ML031840259
| ML031840259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/2003 |
| From: | Roy D Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-443/03-301 50-443/03-301 | |
| Download: ML031840259 (50) | |
Text
SCENARIO 1 OVERVIEW The crew will take the shift at 75% with instructions from the SM to reduce power to 50%
in an expeditious manner as requested by the dispatcher.
After the crew has the shift, PT-505 fails low. The crew responds in accordance with OS1 235.05, "Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure". The failure of this instrument will result in inward rod movement if rod control is in AUTO.
The RO should place rod control in manual to halt rod insertion. The crew will BYPASS PT-505 and continue with the startup with SM permission.
The crew continues with the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%,
the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service.
After PZR level is stabilized and letdown is restored, the main generator breaker trips open causing a loss of load and reactor trip. The crew is expected to enter E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection".
RCS and SIG pressures should rise due to trip. One PZR PORV and two SIG safety valves on SIG 'A open and fail open during the transient. if pressure does not get high enough to lift them, the simulator instructor will fail them open and stick them open.
It is expected that the crew will identify the stuck open PZR PORV early in 4 and shut the associated block valve, mitigating the vapor space LOCA. If they do not, they will be directed to E-I, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" where they will be directed to shut the affected block valve.
The stuck open S/G safeties should cause transition from E-O to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator".
All 4 MSlVs are faulted at the beginning of the scenario such that they do not close automatically. Operator action will be required to shut the MSIVs, which will compound difficulties during the S/G depressurization due to the stuck open safeties.
Crew should remain in E-I until S/G 'A' blows down completely after which the crew will be directed to ES-I.I, "SI Termination". The scenario can be terminated when the crew transitions to ES-I.I or when the lead examiner is satisfied.
Pad C - Operating Exam - Scenario I Event
==
Description:==
Time I Position The purpose of scenario one is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as a reactor trip with complications.
The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a downpower maneuver to 50%.
Shortly after taking the shift, PT-505 Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitter fails low. This instrument failure will cause rods to insert automatically. The RO is expected to verify plant conditions, stop rod motion, and restore plant conditions to program band. The US should direct actions in accordance with OSI235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure.
PT-605 TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Decrease.
The first event will take place shortly after the crew assumes the I
I watch and prior to any actions to reduce power so that the first event CUE takes place while control rods are in AUTO.
After the crew has the watch and on the lead examiners cue, PT-505 transmitter fails. This generates a 87457 ROD MOTION DETECTED and a D4421 TAVE-TREF DEVIATION alarm on the BOP us VAS. The sound of rods stepping in should be noted by the crew.
RO may take manual control of rods as a skill of the operator. He is expected to check that the rod motion is not warranted by high Tave or turbine load reduction first.
Checks FW-PI-505 and determines it has failed low and informs US.
Enters OS1 235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 Or PT-506 RO Instrument Failure Places rod control in MANUAL. Manually controls rods to restore BOP Tavg to program level.
Place steam dump controller to PRESSURE mode and adjust steam BOP us dump pressure setpoint to 1092 psig.
Verifies other plant status items (AMSAC, P-I 3)
Verify TS compliance TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 18.f. Rx Trip System Instrumentation. Action 8: determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. Contacts maintenance/l&C about channel failure. Directs I&C USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 NOTE Page 1 of8 to place AMSAC channel in BYPASS.
I&C will be called to troubleshoot the failed instrument. The I
instrument will be put in BYPASS which will remove input to any controVprotection systems. The I&C personnel will also conduct any tripping of bistables called for by Technical Specification Action Statements.
The crew continues with the power reduction. After the crew reduces power by 3-4%,
and when directed by the lead examiner, the controlling PZR level channel, LT-459, fails low. Charging flow will increase and letdown will isolate. The RO is expected to take manual control of the PZR level controller and restore PZR level. The RO will also restore letdown to service.
NOTE Event I
FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR LEVEL INSTRUMENT reducing power by 34% (lead examiner's discretion):
During power reduction, RO must maintain AFD within administrative
==
Description:==
mqTa&i RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior After crew completes OS1235.05, SM directs them to continue reactivity change from RS1735,"Reactivity' Calculations" SET CS-F K-1 10, RCS boric acid makeup flow controller, to the I
I shutdown. Atlow candidates to demonstrate reactivity control by RO RO desired flow rate SET the boric acid supply counter to the desired acid quantity TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP limits.
If US directs, place heater level controls in Local (Level) Control Mode.
DETERMINE the auantitv of boric acid rewired to make the desired RO RO PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to OFF.
As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic BOP
/Ro load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.
Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generator Capability Curve and load dispatcher's instructions.
PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to BORATE.
Operators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the borationldilution and makeup evolution. This will ensure proper system response is verified as well as the desired amount.
TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quanttty, VERIFY the boration stops. TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP.
As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.
RO will manually insettlwithdraw rods to maintain axial flux difference in band.
Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to the desired load but not less than 45%.
If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 2 of 8
I I BOP I Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.
BOP Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.
I I
I RO I Recognizes controlling channel (Ll-459) has failed low. Recognizes I us letdown has isolated. Informs US.
Enters and directs action IAW OS1 202.07, "PZR Level Instrument Failure".
Takes manual control of PZR level controller RC-LK-459 or controls RO RO RO necessary. Selects an alternate RECORDER channel.
Determines that letdown can be restored and restores letdown IAW I
I RC-LCV-460, OPEN CS-V145, establish letdown flow using letdown flow I
RO OS1201.07.
Establish normal letdown: OPEN CC-V341, place CS-TK-130 in AUTO, CLOSE CS-HCV-189, CLOSE CS-HCV-190, OPEN RC-LCV-459, OPEN RO I
I I Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Verifies redundant channel I
control valves.
Returns PZR level controller to AUTO after new controlling channel us selected.
Verifies TS compliance 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item I I and TS 3.3.3.6 USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 NOTE Page 3 of 8 bistables NOT tripped and inform I&C of controller failure.
Table 3-3.1 item 11: inoperable channel LT-459 tripped within 6 NOTE hours.
TS 3.3.3.6 requires that LT-459 be returned to operable status within
When directed by the lead examiner, the main turbine generator output breaker will trip open due to a faulty 86 relay. This will cause a reactor trip. Immediately affer the reactor trip, PZR PORV 456A is failed open and 2 safety valves on S/G 'A are failed open. The MSlVs are failed open such that they will close only with manual operation.
The 'A' S/G will depressurize fairly rapidly. The crew should enter E-0 then transition to Event DescriDtion:
Position CUE MAIN GENERATOR BREAKER TRIP I REACTOR TRIP Applicant's Actions or Behavior After the US discusses TS requirements for the failure of controlling Time CUE PZR level instrument, and at the discretion of the lead examiner, the main turbine generator output breaker will open on fault resulting in a loss of loadlreactor trip. The first-out alarm will be TURBINE TRIP in addition to several trip related alarms.
PZR PORV 456A fails OPEN. The operators have the red valve us open indicator lamp as indication that the valve is OPEN. Two SG safeties fail open on SG 'A'. It is expected that the PZR PORV will be detected early. The SG safeties may not be noticed until appropriate diagnosis step in E-O. SG A E W OPEN indicators on UL-2 and UL-4 indicate that SG 'A' is at low pressure and ERN has been automatically secured to it on high E W flow.
Enters E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" RO RO/BOP BOP BOP/RO BOP BOP RO/BOP RO The RO may ask permission from the US to take manual control of PORV 456A and shut it (skill of the trade). The valve will fail to close. The RO will be directed to close the associated block valve.
Reactor trip immediate actions: verify reactor trip, turbine trip, power to AC buses, and SI actuated.
