ML023300009

Draft - Section C Operating

ML023300009
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/04/2002
From:	Diane Jackson Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-272/02-301, 50-311/02-301 50-272/02-301, 50-311/02-301
Download: ML023300009 (72)

Text

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDELINE SCENARIO TITLE: DBLOCA/Loss of CL Recirc.

SCENARIO NUMBER: GOLF NRC ESG1 EFFECTIVE DATE: September 19, 2002 EXPECTED DURATION: 75-90 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 0 PROGRAM: I L.O. REQUAL 1711! INITIAL LICENSE STA LII OTHER Revision Summary PREPARED BY: JK Lloyd/F. Kaminski 7/3/02 (DEVELOPER) (DATE)

REVIEWED BY:

(EP REPRESENTATIVE) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(TRAINING SUPERVISOR) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE) (DATE)

GOLF NRC ESGI Enabling Objectives A. Perform a power ascension lAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 B. Take corrective action for a failed IRNIS detector lAW S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 C. Evaluate and implement required Technical Specifications D. Respond to failure of a PZR level channel lAW S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012 E. Respond to loss of a Circulating Water Pump Bus lAW S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 F. Isolate steam flow to the main turbine lAW the immediate actions of TRIP-1 G. Enter and execute the EOP network lAW SC.OP-AP.ZZ-01 02 H. Respond to a DBA LOCA lAW 2-EOP-TRIP-1 and 2-EOP-LOCA-1 I. Take compensatory action for loss of both RHR Pumps lAW 2-EOP-LOCA-5 MAJOR EVENTS, A. Power ascension B. IRNIS Channel N35 fails.

C. Controlling PZR level channel fails HI D. Loss of multiple Circulators/lowering condenser vacuum requires MANUAL Rx trip E. AUTO and MANUAL turbine trips fail F. Large break LOCA G. 21 SI Pump fails to start H. Loss of CL recirculation capability 2 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 The scenario begins with directions for power ascension at 5% per hour. 22 SI Pump is C/T for bearing replacement and 21 B Circulator is C/T for screen repairs.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, IRNIS channel N35 will fail high. The crew should respond lAW S2.OP AB.NIS-0001, remove channel from service and implement the correct technical specification(s). Later in the scenario this failure will require the RO to manually re-instate the SRNIS detectors.

After the plant is stable, the controlling PZR level instrument fails high. The crew should respond lAW the console alarm procedure and select another channel for control.

Loss of Circulating Water Pump Bus Section 23 and/or lowering condenser vacuum will require a MANUAL reactor trip. The Main Turbine AUTO and MANUAL trips will fail resulting in a HI Steam Flow/LO-LO Tavg SI. The RO will have to manually initiate Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI). The crew should perform actions lAW EOP-TRIP-1. 21 SI Pump and 21 RHR Pump fail to start on the SEC signal. The crew should manually start 21 SI Pump to ensure one full train of ECCS equipment but 21 RHR Pump will not start.

During TRIP-1 implementation, the crew should recognize and respond to a DBA LOCA. Two functional restoration procedures may be entered (FRTS-1, FRCE-1) but operator actions are minimal.

At the appropriate point, the crew will transition from TRIP-1 to LOCA-1. 2B 4KV Vital Bus will trip on electrical fault during the execution of LOCA-1, resulting in loss of cold leg recirculation capability. The crew should transition to LOCA-5 at the appropriate step. The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario at any point after the CS flow reduction steps have been completed.

3 of 17

GOLF NRC ESGI IC-181 - EOL, 68 ppm, 820 MWe I I I A ..

SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity

_CHECK

1. SJ0184A 21 SIP fails to start on SEC N/A N/A N/A

2. RH0026A 21 RHR Pump trip N/A N/A N/A

3. RP0069 MT INT VIv's failure N/A N/A N/A

4. RP0073 MT Trip failures N/A N/A N/A

5. RP0279A Train A AUTO MSLI fails N/A N/A NIA

6. RP0279B Train B AUTO MSLI fails N/A N/A N/A

7. N10197A N35 IRNIS channel fails HI N/A N/A RT-1 100

8. PROO17A PZR Level Ch I fails HI N/A N/A RT-2 100

9. EL0053 Loss of CW Pump Bus Section 23 N/A N/A RT-3

10. CN0086 Loss of Condenser Vacuum N/A 3 min. RT-3 90

11. RC0001A RCS loop 21 rupture N/A N/A RT-4

12. EL0145 Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus N/A N/A RT-5 SELF Description Delay Ramp Trigger I Condition CHECK

1. SJ17D: 22 SI Pump Control Power N/A N/A N/A OFF

2. SJ18D: 22 SI Pump Brkr racked out N/A N/A N/A Tagged OVERRIDES:

SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action CHECK CM04 OVDI 21B CIRC START N/A N/A N/A OFF 4 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 TAGGED EQUIPMVENT:

SELF- Description CHECK

1. RHI and RH2 (C/T)

2. VC 1-4 (C/T)

3. RH 18's (C/T)

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)

8. SGFP TRIP (SELF CHECK)

9. 22 ABV Supply Fan (C/T)

10. 23 Charging Pump (C/T)

11. 22 Sl Pump

12. 21B Circulator OTHER CONDITIONS.

'Description

1. Place plastic cover over 22 Sl Pump

2. Place plastic cover over 21B CW Pump 5 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 A. State shift job assignments:

B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)

C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. OS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".

D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

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GOLF NRC ESG1 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evatuator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant!Student Response Comments

1. Power Ascension CRS specifies rate of change CREW notifies the Systems Operator and the Condensate Polishing Operator of the upcoming power ascension PO raises Turbine load:

"* Initiates monitoring the Main Turbine Data display points on the Plant Computer

"* Clears Valve Position Limiter

"* Uses the REF A and GO pushbuttons to attain desired load Initiate the next event (RT-1) on cue RO maintains TAvG/TREF and AFD within the from the Lead Evaluator target band using Auto Rod motion.

