Text

IR 05000327/2002-003, 05000328/2002-003, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Inspection on 03/25/2002 - 03/29/2002 Related to Fire Protection Program. Two non-cited Violations Noted
	ML021260583
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah ; (DPR-077, DPR-079)
Issue date:	05/03/2002
From:	Ogle C; Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Scalice J; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-003
	Download: ML021260583 (29)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority

ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice

Chief Nuclear Officer and

Executive Vice President

6A Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/02-03

AND 50-328/02-03

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On March 29, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire

protection inspection at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the

results of this inspection which were discussed on March 29 and April 24, 2002, with

Mr. Dennis Koehl and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety

significance (Green). These issues were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements.

However, because of their very low safety significance and because they have been entered

into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as Non-Cited Violations, in

accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The first violation involved a

failure to ensure a redundant train for normal letdown isolation would be maintained free of fire

damage. The second violation involved the failure to properly establish the plant fire procedure

such that actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of a severe fire could be effectively

performed.

If you deny these Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your

denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Document

2

TVA

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328

License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-327/02-03,

50-328/02-03 w/Attachment

cc w/encl:

Karl W. Singer

Senior Vice President

Nuclear Operations

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Jon R. Rupert, Vice President (Acting)

Engineering and Technical Services

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Richard T. Purcell

Site Vice President

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

General Counsel

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert J. Adney, General Manager

Nuclear Assurance

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Mark J. Burzynski, Manager

Nuclear Licensing

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Pedro Salas, Manager

Licensing and Industry Affairs

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Lawrence E. Nanney, Director

TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation

Division of Radiological Health

Electronic Mail Distribution

County Executive

Hamilton County Courthouse

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Ann Harris

341 Swing Loop

Rockwood, TN 37854

John D. White, Jr., Director

Tennessee Emergency Management

Agency

Electronic Mail Distribution

3

TVA

Distribution w/encl:

R. W. Hernan, NRR

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE

RII:DRS

NRR

RII:DRS

RII:DRP

RII:DRS

SIGNATURE

FILLION

THOMAS

WISEMAN

BORWN

FREDRICKSON

PAYNE FOR:

NAME

PFillion

MThomas

GWiseman

EBrown

PFredrickson

COgle

DATE

4/30/02

4/29/02

5/ /2002

5/3/02

E-MAIL COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML021260583.wpd

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-327, 50-328

License Nos:

DPR-77, DPR-79

Report No:

50-327/02-03, 50-328/02-03

Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

Sequoyah Access Road

Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379

Dates:

March 25 - 29, 2002

Inspectors:

E. Brown, Resident Inspector, Brunswick (Lead Inspector)

P. Fillion, Reactor Inspector, Region II

M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II

G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II

Accompanying

C. Payne, Fire Protection Team Leader

Personnel:

Approved by:

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1and 2

IR 05000327-02-03 and IR 05000328-02-03 on 03/25-29/2002,Tennesee Valley Authority,

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, triennial baseline inspection of the fire protection

program.

The inspection was conducted by a Brunswick resident inspector, and three regional reactor

inspectors. The inspection identified two Non-Cited Violations which were determined to be of

very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their

color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process.

Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of

the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power plants is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website.

Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. A Non-Cited Violation of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50

Appendix R (Appendix R), III.G.2, was identified for failure to ensure, in the event of a

severe fire, that one of the redundant trains of a system necessary to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions would be free of fire damage. Electrical cables for

redundant charging flow isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 were located in

fire area FAA-029 without adequate spatial separation or fire barriers.

The finding had a credible impact on safety in that fire damage to the unprotected

cables could prevent closure of the valves from the main control room and challenge the

operators ability to establish adequate injection flow to the reactor coolant pump seals.

This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the ignition

frequency was relatively low, fire detection and suppression systems were not

degraded, and there were no components in this area whose failure would result in an

accident initiator (i.e., loss of offsite power, loss of main feedwater). The finding only

affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. (Section 1R05.02)

Green. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, was identified for

inadequate procedure guidance related to the transition from Abnormal Operating

Procedure (AOP) AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, to AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary

Control Room, in the event of a severe fire.