Performs ESF Actuation Verification per Attachment A of E-0 (SI will actuate approximately 1 minute after the reactor trip due to low RCS messurel.
Check main steam line isolation required. Crew may not meet criteria in this step to shut MSlVs yet. MSlVs will NOT automatically isolate (they are faulted OPEN). BOP will have to manually shut MSlVs if required here.
Verify Total ERN Flow -Greater than 500 GPM. BOP may recognize at this point that EFW is isolated to 'A' S/G on high flow (if S/G pressure is low enough).
Stabilize S/G water levels - maintain S/G water levels 2540%
narrow range by opening EFW pump mini-flow valves and throttling EFW flow. (operator action summary page)
Monitor RCS temperature - Stable At or Trending to 557F. RCS will be cooling down due to PZR PORV open and steam demand from stuck open S/G safeties. Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere. OPEN EFW min-flow valves AND throttle total feed flow to maintain greater than 500 gpm. If cooldown continues, close USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Paw 4 of 8
BOP us BOP BOP BOP NOTE RO/US CUE NOTE decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or may be completely depressurized.
Directs transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator" based on S/G
'A' deoressunzation.
have been earlier).
I CLOSE MS-V393'(stearn supply to ENV pump). CLOSE MSBV44 (main steam drain to SIG 'A'). CLOSE SEV9 (blowdown isolation valve to S/G 'A'). The isolation of the 'A' S/G mitigates radioactive release to the public and is a critical task per NUREG 1021 App D.
If S/G boils dry, the BOP may adjust ASDV setpoints to stabilize RCS temperature as directed by Operator Action Summary page of E-2.
Check if ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced. Crew is directed to ES-1.1, "SI Termination".
Lead examiner may terminate scenario at any point in ES-1.1 Ensure the MSlVs are closed before an ORANGE path condition on I the pressurized thermal shock CSF tree. Ensure that the PORV was closed prior to an ORANGE condition on core cooling CSF tree.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario I Page 5 of 8
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario I MFRPSOI 9 MFRPS020 RESET simulator to IC 101,75% power.
INSERT INSERT Please track the following parameters in addition to the standard set (if any):
SR, IR, and PR power level Loop 2 Tave Loop2 Tc Thermocouples (2 channels)
RCS pressure PZR level RVLIS (all level channels)
CCP, RHR, SI flow rates into the RCS S/G A water level (NR and WR)
S/G A pressure All MSlV position indication.
Perform immediately after simulator is in RUN:
Shortly after the crew assumes the watch and only after lead examiners cue:
PT-505 Failure.
Component Malfunction - Feedwater ptFWT505 I FailLow I INSERT The crew will contact I&C to respond to PT-505. Simulator operator will play role of I&C. When directed by crew, bypass PT-505. If the crew does not make a decision on bypasdtrip status, call in as SM and direct BYPASS of PT-505.
To select operator bypass for PT-505:
PANEL OVERVIEW
[ AMSAC CP-519 Select SWITCH SW12 to TBIMP(P505)
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 6 of 8
Crew continues power reduction.
MS-V6 When directed by lead examiner:
Fail Controlling PZR Level Transmitter.
FailOpen INSERT Component Malfunction - Reactor Coolant LTRCLT459 I FailLow I INSERT MS-V7 When I&C is directed to bypass LT-459:
To select operator bypass for LT-459:
FailOpen INSERT PANEL OVERVIEW CP-I DOOR OPEN SWITCH to OPEN I CPI - BTI BYPASS ENABLE SWITCH to ENABLE Select LB-459A BYPASS When directed by lead examiner:
Main Generator Breaker Trip:
I MFED037 - Main Generator Breaker Trip 1 INSERT I
Insert following 2 malfunctions immediately after Main Generator Breaker Trip:
PZR PORV 456A Fails OPEN Component Malfunction Reactor Coolant VpRCPCV456A I FailOpen
[ INSERT SIG A Safeties Fail OPEN Briefing Sheet for Scenario 1 The dispatcher has requested that Seabrook Station reduce power to 50% in an expeditious manner.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 7 of 8
No equipment is out of service.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 1 Page 8 of 8
SCENARIO 2 OVERVIEW The crew will take the watch at CCP By is tagged out for maintenance. The crew is instructed to continue a power increase in accordance with OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality and OS1 000.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.
amps on the intermediate range channels.
NOTE: The control rods are faulted such that they will not insert from the beginning of the scenario.
After the crew assumes the watch, they will continue power ascension in accordance with OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality. Once the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity addition, the Cy S/G level transmitter, LT-539, fails HIGH. The high input to the feed control system will cause Cy S/G feed regulating bypass valves to modulate closed, securing feed to Cy S/G. The is no redundant channel for this level transmitter thus the BOP operator must maintain manual control of S/G C feed regulating bypass valve for the remainder of the startup.
Once level control is regained in the S/Gs (proper level not necessary), a 30 gpd tube leak develops on S/G A. The crew should respond to the leak in accordance with OS1 227.02, Steam Generator Tube Leak. This procedure has the crew verify lineups and notify Chemistry of the tube leak. The crew will begin calculating leak rate. While making the proper notifications, S/G A ASDV will fail OPEN. The BOP will take manual control of the valve and close it. The US will verify TS compliance.
After the ASDV is closed, the controlling PZR pressure instrument fails high.
PZR spray initiates. RCS pressure will decrease rapidly. It is expected that the RO will verify RCS pressure is normal and manually secure PZR spray flow. If the crew is too slow, the plant may trip on low pressure. A plant trip will not negatively affect the scenario at this point because the control rods are faulted. If the crew trips the plant, the S/G tube rupture will be inserted immediately (500gpm) on S/G A.
When PZR sprays are secured and RCS pressure is steady or rising, a 500 gpm tube rupture will start on S/G A. PZR level will decrease as the leak rate is greater than the capacity of the charging system. When the crew manually initiates SI, the A CCP trips. The US will order a manual safety injection at this point if the plant did not trip automatically. Control rods will not insert in response to any action by the crew.
Crew combats ATWS in accordance with FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS. CCP A tripped, thus the normal emergency boration flow path is not available. The RO will line up and start the positive displacement pump to complete the emergency boration.
The crew will address the tube rupture in accordance with E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture".
The scenario is complete when the crew completes a cooldown to the target value in E-3.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 2 The purpose of scenario two is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as actions for a S/G tube rupture and ATWS event.
The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power increase from 1 O8 amps to minimum loading on the main turbine. CCP B is danger tagged for maintenance.
The S/G C level transmitter, LT-539, fails high resulting in S/G C feed regulating bypass valves modulating closed, securing feed to S/G IC.
Event
==
Description:==
Time I Position RO IRO us BOP BOP BOP us S/G C LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew assumes the watch and continues with power ascension on step 4.7 of OS1200.07, Approach to Criticality then starts OS1200.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading.
Expect a reactivity brief.
Step 4.7.1 of OS1200.07:
The reactor is critical and power is being maintained at approximately IO8 amps in the intermediate range. To continue plant startup to minimum load, refer to OS1000.02.
Caution: Do not exceed the capacity of the startup feed pump (I91 amps or 3% RTP). Do NOT exceed a STABLE start up rate of 1 DPM.
Increase reactor power to between I
% and 3% by soluble boron control or control rod motion, and maintain TAVG greater than or equal to TREF and within the limits of Figure 2, TAVG Program.
RO will have manual control of control rods and withdraw rods at a rate determined bv US. Drobablv 2-ste~
incremenls.
