Text

Final As-Administered Scenarios for the Prairie Island Initial Examination - Sep 2003
	ML040160889
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	09/08/2003
From:	Cooper P; Nuclear Management Co
To:	; NRC/RGN-III
References
	50-282/03-301, 50-306/03-301
	Download: ML040160889 (143)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-A Op-Test No.: A-1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: (IC-40)

100% power EOC Turnover:

OOS: Diesel Generator D1, PORV-431C, 123 Air Compressor, 12 BA Transfer pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 VC01A C Loss of charging pump (RO) 2 RC21A C Reactor vessel flange O-ring leak (RO)

Various 3 I Rad monitor (R-11 &12) low flow (LEAD) {T.S}

Overrides 4 MS01B M Steam line rupture inside containment [Ramp 35% over 5 minutes]

5 FW34A/B C AFW pumps fail to start (RO) 5 FW32 C Trip of MDAFW pump on manual start 6 RP06 C MSIVs fail to auto close DI-46158C 6 C MSIVs fail to close in manual (ECA-2.1) (LEAD has CT actions)

DI-46159C 7 CS03A/B C CS pumps fail to start (LEAD) 8 CS02A/B C Caustic addition valves fail to open (LEAD)

Critical Tasks:

E-0 (E) Minimum containment cooling equipment

E-0 (F) Minimum AFW flow

ECA-2.1 (A) Reduce AFW flow

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Page 2 of 137 Initial Conditions:

EOC 100% power 560 MWe 111 ppm boron Turnover Information:

11 Charging pump speed control is in MANUAL. 12 Charging pump was recently stopped on System Engineer request due to extremely hot packing. 12 Charging pump is NOT available for operation until released by the system engineer. We are waiting on the aux operator to verify pressure on the 13 charging pump desurger.

Ensure normal procedure for starting charging pump 13 is open and marked to step in progress.

Out of Service:

Diesel Generator D1

123 Instrument Air Compressor

Pressurizer PORV CV-31231

12 Charging pump - ENSURE control switch is in PULL OUT.

Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Triggers: Trigger 5 Condition: fw:afwmb This goes true if 12 MDAFP breaker closes.

Malfunctions:

FW34A, TD AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start

FW34B, MD AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start

RP06, Failure of MSIVs to Isolate

CS02A, Caustic Addition Valve (CV-31938) Fails to Open

CS02B, Caustic Addition Valve (CV-31941) Fails to Open

CS03A, 11 CS Pump Fails to Auto Start

CS03B, 12 CS Pump Fails to Auto Start Overrides:

Annunciator M47024:1003 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47024:1103 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Switch DI-46158C OFF (Prevents manual closure of associated MSIV)

Switch DI-46159C OFF (Prevents manual closure of associated MSIV)

ERCS point CP-1T0501A to 80 (Prevents ERCS disclosure of SG safety valve position)

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE VC04A N/A 11 Charging Pump Trip - Trigger #1 RC21A N/A Reactor Vessel O-Ring Leak (Inner Seal) - Trigger #2 LO-1R11:DS14 ON Turns on R11/12 Containment Supply Valve Light - Trigger #3 DI-1R11:S107 OFF Disables R11/12 Suction Path Switch - Trigger #3 DI-1R11:S108 OFF Disables R11/12 Suction Path Switch - Trigger #3 MS01B 35% #12 Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment - Trigger #4 MS07A 50% SG Safety Valve Leakage - Trigger #4 (ensures ECA-2.1 transition)

FW32 N/A MD AFW Pump Trip - Trigger #5 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Multiple annunciators will alarm when the malfunction is inserted including 47015:0103, 11 Charging Pump Overload Trip.

If letdown relief valve lifts, alarm 47015:0608, LTDN Relief Line to PRT Hi Temp will come in.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION RO Recognize the loss of charging header and seal injection flow reports conditions to the SS.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The symptoms allow entry in either 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection or 1C12.1 AOP2, Loss of Charging Flow to the Regen HX.

If the SS implements 1C12.1 AOP2, that procedure will direct implementation of 1C12.1 AOP1 for these specific conditions.

BOOTH When AOP is entered, then contact control room and report:

ACTION

13 charging pump desurger pressure normal. (If asked, then report 1980 psig.)

13 Charging pump suction and discharge valves - OPEN

Ready to return charging pump control switch to NEUTRAL SS SS should ensure the LEAD implements 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection.

LEAD Directs implementation of 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection.

Verifies CC flow is 195 gpm to RCPs (RCP CC Out Flow meters on Panel A)

Starts ANY charging pump. (wont be done until outplant operator reports 13 charging pump is ready for a start)

Adjusts charging pump speed and/or CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT to restore seal injection flow (6-10 gpm per RCP).

Restores letdown flow per 1C12.1, Letdown, Charging and Seal Injection -

Unit 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO or LEAD Places letdown in service IAW 1C12.1, Letdown, Charging and Seal Injection -

Unit 1.

Places letdown temperature controller (1HC-130) in manual and opens to about 50%.

Places letdown pressure controller (1HC-135A) in manual and opens to about 50%.

Opens the RCS loop isolation valves. (CV-31255 and CV-31226)

Opens a 40 gpm orifice isolation valve (CV-31325 or CV-31326)

Operates letdown pressure controller (1HC-135A) as needed to ensure the letdown relief valve does NOT open.

Adjusts charging pump speed and 1HC-142 to restore charging flow and seal injection to previous values. (Seal injection flow will be 6-10 gpm/RCP with letdown and charging flows balanced.)

Balances temperature controller (1HC-130) and transfers back to AUTO.

Balances pressure controller (1HC-135A) and transfers back to AUTO.

Places one charging pump speed control in AUTO.

RO or LEAD Verifies actions taken IAW annunciator procedures 47015-0103, 0206, and 0207:

47015-0103, 11 Charging Pump Overload Trip: Directs attempt to determine cause of pump trip and work request to reset the varidrive to minimum speed.

47015-0206, 11 RCP Labyrinth Seal Lo P, and 0207, 12 RCP Labyrinth Seal Lo P, have no additional actions.

Lead Contacts Auxiliary Building operator to investigate tripped pump.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS 1. Will maintain oversight of the event.

2. Will ensure actions are taken in a timely fashion.

3. May direct start of second charging pump to restore normal configuration.

4. WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (none)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN 13 charging pump is in AUTO control.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 137 Event

Description:

Reactor Vessel O-Ring Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Annunciator 47012:0603, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Hi Temp will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

+20 BOOTH

Call LEAD prior to actuating Trigger #2. By keeping LEAD on the phone, this ACTION will ensure the RO has to address alarm condition.

WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

RO Respond to annunciator 47012-0603, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Hi Temp

1. Confirms valid high temperature condition using plant computer (ERCS)

2. Closes CV-31324, RX Vessel leak off isolation

3. Monitors parameters to DETERMINE if RCS leakage is stopped.

4. Should report to SS that RCS leakage has stopped SS Initiates containment entry to determine source of leak. (This may be done by discussing need with Shift Manager)

WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (none)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN preparations for a containment entry are started.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 137 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47022:0309, Rad Monitor Sampling Equip Panel Alarm will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Steps of C11 for removing rad monitor from service may be performed in any logical order.

IF desired, THEN the OOS radiation monitor may be left in the ON position.

+30 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION LEAD Respond to annunciator 47022-0309 Rad Monitor Sampling Equip Panel Alarm

1. DETERMINES R11/R12 failed by inspection of Rad Monitor Panel

2. Refers to C11, Radiation Monitoring System, Step 5.4 and removes R11/R12 from service by:

Notify the Duty Plant Chemist.

Initiate a PINGP 729, Out of Service Radiation Monitor Sample Data Sheet.

Log the radiation monitor removed from service in the reactor log.

Place associated pump switch in OFF.

IF the Radiation Monitor is being removed from service due to equipment failure, THEN place an OUT OF SERVICE sticker on the Rad Monitor.

3. Notifies SRO to refer to TS 3.4.16, Required Actions B.1.1 and B.2 as well as Surveillance 3.4.14.1.

4. Refers to C11, Radiation Monitoring System, Step 6.3 for specific information about removing R11/R12 from service.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 137 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS SRO refers to TS LCO 3.4.16 and determines:

1. 30 day LCO

2. Every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months either

Containment Grab samples OR

RCS inventory balance (leak rate SP)

WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (LCO 3.4.16 Condition B with required actions)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS completes the T.S. assessment.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 9 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Multiple alarms will occur shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

- 47019:0607, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm

- 47022:0611, Containment Condensate Hi Leak Rate

Annunciator 47022:0611, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm should have the highest priority for response IF crew refers to any annunciator response procedures before tripping the reactor.

ADVERSE CONTAINMENT is defined as containment pressure > 5 psig.

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig (<1575 psig ADV) with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

+40 BOOTH

WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION

WHEN LEAD places the steam dumps in STM PRESS mode, THEN enter the control room as the Unit 2 RO and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

LEAD Responds to fire alarm by inspecting fire panel and announcing location of the fire alarms.

RO RECOGNIZES changes in RCS parameters. (Temperature, pressure and power)

MAY reduce turbine load to prevent exceeding 100% power.

SS Directs a MANUAL reactor trip.

RO/LEAD Perform immediate actions of E-0 from memory and report completion to the SS.

1. Verify reactor trip.

2. Verify turbine trip.

3. Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED

4. Check If SI Is Actuated:

SS Starts reading EOPs starting at E-0 step 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 10 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN

Neutron flux - DECREASING

Rod position indicators - ZERO

Rod bottom lights - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated: (either)

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT EVALUATOR NOTE: See Page 15 for Attachment L actions.

LEAD/SS Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification EVALUATOR NOTES:

The following actions will take place throughout the scenario:

12 MD AFW pump will trip 20 seconds after it is started. The RO will report the loss of the MDAFW pump when condition is recognized.

RO/LEAD monitors TDAFW pump discharge pressure as steam generator pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts TDAFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent TDAFW pump trip on low discharge pressure. (900 psig) 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 11 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event RO/SS Check AFW Status:

5 Critical Task a. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM Manually start AFW pumps.

(At least one pump is running before going to step 7 of E-0)

b. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

c. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

d. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature:

a. RCS average temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF ANY RCP RUNNING

-OR-

b. RCS cold leg temperatures - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF NO RCP RUNNING RNO Actions:

May throttle AFW flow to SGs to control temperature

Will close MSIVs if not already closed by LEAD performing Att. L RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

b. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 12 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

a. Injection flow to RCS:

SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

-OR-

RHR pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

b. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1250 PSIG [1575 PSIG]

c. Stop both RCPs RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

a. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED SS Makes transition to 1E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

ALL Check MSIV And Bypass Valve On Affected SG(s) - CLOSED (Manual attempt to close these valves will NOT be successful.)

ALL Check If Either SG Not Faulted:

a. Check SG pressures - EITHER STABLE OR INCREASING Event SS

Makes transition to 1ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF

6 BOTH STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 13 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Check Secondary Pressure Boundary:

MSIVs and bypass valves - CLOSED

FW control and bypass valves - CLOSED

FW isolation valves - CLOSED

Steam supply valves to TD AFW pumps - CLOSED (since only TD AFW pump is available, at least one steam supply valve will remain open)

SG PORVs - CLOSED

SGB isolation valves - CLOSED SS Dispatches operator to locally close valves, one loop at a time.

BOOTH WHEN contacted to locally close an MSIV, THEN wait 10 minutes and :

ACTIONS

Delete malfunction MS07A.

Modify override DI-46158C to ON, then delete the override.

Modify override DI-46159C to ON, then delete the override.

When MSIVs are closed, then report completion of local closure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following is located on the Information Page:

Go to 1E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1, if EITHER SG pressure increases at any time, except while performing SI termination Steps 16 through 18.

The SS should return to E-2 shortly after the MSIVs are closed locally.

The evaluation should end when SS returns to E-2.

ALL Control Feed Flow To Minimize RCS Cooldown:

a. Check cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR

b. Check narrow range level in both SGs - LESS THAN 50% [Wide Range 59%]

c. Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 14 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO or LEAD Reduces AFW flow to 40 gpm to each steam generator.

Critical Task (This must be completed within 10 minutes of being directed. SS may continue on in ECA-2.1 before this action is completed.)

Control feed flow or dump steam to stabilize RCS hot leg temperatures.

ALL Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped: (Repeat of step in E-0)

Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves: (no action needed)

Check Secondary Radiation: NORMAL SS/LEAD Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

(Lead will reset SI and stop RHR pumps.)

ALL

Check If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped: (no action needed)

Check RWST Level - GREATER THAN 33% (no action needed)

Reset SI (already done to stop RHR pumps)

SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation ALL

Establish Instrument Air To Containment (no action needed - didnt isolate)

Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated: (no action needed)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

This is the last step of ECA-2.1, which is included on the D2 form. We expect the crew to transition back to E-2 before getting this far into ECA-2.1.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN transition is made back to E-2.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Attachment L is usually given to the LEAD to perform independently at Step 5 in E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Instructor will take over Attachment L as the Unit 2 LEAD when the LEAD places the steam dumps in STM PRESS mode.

Event LEAD Verify Safeguard Component Alignment:

7 &

8 * "SI NOT READY" lights - NOT LIT

"SI ACTIVE" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS Critical IF not running, will start AFW pumps due to SI status step.

Tasks are in BOLD type (At least one pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

"CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS

Category I doors - CLOSED

Check Category I Special Vent Zone Report - NO OPENINGS REQUIRING CLOSURE WITHIN 6 MINUTES

CLOSE MV-32115, 122 SFP HX INLT HDR MV B

Check Loop A and Loop B Cooling Water Pressures, - GREATER THAN 65 PSIG LEAD Verify Plant Announcements Complete:

(Will probably make plant announcements)

LEAD Check If Main Steamlines Are Isolated:

MSIVs and bypasses - CLOSED (Bypass valves are normally closed, MSIVs are failed open in this scenario)

LEAD Verify SI Flow:

(Checks for SI pump flow if RCS pressure is <2100 psig)

LEAD Verify RHR Flow:

(Checks for RHR pump flow if RCS pressure is <150 psig)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Check Containment Pressure:

(Since pressure has NOT remained <23 psig, must verify containment spray is actuated.)

