Text

Draft IR 05000327-02-003 and IR 05000328-02-003 on 03/25-29/02, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Non-Cited Violations Noted
	ML040090228
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/30/2002
From:	Ogle C; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB
To:	Scalice J; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-003
	Download: ML040090228 (26)
	v • d • e

April XX, 2002

Tennessee Valley Authority

- ATN MVr. J. A.S6Cal ide&-

-- Chief Nuclear Officer and----

Executive Vice President

6A Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/02-03,

50-328/02-03

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On March 29, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire

protection inspection at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the

results of this inspection which were discussed on March 28-29, with Mr. Dennis Cole and other

members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified afinding and- two issues of

very low safety significance (Green). These-two issues were determined to involve violations

of NRC requirements. [However, because of their very low safety significance and because

they have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as

Non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The

first violation involved a failure to ensure that one of the redundant trains for isolation of normal

letdown is maintained free of fire damage. The second violation involved the failure to properly

establish the plant fire procedure such that actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of a

severe fire could be tken. ( The finding Inolved the failure to provide adequate re's

coordenetict- rcv atfault on on unit resulting in the inadvertent trip of the othecr

e"ff~ect fllprforea

If you deny these fiNon-cited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your

denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Document

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at httpv://www.nrc.gov/readina-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch I

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Reporti2i6

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units land 2

IR 05000327-02-03 and IR 05000328-02-03 on 03/25-2912002,Tennesee Valley Authority,

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, triennial baseline inspection of the fire protection

program.

The inspection was conducted by a Brunswick resident inspector, and three regional reactor

inspectors. The inspection identified two nNon-cited violations which were determined to be of

very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their

color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process."

Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level

of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at

htto://nrrl0.nrc.gov/NRRIOVERSIGHT/index.html.

lnspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. A nNon-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R III.G.2, was identified for

failure to ensure that one of the redundant trains of a system necessary to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions Inthe event of a fire was free of fire damage.

ESpepifically; "electrical cables for redundant- charging flow isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90

and 91 were located in Fire Area FAA-029, the Auxiliary Building Corridor, without

adequate spatial separation or fire barriers.

The finding had a credible impact on safety in that fire damage to the unprotected

cables could prevent closure of the valves from the main control room (MCR) and

challenge the operators' ability to establish adequate injection flow to the reactor coolant

pump (RCP) seals. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance

because the ignition frequency was relatively low, fire detection and suppression

systems were not degraded, and there were no components in this area whose failure

would result in an accident initiator (i.e., loss of offsite power, loss of main feedwater,

etc.) so the finding only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. (Section 1R05.02)

Green. A nion-cited violation of Technical Specification-(TS) 6.8.1.a. was identified for

inadequate procedure guidance related to the transition from abnormal operating

procedure (AOP)-N.01, Plant Fires, to AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control

Room, in the event of a severe fire in the control building. AOP-N.01 did not clearly

delineate what conditions would require entry into AOP-C.04 and evacuation of the

MCR). Also, AOP-N.01 did not direct operators to enter AOP-C.04 in the event of a

severe fire in the control building.

This finding had a credible impact on safety, in that, the inadequate guidance in

procedure AOP-N.01 could delay entry into AOP-C.04 and could challenge the operators'

ability to perform certain critical safe shutdown functions (e.g., isolate normal charging,

establish adequate seal injection flow to the RCPs) within the times specified in the

licensee's safe shutdown calculation for Appendix R. This finding was determined to be

of very low safety significance because it did not affect fire detection, fire suppression, or

fire barriers. (Section 1R05.05)

(Green). A findimg was ientified, in that,

This finding had a efedible impee

aen safety, in that,

(Section 1RO5.OX)

Licensee identified Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance which were identified by the licensee were

reviewed by the inspection team. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee

appear reasonable. These violations are listed jSection 40A74.$

Report Details

2. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems

1R05 FIRE PROTECTION

.01 Systems Reguired To Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (SSD)

a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program against applicable

requirements, including the Sequoyah Nuclear (SQN) Units 1 and 2 fire protection

License Conditions 2.C(16) and 2.C(13) respectively, Fire Protection; Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix R lll.G, III.J, 111.0, and 111.1;

Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems

Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1; 10 CFR 50.48; related NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs);

NUREGS and the Technical Specifications (TS).

The team used the licensee's Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)

and in-plaaitwlkdowns to select four risk significant fire areas iFLIG5for inspection. The

four fire areas (erere:

Fire Area FAA-029, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690: Auxiliary Building Corridor

This fire area (FA) includes rooms 690.0-Al, A9, Al0,A13, A14, A17, Al8, A22, A23,

A23a, A24, A27, A30 and A31. This area contains both trains of safe shutdown

equipment or cables and is classified as a 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, III.G.2 area. A

significant fire in this area would require shutdown of either unit from the main control

room (MCR).

Fire Area FAA-067, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734: 6.9 kilovolt (kV) Shutdown Board

Rooms

This FA includes rooms 734.0-A2 and A9. This fire area includes both units train 'A'

auxiliary electric power switchgear. This area is classified as a 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix

R, Ill.G.2. A significant fire in this fire area would require shutdown of either unit from the

MCR and involve the respective3 units centrifugal eharging pumps (GGP) 1(2) B B, the

turbine drive auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pm ad train ' residual heat rem !

(RI R ~pumps 2)- B.

