Letter Sequence Other |
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Results
Other: L-PI-03-016, Response to Opportunity for Comment on Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2001-10, Design Basis Assumptions for Ability of Prairie Island, Unit 2, Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single-Failure Criteria for External Events, ML013480323, ML020020074, ML020020108, ML020030002, ML020410002, ML020570514, ML021060641, ML021070317, ML021140405, ML021140426, ML021610096, ML021990405, ML022140006, ML022600292, ML023290377, ML023640310, ML031010026, ML032040412, ML050900176, ML051030051
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MONTHYEARML0134803232002-01-0404 January 2002
Task Interface Agreement 2000-18, Design-Basis Assumptions for Non-Seismic Piping Failures at the Perry Plant
Project stage: Other
ML0200201082002-01-16016 January 2002
Opportunity for Comment on TIA 2001-04, Design-Basis Reliance on Non-Seismic and Non-Safety Related Equipment
Project stage: Other
ML0200300022002-01-16016 January 2002
Opportunity for Comment on TIA 2001-10, Design Basis Assumptions for Ability of Prairie Island, Units 2, Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single Failure Criteria for External Events
Project stage: Other
ML0200200742002-01-18018 January 2002
Opportunity for Comment on TIA 2001-02, Design Basis Assumptions for Non-Seismic Piping Failure
Project stage: Other
ML0204100022002-02-11011 February 2002
Report on the Status of Open TIAs Assigned to NRR
Project stage: Other
ML0208702382002-03-13013 March 2002
Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Change 01-10, One-Time Frequency Extension for Type a Test (Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (Cilrt))
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0208003112002-03-18018 March 2002
Day Response to Order for Interim Safeguards Security Compensatory Measures
Project stage: Request
ML0210100662002-04-0909 April 2002
TSC 01-10 - TVA Response to RAI
Project stage: Request
ML0211404052002-04-11011 April 2002
Additional Information for Technical Specification (TS) Change 01-10, One-Time Frequency Extension for Type a Test (Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (Cilrt))
Project stage: Other
ML0210703172002-04-17017 April 2002
Memo to Raghavan from Manoly, Response to Task Interface Agreement (TIA 2001-15) for D. C. Cook, Units 1 and 2
Project stage: Other
ML0210606412002-05-0101 May 2002
Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2001-07 from Region III Regarding Quad Cities Maintenance Rule (MR) Issues
Project stage: Other
ML0205705142002-05-0606 May 2002
Response to Task Interface Agreement - TIA 2001-12, Licensing Bases for the Standby Liquid Control System
Project stage: Other
ML0212904652002-05-10010 May 2002
Meeting with Nuclear Management Company, LLC to Discuss the Aspects of Security Orders
Project stage: Request
ML0215504192002-05-10010 May 2002
Response to Draft NRR Position on TIA 2001-04, Design Basis Reliance on Non-Seismic and Non-Safety Related Equipment
Project stage: Draft Other
ML0215504132002-05-10010 May 2002
Response to Draft NRR Position on TIA 2001-02, Design Basis Assumptions for Non-Seismic Piping Failure
Project stage: Draft Other
ML0211404262002-05-24024 May 2002
Memo Re Response to Task Interface Agreement 2001-009 Regarding Potential Unisolable Reactor Coolant Leak Outside Containment
Project stage: Other
ML0509001762002-05-28028 May 2002
Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Zone 98-J, Emergency Diesel Generator Corridor and Fire Zone 99-M, North Electrical Switchgear Room, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
Project stage: Other
ML0214800332002-05-31031 May 2002
DC Cook, Units 1 & 2 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Containment Structure Conformance to Design-Basis Requirements
Project stage: RAI
ML0216100962002-06-11011 June 2002
Information Sent & Received by Electronic Mail Concerning Heavy Loads Request for Additional Infomration
Project stage: Other
05000237/LER-2002-003, Manual Valve Failures Prevent the Cooling Water Flow to Control Room Refrigeration Condensing Unit2002-07-0808 July 2002
Manual Valve Failures Prevent the Cooling Water Flow to Control Room Refrigeration Condensing Unit
Project stage: Request
ML0220301902002-07-16016 July 2002
Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220303702002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Verification Manual, Pages A30.1 - A56.4
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220304002002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Verification Manual, Pages A57.1 - A80.10
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220304152002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Engineering Report SE 99-5, Attachment 6 to AEP:NRC:2520, Pages 1 - B29.6
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220304172002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Verification Manual, Pages A81.1 - 1.2
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220304462002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Verification Manual, Pages B30.1 - B67.6