Critical Task

Manually starts containment spray pumps.

is in BOLD type (At least one pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

Manually opens Caustic Addition Valves (CV-31941 & CV-31938)

LEAD Check RCP Cooling:

CC flow to RCPs > 150 gpm

CC thermal barrier return valves - OPEN

Seal injection flow - 6 gpm to 10 gpm (normal)

LEAD Verify Local Actions Complete:

Turbine roof exhausters

MSR isolation (Attachment J)

LEAD Verify Generator Breakers - OPEN:

LEAD Check Turbine Valves:

Reheat and Intercept Valves - CLOSED

Drain valves - OPEN LEAD Verify Main Feedwater Alignment:

Pumps - STOPPED

Main and bypass FRVs - CLOSED LEAD Verify All Condensate Pumps - STOPPED LEAD Place Steam Dump In "STM PRESS" Mode TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOOTH INSTRUCTOR takes over completion of Attachment L.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-A Op-Test No.: A-2 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: (IC-40)

100% power EOC Turnover:

OOS: Diesel Generator D1, PORV-431C, 123 Air Compressor, 12 BA Transfer pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 VC01A C Loss of charging pump (RO) 2 RC21A C Reactor vessel flange O-ring leak (RO)

Various 3 I Rad monitor (R-11 &12) low flow (LEAD) {T.S}

Overrides 4 MS01B M Steam line rupture inside containment [Ramp 35% over 5 minutes]

5 FW34A/B C AFW pumps fail to start (RO) 5 FW32 C Trip of MDAFW pump on manual start 6 RP06 C MSIVs fail to auto close DI-46158C 6 C MSIVs fail to close in manual (ECA-2.1) (LEAD has CT actions)

DI-46159C 7 CS03A/B C CS pumps fail to start (LEAD) 8 CS02A/B C Caustic addition valves fail to open (LEAD)

Critical Tasks:

E-0 (E) Minimum containment cooling equipment

E-0 (F) Minimum AFW flow

ECA-2.1 (A) Reduce AFW flow

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Page 18 of 137 Initial Conditions:

EOC 100% power 560 MWe 111 ppm boron Turnover Information:

11 Charging pump speed control is in MANUAL. 12 Charging pump was recently stopped on System Engineer request due to extremely hot packing. 12 Charging pump is NOT available for operation until released by the system engineer. We are waiting on the aux operator to verify pressure on the 13 charging pump desurger.

Ensure normal procedure for starting charging pump 13 is open and marked to step in progress.

Out of Service:

Diesel Generator D1

123 Instrument Air Compressor

Pressurizer PORV CV-31231

12 Charging pump - ENSURE control switch is in PULL OUT.

Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Triggers: Trigger 5 Condition: fw:afwmb This goes true if 12 MDAFP breaker closes.

Malfunctions:

FW34A, TD AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start

FW34B, MD AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start

RP06, Failure of MSIVs to Isolate

CS02A, Caustic Addition Valve (CV-31938) Fails to Open

CS02B, Caustic Addition Valve (CV-31941) Fails to Open

CS03A, 11 CS Pump Fails to Auto Start

CS03B, 12 CS Pump Fails to Auto Start Overrides:

Annunciator M47024:1003 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47024:1103 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Switch DI-46158C OFF (Prevents manual closure of associated MSIV)

Switch DI-46159C OFF (Prevents manual closure of associated MSIV)

ERCS point CP-1T0501A to 80 (Prevents ERCS disclosure of SG safety valve position)

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE VC04A N/A 11 Charging Pump Trip - Trigger #1 RC21A N/A Reactor Vessel O-Ring Leak (Inner Seal) - Trigger #2 LO-1R11:DS14 ON Turns on R11/12 Containment Supply Valve Light - Trigger #3 DI-1R11:S107 OFF Disables R11/12 Suction Path Switch - Trigger #3 DI-1R11:S108 OFF Disables R11/12 Suction Path Switch - Trigger #3 MS01B 35% #12 Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment - Trigger #4 MS07A 50% SG Safety Valve Leakage - Trigger #4 (ensures ECA-2.1 transition)

FW32 N/A MD AFW Pump Trip - Trigger #5 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 19 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Multiple annunciators will alarm when the malfunction is inserted including 47015:0103, 11 Charging Pump Overload Trip.

If letdown relief valve lifts, alarm 47015:0608, LTDN Relief Line to PRT Hi Temp will come in.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION RO Recognize the loss of charging header and seal injection flow reports conditions to the SS.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The symptoms allow entry in either 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection or 1C12.1 AOP2, Loss of Charging Flow to the Regen HX.

If the SS implements 1C12.1 AOP2, that procedure will direct implementation of 1C12.1 AOP1 for these specific conditions.

BOOTH When AOP is entered, then contact control room and report:

ACTION

13 charging pump desurger pressure normal. (If asked, then report 1980 psig.)

13 Charging pump suction and discharge valves - OPEN

Ready to return charging pump control switch to NEUTRAL SS SS should ensure the LEAD implements 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection.

LEAD Directs implementation of 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection.

Verifies CC flow is 195 gpm to RCPs (RCP CC Out Flow meters on Panel A)

Starts ANY charging pump. (wont be done until outplant operator reports 13 charging pump is ready for a start)

Adjusts charging pump speed and/or CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT to restore seal injection flow (6-10 gpm per RCP).

Restores letdown flow per 1C12.1, Letdown, Charging and Seal Injection -

Unit 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 20 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO or LEAD Places letdown in service IAW 1C12.1, Letdown, Charging and Seal Injection -

Unit 1.

Places letdown temperature controller (1HC-130) in manual and opens to about 50%.

Places letdown pressure controller (1HC-135A) in manual and opens to about 50%.

Opens the RCS loop isolation valves. (CV-31255 and CV-31226)

Opens a 40 gpm orifice isolation valve (CV-31325 or CV-31326)

Operates letdown pressure controller (1HC-135A) as needed to ensure the letdown relief valve does NOT open.

Adjusts charging pump speed and 1HC-142 to restore charging flow and seal injection to previous values. (Seal injection flow will be 6-10 gpm/RCP with letdown and charging flows balanced.)

Balances temperature controller (1HC-130) and transfers back to AUTO.

Balances pressure controller (1HC-135A) and transfers back to AUTO.

Places one charging pump speed control in AUTO.

RO or LEAD Verifies actions taken IAW annunciator procedures 47015-0103, 0206, and 0207:

47015-0103, 11 Charging Pump Overload Trip: Directs attempt to determine cause of pump trip and work request to reset the varidrive to minimum speed.

47015-0206, 11 RCP Labyrinth Seal Lo P, and 0207, 12 RCP Labyrinth Seal Lo P, have no additional actions.

Lead Contacts Auxiliary Building operator to investigate tripped pump.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 1 Page 21 of 137 Event

Description:

Loss of 11 Charging Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS 5. Will maintain oversight of the event.

6. Will ensure actions are taken in a timely fashion.

7. May direct start of second charging pump to restore normal configuration.

8. WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (none)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN 13 charging pump is in AUTO control.

This crew responded to this event in an unexpected manner. RCP seal temperatures rose after the charging pump was restored. The crew tripped the reactor based on the rising RCP seal temperatures. The chief examiner decided to skip Events 2 and 3 and went directly to Event 4 to get credit for the Major event.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 2 Page 22 of 137 Event

Description:

Reactor Vessel O-Ring Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: Annunciator 47012:0603, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Hi Temp will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

+20 BOOTH

Call LEAD prior to actuating Trigger #2. By keeping LEAD on the phone, this ACTION will ensure the RO has to address alarm condition.

WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

RO Respond to annunciator 47012-0603, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Hi Temp

5. Confirms valid high temperature condition using plant computer (ERCS)

6. Closes CV-31324, RX Vessel leak off isolation

7. Monitors parameters to DETERMINE if RCS leakage is stopped.

8. Should report to SS that RCS leakage has stopped SS Initiates containment entry to determine source of leak. (This may be done by discussing need with Shift Manager)

WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (none)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN preparations for a containment entry are started.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 3 Page 23 of 137 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47022:0309, Rad Monitor Sampling Equip Panel Alarm will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Steps of C11 for removing rad monitor from service may be performed in any logical order.

IF desired, THEN the OOS radiation monitor may be left in the ON position.

+30 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION LEAD Respond to annunciator 47022-0309 Rad Monitor Sampling Equip Panel Alarm

5. DETERMINES R11/R12 failed by inspection of Rad Monitor Panel

6. Refers to C11, Radiation Monitoring System, Step 5.4 and removes R11/R12 from service by:

Notify the Duty Plant Chemist.

Initiate a PINGP 729, Out of Service Radiation Monitor Sample Data Sheet.

Log the radiation monitor removed from service in the reactor log.

Place associated pump switch in OFF.

IF the Radiation Monitor is being removed from service due to equipment failure, THEN place an OUT OF SERVICE sticker on the Rad Monitor.

7. Notifies SRO to refer to TS 3.4.16, Required Actions B.1.1 and B.2 as well as Surveillance 3.4.14.1.

8. Refers to C11, Radiation Monitoring System, Step 6.3 for specific information about removing R11/R12 from service.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 3 Page 24 of 137 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS SRO refers to TS LCO 3.4.16 and determines:

3. 30 day LCO

4. Every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months either

Containment Grab samples OR

RCS inventory balance (leak rate SP)

WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability (LCO 3.4.16 Condition B with required actions)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS completes the T.S. assessment.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 25 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Multiple alarms will occur shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

- 47019:0607, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm

- 47022:0611, Containment Condensate Hi Leak Rate

Annunciator 47022:0611, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm should have the highest priority for response IF crew refers to any annunciator response procedures before tripping the reactor.

ADVERSE CONTAINMENT is defined as containment pressure > 5 psig.

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig (<1575 psig ADV) with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

+40 BOOTH

WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION

WHEN LEAD places the steam dumps in STM PRESS mode, THEN enter the control room as the Unit 2 RO and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

LEAD Responds to fire alarm by inspecting fire panel and announcing location of the fire alarms.

RO RECOGNIZES changes in RCS parameters. (Temperature, pressure and power)

MAY reduce turbine load to prevent exceeding 100% power.

SS Directs a MANUAL reactor trip.

RO/LEAD Perform immediate actions of E-0 from memory and report completion to the SS.

5. Verify reactor trip.

6. Verify turbine trip.

7. Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED

8. Check If SI Is Actuated:

SS Starts reading EOPs starting at E-0 step 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 26 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN

Neutron flux - DECREASING

Rod position indicators - ZERO

Rod bottom lights - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated: (either)

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT EVALUATOR NOTE: See Page 15 for Attachment L actions.

LEAD/SS Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification EVALUATOR NOTES:

The following actions will take place throughout the scenario:

12 MD AFW pump will trip 20 seconds after it is started. The RO will report the loss of the MDAFW pump when condition is recognized.

RO/LEAD monitors TDAFW pump discharge pressure as steam generator pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts TDAFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent TDAFW pump trip on low discharge pressure. (900 psig) 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 27 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event RO/SS Check AFW Status:

5 Critical Task e. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM Manually start AFW pumps.

(At least one pump is running before going to step 7 of E-0)

f. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

g. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

h. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature:

c. RCS average temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF ANY RCP RUNNING

-OR-

d. RCS cold leg temperatures - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF NO RCP RUNNING RNO Actions:

May throttle AFW flow to SGs to control temperature

Will close MSIVs if not already closed by LEAD performing Att. L RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

c. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

d. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 28 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

d. Injection flow to RCS:

SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

-OR-

RHR pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

e. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1250 PSIG [1575 PSIG]

f. Stop both RCPs RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

b. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED SS Makes transition to 1E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

ALL Check MSIV And Bypass Valve On Affected SG(s) - CLOSED (Manual attempt to close these valves will NOT be successful.)

ALL Check If Either SG Not Faulted:

a. Check SG pressures - EITHER STABLE OR INCREASING Event SS

Makes transition to 1ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF

6 BOTH STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 29 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALL Check Secondary Pressure Boundary:

MSIVs and bypass valves - CLOSED

FW control and bypass valves - CLOSED

FW isolation valves - CLOSED

Steam supply valves to TD AFW pumps - CLOSED (since only TD AFW pump is available, at least one steam supply valve will remain open)

SG PORVs - CLOSED

SGB isolation valves - CLOSED SS Dispatches operator to locally close valves, one loop at a time.

BOOTH WHEN contacted to locally close an MSIV, THEN wait 10 minutes and :

ACTIONS

Delete malfunction MS07A.

Modify override DI-46158C to ON, then delete the override.

Modify override DI-46159C to ON, then delete the override.

When MSIVs are closed, then report completion of local closure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following is located on the Information Page:

Go to 1E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1, if EITHER SG pressure increases at any time, except while performing SI termination Steps 16 through 18.

The SS should return to E-2 shortly after the MSIVs are closed locally.

The evaluation should end when SS returns to E-2.

ALL Control Feed Flow To Minimize RCS Cooldown:

d. Check cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR

e. Check narrow range level in both SGs - LESS THAN 50% [Wide Range 59%]

f. Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 30 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO or LEAD Reduces AFW flow to 40 gpm to each steam generator.

Critical Task (This must be completed within 10 minutes of being directed. SS may continue on in ECA-2.1 before this action is completed.)

Control feed flow or dump steam to stabilize RCS hot leg temperatures.

ALL Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped: (Repeat of step in E-0)

Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves: (no action needed)

Check Secondary Radiation: NORMAL SS/LEAD Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

(Lead will reset SI and stop RHR pumps.)

ALL

Check If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped: (no action needed)

Check RWST Level - GREATER THAN 33% (no action needed)

Reset SI (already done to stop RHR pumps)

SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation ALL

Establish Instrument Air To Containment (no action needed - didnt isolate)

Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated: (no action needed)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

This is the last step of ECA-2.1, which is included on the D2 form. We expect the crew to transition back to E-2 before getting this far into ECA-2.1.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN transition is made back to E-2.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 31 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Attachment L is usually given to the LEAD to perform independently at Step 5 in E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Instructor will take over Attachment L as the Unit 2 LEAD when the LEAD places the steam dumps in STM PRESS mode.

Event LEAD Verify Safeguard Component Alignment:

7 &

8 * "SI NOT READY" lights - NOT LIT

"SI ACTIVE" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS Critical IF not running, will start AFW pumps due to SI status step.

Tasks are in BOLD type (At least one pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

"CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS

Category I doors - CLOSED

Check Category I Special Vent Zone Report - NO OPENINGS REQUIRING CLOSURE WITHIN 6 MINUTES

CLOSE MV-32115, 122 SFP HX INLT HDR MV B

Check Loop A and Loop B Cooling Water Pressures, - GREATER THAN 65 PSIG LEAD Verify Plant Announcements Complete:

(Will probably make plant announcements)

LEAD Check If Main Steamlines Are Isolated:

MSIVs and bypasses - CLOSED (Bypass valves are normally closed, MSIVs are failed open in this scenario)

LEAD Verify SI Flow:

(Checks for SI pump flow if RCS pressure is <2100 psig) 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 32 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Verify RHR Flow:

(Checks for RHR pump flow if RCS pressure is <150 psig)

LEAD Check Containment Pressure:

(Since pressure has NOT remained <23 psig, must verify containment spray is actuated.)

Critical Task

Manually starts containment spray pumps.

is in BOLD type (At least one pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

Manually opens Caustic Addition Valves (CV-31941 & CV-31938)

LEAD Check RCP Cooling:

CC flow to RCPs > 150 gpm

CC thermal barrier return valves - OPEN

Seal injection flow - 6 gpm to 10 gpm (normal)

LEAD Verify Local Actions Complete:

Turbine roof exhausters

MSR isolation (Attachment J)

LEAD Verify Generator Breakers - OPEN:

LEAD Check Turbine Valves:

Reheat and Intercept Valves - CLOSED

Drain valves - OPEN LEAD Verify Main Feedwater Alignment:

Pumps - STOPPED

Main and bypass FRVs - CLOSED 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 33 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Verify All Condensate Pumps - STOPPED LEAD Place Steam Dump In "STM PRESS" Mode TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOOTH INSTRUCTOR takes over completion of Attachment L.