Fire Area FAC-009, Control Building, Elevation 685: Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room

This FA includes controls to important safe shutdown (SSD) equipment from the control

room. This area is classified as a 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Ill.G.3 area. A significant

fire in this area would involve evacuation of the MCR and alternative shutdown from the

remote shutdown panel using the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) located in the Auxiliary

Building.

Fire Area FAC-20, Control Building, Elevation 732: Relay Room

This FA includes high voltage electrical relay equipment for offsite power and is located

adjacent to the MCR complex. A significant fire in this area may result in a fire induced

loss of offsite power (LOOP). This area is classified as a 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R,

Il.G.3 area. A fire in this area would require evacuation of the MCR and alternate

shutdown from the remote shutdown panel using the ACR located in the Auxiliary

Building.

- The team reviewed the IPEEE, -Appendix A to GCalculation SQN-26-D054/EPM-ABB-

IMPFHA - Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), the Sequoyah Fire Protection Report (FPR),

associated procedures, and system drawings to identify those systems credited for

SSD of the facility in the event of a fire in the selected fire areas. The inspection

included review of the post-fire SSD capability and the fire protection features to ensure

that at least one post-fire SSD success path was maintained free of fire damage in the

event of a fire.

For a selected sample of SSD systems, components, and plant monitoring instruments,

the team reviewed the SQN Fire Protection Report, the FHA, applicable fire protection

related SERs and NUREGS, and system flow diagrams to evaluate the completeness

and adequacy of the FPR and the systems relied upon to mitigate fires in the selected

fire areas.

The team inspected the capability to shutdown for the scenario where Afire intFA FAC-

20. Relay Room, gui3'initiated a LOOP The asdne by raviewinteam

is . h control circuits and-assbcated " ir6Uit- an61ysjs-for the diesel generators to

determine whether any devices in the control circuit were located in FAG- 2. The

lieensee's circuit analysis was also reviewed to determine whether the diesel generator

control circuit was analyzed in relatin toFA FAC-20. In a similar manner, the control

circuits for the 6.9 kV shutdown board incoming circuit breakers (i.e. offsite power and

diesel generator breaker) were reviewed -to determine whether a fire in.;AF FAC-20 could

interfere with opening of the offsite breaker or closing the diesel generator breaker.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were Identified.

.02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown CaDability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's the FPR for EsFAA-029 and FAA-067 to determine

whether redundant trains of components or circuits required for safe shutdown were

located in the same fire ereseA. From those components, the team selected the

centrifugal charging pumps 1A and 1B power cables, and the charging flow isolation

valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 91 power and control cables to verify that adequate spatial

separation or proper fire barrier protection features were installed in accordance with the

design requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. For the selected cables the team

examined cable routing,` raceway drawings, the actual configuration of the circuits, fire

barriers, dfire detection, and fire suppression eauipment as applicable for

coformance to. mic.

ta li&Pbl'Nc iei Fire

frotectionAs ation(tandards. In addition the team walked down these fire

ereesFs to verify that the licensee documentation reflected the as-built configuration.

Team members also walked down the selected fireareesFA and compared the

associated fire fighting pfe plan prfeendur a1 and drawings with as-built plant

conditions. This was done to verify that they were consistent with the fire protection

features and potential fire conditions described in the FPR. Additionally, the team

reviewed engineering evaluations associated with the reactor auxiliary building floor and

equipment drain sump capacity to verify that the fire brigade and eperftetIhme actions

required for post-fire alternative SSD would not be inhibited by fire suppression activities

or leakage from fire suppression systems. [The team reviewed fire brigade response,-

training, and drill program procedures. Fire brigade drill critiques for operating shifts from

1999 until 2001 as well as fire brigade training/drill records for the same period were

reviewed to verify that fire brigade drills had been conducted in high fire risk plant areas

and that-he fire brigade personnel qualifications, brigade drill response, and brigade

performance met the requirements of the licensee's approved fire protection program.

The team reviewed selected portions of the SQN FHA and plant fire

prevention/combustible hazards administrative control procedures to verify that the

conditions established in various fire protection licensing basis documents were satisfied.

The team performed walkdowns of the four selected plant fire-afeesFAs to observe

whether- the licensee's activities to limit fire hazards were implemented consistent with

procedures. The team reviewed the Januar- 1999 ,tQhrouh Dzemrber 2001 fire brigade

response fire emergency/incident reportsrOMI999, gli'2001, as well as the plant

Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs) resulting from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and

equipment overheating incidents for the years 1999 2001. This review was conducted to

assess the effectiveness of the fire prevention program and to identify any maintenance

or material condition problems related to fire incidents. Additionally, design control

procedures were reviewed to verify that plant changes were adequately reviewed for the

potential impact on the fire protection program, SSD equipment, and procedures as

required by SQN license conditions 2.C(16) and 2.C.(13).

The team walked down the primary fire brigade staging and dress-out areas to assess

the condition of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. Fire brigade personal

protective equipment located in the fire brigade housed dress-out area and lockers in the

serviee baiddidlt;frJbrfgade staging area were reviewed to evaluate equipment

accessibility and functionality. The team observed whether emergency exit lighting was

provided for personnel evacuation pathways to the outside exits as identified in the

National Firc Protection Asseciation (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code. This review also

included examination of whether backup emergency lighting was provided for access

pathways to and within the fire brigade staging and dress-out areas in support of fire

brigade operations should power fail during a fire emergency. The adequacy of the fire

brigade self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) was reviewed as well as the

availability of supplemental breathing air tanks.