RT-1 IRNIS Channel N-35 fails MALF N10297A; SEV=100 RO responds to:

"* Console indication

"* Bistable trip

"* E Window alarm CRS enters AB.NIS-1 RO reports PRNIS has NOT failed PO stops power change RO reports IRNIS N-35 has failed high CREW enters S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001 to remove channel from service RO verifies N-35 not selected on recorder CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1. act. 3 PO places Level Trip Switch in BYPASS at the N-35 drawer ROIPO verifies proper bistable tripped PO removes instrument fuses at N-35 7 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments drawer Initiate next event (RT-2) on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT-2: PZR Level Ch I Fails HI MALF PROQI7A; SEVIOO0 CREW responds to OHA E-36 RO diagnoses PZR level channel failure CREW enters ARP for OHA E-36 and/or console alarm RO takes MANUAL control of Master Flow Controller RO selects an operable channel for Control, Alarm, and Recorder RO restores PZR heaters to normal NOTE: Bistables need not be tripped CRS contacts I&C to remove PZR level to continue the scenario. channel from service lAW SO.RPS-0003 Initiate RT-3 on cue from the Lead CRS enters TSAS(s) 3.3.1.1 Action 6# and Evaluator may review 3.3.3.7 (PAM -only two PZR Level Channels are required)

RT-3: Loss of Circulator Bus Section 23 MAIF EL0053 MALF CN0086, 90%, 3 min. ramp CREW responds to alarms and/or rising backpressure PO reports loss of Bus Section 23 and all ALPHA Circulators CRS enters AB.CW-0001 POICRS initiate Att. 1 CRS orders a MANUAL Reactor Trip due to rising backpressure 8 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/[nstructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments RO trips reactor and performs immediate actions:

"* Trip reactor/confirmation

"* Trip turbine-notes turbine did not trip

"* Attempts turbine trip by bezel PB

"* Initiates MSLI

"* All 4KV busses energized

"* SI actuated RO verifies immediate actions CRS transitions back to TRIP-1 ROIPO report 21 SI Pump and 21 RHR Pump failed to start PO blocks 2A SEC PO resets 2A SEC Initiate RT-4: LBLOCA on cue from Lead Evaluator but not until 2A SEC is reset MALF RCOOOIA CT#1: Establish at least one full RO starts 21 SI Pump complement of injecting ECCS equipment before transitioning from TRIP-I to LOCA-I SAT UNSAT RO reports 21 RHR Pump tripped RO stops RCP's lAW CAS RO closes CV1 39 and CV1 40 lAW CAS RO starts 21 CS pump PO throttles AFW flow PO should be directed or request permission to open the Mn Gen Brkr's (1-9 and 9-10)

CRS transitions to FRTS-1 9 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments CRS exits FRTS-1 based on RHR flow NOTE: Depending on crew response CRS transitions to FRCE-1 time, the PURPLE PATH may clear before FR transition is permitted CREW completes FRCE-1 and CRS transitions back to TRIP-1 NOTE: This will occur at the 15-20 RO manually reinstates SRNIS minutes point after the reactor trip CREW performs steps of TRIP-1 and transitions to LOCA-1 at Step 28 NOTE: Depending on crew response RO/PO perform SI reset actions time, the RWST LO Level alarm may "* Reset SI actuate before LOCA-1 is completed. "* Reset Phase A In that case the crew would transition "* Reset Phase B directly to LOCA-3 "* Open 21 and 22CA330

"* Reset 2B and 2C SEC's

"* Verify 230V Control Ctr's reset RO opens21-24SS94 (SG Sample VIv's)

RO reports RCS subcooling not >0 RT-5: Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus RO reports flow on RHR Flow Meters Initiate RT-5 after all EDG's are stopped OR just after transition to LOCA-3 MALF EL0145 PO stops all EDG's RO reports no RHR Pumps available RO closes 21&22CC16 (CCW to RHR HX)

CRS transitions to LOCA-5 RO/PO verify SI Reset actions CRS sends NEO to Reset "B" SEC RO initiates makeup to RWST 10 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO reports no train of emergency recirculation available PO reports Steam Dumps not available PO opens21-24MS10 NOTE: Evaluators should check CRS reviews Table C and determines no Table C against existing conditions CS Pump required RO resets CS Actuation CT#2: Crew conserves RWST RO stops both CS Pumps inventory by running only the required number of CS, Pumps ISAT UNSAT___

RO closes 21 and 22CS2 CREW maintains 22 CCP in service Terminate the scenario at Lead Evaluator discretion 11 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures E. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction G. S2.OP-AB.COND-0001, Condenser Malfunction H. S2.OP-AB.CW-0001, Circulating Water System Malfunction I. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection J. 2-EOP-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent PTS Conditions K. 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure L. 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant M. 2-EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Recirculation 12 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 VIII CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigation capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

"* degradation of any barrier cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

"* a violation of a safety limit

"* a violation of the facility lice to fission product release

"* degraded emergency core nse condition

"* incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

"* a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...

"* effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

"* recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

"* take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

"* prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

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GOLF NRC ESG1 IVIII ESG - CRITICAL TASKS CT#1 - Start 21 SI Pump to establish at least one full train of injecting ECCS equipment prior to permanently exiting TRIP-1 CT#2 - Stop both CS Pumps to minimize flow out of the RWST until emergency recirculation capability can be restored 14 of 17

GOLF NRC ESGI IX ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N N Station Black Out Y LOCA COMPONENTITRAINISYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS Y Initiate feed and bleed 15 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 MODE: 1 POWER: 60% RCS 1256 MWe: 630 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 4000 MWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.5.2.a (22 SI Pump) - 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> remaining. Bearing replacement, expected back in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURESISURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

Raise power at 5%/hr Reactor Engineering recommends diluting 130 gals/ percent power. Also recommends using control rods for first 5% power rise, OS agrees.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

RMS Channels R41A-D out of service, ODCM 3.3.3.9 in effect.

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

None SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to Unit 1 RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

21 B Circulator is C/T for screen repairs 16 of 17

GOLF NRC ESG1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL-10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet with Baseline Data is by Aux Alarm Typewriter

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 21 Verify phones are connected to simulator, not live to plant after a drill 17 of 17

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER: GOLF NRC ESG2 EFFECTIVE DATE: September 19, 2002 EXPECTED DURATION: 75-90 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 0 PROGRAM: .. L.O. REQUAL XZ INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary PREPARED BY: JK Lloyd/F. Kaminski 7/17/02 (DEVELOPER) (DATE)

REVIEWED BY:

(EP REPRESENTATIVE) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(TRAINING SUPERVISOR) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE) (DATE)