Once the reactivity manipulation is completed satisfactorily, the lead examiner will direct the failure of the C S/G level transmitter, LT-539, to its HIGH value. The high S/G level will cause C S/Gs feed regulating bypass valve to modulate closed and C S/G water level to decrease. No immediate alarm is received. If crew does not notice failure, the SG C LEVEL HI/LO annunciator will come in.
Informs US of lowering S/G water levels in C S/G. The BOP will verify level deviation on controlling level channel, Nv-LI-539 OR FW-Ll-553. The BOP will take manual control of S/G C feed regulating bypass valve and restore S/G C water levels to the program level.
The US will enter and direct action from OSI235.03, S/G Level Instrument Failure.
Place C steam generator bypass feed control valve in MANUAL.
Control S/G water level manually between 50-70% on the narrow range level detectors.
BOP may select different channel for feed regulating valve control in anticipation of future use during startup.
Verify redundant bistables NOT tripped. Verify Technical SDecification ComDliance. TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 item 13 Reactor Trip USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 1 of 11
System Instrumentation, TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3, items 5.b, 6.a, 7.c, and 1O.c Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instruments, TS 3.3.3.6 table 3.3-10, item 7 Accident Monitoring Instruments.
TS Actions required:
For 3.3.1 and 3.3.2: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.
For 3.3.3.6: requires LT-539 to be returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Notifies I&C of level channel failure and directs them to come to the control room.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 2 of 1 1
A 30 gpd tube leak develops on S/G A. This leak is not large enough to be noticeable on level instruments but will be detected on radiation monitors. While the crew is making the proper notifications for the tube leak, the A S/G ASDV will fail open.
Event
==
Description:==
30 GPD PRIMARY TO SECONDARY TUBE LEAK ON S/G A Time alarms alert the crew to the leak. The first indication of the leak is S/G blowdown lines in an ALERT status on RDMS. Expected VAS alarms are B8442, PRI to SEC Leak Rate of Change HI and B8443 PRI to SEC Leak Rate of Change HI HI. Note: 30gpd tube leak will Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CUE At lead examiners cue, a 30 gpd leak develops on S/G A. RDMS us BOP/RO BOP/RO CUE not be noticeable in any plant parameters except radiation monitors.
Enters and directs action of OS1 227.02, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
Identify affected steam generators. Check RDMS for increasing radiation levels: main steam line monitors and S/G blowdown sample monitors.
Notify Chemistry to implement CS0905.08, Response to a Primary to Secondary Leak. Chemistry may recommend RDMS setpoint changes and report results of grab samples. Notifications to HP, plant management, and waste services will be made to facilitate station response to the leak.
While the crew is implementing OS1227.02 (during notifications), a S/G A ASDV will begin to fail open. The failure is ramped over 30 seconds. The ATMOS STM DUMP VALVE OPEN annunciator will come in as well as the VAS alarm D5214 ASDV A NOT FULL CLOSED.
us NOTE us Verifies Technical Specifications are met. T.S. 3.7. I
.6 Atmospheric Release Valve and T.S. 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves.
TS 3.7.1.6 and 3.6.3 are not applicable due to ASDV being manually operable.
Refer to FR-H.4, Response To Loss Of Normal Steam Dump I
I CaDabilities USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 3 of 11
After the crew shuts the 'A' S/G ASDV manually, the controlling PZR pressure channel fails high. This results in a rapid pressure decrease in the RCS. The crew will have to take action to manually shut the PZR spray valves or take manual control of the master pressure controller to mitigate the pressure decrease.
Event
==
Description:==
Time Position CUE FAILURE OF CONTROLLING PZR PRESSURE CHANNEL PT-455 Applicant's Actions or Behavior When the 'A' ASDV is closed and the US has addressed any TS issues, the controlling PZR pressure instrument, PT-455, fails high.
PZR spray initiates. RCS pressure decreases quickly. The crew will receive VAS alarm F7860 PZR PRESS HI CHANNEL TRIP and the
-r RO PRESSURIZER PB-455A PRESS HI annunciator will come in.
Uses VAS alarm procedure or skill of the operator to identify failed PT-455 instrument. The RO may take manual control of the master pressure controller or spray valves to control RCS pressure.
Enters and directs actions in OS1201.06, "PZR Pressure Instrument PT-4551458 Failure".
If pressure decrease is not stopped quickly, the reactor will trip on low pressure. This should not affect the course of the scenario because the control rods are already faulted. The simulator instructor will insert the tube rupture immediately if the plant trips on low pressure.
Realign Pressure Instruments. If not done so already, the RO will either take manual control of the master pressure controller or spray RO flow to return RCS pressure to program band.
Select an alternate pressure channel for CONTROUBACKUP.
RO us NOTE For 3.3.1: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.
For 3.3.2: determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
For 3.2.5: with pressure below 21 85psig, restore pressure to its normal limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than 5%
RTP within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The RO will verify that there are no other pressure boundary breaches and will verify pressure setpoints on the master controller.
Verify Redundant Channel Bistables NOT TRIPPED and Verify Technical Specification Compliance: TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1, items 7,9, and 10 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation. TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3 items I
.d and 10.a ESFAS Instrumentation. TS 3.2.5 DNB Parameters (if RCS pressure drops below 21 85 psig). Ensures I&C is informed and directs all appropriate bistables in attachment A are tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
TS Actions:
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 4 of 11
After the crew stabilizes RCS pressure and restores RCS pressure control to automatic, the tube leak in S/G A develops into a 500 gpm tube rupture. The crew will manually SI because PZR level cannot be maintained with normal charging. Control rods will fail to insert on the SI. The crew will take action for an ATWS when they realize that control rods will not insert. CCP A trips on overcurrent when the SI is manually initiated, preventing the crew from performing a normal emergency boration. Emergency boration will be lined up in an alternate lineup using the positive displacement pump (PDP).
r Event us RO us RO RO us RO us RO RO RO RO RO RO BOP CUE 500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE / ATWS Applicants Actions or Behavior After the US determines TS compliance for PT-455, the 500 gpm tube rupture will be inserted on S/G A. The 500 gpm leak is beyond the capability of both centrifugal charging pumps. The crew should receive VAS alarms PZR Pressure Lo & B/U Heaters On and PZR LEVEL DEVIATION annunciators and RDMS alarm MAIN STEAM Will determine that PZR level CANNOT be maintained with leak this large. Per OS1227.02 caution statement before step 1, SI is to be initiated if PZR level cannot be maintained greater than 5% with normal charging lineup. CCP A fails when SI is initiated.
Manually initiates SI. Control rods do not insert. Informs US of LINE LOOP 1 - HIHI.
ATWS condition. Isolates letdown based on decreasing PZR level.
Enters and directs actions of E-0. Acknowledges ATWS condition.
Verify Reactor Tripped. RO determines that the reactor is NOT tripped and reports this to US.
Transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Directs NSO to locally trip reactor.
Verify reactor tripped: reactor is NOT tripped.
Initiate Emergency Boration of the RCS. The RO should note that there are NO CCPs runnina.
z g n charging flow path: align CCP suction to RWST by opening CS-LCV-I 12D and -1 12E. Isolate VCT by closing CS-LCV-I 12B and -1 12C.
Performs attachment A of E-0 in conjunction with this procedure to verify proper ECCS operation.
Once the emergency boration lineup is complete and injecting, the NSO will open the reactor trip breakers locally.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 5 of I1
I us USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Returns to E-0 (procedure in effect) after FR-S.1 is completed.
Page 6 of 11
The crew will address the 500 gpm tube rupture in accordance with E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, after FR-S.1 is exited. The scenario is complete once the crew isolates S/G A. The US will be expected to make an EAL evaluation for the end state of the scenario and complete section A.4 of the Administrative JPM Examination.
