABLE.

in Table 3.3.1.1-1 APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS t

I Separate Condition entry isallowed for each channel.

CONDITION l

REQUIRED ACTION l COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

trip.

OR A.2

NOTE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Not applicable for r Functions 2.a, 2.b,

2.

c, or 2.

d/j or Z..

Place associated trip system in trip.

B. ---------NOTE--------

B.1 Place channel in one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable for trip system in trip.

Functions 2.a, 2.b,

& 2.c, sPt2.dX

2.

\\

OR One or more Functions B.2 Place one trip system 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with one or more in trip.

required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-1 Amendment No. 232

a U JA..A r

&'V Attachment Page _4L. of Dwg Sht Rev initials

____=_

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action 0.1 fully insert all and referenced in insertable control Table 3.3.1.1-1.

rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

tf45eL

j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES---------

1.

Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2.

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.1.1.2

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between 7 days the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is

- 2% RTP while operating at 2 25% RTP.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 P UIAiendent No. 210

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 1:

I.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

1.1 Initiate alternate method to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillations.

AND 1.2

NOTE----------------

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 120 days Restore required channels to OPERABLE.

J.

Required Action and J.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion Time

<25% RTP.

of Condition I not met.

PBECR 99^0/.K Rev AttachmentPage £7 of Dwg Sht Rev inihalsC.chtJ RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 I

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.10

-OTE Radiation detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.11

NOTES--------------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

v

2. For Functiod 2.J2 the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.12 NOTES

1.

Neutron detectors are excluded.

2.

For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

3. For Function, 2 V the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months I

I (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment No. 232

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 II

.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5X RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Calibrate each radiation detector.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.17 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.18 Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months limits.

It~-3E(ZT, I

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3 -6 Amendment No. 247

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 2:

SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM Simulated 24 months Thermal Power is 2 29.5% and recirculation drive flow is

< 60%.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1.

Wide Range Neutron Monitors

a.

Period-Short 2

5(a) 3 3

3 G

SR SR SR SR SR H

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.17

13 seconds k 13 seconds NA

b.

Inop 2

5 (a) 3 H

SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.17 NA

2.

Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

b.

Simulated Thermal Power-High

c.

Neutron Flux-High

d.

Inop

e.

2-Out-Of-4 Voter 2

3 (c)

G SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 33.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 s 15.0X RTP s 0.65 W

+ 63.7S RTP(b) and s 118.0S RTP s 119.7S RTP NA NA I

1 1,2 1.2 3 ("

3(c) 2 G

G I

SR SR SR SR SR I "

3 7~

(continued)

(a)

With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

I (b) (--a5 ng.7 G7S 6

RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1. 'Recirculatlon Loops operatingg.

(c)

Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

I E 3 3

6 3j A 6 I

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3 -7 Amendment No. 247

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 3:

f.

OPRM Upscale 2 25%

RTP 3(c)

I SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.19 NA(d)

INSERT 3A:

(d)

See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 PB ECR 91 o/6x Rev Attachment Page a..l of Dwg Sht Rev initials 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in

'rH8@w RE H

OR One recirculation loop shall be in operation

/o~f//f igfirw32.7 ad d reF-f ol owi ngrl-mits apple fedwhie the assocae LOiaplcble:

a. LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specif n the COLR; W

b. LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR; and

c. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

NOTE---

Required limit modifications for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

I APPLICABILITY:

MODES I and 2.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-1 Amendment No. 232

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 PB ECR 271-cos-Rev Attachment Page.*3 of Dwg Sht Rev initials PEAPS UNIT 2 3.4-2 Amendment No. 210

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-3 Amendment No. 210

Po M-I,{

Attachment Page &-5 of Dwg Sht Rev.

initials 91iI SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR *3.4.1.1

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both recirculation loops are in operation.

Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is:

a. < 10.25 X 106 Ibm/hr when operating at

< 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr; and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

b.

q<5.125X 10 x 71.75 X 106 Ibm/hr when operating at ibm/hr.

I

/

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-4 Amendment No. 210

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 PBAPS UN IT 2 3.4-5 Amendment No. 247

PB ECR qYo"°"S Rev RPS Instrumentation Atadlment~age C v B 3.3.1.1 DWg Sht Rev BASES APPLICABLE l.b.

Wide Rance Neutron Monitor-Tnoy (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Six channels of the Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop APPLICABILITY Function, with three channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. Since this Function is not assumed in the safety analysis, there is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function is required.

Average Power Ranae Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to i

~greater than RTP.

The APRM System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels.

The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each

}

group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed (w-t APRM will result in a 'half-trip' in all four of the voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system. 6K(

trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip system t u resulting in a full scram signal.

Three of the four APR1 It49E:I channels and all four of the voter channels are required to (a

be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM1f4 n tet e4 at least 20 LPRM inputs, with at least three RN inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel, and the number of LPRM inputs that have become inoperable (and bypassed) since the last APRM calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) must be less than ten for each (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-7 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 4:

Each APRM also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

INSERT 5:

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f.

Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d INSERT 6:

logic channel (Al, A2, Bi, and B2)

INSERT 7:

Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels.

INSERT 8:

Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c INSERT 9:

For the OPRM Upscale, Function 2.f, LPRMs are assigned to "cells" of 3 or 4 detectors. A minimum of 25 cells, each with a minimum of 2 OPERABLE LPRMs, must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE.

PB ECR 9-o/5 Rev Attadhment Page _L_. of Dwg Sht Rev BASES initials RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 i

I APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY II I

I II 2.a. Averace Power Rance Monitor Neutron Flux-Hich (Setdown)

(continued)

For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function because of the relative setpoints.

At higher power levels, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function. However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25% RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-Hich Ii 0.

I I

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors average neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor. The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpQint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod

- a pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High j

unction Allowable Value. L_^(oti u

U 3-8 vconti nued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-8 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 9a:

A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires the flow value, used in the Allowable Value equation, be reduced by AW. The value of AW is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pumps associated with the inactive recirculation loop. The Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two loop operation. The value of AW is plant specific and is defined in plant procedures. The Allowable Value equation for single loop operation is only valid for flows down to W = AW; the Allowable Value does not go below 63.7% RTP. This is acceptable because back flow in the inactive recirculation loop is only evident with drive flows of approximately 35% or greater (Reference 19).

PBECR -°~co

/

rPS s mRtv AttachmentPage 7i of RPS 3nstrumentat Dwg 3311 Sht Rev BE initials.

$(

Rear BASES APPLICABLE 2.d.

Averace Power Rance Monitor-Tnoy SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY for each of the APRM Functions. This Function (Inop)

(continued) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is not in the "Operate" position, an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRIM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more

,,APRM channels result in a trip output from each the four voter channels to it's associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

2.e.

2-Out-Of-4 Voter The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between e APRM Functionsaand the final RPS trip system logic.

As sch, it isrequired to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions.

Therefore, the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function needs to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE.

Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions.

If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated trip system.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-12 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 10:

, including the OPRM Upscale Function, INSERT 11:

The 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module includes 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2.f. This voting is accomplished by the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware in the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module. Each 2-Out-Of-4 Voter includes two redundant sets of outputs to RPS. Each output set contains two independent contacts; one contact for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c and 2.d, and the other contact for Function 2.f. The analysis in Reference 12 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable. However, the voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the plant interface portions of the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module that are not necessary to perform the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter function.

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 12:

2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale The OPRM Upscale Function provides compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 and 12, thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 14, 15 and 16 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (PBDA), the amplitude based algorithm (ABA), and the growth rate algorithm (GRA). All three are implemented in the OPRM Upscale Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the PBDA. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Upscale Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specifications purposes is based only on the PBDA.

The OPRM Upscale Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into 'cells" for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPRM Upscale trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5%

RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is < 60% of rated flow, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations may occur (Reference 18). These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the "auto-bypass" setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Upscale trip enabled region.

The OPRM Upscale Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at 2 25% RTP. The 25%

RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring while the plant is operating below 29.5% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 29.5%

APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint without operator action. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

An OPRM Upscale trip is issued from an APRM channel when the PBDA in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel trip. An OPRM Upscale trip is also issued from the channel if either the GRA or ABA detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel.

There are four "sets" of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters: a) OPRM trip auto-enable setpoints for APRM Simulated Thermal Power (29.5%) and drive flow (60%); b) PBDA confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; c) PBDA tuning parameters; and d) GRA and ABA setpoints.

The first set, the OPRM auto-enable region setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints without the application of setpoint methodology per Reference 18. The settings, 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power and 60% drive flow, are defined (limit values) in and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 16, and are documented in the COLR. There are no Technical Specifications allowable values for these setpoints. The third set, the OPRM PBDA "tuning" parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by PBAPS procedures. The fourth set, the GRA and ABA setpoints, in accordance with References 14,15 and 16, are established as nominal values only, and are controlled by PBAPS procedures.

PBECR 99-0oDrffi Rev R

3.3.1a 1

Attachment Page 7.VL.of RPS 3srumntai1 Dwg Sht Rev-BASES initials i ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g.,

as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

)Ole.

As noted, Action A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 12.a, 2.b. 2.c,<

2.d, I Inoperability of one required APRM channel affects both trip systems.

For that condition, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

B.1 and B.2 Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13 for the 12.hour Completion Time. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the associated Function will have all required channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-24 Revision No. 36

PBAECaR 9f- 00J Rev RPS Instrumentation Dwg______

Sht Rev BASES initials.

ACTIONS B.] and B.2 (continued)

ComDleting one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level equivalent to that evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13, which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A. The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).

If this action would result in a scram or RPT, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram, Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Condition B is~not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.dX Inoperability of an APRM channel affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRM 2-Out-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies.- For an inoperable APRM channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single fai ure.

lnoperability of more than one required AP channel results in loss of trip caabilit Vand entry into Condition l

, as well as entry into Condition A for each 4X +kst A-^c channel.

Because Condition A and C provide Required Actions that are appropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b. 2.c and these functions are not associated wit specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-Out-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels, Condition B does not I

apply.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.3-25 Revision No. 36

PBECR 49 cx20,2-Rev Attachment Page 72 of Dwg Sht Rev initials

=QP7 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued) aF.IG. 1 TA.

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

In addition, the Completion Time of Required ActioraE.1 (0,consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2., "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."

O.V>Jk 3:1Ac If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 9, 12 & 13) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.

That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

Lcnntiniied1 I

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-27 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13:

1.1 If OPRM Upscale trip capability is not maintained, Condition I exists. References 12 and 13 justified use of alternate methods to detect and suppress oscillations for a limited period of time.

The alternate methods are procedurally established consistent with the guidelines Identified in Reference 17 requiring manual operator action to scram the plant if certain predefined events occur. The 12-hour allowed Completion Time for Required Action 1.1 is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place.

Based on the small probability of an Instability event occurring at all, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months duration is judged to be reasonable.

1.2 The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented In accordance with 1.1 was evaluated (References 12 and 13) based on use up to 120 days only. The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120 day period was negligibly small. The 120-day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis might be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithms or equipment. This action is not Intended and was not evaluated as a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status. Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the completion times allowed for Actions for Condition A.

A note is provided to indicate that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. The intent of that note is to allow plant startup while operating within the 120-day completion time for action 1.2. The primary purpose of this exclusion is to allow an orderly completion of design and verification activities, in the event of a required design change, without undue impact on plant operation.