Page 1 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives A. Respond to a pressurizer pressure channel failure lAW S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 B. Apply technical specifications C. Respond to closure of the RCP Thermal Barrier HX Return Valve (2CC131) lAW the associated Alarm Response Procedure and S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 D. Respond to trip of a circulating water pump lAW S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 E. Reduce power JAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 and/or S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 F. Respond to trip of the operating charging pump G. Initiate a reactor trip lAW the S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 H. Respond to a 21 SG tube leak progressing to a SGTR lAW the EOP network and/or S2.OP-AB.SG 0001 I. Take corrective action for failure of 2C SEC J. Take corrective action for failure of 21MS167 I. MAJOR EVENTS A. Pressurizer Pressure Channel I fails HI B. Instrument failure causes 2CC131, RCP Thermal Barrier HX Return Valve, to close C. Trip of 21 B Circulator requires a power reduction D. Trip of the operating charging pump results in loss of RCP seal injection with no CCW to the thermal barriers E. MANUAL reactor trip and stop of all RCP's F. Progressing 21 SG Tube Leak results in MANUAL or AUTO SI G. 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) fails to actuate H. 21 SG MSIV (21 MS167) fails to close Page 2 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 The crew assumes the watch with directions to maintain 100% power. A power reduction is scheduled for later this shift to allow replacement of an electronic component in the 21 SGFP speed control system. The OS is expecting a call from the OM and will inform them when to start the power reduction. Both 21 AFW Pump and 21A Circulator are OOS for maintenance.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator the controlling PZR pressure channel fails high. The crew should respond lAW S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001. When PZR PRESS control is returned to AUTO and on cue from the Lead Evaluator, an RCP Thermal Barrier leak will cause a HI DISCHARGE FLOW alarm to actuate on the CCW section of the console. The crew will enter the alarm response procedure (ARP) and determine that the RCP Thermal Barrier HX CCW Return Valve (2CC1 31) should have closed. The RO should take manual control of 2CC131 and close it. Then the crew should enter S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, RCP Malfunction.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator 21 B Circulator breaker trips open. S2.OP-AB.CW-1 requires a power reduction because neither circulator is running on 21 Condenser. The crew should initiate a power reduction lAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 and/or S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator the operating charging pump trips, resulting in a loss of seal injection with no CCW flow through the thermal barrier HX's of all RCP's. The crew should initiate a manual reactor trip, stop all RCP's, enter EOP-TRIP-1 (TRIP-i) and then transition to TRIP-2. Coincident with the reactor trip, a progressive tube leak begins in 21 SG. The crew should recognize the tube leak, initiate a manual safety injection and then transition back to TRIP-1. 2C SEC fails to start loads when SI actuates. The crew should take the actions necessary to start 2C Vital Bus equipment. They will continue to the diagnostic section of TRIP-1 and transition to SGTR-1. The crew unsuccessfully attempts to close 21MS167 and therefore must close the other MS167's. The crew should trip the SDAFW Pump to terminate that release path.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario at any point after the SDAFW Pump is tripped.

Page 3 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 IC-182, 100% power SELF Description Delay I Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK

1. MS0092E: 21MS167 cannot be closed N/A N/A N/A N/A

2. CC0326 2CC131 Fails to Auto Close N/A N/A N/A N/A

3. PRO016A PP Ch I (PT455) fails HI N/A N/A RT-1 2500

4. RC001 3A 21 RCP Thermal Barrier fails. N/A N/A RT-2 205

5. CW01 14B 21B Circulating Water Pump N/A N/A RT-3 10 trips

6. CV0208A: 21 CCP breaker trips N/A N/A RT-4

7. SG0078A: 21 Steam Generator Tube N/A N/A ET-1 650 Rupture

8. RP318S2 22 Chg Pmp fails to start on SEC N/A N/A N/A N/A

9. RP318R2 21 SI Pmp fails to start on SEC N/A N/A N/A N/A

10. RP318B3 Prim SW Pmp 25 fails to start on N/A N/A N/A N/A SEC

11. RP318C3 ALT SW Pmp 25 fails to start on N/A N/A N/A N/A SEC

12. RP318D3 25 CFCU Low Speed fails to start N/A N/A N/A N/A on SEC

13. RP318D5 25 CFCU Low Speed fails to start N/A N/A N/A N/A on SEC

14. RP318M1 Emerg Cntrl Air Compr fails to N/A N/A N/A N/A start on SEC

15. RP318G1 21 Aux Bldg Supply Fan fails to N/A N/A N/A N/A start on SEC

16. RP318F3 23 Chiller fails to start on SEC N/A N/A N/A N/A

17. RP318G5 23 Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan fails to N/A N/A N/A N/A start on SEC Page 4 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK I

1. AF21D 21 AFWP TAGGED

2. AF20D 21 AFWP Control Power OFF

3. PR34D PORV Stop Valve 2PR6 Tagged TAGGED SELF- Description Delay Ramp TriggerI Action CHECK CM02 OVDI 21A Circ Start N/A N/A N/A OFF TAGGED EQUIPMENT:

SELF- Description CHECK

1. RH1 and RH2 (C/T)

2. VC 1-4 (C/T)

3. RH 18's (C/T)

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)

8. SGFP TRIP (SELF CHECK)

9. 22 ABV Supply Fan (C/T)

10. 23 Charging Pump (C/T)

11. 21A Circulator

12. 21 Aux Feedwater Pump OTHER CONDITIONS:

SDescription

1. Ensure 21 CCP I/S

2. Ensure PP Ch I selected for control Page 5 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 State shift job assignments:

Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)

Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. OS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".

Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

Page 6 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE I Evaluatorlinstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RT-1: Pressurizer Pressure Channel I fails high MALF: PROO16A, Severity: 2500 CREW responds to indications/alarms

"* OHA D-8, RC PRESS HI

"* OHA E-42, 2PR1 1/2

"° RC PRESSURE DEVIATION HI console alarm

"* PS1 & 2 full open

"* Actual PZR pressure lowering RO responds to the transient:

"* Evaluates indications and determines PP Channel I failed

"* Obtains concurrence of the CRS and places the Master Pressure Controller in MANUAL

"* Closes both Spray Valves and energizes all PZR Heaters by depressing the PRESSURE INCREASE pushbutton CRS enters AB.PZR-1, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.

RO selects PP Channel III to CONTROL RO returns Master Pressure Controller to AUTO CRS directs RO to place 2PR1 in MANUAL and close 2PR6 RT-5: PR34D 2PR6 C/T CRS directs WCC or a NEO to remove

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ power from 2PR6 CRS initiates actions of S2.OP-SO.RPS 0003, Placing PZR Channel in Tripped Condition CREW notifies I&C for assistance Page 7 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments NOTE: If pressure falls below 2205 CRS reviews and enters Tech Specs.