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220304482002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Solvia Verification Manual, Attachment 6, Pages B68.1 - Attachment 7
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0220303342002-07-16016 July 2002
Attachment to Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Re Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements. Attachment 5, Solvia Engineering Report SE 99-4
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML0219904052002-07-18018 July 2002
Supplemental Fire Modeling for Fire Zone 98-J, Emergency Diesel Generator Corridor & Fire Zone 99-M, North Electrical Switchgear Room, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
Project stage: Other
ML0224100432002-08-23023 August 2002
Supplement to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding Containment Structure Conformance to Design Basis Requirements
Project stage: Supplement
ML0223805242002-08-23023 August 2002
License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Essential Service Water System Allowed Outage Time-Additional Information
Project stage: Request
ML0221400062002-08-29029 August 2002
Response to Task Interface Agreement (TIA 2001-02) &Tia 2001-04 Evaluation of Service Water System Design Basis Requirements
Project stage: Other
ML0224201372002-09-11011 September 2002
Cover Letter - Draft Response to Task Interface Agreement 2001-13 Concerning the Reactor Building Crane and Heavy Loads
Project stage: Draft Other
ML0226002922002-09-17017 September 2002
Memorandum Regarding Report on the Status of Open TIAs Assigned to NRR
Project stage: Other
ML0231000392002-11-11011 November 2002
Examples of Risk-Informed Licensing Actions for Acrs/Acnw
Project stage: Request
ML0236403102002-12-30030 December 2002
Opportunity for Comment on Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2001-10, Design-Basis Assumptions for Ability of Prairie Island, Unit 2, Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single-Failure Criteria for External Events
Project stage: Other
ML0510300512003-01-13013 January 2003
Response to Task Interface Agreement (TIA 2001 -15) Regarding Evaluation of Containment Structure Conformance to Design-basis Requirements
Project stage: Other
ML0232903772003-01-13013 January 2003
Task Interface Agreement (TIA 2001-15) Evaluation of Containment Structure Conformance to Design-Basis Requirement
Project stage: Other
ML0224200972003-02-21021 February 2003
Draft - NRR Response to TIA 2001-13, Backfitting Requirements for Dresden Units 2 & 3 Reactor Building Crane
Project stage: Draft Other
ML0310100262003-02-21021 February 2003
NRC Response to TIA 2001-13, Backfitting Requirements for Dresden Units 2 & 3 Reactor Building Crane
Project stage: Other
L-PI-03-016, Response to Opportunity for Comment on Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2001-10, Design Basis Assumptions for Ability of Prairie Island, Unit 2, Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single-Failure Criteria for External Events2003-04-21021 April 2003
Response to Opportunity for Comment on Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2001-10, Design Basis Assumptions for Ability of Prairie Island, Unit 2, Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single-Failure Criteria for External Events
Project stage: Other
ML0320404122003-09-0404 September 2003
Response to TIA 2001-10, Design Basis Assumptions for Ability of Emergency Diesel Generators to Meet Single Failure Criteria for External Events
Project stage: Other
ML0411204872004-04-13013 April 2004
License Amendment Request to Use Yield Strength Determined from Measured Material Properties for Reinforcing Bar in Structural Calculations for Control Rod Drive Missile Shields
Project stage: Request
2002-05-28
[Table View] |
Text
December 30, 2002 Mr. Mano Nazar Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2 - OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMENT ON TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT (TIA) 2001-10, "DESIGN-BASIS ASSUMPTIONS FOR ABILITY OF PRAIRIE ISLAND, UNIT 2, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS TO MEET SINGLE-FAILURE CRITERIA FOR EXTERNAL EVENTS" (TAC NO. MB2953)
Dear Mr. Nazar:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has completed its review of the subject TIA request dated September 7, 2001, from the NRCs Region III office. This TIA requested the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staffs assistance in resolving an issue related to design-basis assumptions for ability of the emergency diesel generators at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, to meet single-failure criteria for external events. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the opportunity to respond to the NRR staffs preliminary conclusions made in the enclosed draft TIA response. In developing the enclosed TIA response, the NRR staff considered your letter dated September 17, 2001, as well as other relevant licensing basis documents.