PB ECR 99-000/5 Rev AtachmentPage2 Lof RPS Instrumentation Dwg B 3.3.1.1 Sht Rev initials o'is-BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.14 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS In addition, Function 5 and 7 instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due to high radiation and the installed indication instrumentation does not provide accurate indication of the trip setting. For the Function 9 channels, verification that the trip settings are less than or equal to the specified Allowable Value during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required since the instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due to high radiation and the installed indication instrumentation does not provided accurate indication of the trip setting. Waiver of these verifications for the above functions is considered acceptable since the magnitude of drift assumed in the setpoint calculation is based on a 24 month calibration interval. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.12. SR 3.3.1.1.15.

and SR 3.3.1.1.16 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the current plant specific setol____

odlog. bR>33.1t^16 3owpeer, Si gog-ty-A As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.12, neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-32 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13a:

As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.10, radiation detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION due to ALARA reasons (when the plant is operating, the radiation detectors are generally in a high radiation area; the steam tunnel). This exclusion is acceptable because the radiation detectors are passive devices, with minimal drift. To complete the radiation CHANNEL CALIBRATION, SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires that the radiation detectors be calibrated on a once per 24 months Frequency.

The once per 92 days Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.10 is conservative with respect to the magnitude of equipment drift assumed in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.16 is based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

PBECR W-Cefl-f Rev RPS Instrumentation Aadchmentage UZ of _

8 3.3.1.1 Dwg Sht Rev BASES initis SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.12. SR 3.3.1.1.15, REQUIREMENTS and SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued) neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) e-ve~

and the 1000 MWD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs KSR 3.3.1.1.8.

A second note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 t I1b6P'4.,

that a ows e~l WRNM SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 WRNM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1, if the 24 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of roviding a reasonable tim in which to comolete the SR. F the RM Simue "Therm Power 'iga F fiction SR 3.3.1.12 iso inc des cali ating' he ass ciated recirc ation oop flow channe A

ird no e is.p vided or SR.3.1.1 2 to in ude th r circul ion fi w tran itters that f ed the A s as oDlie to Fun ion 2.

The veraq Power R ae Mo tar A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the (continued) i PBAPS UNIT 2 8 3.3-33 Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13b:

A third note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 that includes in the SR the recirculation flow (drive flow) transmitters, which supply the flow signal to the APRMs. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) and the OPRM Upscale Function (Function 2.0, both require a valid drive flow signal. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Upscale Function uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Upscale trip output to RPS. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the APRM drive flow signal requires both calibrating the drive flow transmitters and establishing a valid drive flow / core flow relationship. The drive flow I core flow relationship is established once per refuel cycle, while operating at or near rated power and flow conditions.

This method of correlating core flow and drive flow is consistent with GE recommendations. Changes throughout the cycle In the drive flow / core flow relationship due to the changing thermal hydraulic operating conditions of the core are accounted for in the margins included in the bases or analyses used to establish the setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function and the OPRM Upscale Function.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.1.1.12 and SR 3.3.1.1.15 are based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (IS.z1t tgAl I

SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued) tSE intended function.

For the APRM Functions this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels.{ The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing - applicable to Function 2.b only), the 2-Out-Of 4 voter channels, and the interface connections into the RPS trip systems from the voter channels.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.11 is based on the reliability analyses of References 12 and 13.

(NOTE: The actual voting logic of the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.17.)

A Note is provided for Function 2.a that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

A second Note is provided for Function 2.b that clarifies that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Function 2.b includes testing of the recirculation flow processing electronics, excluding the flow transmitters.

This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the Allowable Value (s 28.9% RTP which is equivalent to s 138.4 psig as measured from turbine first stage pressure) and the actual setpoint.

Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER 2 29.5% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.

If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e.,

the Functions are bypassed at 2 29.5% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the (continued)

I -

I I

I PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-34 Revision No.43

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13c:

The scope of the APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is limited to verification of system trip output hardware. Software controlled functions are tested only incidentally. Automatic internal self-test functions check the EPROMs in which the software-controlled logic is defined. Any changes in the EPROMs will be detected by the self-test function resulting in a trip and/or alarm condition.

INSERT 13d:

and the auto-enable portion of Function 2.f INSERT 13e:

The actual auto-enable setpoints for the OPRM Upscale trip are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19.

PB ECR 9qicfor Rev Attachment Page.Y -of Dwg Sht Rev BASES initias VA*/

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 SURVEI LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued) affected Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).

placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

If The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a'specific channel.

The functional'testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDY vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8),

overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates AP trip conditions at the 2-Out-Of-4 voter vc&

OPn,2.~

channer Hinpu sto check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-Out-Of-4 logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

SR 3.3.1.1.18 This SR ensures that the are maintained less than i value. The RPS RESPONSE -

included in Reference 11.

individual channel response times or equal to the original design TIME acceptance criterion is RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month Frequency. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the PBAPS refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

I I

BIo (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-35 Revision No. 36

ECR# PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 14:

SR 3.3.1.1.19 This surveillance involves confirming the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoints. The auto-enable setpoint values are considered to be nominal values as discussed in Reference 18. This surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale trip is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and core flow (SR 3.3.1.1.12), respectively.

If any auto-enable setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale trip is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power > 29.5% and recirculation drive flow < 60%), then the affected channel Is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function. Alternatively, the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint(s) may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (not bypassed). If the OPRM Upscale trip is placed in the not-bypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

PB ECR

?

Rev Attachment Page of Dwg initials Re

=

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.

2.

UFSAR, Chapter 14.

3.

NEDO-32368, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Wide Range Neutron Monitoring System Licensing Report for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3,"

November 1994.

4.

NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom 2 & 3," dated May 1993.

5.

UFSAR, Section 14.6.2.

6.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.4.

7.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.

8.

P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC),

BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

9.

NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"

March 1988.

10.

MDE-87-0485-1, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Reactor Protection System for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3,' October 1987.

11.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.9.

12.

NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM)

,_-'-<Reroit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function",

1995.

13.

NEDC-32410P Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function, Supplement 1", November 1997.

(, K-

-S----w

/

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-35a Revision No. 36

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 15:

14.

NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

15.

NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

16.

NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

17.

Letter, L. A. England (BWROG) to M. J. Virgilio, 'BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action", June 6, 1994.

18.

BWROG Letter 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L. E. Phillips (NRC), "Guidelines for Stability Option IlIl 'Enable Region' (TAC M92882)," September 17,1996.

19.

NEDO-24229-1, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

PBECR 9q-c"s Rev Recirculation Loops Operating Attachment Page.Z of_

B 3.4.1 Dwg Sht -

Rev BASES inifils Jo APPLICABLE Plant specific LOCA and average power range monitor/rod SAFETY ANALYSES block monitor Technical Specification/maximum extended load (continued) line limit analyses have been performed assuming only one operating recirculation loop.

These analyses demonstrate that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling (Refs. 2, 3, and 4).

The transient analyses of Chapter 14 of the UFSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 5) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The MCPR limits and APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFACw, and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFAC,) for single loop operation are specified in the COIR.

The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value is in LCO 3.3.1.1, 'Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."

Safe analyses erforme for UFS Chapter Implci; as me core ditions re sta Howeve, at the igh ower/low ow corn of the ower/flow dp, an i reased probabi y for V it cycl oscillati s exists Ref. 6) depen ng on c inatlo of operat g condif ns (e.g.,

Po

shape, undle p er, and bu e flow Generic faluatia indicat that when gional er ascil ions become tectable n the AP

, the sa ty margin ay be insuf cient unir some oeating Co itlons t nsure ac ions taken to respon:

to the AP s signal would pr ent olation the MCP afety Li (Ref. 7.

NRC G ic Letter 8o2 (Ref.

address stabili calcula on method ogy and ated tha ue to un rtaintie, 10 CFR i@;

Appe Ix A, G eral Desi ZCriteri GC)

G 10 d 12 cou no be met ing analy c proced es on a 4 desig

owever, ference conclude hat ope ing limit ions which ovide for e detec on (by m itoring n ron flux nois evels) suppre on of fl oscillat ns in op ating re ons of p ential i ability sistent with (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-3 Revision No. 36

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANAI (continue t e recomm 'ations of Ref ence 6 are acc potable to LYSES demonstr e compliance w h GDC 10 and 1 The NRC

?d) conclued that regions/of potential ins ability could occur at culated decay atios of 0.8 or reater by the Gen 1 al E ctric methodo

y.

/

Stability tes at operating BW were reviewed t/determine a generic r ion of the power/ low map in which /durveillanc of neutron lux noise level should be perfor d. A conserva ye decay ratio s chosen as the basis for determ'ing the generic egion for surveil nce to acc nt for e plant to plan variability of dery ratio wi core an/fuel designs. T is decay ratio al helps ensue fficient margin o an instability currence is/

maintained.

The/generic region ("

stricted" R ion of Figure 3.4.1-1 has been determin d to be bouned by the 78.7% rod li and the 45% core/low line.

is conforms o Reference recommendations.

peration is ermitted in e "Restric d" Region when tw recirculati loops are i operatirn provided neutro flux noise 1evels are yen ied to be wi tin limits.

Oper ion is permi ed in the "Re tricted' Region w n only one r irculation 1Ip is in op ration provided re flow is >

%9 of rated care flow and eutron flux level are verifiedto be within mits.

Single recircul ion loop operaion in the "

stricted" Region with coue flow

39X o rated core f ow shall be avoided due the increas potential fopthermal hydr lic instabilit in this condi ion.

The "Unr stricted" Re on of Figure 3.1-1 is the a ea of the powe /flow map whene unrestrcted operatio (with respect o thermal hy aulic stabi ty concerns) s allowed, an includes any rea not sho n as the "Res icted" Region the figure.

The full p er/flow map i not shown in Figure 3.4.1-1 o enhance the readability of he bounds of

'e Restricted" Region.

Operation ou ide the bounds f Figure 3.4. -1 is governed by the pla operating prof dures./

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

-J LCO Two recirculation loops are normally required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the (continued)

)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-4 Revision No. 43

PBECR 71"-04/65 Rev Recirculation Loops Operating Attachment Page I-of B 3.4.1 Dwg Sht Rev BASES initials LCO assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied.

POE tustt if th0n~srptdv~eiN a g~e :Z.1j.

IEMUPORYesu S e SlOW fab t Ri ions J Alternatively, with only one recirculation oop in operation, modifications to the required APLHGR limits (power-and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFAC, and MAPFAC,, respectively of LCO 3.2.1, 'AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)'), MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2,

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)-) and APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value (LCD 3.3.1.1) must be applied to allow continued ope-r-ation consistent with the assumptions of Referencei S The LCO is modified by a Note which allows up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months before having to put in effect the required modifications to required limits after a change in the reactor operating conditions from two recirculation loops operating to single recirculation loop operation. If the required limits are not in compliance with the applicable requirements at the end of this period, the associated equipment must be declared inoperable or the limits "not satisfied," and the ACTIONS required by nonconformance with the applicable specifications implemented. This time is provided due to the need to stabilize operation with one recirculation loop, including the procedural ste s necessar to limit flow in the operating loopdm; toja )E@Rl eO mshitp i

y 1E A

uhn e

ye and the complexity and detail required to fully implement and confirm the required limit modifications.

APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-5 Revision No. 36

PB ECR _99________

Rev Recirculation Loops Operating Attachment Page q..

of_

B 3.4.1 Dwg Sht Rev BASES initials ACTIONS A.l W

one o two re *rculati loops i operation with cor ow as functia of THE L POWER'n the "Re ricted" Region f Figur 3.4.1-1 the pla is opera ng in a egion wher the pot tial for/thermal ydraulic i stabilit ex'ts. In rder to ssure su icient ma in is pr vided f r operat respon to det t and sup ess pot ial limit cycle as llation APRM an local po r range nitor (LP neutron lux noi levels mint be per odically Ma tored an verified a be s 4 and s 3 mes basell ise level.

Detec r levels and C o one LPRM s ing per core Liadrant us detec rs A and of one LP string in the nter of e core all be ma itored.

A nimum of three PRMs sha also b monitored The Compl ion Time of is verif 'ation (w hin 1 ho and once r 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months th eafter d within hour af r completio of any IRMAL WER incr ase 2 5% TED THE L POWER) a accepta e for ensurin otentia limit cyc e oscillati s are de cted to allow erator sponse to uppress th oscillat In. These Comp tion Ti s were de loped cons ering th operator's in rent kn edge of actor stat and sen tivity to tential ermal hy aulic inst ilities en operat g in his con tion.

B.1 Ith the quired Ac an and as ciated pletion me of Conditi A not me, sufficiet margin ay not be vailable for o rator res nse to s ress pot tial limK cycle osci ations s ce APRM a LPRM4 neu on flux ise 1ev s may'be > 4% d > 3 ti s baseli, noise 1ev s. As sult, ac aon must b immediat y initiaed to reare, noise le ls to wit n requird limits.

he 2 h r Comple on Time f restor g APRM an PRM ne ron flux nois levels to ithin r uired li s is ac ptable b use it inimizes sk whil allowing me for storatlo efore s jecting e plant transi s assoc ted wit utdown.

(continued)

/

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-6 Revision No. 36

Recirculation Loops Operatinig B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With the requirements of the LCO not met the rec ucilattionKl oopsitst restore to operation wi matched flows within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

A recirculation loop is considered not in operation when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits. The loop with the lower flow must be considered not in oneration. (Oweyer./the fliow rite/ofobothilpoos/shal1'

_a LOCA occur with onerecfrcuaion loop not in operation, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses.

Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to operating limits and RPS setpoints, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-7 Revision No. 1

PB ECR 5M9Rev....Rev_

Recirculation Loops Operating Attachment Page LZ. of B 3.4.1 Dwg Sht Rev BASES initials ACTIONS (continued)

This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps. If zero or reverse flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.

ui-ed ction and associated Completion Time of n

-o Are Cu-Lott o

Condition not met, the plant must be brought to a looo5os p

MODE in whicDthe LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics.

The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

{ it reci atio p in X rtion /the pigtmus I bx~ght to tMOE IB which tiLCO do nnt aRFy A ton J st be iita b'mmeda ' to red te TER L POE't 0y

/

ihatetnostr icted, gion ofFgue.411o aspire th I1 hyd ulic stabity conc s ar address ant is en requirrto be aced i ODE 3 6 h rs.

/'In this ondition he reci fulatioops e notfqiiry to beJ perating ecause o the re ced se rity OBAs d

minia dpendfneo hercr~ain~o osdw har cteris dcs I

Thtalw~~mpltt Ti~zsra nable

/t rach AWDE 3 cotieriqh oJtalfeterSl

< /

hyrau Wc insa t in is c in (continued)

/

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-8 Revision No. 1

Reiclto op prtn Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch.

At low core flow (i.e.,

< 71.75 X 10' lbm/hr), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr.

The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of core flow.

(Rated core flow is 102.5 X 106 lbm/hr. The first limit is based on mismatch

10% of rated core flow when operating at < 70% of rated core flow. The second limit is based on mismatch s 5%

of rated core flow when operating at 2 70% of rated core flow.) If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in o~eration.

( CHoe~or the urposos of perormingAR 3.4<I.L,,te) bo loops/ shall be/used.) /

e-R i's n otf required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation.

The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both loops are in operation.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by operating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.

h en reacto O

ER.,.and cor flo por itin a 6priate par>Me lmt orevent unc~nnTle

}

oe~~ila t

ost low reci r t on f~lows

,5d high A ctor power e reactor ex its increas susceptibi y

to therma draulic inst ity.

Fig 3.4.1-1 is ed on guj nce provided eferences nd 9 which used to r

ond to operat in these c itions.

Th 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months requency is sed on operag experiencnd the operator inherent kno dge of reac status, in ding sig c

ant chang THERMALP and core fl (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-9 Revision No. 43

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES REFERENCES

1.

UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2.

NEOC-32163P, "PBAPS Units 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," January 1993.

3.

NEDC-32162P, "Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 and 3," Revision 1, February 1993.

4.

NEDC-32428P, 'Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 Cycle 11 ARTS Thermal Limits Analyses," December 1994.

5.

NEDO-24229-1, "PBAPS Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

6.

GE ervice I formation etter No 0, "W ore g

rmal alic St lity, 7 ision 1 Fbruary NRC B letin 88 7, "Power scillati ns in Boi g Wat r Reactor (BWRs),Po upplement

, Decem 30, N4RC Gener cLetter

-02, "Tec ical Reso ution of )

Generic ssue 8-19 hermal Hy raulic Sta ii ity,"

/

Januar 22, 1986.

NEDC-33064P, "Safety Analysis Report For Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 & 3 Thermal Power Optimization,' May 2002.

0

,q)

I PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-10 Revision No. 43

PB ECR 5yCfOAws Rev-Atchment Page of Reporting Requirements Sht Rev 5.6 initials 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a.

Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

1. The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1;

2. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.3.2.1;

3.

The Line Neat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.3;QP

4.

The Control Rod Block Instrumentation for Specification

(

.SE2'[t 3..2 332

b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:

1.

NEDE-24011-P-A, 'General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel' (latest approved version as specified in the COLR);

2.

NEDC-32162P, "Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3,' Revision 2, March, 1995;

3.

PECo-FMS-0001-A, "Steady-State Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 using the FIBWR Computer Code";

4.

PECo-FMS-0002-A, "Method for Calculating Transient Critical Power Ratios for Boiling Water Reactors (RETRAN-TCPPECo)";

5.

PECo-FMS-0003-A, "Steady-State Fuel Performance Methods Report";

6.

PECo-FMS-0004-A, "Methods for Performing BWR Systems Transient Analysis";

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 5.0-21 Amendment No. 236

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 16:

5.

The Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Instrumentation for Specification 3.3.1.1.

PB ECR 99-02,6-Rev Attachment Page.15 of_

Dwg Sht Rev inridals 04 J___

Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.5 Reporting Requirements 5.6.5 CORE OPERATTNG LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

(continued)

7.

PECo-FMS-0005-A, "Methods for Perf rming BWR Steady-State Reactor Physics AnalysisO;

8.

PECo-FMS-0006-A, "ottha4_for Performing BWR Reload Safety Evaluation tce ay

c. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) limits, nuclear limits such as SDM, transient analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

d.

The COLR, including any midcycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

Post Accident Monitorino (PAM) Instrumentation Report 5.6.6 When a report is required by Condition B or F of LCO 3.3.3.1,

'Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

. PAPS UNIT 2 S. D-22 Amendment No.

> 214

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 17:

9.

NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page /V 0;4~

TECH SPEC MARKUP for Stability (PRNM) OPRM Trip Activation MOD at PEACH BOTTOM UNIT 3

02403, 02/03/i PB ECR 77 - Ad RVen Attachment Page al oa Dwg Sht Rex initials.

/

AMr_....

f-DIR. LICENSING X

v RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 APPLICABILITY:

The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS Separate Condition entry is NOTE--

allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

trip.

DR A.2

NOTE---------

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Not applicable for (r

Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c.

Place associated trip system in trip.

B. ----

NOTE--

BI Place channel in one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable for trip system In trip.

Functions 2.a, Z.b, z.c, 4-Zd ox DR.

Q One or more Functions B.2 Place one trip system 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with one or more in trip.

required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

(continued)

/

PBAFS UNIT:3 3.3-1 Amendment No. 234 I

PB ECR 99°=:S Rev Attachment Page IL. of Dwg Sht Rev initials RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTTION (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action D.1 fully insert all and referenced in insertable control Table 3.3.1.1-1.

rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of

-required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.1.1.2

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER x 25% RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between 7 days the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is

< 2% RTP while operating at - 25% RTP.

(

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3 -3 Amendment No. 214

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 1:

I.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

1.1 Initiate alternate method to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillations.

AND 1.2

NOTE----------------

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 120 days Restore required channels to OPERABLE.

J.

Required Action and J.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion Time

<25% RTP.

of Condition I not met.

U&# U.D, 02/C PBECR 9

-czxr Rev AttachmentPage /Ly of Dwg

I Sht _

Rev -

initials A DIR. LICENiSING RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.X.1.10 NOTE-Radiation detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

92 days SR 3.3.1..11

- ------NOTES ---------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE I until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

2. For Functioi 2.b the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.1Z NOTES-----

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

3. For Funct1onA2.bt.

the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are Included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months (continued)

I PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-5 Amendment No. 234

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Calibrate each radiation detector.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.17 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.18 Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months limits.

I I

-7 PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-6 Amendment No. 250

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page _

TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 2:

SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM Simulated 24 months Thermal Power is 2 29.5% and recirculation drive flow is

< 60%.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1

. Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page I of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Wide Range Neutron Monitors

a. Period-Short 2

5(a) 3 3

3 G

SR SR SR SR SR H

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.1B 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1. 18 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.17 2 13 seconds 2 13 seconds NA

b. Inop 2

5(a) 3 H

SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.17 NA

2. Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

b. Simulated Thermal Power-High

c.

Neutron Flux-High

d. Inop

e. 2-Dut-Of-4 Voter 2

1 1

1.2 1.2 3 (c) 3(c) 3 (c) 3 (c) 2 6

SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR G

SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3. 1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3..1.12 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 1s l5.0 RTP s 0.65 W

+ 63.7S RTP(b) and s 118.0S RTP s 119.7S RTP NA NA I

I

<-GIiim (continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

I(b)

W I

63.7!_ 0 656 RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1. 'Recirculation Loops Operating.'

(c) Each APRM channel provides puts to oth tr I

i r, -ZI~s_

ar SA PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-7 Amendment No. 250

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 3:

f.

OPRM Upscale 2 25%

RTP 3(c)

I SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.19 NA(d)

INSERT 3A:

(d)

See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

__e

PB ECR 9Waz"6 Rev I

Attachment Pagei/_22. of initials DIja. LICENS!NC Nu DI:

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 One recirculation loop shall be in operti__on with co VAg Fig6re Y4J.Z15xdXth~e foll1ow g1im ts Ip ~

the asSOIc la LI ls applicable:

a. LCO 3.2.1. "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specift26>ln the COLR; Au)i

b. LCD 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),

single

-loop operation limits specified in the COLR: and C.

LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation,. Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

I

-u------------

u I r t-_

Required limit modifications for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY:

I PBAPS UNIT ~3 MODES I and 2.

3.4-1 Amendment No. 234

P3L3 HuK I I--I-CU Attachment Page /1 ° of -

Dwg Sht Rev -

initials A

&/

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 I

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-2 Amendment No. 214

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-3 Amendment No. 214

Attachment Page liZ of_

Dwg Sht Rev initials Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both recirculation loops are in operation.

Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is:

a. s 10.25 X 106 ibm/hr when operating at

< 71.75 X 106 Ibm/hr; and

b. < 5.125 X 106 Ibm/hr when operating at 2 71.75 X 106 Ibm/hr.

I PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-4 Amendment No. 214

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3BAPS UNIT 3 3.4-5 Amendment No. 250

us. %

-w 02/03/00 TRU 13:40 FAX 610 640 6773 DIR. LICENsnu.

PBECR 9

Rev RPS Instrumentation Attachment Page JILL of B 3.3.1.1 Dwg Sht -

Rev BASES initials APPLICABLE l.b.

wide Range Neutron Monitor-Tnoo (continued)

SAFETY AflALYSES, LCO, and Six channels of the Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop APPLICABILITY Function, with three channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

Since this Function is not assumed in the safety analysis, there is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function is required.

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary Indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases.

The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an Indication of the power distribution and local power changes.

The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous Indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

-0 4-The APRH System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four Voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one. RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed.

APRM will result in a "half-trip" in all four of the Voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system. 9rk4; tri from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a ful trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn I results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip systemv,7 us 1I4SE resulting in a full scram signal. ^Three of the foUrtAPRH annels and a our of voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APR14 f U

,%%0r6at least 20 LPRM inputs, with g osevr %

a east ree LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRts are located, must be operable for each APRM channel, and the number of LPRH inputs that have become inoperable (and bypassed) since the last APRM calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) must be less than ten for each APRM4 channel.,(oninud PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-7 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 4:

Each APRM also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

INSERT 5:

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f.

Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d INSERT 6:

logic channel (Al, A2, BI, and B2)

INSERT 7:

Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels.

INSERT 8:

Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c INSERT 9:

For the OPRM Upscale, Function 2.f, LPRMs are assigned to 'cells" of 3 or 4 detectors. A minimum of 25 cells, each with a minimum of 2 OPERABLE LPRMs, must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE.

PB ECR.9l-VEY.Ž Rev Attachment Page //L of Dwg Sht Rev initials au&Zi RPS tnstrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES I

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY I

2.a. Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

(continued)

For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range. For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function because of the relative setpoints. At higher power levels, It is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function. However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed'25% RT? (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25% RTP.

I The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant Increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

I I

l The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b.

Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors average neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMPL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power CA experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High t

unction Allowable Value.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-8 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 9a:

A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires the flow value, used in the Allowable Value equation, be reduced by AW. The value of AW is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pumps associated with the inactive recirculation loop. The Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two loop operation. The value of AW is plant specific and is defined in plant procedures. The Allowable Value equation for single loop operation is only valid for flows down to W = AW; the Allowable Value does not go below 63.7% RTP. This is acceptable because back flow in the inactive recirculation loop is only evident with drive flows of approximately 35% or greater (Reference 19).

02/03/00 TliU 1mu o

rn" TV.__

02/03/00 THU 13:47 FrA.

Olu o4c 6773 DIR. LICENsi&NQ PB ECR 926a-.

ARi Attachment Page I6 of -

Dwg Sht Rev -

initial s RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES I APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES.

LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.d.

Average Power Ran-ge Monitor-Inop Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APR1 Functions.

This Function (Inop) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APR1 channel. any time its mode switch is not in the Operate* position. an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APR14 channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more

!,I APRM channels result in a trip output from each bthe four voter channels to it's associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

7..e.

-Out-nf-4 Voter C1"___>0:y1__r:D0 The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between the APRM Functionstand the final RPS trip system logic. As such, It is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions.

Therefore, the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function needs to be OPERABLE in MODES I and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE.

Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions.

If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the

\\ associated trip system.

r ~-; E_ D 4 -tL-s-There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(continuedl I

PBAPS UNIT B 3.3-12 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 10:

, including the OPRM Upscale Function, INSERT 11:

The 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module includes 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2.f. This voting is accomplished by the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware in the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module. Each 2-Out-Of-4 Voter includes two redundant sets of outputs to RPS. Each output set contains two independent contacts; one contact for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c and 2.d, and the other contact for Function 2.f. The analysis in Reference 12 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable. However, the voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the plant interface portions of the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module that are not necessary to perform the 2-Out-Of -4 Voter function.

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 12:

2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale The OPRM Upscale Function provides compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 and 12, thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 14, 15 and 16 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (PBDA), the amplitude based algorithm (ABA), and the growth rate algorithm (GRA). All three are implemented in the OPRM Upscale Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the PBDA. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Upscale Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specifications purposes is based only on the PBDA.

The OPRM Upscale Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into ucells" for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPRM Upscale trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5%

RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is < 60% of rated flow, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations may occur (Reference 18). These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the 'auto-bypass" setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Upscale trip enabled region.

The OPRM Upscale Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at 2 25% RTP. The 25%

RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring while the plant is operating below 29.5% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 29.5%

APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint without operator action. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

An OPRM Upscale trip is issued from an APRM channel when the PBDA in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel trip. An OPRM Upscale trip is also issued from the channel if either the GRA or ABA detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel.

There are four "sets' of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters: a) OPRM trip auto-enable setpoints for APRM Simulated Thermal Power (29.5%) and drive flow (60%); b) PBDA confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; c) PBDA tuning parameters; and d) GRA and ABA setpoints.

The first set, the OPRM auto-enable region setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints without the application of setpoint methodology per Reference 18. The settings, 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power and 60% drive flow, are defined (limit values) in and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 16, and are documented in the COLR. There are no Technical Specifications allowable values for these setpoints. The third set, the OPRM PBDA 'tuning" parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by PBAPS procedures. The fourth set, the GRA and ABA setpoints, in accordance with References 14, 15 and 16, are established as nominal values only, and are controlled by PBAPS procedures.

02 PB ECR '?1Oc/6 Rev DIR. LICEl sisu Attachment Page 4LZL of Dwg

Swt Rev RPS Instrumentation initials 4AiI B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.l and A.2 (continued)

Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions 8.1. 8.2. and C.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2.

Placing the Inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g.,

as in the case where placing the inoperable channel In trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken As noted, Action/A.2 is no appLcable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.

c, 4&:5 Inoperability of one required APR4 channel affects both trip systems.

For that condition, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and Is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure. Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entery into Condition A for each channel.

B-l1and W.2 Condition B exists when. for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failurb in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13 for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the associated Function will have all required channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

{contAnued)

PSAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-24 Revision No. 30 Il I

0?'

Or PB ECR '

Rev 3

DIR. LIlSZXC Attachment Page 12a2 of Dwg Sh-R RPS Instrumentation ini__a__

B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS 0.1 and B.2 (continued)

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level equivalent to that evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13, which Justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A.

The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed In trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are iro the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent Judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).

If this action would result in a scram or RPT, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g.,

as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram, Condition D must be entered and its Re ui ed Action taken.

As noted, CondEf 0

B is no applicable for APRM Functions Za, Z.b, 2.c, Inoperability of an APRM channel affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRH 2-Out-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies.

For an inoperable APR1M channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring rabilit) that will restore ca ability to acconmodate a snle failure.

nopera iy o more than one required APRh channel results in loss of trip capabil tyv nd entry no on on el as entry Into Condition A for each channel.

Because Condition A and C provide Required Actions that are a, ropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions b,

ia c

i and these functions are not f

we Z-associated with specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-Out-

-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels. Condition B does not apply.

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-25 Revision No. 30

0:

PB ECR 9

.Rovo_.

Rev 3

Attachment Page 1.23 of Dwg Sht Rev initials DIR. LICENSING RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

.I J.L) d

.1 If the channel (s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system Placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required C

onsistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.Z.T,

¢MINIMuH CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR).

tu If the channel (s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed In trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MOOE or other specified condition in which the LCO doss not apply.

This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel C-Has T.

assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry Into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 9, 12 & 13) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.

That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

I PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-27 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13:

1.1 If OPRM Upscale trip capability is not maintained, Condition I exists. References 12 and 13 justified use of alternate methods to detect and suppress oscillations for a limited period of time.

The alternate methods are procedurally established consistent with the guidelines identified in Reference 17 requiring manual operator action to scram the plant if certain predefined events occur. The 12-hour allowed Completion Time for Required Action 1.1 is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place.

Based on the small probability of an instability event occurring at all, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months duration is judged to be reasonable.

1.2 The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented in accordance with 1.1 was evaluated (References 12 and 13) based on use up to 120 days only. The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120 day period was negligibly small. The 120-day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis might be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithms or equipment. This action is not Intended and was not evaluated as a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status. Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the completion times allowed for Actions for Condition A.

A note is provided to indicate that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. The intent of that note is to allow plant startup while operating within the 120-day completion time for action 1.2. The primary purpose of this exclusion is to allow an orderly completion of design and verification activities, in the event of a required design change, without undue impact on plant operation.

02/

PB ECR 71C.c-Rev Atta~hlet Page ;.LS of Dwg Sht Rev -

initials RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.14 (continued)

In addition, Function S and 7 instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due to high radiation and the installed indication instrumentation does not provide accurate indication of the trip setting.

For the Function 9 channels, verification that the trip settings are less than or equal to the specified Allowable Value during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required since the instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due.to high radiation and the installed indication Instrumentation does not provided accurate Indication of the trip setting. Waiver of these verifications for the above functions is considered acceptable since the magnitude of drift assumed in the setpoint calculation Is based on a 24 month calibration interval. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these. components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3-.3.121.12. SR 3.3.1.1.15.

and SR 3.3.1.1.16 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.

This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the current Plant specific setaoint methodolot.1S 3.lv 6

hjsT-/

fl f > l 1,Hrg1d F't

~i~n;V,?etiIt~s snga 4s4=dfrd/

As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.12. neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in (contlnuedl PHAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-32 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13a:

As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.10, radiation detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION due to ALARA reasons (when the plant is operating, the radiation detectors are generally in a high radiation area; the steam tunnel). This exclusion is acceptable because the radiation detectors are passive devices, with minimal drift. To complete the radiation CHANNEL CALIBRATION, SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires that the radiation detectors be calibrated on a once per 24 months Frequency.

The once per 92 days Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.10 is conservative with respect to the magnitude of equipment drift assumed in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.16 is based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

PB ECR Rev AttaihmentTPage, L of

'Dwg Sht Rev initials 9YfiZ RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS W

b, s-1 S

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.12. SR 3.31.1.,15.

and SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued) neutron detector sensitivity aro compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 MVD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 Oat a II ows tFe WRNM SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 WRNM Functions cannot be performed in MODE I without utilizing Jumpers, lifted.leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1, if the 24 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and In consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the ;RfrsTP e PPRM I

IC Ii A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the

..continued.

PBAPS UNIT 3:

B 3.3-33 Revision No. 30 PRAPS UNIT 3:

9 3.3-33 Revision No. 30

ECR 1# PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13b:

A third note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 that includes in the SR the recirculation flow (drive flow) transmitters, which supply the flow signal to the APRMs. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) and the OPRM Upscale Function (Function 2.0, both require a valid drive flow signal. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Upscale Function uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Upscale trip output to RPS. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the APRM drive flow signal requires both calibrating the drive flow transmitters and establishing a valid drive flow / core flow relationship. The drive flow / core flow relationship is established once per refuel cycle, while operating at or near rated power and flow conditions.