41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 34 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event No.: 4-8 Page 35 of 137 Event

Description:

Steam Line Rupture inside Containment Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-B Op-Test No.: B-1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: (IC-6)

6% power Turnover:

Ready to roll main turbine.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RX216 I SG pressure fails (HIGH) {T.S.} (LEAD) 2 SI07A C SI accumulator check valve leakage (LEAD) 3 FW13A R Main feedwater pump trips (RO - power reduction)

ED18, Loss of all AC power (ECA-0.0) with restoration from DG within 5 4 ED19, C minutes (LEAD)

DG07A/B 5 SG02A M SG tube rupture [10%]

RC22A or 6 C Pressurizer PORV leaks after Reactor Trip (RO)

B Critical Tasks:

E-0 (A) Restore heat sink -OR- Manual reactor trip

E-0 (C) Restore electrical power

E-3 (A) Isolate ruptured SG

E-3 (C) Depressurize RCS

E-3 (D) Terminate SI

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aj 41 of 41 NUREG- 1021, Draft Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Initial Conditions:

BOC 6% power 0 MWe 1776 ppm boron Turnover Information:

A plant startup is in progress following a 6-day outage to repair turbine control valve (CV-1). We are ready to roll main turbine. Ensure normal procedure for startup is open and marked to step in progress.

Out of Service: None Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Malfunctions: None Overrides:

DI-46948A Auto OFF, DG (D1) Breaker 15-2 Fails to Auto Close

DI-46919A Auto OFF, DG (D2) Breaker 16-9 Fails to Auto Close This scenario was originally designed to run such that the diesel generators were supposed to start but the individual diesels output breakers were not to close onto the bus. Instead because of an error in the simulator set up the diesel generators did not start at all.

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE RX216 1400 MS Pressure Controller 21203 (PT 478) - Trigger #1 SI07A N/A 11 SI Accumulator Check Valve Leakage - Trigger #2 FW13A N/A 11 Main Feed Water Pump Trip - Trigger #3 ED18 N/A Fault in 1R Transformer - Trigger #4 ED19 N/A Fault in CT11 Transformer - Trigger #4 SG02A 10% 11 SG Tube Rupture - Trigger #5 RC22A N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #6 RC22B N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SG pressure channel fails (HIGH)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Bistable tripping will not be performed.

Thermal Power Monitor actions of 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide, will not be required due to the initial power level of this scenario.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION LEAD/SS RECOGNIZE 12 SG PORV has opened and manually CLOSE the PORV.

LEAD Respond to annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble Correctly Identifies the failed SG pressure channel. (1P-478 or Blue channel)

INITIAL ACTIONS:

1. Verify steam generator level control operating properly in automatic.

2. Control level in manual for any SG which has shifted to manual.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Refer to 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide - Unit 1 for any Reactor Protection or Engineered Safeguards system input failure.

LEAD Responds in accordance with 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide.

Verify 1HC-478, 12 SG PORV controller, is in manual with PORV closed.

Verify SG water level control is working properly.

Contacts I&C to trip affected bistables.

Inform SS of TS LCO information.

BOOTH When contacted as I&C, reply: We will be able to support bistable tripping in ACTION about 45 minutes.

SS WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability - LCO 3.3.2 Condition D (from Function 1.e). This is a 6-hour LCO for tripping associated bistables.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS COMPLETES THE T.S. ASSESSMENT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Pressurizer level, charging flow and seal injection flow will start to change shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciators 47018:0203, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Press and 47018:0303, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Lvl will alarm about 2 minutes after the malfunction is inserted.

Procedure 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak does not provide guidance for accumulator check valve leakage.

+ 15 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

ACTION RO May recognize RCS leakage by changes in charging flow, seal injection flow or VCT level.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS leakage is covered by T.S. 3.4.14.

SS IF RCS leakage is recognized before accumulator alarms come in, the SS will implement 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak.

RO May take manual control of charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.

May have to adjust CV-31198, Charging Line Flow Control, (using 1HC-142) to maintain RCP seal injection flow 6-10 gpm/RCP.

BOOTH IF the crew contacts the system engineer, THEN acknowledge information but ACTION make NO recommendation.

IF the crew calls for an outplant operator, THEN come to the control room as requested.

LEAD Acknowledges accumulator high level and/or pressure alarms.

Informs SS of the required actions to drain accumulator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Refers to 1C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1 step 5.1 to lower accumulator level:

Check RCDT level available.

Under admin control, open CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

When level is 48%, shut CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

Independently verify CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank is closed.

Notify System Engineer.

BOOTH Delete malfunction SI07A after the accumulator outlet valve is closed.

ACTION LEAD/RO C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1, Step 5.11 Reducing Accumulator In-Leakage:

Under administrative control, direct outplant operator to open test line shutoff valves. (Remote: SI101)

BOOTH ACTIONS:

Direct outplant to remove safeguards hold card and close 1LA1-D3, 11 REMOTES ARE INDICATED BY Accumulator Discharge MV breaker. (Remote: SI112)

THE BOLD TYPE.

Enter TS 3.5.1 Condition B (24 hr completion time) and close MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Open CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Record leak rate (should be 0)

Close CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Open MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Independently verify position of MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Exit TS 3.5.1

Direct outplant operator to open 1LA1-D3, 11 Accumulator Discharge MV breaker, and install safeguards hold card. (Remote: SI112)

Direct outplant operator to close test line shutoff valves and reinstall lockwire.

(Remote: SI101)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Provides oversight for LEAD activities Refers to Technical Specifications WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (None as long as accumulator is available)

Statement of T.S. applicability (May enter LCO 3.5.1 Condition A based on possible dilution of the accumulator boron concentration.)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVE IS REOPENED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 3 Page 41 of 137 Event

Description:

Main Feed water pump trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47010:0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

SS may direct a reactor trip rather than reducing power.

RO does not need to inform SS of each negative reactivity insertion during this transient. However, if rods need to be withdrawn, RO must communicate with SS before rods are moved.

SG low level reactor trip setpoint is 13%.

+ 40 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION LEAD Respond to Alarm 47010-0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT.

Informs SS that 11 MFW pump locked out.

SS Directs RO to reduce Reactor Power to maintain SG levels.

Should establish a manual reactor trip criterion based on SG level.

Maintains oversight and, IF necessary, directs a manual reactor trip.

RO As directed by SS, reduces and maintains reactor power at a level low CRITICAL enough to allow AFW to maintain SG level.

TASK (Either power is stabilized at level within capacity of AFW system -OR- a manual reactor trip is performed before an automatic setpoint is reached.)

LEAD Monitors SG levels for approach to reactor trip setpoint (13%).

WHEN power is reduced, THEN adjust AFW flow to maintain SG levels.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SG LEVELS ARE STABLE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Multiple annunciators will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Auto-switchover to RWST and CVCS makeup are not available without bus 15. Until bus 15 is re-energized, there is a possibility that any running charging pump could trip when the VCT empties. If so, the crew may implement the 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection or 1C12.1 AOP2, Loss of Charging Flow to the Regen HX. However, if CC flow is being supplied to the RCPs, there is no need to restore charging flow quickly.

+ 45 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION RO/SS RECOGNIZE that a reactor trip is necessary (i.e. loss of RCPs and MDAFW pump) and MANUALLY TRIP the reactor.

SS Directs entry into E-0 RO/LEAD Perform immediate actions of E-0 from memory and report completion to the SS.

9. Verify reactor trip.

10. Verify turbine trip.

11. Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED. (No)

LEAD informs SS that a transition to ECA-0.0 is required.

SS Starts reading E-0 at step 1.

At Step 3, SS directs transition to ECA-0.0.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees are monitored for information only. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

SS/RO Check If RCS Is Isolated:

a. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

b. Close letdown isolation valves (CV-31255 and CV-31226)

c. Excess letdown isolation valve (CV-31330) - CLOSED SS/LEAD Verify AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Perform Notifications:

Announce Unit 1 Reactor Trip

Notify Shift Manager and SEC SS/LEAD Check Cooling Water Header Pressures - BOTH GREATER THAN 25 PSIG EVALUATOR NOTE:

SS and LEAD should determine that both buses are available.

Since both bus 15 & 16 are available, it is preferable to restore bus 16 first.

SS/LEAD Attempt to Restore Power to Any Available Safeguards Bus From Unit 1 Source

a. Energize available bus with diesel generator:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Power must be restored to either bus 16 or 15 from the associated DG.

We will go to the next event prior to the second bus being energized.

SS/ LEAD Because safeguards bus did not automatically energize, the RNO is implemented:

CRITICAL Manually energize bus from any available Unit 1 source: (D2)

TASK:

RESTORE

Place desired source breaker MAN/AUTO switch to MANUAL.

POWER TO BUS 15 OR

Place synchroscope select switch to desired source position.

16

Close desired source breaker.

BOOTH Actuate Trigger 6 or Trigger 7 depending on which safeguards bus is energized.

ACTION This will provide continuous leakage through a PORV with block valve available.

SS/ LEAD Check safeguards buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED SS/RO Start one charging pump.

SS WHEN power is restored, transition back to E-0 Step 3.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees will be monitored on next transition from E-0. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN POWER IS RESTORED TO BUS 15 OR 16.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

A surrogate operator will be provided after the LEAD is assigned to restore power to the second safeguards bus. This operator should be assigned to perform Attachment L of E-0.

Due to the initial conditions, an RCS cooldown will probably not be required for the SGTR.

Symptoms of SG tube rupture will appear about 3 minutes after the malfunction is inserted. Symptoms include radiation monitor alarms and rising level in 11 SG.

+50 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #5.

ACTION LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED (No - One bus will be de-energized)

LEAD Initiate action to restore power to de-energized safeguard bus per:

1C20.5 AOP1, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 15. (See page 50)

1C20.5 AOP2, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 16. (See page 52)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The SG tube rupture may not have created symptoms for an SI depending on when malfunction was activated. If symptoms dont exist, SS will transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery. SI initiation criteria on the INFO page of ES-0.1 will cue manual SI and return to E-0, if necessary.

RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated: (either)

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT BOOTH WHEN LEAD is assigned to restored power using an AOP, THEN enter the ACTION control room as the Unit 2 RO. Ask for Attachment L of E-0.

DO NOT perform the actions of the AOP for restoring power to bus 15 or 16.

SURROGA Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification TE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check AFW Status:

i. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

j. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

k. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

l. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

EVALUATOR NOTES:

RO/LEAD monitors AFW pump discharge pressure as SG pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts AFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent AFW pump trip on low discharge pressure.

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature: (substep a is not applicable since RCPs are off)

b. RCS cold leg temperatures - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF NO RCP RUNNING RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

e. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED Event

6

RECOGNIZE partially open PORV and close block valve to isolate leakage.

(Must be completed without transition to ECA-3.1.)

f. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

c. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED EVALUATOR NOTE:

Radiation will NOT be normal. Condenser air ejector and SG blowdown radiation monitors will show abnormal trends.

RO/SS Check If SG Tubes Are Not Ruptured:

Condenser air ejector radiation - NORMAL (No)

SGB radiation - NORMAL (No)

Main steamline radiation - NORMAL RO/SS Diagnose event as a Ruptured Steam Generator.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

11 SG PORV may open during this scenario after the 11 SG MSIV is closed.

SS Directs transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Starts reading E-3.

RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

RO/SS Identify Ruptured SG(s):

(Correctly identify 11 SG as the ruptured SG.)

RO/SS Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG(s): (11 SG)

CRITICAL

Close steam supply from 11 SG to TD AFW pump (MV-32016)

TASK

Close 11 SG MSIV (CV-31098) and bypass valve (MV-32045)

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Level: (11 SG)

CRITICAL a. Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 5%

TASK

b. Stop auxiliary feed flow to 11 SG by closing:

MV-32238, 11 TD AFWP to 11 SG

MV-32381, 12 MD AFWP to 11 SG (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

RO/SS Reset SI RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Pressure - GREATER THAN 210 PSIG RO/SS Initiate RCS Cooldown:

a. Determine required core exit temperature: (505°F)

b. Check one condensate pump - RUNNING

c. Establish steam dump to condenser: (not possible, do RNO listed below)

Dump steam from intact SG PORV at maximum rate.

d. WHEN core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE

a. Stop RCS cooldown

b. Maintain core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE RO/SS Check Intact SG Level:

a. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% IN EITHER SG

b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves:

PORVs - CLOSED

Block valves - OPEN and AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Reset Containment Isolation Establish Instrument Air To Containment (no action required - did not isolate)

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

Check If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

Check Ruptured SG Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING Check RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 40°F [55°F]

Depressurize RCS Using PRZR Spray To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

(Not performed since RCPs are not running.)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS depressurization should be stopped if any of the following conditions are met:

RCS pressure < 11 SG pressure AND PRZR level >7% (expected)

PRZR level >75%

RCS subcooling <20°F RO/SS Depressurize RCS Using PRZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

CRITICAL

OPENS a pressurizer PORV.

TASK

WHEN conditions exist, THEN RO will close PORV.

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

SS/RO Check RCS Pressure - INCREASING ALL Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F

Secondary heat sink: AVAILABLE

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 7%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior SS/LEAD Stop SI Pumps CRITICAL (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

TASK TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOTH SI PUMPS ARE STOPPED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 15 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP1, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 15 LEAD Minimize Heater Drain Tank Pump flow while maintaining main feedwater pump suction pressure to prevent Heater Drain Tank Pump lockout. (NA post trip)

BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 15 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46932, BUS 15 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10) - Not Available

D1 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.11)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 15 from D1 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46951, BKR 15-3 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46948, BKR 15-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place CS-46909, BKR 15-7 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT.

CS-46036, 11 CC PUMP

CS-46008, 11 CNTMTT SPRAY PMP

CS-46178, 11 SI PUMP

CS-46184, 11 RHR PUMP

CS-46905, BKR 15-6 BUS 15 FEED TO 112M XFMR

CS-46956, BKR 15-11 BUS 15 FEED TO 111M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D1.

LEAD Place CS-46950, BKR 15-2 BUS 15 SOURCE FROM D1 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4191801, BUS 15 4160 VOLTS, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are energized from 11A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 111 and 112 to Bus 15 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 15 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN Bus 15 is energized.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 16 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP2, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 16 BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 16 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46901, BUS 16 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.8) - Not Available

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

D2 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 16 from D2 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46922, BKR 16-8 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46918, BKR 16-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46919, BKR 16-9 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT:

CS-46037, 12 CC WTR PMP

CS-46009, 12 CNTMT SPRAY PUMP

CS-46179, 12 SI PUMP

CS-46185, 12 RHR PUMP

CS-46425, 12 MD AFWP

CS-46927, BKR 16-4 BUS 16 FEED TO 121M XFMR

CS-46916, BKR 16-11 BUS 16 FEED TO 122M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D2.

