ML032730671

Tech Spec Pages for Amendment 259 Revising Safety Features Actuation System (Sfas) Instrumentation to Allow an 8-hr Delay in Entering an Action Statement When Sfas Instrumentation Channel Is Undergoing Functional Testing

ML032730671
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/29/2003
From:	Sands S NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:	Myers L FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
TAC MB1679
Download: ML032730671 (7)

Text

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Protection System instrumentation channels and shutdown bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each Reactor Protection System instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The shutdown bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by shutdown bypass operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME* of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing; the response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from the neutron detector output or from the input of the first electronic component in the channel. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times the REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

The response times include the sensor (except for the neutron detectors), Reactor Protection System instrument delay, and the control rod drive breaker delay. A delay time has been assumed for the Reactor Coolant Pump monitor in the determination of the response time of the High Flux/Number of Reactor Coolant Pumps On functional unit.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 218, 225, -p59

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) functional units shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4, with the exception of: Instrument Strings Functional Units b, c, d, e, and f and Interlock Channels Functional Unit a, which shall be set consistent with the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the functional unit inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3, until the functional unit is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with Table 3.3-4.

b. With a SFAS functional unit inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each SFAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the RCS pressure operating bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected by the RCS pressure operating bypass operation. This RCS pressure operating bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each functional unit affected by the RCS pressure operating bypass operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each SFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL. Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that all functional units are tested at least once every N times the REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a specific SFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Units" Column of Table 3.3-3.

The response times (except for manual initiation) include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, when applicable. The response time limit (except for manual initiation) includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT i 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 218, 225, 241, 243, 259

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

• Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 1800 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 1800 psig.

• • Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 660 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 660 psig.

• • • DELETED

• • • • DELETED

• • • • • All functional units may be bypassed for up to one minute when starting each Reactor Coolant Pump or Circulating Water Pump.

• • • • • • When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.

1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided, within one hour (except as noted below), the inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripped condition. When one functional unit is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, a declaration of inoperability and associated entry into this ACTION statement may be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, provided at least two other corresponding functional units are OPERABLE.

I ACTION 11 - With any component in the Output Logic inoperable, trip the associated components within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 28,37,52,102,135,

- 159,186,211,218,221,259 Corrected by letter dated 6/2/98

INSTRUMENTATION STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.2 The Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-12, with the exception of the Steam Generator Level-Low Functional Unit which shall be set consistent with the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-12.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With a SFRCS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-12, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-1 1, until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with Table 3.3-12.

b. With a SFRCS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the action shown in Table 3.3-11.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.2.1 Each SFRCS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-I 1.

4.3.2.2.2 The logic for the shutdown bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation; The shutdown bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.2.3 The STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each SFRCS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times the REFUELING INTERVAL where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific SFRCS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-11.

The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) response time is to be the time elapsed from the monitored variable exceeding the trip setpoint until the MSIV is fully closed. The Turbine Stop Valves (TSVs) response time is to be the time elapsed from the main steam line low pressure trip condition until the TSV is fully closed.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 3-23 Amendment No. 218, 225,259

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

• May be bypassed when steam pressure is below 750 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when the steam pressure exceeds 800 psig.

1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable section of the channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (except as noted below). When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, a declaration of inoperability and associated entry into this ACTION statement may be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, provided the remaining actuation channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 3-27 Amendment No. 37, 126, 135, 157,259

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The response time limits for these instrumentation systems are located in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and are used to demonstrate OPERABILITY in accordance with each system's response time surveillance requirements.

SFAS Table 3.3-3, ACTION 10, allows entry into this ACTION statement to be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when a functional unit is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, provided at least two other corresponding functional units remain OPERABLE. This 8-hour allowance provides a reasonable time to perform the required surveillance testing without having to enter the ACTION statement and implement the required ACTIONS.

SFRCS Table 3.3-11, ACTION 16, allows entry into this ACTION statement to be delayed for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, provided the remaining actuation channel remains OPERABLE. This 8-hour allowance provides a reasonable time to perform the required surveillance testing without having to enter the ACTION statement and implement the required ACTIONS.

For the RPS, SFAS Table 3.3-4 Functional Unit Instrument Strings b, c, d, e, and f, and Interlock Channel a, and SFRCS Table 3.3-12 Functional Unit 2:

Only the Allowable Value is specified for each Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint analysis. The nominal trip setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints measured by CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS do not exceed the Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required. -Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing are consistent with the assumptions of the specific setpoint calculations. Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the safety analysis to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip parameter. These uncertainties are defined in the specific setpoint analysis.

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Setpoints must be found within the specified Allowable Values. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current specific setpoint analysis.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 73,125,128,211, 218,225, 241, 243, 259

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel, including the sensor.

The test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift to ensure that the' iistrument channel remains operational between successive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find that measurement errors and bistable setpoint errors are within the assumptions of the setpoint analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint analysis.

The frequency is justified by the assumption of an 18 or 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The SFRCS RESPONSE TIME for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet delay for main steam line low pressure signals and closure time of the turbine stop valves. This SFRCS RESPONSE TIME ensures that the auxiliary feedwater to the unaffected steam generator will not be isolated due to a SFRCS low pressure trip during a main steam line break accident.

Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.2.3 requires demonstration that each SFRCS function can be performed within the applicable SFRCS RESPONSE TIME. When this surveillance requirement can not be met due to an inoperable SFRCS-actuated component, the LCO ACTION associated with the inoperable actuated component should be entered. When the SFRCS RESPONSE TIME surveillance requirement can not be met due to inoperable components within the SFRCS, ACTION 16 of Table 3.3-11 should be followed.

The actuation logic for Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., and 4.c. of Table 3.3-3, Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, is designed to provide protection and actuation of a single train of safety features equipment, essential bus or emergency diesel generator. Collectively, Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., and 4.c. function to detect a degraded voltage condition on either of the two 4160 volt essential buses, shed connected loads, disconnect the affected bus(es) from the offsite power source and start the associated emergency diesel generator. In addition, if an SFAS actuation signal is present under these conditions, the sequencer channels for the two SFAS channels which actuate the train of safety features equipment powered by the affected bus will automatically sequence these loads onto the bus to prevent overloading of the emergency diesel generator. Functional Unit 4.a. has a' total of four units, one associated with each SFAS channel (i.e., two for each essential bus). Functional Units 4.b. and 4.c. each have a total of four units, (two associated with each essential bus); each unit consisting of two undervoltage relays and an auxiliary relay.

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device(s), 2) associated logic and output relays, and 3) power sources. The SFRCS output signals that close the Main Feedwater Block Valves (FW-779 and FW-780) and trip the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) are not required to mitigate any accident and are not credited in any safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.3.2.2 does not apply to these functions.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 125, 211, 225, 246, 259