ML032030458
| ML032030458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/2003 |
| From: | Lamb D NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3 |
| To: | Coutu T Nuclear Management Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032040027 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MB7225 | |
| Download: ML032030458 (7) | |
Text
July 24, 2003 Mr. Thomas Coutu Site Vice President Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC N490 State Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216
SUBJECT:
KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - CORRECTION TO ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT 168 (TAC NO. MB7225)
Dear Mr. Coutu:
On July 8, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 168 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment approved changes to the Facility Operating License and the Technical Specifications (TSs) to increase the licensed rated power by 1.4 percent from 1650 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1673 MWt using measurement uncertainty recapture.
There are several administrative errors contained in Amendment No. 168:
(1)
Amendment No. 168 was inadvertently not typed on page 3 of the Facility Operating License 2.C(3), Technical Specifications, (2)
Amendment No. 168 was inadvertently not typed in the lower right hand corner of the following pages: Facility Operating License page 3, TS vi, TS 1.0-4, TS 3.1-6, TS B3.1-6, TS B3.1-7, Figure TS 3.1-1, Figure 3.1-2, TS 6.9-3, TS 6.9-4, and TS 6.9-5, (3)
Revision 1 was mistakenly typed instead of Revision 0 for WCAP-15591 in the first paragraph on page 9 of the safety evaluation (SE),
(4) 1772 MWt was inadvertently not typed between of and with in the first sentence of the third paragraph under Section 3.2.2.2.11, Loss of Alternating Current (AC) Power to the Plant Auxiliaries on page 16 of the SE, and (5) 101.4 percent was mistakenly typed instead of 1.4 percent in the second paragraph on page 36 of the SE.
Enclosed are the corrected pages.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John G. Lamb, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-305
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page
Letter:
Enclosure:
ML Package:
ML032040027 OFFICE PDIII-1/PM PDIII-1/LA PDIII-1/SC NAME JLamb THarris LRaghavan DATE 07/24/03 07/24/03 07/24/03
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant cc:
John Paul Cowan Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Management Company, LLC 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Cover, MI 49043 Kyle Hoops Plant Manager Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9511 Gordon P. Arent Manager, Regulatory Affairs Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9511 David Molzahn Nuclear Asset Manager Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 600 N. Adams Street Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Thomas Webb Nuclear Asset Manager Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 600 N. Adams Street Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Resident Inspectors Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N490 Hwy 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9510 Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire General Counsel, Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Larry L. Weyers Chairman, President and CEO Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 600 North Adams Street Greey Bay, WI 54307-9002 David Zellner Chairman - Town of Carlton N2164 County B Kewaunee, WI 54216 Sarah Jenkins Electric Division Public Service Commission of Wisconsin PO Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707-7854 KNPP power level instrument uncertainty is acceptable. WCAP-15591 Revision 0 was approved by the NRC staff SER for the KNPP 422 VANTAGE +
l Fuel with PERFORMANCE Features Amendment 167 dated April 4, 2003. The NRC staff finds that WCAP-15591, Revision 0 is an acceptable setpoint l
methodology with regard to the development of instrument uncertainty.
(4)
The licensee of a plant at which the installed Crossflow UFM was not calibrated to a site-specific piping configuration (flow profile and meter factors not representative of the plant-specific installation) should submit additional justification. This justification should show that the meter installation is either independent of the plant-specific flow profile for the stated accuracy, or that the installation can be shown to be equivalent to known calibration and plant configurations for the specific installation, including the propagation of flow profile effects at higher Reynolds numbers. Additionally, for previously installed and calibrated Crossflow UFM, the licensee should confirm that the plant-specific installation follows the guidelines in the Crossflow UFM topical report.
The KNPP Crossflow UFM was calibrated according to the topical report CENPD-397-P-A, Revision 1 dated May 2000. A UFM in feedwater loop A is installed where the flow is fully developed. As such, this UFM does not need calibration. The UFM in feedwater loop B is installed where the flow is not fully developed and thus needed a one-time in-situ calibration. For this calibration, a temporary stand-alone UFMD was installed on the full flow feedwater bypass line. The temporary UFM was installed at a location in the bypass line meeting the conditions for fully developed flow and was used for the UFM B calibration.
The NRC staff finds that the licensees response to the plant-specific requirements stated in the NRCs safety evaluation for topical report CENPD-397 were appropriately addressed and are acceptable.
The NRC staff finds that NMC sufficiently addressed requirements and adequately resolved plant-specific issues related to the UFMDs and their use to support the power uprate request.
These include maintenance and calibration, installation, hydraulic configuration, and procedures for inoperable UFMs or UTMs. NMC used an appropriate methodology which adequately accounted for the uncertainties due to power level instrumentation error.
3.1.3 Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees proposed plant-specific implementation of the feedwater flow measurement device and the power uncertainty calculations. The NRC staff finds that the licensees response to the plant-specific requirements stated in the NRCs safety evaluation for topical report CENPD-397 were appropriately addressed and are acceptable and is consistent with the NRC staffs approval of this topical report. The NRC staff also concludes that the licensee has adequately accounted for the uncertainties due to power level instrumentation error in their power level uncertainty calculations and demonstrated that the calculations meet the relevant requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed 1.4 percent MUR power uprate acceptable with respect to instrumentation and controls.