The team reviewed the RGP oilrCi collection system enclosure drawings to verify

compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section 111.0. This review included evaluation of

operator response procedures to determine if sufficient procedural guidance was

provided to the plant operators-so they would be able to identify an oil leak from the

lubrication system of one of the RCP motors and take appropriate action.

b. Findings

A nNon-cited violation (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, was

identified for failure to ensure that one of the redundant trains of a system necessary to

achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of a fire was free of fire

damage. Electrical cables fqr;redundant charging flow isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and

91 were located in Fire AreeFA FAA-029, the Auxiliary Building Corridor, without spatial

separation or fire barriers.

For a fire in FAA-029, the FHA indicated that reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory

control was achieved through isolation of normal charging and letdown while maintaining

RCP seal flow cooling. Through review of associated system prints and safe shutdown

procedures AOP-N.01 and AOP-N.08, the team noted that the steps to achieve charging

flow isolation while continuing RCP seal flow cooling from the main control room was to

close either valve 1-FCV-62-90 or 91. These valves were in series and powered from

redundant power sources. The FHA indicated that power and control cables for both

these valves were routed closer than the 20 feet specified in Appendix R, IlI.G.2.b in a

relatively small sub-area of Fif-AreieFA FAA-029. Conduit Drawings 1,2-45N824-7 and

1,2-45N824-16 depicted the routing for these cables. From a walkdown of the cable

routing the team verified that there was a location where the unprotected cables for

valves 90 and 91 were separated by approximately 16 feet such that they could be

damaged by a severe fire. The team noted that, in lieu of protecting the 90 and 91

cables in accordance with Appendix R, so they could be operated from the main control

room, the-licensee incorporated steps in the shutdown procedure AOP-N.08 to

manipulate manual valve 537 or 539. - --

The fact that cables for both the charging flow isolation valves could be damaged by a

credible fire in FAA-029 had greater than minor significance because it could affect the

RCP seal injection flow and RCP seal integrity. The finding was found to have credible

impact on safety in that fire damage to the unprotected cables could prevent closure of

the valves from the MCR and challenge the operators' ability to establish adequate flow

to the RCP seals. The ignition frequency for the sub-area in question was taken from

thetheSQN IPEEE as 1.85E-3 per year. The team observed that fire detection and

suppression was installed throughout Fire AreaE, FAA-029. Manual suppression

capability and the automatic suppression system were deemed to be in the normal

operating state by the team. The fire mitigation frequency was conservatively calculated

to be once per 1 05 years. The missing barrier condition existed for greater than 30 days.

Based on these factors, the finding was processed using the Phase 2 transient sheet and

subsequently characterized by the Significance Determination Process as having very

low risk significance (Green). This was because the ignition frequency was relatively low,

fire detection and suppression systems were not degraded, and there were no

components in this area whose failure would result in an accident initiator (i.e., loss of

offsite power, loss of main feedwater, etc.) so the finding only affects the mitigating

systems cornerstone.

The findinQ. i.e. cables-for~ brothct

~ with aii a firebp'nibr

provide 20 foot separa ibetiveen'redudaht charging flow isolation valves-beif

unprotected by a barrier and routed with less than 20 feet separation, is a violation of 10

CFR 50, Appendix R, l1l. G. 2. b, which requires that unprotected cables of redundant

trains be separated by a horizontal distance of greater than 20 feet. The violation is

being treated as a nNon-cited violation and is identified as NCV 50-327/02-003-01. The

licensee documented the violation in PER 02-03645.

.03 Post-Fire SSD Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

On a sample basis-,4the team verified that*selected cables of equipment required to

achieveand maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire

e'easFAs had been properly identified and either adequately protected from the

potentially adverse effects of fire damage or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults

(e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown.

The team selected power, control and instrumentation circuits indicated to be credited for

safe shutdown in the licensee's FHA and walked down the routing of the circuits. The

circuits selected were:

Fire Area FAA-067: 1--L068-335, Pressurizer level indication

Fire Area FAC-009: FI-3-163C, Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator 1.

Fire Area FAC-20: Diesel generator start button

Additionally, on a Sample basis the team reviewed thesected licensee's electrical

coordination studies to verify that fire induced faults on energized non-shutdown circuits

would not prevent the success of the SSD functions. Specifically.the team reviewed

overcurrent protection devices related to the control circuit for centnfugi a gnpump

iCCP) 1A from power sopurce at 125 volt (V) vital battery board 1 to the circuit breaker

close and trip circuits. MTti manufacturer's time-current characteristics were checked

and installed devices were examined and compared to design information. With

regard t eed tehe coordination of overcurrent devices on the alternatirq_

current (AC) svstem, the team determin eU: From the licensee's FHA-whhthejam

reydithbse buses were credited for a fire in fire ereainFA FM-029. Phase faults and

ground faults on the 6.9 kV system were considered, and a review of the 6.9kV system

coordination was performed for a phase fault on a cable emanating from 480 V shutdown

board 1A1-A, reactor MOV board IAI-A and ERCW MCC 1A-A. To the extent possible

installed devices were examined and compared to design documents.

b. Findings

[this section may be deleted based on additional licensee review of eondition]

The team identified a peffefmanee issue of very low signifleanee involvingmi

coordination of overcurrent protection relays.