LEAD Place CS-46921, BKR 16-9 BUS 16 SOURCE FROM D2 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4192401, 4.16 KV BUS 16 VOLTMETER, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are energized from 12A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 121 and 122 to Bus 16 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 16 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BUS 16 IS ENERGIZED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-B Op-Test No.: B-2 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: (IC-6)

6% power Turnover:

Ready to roll main turbine.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RX216 I SG pressure fails (HIGH) {T.S.} (LEAD) 2 SI07A C SI accumulator check valve leakage (LEAD) 3 FW13A R Main feedwater pump trips (RO - power reduction)

ED18, Loss of all offsite AC power (ECA-0.0) with restoration from DG 4 ED19, CM within 5 minutes (LEAD)

DG07A/B 5 SG02A M SG tube rupture [10%]

RC22A or 6 C Pressurizer PORV leaks after Reactor Trip (RO)

B Critical Tasks:

E-0 (A) Restore heat sink -OR- Manual reactor trip

E-0 (C) Restore electrical power

E-3 (A) Isolate ruptured SG

E-3 (C) Depressurize RCS

E-3 (D) Terminate SI

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Initial Conditions:

BOC 6% power 0 MWe 1776 ppm boron Turnover Information:

A plant startup is in progress following a 6-day outage to repair turbine control valve (CV-1). We are ready to roll main turbine. Ensure normal procedure for startup is open and marked to step in progress.

Out of Service: None Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Malfunctions: None Overrides:

DI-46948A Auto OFF, DG (D1) Breaker 15-2 Fails to Auto Close

DI-46919A Auto OFF, DG (D2) Breaker 16-9 Fails to Auto Close This scenario was originally designed to run such that the diesel generators were supposed to start but the individual diesels output breakers were not to close onto the bus. Instead because of an error in the simulator set up the diesel generators did start and the diesel generator output breakers did close onto the buses. Event 5 was dropped by the Chief Examiner because it was unnecessary for this crew and due to the confusion caused by the simulator input error.

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE RX216 1400 MS Pressure Controller 21203 (PT 478) - Trigger #1 SI07A N/A 11 SI Accumulator Check Valve Leakage - Trigger #2 FW13A N/A 11 Main Feed Water Pump Trip - Trigger #3 ED18 N/A Fault in 1R Transformer - Trigger #4 ED19 N/A Fault in CT11 Transformer - Trigger #4 SG02A 10% 11 SG Tube Rupture - Trigger #5 RC22A N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #6 RC22B N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SG pressure channel fails (HIGH)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Bistable tripping will not be performed.

Thermal Power Monitor actions of 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide, will not be required due to the initial power level of this scenario.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION LEAD/SS RECOGNIZE 12 SG PORV has opened and manually CLOSE the PORV.

LEAD Respond to annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble Correctly Identifies the failed SG pressure channel. (1P-478 or Blue channel)

INITIAL ACTIONS:

1. Verify steam generator level control operating properly in automatic.

2. Control level in manual for any SG which has shifted to manual.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Refer to 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide - Unit 1 for any Reactor Protection or Engineered Safeguards system input failure.

LEAD Responds in accordance with 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide.

Verify 1HC-478, 12 SG PORV controller, is in manual with PORV closed.

Verify SG water level control is working properly.

Contacts I&C to trip affected bistables.

Inform SS of TS LCO information.

BOOTH When contacted as I&C, reply: We will be able to support bistable tripping in ACTION about 45 minutes.

SS WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability - LCO 3.3.2 Condition D (from Function 1.e). This is a 6-hour LCO for tripping associated bistables.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS COMPLETES THE T.S. ASSESSMENT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Pressurizer level, charging flow and seal injection flow will start to change shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciators 47018:0203, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Press and 47018:0303, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Lvl will alarm about 2 minutes after the malfunction is inserted.

Procedure 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak does not provide guidance for accumulator check valve leakage.

+ 15 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

ACTION RO May recognize RCS leakage by changes in charging flow, seal injection flow or VCT level.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS leakage is covered by T.S. 3.4.14.

SS IF RCS leakage is recognized before accumulator alarms come in, the SS will implement 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak.

RO May take manual control of charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.

May have to adjust CV-31198, Charging Line Flow Control, (using 1HC-142) to maintain RCP seal injection flow 6-10 gpm/RCP.

BOOTH IF the crew contacts the system engineer, THEN acknowledge information but ACTION make NO recommendation.

IF the crew calls for an outplant operator, THEN come to the control room as requested.

LEAD Acknowledges accumulator high level and/or pressure alarms.

Informs SS of the required actions to drain accumulator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Refers to 1C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1 step 5.1 to lower accumulator level:

Check RCDT level available.

Under admin control, open CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

When level is 48%, shut CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

Independently verify CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank is closed.

Notify System Engineer.

BOOTH Delete malfunction SI07A after the accumulator outlet valve is closed.

ACTION LEAD/RO C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1, Step 5.11 Reducing Accumulator In-Leakage:

Under administrative control, direct outplant operator to open test line shutoff valves. (Remote: SI101)

BOOTH ACTIONS:

Direct outplant to remove safeguards hold card and close 1LA1-D3, 11 REMOTES ARE INDICATED BY Accumulator Discharge MV breaker. (Remote: SI112)

THE BOLD TYPE.

Enter TS 3.5.1 Condition B (24 hr completion time) and close MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Open CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Record leak rate (should be 0)

Close CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Open MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Independently verify position of MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Exit TS 3.5.1

Direct outplant operator to open 1LA1-D3, 11 Accumulator Discharge MV breaker, and install safeguards hold card. (Remote: SI112)

Direct outplant operator to close test line shutoff valves and reinstall lockwire.

(Remote: SI101)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Provides oversight for LEAD activities Refers to Technical Specifications WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (None as long as accumulator is available)

Statement of T.S. applicability (May enter LCO 3.5.1 Condition A based on possible dilution of the accumulator boron concentration.)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVE IS REOPENED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Main Feed water pump trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47010:0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

SS may direct a reactor trip rather than reducing power.

RO does not need to inform SS of each negative reactivity insertion during this transient. However, if rods need to be withdrawn, RO must communicate with SS before rods are moved.

SG low level reactor trip setpoint is 13%.

+ 40 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION LEAD Respond to Alarm 47010-0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT.

Informs SS that 11 MFW pump locked out.

SS Directs RO to reduce Reactor Power to maintain SG levels.

Should establish a manual reactor trip criterion based on SG level.

Maintains oversight and, IF necessary, directs a manual reactor trip.

RO As directed by SS, reduces and maintains reactor power at a level low CRITICAL enough to allow AFW to maintain SG level.

TASK (Either power is stabilized at level within capacity of AFW system -OR- a manual reactor trip is performed before an automatic setpoint is reached.)

LEAD Monitors SG levels for approach to reactor trip setpoint (13%).

WHEN power is reduced, THEN adjust AFW flow to maintain SG levels.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SG LEVELS ARE STABLE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All offsite AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Multiple annunciators will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Auto-switchover to RWST and CVCS makeup are not available without bus 15. Until bus 15 is re-energized, there is a possibility that any running charging pump could trip when the VCT empties. If so, the crew may implement the 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection or 1C12.1 AOP2, Loss of Charging Flow to the Regen HX. However, if CC flow is being supplied to the RCPs, there is no need to restore charging flow quickly.

+ 45 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION RO/SS RECOGNIZE that a reactor trip is necessary (i.e. loss of RCPs and MDAFW pump) and MANUALLY TRIP the reactor.

SS Directs entry into E-0 RO/LEAD Perform immediate actions of E-0 from memory and report completion to the SS.

12. Verify reactor trip.

13. Verify turbine trip.

14. Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED. (No)

LEAD informs SS that a transition to ECA-0.0 is required.

SS Starts reading E-0 at step 1.

At Step 3, SS directs transition to ECA-0.0.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees are monitored for information only. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

SS/RO Check If RCS Is Isolated:

d. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

e. Close letdown isolation valves (CV-31255 and CV-31226)

f. Excess letdown isolation valve (CV-31330) - CLOSED

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All offsite AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS/LEAD Verify AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM SS Perform Notifications:

Announce Unit 1 Reactor Trip

Notify Shift Manager and SEC SS/LEAD Check Cooling Water Header Pressures - BOTH GREATER THAN 25 PSIG EVALUATOR NOTE:

SS and LEAD should determine that both buses are available.

Since both bus 15 & 16 are available, it is preferable to restore bus 16 first.

SS/LEAD Attempt to Restore Power to Any Available Safeguards Bus From Unit 1 Source

a. Energize available bus with diesel generator:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Power must be restored to either bus 16 or 15 from the associated DG.

We will go to the next event prior to the second bus being energized.

SS/ LEAD Because safeguards bus did not automatically energize, the RNO is implemented:

CRITICAL Manually energize bus from any available Unit 1 source: (D2)

TASK:

RESTORE

Place desired source breaker MAN/AUTO switch to MANUAL.

POWER TO BUS 15 OR

Place synchroscope select switch to desired source position.

16

Close desired source breaker.

BOOTH Actuate Trigger 6 or Trigger 7 depending on which safeguards bus is energized.

ACTION This will provide continuous leakage through a PORV with block valve available.

SS/ LEAD Check safeguards buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED SS/RO Start one charging pump.

SS WHEN power is restored, transition back to E-0 Step 3.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees will be monitored on next transition from E-0. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN POWER IS RESTORED TO BUS 15 OR 16.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

A surrogate operator will be provided after the LEAD is assigned to restore power to the second safeguards bus. This operator should be assigned to perform Attachment L of E-0.

Due to the initial conditions, an RCS cooldown will probably not be required for the SGTR.

Symptoms of SG tube rupture will appear about 3 minutes after the malfunction is inserted. Symptoms include radiation monitor alarms and rising level in 11 SG.

+50 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #5.

ACTION LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED (No - One bus will be de-energized)

LEAD Initiate action to restore power to de-energized safeguard bus per:

1C20.5 AOP1, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 15. (See page 50)

1C20.5 AOP2, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 16. (See page 52)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The SG tube rupture may not have created symptoms for an SI depending on when malfunction was activated. If symptoms dont exist, SS will transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery. SI initiation criteria on the INFO page of ES-0.1 will cue manual SI and return to E-0, if necessary.

RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated: (either)

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT BOOTH WHEN LEAD is assigned to restored power using an AOP, THEN enter the ACTION control room as the Unit 2 RO. Ask for Attachment L of E-0.

DO NOT perform the actions of the AOP for restoring power to bus 15 or 16.

SURROGATE Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification This scenario was originally designed to run such that the diesel generators were supposed to start but the individual diesels output breakers were not to close onto the bus. Instead because of an error in the simulator set up the diesel generators did start and the diesel generator output breakers did close onto the buses. Event 5 was dropped by the Chief Examiner because it was unnecessary for this crew and due the confusion caused by simulator input error.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check AFW Status:

m. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

n. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

o. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

p. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

EVALUATOR NOTES:

RO/LEAD monitors AFW pump discharge pressure as SG pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts AFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent AFW pump trip on low discharge pressure.

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature: (substep a is not applicable since RCPs are off)

b. RCS cold leg temperatures - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF NO RCP RUNNING RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

g. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED Event

6

RECOGNIZE partially open PORV and close block valve to isolate leakage.

(Must be completed without transition to ECA-3.1.)

h. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

d. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED EVALUATOR NOTE:

Radiation will NOT be normal. Condenser air ejector and SG blowdown radiation monitors will show abnormal trends.

RO/SS Check If SG Tubes Are Not Ruptured:

Condenser air ejector radiation - NORMAL (No)

SGB radiation - NORMAL (No)

Main steamline radiation - NORMAL RO/SS Diagnose event as a Ruptured Steam Generator.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

11 SG PORV may open during this scenario after the 11 SG MSIV is closed.

SS Directs transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Starts reading E-3.

RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

RO/SS Identify Ruptured SG(s):

(Correctly identify 11 SG as the ruptured SG.)

RO/SS Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG(s): (11 SG)

CRITICAL

Close steam supply from 11 SG to TD AFW pump (MV-32016)

TASK

Close 11 SG MSIV (CV-31098) and bypass valve (MV-32045)

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Level: (11 SG)

CRITICAL c. Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 5%

TASK

d. Stop auxiliary feed flow to 11 SG by closing:

MV-32238, 11 TD AFWP to 11 SG

MV-32381, 12 MD AFWP to 11 SG (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

RO/SS Reset SI RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Pressure - GREATER THAN 210 PSIG RO/SS Initiate RCS Cooldown:

e. Determine required core exit temperature: (505°F)

f. Check one condensate pump - RUNNING

g. Establish steam dump to condenser: (not possible, do RNO listed below)

Dump steam from intact SG PORV at maximum rate.

h. WHEN core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE

c. Stop RCS cooldown

d. Maintain core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE RO/SS Check Intact SG Level:

c. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% IN EITHER SG

d. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves:

PORVs - CLOSED

Block valves - OPEN and AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Reset Containment Isolation Establish Instrument Air To Containment (no action required - did not isolate)

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

Check If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

Check Ruptured SG Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING Check RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 40°F [55°F]

Depressurize RCS Using PRZR Spray To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

(Not performed since RCPs are not running.)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS depressurization should be stopped if any of the following conditions are met:

RCS pressure < 11 SG pressure AND PRZR level >7% (expected)

PRZR level >75%

RCS subcooling <20°F RO/SS Depressurize RCS Using PRZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

CRITICAL

OPENS a pressurizer PORV.

TASK

WHEN conditions exist, THEN RO will close PORV.

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

SS/RO Check RCS Pressure - INCREASING ALL Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F

Secondary heat sink: AVAILABLE

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 7%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior SS/LEAD Stop SI Pumps CRITICAL (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

TASK TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOTH SI PUMPS ARE STOPPED PZR PORV block valve is shut.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 15 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP1, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 15 LEAD Minimize Heater Drain Tank Pump flow while maintaining main feedwater pump suction pressure to prevent Heater Drain Tank Pump lockout. (NA post trip)

BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 15 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46932, BUS 15 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10) - Not Available

D1 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.11)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 15 from D1 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46951, BKR 15-3 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46948, BKR 15-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place CS-46909, BKR 15-7 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT.

CS-46036, 11 CC PUMP

CS-46008, 11 CNTMTT SPRAY PMP

CS-46178, 11 SI PUMP

CS-46184, 11 RHR PUMP

CS-46905, BKR 15-6 BUS 15 FEED TO 112M XFMR

CS-46956, BKR 15-11 BUS 15 FEED TO 111M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D1.