I Event Descril Time ion:
Position CUE RO/BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP NOTE RO us BOP BOP BOP BOP RO NOTE CUE 500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE ON SIG A Applicants Actions or Behavior When crew reaches step 13 of E-0 they will be directed to E-3, Steam Generator Tube RuDture Identify ruptured steam generator using S/G narrow range level (increasing uncontrollably) or radiation monitors.
Adjust ruptured S/Gs ASDV controller setpoint to 1 125psig.
The A S/G is now isolated.
Opens EFW pump mini-flow valves AND stops fded fl Determines required core exit temperature using table in step 7 of E-
- 3.
Place the steam dump pressure controller in manual and at minmum output.
Transfer steam dump control mode selector to steam pressure.
Bypass Low Low Tavg interlock as necessary to maintain steam dump operation during cooldown.
Slowly OPEN steam dumps to prevent a steamline isolation AND establish a maximum cooldown rate.
Maintain PZR pressure less than 1900 psig using normal PZR spray.
Scenario 2 is complete when target cooldown temperature and pressure is reached or at lead examiners discretion.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 7 of 11
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 2 MFRPS002 RESET simulator to IC 194, IO" amps & critical.
T M AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE INSERT Initial Setup:
Conditions to make control rods untrippable from control room:
b kC P RTA bkCPRTB MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR PROTECTION MFRPSOOI I AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FAILURE I INSERT FAILCLOSED FA1 LCLOSED I TRB I
PANEL PDFl2B Override Rx Trip Switches to RELEASE Place Train 'A' Control Room Ventilation in Filter Recirc Mode Conditions for havina charainn DumD 'B' tamed out:
COMPONENT REMOTE FUNCTIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL BKCSI P2B-52 RF: RACKOUT ECCS TRAIN B BYPASSANOP CVCS TRB PUSHBUTTON USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 8 of 1 1
S/G LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE After crew achieves their reactivity addition and on the lead examiners cue, fail the S/G C level transmitter.
PTMSPK3001 COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS FEEDWATER (Perform actions for BTI for failed channel if lead examiner requests.)
I LTFWLT539 I FAILHIGH I INSERT FAIL TO 1500 SPECIFIED VALUE To trip bistables:
I PANEL OVERVIEW TRIP CP-1 DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN Place following switches to TEST/TRIP (or BYPASS):
S/G A TUBE LEAK Once level is restored in C S/G, insert tube leak in S/G A MALFUNCTIONS STEAM GENERATOR I MFSG002 I SG A TUBE RUPTURE I
I I FINAL VALUE 0.021 GPM I INSERT S/G A ASDV FAILURE When the crew is making notifications for the tube leak, the lead examiner will cue the ASDV failure.
I I
I I RAMP 30 SECS I INSERT PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH After the crew gets the S/G A ASDV shut and on the lead examiners cue fail PT-455 high.
COMPONENT MALFUNCTION REACTOR COOLANT I PTRCPT455 I FAILHIGH I INSERT If the reactor trips due to low pressure, IMMEDIATELY insert the rod control and 500gpm tube rupture below.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 9 of 1 I
Otherwise, once RCS pressure is stable, and on the lead examiners cue, insert the rod control failure and 500 gpm tube rupture on S/G A.
ROD CONTROL FAILURE MALFUNCTION ROD CONTROL IMF MFCP005 AUTO/MANUAL ROD MOTION FAILURE INSERT 1
J 500 GPM TUBE RUPTURE ON S/G A MODIFY MFSG002 TO 500 GPM SET FINAL VALUE TO 500 I
INSERT FAILURE OF CCP A When the crew manually initiates SI, fail the remaining CCP.
MALFUNCTIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL I MFCCOIG I CS-P-2A OC TRIP I INSERT TRIP REACTOR After the crew establishes emergency boration with the PDP, manually open the reactor trip breakers.
DELETE MALFUNCTIONS MFRPSOOI AND MFRPS002 (and/or breaker MALFUNCTIONS) TO TRIP REACTOR.
Report to the control room that trip breakers have been opened locally.
Scenario 2 ends when target temperature is reached during E-3 cooldown.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 10 of 11
Scenario 2 Briefing Sheet The reactor is at IO amps. Step 4.6 of OS1 000.07, Approach to Criticality is complete. The crew will continue a power increase in accordance with OS1200.02, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Loading.
The B CCP is tagged out for maintenance.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 2 Page 11 of 11
SCENARIO 3 OVERVIEW The crew takes the watch with reactor power at 75%. The crew is instructed to continue with a power reduction to remove steam generator feed pump 'A from service for corrective maintenance.
When the crew assumes the watch they will continue with a downpower maneuver IAW OS1 000.06, "Power Decrease". After the crew takes the watch but before they commence the power reduction, Loop 1 Tc fails high resulting in Tave for loop 1 failing high. This results in an automatic rod insertion. The RO should take manual control of control rods and stop uncontrolled insertion. The crew will respond to the broken Tc instrument IAW OS1201.08, "TAVG-Delta T Instrument Failure". The crew should defeat affected loop delta-T and Tavg inputs.
Once all bistables are tripped, channels defeated for the loop 1 Tavg instrument, the crew will continue with the power decrease. After a sufficient reactivity change is observed by the examining team, the lead examiner will cue the next event. The SGFP master speed controller setpoint is failed to zero, resulting in SGFPs slowing down. The RO will take manual control of each SGFP and restore proper feed flow.
Once feed flow is stabilized and plant condition is assessed by the US, a leak develops in the PCCW system to the supply of RCP cooling. The leak is 90gpm on the 'C' RCP oil cooler. The leak is great enough to cause RCP shaft and frame vibrations above the ALERT limit. The US should direct a reactor trip based on RCP frame vibration greater than 5 mils.
When the crew completes immediate actions of E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", a large break LOCA develops. The crew is expected to enter E-I,
"Reactor Coolant or Secondary Coolant Leak" to combat the LOCA.
Both RHR pumps and both SI pumps will fail to start automatically requiring manual action by the RO to restore injection to the RCS.
Containment isolation phase B fails to auto-initiate. Manual action is required to complete containment isolation.
The crew will have to transition to a coldleg recirculation scheme or a cooldowddepressurize scheme based on RCS pressure. It is expected that RCS pressure will be less than 260 psig at this point which results in transition to ES-1.3, "Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation".
After the crew aligns the ECCS for recirculation, the A RHR pump and a valve in the B RHR train will fail resulting in a loss of recirculation cooling. The crew will transition to ECA-1.I to supply makeup water to the RWST.
The scenario is complete when makeup water is being supplied to the RWST.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 3 Event
==
Description:==
Time 1 Position The purpose of scenario three is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as actions for a large break LOCA with complications.
The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power decrease from 75% to 50% to remove 'A' SGFP from service. SW 'C is danger tagged for maintenance.
Loop I Tc instrument will fail high resulting in a high Tavg for loop 1. Auctioneered high Tavg will fail high resulting in inward rod motion.
LOOP1 TC INSTRUMENT FAILS HIGH Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO CREW CUE RO T instruments.
Verify rod motion unnecessary and place rod control in MANUAL to Crew assumes the watch and continues downpower from 75% to 50%.
Shortly after assuming the watch, upon lead examiner's cue, a loop 1 Tc fails high resulting in high Tave for loop 1. The following VAS alarms will come in due to the failure: B7457 ROD MOTION DETECTED, D4422 AUCTIONEERED TAVG HIGH, and D4421 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION. The sound of rods driving inward will also cue the owrators. Owrators will have visual indication on loop 1 us Tavg and delta-T inskmentation of which instrument has failed.
RO should identify which channel is faulted by using Tavg and Delta-any procedure as a skill of the trade.