psig, the DNB LCO (3.2.5) also

• 3.3.1.1 Action 6 applies

• 3.3.2.1 Action 19

• 3.4.5 Action b Initiate the next event after TSAS determination(s) and on cue from the Lead Evaluator RO responds to DISCHARGE FLOW HI bezel alarm CREW enters ARP RO places 2CC131 in MANUAL and closes CRS enters AB.RCP-1 RO/CRS implement Attachment 1 RO monitors RCP parameters RO reports seal water flow available to all RCP's CRS initiates actions to send operators into CNMT for thermal barrier isolation activities Initiate the next event on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT-3:CW0 14B 21 B Circulator trips PO responds to console alarm CREW enters AB.CW-1 CREW implements Attachment 1 PO reports no indication of pipe rupture PO reports 21A and 21B Circulators OOS Page 8 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments PO reports four circulators I/S NOTE: At this point, a load reduction CRS directs load reduction lAW may not be required to maintain back Attachment 4 pressure within limits P0 reports no circulators running on 21 Condenser P0 reports 21 HD Pump running NOTE: CRS may direct entry into CRS directs a power reduction to <850 AB.LOAD-1 MWe at *5%/minute P0 initiates load reduction at specified rate RO initiates boration, monitors Tavg and rod motion Initiate the next event on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT-4: CV0208A 21 CCP trips RO/PO responds to console alarm CREW returns to AB.RCP-1 CAS (Att. 1)

RO reports no seal water or thermal barrier flow CRS directs reactor trip ETA1: SGO078A SGTL on 21 SG, RO initiates a MANUAL reactor trip SEV=650 gpm RO stops all four RCP's RO completes IA's of TRIP-1 from memory:

"* Reactor trip

"* Reactor Trip confirmed

"* Trip Turbine

"* At least one vital bus energized

"* SI actuation (NO)

CRS enters TRIP-1 CRS transitions to TRIP-2 Page 9 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments NOTE: Crew may report 21 SGTR RO makes page announcement symptoms at any point CRS directs OS to implement the ECG PO stops both SGFPs RO verifies Tavg trending to 547 0 F RO verifies both reactor trip breakers open PO verifies all rods inserted PO closes 21-24BF22 RO verifies PZR level >17%

RO verifies Charging and Letdown in service RO monitors PZR pressure status RO/CREW notes SGTR symptoms CRS directs RO to initiate a MANUAL SI based on TRIP-2 CAS RO initiates a MANUAL SI CRS transitions to TRIP-1 CRS reviews TRIP-1 immediate actions RO makes page announcement RO/PO verify SEC loading, reports incomplete loading on 2C 4KV Vital Bus PO blocks 2C SEC PO resets 2C SEC Page 10 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/lInstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO/PO start TABLE A loads or verifies equipment running:

CT#I: Start 22 CCP to provide high

• 240/480V Brkr head injection prior to a 22 CCP exiting TRIP-1

• 22 SIP 0 25 or 26SWP SAT UNSAT 0 23 and 25 CFCU in LOW

• 2 ECAC 0 21 AUX BLDG SUP FAN

• 23 AUX BLDG EXH FAN

• 23 Chiller PO reports 22 AFW Pump running RO closes CV1 39 and CV1 40 when/if RCS pressure lowers <1500 PSIG PO verifies valves in Safeguards alignment RO closes 21/22CA330 RO verifies CS not required RO reports MSLI not required RO reports two CCW Pumps operating RO reports adequate ECCS flow PO reports total AFW flow >22E04 and may throttle to maintain level RO reports both RTB's open PO reports both PZR PORV's closed RO reports no SG faulted CT#2: Close 21AF11 and 21AF21 PO reports 21 SG rising in an uncontrolled within no later than 10 minutes manner after SGTR identification TIME:

SAT UNSAT Page 11 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments CREW transitions to SGTR-1 PO sets 21MS10 to 1045 PSIG NOTE: May attempt MSLI for 21 PO Attempts to close 21 MS167 and reports Loop also. 21MS167 is not closed PO closes:

"* 22-24MS167's and MS18's

"* 21-24MS7

"* 21/22MS26 CRS dispatches operators with RP support to close Table A valves PO reports 21 SG ruptured PO reports 23 AFW NOT the only source of AFW PO lowers 23 AFW Pump speed to minimum CT#3: Perform control room action PO trips 23 AFW Pump to eliminate a release path by tripping 23 AFW Pump at the point the step is read SAT UNSAT Terminate scenario at Lead CRS dispatches operator with RP support Evaluator discretion to close 21 MS45 Page 12 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures E. S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction F. S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, RCP Abnormality G. S2.OP-AB.CW-0001, Circulating Water System Malfunction H. S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction I. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation J. S2.OP-AB.SG-0001, SG Tube Leak K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response M. 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 13 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VIII CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigation capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

"* degradation of any barriercooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

"* a violation of a safety limit

"* a violation of the facility lice to fission product release

"* degraded emergency core nse condition

"* incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

"* a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...

"* effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

"* recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

"* take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

"* prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 14 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 VIII ESG - CRITICAL TASKS CT#1: Start 22 CCP to establish high head injection prior to exiting TRIP-1 CT#2: Close 21AF11 and 21AF21 no later than 10 minutes after the step "IS ANY SG LEVEL RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER" is read to minimize the rate of SG level and pressure rise CT#3: Perform control room action to eliminate a release path from the ruptured SG by tripping 23 AFW Pump at the required point of SGTR-1 Page 15 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 IX ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water Y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR Y/N TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine Y Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

Page 16 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS 3 ppm MWe: 1140 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 12500 MWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

Aux Feedwater 3.7.1.2A act a, expires in 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

21 AFW Pump motor and pump disconnected ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

RMS Channels R41A-D out of service, ODCM 3.3.3.9 in effect.

CONTROL ROOM:

"* Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

"* No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

None SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1 RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

21A Circulator tagged for repairs Page 17 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG2 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL-10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet with Baseline Data is by Aux Alarm Typewriter

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 21 Verify phones are connected to simulator, not live to plant after a drill Page 18 of 18

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDELINE SCENARIO TITLE: LOSS OF AFW SCENARIO NUMBER: GOLF NRC ESG3 EFFECTIVE DATE: September 19, 2002 EXPECTED DURATION: 75-90 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 0 PROGRAM: I L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary PREPARED BY: JK Lloyd/F. Kaminski 7/17/02 (DEVELOPER) (DATE)

REVIEWED BY:

(EP REPRESENTATIVE) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(TRAINING SUPERVISOR) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE) (DATE)

GOLF NRC ESG3 OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives A. Reduce power lAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 and/or S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 B. Respond to a CCW leak lAW S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 C. Respond to failure of an RCS loop Tcold instrument lAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 D. Respond to failure of a VCT level channel JAW the console alarm response procedure (ARP)

E. Apply technical specifications F. Respond to loss of 2B Vital Instrument Bus lAW S2.OP-AB.115-0002 G. Initiate a manual reactor trip by opening breakers 2E6D and 2G6D H. Respond to a reactor trip lAW EOP-TRIP-1 and EOP-TRIP-2 I. Maintain a heat sink lAW EOP-FRHS-1 MAJOR EVENTS A. Power reduction B. Isolable CCW leak on 21 safeguards header C. 24 RCS Loop Tc hails high causing continuous rod motion D. VCT level channel LT-1 12 fails high E. Loss of 2B Vital Instrument Bus generates reactor trip demand F. MANUAL reactor trip G. Loss of condenser vacuum trips both SGFP's H. 23 AFW Pump (steam-driven) fails I. Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus results in no AFW J. Crew maintains a heat sink via condensate feed to SG's or RCS feed and bleed Page 2 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 III SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The crew will assume the watch with direction to maintain 100% power - awaiting an order from the OS to reduce power and begin turbine valve testing. Both 21 AFW Pump and 21A Circulator are OOS for maintenance.