The team reviewed the coordination between evereurrent relay G51 CN installed at the

neutral of common station service transformer C 6.9 kV (CGST-C) y winding and

overcurrent relay 5IN relay which was installed at circuit breaker 1418 to provide

protcetion against excess eurrent as a result of excess current on Start Bus 10. The

team noted through review of electrical one line drawings of the distribution system that

the RGPo for both units were powered from Start Bus 1B and Start Bus 2B. The team

determined that if a level single line to ground fault of 6OO A was generated on

fower

Start Bus 1B or cables connecting the start bus to the associated unit boards, the 51N

relay may not respond due to the COO A ground fault being below the 51N's pick up set

point. in contrast, the G51 GN relay was set at 72 A, which was low enough to trip

breakers and de energize theLSST-R G whieh supplied both Start Bus 10 and Start Bus

2B. The team determined that due to the inadequate coordination between the G51 GGN a.

single line to ground fault on start bus 10 could result in a Unit I trip duoto loss of criticl

loads such as fRPs. More significantly, the tripping of the CSST rather than the start

bus could result in the tripping of not just Unit 1 but Unit 2 as well.

This issue has a credible impact on safety due to the increased likelihood of the loss of

critical loads such as the RC-Ps on both units. This issue affects the initiating events

cornerstone due to the potential to increase the likelihood that the Start Bus 2B would trip

as a result of a ground fault on the other unit. As the finding does not contribute to

likelihood of a less of coolant accident (LOCA) initiator, affect mitigation equipment, nor

inzrcaWc+thc>^,=.<*!<h~ of afiroor oo, t .finding screened as Green.

.i--r

.04 Alternative Shutdown (ASD) Cavabilitv

a. -inspection Scope-

The team reviewed the licensee's procedures for fire response and ASD capability for the

fire -eeasFAs selected to verify conformance with applicable requirements as discussed

in Section 1R05.01 above. This review included the licensee's ASD methodology to

determine the adequacy of the identified components and systems to achieve and

maintain safe shutdown. The review also included verifying that the methodology

addressed achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR, with

or without off-site power available. The team also reviewed the licensee's procedures to

verify their consistency with the calculations and assumptions supporting the operator

actions identified in the ASD methodology.

Additionally, for eesesThetarem 'selected severaaciruit where th control or

instrumentation devices were fffiined tobe located at the auxiliary control panel or

other local panelst,;jZhe team reviewed-the relevant drawings to determine whether

isolation devices were ao sig ned into the circuitry as appropriate. The

following circuits ed:

-* Control circuit for the centrifugal charging pump

AFW flow to the steam generator FI-3-163C

Volume control tank outlet isolation valve LCV-62-132 (MOV)

CCP flow to RCS coolant loop 1 FCV-62-85 (AOV)

Source range flux monitor XI-92-5

Verify fied that hot and cold shutdown eandid be maintained frorrn.

- outside the MCR without offsite power was addressed through the review of Emergency

diesel generator(EDG) and breaker circuits.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.05 Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capabilitv

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the operational implementation of post-fire safe shutdown capability

for a fire in the selected fire ereesF,60 to verify that: (1) the training program for licensed

and non-licensed personnel included alternative or dedicated SSD capability; (2)

personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot standby from outside the

- MCR could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire brigade; (3)

adequate procedures existed for use during ASD; and (4)the licensee periodically

performed operability testing of the SSD instrumentation and transfer and control

functions. The team reviewed the contents of selected safe shutdown lockers to verify

-that-materials-needed-to-supportimplementation-of-operator actions specified in the ASD

procedures for hot standby were available and being-properly maintained. Fire brigade

staffing was reviewed to verify that it met the requirements of the licensee's fire

protection program. Training requirements were reviewed for the fire brigade members

and related support personnel such as incident commander (IC), reactor operator (RO),

senior reactor operator (SRO), and auxiliary operators to verify compliance with the

licensee's fire protection proaram. Lesson plans and job performance measures (JPMs)

were reviewed to verify t etdetermJnewheth4r ASD activities were included in the

training program.

Post-fire safe shutdown procedures for the selected areas were reviewed to determine if

adequate staffing and appropriate guidance was provided for the operators to identify

protected equipment and instrumentation and those recovery actions specified in post-

fire shutdown procedures. considered manpower needs for performing restorations and

area accessibility. Specific procedures reviewed included Abnormal Operating

Procedure (AOP)-N.01, Plant Fires, Revision (Rev)14; AOP-N.08, Appendix R Fire Safe

Shutdown, Rev 0; AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room, Rev 4. Selected

procedure sections were walked down to verify that the procedures could be performed

within the times specified in the supporting calculations, given the minimum required

staffing level of operators, concurrent with a loss of offsite power. Additionally, the team

walked down the designated pathways and reviewed the licensee's smoke control

procedures, ventilation systems, and the availability of SCBAs to verify that

environmental conditions, such as smoke and heat, would not prevent operators from

performing the procedures.

b. Findings

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified as a Aion-cited

violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a. for inadequate procedure

guidance related to the transition from AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, to AOP-C.04, Shutdown

From Auxiliary Control Room, in the event of a severe fire in the Control Building.

On March 27, 2002, the team identified that the guidance contained in AOP-N.01 was not

adequate to transition operators to AOP-C.04, in that, AOP-N.01 did not clearly delineate

what conditions would require entry into AOP-C.04 and evacuation of the MCR. Also,

AOP-N.01 did aledt6 direct operators to enter AOP-C.04 in the event of a severe fire

in the ControlBuildina. Jhe lack of clear guidance in AOP-N.01 was noted during a

walkthrough bth6teatmofjt5e procedures AOP-N.01 and AOP-C.04 with operations

personnel. The team observed that the 6fk'ade-ate"guidance in AOP-N.01

appeared to contribute to the operators' confusion regarding the erntry conditions for

AOP-C.04 and the transition from AOP-N.01 to AOP-C.04. This tRn determ'ned that:

the 'confusion could cause the oDerator to delay entry into AOP-C.64idth'e,

peqrformanceof timel&itiLaOLASDactiorns.