This finding had a credible impact on safety in that the inadequate guidance in

procedure AOP-N.01 could delay entry into AOP-C.04 and could challenge the

operators ability to perform certain critical safe shutdown functions within the times

specified in the licensees safe shutdown calculation for Appendix R. This finding was

determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect fire detection,

fire suppression, or fire barriers. (Section 1R05.05)

2

Licensee identified Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee,

were reviewed by the inspection team. Corrective actions taken or planned by the

licensee appeared reasonable. (Section 4OA7)

Report Details

2.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems

1R05

FIRE PROTECTION

.01

Systems Required To Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (SSD)

a.

Inspection Scope

The team evaluated the licensees fire protection program against applicable

requirements, including the Sequoyah Nuclear (SQN) Units 1 and 2 fire protection

License Conditions 2.C(16) and 2.C(13) respectively; Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR 50) Appendix R, III.G, III.J, III.O, and III.L; Appendix A of

Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch

(APCSB) 9.5-1; 10 CFR 50.48; related NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs);

NUREGS and the Technical Specifications (TS).

The team used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)

and in-plant walk downs to select four risk significant fire areas for inspection. The four

selected fire areas were:

Fire Area FAA-029, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690: Auxiliary Building Corridor

This fire area included rooms 690.0-A1, A9, A10, A13, A14, A17, A18, A22, A23, A23a,

A24, A27, A30 and A31. This area was classified as a 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R

(Appendix R), III.G.2 area and contained both trains of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater

pumps, as well as the cables for both trains of essential raw cooling water (ERCW). In

addition, all five component cooling water pumps are within the fire area. A significant

fire in this area would require shutdown of either unit from the main control room (MCR).

Fire Area FAA-067, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734: 6.9 kilovolt (kV) Shutdown Board

Rooms

This fire area included rooms 734.0-A2 and A9. This fire area included both units train

A auxiliary electric power switchgear. This area was classified as an Appendix R,

III.G.2 area. A significant fire in this fire area would require shutdown of either or both

unit(s) from the MCR.

Fire Area FAC-009, Control Building, Elevation 685: Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room

This fire area included controls to important safe shutdown (SSD) equipment from

outside the MCR. This area was classified as a Appendix R, III.G.3 area. A significant

fire in this area would require evacuation of the MCR and alternative shutdown (ASD)

from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) using the remote shutdown panel (RSDP).

2

Fire Area FAC-20, Control Building, Elevation 732: Relay Room

This fire area included high voltage electrical relay equipment for offsite power and was

located adjacent to the MCR complex. A significant fire in this area may result in a fire

induced loss of offsite power (LOOP). This area was classified as an Appendix R,

III.G.3 area. A fire in this area would require evacuation of the MCR and ASD from the

RSDP using the ACR.

The team reviewed the IPEEE, Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Sequoyah Fire Protection

Report (FPR), associated procedures, and plant drawings to identify those systems

credited for SSD of the facility in the event of a fire in the four selected fire areas. The

inspection included review of the post-fire SSD capability and of the fire protection

features to ensure that at least one post-fire SSD success path was maintained free of

fire damage.

For a selected sample of SSD systems, components, and plant monitoring instruments,

the team reviewed the FPR, the FHA, applicable fire protection SERs and NUREGS,

and system flow diagrams to evaluate the completeness and adequacy of the FPR and

the systems relied upon to mitigate fires in the four selected fire areas.

The team inspected the capability to shutdown for the scenario where a fire in fire area

FAC-20 could initiate a LOOP. The team inspected the control circuits and associated

circuit analysis for the diesel generators to determine whether any devices in the control

circuit were located in fire area FAC-20. In a similar manner, the control circuits for the

6.9kV shutdown board were reviewed to determine whether a fire in fire area FAC-20

could interfere with opening of the offsite breaker or closing the emergency diesel

generator (EDG) breaker.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.02

Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees FPR for fire areas FAA-029 and FAA-067 to

determine whether redundant trains of components or circuits required for SSD were

located in the same fire area. From those components, the team selected the power

cables for centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) 1A and 1B, and the power and control

cables to the charging flow isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91. The team

reviewed the cables to verify that adequate spatial separation or proper fire barrier

protection features were installed in accordance with the design requirements of

Appendix R. The team examined cable routing, raceway drawings, the actual

configuration of the circuits, fire barriers, fire detection, and fire suppression equipment

for conformance to applicable NRC requirements and National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) standards. In addition, the team walked down these fire areas to

verify that the licensees documentation reflected the as-built configuration.