Enters and directs action of OS1201.08, "TAVG-Delta T Instrument RO RO RO RO I
I stop Insertion. The RO may do thisvery quickly prior to referencing Failure" Determine loop 1 TAVG channel failed HIGH.
Place rod control in MANUAL (required by procedure at this point).
Depress loop 1 delta-T defeat pushbutton.
Depress loop 1 Tavg defeat pushbutton.
Restore Tavg within 1 F of Tref by manually controlling rod motion.
The operators may choose to reduce turbine load instead because they are performing a power decrease procedure - this is RO acceptable.
Place rod control in AUTO.
us NOTE Verify redundant channel bistables NOT tripped and verify technical specification compliance. TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1 items 7 & 8.
Coordinate with I&C for bypass operation or bistable tripping within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
TS Actions required:
For 3.3.1 ITEMS 7 & 8: startup and/or power operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 1 of 13
is met. The channel may be bypassed up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance of other channels.
I I
I I
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 2 of 13
The steam generator feed pump (SGFP) master controller fails such that SGFP speed decreases (setpoint failed to zero), reducing feed flow to all S/Gs. Manual control of the SGFPs must be taken to restore S/G water level. The crew will continue with the a power reduction in this segment.
==
Description:==
Time Position CUE I Event I
FAILURE OF SGFP MASTER CONTROLLER Applicant's Actions or Behavior After the US determines TS compliance, crew will continue with NOTE power reduction.
During power reduction, RO must maintain AFD within administrative BOP RO RO limits.
If US directs, place heater level controls in Local (Level) Control Mode.
Calculates and aligns boration in accordance with OS1008.01,
"Chemical and Volume Control System Makeup Operations". See reference.
DETERMINE the auantity of boric acid required to make the desired RO reactivity change from RS1735,"Reactiii~ Calculations" SET CS-FK-110, RCS boric acid makeup flow controller, to the RO I
I I boration/dilution and makeup evolution. This will ensure proper desired flow rate SET the boric acid supply counter to the desired acid quantity RO RO TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to STOP PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to NOTE BORATE.
ODerators are required to remain at the makeup controls during the RO system response is verified as well as the desired amount.
TURN the BLENDER MODE START SWITCH to START RO I Generato'; Capability Curve and load dispatcher's instructions.
When the boric acid supply counter has added its preset quantity, VERIFY the boration stops. TURN the BLENDER MODE START USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 RO Page 3 of 13 SWITCH to STOP.
PLACE the BORIC ACID BLENDER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to RO OFF.
As directed by US, RETURN the makeup controls to automatic RO blended makeup.
As directed by US, if RCS boron concentration is being changed by RO BOP BOP greater than 50 ppm, OPERATE pressurizer heaters to force spray to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and pressurizer.
RO will manually insewwithdraw rods to maintain axial flux difference in band.
Use the LOAD SELECTOR load decrease push-button or LOAD LIMIT SET potentiometer to reduce load to the desired load but not less than 45%.
If reducing load with the load selector, FOLLOW the load set with the BOP load limit set potentiometer and the standby load set.
Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine
BOP BOP CUE BOP BOP NOTE BOP NOTE Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled.
Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.
Once crew has demonstrated a satisfactory reactivity addition, the SGFP master controller fails such that the SGFPs slow down. The following annunciators should illuminate: S/G A LEVEL HI/LO, S/G B LEVEL HI/LO, S/G C LEVEL HI/LO, S/G D LEVEL HVLO. VAS alarms D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, D4770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION, and 04770 SG A LVL REF DEVIATION will come in.
The RO should notice that the SGFP controller is malfunctioning and report condition to US (the RO will notice that the setpoint indicates 0).
Takes manual control of SGFP master controller and controls speed manually to restore proper S/G water levels.
The BOP should reference the Secondarv Technical Data Book to determine the proper delta-P for flow desked.
Manually controls SGFPs to maintain proper differential pressure for feed flow.
No TS compliances issues with this failure.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 4 of 13
A PCCW leak develops in the 'C' RCP oil cooler. The lack of cooling causes pump vibration and low levels in the PCCW expansion tank. The US will direct a reactor trip due to high vibrations on RCP 'C'. A large break LOCA develops immediately after the reactor trip. Both RHR pumps and both SI pumps fail to inject automatically and phase B containment isolation will fail to automatically initiate. The crew will eventually transition to either ES-1.3, 'Transition To Cold Leg Recirculation" (expected) or ES-1.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization". The RH-P-8A pump will fail after the recirculation lineup is established followed by closure of CBS-V14 (suction valve for pump RH-P-8B) resulting in a loss of ECCS cooling. The crew will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation".
==
Description:==
Time I Position I CUE Event I PCCW LEAK ON RCP 'C' OIL COOLEWLARGE BREAK LOCA Applicant's Actions or Behavior When manual control of the SGFP master controller is complete and CREW us RO us CUE BOP BOP S/G water levels are being restored, insert a PCCW leak on RCP 'C' oil cooler. Many VAS alarms will come in, including D5781 RCP C MOTOR VIBRATION HIGH and D4313 RCP C UPPER OIL RESVR LEVEL HIGH. The RCP VIBRATION HI annunciator will come in.
Will use plant computer to investigate RCP C -will determine that frame and shaft vibrations are high.
Orders reactor tripped because frame vibrations are greater than 5 mils. The ALARM level is 5 mils for RCP frame vibrations and will result in a manual reactor trip and subsequent securing of RCP 'C'.
Manually TRIP the reactor. RCP 'C' will be secured after immediate actions of E-0 are completed.
Enters and directs actions of E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" After immediate actions of E-0 are taken, a large break LOCA develops in the RCS.
Stabilize SIG water levels - maintain SIG water levels 25-50%
narrow range by opening EFW pump mini-flow valves and throttling EFW flow. (Operator Action Summary page)
At step 7 of E if containment pressure has risen above 18 psig, containment isolation must be verified. Actual containment pressure BOP I
I levels; pressure and water levels will cause transition to E-1, 'Loss of (phase B status panel)
Stop all RCPs. RCPs may have been tripped earlier because us 1
I operator action required.
Reactor or Secondary Coolant".
Will acknowledge RED path on P FR status tree. Enters FR-P.l. No USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 5 of 13
us BOP RO BOP NOTE Will acknowledge ORANGE path on Z FR status tree. Enters FR-Z. 1. No actions by applicants required. Staff will align hydrogen analyzers.
Open ERN pump mini-flow valves AND control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 5% and 50% (25% and 50% for adverse containment).
Resets SI (step 10 of E-1).
Stops unloaded EDGs and resets them for auto-start. Press both emergency stop buttons. After the EDG has stopped, reset the EDG for auto-start. ISOLATE SW to the EDG.
At step 12. the US will determine to either transition to ES-1.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization" or go to ES-1.3, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation" based on RCS pressure being less than or greater than 260 psig. It is expected that RCS pressure is less than 26Opsig and the crew will transition to ES-1.3.
USNRC Examination - Seabmk Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 6 of 13
The crew transitions to ES-1.3, "Cold Leg Recirculation*. Once the crew completes the initial lineup, RHR pump RH-P-8A will trip on overcurrent and the suction valve for RH-P-8B will shut, isolating all RHR flow from the RCS. The crew must then transition to ECA 1.I to line up makeup water supply to the RWST.
Event I
COLD LEG REClRClRHR PUMP FAILURE DURING RECIRC
==
Description:==
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CUE The crew transitions to ES-1.3, "Cold Leg Recirculation".
NOTE RO Any pumps taking suction from RWST should be stopped upon RWST EMPTY alarm.
Place RHR pump switches in the normal-after-start position.