LEAD Place CS-46950, BKR 15-2 BUS 15 SOURCE FROM D1 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4191801, BUS 15 4160 VOLTS, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are energized from 11A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 111 and 112 to Bus 15 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 15 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN Bus 15 is energized.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 16 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP2, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 16 BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 16 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46901, BUS 16 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.8) - Not Available

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

D2 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 16 from D2 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46922, BKR 16-8 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46918, BKR 16-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46919, BKR 16-9 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT:

CS-46037, 12 CC WTR PMP

CS-46009, 12 CNTMT SPRAY PUMP

CS-46179, 12 SI PUMP

CS-46185, 12 RHR PUMP

CS-46425, 12 MD AFWP

CS-46927, BKR 16-4 BUS 16 FEED TO 121M XFMR

CS-46916, BKR 16-11 BUS 16 FEED TO 122M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D2.

LEAD Place CS-46921, BKR 16-9 BUS 16 SOURCE FROM D2 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4192401, 4.16 KV BUS 16 VOLTMETER, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are energized from 12A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 121 and 122 to Bus 16 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 16 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BUS 16 IS ENERGIZED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-2 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-B Op-Test No.: B-1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: (IC-6)

6% power Turnover:

Ready to roll main turbine.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RX216 I SG pressure fails (HIGH) {T.S.} (LEAD) 2 SI07A C SI accumulator check valve leakage (LEAD) 3 FW13A R Main feedwater pump trips (RO - power reduction)

ED18, Loss of all AC power (ECA-0.0) with restoration from DG within 5 4 ED19, C minutes (LEAD)

DG07A/B 5 SG02A M SG tube rupture [10%]

RC22A or 6 C Pressurizer PORV leaks after Reactor Trip (RO)

B Critical Tasks:

E-0 (A) Restore heat sink -OR- Manual reactor trip

E-0 (C) Restore electrical power

E-3 (A) Isolate ruptured SG

E-3 (C) Depressurize RCS

E-3 (D) Terminate SI

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aj

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Initial Conditions:

BOC 6% power 0 MWe 1776 ppm boron Turnover Information:

A plant startup is in progress following a 6-day outage to repair turbine control valve (CV-1). We are ready to roll main turbine. Ensure normal procedure for startup is open and marked to step in progress.

Out of Service: None Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Malfunctions: None Overrides:

DI-46948A Auto OFF, DG (D1) Breaker 15-2 Fails to Auto Close

DI-46919A Auto OFF, DG (D2) Breaker 16-9 Fails to Auto Close Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE RX216 1400 MS Pressure Controller 21203 (PT 478) - Trigger #1 SI07A N/A 11 SI Accumulator Check Valve Leakage - Trigger #2 FW13A N/A 11 Main Feed Water Pump Trip - Trigger #3 ED18 N/A Fault in 1R Transformer - Trigger #4 ED19 N/A Fault in CT11 Transformer - Trigger #4 SG02A 10% 11 SG Tube Rupture - Trigger #5 RC22A N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #6 RC22B N/A Pressurizer PORV Leakage - Trigger #7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

SG pressure channel fails (HIGH)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Bistable tripping will not be performed.

Thermal Power Monitor actions of 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide, will not be required due to the initial power level of this scenario.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION LEAD/SS RECOGNIZE 12 SG PORV has opened and manually CLOSE the PORV.

LEAD Respond to annunciator 47011:0405, FW System Trouble Correctly Identifies the failed SG pressure channel. (1P-478 or Blue channel)

INITIAL ACTIONS:

1. Verify steam generator level control operating properly in automatic.

2. Control level in manual for any SG which has shifted to manual.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Refer to 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide - Unit 1 for any Reactor Protection or Engineered Safeguards system input failure.

LEAD Responds in accordance with 1C51, Instrument Failure Guide.

Verify 1HC-478, 12 SG PORV controller, is in manual with PORV closed.

Verify SG water level control is working properly.

Contacts I&C to trip affected bistables.

Inform SS of TS LCO information.

BOOTH When contacted as I&C, reply: We will be able to support bistable tripping in ACTION about 45 minutes.

SS WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (none)

Statement of T.S. applicability - LCO 3.3.2 Condition D (from Function 1.e). This is a 6-hour LCO for tripping associated bistables.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS COMPLETES THE T.S. ASSESSMENT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Pressurizer level, charging flow and seal injection flow will start to change shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciators 47018:0203, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Press and 47018:0303, 11 Accumulator Hi/Lo Lvl will alarm about 2 minutes after the malfunction is inserted.

Procedure 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak does not provide guidance for accumulator check valve leakage.

+ 15 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

ACTION RO May recognize RCS leakage by changes in charging flow, seal injection flow or VCT level.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS leakage is covered by T.S. 3.4.14.

SS IF RCS leakage is recognized before accumulator alarms come in, the SS will implement 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak.

RO May take manual control of charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.

May have to adjust CV-31198, Charging Line Flow Control, (using 1HC-142) to maintain RCP seal injection flow 6-10 gpm/RCP.

BOOTH IF the crew contacts the system engineer, THEN acknowledge information but ACTION make NO recommendation.

IF the crew calls for an outplant operator, THEN come to the control room as requested.

LEAD Acknowledges accumulator high level and/or pressure alarms.

Informs SS of the required actions to drain accumulator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD Refers to 1C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1 step 5.1 to lower accumulator level:

Check RCDT level available.

Under admin control, open CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

When level is 48%, shut CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank.

Independently verify CV-31443, 11 Accumulator to RC Drain Tank is closed.

Notify System Engineer.

BOOTH Delete malfunction SI07A after the accumulator outlet valve is closed.

ACTION LEAD/RO C18, Engineered Safeguards System Unit 1, Step 5.11 Reducing Accumulator In-Leakage:

Under administrative control, direct outplant operator to open test line shutoff valves. (Remote: SI101)

BOOTH ACTIONS:

Direct outplant to remove safeguards hold card and close 1LA1-D3, 11 REMOTES ARE INDICATED BY Accumulator Discharge MV breaker. (Remote: SI112)

THE BOLD TYPE.

Enter TS 3.5.1 Condition B (24 hr completion time) and close MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Open CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Record leak rate (should be 0)

Close CV-31448, 11 Accumulator test line return valve.

Open MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Independently verify position of MV-32071, 11 Accumulator Isolation valve

Exit TS 3.5.1

Direct outplant operator to open 1LA1-D3, 11 Accumulator Discharge MV breaker, and install safeguards hold card. (Remote: SI112)

Direct outplant operator to close test line shutoff valves and reinstall lockwire.

(Remote: SI101)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Accumulator check valve leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Provides oversight for LEAD activities Refers to Technical Specifications WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Statement of Risk Assessment (None as long as accumulator is available)

Statement of T.S. applicability (May enter LCO 3.5.1 Condition A based on possible dilution of the accumulator boron concentration.)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVE IS REOPENED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 3 Page 82 of 137 Event

Description:

Main Feed water pump trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47010:0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

SS may direct a reactor trip rather than reducing power.

RO does not need to inform SS of each negative reactivity insertion during this transient. However, if rods need to be withdrawn, RO must communicate with SS before rods are moved.

SG low level reactor trip setpoint is 13%.

+ 40 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION LEAD Respond to Alarm 47010-0101, 11 FEED WATER PUMP LOCKED OUT.

Informs SS that 11 MFW pump locked out.

SS Directs RO to reduce Reactor Power to maintain SG levels.

Should establish a manual reactor trip criterion based on SG level.

Maintains oversight and, IF necessary, directs a manual reactor trip.

RO As directed by SS, reduces and maintains reactor power at a level low CRITICAL enough to allow AFW to maintain SG level.

TASK (Either power is stabilized at level within capacity of AFW system -OR- a manual reactor trip is performed before an automatic setpoint is reached.)

LEAD Monitors SG levels for approach to reactor trip setpoint (13%).

WHEN power is reduced, THEN adjust AFW flow to maintain SG levels.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SG LEVELS ARE STABLE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Multiple annunciators will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

Auto-switchover to RWST and CVCS makeup are not available without bus 15. Until bus 15 is re-energized, there is a possibility that any running charging pump could trip when the VCT empties. If so, the crew may implement the 1C12.1 AOP1, Loss of RCP Seal Injection or 1C12.1 AOP2, Loss of Charging Flow to the Regen HX. However, if CC flow is being supplied to the RCPs, there is no need to restore charging flow quickly.

+ 45 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION RO/SS RECOGNIZE that a reactor trip is necessary (i.e. loss of RCPs and MDAFW pump) and MANUALLY TRIP the reactor.

SS Directs entry into E-0 RO/LEAD Perform immediate actions of E-0 from memory and report completion to the SS.

15. Verify reactor trip.

16. Verify turbine trip.

17. Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED. (No)

LEAD informs SS that a transition to ECA-0.0 is required.

SS Starts reading E-0 at step 1.

At Step 3, SS directs transition to ECA-0.0.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees are monitored for information only. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

SS/RO Check If RCS Is Isolated:

g. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

h. Close letdown isolation valves (CV-31255 and CV-31226)

i. Excess letdown isolation valve (CV-31330) - CLOSED SS/LEAD Verify AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Loss of All AC Power with restoration from DG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Perform Notifications:

Announce Unit 1 Reactor Trip

Notify Shift Manager and SEC SS/LEAD Check Cooling Water Header Pressures - BOTH GREATER THAN 25 PSIG EVALUATOR NOTE:

SS and LEAD should determine that both buses are available.

Since both bus 15 & 16 are available, it is preferable to restore bus 16 first.

SS/LEAD Attempt to Restore Power to Any Available Safeguards Bus From Unit 1 Source

a. Energize available bus with diesel generator:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Power must be restored to either bus 16 or 15 from the associated DG.

We will go to the next event prior to the second bus being energized.

SS/ LEAD Because safeguards bus did not automatically energize, the RNO is implemented:

CRITICAL Manually energize bus from any available Unit 1 source: (D2)

TASK:

RESTORE

Place desired source breaker MAN/AUTO switch to MANUAL.

POWER TO BUS 15 OR

Place synchroscope select switch to desired source position.

16

Close desired source breaker.

BOOTH Actuate Trigger 6 or Trigger 7 depending on which safeguards bus is energized.

ACTION This will provide continuous leakage through a PORV with block valve available.

SS/ LEAD Check safeguards buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED SS/RO Start one charging pump.

SS WHEN power is restored, transition back to E-0 Step 3.

SS should remind operators that Critical Safety Function status trees will be monitored on next transition from E-0. (UPDATE or BRIEF)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN POWER IS RESTORED TO BUS 15 OR 16.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

A surrogate operator will be provided after the LEAD is assigned to restore power to the second safeguards bus. This operator should be assigned to perform Attachment L of E-0.

Due to the initial conditions, an RCS cooldown will probably not be required for the SGTR.

Symptoms of SG tube rupture will appear about 3 minutes after the malfunction is inserted. Symptoms include radiation monitor alarms and rising level in 11 SG.

+50 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #5.

ACTION LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED (No - One bus will be de-energized)

LEAD Initiate action to restore power to de-energized safeguard bus per:

1C20.5 AOP1, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 15. (See page 50)

1C20.5 AOP2, REENERGIZING 4.16KV BUS 16. (See page 52)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The SG tube rupture may not have created symptoms for an SI depending on when malfunction was activated. If symptoms dont exist, SS will transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery. SI initiation criteria on the INFO page of ES-0.1 will cue manual SI and return to E-0, if necessary.

RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated: (either)

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT BOOTH WHEN LEAD is assigned to restored power using an AOP, THEN enter the ACTION control room as the Unit 2 RO. Ask for Attachment L of E-0.

DO NOT perform the actions of the AOP for restoring power to bus 15 or 16.

SURROGA Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification TE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check AFW Status:

q. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

r. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

s. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

t. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

EVALUATOR NOTES:

RO/LEAD monitors AFW pump discharge pressure as SG pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts AFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent AFW pump trip on low discharge pressure.

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature: (substep a is not applicable since RCPs are off)

b. RCS cold leg temperatures - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF NO RCP RUNNING RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

i. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED Event

6

RECOGNIZE partially open PORV and close block valve to isolate leakage.

(Must be completed without transition to ECA-3.1.)

j. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

e. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED EVALUATOR NOTE:

Radiation will NOT be normal. Condenser air ejector and SG blowdown radiation monitors will show abnormal trends.

RO/SS Check If SG Tubes Are Not Ruptured:

Condenser air ejector radiation - NORMAL (No)

SGB radiation - NORMAL (No)

Main steamline radiation - NORMAL RO/SS Diagnose event as a Ruptured Steam Generator.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

11 SG PORV may open during this scenario after the 11 SG MSIV is closed.

SS Directs transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Starts reading E-3.

RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

(Not running due to loss of power)

RO/SS Identify Ruptured SG(s):

(Correctly identify 11 SG as the ruptured SG.)

RO/SS Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG(s): (11 SG)

CRITICAL

Close steam supply from 11 SG to TD AFW pump (MV-32016)

TASK

Close 11 SG MSIV (CV-31098) and bypass valve (MV-32045)

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Level: (11 SG)

CRITICAL e. Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 5%

TASK

f. Stop auxiliary feed flow to 11 SG by closing:

MV-32238, 11 TD AFWP to 11 SG

MV-32381, 12 MD AFWP to 11 SG (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

RO/SS Reset SI RO/SS Check Ruptured SG Pressure - GREATER THAN 210 PSIG RO/SS Initiate RCS Cooldown:

i. Determine required core exit temperature: (505°F)

j. Check one condensate pump - RUNNING

k. Establish steam dump to condenser: (not possible, do RNO listed below)

Dump steam from intact SG PORV at maximum rate.

l. WHEN core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE

e. Stop RCS cooldown

f. Maintain core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE RO/SS Check Intact SG Level:

e. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% IN EITHER SG

f. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves:

PORVs - CLOSED

Block valves - OPEN and AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior RO/SS Reset Containment Isolation Establish Instrument Air To Containment (no action required - did not isolate)

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

Check If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

Check Ruptured SG Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING Check RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 40°F [55°F]

Depressurize RCS Using PRZR Spray To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

(Not performed since RCPs are not running.)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCS depressurization should be stopped if any of the following conditions are met:

RCS pressure < 11 SG pressure AND PRZR level >7% (expected)

PRZR level >75%

RCS subcooling <20°F RO/SS Depressurize RCS Using PRZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow And Refill PRZR:

CRITICAL

OPENS a pressurizer PORV.

TASK

WHEN conditions exist, THEN RO will close PORV.

(Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

SS/RO Check RCS Pressure - INCREASING ALL Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F

Secondary heat sink: AVAILABLE

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 7%

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 Event No.: 5 & 6 Event

Description:

SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior SS/LEAD Stop SI Pumps CRITICAL (Must be completed before SG WR level exceeds 90%.)

TASK TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOTH SI PUMPS ARE STOPPED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 15 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP1, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 15 LEAD Minimize Heater Drain Tank Pump flow while maintaining main feedwater pump suction pressure to prevent Heater Drain Tank Pump lockout. (NA post trip)

BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 15 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46932, BUS 15 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10) - Not Available

D1 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.11)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 15 from D1 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46951, BKR 15-3 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46948, BKR 15-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place CS-46909, BKR 15-7 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT.

