ML023530428

License Amendment, Issuance of Amendments

ML023530428
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/18/2002
From:	Joseph Colaccino NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Colaccino J, NRR/DLPM, 415-2753
References
TAC MB5484, TAC MB5485
Download: ML023530428 (16)

Text

December 18, 2002 Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.

Vice President - Hatch Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB5484 AND MB5485)

Dear Mr. Sumner:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 235 to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 177 to Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated June 24, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2002.

The amendments delete Technical Specification 5.5.3, "Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)," and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the PASS at Plant Hatch.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Joseph Colaccino, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 235 to DPR-57

2. Amendment No. 177 to NPF-5

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

December 18, 2002 Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.

Vice President - Hatch Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB5484 AND MB5485)

Dear Mr. Sumner:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 235 to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 177 to Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated June 24, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2002.

The amendments delete Technical Specification 5.5.3, "Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)," and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the PASS at Plant Hatch.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Project Manager, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC OGC

Enclosures:

PDII-1 R/F ACRS

1. Amendment No. 235 to DPR-57 BBonser, RII GHill(4)

2. Amendment No. 177 to NPF-5 WBeckner

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page ADAMS ACCESSION NO: ML023530428 OFFICE LPM PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA PDII-1/SC NAME WReckley JColaccino CHawes JNakoski DATE 12/12/02 12/13 /02 12/13/02 12/17/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 235 Renewed License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility)

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated June 24, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2002, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 235, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: December 18, 2002

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 235 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 5.0-8 5.0-8

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 177 Renewed License No. NPF-5

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility)

Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated June 24, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2002, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 177 are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance: December 18, 2002

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 177 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 5.0-8 5.0-8

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 235 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 AND AMENDMENT NO. 177 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 24, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated September 24, 2002, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear, the licensee), et al., proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would delete TS 5.5.3, "Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)," and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the PASS at Plant Hatch. The supplemental letter dated September 24, 2002, provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the June 24, 2002, application nor the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposed requirements on licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of the PASS were described in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. The NRC issued orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and related administrative controls was added to the TS of the operating plants and was included in the initial TS for plants licensed during the 1980s and 1990s. Additional expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.

Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have led the NRC staff to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe accidents. The NRCs efforts to oversee the risks associated with nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory costs to licensees

and the public have prompted the NRC to consider eliminating the requirements for PASS in TS and other parts of the licensing bases of operating reactors.

The staff has completed its review of the topical report submitted by the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) that proposed the elimination of PASS. The justifications for the proposed elimination of PASS requirements center on evaluations of the various radiological and chemical sampling and their potential usefulness in responding to a severe reactor accident or making decisions regarding actions to protect the public from possible releases of radioactive materials. As explained in more detail in the staffs safety evaluations for the topical report, the staff has reviewed the available sources of information for use by decision-makers in developing protective action recommendations and assessing core damage.

Based on this review, the staff found that the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with the owners group that licensees can remove the TS requirements for PASS, revise (as necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and pursue possible design changes to alter or remove existing PASS equipment.

2.0 BACKGROUND

In its letter dated November 30, 2000, the BWROG submitted for the NRC staff's review Topical Report NEDO-32991, "Regulatory Relaxation for BWR Post Accident Sampling Stations (PASS)," for eliminating PASS requirements from BWRs. The NRC staff's Safety Evaluation (SE) for the BWROG topical report is dated June 12, 2001 (ADAMS Accession Number ML011630016). The BWROG proposed that relaxation of the PASS requirements be incorporated into the standard technical specifications by submitting TSTF-413.

The NRC staff prepared an SE relating to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling for BWRs and solicited public comment (66 FR 66949, dated December 27, 2001) in accordance with the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the PASS requirements from TS. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this SE apply were informed (67 FR 13027, dated March 20, 2002) that they could request amendments conforming to the SE, and, in such requests, should confirm the applicability of the SE to their reactors and provide the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments 3.0 EVALUATION The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant specific amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related administrative controls from TS, would also supercede the PASS specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.

The technical evaluations for the elimination of PASS sampling requirements are provided in the safety evaluation dated June 12, 2001, for BWROG topical report NEDO-32991. As

described in its safety evaluation for the topical report, the staff finds that the post-accident sampling requirements for the following may be eliminated for BWR plants:

1. Reactor coolant dissolved gases

2. Reactor coolant hydrogen

3. Reactor coolant oxygen

4. Reactor coolant chlorides

5. Reactor coolant pH

6. Reactor coolant boron

7. Reactor coolant conductivity

8. Radioisotopes in the reactor coolant

9. Containment hydrogen

10. Containment oxygen

11. Radioisotopes in the containment atmosphere

12. Suppression pool pH

13. Chlorides in the suppression pool

14. Boron in the suppression pool

15. Radioisotopes in the suppression pool The staff agrees that sampling of radioisotopes is not required to support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of an accident because the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt manner.