This finding had a credible impact on safety, in that the inadequate guidance in

procedure AOP-N.01 could delay entry into AOP-C.04 and could challenge the operators'

ability-to perform certain critical safe shutdown functions (e.g., isolate normal charging,

establish adequate seal injection flow to the RCPs) within the times specified in licensee

-calculation SQN-SQS4-0127, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10 CFR50

Appendix R, Rev 21. This finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and was

determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using Attachment F to the

Significance Determination Process (SDP), because it did not affect fire detection, fire

suppression, or fire barriers.

Sequoyah Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev 2, Appendix

A, Item 6.v, requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and

maintained for plant operations during emergencies such as plant fires. Embodied in this

requirement is that the procedures have to be adequate. Contrary to the above, the

licensee failed to establish adequate procedural guidance in AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, to

provide sufficient guidance to operators with regard to what conditions would require

entry into AOP -C.04 for safe shutdown from outside of the MCR.

Because of the very low safety significance of this issue and because the licensee has

entered this issue in their corrective action program as PER 02-003550, this violation is

being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VL.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

This violation is identified as NCV 50-327, 328/02-03-02, Inadequate Procedure

Guidance for Implementing Abnormal Operating Procedures for Plant Fires.

The team noted other observations during the procedure reviews and walkthroughs

which could challenge operator performance of safe shutdown activities. The following

are examples of the types of observations identified:

The validation method for the latest revisions to AOP-N.01 and AOP-C.04 lacked

thoroughness in that, a "tabletop review" was performed instead of a field validation.

Time requirements specified in calculation SQN-SQS4-0127 for performing certain

critical safe shutdown functions were not incorporated into AOP-C.04.

AOP-C.04, Checklist 5 required an excessive amount of time (more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) to

complete. The checklist appeared to contain various unnecessary items and was not

developed to minimize time. The team noted that an additional field validation of AOP-

C.04, Checklists 5 and 6 was performed the week of March 11, 2002. However, this

validation verified accuracy of component identifiers and tags, but did not evaluate

. timeliness.

AOP-C.04 and AOP-N.08 were inconsistent in specifying the time required to re-

establish seal injection flow to the RCPs (i.e., AOP-C.04 specified as soon as possible

and AOP-N.08 specified 15 minutes)!

Weaknesses were identified in the operators' understanding and familiarity with AOP-

N.01, AOP-N.08, and AOP-C.04.

.06 Communications for Performance of Alternative SSD Capability

a. Inspection Scope

- The team reviewed the- licensee's communications systems separation analysis to

verify [the edeq eiL bilit 1 ofEthe communication system to support plant personnel

in the Performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The

teemWalkdowris>.were performed wellkdowns of sections of the alternative SSD

procedure AOP-C.04 to evaluate- the adequacy of the plant communication systems to

support plant personnel in the performance of alternative SSD functions. The team

reviewed the adequacy of credited redundant communications systems and verified

the licensee's portable radio channel features would operate should the radio repeaters

for the primary communications system be unavailable. [The team also examined

whether sound-powered phone jacks werepre-nt at the locations identified in the

alternative shutdown procedure as designated by the SQN Updated Final Safety

Analysis Report (UFSAR). tThis review included examination of tihe sound powered

phone periodic test record and inventory surveillance records of post-fire SSD operator

equipment to assess whether the surveillance test program was sufficient to verify

proper operation of the system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.07 Emeraency Lighting for Performance of ASD CaDabilitv

a. Inspection ScoDe

The team walked down selected areas where equipment would be controlled or

monitored during post-fire shutdown to observe whether battery pack emergency lighting

units (ELUs) were installed to allow operation of the equipment if normal lighting was lost.

In some cases the installed ELUs were tested to demonstrate functionality, and the

locations and identification numbers on the ELUs were compared to design documents to

assure the as-built configuration was consistent with the design. The team also reviewed

licensee periodic test documentation to verify that the ELUs were being maintained in an

operable manner.

No findings of significance were identified.

.08 Cold Shutdown ReDairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team randomly selected a component, from the section of the FHA that listed

repairs that may be needed to achieve cold shutdown, and evaluated the probability for

-success-of-the.repair-.The-component 1chosen was the.RHR system isolation valve 1-

FCV-074-00,1specified for Iire-AreeA FAA-029. CGnsiderations applied this'e4

review wereconsdei6redhte level of difficulty of thereDair as compared to expected skills

of the person assigned to perform the task, adeqiacyrelevant proceduresLinth'e

availability of necessary materials-te.

b. Findings__.__

No findings of significance were identified.

.09 Fire Barriers and Fire Area/Zone/Room Penetration Seals

a. Inspection Scope

- The team walked down the selected fi areasFAi to evaluate the adequacy of the fire

resistance of fire-earet barrier enclosure walls, ceilings, floors, structural steel

support protection, fire barrier penetration seals, fire doors, fire dampers, and electrical

raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS) to ensure that at least one train of SSD

equipment was free of fire damage. IThe team observed the

wynai

material condition and configuration of the installed fire barrier features, as well as,

reviewed construction details and supporting fire endurance tests for the installed fire

barrier features. The team compared the observed fire barrier penetration seal

configurations to the design drawings and tested configurations. The team also

compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barriers in which they

were installed.