3

Team members also walked down the four selected fire areas to compare the

associated fire fighting pre-plans and drawings with as-built plant conditions. This was

done to verify that fire fighting pre-plans and drawings were consistent with the fire

protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FPR. Additionally, the

team reviewed engineering evaluations associated with the Auxiliary Building floor and

equipment drain sump capacity to verify that those actions required for ASD would not

be inhibited by fire suppression activities or leakage from fire suppression systems. The

team reviewed fire brigade response, training, and drill program procedures; fire brigade

drill critiques; and drill records for the operating shifts from 1999 through 2001. The

reviews were performed to determine whether the drills had been conducted in high fire

risk plant areas and whether fire brigade personnel qualifications, drill response, and

performance met the requirements of the licensees approved fire protection program.

The team reviewed selected portions of the FHA and fire prevention/combustible

hazards procedures to determine if the conditions established in the fire protection

licensing basis documents were satisfied. The team performed walk downs of the four

selected fire areas to observe whether the licensee limited fire hazards in a manner

consistent with these procedures. Fire brigade response and emergency/incident

reports from 1999 through 2001, as well as Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs)

resulting from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and equipment overheating incidents were

reviewed. This review was conducted to assess the effectiveness of the fire prevention

program and to identify any maintenance or material condition problems related to fire

incidents. Additionally, design control procedures were reviewed to verify that plant

changes were adequately reviewed for the potential impact on the fire protection

program, SSD equipment, and procedures as required by SQN License Conditions

2.C(16) and 2.C(13).

The team walked down the primary fire brigade staging and dress-out areas to assess

the condition of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. Fire brigade personal

protective equipment located in the fire brigade house, dress-out area and lockers in the

fire brigade staging area were reviewed to evaluate equipment accessibility and

functionality. The team observed whether emergency exit lighting was provided for

personnel evacuation pathways to the outside exits as identified in the NFPA 101, Life

Safety Code. This review also included examination of whether backup emergency

lighting was provided for access pathways to and within the fire brigade staging and

dress-out areas in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during a fire

emergency. The fire brigade self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) were

reviewed for adequacy as well as the availability of supplemental breathing air tanks.

The team reviewed the reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil collection system enclosure

drawings to verify compliance with Appendix R, III.O. The team evaluated operator

response procedures to determine if sufficient procedural guidance was provided to

identify an oil leak from the RCP lubrication system and take appropriate action.

b.

Findings

A Non-Cited Violation (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, III.G.2, was identified for

failure to ensure, in the event of a severe fire, that one of the redundant trains of a

system necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would be free of fire

4

damage. Electrical cables for redundant charging flow isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and

1-FCV-62-91 were located in fire area FAA-029 without adequate spatial separation or

fire barriers.

For fire area FAA-029, the FHA indicated that reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory

control was achieved through isolation of normal charging and letdown while maintaining

RCP seal flow cooling. Through review of associated system drawings and SSD

procedures AOP-N.01 and AOP-N.08, the team noted that the step to achieve charging

flow isolation while continuing RCP seal flow cooling was to close either valve 1-FCV-

62-90 or 1-FCV-62-91 from the MCR. These valves were installed in series and

powered from redundant power sources. The FHA indicated that power and control

cables for both valves were routed closer than 20 feet specified in Appendix R, III.G.2.b.