Since the licensee performed the analyses based upon a core power level of 1772 MWt with a 2 percent uncertainty (1807 MWt), using an approved methodology, the NRC staff finds that it bounds the requested core power level of 1673 MWt. Therefore, the analyses are acceptable for the 1.4 percent MUR power uprate.
3.2.2.2.10 Loss of Electrical Load (Overpressure and DNB)
A loss of external electrical load event occurs when an electrical disturbance causes the loss of a significant portion of the generator load. KNPP is analyzed to accept a large load rejection at 50 percent of plant-rated power without a reactor trip. Currently, there is a discrepancy between the 2002 update of the KNPP Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and the MUR power uprate submittal. The USAR states the following: The Reactor Coolant System can accept a complete loss of external load from full power without a reactor trip. The licensee states that the reason for the discrepancy is that the USAR change has not been processed.
The licensee stated that the changes will be made in the next planned KNPP USAR revision that will occur approximately November 2003.
The licensee submitted their analyses for this transient to the NRC by letter dated July 26, 2002. By letter dated April 4, 2003, the NRC staff found that the licensee performed the analyses assuming a reactor core power level of 1772 MWt for the DNB case and 1772 MWt with a 2 percent uncertainty (1807 MWt) for the overpressure case. The results indicate that the SRP acceptance criteria continue to be met, i.e., the minimum DNBR remains above the limit value, and the RCS pressure and the main steam system pressure remains below 110 percent of the design values.
Since the licensee performed the analyses based upon a core power level of 1772 MWt and 1807 MWt, using an approved methodology, the NRC staff finds that it bounds the requested core power level of 1673 MWt. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the analyses acceptable for the 1.4 percent MUR power uprate.
3.2.2.2.11 Loss of Alternating Current (AC) Power to the Plant Auxiliaries The loss of all AC power to the station auxiliaries transient results in a loss of all power to auxiliary systems including the RCPs, condensate pumps, etc. Upon the loss of power, core cooling and removal of residual heat is accomplished by natural circulation in the reactor coolant loops, aided by auxiliary feedwater and safety valves on the secondary side.
The licensee submitted their analysis for this transient to the NRC by letter dated July 26, 2002.
By letter dated April 4, 2003, the NRC staff found that the licensee performed the analysis assuming a reactor core power level of 1772 MWt with a 2 percent uncertainty (1807 MWt).
The results indicate that the SRP acceptance criteria continue to be met, i.e., the minimum DNBR remains above the limit value and the RCS and main steam system pressures remain below 110 percent of their design values.
Since the licensee performed the analysis based upon a core power level of 1772 MWt with a 2 l
percent uncertainty (1807 MWt), using an approved methodology, the NRC staff finds that it bounds the requested core power level of 1673 MWt. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the analysis acceptable for the 1.4 percent MUR power uprate.
does not change as a result of the 1.4 percent power uprate. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the safety related MOVs at KNPP will continue to be capable of performing their intended functions at the uprated power condition.
The licensee reviewed the evaluation of generic letter (GL) 95-07 associated with the pressure locking and thermal binding for safety related gate valves. The licensee found that the existing analysis used pressure conditions that would not be affected by the 1.4 percent power uprate.
The licensee reviewed the evaluation of the NMC GL 96-06 program regarding the over-pressurization of isolated piping segments. The licensee concluded that the existing evaluation for GL 96-06 was based on the containment integrity analysis performed at 102 percent of the current rated power and is therefore bounding, for the proposed power uprate of 1.4 percent l
rated power level. On the basis of the above review, the NRC staff concurs with the licensees conclusions that the power uprate will have no adverse effects on the safety-related valves and that conclusions of the NMC GL 95-07, and GL 96-06, as well as GL 89-10 programs, remain valid, and are therefore, acceptable for the proposed 1.4 percent MUR power uprate.
As a result of the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the BOP piping, pipe supports, equipment nozzles and valves, remain acceptable and continue to satisfy the design-basis requirements for the proposed power uprate and are therefore, acceptable for the proposed 1.4 percent MUR power uprate.
3.4.3 Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees evaluation of the impact of the proposed MUR power uprate on NSSS and BOP systems and components with regard to stresses, CUFs, flow induced vibration, HELB locations, jet impingement and thrust forces, and safety-related valve programs and concludes that the these areas will continue to be acceptable following implementation of the proposed MUR power uprate. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed 1.4 percent MUR power uprate acceptable with respect to the areas of civil and mechanical engineering.
3.5 Dose Consequences Analysis 3.5.1 Regulatory Evaluation The NRC staff review covers the impact of the proposed MUR power uprate on the results of dose consequence analyses (NRC RIS 2002-03, Attachment 1, Sections II and III). The review is conducted to verify that the results of the licensees dose consequence analyses continue to meet the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR Part 100, 10 CFR 50.67, and/or 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC-19, as applicable, following implementation of the proposed MUR power uprate.
3.5.2 Technical Evaluation The NRC staff reviewed the impact of the proposed 1.4 percent MUR power uprate on DBA radiological analyses.
In March 2002, the licensee requested revisions to the radiological consequence analyses for DBAs in the Kewaunee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The proposed revisions