This method of correlating core flow and drive flow is consistent with GE recommendations. Changes throughout the cycle in the drive flow / core flow relationship due to the changing thermal hydraulic operating conditions of the core are accounted for in the margins included in the bases or analyses used to establish the setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function and the OPRM Upscale Function.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.1.1.12 and SR 3.3.1.1.15 are based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration Interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued) intended function.

For the APRM Functions, !his test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing - applicable to Function 2.b Nonly), the 2-Out-Of 4 voter channels, and the interface connections into the RPS trip systems from the voter channels.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.11 is based on the reliability analyses of References 12 and 13.

(NOTE: The actual voting logic of the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.17>)

QiiE3e A Note is provided for Function 2.a that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads.

This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

A second Note is provided for Function 2.b that clarifies that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Function 2.b includes testing of the recirculation flow processing electronics, excluding the flow transmitters.

SR 3.3.1.1.13 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

This involves calibration of the bypass channels.

Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the Allowable Value (5 28.9% RTP which is equivalent to

138.4 psig as measured from turbine first stage pressure) and the actual setpoint.

Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER 2 29.5% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.

I I

If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e.,

the Functions are bypassed at 2 29.5% RTP, either due to open I main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-34 Revision No. 45

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 13c:

The scope of the APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is limited to verification of system trip output hardware. Software controlled functions are tested only incidentally. Automatic internal self-test functions check the EPROMs in which the software-controlled logic is defined. Any changes in the EPROMs will be detected by the self-test function resulting in a trip and/or alarm condition.

INSERT 13d:

and the auto-enable portion of Function 2.f INSERT 13e:

The actual auto-enable setpoints for the OPRM Upscale trip are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19.

oz/JJS 1/

0203/

PBECR 9 Rev Attachment Page /3t of Dwg Sht Rev initials 4__

DIP~. LIMSZ'31C muj "s.X.

RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 58 3.

L.1.1 (continued) affected Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable.

Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).

placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

if The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8),

overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month frequency.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APR11 Function 2.e simulates APRM trip conditions at the 2-Out-Of-4 voter

(=1'EI input to check all combinations of two tripped Inputs to the 2-Out-Of-4 logic in the voter channels and APR4 related redundant RPS relays.

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are maintained less than or equal to the original design value.

The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 11.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month Frequency.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the PBAPS refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of Instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

bo (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3i 8 3.3-35 Revision Ho. 30 I

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 14:

SR 3.3.1.1.1 9 This surveillance involves confirming the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoints. The auto-enable setpoint values are considered to be nominal values as discussed in Reference 18. This surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale trip is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and core flow (SR 3.3.1.1.12), respectively.

If any auto-enable setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale trip is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power 2 29.5% and recirculation drive flow < 60%), then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function. Alternatively, the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint(s) may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (not bypassed). If the OPRM Upscale trip is placed in the not-bypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

02/03/00 02/03/00 1

PB ECR.F Rev Dzx.

.Lj(SZNc Attachment Page /L7 of Dwg Sht _

Rev initials *&

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.

Z. UFSAR, Chapter 14.

3.

NEDD-32368, *Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Wide Range Neutron Monitoring System Licensing Report for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3,'

November 1994.

4.

NEDC-32183P, 'Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom 2 & 3," dated May 1993.

S. UFSAR, Section 14.6.2.

6. UFSAR, Section 14.5.4.

7. UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.

B. P. Check (HRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), PBYR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

9.

NEDO-30B51-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"

March 1988.

10. MOE-87-0485-1, 'Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Reactor Protection System for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3," October 1987.

11.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.9.

12.

NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUJMAC PRNM)

Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Functiong, h995.

13.

NEDC-32410P Supplement 1, 'Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip

__________Function, Supplement 1', November 1997.

-(:

I

S:

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-36 Revision No. 30

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 15:

14.

NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

15.

NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

16.

NEDO-32465-A, Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

17.

Letter, L. A. England (BWROG) to M. J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action", June 6,1994.

18.

BWROG Letter 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L. E. Phillips (NRC), "Guidelines for Stability Option IlIl 'Enable Region' (TAC M92882)," September 17, 1996.

19.

NEDO-24229-1, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

o7z.

PB ECR o

Rev Attachment Page 1,W ofI Dwg Sht Rev_

initials S1 DIJ. LcSiSIXG Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 1013 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Plant specific LOCA and average power range monltorfrod block monitor Technical Specification/maximum extended load line limit analyses have been perforawd assuming only one operating recirculation loop.

These analyses demonstrate that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculatlon loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling (Refs. 2, 3, and 4).

-ta I

The transient analyses.of Chapter 14 of the UFSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 5) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the 1CPR requirements are modified.

During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The MCPR limits and APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFAC,, and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFAC.) for single loop operation are specified in the COLR.

The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value is in LCO 3.3-1.1, "Reactor Protection System.(RPS) Instrumentation.*

Safety a yses pea rmed for FSAR Ch er 14 1 citly assume re cond Ions are able.

H aver, at a high power ow flow raer of e power/ ow map, ncreasd pro bility limit -.

,cle oscil tions exn s (Ref.rfa d ending comb na ons of op atlng con tlons,(Cm.

ower s e, bundl power, a bundle fi

).

Gene c

evalu ons nd te that en region power os latlo bec detect e on the PRls, the afty aM n may b in ffMcIen under so operatinso nditions ensu Otins n to re ond to the PRIk sig s would vent iolati of the PR Safety imit (Ref

).

.NRC eneric Lett B6-02 (

. 8) addr sed stabi ty calcul ion met dology d stated t due to certaintas, 10 CFR 0 endix A General De gn Criter (6UC) l and 12 co d at be using ana tic proce res on a R 4 desi Howeve

, Reference concludathat op ting limit ions whic rrovide foy/the dete tion (by itoring n ron Jiux no e evels) jd suppre ion of ax oscillat s irV'

\\ operating regions of potentila i tability c sistent fcontinued)

PBAPS UNIT B 3.4-3 Revision No. 30 i

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE the recommenda ons of Rf ence 6 are a eptable to SAFETY ANALYSES demonstrate mpliance wih GDC 10 and The NRC (continued) concluded at regions f potential i stability coul occur c

t clcu fed decay r>tOs of 0.8 ogreater by thpzeea I Elect ri methodolo.

Sta ity tests t operating Rs were revie d to determine/

a generic reg'n of the pow /flow map in ich surveilla e

of neutron ux noise leve s should be peformed. A conservat~ e decay ratio/as chosen as he basis for determi ng the generi region for s veillance to count for t plant to pla variability f decay ratio ith core and el designs.

his decay ra *o also helps sure su icient margi to an instabi ity occurrenc is intained. T generic regi

("Restricted Region of Figure 3.4.1- ) has been determined to be ounded by the 78.7% rod Vne and the 45 core flow lin This confor to Reference recommendat ons.

Operatio is permitted ithe "Restriced" Region wien two recircu tion loops aroin operaion provided eutron flux noi e levels are virified to be thin limits.

Operation is p rmitted in the stricted" Regon when only o e recirculatio loop is in peration pro ded core flow is > 39% of rat core flow an neutron flu levels are ver ied to be wit n limits.

Single re rculation loop peration in t "Restricted" Region th core flow :59% of rated cope flow shall b avoid due to the in eased potentia for thermal h raulic insbility in this ondition.

The Unrestricted" egion of F ure 3.4.1-1 is he area of the rower/flow map ere nrestricted op ation (with res ect to thermal ydraulic/

stability con ins) is allowed and includes y area not shown as the 'Restricted" Regon of the fig e. The full power/flow ap is not show in Figure 3.4 -1 to enhance the readabil y of the bound of the "Restr ted" Region.

Operatjn outside the unds of Figur

.4.1-1 is governed by p nt operating pr cedures.

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two recirculation loops are normally required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-4 Revision No. 45

02Y'03/00 Tl 02/03/00 TB PB ECR 5"7 -

Rev Attachment Page i37 of =

Dwg Sht Rev initials Z/

,1e D~IR. LICESXN4 tlUl Recirculation Loops Operating 8 3.4.1 BASES LC0 I

Rp~ofon{J Alternat1vely, with only one recirculation loop noperatlon, miodifications to the required APLHGR limits (power-and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers. MAPFAC. and MAPFAC,, respectvely of LCO 3.2.1. 'AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)'),

HCPR limits (LCD 3.2.2, RMINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1) must be applied to allow continquCd operation consistent with the assumptions of Reference e

S5?

The LCO Is modified by a Note which allows up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months before having to put in effect the required modifications to required limits after a change in the reactor operating conditions from two recirculation loops operating to single recirculation loop operation. If the required limits are not in compliance with the applicable requirements at the end of this period, the associated equipment must be declared inoperable or the limits not satisfied,w and the ACTIONS required by nonconformance with the applicable specifications implemented. This time Is provided due to the need to stabilize operation with one recirculation loop, including the proced ural teps necessary to limit flow in, the operating looc.

IFhiWtEotaKrnERMAUO7R.

rmemtitr WVGr LfluX4 _I__ eYilsFand the complexity and-deyata fully Implement and confirm the required limit modifications.

APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3. 4. and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

(eontinued}

t PBAPS UNIT 3.

B 3.4-5 Revision NO.

30

0.2/3/0b PBECR

_CY5 Rev 02/03/00 T.

AttadmentPageL.of-DL LIMON u UAa Dwg Sht Rev Recirculation Loops Operating initials B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS wit otne or 0c reclrlatioops o er Ion wit core I

w as a netlon THE POWE In the Restric 0

eglon a Figur

.4.l-1, he pla is op rating I a region where potens al forIhermal ydraul instab ity axis.

In a er to sure su icent argin i provided fo operato respon to det t and ppress tential l1it le osc lation APRH a local ower rite monitor (LP neutro ux nol level /must be eriodically Mn ored an verifie a be and s times bas ine n so love Detec r level A and Cof one LP string er core uadrant us dote ors A a C of one RH stri in the enter of e core hall be nitored.

minim of thre APRMs sha also b monitor The Co etion Tmis of is verif iaton ( 'thin 1 ur and onc per 8 h rs t

reafter a within hour a er comple on of a THERMAL OWER incr se 2 5% TED TH L POWER) are acceable for ensuring otential, mit cy e oscilla ons are etected I allow o rator r ponse t suppress a ascil tIon.

se Conpi Ion Ti were d eloped co Idering e operat

's I lnh nt know dge of eartor st us and s slivity a

p Iential t riul hy aulic Ins bilitie when oper tng i Wi the R ulred Ac on knd a ociated mplet Ti me ao ndition not me, suffici t margin ay not avail a

oor opertar res ns to s press poa ntal I it cycl oscill ions sI s APRH LPRM no ron flu noise I elIS may

> 4X a

> 3 tI baseli noise vels.

a res t. act n must b immediat y

nit ted to r astore

/ nseleves to witbf requird 1Mits Te 2 tur

/

fI opt~gi Time f restori5 'APR a~

LPRM n tfran t snoise 1'eli to thin re ired l ts is a eptabl because

/it mid1es r ik hle ;<owing m~e for rsora J~n before

'sub tn t PI pant ttr nsie s assoc e d wiP shutdown.

tfontinuedl U

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-6 Revision No. 30

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.]

nd C.2 (continued) iyth pe reci cul ion op i oper ion ith re f ow

/ 3 of a d re fl an THE POWR in he stri te Reion Fig re 3.4 1-1, n in ease ten a for therm hy aulic nstab lity xists.