Conduit drawings 1(2)-45N824-7 and 1(2)-45N824-16 depicted the routing for these

cables. During a walk down of the cable routing, the team verified that there was a

location where the cables for 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 were unprotected and

separated by approximately 16 feet. The team noted that, in lieu of protecting the

1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 cables in accordance with Appendix R, to permit

operation from the MCR, the licensee incorporated steps in the shutdown procedure

AOP-N.08 to manually manipulate local valves 1-62-537 or 1-62-539.

This finding had more than minor significance because both charging flow isolation

valves could be damaged by a credible fire in fire area FAA-029, which in turn, could

affect the RCP seal injection flow and seal integrity. The finding had a credible impact

on safety in that fire damage to the unprotected cables could prevent closure of the

valves from the MCR and challenge the operators ability to establish adequate flow to

the RCP seals. Based on review of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F,

Determining Potential Risk Significance of Fire Protection and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Inspection Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low significance. The

ignition frequency for the sub-area in question was taken from the SQN IPEEE as

1.85E-3 per year. The team observed that fire detection and suppression was installed

throughout fire area FAA-029. Manual suppression capability and the automatic

suppression system were deemed to be in the normal operating state by the team. The

fire mitigation frequency was conservatively calculated to be once per 105 years. The

missing barrier condition existed for greater than 30 days. Based on these factors, the

finding was processed using the Phase 2 transient worksheet and subsequently

characterized by the Significance Determination Process (SDP) as having very low risk

significance (Green). This was because the ignition frequency was relatively low, fire

detection and suppression systems were not degraded, and there were no components

in this area whose failure would result in an accident initiator (LOOP or loss of main

feedwater, etc.). The finding only affected the mitigating systems cornerstone.

The failure to protect cables with an adequate fire barrier or to provide 20 feet of

separation between redundant charging flow isolation valves is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.G.2.b. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation and is

identified as NCV 50-327/02-03-01, Failure to Provide Adequate Protection for Cables to

Redundant SSD Components. The licensee documented the violation in PER 02-

03645.

5

.03

Post-Fire SSD Circuit Analysis

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed selected cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain hot

shutdown conditions in the event of fire in the four selected fire areas to verify that the

cables had been properly identified and either adequately protected from the potentially

adverse effects of fire damage or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults would not

prevent safe shutdown. The team selected power, control, and instrumentation circuits

indicated to be credited for SSD in the licensees FHA and walked down the routing of

the circuits. The circuits selected for review were:

Fire Area FAA-067: 1-L068-335, Pressurizer level indication

Fire Area FAC-009: FI-3-163C, Auxiliary feedwater flow to steam generator 1

Fire Area FAC-20: Diesel generator start button

Additionally, the team reviewed selected electrical coordination studies to verify that fire

induced faults on energized non-shutdown circuits would not prevent the success of the

SSD functions. Specifically, the team reviewed overcurrent protection devices related to

the control circuit for CCP 1A from its power source at 125 volt (V) Vital Battery Board 1

to the circuit breaker close and trip circuits. The manufacturers time-current

characteristics were checked; and installed devices were examined and compared to

design information. The team reviewed the coordination of overcurrent devices on the

alternating current (AC) system. From the licensees FHA, the team reviewed those

buses identified in the FPR for a fire located in fire area FAA-029. Phase faults and

ground faults on the 6.9kV system were considered, and a review of the 6.9kV system

coordination was performed for a phase fault on a cable emanating from 480V

Shutdown Board 1A1-A, Reactor Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) board 1A1-A and ERCW

Motor Control Center (MCC) 1A-A. To the extent possible installed devices were

examined and compared to design documents.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.04

ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees procedures for fire response and ASD capability for

the four selected fire areas to verify conformance with applicable requirements (see

Section 1R05.01 above). This review included the licensees ASD methodology to

determine the adequacy of the identified components and systems to achieve and

maintain safe shutdown. The review also evaluated that the methodology addressed

achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR, with and

without off-site power available. The team also reviewed the licensees procedures for

6

consistency with the calculations and assumptions supporting the operator actions

identified in the ASD methodology.