NOTE The following steps isolate RWST feed to SI pumps and CCPs.
RO CLOSE CBS-V47. CLOSE CBS-V51.
RO CLOSE CS-LCV-112D. CLOSE CS-LCV-112E.
RO Deenergize CCP suction valves: CS-LCV-112D MCC-E512 and CS-LCV-112E MCC-E612.
RO Deenergize MCC-E522 and MCC-E622.
I 1
I NOTE I RHR pump P-8A trips on overcurrent us Transitions back to E-I (end of ES-1.3).
I 1
I NOTE I Suction valve for RHR pump P-8B fails shut (Loss of ECCS Recirculation).
Transitions to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation".
us I
I Transition criteria are on the operator &tion summary page of E-I.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 7 of 13
RO Check containment sump valve CBS-VI4 is OPEN-NO -if valve cannot be opened, then stop corresponding RHR and CBS pumps.
I I
1 Reset automatic switchover S SIGNAL RESET FOR S/RWST LO-LO I
I RO RO RO should stop RH-PSB and CBS pump B.
Reset SI us CBS-V8 or CBSV14 AUTO OPEN.
Locally OPEN makeup valves to RWST. Orders the following valves I
I Place blender mode start switch to START.
I I RO RO RO RO RO RO RO opened: CS-V446 and CS-V444.
Set BA flow counter for greater than 10,000.
Set total makeup flow counter for greater than 30,000.
Set total flow controller, CS-FK-111, for 120 gprn.
Set BA flow controller, CS-FK-110, for 40 gpm.
Place one RMW pump in AUTO. Place one BA pump in AUTO.
Aligns the following valves: CS-FCV-1 IOA AUTO, CS-FCV-1 1 1A USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 RO Page 8 of 13 AUTO, CS-FCV-1 10B CLOSED, and CS-FCV-111 B CLOSED.
Place the boric acid blender switch in MANUAL.
I CUE Once BA flow and total makeup flow have been verified, the scenario can be terminated by the lead examiner.
The following script is provided in the case that the crew transitions to ES-1.2 instead of ES-1.3 following the LOCA. The scenario will be terminated when the crew establishes the maximum cooldown rate in step 8.
Event ES-I.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION
==
Description:==
CONTINGENCY Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Reset SI.
RO RO us BOP Reset Phase A and Phase B Containment Isolation Signals (T signal reset and P signal reset).
Place all PZR heater switches in OFF position.
Consult with TSC for a recommended minimum indicated PZR water level that will ensure heaters are covered.
OPEN E M I pump miniflow valves AND control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 5% and 50% (25% and 50% for adverse RO containment).
Monitors shutdown margin during cooldown.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 b
NOTE BOP BOP BOP BOP CUE Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than 100F/HR.
Place the steam dump pressure controller in MANUAL and at minimum output.
Transfer steam dump control mode selector to steam pressure.
Bypass Low Low Tavg interlock as necessary to maintain steam dump operation during cooldown.
Slowly OPEN steam dumps to prevent a steamline isolation AND establish a cooldown rate less than IOOF/HR.
The lead examiner may terminate the scenario at this point after observing a portion of the cooldown.
Page 9 of 13
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 3 MFRPS013 MFRPS014 RESET simulator to IC1 01,75% power.
P SIGNAL FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE TRA P SIGNAL FAILS TO AUTO ACTUATE TRB
'LEASE TRACK THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS UORMALLY TRACKED:
,oop 2 Tave, Tc I C s pressure SR, IR, and PR power 3HR flow rate into RCS
'ZR level 3VLIS (some indication of water level in the reactor vessel)
Zontainment pressure Initial Setup:
SW Pump 41C tagged out for maintenance COMPONENT REMOTE FUNCTIONS SELECT CSW41C BREAKER RACKED IN INSERT: RF: RACK-OUT SI Pumps fail to start on SI MALFUNCTIONS SAFETY INJECTION MFS1003 MFS1004 SI PUMP P-6A FAILS TO AUTO START SI PUMP P-6B FAILS TO AUTO START RHR Pumps fail to start on SI MALFUNCTIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL MFRHOOS MFRHOOG RH-P-8A FAILS TO AUTO START RH-P-8B FAILS TO AUTO START Shortly after the crew assumes the watch, the lead examiner will cue event #I which is failure of Loop I Tc HIGH.
Failure of Loop I Tc COMPONENT MALFUNCTION REACTOR COOLANT ttRCTT41 I I FAILHIGH I INSERT USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 1Oof 13
I I
PANEL OVERVIEW TRIP CP-1 d
DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN L TB-41 I C OTdelta T TB412G Low Tavg for feedwater TB412D tow Low Tavg for PI 2 Place the following switches to TESTTTRIP:
TB-411G OPdelta T MFRCOOG C RCP CC TO OIL COOLER LEAKAGE INSERT To Bypass the Tc instrument:
PANEL OVERVIEW BTI CP1 DOOR OPEN SELECT OPEN SELECT ENABLE Place the following switches to BYPASS:
TB-41 I G OP-delta T TB-41 I C OT-deita T TB412G Low Tavg for feedwater TB412D Low Low Tavg for PI2 I
I After TS evaluations are made for the Tc instrument, the reactor power decrease will continue. Once the lead examiner is satisfied with the reactivity change, he will cue the next event.
SGFP Master Controller Failure I COMPONENT MALFUNCTION FEEDWATER I
CTMK509A FAILSETPOINT 0
INSERT After the crew restores proper S/G water level and at the discretion of the lead examiner, insert the PCCW leak.
PCCW Leak to RCP C USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material - Scenario 3 Page 11 of 13
The crew will trip the reactor and enter E-0. When the immediate actions of E-0 are complete and no later than 30 seconds after the trip, insert the LOCA.
MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR COOLANT MFRC024 RCS COLD LEG LOCA (DOUBLE ENDED SHEAR)
INSERT The crew will transition to ES-1.3, "Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation". Once the crew aligns the ECCS system for recirculation, RH-P-8A fails.
Failure of RHR Pump 8A MALFUNCTIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL MFRH003 I RHR PUMP P-8A OC TRIP 1 INSERT The crew will transition back to E-I, when the'crew reaches E-I, the RH-P-8B suction valve will fail shut.
Failure of CBS-VI4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING SPRAY cCBSVl4 I GO TO POSITION "0" I INSERT On cue from the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page 12 of 13
Scenario 3 Briefing Sheet The reactor is at 75%. Your crew is to continue a power decrease in accordance with OS1000.06, "Power Decrease" to 50% to facilitate taking SGFP 'A' out of service for maintenance.
SW pump 'B' is tagged out for maintenance.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 3 Page i30f 13
SCENARIO 4 OVERVIEW The candidates will take the shift at 75% with instructions from the SM to continue a power increase in accordance with OS1000.05, Power Increase to 100%. The B EDG is failed such that it will not start when called upon. The main turbine output breaker is failed such that it will not open automatically on a trip. After an appropriate reactivity manipulation is completed by the crew, main steam header pressure transmitter, PT-507, will fail high. The failure of this instrument \\Fill result in a feed demand signal. SGFPs will increase in speed and feed header pressure will rise.
After feed flow is stabilized, the PZR master pressure controller PK-455A setpoint fails high resulting in the pressure control system sensing that RCS pressure is too low. All PZR heaters energize to raise pressure. The crew will have to take manual control of the pressure controller to mitigate pressure increase.
After the crew regains pressure control and evaluates technical specifications, centrifugal charging pump CS-P-2B trips on overcurrent. Letdown must be manually isolated due to regenerative heat exchanger temperatures rising and flashing in the letdown line. CS-P-24 will have to be started. The operators will manually restore letdown system to operation.