CS-46036, 11 CC PUMP

CS-46008, 11 CNTMTT SPRAY PMP

CS-46178, 11 SI PUMP

CS-46184, 11 RHR PUMP

CS-46905, BKR 15-6 BUS 15 FEED TO 112M XFMR

CS-46956, BKR 15-11 BUS 15 FEED TO 111M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D1.

LEAD Place CS-46950, BKR 15-2 BUS 15 SOURCE FROM D1 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4191801, BUS 15 4160 VOLTS, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46906, BUS 15 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are energized from 11A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 111 and 112 to Bus 15 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 111 and 112 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 15 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN Bus 15 is energized.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

These actions are required if Bus 16 is NOT energized in ECA-0.0.

This is 1C20.5 AOP2, Energizing 4.16KV Bus 16 BOOTH When contacted as outplant operator, report no protective targets for bus to be ACTION energized. Also report no visible damage to bus equipment.

LEAD Perform the following:

Record Control Room alarms associated with Bus 16 de-energization.

Record local bus protective relay targets and status of bus and breakers.

LEAD Determine the cause of de-energization. (DG output breaker failed to close.)

LEAD Isolate or repair the problem. (NA because manual closure has not been tried.)

LEAD Place CS-46901, BUS 16 VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Refer to 1C20.5 for lockout resetting requirements. (NA - no lockout occurred)

IF lockout cannot be promptly reset THEN contact engineering to provide a work order to transfer 480V Buses 111 and 112 to alternate supply.

LEAD Check the following source voltages and use the first acceptable supply in the order listed:

CT11 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.8) - Not Available

1RY 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.9) - Not Available

D2 4000-4400 volts (go to Step 2.4.10)

LEAD Re-energize Bus 16 from D2 as follows:

LEAD Place CS-46922, BKR 16-8 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46918, BKR 16-2 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

LEAD Place CS-46919, BKR 16-9 MAN/AUTO CLOSURE SEL SW, in MANUAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Place the following control switches in PULLOUT:

CS-46037, 12 CC WTR PMP

CS-46009, 12 CNTMT SPRAY PUMP

CS-46179, 12 SI PUMP

CS-46185, 12 RHR PUMP

CS-46425, 12 MD AFWP

CS-46927, BKR 16-4 BUS 16 FEED TO 121M XFMR

CS-46916, BKR 16-11 BUS 16 FEED TO 122M XFMR LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROSCOPE SEL SW, to D2.

LEAD Place CS-46921, BKR 16-9 BUS 16 SOURCE FROM D2 DSL GEN, to CLOSE.

LEAD Verify 4192401, 4.16 KV BUS 16 VOLTMETER, indicates between 4000-4400 volts.

LEAD Place CS-46917, BUS 16 SYNCHROCOPE SEL SW, to OFF.

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are energized from 12A Alt Transformer, THEN restore 480V Buses 121 and 122 to Bus 16 per 1C20.6.

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD IF 480V Buses 121 and 122 are NOT energized, THEN:

(NA - condition not met)

LEAD Restore Bus 16 loads as dictated by plant conditions and loading limitations.

LEAD Notify General Superintendent of Operations and the NRC Resident Inspector of entry into this AOP per SWI O-28.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BUS 16 IS ENERGIZED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: B-1 C20.5 AOP1 Event

Description:

Restoring Power to Bus 15 Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-C Op-Test No.: C-1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

79% power BOC

Xenon burning out Turnover:

OOS: Diesel Generator D1, PORV-431C, 123 Air Compressor, 12 BA Transfer pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 NA N Boration for temperature control (RO) 2 EG200 I Generator gas temperature controller failure (LEAD) 3 RX014 I Pressurizer low level bistable failure (No heaters) (RO) 4 CC01B C Running CC pump trips 4 CC02A C Standby CC pump fails to auto-start {T.S. 3.0.3} (LEAD) 5 RC14 C RCS Leak (LEAD) 6 MS02B M Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV 7 various C ATWS (rods fail to move in auto) (RO) 8 TC01A C Turbine stop and control valves stick open (LEAD) 9 NI04A I IR compensation causes P-6 failure (SR does not energize) (RO)

Critical Tasks:

E-0 (A) Manual reactor trip

E-0 (K) Minimum CCW pumps

FR-S.1 (C) Negative reactivity insertion

FR-S.1 (A) Isolate Main Turbine

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Initial Conditions:

BOC 79% power 448 MWe 1373 ppm boron Turnover Information:

Unit is holding power at the present level at direction of system load dispatch.

Out of Service:

Diesel Generator D1

123 Instrument Air Compressor

Pressurizer PORV CV-31231 Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Triggers:

Trigger 6 condition: RCPPZ<2165 with attached command of DMF RX04 Malfunctions:

TC01A, Turbine Stop Valve Sticks Open

TC14D, Turbine Control Valve Sticks Open

NI04A, Intermediate Range Improper Compensating Voltage

CC02A, 11 CC Pump Fails to Auto Start

RP07, Mechanical Failure of Reactor Trip Breakers

TC11A, Failure of Turbine Auto Trip Overrides:

Annunciator M47024:1003 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47024:1103 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47014:0606B Disable (Hides AMSAC/DSS failure)

ERCS Point CP-1Y0501D Reset (Hides AMSAC/DSS failure)

Light LO-46263G Off (Disables block valve for PORV CV-31231)

Switch DI-46263O Off (Disables block valve for PORV CV-31231)

Switch DI-46447B On (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Switch DI-46447I Off (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Switch DI-46182 Off (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE EG200 0% Generator Gas Temperature Controller Failure - Trigger #1 RX04 N/A Pressurizer Heaters Fail Off - Trigger #2 CC01B N/A 12 CC Pump Trip - Trigger #3 RC14 1% RCS leak - Trigger#4 MS02B 40% 12 Main Steam Line Rupture Outside Containment - Trigger #5 RD02 N/A Controlling Bank Fails to Move in AUTO - Trigger #5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Normal boration for temperature control Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

The evolution can be performed using either section 5.2 or 5.8 of C12.5, Boron Concentration Control.

Annunciator 47015:0403, Boric Acid Flow Controller Deviation is expected to come in momentarily during the evolution. As an expected alarm, no reference to the annunciator response procedure is required unless the alarm does not clear.

RO When Tavg deviates from Tref sufficiently, the RO will add boric acid (BA) to the RCS by:

1. Setting Boric Acid Integrator (YIC-110) to the desired quantity of BA.

2. Selecting BORATE on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

3. Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

4. Observing proper system responses such as: boric acid flow indication and proper valve responses.

5. When BA flow automatically stops, BA will be flushed into CVCS by performing a Manual Makeup of 10 gallons of water.

Setting Reactor Makeup Water Integrator for 10 gallons (YIC-111)

Selecting ALT DIL on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

Placing control switch CS-46454 in CLOSE for CV-31201, 11 BA Blender to 11 VCT Inlet.

Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

Observing proper system responses such as: boric acid flow indication and proper valve responses.

6. When Makeup Water flow stops, reset system for AUTO Makeup by:

Placing control switch CS-46454 in AUTO for CV-31201, 11 BA Blender to 11 VCT Inlet.

Selecting AUTO on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN MAKEUP SYSTEM IS RETURNED TO AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Generator gas temperature controller failure (detector fails low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47007:0401, Generator or Exciter Cold or Hot Gas Hi Temp will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciator 47007:0303, Hydrogen and Seal Oil Local Alarm comes in.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION LEAD Responds to alarm 47007-0401, Generator Or Exciter Cold Or Hot Gas Hi Temp

1. Observes Generator recorder temps to verify valid alarm

2. Informs SS alarm is valid

3. Determines Generator cooling water control valve is closed, takes manual control of controller 43081 for CV-31360, GEN H2 CLG WTR, and restores cooling.

4. Restores temperature and clears alarm.

5. Contacts NLO to determine cause of local alarm

6. Initiates action to investigate and repair failure, calls I & C.

BOOTH When contacted, report local alarm is 70403-0105, Hydrogen Temperature High.

ACTION NOTE: Alarm can be reset using remote EG113.

LEAD For 47007-0303:

Dispatch an operator to the Hydrogen and Seal Oil Panel to determine the initiating alarm AND respond to the alarm as specified in C70403, Hydrogen and Seal Oil - Unit 1 Remote Alarm Responses.

SS Provides direction as needed

1. May direct Lead to take manual control of Generator cooling water

2. Directs Lead to initiate investigation and repair SS WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Summary of event and contingent actions.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN LEAD CONTACTS I&C ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47012:0607, PRZR Lo-Lo LVL Heaters Off And Letdown Secured will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

This event will require entry into T.S. LCO 3.0.3.

This malfunction will be deleted when directed by Lead Evaluator or whenever RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

ACTION IF RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig, THEN delete malfunction RX04. Inform the SS that the failed bistable card has been replaced.

RO Responds to annunciator 47012-0607 PRZR LO-LO LVL HEATERS OFF AND LETDOWN SECURED

1. Determines all pressurizer heaters off and letdown isolated

2. Determines pressurizer level instruments are working and actual level is increasing (probable failed bistable vice level channel failure)

3. Reports observations to SS

4. Reduces charging flow to minimum LEAD 1. May refer to Instrument Failure Guide.

2. Reports observations to SS EVALUATOR NOTE:

There is NOT a kickout from the alarm procedure to this AOP.

SS May direct entry in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT OR Based on information from RO, Lead and control board indications SS should:

1. Direct RO to manually control charging

2. Direct Lead to place excess Letdown in service

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/RO Actions in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT:

Verify Reactor Makeup Controller in AUTO.

IF VCT level is less than 17%, THEN verify automatic makeup has initiated.

CLOSE the letdown orifice isolation valves:

CV-31325, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 40 GPM

CV-31326, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 40 GPM

CV-31327, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 80 GPM CLOSE the letdown isolation valves:

CV-31226, LETDOWN LINE ISOL

CV-31255, LETDOWN LINE ISOL Place speed control for all operating charging pumps in MANUAL.

LEAD/RO IF two (2) Charging Pumps are running, THEN stop one of the pumps as follows:

Reduce charging pump speed and at the same time CLOSE CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT, to maintain seal injection flow of 6-10 gpm to each RCP.

Continue until the selected charging pump is at minimum speed.

Adjust CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT, until seal injection flow is approximately 9.5 gpm, then stop the selected charging pump.

Adjust the speed of the inservice charging pump and CV-31198 to maintain seal injection flow of 6-10 gpm to each RCP. Continue until charging line flow control valve is fully CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/RO Actions in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT: (cont.)

Initiate CC flow through Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger by OPENING MV-32095, 11 EXCESS LTDN HX CC INLT/OUTL.

Establish Excess Letdown flow to the VCT.

1.0 POSITION CV-31333, EXCESS LTDN DIVERT TO RCDT TO THE V.C. TK POSITION.

2.0 OPEN CV-31330, EXCESS LTDN HX INLT.

3.0 SLOWLY OPEN CV-31210, Excess Ltdn flow cont.

Monitor PRZR level, adjusting Excess Letdown flow as needed with CV-31210.

Notify Duty Chemist if purification is removed from service.

Minimize load changes.

IF RCS activity does not remain within limits, THEN proceed to bring the reactor to Mode 3, Hot Standby condition.

BOOTH

When contacted as I&C, respond with you will investigate the failure. After ACTION investigation, report failed bistable card and estimate 40 minutes to obtain, calibrate and install a new bistable card.

When contacted as Chemist, report normal RCS activity. If a value is needed, report 0.8 µc/cc.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Reviews Technical Specifications and determines LCO 3.4.9b is NOT met.

Recognizes that no condition is applicable and enters LCO 3.0.3.

May direct RO and Lead to prepare and commence plant shut down When appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Impacts of failed bistable, pressurizer heaters all inoperable (LCO 3.0.3: 7 hrs to mode 3, 13 hrs to Mode 4)

Challenge to pressurizer pressure and level control

Plant shutdown must be initiated within one hour.

BOOTH When directed by Lead Evaluator OR when RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig, ACTION contact SS and report bistable has been replaced and system should be operable.

SS Should direct the RO to restore pressurizer heaters.

RO Restores pressurizer heaters by placing control switches to OFF then placing control switches in AUTO or ON.

(Usual configuration has at least one bank of heaters in ON and the rest of the heaters in AUTO.)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN HEATERS ARE RESTORED TO SERVICE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Running CC pump trips, Standby CC pump fails to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47020:0102, 12 CC Pump Locked Out will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

This event makes both Unit 1 CC pumps inoperable and requires entry in T.S. LCO 3.0.3.

BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION

+ 25 LEAD Responds to multiple alarms.

Determines 12 CC pump tripped, 11 CC did not auto start

Manually starts 11 CC pump and restores CC pressure After manual action only alarm 47020-0102 12 CC PUMP LOCKED OUT remains and is addressed:

Initiates action to investigate, calls Station Electrician.

SS Provides direction to Lead as needed to restore CC system.

May direct Lead to manually start 11 CC pump.

May direct Lead to initiate investigation and repair When appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

T.S. LCO. 3.7.7 which is not met because both trains CC inoperable (due to pump locked out and auto start failure).

T.S. LCO 3.0.3 which is entered because LCO 3.7.7 is not met.

(LCO 3.0.3 requires shutdown to Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months with 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months to Mode 4.)

BOOTH WHEN SS makes a T.S. determination for this event, THEN delete malfunction ACTION RX04. Inform the SS that the failed bistable card has been replaced.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS ANNOUNCES ENTRY INTO TS LCO 3.0.3.

The Chief Examiner deleted Event 5 because it was unnecessary and time consuming.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RCS leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Pressurizer level will begin to drop very slowly, charging pump speed will increase and seal injection flow will be affected when the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciator 47022:0108, Hi Radiation Train B Panel Alarm will alarm about 5 minutes after the malfunction is inserted (R-12). The alarm will reflash about 10 minutes after the malfunction is inserted (R-11).

DNB T.S. LCO is 3.4.1 with limits on:

RCS temperature < 564°F RCS pressure > 2205 psig RCS flow > 177,000 gpm BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION

+ 30 RO May RECOGNIZE symptoms of RCS leakage before alarms and inform SS.

SS Implements 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak

Should establish and brief crew on manual reactor trip criteria.

RO VERIFIES pressurizer level control system is restoring pressurizer level.

LEAD USES plant computer to DETERMINE RCS leak rate. (about 5 gpm)

SS Uses Figure 1 and DETERMINES leak is in the containment.

WHEN leak rate is known, SS should discuss the possibility of a containment entry with the Shift Manager.

SS Directs LEAD to remove excess letdown from service per step 2.4.8.B to try and isolate the leak.

LEAD CLOSES Excess Letdown isolation valve (CV-31330)

Verifies RCS leak is NOT isolated using the plant computer.

SS If time is available, SS should review Technical Specifications and determine LCO 3.4.14 Condition A (due to LCO item b) is NOT met. This requires implementation of Condition A to reduce the leakage (or identify source) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN LEAD ANNOUNCES THAT THE LEAK IS NOT ISOLATED WITH EXCESS LETDOWN OOS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47022:0611, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

This is the beginning of the MAJOR event.