Shortly after the crew assumes the watch, the System Operator will call with directions to rapidly reduce load to 1000 Mwe due to a transformer failure at the New Freedom Switching Station. When the plant is in a stable condition a leak develops in 21 CCW safeguards header. The crew should respond and isolate the leak lAW AB.CC-1, Component Cooling Abnormality.

When the CCW leak has been isolated, RCS loop 24 Tcold fails high. The crew should respond IAW AB.ROD-3, Continuous Rod Motion, remove the channel from service and return Rod Control to AUTO.

While the associated bistables are being tripped LT-1 12, VCT level instrument fails high. The crew should respond lAW the related Alarm Response Procedure.

When the vacuum breaker 21AR65 fails open. this generates a turbine trip/reactor trip demand but the reactor does not trip automatically. The reactor will not trip until the RO opens 2E6D/2G6D during the EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions. Coincident with the reactor trip the loss of condenser vacuum causes a trip of both SGFP's. The SDAFW Pump trips on overspeed when it attempts to start in response to the turbine/reactor trip.

Shortly after transitioning to EOP-TRIP-2, 2B 4KV Vital Bus trips on electrical fault resulting in loss of 22 AFW Pump. The crew should continue in EOP-TRIP-2 and transition to EOP-FRHS-1 when a RED PATH develops on the Heat Sink CFST.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when feed has been established via a Condensate Pump or RCS Feed and Bleed has been initiated.

Page 3 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 IC-183, 100% power, EOL SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK

1. RP0058 Failure of AUTO RX TRIP N/A N/A N/A N/A

2. RPA059A Failure of MAN RX TRIP N/A N/A N/A N/A

3. AF0183 23 AFWP OVSPD N/A N/A N/A N/A

___4. RC001 5D Loop 24 Tc RTD fails high N/A N/A RT-2 630 CV0037 VCT Level transmitter LT-1 12 fails N/A N/A RT-3 100 high

6. VL01 15 21AR65 Fails to Position (0-100%) N/A N/A RT-4 100%

7. BF0105A 21 Stm Gen Feed Pump Trip N/A N/A ET-1 3

8. BF0105B 22 Stm Gen Feed Pump Trip N/A N/A ET-1 3

9. EL0145 Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus N/A N/A RT-5 Page 4 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 REMOTES:

SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK

1. AF21 D 21 AFW Pump Brkr racked out N/A N/A N/A TAGGED

2. AF20D 21 AFWP Control Power N/A N/A N/A OFF

3. CC1 1A 2CC143 CCW Surge Tank Drain N/A N/A RT-1 100

4. CC12A 2CC144 CCW Surge Tank Drain N/A N/A RT-1 100 OVERRIDES:

SELF- Description Delay Ramp Trigger Action CHECK 1 B440 OVDI: RTB A N/A N/A N/A OFF

2. B441 OVDI: RTB B N/A N/A N/A OFF B441 OVDI 21A Circ Start N/A N/A N/A OFF TAGGED EQUIPMENT::

SELF- Description CHECK

1. RH1 and RH2 (C/T)

2. VC 1-4 (C/T)

3. RH 18's (C/T)

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)

8. SGFP TRIP (SELF CHECK)

9. 22 ABV Supply Fan (C/T)

10. 23 Charging Pump (C/T)

11. 21 AFW Pump

12. 21A Circulator OTHER CONDITIONS:

IDescription 1.

Page 5 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 V SEQUENCE OF EVENTS State shift job assignments:

Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)

Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. OS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".

Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

Page 6 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments On CUE from the Lead Evaluator, BOOTH OPERATOR: Call as Systems Operator - reduce power to 1000 MWe as quickly as possible due to a transformer failure at the New Freedom Switching Station.

CRS specifies load reduction rate CREW references IOP-4 and/or AB.LOAD-1 PO sets EHC controls PO initiates load reduction RO initiates boration RO ensures rod motion tracks Tavg Initiate the next event (RT-1) on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT-1 CCW Header leak REMOTE CCI IA Severity 100 REMOTE CCI 2A Severity 100 RO responds to console alarm CRS enters ARP RO opens 2DR107 CRS transitions to AB.CC-1 RO reports CCW Surge Tank level rising with M/U valve open CREW contacts NEO(s) to look for CCW leaks After approximately two minutes, CRS refers to AB.CC-1 Att. 3 and directs report a vent valve on the CC header leak isolation near the Waste Evaporator was found open, the vent has been closed Page 7 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments CRS refers to Technical Specifications Initiate the next event (RT-2) on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT-2: Loop 24 Tc RTD fails high I RC0015D Severity = 630 RO responds to:

"* Console alarms

"* OHA E-8&16

"* Rods stepping in RO determines no Turbine Runback in progress RO gains CRS concurrence and places Rod Control in MANUAL CRS enters AB.ROD-3 RO monitors and controls Tavg CRS verifies rod motion was in the inward direction RO verifies a NIS channel has not failed RO stops RCS dilution RO identifies Loop 24 Tcold failed high RO returns PZR level to program by adjusting Master Flow Controller in MANUAL RO defeats failed Tavg input by depressing the 24 Loop Deviation Defeat PB RO selects Tavg Recorder to a valid loop RO defeats failed AT input to RIL Comparator by depressing the Deviation Defeat PB for 24 Loop RO selects AT Recorder to a valid loop NOTE: Bistables do not need to be CRS contacts Maintenance to remove tripped to continue scenario channel from service Page 8 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluatorlinstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO returns Master Flow Controller to AUTO CRS verifies rods are above the RIL RO restores Rod Control to AUTO Initiate next event (RT-3) after CRS/STA refers to TS.