The team reviewed ASD procedures, selected fire fighting pre-plan procedures, and

heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to verify that access to remote

shutdown equipment and operator manual actions would not be inhibited by smoke

migration from one area to adjacent plant areas used to accomplish SSD.

In addition, the team reviewed the licensing documentation, Generic Letter (GL) 86-10

engineering evaluations of fire barrier features, and engineering evaluations for NFPA

code deviations to verify that the fire barrier installations met design requirements and

license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Fire Protection Systems. Features, and Eguipment

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed flow diagrams, cable routing information, periodic test procedures,

engineering evaluations for NFPA code deviations, and operational valve lineup

procedures associated with the eIctrinc drivenhigh pressure seviJcterfire pumps

and fire protection water supply system. The review was to determine whether the

common fire protection water delivery and supply components could be damaged or

inhibited by fire-induced failures of electrical power suDplies or control circuits.

Additionally, team members walked down portions of the fire protection water supply

system in the selected areas to assess the material condition, operational effectiveness,

and whether the installed configurations were within the parameters of the engineering

evaluations.

The team verified that adequate fire protection features were installed in accordance with

the separation and design requirements fn"Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section

III.G.2. The team walked down accessible portions of the fire detection and alarm

systems in the selected plant areas to evaluate the engineering design and operation of

the installed configurations. The team also reviewed engineering drawings for fire

detector, spacing and locations Inthe selected plant areas to verify effectiveness of the

systems and compliance with the licensee's FPR and associated NFPA Gbode of

Rrecord. Team memberst walked down the selected areas with sprinklers to assure

proper placement and spacing of the sprinkler heads and the lack of sprinkler head

obstructions. The team-also reviewed design calculations to verify that the required fire

hose water flow and sprinkler system density for each protected area were available.

The team reviewed a sample of manual fire hose lengths to verify that they could reach

the SSD equipment. Additionally, the team verified whether the-design and placement of

the manual fire fighting fire hose equipment and fire extinguishers were properly reflected

in the fire brigade pre-fire plans.

The team reviewed the adequacy of the desicin and installation of the carbon dioxide

(CO2 ) fire suppression system for fife ereathefA FAC-009, the Unit 1 Auxiliary

instfurnent Room.- This review included C02 fire suppression system controls to assure

accessibility and functionality of the system and associated ventilation system fire

dampers. IThe team also reviewed licensee design calculations, vendor certifications,

and pre-operational test data to verify that the required quantity of CO2 for the areas was

available. Additionally, the team reviewed several drawings, schematics, flow diagrams,

and evaluations associated with the area floor drain system to verify that systems and

operator actions required for alternative SSD would not be inhibited through potential

leakage from C02 fire suppression activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatorv Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed several licensee identified deficiencies, which dealt with maintaining

one redundant train of SSCs free from fire damage in accordance with 10 CFR 50

Appendix R III.G.2. The review was performed to verify that the risk associated with the

adverse conditions were properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures

egdateywconsid 6iiJP;EEE lsktInsidhtnd were implemented in accordance with the

approved fire protection program.

b. Findings --a

No findings of-significance were identified.

.12 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of PERs related to fire protection and protection of SSCs

for SSD in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G, III.J. and 111.0 to verify that

items were captured in the licensee's corrective action program in accordance with SPP-

3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev 4. The items selected were reviewed for

classification and for the appropriateness of the corrective actions taken to resolve the

issues. The team reviewed self-assessments and audits related to the fire protection and

safe shutdown programs to assess whether the licensee was performing comprehensive

audits of these programs in accordance with the requirements set forth in Appendix A of

BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented the inspection results to Dennis Cole, and other members of

licensee mana ement and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on March 28-29, 2002

and on Aprl licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No

T24,2OO2.the

proprietary information is included in this report.

40A7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are

violations of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section Vl of the NRC

Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs.

NCV Tracking Number Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

50-327, 328/02-03-03 10 CFR 50 Appendix III.J states that emergency lighting

units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be

provided in all areas needed for operation of safe

shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes

thereto. The licensee identified during a self-assessment

that the need for emergency lighting for the 1(2) FGV-63-

G00!-gFCqY`63 001 had not been provided. Manual

operation of these valves is required in the event of a

severe fire in accordance with licensee shutdown

procedures.-The-failure to provide adequate illumination of

manual actions required for safe shutdown is identified as

a Aon-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R III.J. The

issue is in the licensee's corrective action program as PER

02-000550-000 (Green).

50-327, 328/02-03-04 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Il.G. 2. states that except as

provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables

or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that

could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot

shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant

trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot

.shutdown conditions are located within the same h&e

ereaFA outside of primary containment, one of the

following means of ensuring that one of the redundant

trains is free of fire damage shall be provided: (a.)

Separation of cables and equipment and associated

non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier

having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or

supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide

fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier;

(b.) Separation of cables and equipment and associated

non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal

distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening

combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and

an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in

the fire-ee FA; or (c.) Enclosure of cable and equipment

and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train

in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating, In addition, fire

-~ - - detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall

be installed in the fife a-reeFA. The licensee identified

during a self-assessment that as a result of inadequate

protection to the control/and or control cables a spurious

closure signal to the VCT level control valves was credible.

