ML040620464
| ML040620464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/2004 |
| From: | Montgomery B Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML040620464 (5) | |
Text
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 Constellation
_I Energy Group February 27, 2004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. I & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments - 10 CFR 50.59 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant hereby submits a report containing brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Attachment (1) of this report includes 50.59 evaluations recorded and approved between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2003. Items in the report are sorted by 50.59 identification number.
Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours, ruc Mon omery Manager-Cal CliffsNuclear Po0er Plant Engineering Services BSM/CAN/bjd
Attachment:
(1)
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)]
cc:
J. Petro, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. J. Laufer, NRC G. S. Vissing, NRC H. J. Miller, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR
_T l-
ATTACHMENT (1)
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)]
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
February 27, 2004
Safety Evaluations approved by OSSRC, 1/1/2003 through 12/31/2003 Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00394 50.59 64 0002 2/5/2003 Subject SAFETY EVALUATION FOR ESP ES199601526-000 RSG COMPONENT 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION Summary As a result of steam generator tube degradation over the lives of these components, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant incorporated (CCNPPI) elected to replace the CCNPP Units I and 2 original Combustion Engineering steam generators (OSGs) with replacement steam generators (RSGs) manufactured by Babcock and Wilcox Canada (BWC). The resultant benefits of the RSGs are improved core heat removal and increased reactor coolant system (RCS) flow, improved margin against steam generator tube rupture, reduced personnel exposure due to fewer and less frequent steam generator tube inspections and repairs, and increased availability of units I and 2 due to improved steam generator tube integrity. Design and licensing basis evaluation for the RSG components in their installed configurations is contained in this 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and the Design Input Requirements (DIR) of Engineering Service Package (ESP) ES199601526-000, replacement of CCNPP steam generators. Separate 10 CFR 50.59 screenings are performed for ESPs ES199601526-116 (-216), Unit I (unit 2) RSG modification, which addresses the implementation activities associated with physical removal of the OSGs and installation of the RSGs. The primary basis document for evaluating the design and manufacture of the RSGs is FTI Document No. 77-5005336, replacement steam generator report for Baltimore Gas and Electric Unit I and 2. The RSG report describes RSG design and fabrication, and describes the use of the RSGs at CCNPP. The contents of the report support the conclusion that the RSGs will support normal and transient plant operation with no adverse impact and that the existing licensing basis is maintained with the RSGs. Utilizing the RSG report and other supporting information, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation performed for ESP ES 199601526-000 concluded that no 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) criteria exists that would require a License Amendment Request. Therefore, this ESP supplement may be performed without prior NRC approval.
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00481 50.59 64 0000 6/18/2002 Subject PAMS UPGRADE Summary This activity replaces the signal processing and operator display portion of the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS), the Sub-Cooled Margin Monitor (SCMM) system, and Core Exit Thermocouples (CET), Post Accident Monitoring instrumentation with a Westinghouse supplied ACI 60 Safety System Platform ("Common Q system"). Additionally, the recorders and indicators associated with Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables: Steam Generator Wide Range Level, Pressurizer Pressure and RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature are integrated into the replacement system.
This activity has been evaluated for potential interactions with other plant systems, structures and components and it has been determined that there are no adverse interactions, and functions, failure modes and failure results of other SCC's remain unaffected. Additionally, evaluations have determined that accident evaluations remain unchanged. Therefore, no License Amendment is required.
Safety Evaluations approved by OSSRC, 1/1/2003 through 12/31/2003 Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00485 50.59 64 0000 4/4/2003 Subject UNIT 2 CYCLE 15 RELOAD 50.59 FOR BATCH 2T FUEL ASSEMBLIES Summary SE00485 evaluated the operation of Unit 2 Cycle 15 (U2C 15) in all plant modes for the designed 24 month cycle length. The analyses accounted for the U2C15 fuel management and all of the physical changes associated with the Batch 2T fresh fuel assemblies (Turbo grids, ZIRLO cladding, fuel design changes) and the lead fuel assemblies. The effects of replacement steam generators have been included in all supporting analyses. No RPS setpoint changes were required. A COLR for U2C15 has been developed per the requirements of Technical Specification 5.6.5.
The evaluation concluded that NRC approval was required for the following activities:
-NRC issue Tech Spec change to add Westinghouse LFAs to Tech Spec on Design Features (T. S. 4.2.1) ES200100624, MS 028.
-NRC issue Tech Spec change to add Framatome LFAs to Tech Spec change to add Framatome LFAs to Tech Spec on Design Features (T.S.4.2. 1)
ES200100624, MS 029.