Asa es t, mm ate ctio shoul be i tiat to educ ATH P0R to he "

nrestricted" egio f F gure.4.1 i reaecor flo to> #

of ated ore fow.

he 4 our ompi ion ime pr ides rea nabl /amou of ime co lete the quire Actio and con idere acc table basey on t~ r ent soe mo itor ip by She op rato~

(R qure ctig A.1) alowifi Po t ntialimit/cycl Vocllaios o be icly Me ectsd With the re uirements of the LCO not met 6

a sin the recircuTatio loop6 s must Be restored to operation wi matched flows within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

A recirculation loop is considered not in operation when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits.

The loo with the lower flow must be considered not in operation.

2 wr hyfo eef~yt o6sa

\\<i~~T-d^

a¢ iLOCA -occur wiith one recirculation loop nolin operation, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses.

Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to operating limits and RPS setpoints, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-7 Revision No. 1

PB ECR 99S'5 Rev A ttachent Page 14° of_

/

Recirculation Loops Operating Slt Rev B 3.4.1 initials _i12iIfII BASES ACTIONS (continued)

This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps. If zero or reverse flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.

Action and associated Completion Time of

<&ai Condition not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in wh idhthe LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 8 3.4-8 Revision No. 1

Reiclto op prtn Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch.

At low core flow (i.e.,

< 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr.

The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of core flow.

(Rated core flow is 102.5 X 101 lbm/hr. The first limit is based on mismatch s 10% of rated core flow when operating at < 70% of rated core flow. The second limit is based on mismatch s 5%

of rated core flow when operating at 2 70% of rated core flow.)

If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in operation.

t(H~ev, u t>pryb s e,, otpeqbyrmi"w bb

,1.;z,

~t)e

\\<L~tae pT okh l6psAhaljr be/used/)? :The SR is

~not~

rwoops are not in ration since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation.

The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both loops are in operation.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by operating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.

/ _4fsSR ensures tgecorT EML POWER o

w ar>-

w~~

wthin appro~ t paaeter limitsMr~eetucn~ke power ;e~ains. At lo rgru aton fosu hgh or power, the react xhibits increa usceptibility to thermal hydrau tability. Fige 3.4.1-1 is based on guidance ded in Referen and 9 which are to respon operation in th conditions.

The our F

ncy is based o rating experienc the operators' inhe knowledge of reta r status, including signifi anges in THER R and core flow.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-9 Revision No. 45

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES REFERENCES

1.

UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2.

NEDC-32163P, -PBAPS Units 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," January 1993.

3.

NEDC-32162P, 'Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 and 3," Revision 1, February 1993.

4.

NEDC-32427P, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 Cycle 10 ARTS Thermal Limits Analyses," December 1994.

5.

NEDO-24229-1, "PBAPS Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

6.

GE Ser e Jnfor X ion Letter N 380, "

'Co Ther al Hydra c Stability,"

evisionK, Febri NRC Gener' Letter 86-Generi Issue B-19 Thy Jany ry 22, 1986. 7 NEDC-33064P, "Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 & 3 Thermal Power Optimization," May 2002.

I PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.4-10 Revision No.

45

PB ECR 77-'/5l Rev Attachment Page / Y3 of Dwg Sht Rev intials.

R6~orting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a.

Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

1. The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1;

2. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and.3.3.2.1;

3. The Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.3; The Con Rod Block Instrumentation for Specification 3.3.2~[,

b.

The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:

1.

NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel" (latest approved version as specified in the COLR);

2.

NEDC-32162P, "Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3," Revision 2, March, 1995;

3.

PECo-FMS-0001-A, "Steady-State Thermal Analysis of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 Computer Code";

Hydraulic using the FIBWR

4.

PECo-FMS-0002-A, "Method for Calculating Transient Critical Power Ratios for Boiling Water Reactors (RETRAN-TCPPECo)";

5.

PECo-FMS-0003-A, "Steady-State Fuel Performance Methods Report";

6.

PECo-FMS-0004-A, "Methods for Performing BWR Systems Transient Analysis";

(continued)

/

I PBAPS UNIT 3 5.0-21 Amendment No. 233

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 16:

5.

The Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Instrumentation for Specification 3.3.1.1.

PB ECR '9, OPPxd Rev Attachment Page Ž1r of Dwg Sht Rev initials Rep'orting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.S CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

(continued)

7.

PECo-FMS-OOO5-A, "Methods for Performing State Reactor Physics Analysis";(&

BWR Steady-S.----

8.

PECo-FMS-0006-A, for Performing BWR Reload Safety EvaluatioJ

c. The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) limits, nuclear limits such as SON, transient analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

d. The COLR, including any midcycie revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

5.6.6 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation Report When a report is required by Condition B or F of LCO 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

I PBAPS UNIT 3 5.0-22 Amendment No. ~4Z19

ECR # PB 99-00015 Rev. 0 Page TECH SPEC MARKUP INSERT 17:

9.

NEDO-32465-A, Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278 Activation of the Trip Outputs of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor Portion of the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System Typed Technical Specifications and Bases Pages for Proposed Changes UNIT 2 3.3-1 3.3-3 3.3-3a 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-7 3.4-1 3.4-2 3.4-3 3.4-4 3.4-5 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-9 B 3.3-12 B 3.3-12a B 3.3-12b B 3.3-24 B 3.3-25 UNIT 2 B 3.3-27 B 3.3-27a B 3.3-32 B 3.3-33 B 3.3-34 B 3.3-35 B 3.3-35a B 3.3-35b B 3.4-3 B 3.4-4 B 3.4-5 B 3.4-6 B 3.4-7 B 3.4-8 B 3.4-9 B 3.4-10 5.0-21 5.0-22 UNIT 3 3.3-1 3.3-3 3.3-3a 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-7 3.4-1 3.4-2 3.4-3 3.4-4 3.4-5 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-9 B 3.3-12 B 3.3-12a B 3.3-12b B 3.3-24 B 3.3-25 UNIT 3 B 3.3-27 B 3.3-27a B 3.3-32 B 3.3-33 B 3.3-34 B 3.3-35 B 3.3-36 B 3-3-36a B 3.4-3 B 3.4-4 B 3.4-5 B 3.4-6 B 3.4-7 B 3.4-8 B 3.4-9 B 3.4-10 5.0-21 5.0-22

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 APPLICABILITY:

The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS NOTE-------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

trip.

OR A.2

NOTE---------

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Place associated trip system in trip.

B. -------- NOTE---------

B.1 Place channel in one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable for trip system in trip.

Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.OR One or more Functions B.2 Place one trip system 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with one or more in trip.

required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

(continued)

I I

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3 -1 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action D.1 fully insert all and referenced in insertable control Table 3.3.1.1-1.

rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

I. As required by I.1 Initiate alternate 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 method to detect and and referenced in suppress thermal Table 3.3.1.1-1.

hydraulic instability oscillations.

AND I.2

NOTE--------

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.

J.

Required Action and J.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion to <25% RTP.

Time of Condition I not met.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-3 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.1.1.2

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between 7 days the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is

2% RTP while operating at 2 25% RTP.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-3a Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.10

NOTE-------------------

Radiation detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.11

NOTES------------------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.12

NOTES------------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

3. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months (continued)

I PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Calibrate each radiation detector.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.17 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.18 Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months limits.

SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM 24 months Simulated Thermal Power is 229.5% and recirculation drive flow is <60%.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3 -6 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1.

Wide Range Neutron Monttors

a.

Period-Short 2

5 (a) 3 3

3 G

SR SR SR SR SR H

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.17 2 13 seconds 2 13 seconds NA

b.

Inop 2

5 (a) 3 H

SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.17 NA

2.

Average Power Range Monttors

a.

Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

b.

Simulated Thermal Power-High

c.

Neutron Flux-High

d.

Inop

e.

2-Out-Of-4 Voter

f.

OPRM Upscale 2

1 1

1.2 1.2 R25P RTP 3(c) 3C(c) 3(c) 3(c)

G SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR G

SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.19 s 15.0 RTP s 0.65 W

+ 63.7S RTP(b) and s 118.0S RTP s 119.7S RTP NA NA NA(d) 3(c)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(continued)

With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

0.65 (U - AW) + 63.71 RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, 'Recirculation Loops Operating.'

Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

I PBAPS UNIT 2 3.3-7 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation.

OR One recirculation loop shall be in operation with the following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable:

a.

LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

b.

LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR; and

c.

LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

NOTE----------------------------

Required limit modifications for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-1 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY (The contents of this page have been deleted)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-2 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 Satisfy the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months LCO not met.

requirements of the LCO.

B. No recirculation B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months loops in operation.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

I I

I PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4 -3 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both recirculation loops are in operation.

Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is:

a.

10.25 X 106 lbm/hr when operating at

< 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr; and

b.

5.125 X 106 lbm/hr when operating at 2 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-4 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY (The contents of this page have been deleted)

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.4-5 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.b.

Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Six channels of the Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop APPLICABILITY Function, with three channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

Since this Function is not assumed in the safety analysis, there is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function is required.

Average Power Ranae Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes.

The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

Each APRM a so includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

The APRM System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a "half-trip' in all four of the voter channels, but no tri Dinputs to either RPS trip system.

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f.

Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bi, and B2), thus resulting in a full scram signal.

Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels. Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least 20 LPRM inputs, with at least three LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel, and the number of LPRM inputs that have become inoperable (and bypassed) since the last APRM calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) must be less than ten for each APRM channel.

For the OPRM Upscale, Function 2.f, LPRMs are assigned to "cells" of 3 or 4 detectors. A minimum of 25 cells, each with a minimum of 2 OPERABLE LPRMs, must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-7 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 2.a.

Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

(continued)

For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function because of the relative setpoints.

At higher power levels, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25% RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b. Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors average neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function Allowable Value. A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires the flow value, used in the Allowable Value equation, be reduced by AW. The value of AW (continued)

B 3.3-8 Revision No.

PBAPS UNIT 2

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 2.b.

Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High (continued) is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pum s associated with the inactive recirculation loop. The Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two loop operation. The value of AW is plant specific and is defined in plant procedures. The Allowable Value equation for single loop operation is only valid for flows down to W = AW; the Allowable Value does not go below 63.7% RTP. This is acceptable because back flow in the inactive recirculation loop is only evident with drive flows of approximately 35% or greater (Reference 19).

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function is not specifically credited in the safety analysis but is intended to provide an additional margin of protection from transient induced fuel damage during operation where recirculation flow is reduced to below the minimum required for rated power operation.

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and protects the fuel cladding integrity by ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

During these events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux scram.

For rapid neutron flux increase events, the THERMAL POWER lags the neutron flux and the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function will provide a scram signal before the Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function setpoint is exceeded.

Each APRM channel uses one total drive flow signal representative of total core flow.

The total drive flow signal is generated by the flow processing logic, part of the APRM channel, by summing up the flow calculated from two flow transmitter signal inputs, one from each of the two recirculation loop flows.

The flow processing logic OPERABILITY is part of the APRM channel OPERABILITY requirements for this Function.