If no automatic trip signal is present, the SS may dispatch operator to trip reactor locally. (NOTE: Automatic trip signal occurs very quickly)

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

+45 BOOTH

With concurrence of LEAD EVALUATOR, activate event trigger #5.

ACTION

WHEN LEAD contacts you to stop turbine building roof exhausters, THEN enter the control room and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

LEAD Responds to fire alarm by inspecting fire panel and announces location of alarm.

May direct a Plant Equipment Operator to investigate but IF SO, THEN must inform PEO of the possibility of a steam leak in the area.

RO Reports lowering RCS pressure and temperature.

SS Based on information from RO and observations directs:

1. RO to trip Reactor

2. May direct Lead to evacuate Auxiliary Building BOOTH Report steam leak. A lot of steam blocks stairway to access 735 level. I am ACTION leaving the area.

RO Attempts manual reactor trip and announces failure.

CS-46450, Rx Trip - Reset on Panel A

CS-46331, Rx Trip on Panel D

CS-46447, AMSAC/DSS on Panel E SS Directs transition to FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.

Starts reading FR-S.1 at Step 1 RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip: (Condition not met)

CRITICAL RO must ensure rods are continuously inserted in MANUAL until the reactor TASK trip breakers are open.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

CRITICAL

Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED (Condition not met)

TASKS:

RNO:

MANUALLY TRIP Manually trip turbine.

TURBINE.

IF NOT, THEN :

MANUALLY CLOSE 1) Verify all turbine control valves closed.

MSIVS.

IF NOT, THEN manually close control valves.

IF NOT, THEN close MSIVs and bypass valves.

Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING LEAD/SS Initiate a normal boration of RCS at 12-15 gpm.

CRITICAL Borates RCS at 12 to 15 gpm.

TASK (Must be completed before exiting from FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.)

BOOTH When directed to locally open reactor trip breakers, then wait 3 minutes and ACTION delete malfunction RP07.

ALL Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip

Turbine trip SS must dispatch operator to locally trip reactor and turbine.

LEAD/SS Check SG levels:

LEAD/SS Stop reactor makeup pumps RO/SS Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled cooldown: (YES)

LEAD/SS Check MSIV and bypass valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Identify Faulted SGs (Determine 12 Steam Generator faulted)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Directs Lead to isolate 12 Steam Generator LEAD Isolates 12 Steam Generator:

1. Verifies Main Feed isolation valves are closed.

Main valve - CV-31128

Bypass - CV-31370

2. Closes Aux Feed supply valves:

CRITICAL

TDAFP supply - MV-32239 TASK

MDAFP supply - MV-32382

3. Closes Steam Supply to TD AFW pump - MV-32017

4. Verifies 12 SG PORV (CV-31089) is closed (Must be completed before exiting from FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.)

RO Check core exit temperature - LESS THAN 1200°F RO Verify reactor is subcritical:

Power less than 5%

Intermediate range SUR - NEGATIVE SS WHEN FR-S.1 is complete and reactor power is less than 5%, returns to E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection step 1.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS ANNOUNCES RE-ENTRY INTO E-0 FROM FR-S.1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

This continues the MAJOR event.

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

SS Starts reading E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection step 1.

RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN

Neutron flux - DECREASING

Rod position indicators - ZERO

Rod bottom lights - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated:

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

-OR-

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification (See Page 115 for Attachment L actions.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check AFW Status:

u. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

v. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG

w. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG

x. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

EVALUATOR NOTES:

RO/LEAD monitors AFW pump discharge pressure as SG pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts AFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent AFW pump trip on low discharge pressure.

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature:

e. RCS average temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF ANY RCP RUNNING RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

k. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

l. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCP trip criteria will be exceeded at some point in this scenario.

RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

g. Injection flow to RCS:

SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

-OR-

RHR pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

h. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1250 PSIG [1575 PSIG]

i. Stop both RCPs

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

f. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOOTH WHEN LEAD contacts Turbine Building Operator for local actions, THEN enter the ACTION control room as the Unit 2 RO and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

SS Transitions to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, step 1.

(NOTE: All of the manual actions in E-2 were performed in FR-S.1.)

SS/LEAD Check MSIV And Bypass Valve On Affected SG(s) - CLOSED SS/LEAD Check If Either SG Not Faulted: (11 SG is not faulted)

SS/LEAD Identify Faulted SG: (12 SG is faulted)

SS/LEAD Isolate Faulted SG: (All actions were completed in FR-S.1)

SS/LEAD Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10,000 GALLONS SS/LEAD Check Secondary Radiation:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

It is possible to use the INFO page of E-1 to make a transition directly to ES-0.2, SI Termination, if all listed conditions are satisfied. If this is done, the actions of ES-0.2 are listed starting on page 113.

SS

Makes transition to 1E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

SS/LEAD Place Steam Dump In "STM PRESS" Mode ALL Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS/LEAD Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

RNO: Verify faulted SG(s) isolated:

ALL Check Intact SG Level:

g. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% IN EITHER SG

h. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

SS/LEAD Check Secondary Side Radiation - NORMAL RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves:

SS/LEAD Reset SI SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation SS/LEAD Establish Instrument Air to Containment (never isolated)

LEAD/SS Check Power Supply To Charging Pumps - OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO/SS Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

ALL Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F

Secondary heat sink - AVAILABLE

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 7% [27%]

SS

Makes transition to 1ES-0.2, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

SS/LEAD Reset SI SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS/LEAD Establish Instrument Air to Containment (never isolated)

SS/LEAD Align AMSAC/DSS System:

CS-46447, AMSAC/DSS Control Switch, in PULL to LOCK

Reset using CS-46448, AMSAC/DSS Reset PB RO/SS Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

SS/LEAD Stop Safeguards Pumps:

RHR pumps

SI pumps

~20 RO Recognizes Intermediate Range NI under-compensated.

min after (EVENT #7) Reports conditions to the SS.

RX trip Manually energizes the SR NIs TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOTH SI PUMPS ARE STOPPED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Attachment L is usually given to the LEAD to perform independently at Step 5 in E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Instructor will take over Attachment L as the Unit 2 LEAD when the LEAD contacts the outplant operator to stop turbine bulding roof exhausters.

Event LEAD Verify Safeguard Component Alignment:

7 &

8 * "SI NOT READY" lights - NOT LIT

"SI ACTIVE" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS CRITICAL IF not running, will start 11 CC pump due to SI status step.

TASKS ARE IN BOLD (At least one CC pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

TYPE

"CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS

Category I doors - CLOSED

Check Category I Special Vent Zone Report - NO OPENINGS REQUIRING CLOSURE WITHIN 6 MINUTES

CLOSE MV-32115, 122 SFP HX INLT HDR MV B

Check Loop A and Loop B Cooling Water Pressures - >65 PSIG LEAD Verify Plant Announcements Complete:

(Will make plant announcements)

LEAD Check If Main Steamlines Are Isolated:

MSIVs and bypasses - CLOSED (Bypass valves are normally closed, MSIVs are failed open in this scenario)

LEAD Verify SI Flow:

(Checks for SI pump flow if RCS pressure is <2100 psig)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Verify RHR Flow:

(Checks for RHR pump flow if RCS pressure is <150 psig)

LEAD Check Containment Pressure:

(Since pressure has remained <23 psig, no action is required.)

LEAD Check RCP Cooling:

CC flow to RCPs > 150 gpm

CC thermal barrier return valves - OPEN

Seal injection flow - 6 gpm to 10 gpm (normal)

LEAD Verify Local Actions Complete:

Turbine roof exhausters

MSR isolation (Attachment J)

TERMINATION CUE: When BOOTH INSTRUCTOR takes over completion of Attachment L.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Facility: Prairie Island Scenario No.: 2003NRC-C Op-Test No.: C-2 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

79% power BOC

Xenon burning out Turnover:

OOS: Diesel Generator D1, PORV-431C, 123 Air Compressor, 12 BA Transfer pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 NA N Boration for temperature control (RO) 2 EG200 I Generator gas temperature controller failure (LEAD) 3 RX014 I Pressurizer low level bistable failure (No heaters) (RO) 4 CC01B C Running CC pump trips 4 CC02A C Standby CC pump fails to auto-start {T.S. 3.0.3} (LEAD) 5 RC14 C RCS Leak (LEAD) 6 MS02B M Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV 7 various C ATWS (rods fail to move in auto) (RO) 8 TC01A C Turbine stop and control valves stick open (LEAD) 9 NI04A I IR compensation causes P-6 failure (SR does not energize) (RO)

Critical Tasks:

E-0 (A) Manual reactor trip

E-0 (K) Minimum CCW pumps

FR-S.1 (C) Negative reactivity insertion

FR-S.1 (A) Isolate Main Turbine

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Initial Conditions:

BOC 79% power 448 MWe 1373 ppm boron Turnover Information:

Unit is holding power at the present level at direction of system load dispatch.

Out of Service:

Diesel Generator D1

123 Instrument Air Compressor

Pressurizer PORV CV-31231 Simulator Setup:

Preset Simulator inputs:

Triggers:

Trigger 6 condition: RCPPZ<2165 with attached command of DMF RX04 Malfunctions:

TC01A, Turbine Stop Valve Sticks Open

TC14D, Turbine Control Valve Sticks Open

NI04A, Intermediate Range Improper Compensating Voltage

CC02A, 11 CC Pump Fails to Auto Start

RP07, Mechanical Failure of Reactor Trip Breakers

TC11A, Failure of Turbine Auto Trip Overrides:

Annunciator M47024:1003 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47024:1103 Crywolf (Associated with DG out of service)

Annunciator M47014:0606B Disable (Hides AMSAC/DSS failure)

ERCS Point CP-1Y0501D Reset (Hides AMSAC/DSS failure)

Light LO-46263G Off (Disables block valve for PORV CV-31231)

Switch DI-46263O Off (Disables block valve for PORV CV-31231)

Switch DI-46447B On (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Switch DI-46447I Off (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Switch DI-46182 Off (Disables AMSAC/DSS)

Triggered Simulator Inputs:

INPUT VALUE TITLE EG200 0% Generator Gas Temperature Controller Failure - Trigger #1 RX04 N/A Pressurizer Heaters Fail Off - Trigger #2 CC01B N/A 12 CC Pump Trip - Trigger #3 RC14 1% RCS leak - Trigger#4 MS02B 40% 12 Main Steam Line Rupture Outside Containment - Trigger #5 RD02 N/A Controlling Bank Fails to Move in AUTO - Trigger #5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Normal boration for temperature control Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

The evolution can be performed using either section 5.2 or 5.8 of C12.5, Boron Concentration Control.

Annunciator 47015:0403, Boric Acid Flow Controller Deviation is expected to come in momentarily during the evolution. As an expected alarm, no reference to the annunciator response procedure is required unless the alarm does not clear.

RO When Tavg deviates from Tref sufficiently, the RO will add boric acid (BA) to the RCS by:

7. Setting Boric Acid Integrator (YIC-110) to the desired quantity of BA.

8. Selecting BORATE on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

9. Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

10. Observing proper system responses such as: boric acid flow indication and proper valve responses.

11. When BA flow automatically stops, BA will be flushed into CVCS by performing a Manual Makeup of 10 gallons of water.

Setting Reactor Makeup Water Integrator for 10 gallons (YIC-111)

Selecting ALT DIL on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

Placing control switch CS-46454 in CLOSE for CV-31201, 11 BA Blender to 11 VCT Inlet.

Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

Observing proper system responses such as: boric acid flow indication and proper valve responses.

12. When Makeup Water flow stops, reset system for AUTO Makeup by:

Placing control switch CS-46454 in AUTO for CV-31201, 11 BA Blender to 11 VCT Inlet.

Selecting AUTO on the Makeup Mode Selector switch (CS-46300)

Starting the system using control switch (CS-46457)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN MAKEUP SYSTEM IS RETURNED TO AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Generator gas temperature controller failure (detector fails low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47007:0401, Generator or Exciter Cold or Hot Gas Hi Temp will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciator 47007:0303, Hydrogen and Seal Oil Local Alarm comes in.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #1.

ACTION LEAD Responds to alarm 47007-0401, Generator Or Exciter Cold Or Hot Gas Hi Temp

7. Observes Generator recorder temps to verify valid alarm

8. Informs SS alarm is valid

9. Determines Generator cooling water control valve is closed, takes manual control of controller 43081 for CV-31360, GEN H2 CLG WTR, and restores cooling.

10. Restores temperature and clears alarm.

11. Contacts NLO to determine cause of local alarm

12. Initiates action to investigate and repair failure, calls I & C.

BOOTH When contacted, report local alarm is 70403-0105, Hydrogen Temperature High.

ACTION NOTE: Alarm can be reset using remote EG113.

LEAD For 47007-0303:

Dispatch an operator to the Hydrogen and Seal Oil Panel to determine the initiating alarm AND respond to the alarm as specified in C70403, Hydrogen and Seal Oil - Unit 1 Remote Alarm Responses.

SS Provides direction as needed

3. May direct Lead to take manual control of Generator cooling water

4. Directs Lead to initiate investigation and repair SS WHEN appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Summary of event and contingent actions.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN LEAD CONTACTS I&C ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47012:0607, PRZR Lo-Lo LVL Heaters Off And Letdown Secured will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

This event will require entry into T.S. LCO 3.0.3.

This malfunction will be deleted when directed by Lead Evaluator or whenever RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig.

+5 BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #2.

ACTION IF RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig, THEN delete malfunction RX04. Inform the SS that the failed bistable card has been replaced.

RO Responds to annunciator 47012-0607 PRZR LO-LO LVL HEATERS OFF AND LETDOWN SECURED

5. Determines all pressurizer heaters off and letdown isolated

6. Determines pressurizer level instruments are working and actual level is increasing (probable failed bistable vice level channel failure)

7. Reports observations to SS

8. Reduces charging flow to minimum LEAD 3. May refer to Instrument Failure Guide.

4. Reports observations to SS EVALUATOR NOTE:

There is NOT a kickout from the alarm procedure to this AOP.

SS May direct entry in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT OR Based on information from RO, Lead and control board indications SS should:

3. Direct RO to manually control charging

4. Direct Lead to place excess Letdown in service

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/RO Actions in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT:

Verify Reactor Makeup Controller in AUTO.

IF VCT level is less than 17%, THEN verify automatic makeup has initiated.

CLOSE the letdown orifice isolation valves:

CV-31325, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 40 GPM

CV-31326, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 40 GPM

CV-31327, LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOL 80 GPM CLOSE the letdown isolation valves:

CV-31226, LETDOWN LINE ISOL

CV-31255, LETDOWN LINE ISOL Place speed control for all operating charging pumps in MANUAL.

LEAD/RO IF two (2) Charging Pumps are running, THEN stop one of the pumps as follows:

Reduce charging pump speed and at the same time CLOSE CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT, to maintain seal injection flow of 6-10 gpm to each RCP.

Continue until the selected charging pump is at minimum speed.

Adjust CV-31198, CHG LINE FLOW CONT, until seal injection flow is approximately 9.5 gpm, then stop the selected charging pump.