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00486 50.59 64 0000 8/26/2003 Subject EVALUATE MODELING CLOSURE OF THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE DURING MSLB ANALYSIS FOR CONTAINMENT
RESPONSE
Summary The limiting MSLB case for input to the Containment Response analysis documented in Chapter 14.20 of the Calvert Cliffs UFSAR is modeled to occur at 75% reactor power and to include a failure of the Steam Generator Feed Pumps to trip upon receipt of the Steam Isolation Signal. It has been noted that differential pressure conditions across the Main Feed Isolation Valve will prohibit its complete closure under the modeled circumstances. In order to account for this complication, the input assumptions to the analysis are modified, in accordance with NUREG 0138, to include a complete failure of the MFIV to shut throughout the entire course of the transient. Per NUREG 0138, action of the Feedwater Regulating Valve and associate Bypass Valve may be modeled in the calculation to account for the requirement of Steam Generator Isolation. The pressure and temperature results from the subsequent Containment Response Analysis are bounded by the original calculation, which assumed complete closure of the MFIV, but ignored the FRV and BPV.
As all I OCFR50.59 criteria are met with satisfaction, there is no requirement of a license amendment for Calvert Cliffs in order to document and evince the ability to operate within the design limits of the containment structure under the calculated response to a Main Steam Line Break inside containment.
Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00487 50.59 64 0000 4/7/2003 Subject REVISION OF PSTP-02 HZP CBC ACCEPTANCE AND REVIEW CRITERIA (UFSAR 13.4.5)
Summary The low power physics testing HZP CBC review criteria will be changed from +\\- 50 ppm to +\\- 0.5% delta rho and the acceptance criteria will be changed from +\\- 100 ppm to +\\- 0.75% delta rho. The new review and acceptance criteria will be conservative with respect to Technical Specifications.
The change will also prevent the acceptance and review criteria from being impacted by core design changes and cycle length, which change inverse boron worth. A careful evaluation has also shown that the HZP CBC test and low power physics testing at Calvert Cliffs will remain in conformance with ANSI/ANS 19.6.1.
Safety Evaluations approved by OSSRC, 1/1/2003 through 12/31/2003 Document Id Doc Type Rev Status Revision Date Issued SE00489 50.59 64 0000 9/15/2003 Subject EVALUATE PERFORMING ETP-03-018, TO DISABLE SWIITCHGEAR ROOM VENTILATION FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME TO COLLECT DATA ON ROOM TEMPERATURE HEAT-UP RATE Summary The reason to pursue completing the subject ETP-03-018 is to resolve an issue raised in 2001 by the NRC resident describing that the SWGR air design temperature may exceed its design limit of 104 degrees F, once the operating HVAC train fails. The redundant HVAC train is not designed to start automatically. Current operating procedure calls for an operator be dispatched to the 69' Fan room to manually switch over to the redundant train once the high SWGR room temperature alarm is displayed in the CR on panel IC10. Due to the high setting of the temperature switch triggering the alarm (100 degrees F nominal), the concern was that given the approximately 10 minutes it would take an operator to perform that action, room temperature limits may have already been exceeded.
The purpose of the proposed test (ETP 03-018) is to gather information on the rate of rise in SWGR air temperature once the operating HVAC system, including both the refrigeration and ventilation portions are turned off for a period not to exceed 10 minutes.
Based on the actions, cautions, and warnings built into the ETP; the potential for the room temperature to exceed 104 degrees F for the selected HVAC system's failure to start when called upon is minimal. The evaluation issued under ES200200214 provides additional engineering justification for the acceptability to perform the ETP.
The test will be started at as low as possible average room temperature as Plant conditions permit. Operators will be briefed as to what is the expected rate of temperature rise and, at what room temperature and how quickly will they need to terminate the test and return the HVAC system to normal service.
Since the affect of re-establishing HVAC is almost instantaneous, additional rise in room temperatures is mitigated to ensure that room design limits will not be exceeded.
Redundant means of communication will be established to ensure that the Operators stationed in the various rooms will remain in contact and able to carry out the necessary actions to re-establish room ventilation. Loss of communication will prompt operators to expeditiously re-start one of the HVAC trains.
The recently installed new SWGR HVAC air handling and refrigeration units have been and would be expected to operate reliably and their failure to start is not credible. Multiple hardware failure need not be postulated. If however one were to fail to start the redundant train could be started without delay. If a DBE were to occur during the test, the single failure of any of the EDGs would not impact the operator's ability to start the other ventilation train.
Based on the explanations contained in the 50.59 evaluation and in the associated ES200100214-000, the proposed activity does not require prior NRC approval.