The APRM flow processing logic is considered inoperable whenever it cannot deliver a flow signal less than or equal to actual Recirculation flow conditions for all steady state and transient reactor conditions while in Mode 1. Reduced or'Downscale flow conditions due to planned maintenance or testing activities during derated plant conditions (i.e. end of cycle coast down) will result in conservative setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High function, thus maintaining that function operable.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-9 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.d.

Average Power Range Monitor-Inop SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY for each of the APRM Functions.

This Function (Inop)

(continued) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is not in the "Operate" position, an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more unbypassed APRM channels result in a trip output from each of the four voter channels to it's associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

2.e.

2-Out-Of-4 Voter The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between the APRM Functions, including the OPRM Upscale Function, and the final RPS trip system logic.

As such, it is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions. Therefore, the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function needs to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE.

Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions.

If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated trip system.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module includes 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c and 2.d independently of Function 2.f.

This voting is accomplished by the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware in the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module.

Each 2-Out-Of-4 Voter includes two redundant sets of outputs to RPS.

Each output set contains two independent contacts; one contact for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c and 2.d, and the other contact for Function 2.f.

The analysis in Reference 12 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable.

However, the voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the plant interface portions of the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module that are not necessary to perform the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter function.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(rnnt-i mipti PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-12 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The OPRM Upscale Function provides compliance with 10 CFR APPLICABILITY 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 and 12, (continued) thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 14, 15 and 16 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (PBDA), the amplitude based algorithm (ABA), and the growth rate algorithm (GRA). All three are implemented in the OPRM Upscale Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the PBDA. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Upscale Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specifications purposes is based only on the PBDA.

The OPRM Upscale Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into "cells" for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPRM Upscale trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is

< 60% of rated flow, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations may occur (Reference 18). These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the "auto-bypass" setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Upscale trip enabled region.

The OPRM Upscale Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at 2 25% RTP. The 25% RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring while the plant is operating below 29.5% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint without operator action. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-12a Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

Upscale (continued)

An OPRM Upscale trip is issued from an APRM channel when the PBDA in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel trip. An OPRM Upscale trip is also issued from the channel if either the GRA or ABA detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel.

There are four "sets" of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters: a) OPRM trip auto-enable setpoints for Simulated Thermal Power (29.5%) and drive flow (60%); b)

PBDA confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; c) PBDA tuning parameters; and d) GRA and ABA setpoints.

The first set, the OPRM auto-enable region setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints without the application of setpoint methodology per Reference 18. The settings, 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power and 60% drive flow, are defined (limit values) in and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 16, and are documented in the COLR. There are no Technical Specifications allowable values for these setpoints.

The third set, the OPRM PBDA "tuning" parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by PBAPS procedures. The fourth set, the GRA and ABA setpoints, in accordance with References 14, 15 and 16, are established as nominal values only, and controlled by PBAPS procedures.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-12b Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g.,

as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Action A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Inoperability of one required APRM channel affects both trip systems.

For that condition, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

B.1 and B.2 Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13 for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the associated Function will have all required channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-24 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level equivalent to that evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13, which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A.

The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions).

The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).

If this action would result in a scram or RPT, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram, Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Condition B is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Inoperability of an APRM channel affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRM 2-Out-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies.

For an inoperable APRM channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of a Function in more than one required APRM channel results in loss of trip capability for that Function and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

Because Condition A and C provide Required Actions that are appropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f, and these functions are not associated with specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-Out-Of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels, Condition B does not apply.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-25 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1. F.1. G.1. and J.1 (continued)

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

In addition, the Completion Time of Required Actions E.1 and J.1 are consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."

HI1 If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted.

Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

If OPRM Upscale trip capability is not maintained, Condition I exists. References 12 and 13 justified use of alternate methods to detect and suppress oscillations for a limited period of time. The alternate methods are procedurally established consistent with the guidelines identified in Reference 17 requiring manual operator action to scram the plant if certain predefined events occur. The 12-hour allowed Completion Time for Required Action I.1 is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place. Based on the small probability of an instability event occurring at all, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months duration is judged to be reasonable.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-27 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS 1.2 (continued)

The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented in accordance with I.1 was evaluated (References 12 and 13) based on use up to 120 days only. The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120-day period was negligibly small. The 120-day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis might be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithms or equipment. This action is not intended and was not evaluated as a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status.

Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the completion times allowed for Actions for Condition A.

A note is provided to indicate that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. The intent of that note is to allow plant startup while operating within the 120-day completion time for action I.2. The primary purpose of this exclusion is to allow an orderly completion of design and verification activities, in the event of a required design change, without undue impact on plant operation.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 9, 12 & 13) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.

That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-27a Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.14 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS In addition, Function 5 and 7 instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due to high radiation and the installed indication instrumentation does not provide accurate indication of the trip setting.

For the Function 9 channels, verification that the trip settings are less than or equal to the specified Allowable Value during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required since the instruments are not accessible while the unit is operating at power due to high radiation and the installed indication instrumentation does not provided accurate indication of the trip setting.

Waiver of these verifications for the above functions is considered acceptable since the magnitude of drift assumed in the setpoint calculation is based on a 24 month calibration interval.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components will ass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.12. SR 3.3.1.1.15.

and SR 3.3.1.1.16 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.

This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.10, radiation detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION due to ALARA reasons (when the plant is operating, the radiation detectors are generally in a high radiation area; the steam tunnel). This exclusion is acceptable because the radiation detectors are passive devices, with minimal drift. To complete the radiation CHANNEL CALIBRATION, SR 3.3.1.1.16 requires that the radiation detectors be calibrated on a once per 24 months Frequency.

The once per 92 days Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.10 is conservative with respect to the magnitude of equipment drift assumed in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.16 is based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

As noted for SR 3.3.1.1.12, neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.

Changes in (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-32 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.10, SR 3.3.1.1.12, SR 3.3.1.1.15.

REQUIREMENTS and SR 3.3.1.1.16 (continued) neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 MWD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8).

A second note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 that allows the WRNM SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 WRNM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1, if the 24 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

A third note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.12 that includes in the SR the recirculation flow (drive flow) transmitters, which supply the flow signal to the APRMs. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) and the OPRM Upscale Function (Function 2.f), both require a valid drive flow signal. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Upscale Function uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Upscale trip output to RPS. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the APRM drive flow signal requires both calibrating the drive flow transmitters and establishing a valid drive flow /

core flow relationship. The drive flow /core flow relationship is established once per refuel cycle, while operating at or near rated power and flow conditions. This method of correlating core flow and drive flow is consistent with GE recommendations. Changes throughout the cycle in the drive flow / core flow relationship due to the changing thermal hydraulic operating conditions of the core are accounted for in the margins included in the bases or analyses used to establish the setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function and the OPRM Upscale Function.

The Frequencies of SR 3.3.1.1.12 and SR 3.3.1.1.15 are based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval used in the determination of the equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.1.1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-33 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS intended function.

For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The scope of the APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is limited to verification of system trip output hardware.

Software controlled functions are tested only incidentally. Automatic internal self-test functions check the EPROMs in which the software-controlled logic is defined.

Any changes in the EPROMs will be detected by the self-test function resulting in a trip and/or alarm condition.

The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing - applicable to Function 2.b and the auto-enable portion of Function 2.f only), the 2-Out-Of 4 voter channels, and the interface connections into the RPS trip systems from the voter channels. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.11 is based on the reliability analyses of References 12 and 13.

(NOTE: The actual voting logic of the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.17. The actual auto-enable setpoints for the OPRM Upscale trip are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19.)

A Note is provided for Function 2.a that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

A second Note is provided for Function 2.b that clarifies that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Function 2.b includes testing of the recirculation flow processing electronics, excluding the flow transmitters.

SR 3.3.1.1.13 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

This involves calibration of the bypass channels.

Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the Allowable Value (C 28.9% RTP which is equivalent to

138.4 psig as measured from turbine first stage pressure) and the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed during the calibration at THERMAL POWER 2 29.5% RTP to ensure that the calibration is valid.

If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e.,

the Functions are bypassed at 2 29.5% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-34 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS affected Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable.

Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8),

overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the 2-Out-Of-4 voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-Out-Of-4 logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

SR 3.3.1.1.18 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are maintained less than or equal to the original design value.

The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criterion is included in Reference 11.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month Frequency.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the PBAPS refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-35 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.1.19 This surveillance involves confirming the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoints. The auto-enable setpoint values are considered to be nominal values as discussed in Reference 18.

This surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale trip is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and core flow (SR 3.3.1.1.12),

respectively.

If any auto-enable setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale trip is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power 229.5% and recirculation drive flow < 60%), then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function. Alternatively, the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint(s) may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (not bypassed). If the OPRM Upscale trip is placed in the not-bypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.2.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 14.

3.

NEDO-32368, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Wide Range Neutron Monitoring System Licensing Report for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3,"

November 1994.

4.

NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom 2 & 3," dated May 1993.

5. UFSAR, Section 14.6.2.

6.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.4.

7.

UFSAR, Section 14.5.1.

8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

9.

NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-35a Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

10.

MDE-87-0485-1, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Reactor Protection System for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3," October 1987.

11.

UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.9.

12.

NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM)

Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function",

October 1995.

13.

NEDC-32410P Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function, Supplement 1", November 1997.

14.

NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

15.

NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," November 1995.

16.

NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

I

17.

Letter, L. A. England (BWROG) to M. J. Virgilio, Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action," June 6, 1994.

"BWR

18.

BWROG Letter 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L. E.

Phillips (NRC), "Guidelines for Stability Option III

'Enable Region' (TAC M92882)," September 17, 1996.

19.

NEDO-24229-1, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.3-35b Revision No.

I

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Plant specific LOCA and average power range monitor/rod block monitor Technical Specification/maximum extended load line limit analyses have been performed assuming only one operating recirculation loop. These analyses demonstrate that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling (Refs. 2, 3, and 4).

The transient analyses of Chapter 14 of the UFSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref.

5) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified.

During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow.

The MCPR limits and APLHGR limits (power-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFACP, and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFACf) for single loop operation are specified in the COLR.

The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value is in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-3 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two recirculation loops are normally required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-4 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES LCO (continued) assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied.

Alternatively, with only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLHGR limits (power-and flow-dependent APLHGR multipliers, MAPFAC, and MAPFACf, respectively of LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1) must be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the assumptions of Reference 5.

I I

The LCO is modified by a Note which allows up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months before having to put in effect the required modifications to required limits after a change in the reactor operating conditions from two recirculation loops operating to single recirculation loop operation. If the required limits are not in compliance with the applicable requirements at the end of this period, the associated equipment must be declared inoperable or the limits "not satisfied," and the ACTIONS required by nonconformance with the applicable specifications implemented. This time is provided due to the need to stabilize operation with one recirculation loop, including the procedural steps necessary to limit flow in the operating loop, and the complexity and detail required to fully implement and confirm the required limit modifications.

I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-5 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY (The contents of this page have been deleted)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-6 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

A.I With the requirements of the LCO not met, the recirculation loops must be restored to operation with matched flows within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A recirculation loop is considered not in operation when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits.

The loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation.

Should a LOCA occur with one recirculation loop not in operation, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to operating limits and RPS setpoints, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

(continued)

I I

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-7 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS Ak1 (continued)

This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits.

However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps.

If zero or reverse flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.

B11 I

With no recirculation loops in operation or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics.