Adjust the speed of the inservice charging pump and CV-31198 to maintain seal injection flow of 6-10 gpm to each RCP. Continue until charging line flow control valve is fully CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/RO Actions in 1C12.1 AOP3, Loss of Letdown Flow to the VCT: (cont.)

Initiate CC flow through Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger by OPENING MV-32095, 11 EXCESS LTDN HX CC INLT/OUTL.

Establish Excess Letdown flow to the VCT.

4.0 POSITION CV-31333, EXCESS LTDN DIVERT TO RCDT TO THE V.C. TK POSITION.

5.0 OPEN CV-31330, EXCESS LTDN HX INLT.

6.0 SLOWLY OPEN CV-31210, Excess Ltdn flow cont.

Monitor PRZR level, adjusting Excess Letdown flow as needed with CV-31210.

Notify Duty Chemist if purification is removed from service.

Minimize load changes.

IF RCS activity does not remain within limits, THEN proceed to bring the reactor to Mode 3, Hot Standby condition.

BOOTH

When contacted as I&C, respond with you will investigate the failure. After ACTION investigation, report failed bistable card and estimate 40 minutes to obtain, calibrate and install a new bistable card.

When contacted as Chemist, report normal RCS activity. If a value is needed, report 0.8 µc/cc.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Pressurizer low level bistable failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Reviews Technical Specifications and determines LCO 3.4.9b is NOT met.

Recognizes that no condition is applicable and enters LCO 3.0.3.

May direct RO and Lead to prepare and commence plant shut down When appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

Impacts of failed bistable, pressurizer heaters all inoperable (LCO 3.0.3: 7 hrs to mode 3, 13 hrs to Mode 4)

Challenge to pressurizer pressure and level control

Plant shutdown must be initiated within one hour.

BOOTH When directed by Lead Evaluator OR when RCS pressure drops to 2150 psig, ACTION contact SS and report bistable has been replaced and system should be operable.

SS Should direct the RO to restore pressurizer heaters.

RO Restores pressurizer heaters by placing control switches to OFF then placing control switches in AUTO or ON.

(Usual configuration has at least one bank of heaters in ON and the rest of the heaters in AUTO.)

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN HEATERS ARE RESTORED TO SERVICE

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Running CC pump trips, Standby CC pump fails to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47020:0102, 12 CC Pump Locked Out will alarm when the malfunction is inserted.

This event makes both Unit 1 CC pumps inoperable and requires entry in T.S. LCO 3.0.3.

BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #3.

ACTION

+ 25 LEAD Responds to multiple alarms.

Determines 12 CC pump tripped, 11 CC did not auto start

Manually starts 11 CC pump and restores CC pressure After manual action only alarm 47020-0102 12 CC PUMP LOCKED OUT remains and is addressed:

Initiates action to investigate, calls Station Electrician.

SS Provides direction to Lead as needed to restore CC system.

May direct Lead to manually start 11 CC pump.

May direct Lead to initiate investigation and repair When appropriate and IF time is available, SS should conduct a briefing which should include:

T.S. LCO. 3.7.7 which is not met because both trains CC inoperable (due to pump locked out and auto start failure).

T.S. LCO 3.0.3 which is entered because LCO 3.7.7 is not met.

(LCO 3.0.3 requires shutdown to Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months with 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months to Mode 4.)

BOOTH WHEN SS makes a T.S. determination for this event, THEN delete malfunction ACTION RX04. Inform the SS that the failed bistable card has been replaced.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS ANNOUNCES ENTRY INTO TS LCO 3.0.3.

The Chief Examiner deleted Event 5 because it was unnecessary and time consuming.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RCS leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Pressurizer level will begin to drop very slowly, charging pump speed will increase and seal injection flow will be affected when the malfunction is inserted.

Annunciator 47022:0108, Hi Radiation Train B Panel Alarm will alarm about 5 minutes after the malfunction is inserted (R-12). The alarm will reflash about 10 minutes after the malfunction is inserted (R-11).

DNB T.S. LCO is 3.4.1 with limits on:

RCS temperature < 564°F RCS pressure > 2205 psig RCS flow > 177,000 gpm BOOTH WHEN directed, THEN activate event trigger #4.

ACTION

+ 30 RO May RECOGNIZE symptoms of RCS leakage before alarms and inform SS.

SS Implements 1C4 AOP1, Reactor Coolant Leak

Should establish and brief crew on manual reactor trip criteria.

RO VERIFIES pressurizer level control system is restoring pressurizer level.

LEAD USES plant computer to DETERMINE RCS leak rate. (about 5 gpm)

SS Uses Figure 1 and DETERMINES leak is in the containment.

WHEN leak rate is known, SS should discuss the possibility of a containment entry with the Shift Manager.

SS Directs LEAD to remove excess letdown from service per step 2.4.8.B to try and isolate the leak.

LEAD CLOSES Excess Letdown isolation valve (CV-31330)

Verifies RCS leak is NOT isolated using the plant computer.

SS If time is available, SS should review Technical Specifications and determine LCO 3.4.14 Condition A (due to LCO item b) is NOT met. This requires implementation of Condition A to reduce the leakage (or identify source) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN LEAD ANNOUNCES THAT THE LEAK IS NOT ISOLATED WITH EXCESS LETDOWN OOS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Annunciator 47022:0611, Fire Detection Panel FP121 Fire Alarm will alarm shortly after the malfunction is inserted.

This is the beginning of the MAJOR event.

If no automatic trip signal is present, the SS may dispatch operator to trip reactor locally. (NOTE: Automatic trip signal occurs very quickly)

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

+45 BOOTH

With concurrence of LEAD EVALUATOR, activate event trigger #5.

ACTION

WHEN LEAD contacts you to stop turbine building roof exhausters, THEN enter the control room and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

LEAD Responds to fire alarm by inspecting fire panel and announces location of alarm.

May direct a Plant Equipment Operator to investigate but IF SO, THEN must inform PEO of the possibility of a steam leak in the area.

RO Reports lowering RCS pressure and temperature.

SS Based on information from RO and observations directs:

3. RO to trip Reactor

4. May direct Lead to evacuate Auxiliary Building BOOTH Report steam leak. A lot of steam blocks stairway to access 735 level. I am ACTION leaving the area.

RO Attempts manual reactor trip and announces failure.

CS-46450, Rx Trip - Reset on Panel A

CS-46331, Rx Trip on Panel D

CS-46447, AMSAC/DSS on Panel E SS Directs transition to FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.

Starts reading FR-S.1 at Step 1 RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip: (Condition not met)

CRITICAL RO must ensure rods are continuously inserted in MANUAL until the reactor TASK trip breakers are open.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

CRITICAL

Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED (Condition not met)

TASKS:

RNO:

MANUALLY TRIP Manually trip turbine.

TURBINE.

IF NOT, THEN :

MANUALLY CLOSE 1) Verify all turbine control valves closed.

MSIVS.

IF NOT, THEN manually close control valves.

IF NOT, THEN close MSIVs and bypass valves.

Check AFW Pumps - RUNNING LEAD/SS Initiate a normal boration of RCS at 12-15 gpm.

CRITICAL Borates RCS at 12 to 15 gpm.

TASK (Must be completed before exiting from FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.)

BOOTH When directed to locally open reactor trip breakers, then wait 3 minutes and ACTION delete malfunction RP07.

ALL Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip

Turbine trip SS must dispatch operator to locally trip reactor and turbine.

LEAD/SS Check SG levels:

LEAD/SS Stop reactor makeup pumps RO/SS Check for reactivity insertion from uncontrolled cooldown: (YES)

LEAD/SS Check MSIV and bypass valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Identify Faulted SGs (Determine 12 Steam Generator faulted)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip Failure (during steam line rupture)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS Directs Lead to isolate 12 Steam Generator LEAD Isolates 12 Steam Generator:

5. Verifies Main Feed isolation valves are closed.

Main valve - CV-31128

Bypass - CV-31370

6. Closes Aux Feed supply valves:

CRITICAL

TDAFP supply - MV-32239 TASK

MDAFP supply - MV-32382

7. Closes Steam Supply to TD AFW pump - MV-32017

8. Verifies 12 SG PORV (CV-31089) is closed (Must be completed before exiting from FR-S.1, Response to ATWS/Nuclear Power Generation.)

RO Check core exit temperature - LESS THAN 1200°F RO Verify reactor is subcritical:

Power less than 5%

Intermediate range SUR - NEGATIVE SS WHEN FR-S.1 is complete and reactor power is less than 5%, returns to E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection step 1.

TERMINATION CUE: WHEN SS ANNOUNCES RE-ENTRY INTO E-0 FROM FR-S.1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

This continues the MAJOR event.

RCP trip criteria are RCS pressure <1250 psig with at least one SI pump running with flow indicated.

SS Starts reading E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection step 1.

RO/SS Verify Reactor Trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN

Neutron flux - DECREASING

Rod position indicators - ZERO

Rod bottom lights - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves - CLOSED LEAD/SS Verify Both Safeguard Buses - ENERGIZED RO/SS Check If SI Is Actuated:

"SI ACTUATED" status light - LIT

-OR-

Any SI first-out annunciators - LIT LEAD/SS Verify Status Of Equipment On ATTACHMENT L: SI Alignment Verification (See Page 115 for Attachment L actions.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check AFW Status:

y. Verify total AFW flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM

z. Verify AFW pumps discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 900 PSIG aa. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% [Wide Range 50%] IN EITHER SG bb. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

[Wide Range 50% and 59%]

EVALUATOR NOTES:

RO/LEAD monitors AFW pump discharge pressure as SG pressure drops.

RO/LEAD adjusts AFW throttle valves as necessary to prevent AFW pump trip on low discharge pressure.

RO/SS Check RCS Temperature:

f. RCS average temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F IF ANY RCP RUNNING RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Spray Valves:

m. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED

n. PRZR spray valves - CLOSED EVALUATOR NOTE:

RCP trip criteria will be exceeded at some point in this scenario.

RO/SS Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

j. Injection flow to RCS:

SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

-OR-

RHR pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND FLOW INDICATED

k. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1250 PSIG [1575 PSIG]

l. Stop both RCPs

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/SS Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

g. Check SG pressures:

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOOTH WHEN LEAD contacts Turbine Building Operator for local actions, THEN enter the ACTION control room as the Unit 2 RO and relieve the LEAD of E-0 Attachment L.

SS Transitions to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, step 1.

(NOTE: All of the manual actions in E-2 were performed in FR-S.1.)

SS/LEAD Check MSIV And Bypass Valve On Affected SG(s) - CLOSED SS/LEAD Check If Either SG Not Faulted: (11 SG is not faulted)

SS/LEAD Identify Faulted SG: (12 SG is faulted)

SS/LEAD Isolate Faulted SG: (All actions were completed in FR-S.1)

SS/LEAD Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10,000 GALLONS SS/LEAD Check Secondary Radiation:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

It is possible to use the INFO page of E-1 to make a transition directly to ES-0.2, SI Termination, if all listed conditions are satisfied. If this is done, the actions of ES-0.2 are listed starting on page 113.

SS

Makes transition to 1E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

SS/LEAD Place Steam Dump In "STM PRESS" Mode ALL Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS/LEAD Check If SGs Are Not Faulted:

RNO: Verify faulted SG(s) isolated:

ALL Check Intact SG Level:

i. Check SG levels - NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN 5% IN EITHER SG

j. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range SG level between 5% and 50%

SS/LEAD Check Secondary Side Radiation - NORMAL RO/SS Check PRZR PORVs And Block Valves:

SS/LEAD Reset SI SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation SS/LEAD Establish Instrument Air to Containment (never isolated)

LEAD/SS Check Power Supply To Charging Pumps - OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO/SS Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

ALL Check If SI Should Be Terminated:

RCS subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F

Secondary heat sink - AVAILABLE

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING

PRZR level - GREATER THAN 7% [27%]

SS

Makes transition to 1ES-0.2, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.

Review Critical Safety Function Status Information at transition.

Reads procedure starting at step 1.

SS/LEAD Reset SI SS/LEAD Reset Containment Isolation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: C Event No.: 8 and 9 Event

Description:

Main steam rupture outside containment before MSIV (E-0 implementation)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SS/LEAD Establish Instrument Air to Containment (never isolated)

SS/LEAD Align AMSAC/DSS System:

CS-46447, AMSAC/DSS Control Switch, in PULL to LOCK

Reset using CS-46448, AMSAC/DSS Reset PB RO/SS Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

SS/LEAD Stop Safeguards Pumps:

RHR pumps

SI pumps

~20 RO Recognizes Intermediate Range NI under-compensated.

min after (EVENT #7) Reports conditions to the SS.

RX trip Manually energizes the SR NIs TERMINATION CUE: WHEN BOTH SI PUMPS ARE STOPPED.

The IR NI failure was eliminated from this scenario for two crews. In the first case, because of a simulator input error the IR did not fail. In the second case, the event was not necessary to evaluate the performance of the RO so the Chief Examiner eliminated the Event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event: Attachment L Page 136 of 137 Event

Description:

LEADs implementation of E-0 Attachment L Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTES:

Attachment L is usually given to the LEAD to perform independently at Step 5 in E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Instructor will take over Attachment L as the Unit 2 LEAD when the LEAD contacts the outplant operator to stop turbine bulding roof exhausters.

Event LEAD Verify Safeguard Component Alignment:

7 &

8 * "SI NOT READY" lights - NOT LIT

"SI ACTIVE" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS CRITICAL IF not running, will start 11 CC pump due to SI status step.

TASKS ARE IN BOLD (At least one CC pump is running before Attachment L is completed)

TYPE

"CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" lights - LIT FOR PLANT CONDITIONS

Category I doors - CLOSED

Check Category I Special Vent Zone Report - NO OPENINGS REQUIRING CLOSURE WITHIN 6 MINUTES

CLOSE MV-32115, 122 SFP HX INLT HDR MV B

Check Loop A and Loop B Cooling Water Pressures - >65 PSIG LEAD Verify Plant Announcements Complete:

(Will make plant announcements)

LEAD Check If Main Steamlines Are Isolated:

MSIVs and bypasses - CLOSED (Bypass valves are normally closed, MSIVs are failed open in this scenario)

LEAD Verify SI Flow:

(Checks for SI pump flow if RCS pressure is <2100 psig)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2003 Scenario No.: A Event: Attachment L Page 137 of 137 Event

Description:

LEADs implementation of E-0 Attachment L Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior LEAD Verify RHR Flow:

(Checks for RHR pump flow if RCS pressure is <150 psig)

LEAD Check Containment Pressure:

(Since pressure has remained <23 psig, no action is required.)

LEAD Check RCP Cooling:

CC flow to RCPs > 150 gpm

CC thermal barrier return valves - OPEN

Seal injection flow - 6 gpm to 10 gpm (normal)

LEAD Verify Local Actions Complete:

Turbine roof exhausters

MSR isolation (Attachment J)

TERMINATION CUE: When BOOTH INSTRUCTOR takes over completion of Attachment L.

ML040160889

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