The team selected several circuits where the control or instrumentation devices were

determined to be located at the RSDP or other local panels. The team reviewed

relevant drawings to determine whether isolation devices were appropriately designed

into the following circuits:

Control circuit for the centrifugal charging pump

AFW flow to the steam generator FI-3-163C

Volume control tank (VCT) outlet isolation valve LCV-62-132

CCP flow to RCS coolant loop FCV-62-85

Source range flux monitor XI-92-5

The team evaluated if hot and cold shutdown could be maintained from outside the MCR

without offsite power through a review of selected EDG electrical components.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.05

Operational Implementation of ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the operational implementation of post-fire safe shutdown capability

for a fire in the four selected fire areas to determine if: (1) the training program for

licensed and non-licensed personnel included alternative or dedicated SSD capability;

(2) personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot standby from outside the

MCR could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire brigade; (3)

adequate procedures existed for use during ASD; and (4) the licensee periodically

performed operability testing of the RSDP instrumentation as well as transfer and

control functions. The team observed the contents of selected SSD lockers to verify

that materials needed to support implementation of operator actions specified in the

ASD procedures for hot standby were available and properly maintained. Fire brigade

staffing was reviewed to verify that it met the requirements of the licensees fire

protection program. Training requirements were reviewed for the fire brigade members

and related support personnel such as incident commander, reactor operator, senior

reactor operator, and auxiliary operators to verify compliance with the licensees fire

protection program. Lesson plans and job performance measures (JPMs) were

reviewed to determine whether ASD activities were included in the training program.

Post-fire SSD procedures for the four selected fire areas were reviewed to determine if

adequate staffing and appropriate guidance was provided for the operators to identify

protected equipment and instrumentation. Additionally, recovery actions were reviewed

7

to determine if manpower needs for restoration and area accessibility were considered.

Specific procedures reviewed included AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, Revision (Rev) 14; AOP-

N.08, Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev 0; and AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary

Control Room, Rev 4. Selected procedure sections were walked down to verify that the

procedures could be performed within the times specified in the supporting calculations,

given the minimum required staffing level of operators, concurrent with a LOOP.

Additionally, the team walked down the designated pathways and reviewed the

licensees smoke control procedures, ventilation systems, and the availability of SCBAs

to verify that environmental conditions, such as smoke and heat, would not prevent

operators from performing the procedures.

b.

Findings

A Non-Cited Violation (Green) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, was identified for

inadequate procedural guidance related to the transition from AOP-N.01, to SSD

procedure AOP-C.04, in the event of a severe fire.

The team performed a walk down of procedures AOP-N.01, AOP-N.08, and AOP-C.04

with operations personnel. For a fire in the Control Building, the team identified that

AOP-N.01 failed to specify those conditions which would require evacuation of the MCR

and entry into AOP-C.04. The team noted other observations during the procedure

reviews and walk downs which could challenge operator performance of safe shutdown

activities. The following are examples of the types of observations identified:

-

During an inspection team walk down of the SSD procedures AOP-N.01,

AOP-N.08, and AOP-C.04, the onshift crew exhibited unfamiliarity with all three

of the SSD procedures.

-

The validation method for the latest revisions to AOP-N.01 and AOP-C.04

lacked thoroughness. The licensee had performed a tabletop review of a field

validation despite significant procedural changes. These changes included a

new SSD methodology which added new locations for some procedural steps.

-

Time requirements specified in calculation SQN-SQS4-0127 for performing

certain critical safe shutdown functions were not incorporated into AOP-C.04.

-

AOP-C.04, Checklist 5 required more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to complete. The checklist

appeared to contain various unnecessary items. The team noted that an

additional field validation of AOP-C.04, Checklists 5 and 6 was performed the

week of March 11, 2002. However, this validation verified accuracy of

component identifiers and tags, but did not evaluate timeliness of critical SSD

actions.

-

AOP-C.04 and AOP-N.08 were inconsistent in specifying time critical actions

such as assuring seal injection flow to the RCPs. The team noted that

AOP-C.04 specified as soon as possible and AOP-N.08 specified 15 minutes.

8

The licensee documented these and other team observations in PERs 02-03552 and

02-03543.