The staff does, however, believe that there could be significant benefits to having information about the radioisotopes existing post-accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term recovery operations. As stated in the safety evaluation for the topical report, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this function by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from the reactor coolant system (RCS), suppression pool, and containment atmosphere. (See item 4.1 under Verifications and Commitments.) The contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, suppression pool, and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee to derive information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in containment and the pH of water in the suppression pool.

The staff considers the sampling of the suppression pool to be potentially useful in confirming calculations of pH and confirming that potentially unaccounted for acid sources have been sufficiently neutralized. The use of the contingency plans for obtaining samples would depend on the plant conditions and the need for information by the decision-makers responsible for responding to the accident.

In addition, the staff considers radioisotope sampling information to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage without having an indication of a loss of reactor coolant inventory. However, the staff agrees with the topical reports contentions that other indicators of failed fuel, such as radiation monitors, can be correlated to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 4.2 under Verifications and Commitments.)

In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, the staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. This information would be useful for decision makers trying to assess a release of and limit the publics exposure to radioactive materials. (See item 4.3 under Verifications and Commitments.)

The staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of PASS that are described in the topical report, related safety evaluation and this proposed change to TS are unlikely to result in a decrease in the effectiveness of a licensees emergency plan. Each licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the change decreases the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. Evaluations and reporting of changes to emergency plans should be performed in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures.

The staff notes that containment hydrogen concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44 and are relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI.2.a.(ii)(3). The staff concludes that these hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration during the early phases of an accident. The staff sees value in maintaining the capability to obtain grab samples for complementing the information from the hydrogen monitors in the long term (i.e., by confirming the indications from the monitors and providing hydrogen measurements for concentrations outside the range of the monitors). As previously mentioned, the licensees contingency plan (see item 4.1) for obtaining highly radioactive samples will include sampling of the containment atmosphere and may, if deemed necessary and practical by the appropriate decision-makers, be used to supplement the safety-related hydrogen monitors.

4.0 VERIFICATIONS AND COMMITMENTS As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

4.1 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, suppression pool, and containment atmosphere.

The licensee has developed contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples from the RCS, suppression pool, and containment atmosphere. The contingency plans will be contained within the licensee's chemistry procedures. The licensee will implement this commitment with the implementation of the amendment.

4.2 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold (typically this is 300 FCi/ml dose equivalent iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or correlations of radiation readings to radioisotope concentrations in the reactor coolant.

The licensee has established a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold. The capability will be described in the emergency implementing procedures. The licensee will implement this commitment with the implementation of the amendment.

4.3 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), an I-131 site survey detection capability, including an ability to assess radioactive iodines released to offsite environs, by using effluent monitoring systems or portable sampling equipment.

The licensee has developed an I-131 site survey detection capability, including an ability to assess radioactive iodines released to offsite environs. The capability for monitoring iodines is maintained within the emergency plan implementing procedures. The licensee has implemented this commitment.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensees administrative processes, including its commitment management program.

Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements.

The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements, which would require prior NRC approval of subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 0, Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes, provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff.

(See Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC Staff," dated September 21, 2000 [ADAMS Accession Number ML003741774].) The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (67 FR 5098, dated August 6, 2002). Accordingly, the

amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Reckley Date: December 18, 2002

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant cc:

Mr. Ernest L. Blake, Jr. Charles A. Patrizia, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker and Trowbridge 10th Floor 2300 N Street, NW. 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20037 Washington, DC 20004-9500 Mr. D. M. Crowe Chairman Manager, Licensing Appling County Commissioners Southern Nuclear Operating County Courthouse Company, Inc. Baxley, Georgia 31513 P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 Mr. J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Resident Inspector Southern Nuclear Operating Plant Hatch Company, Inc.

11030 Hatch Parkway N. P. O. Box 1295 Baxley, Georgia 31531 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 Mr. Charles H. Badger Mr. P. W. Wells Office of Planning and Budget General Manager, Edwin I. Hatch Room 610 Nuclear Plant 270 Washington Street, SW. Southern Nuclear Operating Atlanta, Georgia 30334 Company, Inc.

U.S. Highway 1 North Harold Reheis, Director P. O. Box 2010 Department of Natural Resources Baxley, Georgia 31515 205 Butler Street, SE., Suite 1252 Atlanta, Georgia 30334 Mr. L. M. Bergen Resident Manager Steven M. Jackson Oglethorpe Power Corporation Senior Engineer - Power Supply Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Municipal Electric Authority P. O. Box 2010 of Georgia Baxley, Georgia 31515 1470 Riveredge Parkway, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30328-4684