Our internal procedures encourage the input of licensees or other external stakeholders in order to ensure all relevant information has been considered in responding to a TIA. While you are not required to respond to this letter, your staff has previously indicated a desire to review and comment on the staffs draft TIA response.
If you decide to respond to this letter, we request that your response be provided within 60 days of receipt of this letter. Please feel free to contact me at (301) 415-1446 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John G. Lamb, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-306
Enclosure:
Response to TIA 2001-10 cc w/encl: See next page
ML023640310
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 cc:
J. E. Silberg, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20037 Site Licensing Manager Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Adonis A. Neblett Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 455 Minnesota Street Suite 900 St. Paul, MN 55101-2127 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office 1719 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089-9642 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Administrator Goodhue County Courthouse Box 408 Red Wing, MN 55066-0408 Commissioner Minnesota Department of Commerce 121 Seventh Place East Suite 200 St. Paul, MN 55101-2145 Tribal Council Prairie Island Indian Community ATTN: Environmental Department 5636 Sturgeon Lake Road Welch, MN 55089 Mr. Roy A. Anderson Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Nuclear Asset Manager Xcel Energy, Inc.
414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 March 2002
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION STAFFS RESPONSE TO TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT (TIA) 2001-02 "PIPE FAILURE CRITERIA FOR THE COOLING WATER SYSTEM AT THE PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION"
1.0 BACKGROUND
By memorandum dated September 7, 2001, Region III requested that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) resolve an issue related to design-basis assumptions for ability of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators to meet single-failure criteria for external events. The specific issue involves the Nuclear Management Companys (the licensees) contention that the original design and licensing basis of the plant does not require mitigation of an external event concurrent with a postulated single failure.
Construction permits for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, were issued on June 25, 1968. Both units were designed and constructed to comply with the licensees understanding of the intent of the draft Atomic Energy Commission General Design Criteria as proposed on July 10, 1967. PINGP was originally licensed with only two emergency diesel generators to be shared between both Units 1 and 2. In the early 1990's, as part of the Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project, the licensee added two safety-grade emergency diesel generators (designated as D5 and D6) and split the electrical distribution system such that the new diesels served Unit 2 and the existing diesels served Unit 1 (with the ability to cross-tie the diesels to the opposite unit if needed). This modification was done not only to meet the Station Blackout Rule, but also to enhance safety by increasing the redundancy and reliability of the safety-related emergency ac power system.
The TIA 2001-10 requested NRR to address the following question:
From a design and licensing basis perspective for system functional capability, is the Unit 2 emergency [alternating current] ac power system required to meet single-failure criteria for external events such as a flood even though the rest of the plant may not be required to?
2.0 EVALUATION As indicated in the licensees Design Report for the Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project, Revision 2" dated September 23, 1993, the subject emergency diesel ENCLOSURE generators (D5 and D6) were designed to meet the requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, including all Appendices [i.e., Appendix A to Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants]. GDC 2, Design bases for protection against natural phenomena, requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. GDC 17, Electric Power system, requires in part that onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single-failure.
Therefore, by having independent and redundant trains of a system (i.e., D5 and D6 emergency diesel generators) and qualifying both trains of the system to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, the system is designed to perform its intended safety functions, coincident with a random single-failure, during a postulated external event. This is consistent with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staffs long-standing position that redundant trains of equipment be protected from external events in order to meet the single-active failure criterion. However, individual exceptions to this requirement may have been accepted under specific conditions and events and these exceptions must be taken on a case-by-case basis.
In its letter dated September 17, 2001, the licensee stated that it has historically been acceptable to not consider a single-active failure during an external event. The licensee provides the fuel oil transfer pumps for the emergency diesel generators as an example where both pumps (Train A and Train B) are relied upon (one at a time) during a probable maximum flood (with 14-day duration). While the NRC staff recognizes this design limitation for the emergency ac power system to consider a single-active failure during a specific external event (a probable maximum flood), such a long term single-active failure vulnerability cannot be used as a basis for a general exception to the single-active failure considerations during an external event.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the above considerations, the NRC staff concludes that the Unit 2 emergency ac power system should meet the single-failure criterion for external events.