Once letdown is restored and the US evaluates TS compliance, the 1 I A DC BUS de-energizes on fault. S/G water levels decrease rapidly resulting in a plant trip. The main turbine output breaker will not open automatically on the plant trip. The BOP operator must open the breaker manually. Following the plant trip is a loss of offsite power. EDG B will fail to start. The loss of DC bus I 1A will prevent EDG A from starting resulting in a loss of all AC power. A 90 gpm small break LOCA develops as a result of RCP seal failure. The DC bus 11A will be reenergized once step 6 of ECA-0.0 is complete, allowing the crew to start EDG A.
The scenario is complete when the crew restores ECCS flow to the RCS in ECA-0.1, Loss Of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required or ECA-0.2, Loss Of All AC Power Recovery With SI Required.
Part C - Operating Exam - Scenario 4 RO The purpose of scenario two is to observe the crew combat various instrument and component failures as well as actions for loss of all AC power and subsequent small break LOCA due to RCP seal failure. The scenario will terminate when ECCS flow is restored to the RCS after AC power recovery.
to control the load.
SELECT the desired loading rate as directed by the US on the The 'B' EDG is failed such that it will not start when called upon. The main turbine output breaker is failed such that it will not open automatically on a trip. After an appropriate reactivity manipulation is completed, main steam header pressure transmitter, PT-507, fails high. The failure of this instrument will result in a feed demand signal. SGFPs will increase in speed and feed header pressure will rise.
BOP BOP The crew takes the watch with instructions to continue a power increase from 75% to full power.
LOADING RATE LIMIT.
It may be necessary to THROTTLE OPEN the in service SCCW heat exchanger outlet valve as power increases. Reference ON1 037.02, "SCCW System Operation" and CR 00-1 2472.
Adjust the LOAD LIMIT SET 1% or 2% above the actual plant load.
I 1 BOP verify the LOAD INCREASING light illuminates.
Verify turbine load increasing until either the AT SET LOAD or LOAD I
I I BOP I On the load selector, depress the INCREASE LOAD pushbutton and BOP BOP BOP BOP LIMIT LIMITING light illuminates.
Continue with load increase by utilizing the LOAD LIMIT SET I
% to 2% above the load set until reaching desired load not to exceed 100% RTP.
Starts a second heater drain pump per ON1038.01.
When control valve 4 is greater than 10% open, perform OX1431.03 for control valve 4.
When control valve 4 is greater than 10% open, CLOSE MSD Group RO B Drains and Group A DTains (MCB-FF).
Maintain AFD within the administrative control band in RN1740.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 1 of12
BOP BOP Maintain generator VARs consistent with load per The Turbine Generator Capability Curve and load dispatcher's instructions.
Maintain the manual voltage regulator nulled if automatic voltage CUE BOP us BOP BOP When lead examiner is satisfied with power increase, cue the failure of PT-507. VAS alarm B8181 FEEDWATER HEADER PRESSURE HI comes in.
Identifies that PT-507 failed high. Take manual control of PK-509, feedwater master controller and restore feedwateristeam header differential pressure to the program value located in the Secondary Technical Data Book on a chart of DP vs Power Level.
Enters and directs actions of ON1230.01, "Steam Header Pressure PT-507 Instrument Failure" If not already done from VAS procedure: Transfer main feed pump master control to MANUAL. will use graph in Secondary Technical Data Book to determine proper delta P for required feed flow and adjust feed output accordingly.
regulator is being used.
Maintain speed deviations for both main feed pumps nulled.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 2 of 12
The PZR master pressure controller PK-455A setpoint fails high resulting in the pressure control system sensing that RCS pressure is too low. All PZR heaters energize to raise pressure.
ion:
Position CUE Applicants Actions or Behavior At lead examiners cue, the master PZR pressure controller setpoint Descril Time us set point.
Enters and directs actions of OS1201.06, PZR Pressure Instrument
- -~
fails high. The MASTER PRESS CTLR OUTPUT LO annunciator comes in. PZR heaters energize to raise pressure to the new RO PT-455/458 Failure Determines that PK-455A setpoint is failed HIGH.
RO RO Takes manual control of master PZR pressure controller and restores normal pressure. The operator may also elect to manually spray down RCS to reduce pressure.
Selects an alternate pressure channel for CONTROUBACKUP, as RO US/RO NOTE necessary.
If setpoint cannot be restored, the operator will control pressure in manual.
Verify Redundant Channel Bistables NOT TRIPPED and Verify Technical Specification Compliance: TS 3.3.1 table 3.3-1, items 7,9, and 10 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation. TS 3.3.2 table 3.3-3 items 1.d and 10.a ESFAS Instrumentation. TS 3.2.5 DNB Parameters (if pressure drops below 2185psig). Ensures I&C is informed.
Because the controller failed vice a pressure channel, no TS actions required in 3.3.1 and 3.2.2.
TS 3.2.5:
with pressure below 2185psig, restore pressure to its normal limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than 5%
RTP within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 3 of 12
After the crew regains pressure control and evaluates technical specifications, centrifugal charging pump CS-P-2B trips on overcurrent. Letdown will be manually isolated and CS-P-2A will have to be started. The operators will manually restore
==
Description:==
Time letdown.
I Event Position CUE RO us RO RO RO RO RO RO us NOTE TRIP OF CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP CS-P-2B Applicants Actions or Behavior After the operators regain control of RCS pressure and the US resolves any TS issues, the lead examiner will cue the failure of the B CCP. The trip results in VAS alarm D4652 CTRFGL CHG PUMP BKR TRIP & L/O and the RCP SEAL INJECTION FLOW LO annunciator.
Verifies pump trip and informs US.
Enters and directs actions of OS1202.02, Charging System Failure or OS1 202.02, Loss of Letdown Isolates letdown due to rapidly rising temperatures and flashing in the regenerative HX. CLOSE CS-V145.
Place CS-FK-121 in manual and minimum output.
Start CS-P-2A.
Slowly increase output on CS-FK-121 to establish charging flow.
Adjust CS-HCV-182 as necessary to restore RCP seal flow.
Establish normal letdown: OPEN CC-V341, place CS-TK-130 in LCV-459, OPEN RC-LCV-460, OPEN CS-VI 45, establish letdown flow using letdown flow control valves. Flow is restored by slowly opening CS-PK-131, CS-HCV-I 89, and CS-HCV-I 90.
Verify TS Compliance. TS 3.1.2.2, Boration Systems Flow Paths -
Operating, TS 3.1.2.4, Boration Systems Charging Pumps -
Operating, TS 3.5.2 ECCS Subsystems -Tavg Greater than 350F.
TS 3.1.2.2 is met and thus N/A.
TS 3.1.2.4 with only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
TS 3.4.2 with one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoDerable subsvstem to oDerable status within 7 davs.
AUTO, CLOSE CS-HCV-189, CLOSE CS-HCV-190, OPEN RC-USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 4 of 12
Once letdown is restored and the US evaluates TS compliance, the I I A DC BUS de-energizes on fault. S/G water levels decrease rapidly resulting in a plant trip. The turbine output breaker will not automatically open on plant trip. The BOP operator must open the breaker manually. Following the plant trip is a loss of offsite power. EDG 'B will fail to start. The loss of DC bus I I A will prevent EDG 'A from starting resulting in a loss of all AC power. A 90 gpm small break LOCA develops as a result of RCP seal failure. Note: Once ECAO.0 is entered, NO transitions to FRPs should be made until the crew transitions to ECA-0.2, "Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required".
Event DescriDtion:
LOSS OF DC BUS 11A AND LOSS OF ALL AC Time Applicant's Actions or Behavior After letdown is restored and the US evaluates if there are TS Position CUE us us CUE BOP us compliance issues, the lead examiner will cue the DC bus failure.