TSAS determination and/or on cue "* 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (OTAT) from the Lead Evaluator "* 3.3.2.1 Action 19 RT-3: VCT Level transmitter LT-1 12 fails high MALF CV0037, Severity 100 RO responds to VCT HI/LO LEVEL console alarm RO compares console level with computer indications and determines LT-112 is failed CREW refers to the CC2 Console Alarm Response Procedure CRS directs RO to select CV35 to MANUAL and align it to the VCT Initiate next event (RT-4) on cue CREW discusses related problems:

from the Lead Evaluator "* MANUAL M/U required if VCT level lowers

"* AUTO swap to RWST disabled RT-4 Vacuum Breaker fails open MALF VLI0115 Severity 100 CREW responds to multiple alarms RO recognizes reactor trip demand CRS directs MANUAL reactor trip RO attempts both trip handles RO attempts to open RTB's RO opens 2E6D and 2G6D Page 9 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO performs TRIP-1 Immediate actions

"* Trip reactor/confirmation

"* Trips turbine

"* All 4KV busses energized

"* SI not actuated CRS enters TRIP-1 and reads Immediate actions CREW transitions to TRIP-2 RO announces reactor trip CRS informs OS to implement ECG NOTE: PO should report 23 AFWP PO reports AFW flow >22E04 not running PO reports both SGFP's tripped RT-5 Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus MALF EL0145 CREW responds to alarms PO reports loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus CREW/PO recognizes loss of 22 AFW Pump CRS requests Maintenance assistance BOOTH OPERATOR: After 2-3 CRS dispatches NEO to check 23 AFW minutes, report signs of serious Pump mechanical failure - perhaps the overspeed trip mechanism failed CREW performs TRIP-2 actions until a HS RED PATH develops CRS transitions to FRHS-1 ROIPO report RCS pressure >Intact SG pressure Page 10 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments EVALUATORS: If Feed & Bleed is CRS reviews RCS Bleed and Feed required then go to Page 13 of this initiation criteria Scenario Guide CRS and P0 continue efforts to restore AFW flow CT#1: Crew stops all RCP's prior to RO stops all RCP's commencing selected SG de pressurization

-SAT UNSAT__

P0 reports Condensate System in operation P0 reports SGFP's not available RO initiates Sl CRS designates crew member to perform APPX-3 RO:

"* Resets Sl

"* Resets Phase A Isolation

"* Resets Phase B Isolation

"* Opens 21 and 22CA330

"* Resets each SEC (sends NEO for B SEC)

"* Resets 230V Control Centers RO stops all running RHR and SI Pumps RO stops either 21 or 22 Charging Pump CREW selects SG to be depressurized P0 fully opens selected MS10 Page 11 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments BOOTH OPERATOR: CREW sends a NEO to open selected Open the selected BF19 or BF40 BF40 or 19 using the associated MALF and failing to the requested position.

BFI9's: VL0446-0449 BF40's: VL0466-0469 PO opens selected BF13 PO releases associated BF22 PO opens 21 and 22CN48 PO closes 21 and 22CN32 CT#2: Establish condensate flow PO/STA observe and verify selected SG into at least one SG level rising and/or CET temperatures lowering SAT UNSAT Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when condensate flow to SG is confirmed Page 12 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments FEED and BLEED Steps CT#1: Crew stops all RCP's prior to RO stops all RCP's ISI Initiation SAT UNSAT RO initiates SI PO verifies Safeguards valves in SI position RO verifies 21 or 22 Charging Pp running and BIT flow established CT#2: Establish bleed path so the RO opens both PZR PORVs and PORV RCS depressu rizes sufficiently for Stop valves SI Pump injection to occur SAT__ UNSAT__

RO/PO perform APPX-3 ROIPO resets Safeguards if not performed RO maintains ECCS flow and PZR PORVs open Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario any time after the PORV's are open and injection flow is confirmed Page 13 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), Use of Procedures E. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction G. S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality H. S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion I. S2.OP-AB.115-0002, Loss of 2B 115V Vital Instrument Bus J. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection K. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response L. 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Page 14 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VIII CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigation capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

"* degradation of any barrier cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

"* a violation of a safety limit

"* a violation of the facility lice to fission product release

"* degraded emergency core nse condition

"* incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

"* a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...

"* effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

"* recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

"* take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

"* prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

Page 15 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 VIII ESG - CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS FOR FEEDING SG VIA CONDENSATE CT#1: Crew stops all RCP's to lower heat input prior to commencing selected SG de-pressurization CT#2: Maintain a heat sink by establishing condensate flow into at least one SG prior to "SG dryout" CRITICAL TASKS IF BLEED AND FEED IS REQUIRED CT#1: Crew stops all RCP's to lower heat input prior to SI Initiation and lowering RCS pressure CT#2: Establish RCS bleed path so the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for SI Pump injection to occur Page 16 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, 0 TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation N Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS Y Initiate feed and bleed Page 17 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS BORON: 1152 ppm MWe: 1140 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 4000 MWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

21 AFW Pump, 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> remaining EVOLUTIONSIPROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

None - awaiting orders to lower power for turbine valve testing.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump motor bearing replacement.

RMS Channels R41A-D out of service, ODCM 3.3.3.9 in effect.

CONTROL ROOM:

"* Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

"* No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

None SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

21 B Circulator tagged for screen repairs Page 18 of 19

GOLF NRC ESG3 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL-10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet with Baseline Data is by Aux Alarm Typewriter

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 21 Verify phones are connected to simulator, not live to plant after a drill Page 19 of 19

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: MANUAL Reactor Trip/SBLOCA SCENARIO NUMBEFR: GOLF NRC ESG-Spare EFFECTIVE DATE: September 19, 2002 EXPECTED DURATI ON: 75-90 minutes REVISION NUMBER : 0 PROGRAM: ZZL.O. REQUAL SX INITIAL LICENSE LII STA OTHER Revision Summary PREPARED BY: J.K. Lloyd/F. Kaminski 7/3/02 (DEVELOPER) (DATE)

REVIEWED BY:

(EP REPRESENTATIVE) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(TRAINING SUPERVISOR) (DATE)

APPROVED BY:

(OPS MANAGER OR DESIGNEE) (DATE)

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare Enabling Objectives A. Perform a normal power reduction lAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 B. Respond to failure of a PZR level channel lAW S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012 C. Respond to failure of Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel lAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 D. Evaluate and implement required Technical Specifications E. Respond to a leak in 2 SW Bay lAW S2.OP-AB.SW-0003 F. TCAF closure of a turbine governor valve (TGV) lAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 and S2.OP-AB.LOAD 0001 G. Direct/initiate a reactor trip in response to a feedwater regulating valve failure H. Enter and execute the EOP network lAW SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q)

I. Respond to a SBLOCA lAW 2-EOP-LOCA-1 and LOCA-2 J. Restart ECCS loads following Blackout after SI Reset lAW 2-EOP-LOCA-2 MJREVENTS A. Power reduction to 60%

B. Controlling PZR level channel fails low C. PT-505 failure D. SW Bay 2 leak E. TGV fails closed F. One BF19 fails closed during the rapid power reduction G. SBLOCA following the reactor trip H. Blackout following SI Reset 2 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare The scenario begins at 70% power with 22 SI Pump out of service for motor bearing replacement. The crew is directed to lower power to 60% at 10%/hour so that 21 SGFP can be removed from service for a control oil leak repair.