As the power cables for the RWST suctions valves are in

~

- ~ the same fife aeerea and not protected there was an

interaction which existed such that suction to both the VCT

and RWST could be lost. The licensee's failure to provide

adequate protection to prevent the operation or the

maloperation of cables or equipment necessary to achieve

and maintain hot shutdown is identified as a nNon-cited

violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.2. JThe issue is in

the licensee's corrective action program as PER 02-

000576-000 (Green).

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee- -

UI, raszewskit~.Licensirng EngLneer

J. Bible. Maintenance and Modifications Manager, SQN

S1PJ OSQN

P. Boulden, Engineer, SQN

D. Craven, TPS-TOM Service Manager, SQN

T. Davis, Fire Protection Supervisor, WBN

B. Dukes, Engineer, SQN

R. Egli, Fire Protection Systems Engineer, SQN

K. Frazier, Systems Engineer, SQN

E. Freeman, Operations Manager, SQN

R. GladneY, Electrical Desiqn Manacer, SQN

WI-GmetIed lefiga:ngnWr<BN

R. Goodman, Training Manager, SQN

0. Hayes, Operations Support Superintendent, SQN

P. Johnson. Fire Operations, SQN

DJ Koehl'an Manage r;,SQN

PE.Lundy, Engineering Manager, SQN

J. Patrick, Senior Specialist, SQN

J. Pierce, Engineer, SQN

D. Porter, Operations, SQN

-R. Proffilt, Nuclear Engineer, SQN

J. Reynolds, Nuclear Assurance, SQN

R. Rogers, Engineering Design Manager, SQN

P. Salas, Licensing and Industrial Affairs Manager, SQN

B. SimrilFire protection Specialist, SQN

bJThomas, Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering Supervisor, SQN

E. Turner, Electrical Engineering Design, SQN

J. Wilkes, Operations Superintendent, SQN

NRC

C. Payne, Senior Reactor Inspector, RII

R. Tellson, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, and DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

50-327/02-03-01 NCV Failure to Provide Adequate Protection for Cables to

Redundant SSD Components (Section 1R05.03)

50-327, 328/02-03-02 NCV Inadequate Procedure Guidance for Implementing

Abnormal Operating Procedures for Plant Fires (Section

1R05.05)

50-327, 328/02-03-03 NCV Inadequate Emergency Lighting for the RWST Suction

-Valve-(Section-40A7)

50-327, 328/02-03-04 NCV Failure to Provide Adequate Protection for Cables to the

VCT Suction Valves (Section (40A7)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACR - Auxiliary Control Room

AOP - Abnormal Operating Procedure

APCSB - Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch

ASD - Alternative Shutdown

BTP - Branch Technical Position

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations

DC - Direct Current

EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure

ELU - Emergency Lighting Unit

FDW/FW - Feedwater

FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report

HVAC - Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events

JPM - Job Performance Measure

LP/LPI - Low Pressure Injection

MCR Main Control Room

NCV - Non-Gcited Violation

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PER - Problem Evaluation Report

PORV - Power Operated Relief Valve

PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump

RCS/RC - Reactor Coolant System

SCBA - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP - Significance Determination Process

SER - Safety Evaluation Report

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitment

SSA - Safe Shutdown Analysis.-

SSD - Safe Shutdown

TS - Technical Specifications

UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI - Unresolved Item --

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures:

0-AR-M-29, Annunciator Response Fire Detection System, Rev 8

0-PI-OPS-000-708.0, 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance Verification, Rev 3

1-AR-M5-B, Annunciator Response CVCS Seal Water and RCP, Rev 28

1-SO-77-4, System Operating Instruction for Auxiliary Reactor Building Floor and Equipment

1-PI-OPS-000-01 0.A, Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches, Rev 0, Completed

11/13/2001

AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room, Rev 4

AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, Rev 14

AOP-N.08, Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev 0

SPP-9.3, Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control, Rev 6

SPP-1 0.7, Housekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control, Rev 0S2

SSP-1 0.10, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev 1

SSP-1 0.11, Control of Ignition Sources, Rev 1

rain _ucop, Re.

fl

SMI-0-317-18, Special Maintenance Instruction - Appendix R - Casualty Procedures, Rev 6

0-Sl-FPU-031-001.R, Visual Inspection Fire Dampers, Rev 2

0-PI-FPU-317-299.W, Attachment 4, Operations Fire Protection Weekly Inspection, Rev 10

0-SI-FPU-410-703.0, Inspection of FPR Required Fire Doors, Rev 0

0-SI-234.6, Functional Test of Fire Protection Report Required Detectors, Rev 32

FPI-0102, Appendix C Active Permits (Impairments), dated March 26, 2002

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-00, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690'- 0, Rev 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-01, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690'- 0, Rev 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690'- 0, Rev 5

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-00, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734'- 0, Rev 2

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-01, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734'- 0, Rev 4

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734'- 0, Rev 3

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734'- 0, Rev 4

Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-685-00, Control Building, Elevation 685'- 0, Rev 3

Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-732-00, Control Building, Elevation 732'- 0, Rev 4

Job Performance Measures (JPMs) and Lesson Plans:

Lesson Plan OPL273C0202, Appendix R Fires (AOP-N.01, AOP-N.08, AOP-C.04), Rev 0

JPM CRO-005, Evacuate the Control Room, Rev 13

JPM CRO-052, Perform Required Actions in Preparation for Manning the SSF, Rev 4

PERS. Audits. and Self-Assessments:

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Biennial\Triennial) No. SSA0101