DC BUS I 1A de-energizes on fault. Several alarms come in including the DC BUS 11A VOLTS LO annunciator and VAS alarm Should enter and direct actions of OS1248.01, "Loss of a Vital DC Bus". The plant will trip before any realistic action can be taken by the crew.
Will transition and direct actions of E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" after the reactor trips, As soon as the plant trips, a loss of all AC power will occur when offsite power is lost and neither EDG starts. 'A EDG will not start because bus 11A is de-energized and 'B' EDG is faulted. An 84 gprn leak develops to simulate RCP seal failure.
Identifies that the main generator output breaker failed to open on reactor trip. Opens the breaker manually.
Should dispatch a NSO to investigate breaker 1 ?A.
D6094 DC BUS 11A VOLT LO-LO us BOP CREW RO/BOP Immediately transitions to ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power".
Contacts load dispatcher to investigate loss of offsite power.
May attempt to emergency start EDG as skill of the trade after the loss of all AC. The EDGs will not start.
The crew will attempt to start 'B' EDG with no success in accordance with step 5.c of ECA-0.0. The step 5 RNO column will direct them to step 6. The US/RO will direct the NSO to attemp a local start.
Step 6 of ECA-0.0 has the crew place several loads in pull to lock.
T RO During performance of step 6 of ECA-0.0, or immediately after, the SM will contact US and say, "I have talked with maintenance and we believe the loss of bus I I A was due to a spurious breaker trip. I am directing you to restore bus 11A." Bus I 1A will be restored. This implies that EDG 'A is now available to power bus E5. The crew will return to step 5, "Try to Restore Power to Any AC Emergency Bus". Step 6 MUST be completed once started.
Place the following loads in PTL:
Circ water pumps Containment air compressors - OFF USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material - Scenario 4 Page 5 of 12
e e
a, e
e 0
e a
a a
a a
e SI pumps SCCW pumps Heater drain pumps Condensate pumps Mechanical vacuum pumps SUFP Motor driven E W pump Charging pumps RCPs Thermal barrier cooling pumps - STOP PCCW pumps Containment spray pumps RHR pumps us shuts and EPS is sequencing.
Directs crew to step 23 of ECA-0.0 when bus E5 is restored.
I RO/BOP I Direct NSO to shut EDG breaker locally. Verify EDG output breaker BOP RO/BOP us Operate S/G ASDVs to stabilize S/G pressure.
Verifies vital loads are running on bus E5 and verifies proper service water system operation. Orders NSO to verify loads in the field.
Transition guideline: if SI has actuated, the crew will transition to ECA-0.2, "Loss Off All AC Power Recovery With SI Required" else go to ECA-0.1, "Loss of All AC Power Recovery without SI Required".
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 6 of 12
Event
==
Description:==
Time Position RO BOP BOP/RO RO RO RO RO RO RO ECA-0.1, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED Applicants Actions or Behavior Check containment isolation phase A -NOT ACTUATED - if yes, then reset CIS phase A and phase B (T signal reset and P signal reset)
Reset EPS-RMO Open IA-V530 to establish containment instrument air.
Start one PCCW pump on each energized bus.
Open CS-LCV-112B. Open CS-LCV-112C.
CLOSE CS-VI42 or CLOSE CS-VI43 CLOSE CS-FK-121, charging flow control valve.
OPEN CS-VI96 CLOSE SI-Vl38. CLOSE SI-V139.
I I established.
RO USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 START both containment air compressors:
SA-C-4A and SA-C4B Page 7 of 12
RO/BOP BOP BOP/RO BOP/RO BOP/RO CUE I
I ECA-0.2, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED Applicants Actions or Behavior Reset SI.
Manually align valves to establish ECCS injection alignment per attachment B of ECA-0.2.
Reset EPS-RMO Start one PCCW pump on E5.
The lead examiner may terminate the scenario after ECCS flow has been established and is injecting to the RCS.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 8 of 12
Simulator Instructor Instructions for Scenario 4 MALFUNCTIONS ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION MFED033 I DGI B AUTO START FAILURE RES,ET simulator to IC 101, 75% power.
Align CS-P-2B for charging, place CS-P-2A in STANDBY.
Please track the following parameters along with the standard set (if any):
INSERT SR, IR, and PR power level Loop 2 Tave Loop2 Tc RCS pressure PZR level RVLlS (all level channels)
Core thermocouples (2 channels CCP, RHR, SI flow rates into the Bus E5 voltage INSERT OVERRIDE DGIB EMERGENCY STOP PBo INSERT OVERRIDE DGI B EMERGENCY START PBo acceptable)
RCS STOP RELEASE Initial Setup:
Prevent Main Turbine Automatic Trip MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR PROTECTION MFED0036 MAIN GENERATOR BKR AUTOTRIP FAILS TO FUNCTION.
After the crew assumes the watch and performs an adequate reactivity addition, the lead examiner will prompt the PT-507 failure.
PT-507 Fails HIGH COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS MAIN STEAM pt MS PT507 I FAILHIGH I INSERT When the crew restores normal feed flow to the S/Gs and at the examiners discretion, insert the malfunction for the PK-455A setpoint failure.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 9 of 12
PZR Master Pressure Controller Setpoint Fails High MFEDOIS PANEL PDFIOA INSERT OVERRIDE RAMP OVER 120 SECS SELECT SETPT POT ON RC-PK-455A FINAL VALUE 2350 I INSERT 125VDC BUS I I A INSERT GROUND FAULT When the crew stabilizes RCS pressure, and TS compliance has been resolved, the lead examiner will cue the trip of CS-P-2B.
MFED038 CS-P-2B Trip LOSS OF OFFSITE INSERT POWER MALFUNCTIONS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL COMPONENT MFCS017 I CS-P-2B OCTRIP I INSERT After the crew restores charging and letdown and the US resolves TS compliance issues, the lead examiner will cue the loss of bus I 1A.
DC BUS 11A Failure After the BOP opens the main turbine output breaker (or output breakers 11 and 163 open), insert the malfunction for loss of offsite power and the RCS leak below.
Loss of Offsite Power 90gpm RCS Leak I MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR COOLANT I
I MFRC018 I RCS LEAK I SELECTSOGPM 1 INSERT USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 10 of 12
RCP Seal Failures MALFUNCTIONS REACTOR COOLANT MFRCO16 D RCP # I SEAL FINAL VALUE = I MFRC017 D RCP #2 SEAL FINAL VALUE = 1 FAILURE FAILURE INSERT INSERT Use Sim Diagram CS4 to close the following seal injection throttle valves:
CLOSE CS-VI 53 CLOSE CS-VI 57 CLOSE CS-VI61 CLOSE CS-VI65 Click on VALVE I FINAL VALUE = 0 I INSERT When crew completes step 6 of ECA-0.0, call the control room as the Shift Manager: I have talked with maintenance and we believe the loss of bus I I A was due to a spurious breaker trip. I am directing you to restore bus I IA.
Restore Bus I I A and EDG A I DELETE MALFUNCTION MFEDOIS I
Respond to control room orders to start the EDG locally as NSO. Take local control of DGIA if directed. DGlA should AUTO START - if it does not auto start then start via PB overrides.
Scenario is complete when crew restores ECCS flow to reactor in either ECA-0.1 or ECA-0.2.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 11 of 12
Scenario 4 Briefing Sheet The reactor is at 75% power. The crew will continue with a power ascension in accordance with OS1000.05, Power Increase to raise power to 100%.
USNRC Examination - Seabrook Station June 2003 Exam Material -Scenario 4 Page 12 of 12