After the plant is stable, the controlling PZR level instrument fails low. The crew should respond lAW the console alarm procedure, select another channel and restore letdown.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, PT-505, Turbine First Stage Pressure Detector will fail low, causing continuous rod insertion. The crew should respond lAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion, place rod control in MANUAL, perform necessary operations to remove the channel from service and implement Technical Specifications.

After identification of the PT-505 related technical specifications, a leak will develop in #2 SW Bay. The crew should respond lAW S2.OP-AB.SW-0003, SW Bay Leak, shift the running SW Pumps, isolate the leak, and implement Technical Specifications.

On cue from the lead evaluator one turbine governor valve will fail closed. The CRS should refer to the load limitations specified in S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001, Turbine Generator Operation, and initiate a rapid load reduction to <30% power lAW S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction. During the load reduction the feedwater regulating valve on one of the SG's will fail closed. The CRS should direct a MANUAL reactor trip. Following the reactor trip a SBLOCA will ramp in and the crew should initiate a MANUAL SI.

The path of EOP use is TRIP-i; TRIP-2; back to TRIP-I; LOCA-1; LOCA-2. In LOCA-2, the crew will begin a cooldown of the RCS. A loss of off-site power will occur during the cooldown, requiring the crew to re start ECCS loads.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario after the ECCS loads have been re-started.

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GOLF NRC ESG-Spare IC-1 84 1 P1U1 7A [Pzr LVI UH I (L 14b9) [ails H/L N/A N/A K I-I U 2 TUO055 1s' Stg Press Xmtr 505 Fails H/L N/A N/A RT-2 0 3 SW0216A 21 SW Hdr Leak in SW Structure N/A 2 min. RT-3 10000 4 TU0081 H 24MS29 Turb Cntrl VIv fails cis. N/A N/A RT-7 N/A 5 VL0447 22BF1 9 Fails to Position (0-100%) N/A N/A RT-8 0 6 RC0002 RCS Leak into Containment N/A 1 min. RT-9 1750 7 CV0040 Fuel Element failure N/A N/A RT-9 9 8 EL01 34 Loss of all 500KV Offsite Power N/A N/A RT-1 0

1. bd1iU N/A N/A NUNL I AUL5 2 SJ17D N/A N/A NONE OFF 3 SW23D N/A N/A RT-4 OFF 4 SW27D N/A N/A RT-5 OFF 5 SW32D N/A N/A RT-6 OFF

-I. u, IlUZ uvui z'l/kuIrCz aari N/A N/A N/A U I-'-

TAGGED EQUIPMENT:

1. RH1 and RH2 (C/T)

2. VC1-4 (C/T)

3. RH18's (C/T)

4. RCP's (self check)

5. RTB's (self check) and RTBB's (C/T)

6. MS 167's (self check)

7. 500 KV Swyd. (self check)

8. SGFP Trip (self check)

9. 22 ABV Supply Fan (C/T) 10 23 CVC Pump (C/T)

OTHER CONDITIONS:

1. None 4 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare V SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

"* State shift job assignments:

"* Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)

"* Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. OS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift".

"* Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the OS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.

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GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comnments

1. Power reduction to 60% using normal plant procedures CRS briefs crew and establishes rate of power reduction CREW commences a power reduction lAW Step 5.3, S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 CREW notifies System Operator and Condensate Polishing Operator PO initiates load reduction

• Initiates monitoring Main Turbine Data display points on the Plant Computer

• Uses Rate Thumbwheel, REF V and GO pushbuttons to attain desired load RO initiates boration Initiate next event (RT-1) on cue RO maintains minimal TAvG/TREF mismatch from Lead Evaluator and AFD within band P0 verifies SG Feed Pump suction pressure is being maintained >300 psig P0 monitors condenser temperatures using the plant computer RT-1: PZR Level Ch I Fails LO MALF PRO01I7A; SEV=O CREW responds to OHA E-36 RO diagnoses PZR level channel failure CREW enters ARP for OHA E-36 and/or console alarm RO takes MANUAL control of Master Flow Controller RO selects an operable channel for Control, Alarm, and Recorder RO restores PZR heaters to normal 6 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO restores letdown lAW S2.OP-SO.CVC 0001 NOTE: Bistables need not be tripped CRS contacts I&C to remove PZR level to continue the scenario. channel from service lAW SO.RPS-0003 Initiate RT-2 on cue from the Lead CRS enters TSAS(s) 3.3.1.1 Action 6# and Evaluator may review 3.3.3.7 (PAM -only two PZR Level Channels are required)

RT-2: First Stage Impulse Pressure Channel (PT-505) Failure MALF TU0055, Severity = 0 RO determines rod insertion is unwarranted, gains CRS concurrence, places Rod Control in MANUAL CRS enters AB.ROD-3 PO identifies PT-505 failed low and verifies alarms are consistent with the failure Crew performs actions of AB.ROD-3:

"* RO places rod control in MANUAL

"* RO adjusts Tave to within 1.50 F of Tref

"* RO determines rods above RIL

"* PO verifies Steam Dump set at 1005 psig, verifies AUTO selected, then selects MS PRESS CONT

"* PO verifies SG levels being maintained 33-44%

CRS enters TS 3.3.2.1.b, Action 19 CRS directs initiation of SO.RPS-6, to remove failed channel from service 7 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluatorlinstructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments Initiate next event (RT-3) after l&C CRS contacts I&C for assistance with is contacted for BIS tripping OR on PT-505 cue from the Lead Evaluator CRS communicates channel failure to OS and/or OM RT 2 SW Bay Leak MALF SW0216GA; SEVI 0000, RAMP=2 mins.