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Annual) No. SSA0001

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Triennial) No. SSA9802

Self Assessment Report, SQN-OPS-09-001 Rev 1

Attachment

2

Self Assessment Report ,SQN-OPS-01-007

PER 00-011423, Sequoyah Does not Perform Periodic Functional Testing on Alternate

Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls, dated 12/15/2000

PER 01-009956, Handswitches Had to be Cycled to Pass Continuity Checks During

Performance of Procedure 0-PI-OPS-000-010.A, dated 11/2/2001

PER 01-010214, Discrepancies During Performance of Procedure 1-PI-OPS-000-010.A,

dated 11/8/2001

Calculations

SQN-26-D054/EPM-ABB-IMPFHA, Sequoyah Fire Hazards Analysis Calculation, Rev 31

SQN-SQS4-0127, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R,

Rev 1

SQN-APPR-1, Analysis of AC/DC Instrument and Control (I&C) Power Systems to Identify

Associated Circuits - 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sheets 16A, 16B, 16C, 17, 37, 46, 54, 76 & 79C

of 131, Appendix R Common Power Supply Analysis, Rev 7 [Coordination 125 VDC Vital

Battery Board 1,11, III & IV]

SQN-APS-003, 480 V APS Class I E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 2, Sheet

C-6, Rev 15 [480 V shutdown boards]

SQN-APS-003, 480 V APS Class I E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 3, Sheet

C-7, Rev 12 [480 V reactor mov boards]

SQN-APS-003, 480 V APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 8, Sheet

C-13, Rev 28 [480 V ERCW PMP STA MCCs]

Drawing Numbers

1-47W809-1, Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev 64

1, 2-47W810-1, Units 1 and 2 Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram, Rev 39

1-47W81 1-1, Unit 1 Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, Rev 57

1, 2-47W813-1, Units 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Rev 49

2-47W809-1, Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev 64

2-47W81 1-1, Unit 2 Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, Rev 48

1,2-45N767-1, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-1 Rev 26

1,2-45N767-2, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-2 Rev 31

1,2-45N767-3, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-3 Rev 23

1,2-45N767-4, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-4 Rev 20

1,2-45N767-5, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-5 Rev 15

1,2-45N765-1, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-1, Rev

14 [6900 V Shutdown board 1A-A normal feeder breaker 1718]

1,2-45N765-2, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-2, Rev

16 [6900 V Shutdown board 1A-A emergency feeder breaker 1912]

1-45E890-104-1, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Pressure Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1,2,4,5,6&9, Rev 4 [conduit and tray plan for charging pump cables in FAA-029]

Attachment

3

1,2-45N824-7, Conduit & Grounding Floor Elevation 690.0 Ceiling Plan, Rev 2 [conduit plan for

62-90 & 91 valve cables]

1,2-45N824-16, Conduit & Grounding Floor Elevation 690.0 Details - Sht-4, Rev 0 [conduit plan

for 62-90 valve cables]

_-1,2-45N826-Br8Conduit & Grounding Floor-Elevations 706.0 & 714.0 Ceiling Plan, Rev 2,

[Routing of pressurizer level circuits] -

1-45E890-103-1, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1,2,4,5,6 & 9, Rev 3 [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-45E890-103-2, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1,2,4,5,6 & 9, Rev 1, [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-45E890-102-2, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1,2,4,5,6 & 9, Rev 1, [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-47W610-3-3, Mechanical Control Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev 17

1,2-45N812-5, Conduit & Grounding Floor 685.0 Details - Sht 3, Rev I [Routing of cables for

diesel generator start button]

1,2-45N765-16, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-16,

Rev 17 [Centrifugal charging pumps]

1,2-15E500-1, Key Diagram Station Aux Power System, Rev 22

1,2-45N779-1 1, Wiring Diagrams 480 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-1 1, Rev

24, [MOV LCV-62-132]

1,2-45N662-1, Wiring Diagrams Chemical & Volume Cont Sys Schematic Diagram Sht-1, Rev

10, [AOV LCV-62-85]

1-47W610-92-1, Mechanical Control Diagram Neutron Monitoring System, Rev 3

1,2-47A381 -111, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning Dampers, Rev 3

1,2-47A381-113, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning Dampers, Rev 2

1,2-47W494 series, Fire Protection Fire Cells, Rev 6

1,2-47W600-250, Mechanical Instruments and Controls Fire Detectors, Rev 5

-.1,2-47W600-254, Mechanical Instruments and Controls Fire Detectors, Rev 2

-1,2-47W610 series, Control Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Rev 21

.1,2-47W611 series, Logic Diagram.-Fire.Detection System, Rev 12

1,2-47W849-1, Flow Diagram Hydrogen System for Generator Cooling, Rev 31

1,2-47W850-2, Flow Diagram Fire Protection, Rev 25

1,2-47W850-6A, Connectivity Diagram Fire Protection System, Rev 0

1,2-47W866-2, Flow Diagram Heating & Ventilation Air Flow, Rev 11

1,2-47W866-4, Flow Diagram Heating & Ventilation Air Flow, Rev 32

1,2-47W880-26, Conduit and Grounding Cable Tray Fire Stop, Rev 2

1,2-48W990-1, Miscellaneous Steel Fire Protection Reactor Coolant Pump Hood, Rev 3

1,2-48W991-1, Miscellaneous Steel Fire Protection Reactor Coolant Pump, Rev 6

1,2-47W920-8, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning, Rev 3

ML040090228

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