The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-8 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch.

At low core flow (i.e.,

< 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr.

The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of core flow.

(Rated core flow is 102.5 X 106 lbm/hr.

The first limit is based on mismatch 5 10% of rated core flow when operating at < 70% of rated core flow.

The second limit is based on mismatch 5 5%

of rated core flow when operating at 2 70% of rated core flow.) If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered not in operation.

The SR is not required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation.

The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both loops are in operation.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by operating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-9 Revision No.

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2. NEOC-32163P, "PBAPS Units 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," January 1993.

3.

NEDC-32162P, "Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 and 3," Revision 1, February 1993.

4.

NEDC-32428P, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 Cycle 11 ARTS Thermal Limits Analyses," December 1994.

5.

NEDO-24229-1, "PBAPS Units 2 and 3 Single-Loop Operation," May 1980.

6. NEDC-33064P, "Safety Analysis Report For Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 & 3 Thermal Power Optimization," May 2002.

PBAPS UNIT 2 B 3.4-10 Revision No.

Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a.

Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

1.

The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1;

2.

The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.3.2.1;

3.

The Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.3;

4.

The Control Rod Block Instrumentation for Specification 3.3.2.1; and

5.

The Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

Instrumentation for Specification 3.3.1.1.

b.

The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the following documents:

1.

NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel" (latest approved version as specified in the COLR);

2.

NEDC-32162P, "Maximum Extended Load Line Limit and ARTS Improvement Program Analyses for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3," Revision 2, March, 1995;

3.

PECo-FMS-0001-A, "Steady-State Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 using the FIBWR Computer Code";

4.

PECo-FMS-0002-A, "Method for Calculating Transient Critical Power Ratios for Boiling Water Reactors (RETRAN-TCPPECo)";

5.

PECo-FMS-0003-A, "Steady-State Fuel Performance Methods Report";

6.

PECo-FMS-0004-A, "Methods for Performing BWR Systems Transient Analysis";

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 2 5.0-21 Amendment No.

Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

(continued)

7.

PECo-FMS-0005-A, "Methods for Performing BWR Steady-State Reactor Physics Analysis";

8.

PECo-FMS-0006-A, "Methods for Performing BWR Reload Safety Evaluations"; and

9.

NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications," August 1996.

c.

The core operating limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) limits, nuclear limits such as SDM, transient analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

d.

The COLR, including any midcycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

5.6.6 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report When a report is required by Condition B or F of LCO 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

PBAPS UNIT 2 5.0 -22 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 APPLICABILITY:

The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE---------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

trip.

OR A.2

NOTE---------

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Place associated trip system in trip.

B. --------- NOTE---------

B.1 Place channel in one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable for trip system in trip.

Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2f.

OR One or more Functions B.2 Place one trip system 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months with one or more in trip.

required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

(continued)

I I

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3 -1 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action D.1 fully insert all and referenced in insertable control Table 3.3.1.1-1.

rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

I. As required by I.1 Initiate alternate 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 method to detect and and referenced in suppress thermal Table 3.3.1.1-1.

hydraulic instability oscillations.

I.2

NOTE--------

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.

Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.

J.

Required Action and J.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion to <25% RTP.

Time of Condition I not met.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3 -3 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTES------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.1.1.2

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between 7 days the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is

2% RTP while operating at 2 25% RTP.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-3a Amendment No.

I

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.10

NOTE-------------------

Radiation detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

92 days SR 3.3.1.1.11

NOTES------------------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.12

NOTES------------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

3. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months (continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-5 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.13 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Calibrate each radiation detector.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.17 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.18 Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within 24 months limits.

SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM 24 months Simulated Thermal Power is 229.5% and recirculation drive flow is <60%.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-6 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Wide Range Neutron Monitors

a.

Period-Short 2

3 5(a)

G SR SR SR SR SR H

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 3.3.1.1.5 3.3. 1.1.17 2 13 seconds

Ž 13 seconds NA

b. Inop 2

3 5(a)

H SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.17 NA

2. Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

b. Simulated Thermal Power-High

c. Neutron Flux-High

d. Inop

e. 2-Out-Of-4 Voter 2

1 1

1.2 1,2 3(c) 3(c) 3(c) 3(c) 2 G

SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR F

SR SR SR SR SR G

SR G

SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.17 3.3.1.1.18 s 15.0S RTP s 0.65 W

+ 63.7X RTP(b) and s 118.0X RTP s 119.7S RTP NA NA

f. OPRM Upscale 225X RTP 3(c)

I SR SR SR SR SR 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.12 3.3.1.1.19 NA(d)

(a)

(b)

(c)

With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more 0.65 (U - AU) + 63.7S RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO Each APRM channel provides Inputs to both trip systems.

(continued) fuel assemblies.

3.4.1, 'Recirculation Loops Operating.'

I (d) See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

I PBAPS UNIT 3 3.3-7 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation.

OR One recirculation loop shall be in operation with the following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable:

a. LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

b.

LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR; and

c.

LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

NOTE----------------------------

Required limit modifications for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-1 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY (The contents of this page have been deleted)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4 -2 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 Satisfy the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months LCO not met.

requirements of the LCO.

B. No recirculation loops B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in operation.

DE Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

I I

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-3 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1

NOTE-------------------

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both recirculation loops are in operation.

Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is:

a.

10.25 X 106 lbm/hr when operating at

< 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr; and

b.

5.125 X 106 lbm/hr when operating at 2 71.75 X 106 lbm/hr.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months I

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4 -4 Amendment No.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY (The contents of this page have been deleted)

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.4-5 Amendment No.

RPS Instrumentation RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.b.

Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Six channels of the Wide Range Neutron Monitor-Inop APPLICABILITY Function, with three channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

Since this Function is not assumed in the safety analysis, there is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function is required.

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases.

The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

Each APRM also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

The APRM System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels.

Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system.

The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a "half-trip. in all four of the voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f.

Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d trip from any two unby assed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bi, and B2), thus resulting in a full scram signal.

Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels.

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal.

In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least 20 LPRM inputs, with at least three LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel, and the number of LPRM inputs that have become inoperable (and bypassed) since the last APRM calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) must be less than ten for each APRM channel.

For the OPRM Upscale, Function 2.f, LPRMs are assigned to "cells" of 3 or 4 detectors. A minimum of 25 cells, each with a minimum of 2 OPERABLE LPRMs, must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-7 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 2.a. Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

(continued)

For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Wide Range Neutron Monitor Period-Short Function because of the relative setpoints.

At higher power levels, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown) Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function.

However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow.

Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER

< 25% RTP.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists.

In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM and rod block monitor protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b. Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-Hiah The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors average neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant.

The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor.

The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function Allowable Value. A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires the flow value, used in the Allowable Value equation, be reduced by AW. The value of AW (continued)

B 3.3-8 Revision No.

PBAPS UNIT 3

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 2.b.

Average Power Ranae Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-Hiqh (continued) is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pumps associated with the inactive recirculation loop. The Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two loop operation. The value of AW is plant specific and is defined in plant procedures. The Allowable Value equation for single loop operation is only valid for flows down to W = aW; the Allowable Value does not go below 63.7% RTP. This is acceptable because back flow in the inactive recirculation loop is only evident with drive flows of approximately 35% or greater (Reference 19).

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function is not specifically credited in the safety analysis but is intended to provide an additional margin of protection from transient induced fuel damage during operation where recirculation flow is reduced to below the minimum required for rated power operation.

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and protects the fuel cladding integrity by ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

During these events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux scram.

For rapid neutron flux increase events, the THERMAL POWER lags the neutron flux and the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function will provide a scram signal before the Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power-High Function setpoint is exceeded.

Each APRM channel uses one total drive flow signal representative of total core flow.

The total drive flow signal is generated by the flow processing logic, part of the APRM channel, by summing up the flow calculated from two flow transmitter signal inputs, one from each of the two recirculation loop flows.

The flow processing logic OPERABILITY is part of the APRM channel OPERABILITY requirements for this Function.

The APRM flow processing logic is considered inoperable whenever it cannot deliver a flow signal less than or equal to actual Recirculation flow conditions for all steady state and transient reactor conditions while in Mode 1.

Reduced or Downscale flow conditions due to planned maintenance or testing activities during derated plant conditions (i.e. end of cycle coast down) will result in conservative setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High function, thus maintaining that function operable.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-9 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.d.

Average Power Range Monitor-Inop SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY for each of the APRM Functions. This Function (Inop)

(continued) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is not in the "Operate" position, an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels.

Inop trips from two or more unbyp assed APRM channels result in a trip output from each of the four voter channels to it's associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

2.e.

2-Out-Of-4 Voter The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between the APRM Functions, including the OPRM Upscale Function, and the final RPS trip system logic.

As such, it is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety anal sis applicable to each of those Functions. Therefore, the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function needs to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE.

Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions.

If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated trip system.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module includes 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware. The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2.f. This voting is accomplished by the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter hardware in the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module.

Each 2-Out-Of-4 Voter includes two redundant sets of outputs to RPS.

Each output set contains two independent contacts; one contact for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c and 2.d, and the other contact for Function 2.f.

The analysis in Reference 12 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable.

However, the voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the plant interface portions of the 2-Out-Of-4 Logic Module that are not necessary to perform the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter function.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-12 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.f. Oscillation Power RanQe Monitor (OPRM) Upscale SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The OPRM Upscale Function provides compliance with 10 CFR APPLICABILITY 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 and 12, (continued) thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 14, 15 and 16 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (PBDA),

the amplitude based algorithm (ABA), and the growth rate algorithm (GRA). All three are implemented in the OPRM Upscale Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the PBDA.

The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Upscale Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specifications purposes is based only on the PBDA.

The OPRM Upscale Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into "cells" for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

The OPRM Upscale trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 29.5% RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is

< 60% of rated flow, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations may occur (Reference 18). These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the "auto-bypass" setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Upscale trip enabled region.

The OPRM Upscale Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at 2 25% RTP. The 25% RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring while the plant is operating below 29.5% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable setpoint without operator action. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Upscale trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-12a Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

Upscale (continued)

An OPRM Upscale trip is issued from an APRM channel when the PBDA in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel trip. An OPRM Upscale trip is also issued from the channel if either the GRA or ABA detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel.

There are four "sets" of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters: a) OPRM trip auto-enable setpoints for APRM Simulated Thermal Power (29.5%) and drive flow (60%); b) PBDA confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; c) PBDA tuning parameters; and d) GRA and ABA setpoints.

The first set, the OPRM auto-enable region setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints without the application of setpoint methodology per Reference 18. The settings, 29.5% APRM Simulated Thermal Power and 60% drive flow, are defined (limit values) in and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 16, and are documented in the COLR. There are no allowable values for these setpoints.

The third set, the OPRM PBDA "tuning" parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by PBAPS procedures. The fourth set, the GRA and ABA setpoints, in accordance with References 14, 15, and 16, are established as nominal values only, and are controlled by PBAPS procedures.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-12b Revision No.

RP ntuetto RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g.,

as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Action A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Inoperability of one required APRM channel affects both trip systems.

For that condition, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entery into Condition A for each channel.

B.1 and B.2 Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system.

In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function).

The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13 for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the associated Function will have all required channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

(continued)

PBAPS UNIT 3 B 3.3-24 Revision No.

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level equivalent to that evaluated in References 9, 12 or 13, which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A.

The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).