Crew responds to OHA alarms and RO acknowledges standby pump start ROLE PLAY: Report water level RO/PO dispatches NEO to investigate rising in Bay 2 - Recommend stopping the pumps ASAP CRS enters AB.SW-1 or goes directly to AB.SW-3 CREW transitions to AB.SW-3 RO opens 21&22SW23, NucHdr X-ties RO closes 21 &22SW1 7, Pump Disch. X ties P0 monitors AB.SW-3 CAS Crew isolates 2 SW Bay:

SIM OP: 125 VDC Control Power for "* RO starts 24 SW Pump Bay 2 Pumps: "* RO stops 21&23 SW Pumps RT-4 REMOTE: SW23D "* CRS directs NEO to open 125 VDC RT-5 REMOTE: SW27D Control Power to 2 Bay SW Pumps RT-6REMOTE: SW32D "* RO closes 21SW22, NucHdr Inlet

"* RO closes 21SW20, TurbHdr Supply ROLE PLAY: NEO reports level has CRS contacts maintenance to investigate stopped rising Initiate next event (RT-7) after TS CRS enters TSAS 3.7.4 call and/or on cue from the Lead Evaluator RT TGV Fails Closed MALF TUO081 H 8 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments RO/PO respond to uncontrolled load change, RCS response RO controls Tavg with rods in MANUAL PO identifies 24MS29 CLOSED using EHC console indications CRS dispatches NEO to investigate cause of valve closure Role Play: After 5 minutes, NEQ CRS reviews S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 reports EHC fluid leak on fittings of precautions and limitations. Determines 24MS29. Leak is contained but load limitation of <30% with failed governor cannot be repaired. valve CRS orders a turbine load reduction at 5%/minute lAW SO.TRB-1 CRS informs the Electric System Operator, OS and/or OM of load reduction PO/RO coordinate actions to reduce turbine load to <30% power CRS enters AB.LOAD-1 PO responds to alarms and/or notes change in BF19 position PO attempts to open 22BF19 in MANUAL CRS directs MANUAL Reactor Trip RO initiates a MANUAL Rx Trip RO completes IA's of TRIP-1 from memory:

"* Reactor trip

"* Reactor Trip confirmed

"* Trip Turbine

"* At least one vital bus energized

"* SI actuation (NO) 9 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments CRS enters TRIP-1 CRS transitions to TRIP-2 RO makes page announcement CRS directs OS to implement the ECG PO stops both SGFPs Initiate next event (RT-9) after SGFP's are stopped or on cue from Lead Evaluator RO verifies Tavg trending to 5470 F RO verifies both reactor trip breakers open PO verifies all rods inserted PO closes 21-24BF22 RO verifies PZR level >17%

RO verifies Charging and Letdown in service RO monitors PZR pressure status ROICREW notes LOCA symptoms CRS directs RO to initiate a MANUAL SI based on TRIP-2 CAS RO initiates a MANUAL SI CRS transitions to TRIP-1 RO performs TRIP-1 immediate actions RO makes page announcement 10 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments NOTE: 21, 22, 23 SW Pumps and 22 RO/PO verify SEC loading SI Pump all 00S, with control power removed RO monitors TRIP-1 CAS CT#1: Crew closes CV139 or CV140 Crew closes CV139 and CV140 when CAS IAWprocedure CAS when pressure criteria is met lowers <1500 psig SAT UNSAT PO verifies 21 & 22 AFW Pumps running PO verifies valves in Safeguards alignment RO verifies 21/22CA330 closed RO verifies CS not required RO initiates MSLI CT#2: Crewstops all RCP's before RO stops all RCPs when pressure lowers exiting the procedure in effect below 1350 psig CREW transitions to LOCA-1 @ Step 28 CREW performs SI Reset actions:

"* Resets SI

"* Resets Phase A Isolation

"* Resets Phase B Isolation

"* Opens 21 & 22 CA330, Containment Control Air Isolation

"* Resets all SECs

"* Verifies all 230V Control Centers reset RO opens21-24SS94, Bldn. Sample Vlvs.

RO stops RHR Pumps 11 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VI SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments PO stops all EDG's CRS transitions to LOCA-2 PO initiates 100°F/hr cooldown using MS10's Initiate next event (RT-1 0) after cooldown is in progress RO reports subcooling NOT >0 0 F RT-10 Loss of Off-Site Power MALF EL0134 CRS may terminate the cooldown until ECCS loads are restored CT#3: Crew re-starts at least 21 SI CREW re-starts loads lAW Table A IPump and 3 CFCU's in LOW Speed SAT UNSAT Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario after actions to restart Table A loads have been completed 12 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG)

D. SC.OP-AP.ZZ-01 02(Q), Use of Procedures E. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation F. S2.OP-SO.CVC-0001, Establishing Charging and Letdown G. S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001, Turbine Generator Operation H. S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion I. S2.OP-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak J. S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction K. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection L. 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response M. 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant N. 2-EOP-LOCA-2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 13 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare VIlI CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigation capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

"* degradation of any barriercooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity

"* a violation of a safety limit

"* a violation of the facility lice to fission product release

"* degraded emergency core nse condition

"* incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)

"* a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...

"* effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

"* recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

"* take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

"* prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

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GOLF NRC ESG-Spare SVIII ESG - CRITICAL TASKS CT#1: Close at least one series CCP miniflow valve (CV139 or 140) when RCS pressure lowers

<1500 psig to maximize injection flow during a SBLOCA before exiting the procedure in effect CT#2: Stop all RCP's when RCS pressure lowers <1350 psig to minimize RCS mass loss during a small SBLOCA before exiting the procedure in effect CT#3: Re-establish plant design basis conditions by starting at least one train of ECCS equipment after a loss of off-site power occurs with SI Reset 15 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss of CCW Y Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N N Station Black Out Y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Y Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures N Early depressurize RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

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MODE: 1 POWER: 70% RCS 753 MWe: 800 BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED):

NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 8 GWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.5.2.a (22 SI Pump) - 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> remaining EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:

Awaiting orders to reduce to 60% power this shift lAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004. 21 SGFP will be taken 0OS for a control oil leak repair.

ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

22 Safety Injection Pump out of service for maintenance activity.

RMS Channels R41A-D out of service, ODCM 3.3.3.9 in effect.

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

None SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:

21A Circulator tagged out of service for screen repairs 17 of 18

GOLF NRC ESG-Spare SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST

1. Verify simulator is in correct load for training

2. All required computer terminals in operation

3. Simulator clocks synchronized

4. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

5. Rod step counters correct (channel check)

6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

7. DL-10 log up-to-date

8. Required procedures clean

9. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

10. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon

11. Procedure pens available

12. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step

13. Shift manning sheet available

14. SPDS reset

15. Reference verification performed with required documents available

16. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet with Baseline Data is by Aux Alarm Typewriter

17. Required keys available

18. Video Tape (if applicable)

19. Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03

20. Reset P-250 Rod Counters 21 Verify phones are connected to simulator, not live to plant after a drill 18 of 18