This finding had a credible impact on safety in that the inadequate guidance in

procedure AOP-N.01 could delay entry into AOP-C.04. This delay could challenge the

operators ability to perform certain critical safe shutdown functions within the times

specified in licensee calculation SQN-SQS4-0127, Equipment Required for Safe

Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Rev 21. This finding affected the mitigating

systems cornerstone and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)

using Attachment F to the SDP, because it did not adversely affect fire detection, fire

suppression, or fire barriers.

TS 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and

maintained covering the activities in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Rev

2. RG 1.33, Section 6.v, requires procedures for emergencies such as plant fires. The

failure to adequately establish guidance in AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, for transition into

AOP-C.04 in the event of a severe fire is a violation. This violation is being treated as a

Non-Cited Violation and is identified as NCV 50-327, 328/02-03-02, Inadequate

Procedure Guidance for Implementing Abnormal Operating Procedures for Plant Fires.

The licensee documented the violation in PER 02-03550.

.06

Communications for Performance of ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees communications systems separation analysis to verify

the availability of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the

performance of ASD functions and fire brigade duties. Walk downs were performed of

sections of AOP-C.04 to evaluate the ability of plant communication systems to support

plant personnel in the performance of ASD functions. The team reviewed redundant

ASD communications systems to assess whether the licensees portable radio channel

features would continue to operate should the radio repeaters for the primary

communications system be unavailable. The team also examined whether sound

powered phone jacks were present at the locations identified in the ASD procedure as

designated by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This review included

examination of the sound powered phone periodic test and inventory surveillance

records to assess whether the surveillance test program was sufficient to verify proper

operation.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.07

Emergency Lighting for Performance of ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team walked down the selected fire areas to observe whether battery pack

emergency lighting units (ELUs) were installed to allow operation of ASD equipment if

9

normal lighting was lost. In some cases, the installed ELUs were tested to demonstrate

functionality. The locations and identification numbers on the ELUs were compared to

design documents to confirm the as-built configuration. The team also reviewed

licensee periodic tests to verify that the ELUs were being maintained in an operable

manner.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.08

Cold Shutdown Repairs

a.

Inspection Scope

The team randomly selected a component, from the section of the FHA that listed

repairs that may be needed to achieve cold shutdown, and evaluated the likelihood the

repair would be successful. The component chosen was the residual heat removal

system isolation valve 1-FCV-074-001 specified for fire area FAA-029. The review

considered the level of difficulty of the repair, as compared to expected skills of the

person assigned to perform the task, adequacy of relevant procedures, and the

availability of necessary materials.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.09

Fire Barriers and Fire Area/Zone/Room Penetration Seals

a.

Inspection Scope

The team walked down the selected fire areas to evaluate the adequacy of the fire

resistance of barrier enclosure walls, ceilings, floors, and structural steel support

protection. This evaluation also included fire barrier penetration seals, fire doors, fire

dampers, and the electrical raceway fire barrier systems to ensure that at least one train

of SSD equipment would be maintained free of fire damage. The team observed the

material condition and configuration of the installed fire barrier features, as well as,

reviewed construction details and supporting fire endurance tests for the installed fire

barrier features. The team compared the observed fire barrier penetration seal

configurations to the design drawings and tested configurations. The team also

compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barriers in which they were

installed.

The team reviewed ASD procedures, selected fire fighting pre-plan procedures, and

heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to verify that access to remote

shutdown equipment and operator manual actions would not be inhibited by smoke

migration from one area to adjacent plant areas used to accomplish SSD. In addition,

the team reviewed licensing documentation, engineering evaluations of Generic Letter 86-10 fire barrier features, and NFPA code deviations to verify that the fire barrier

installations met design requirements and license commitments.

10

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10

Fire Protection Systems, Features, and Equipment

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed flow diagrams, cable routing information, periodic test procedures,

engineering evaluations for NFPA code deviations, and operational valve lineup

procedures associated with the fire pumps and fire protection water supply system. The

review evaluated whether the common fire protection water delivery and supply

components could be damaged or inhibited by fire-induced failures of electrical power

supplies or control circuits. Additionally, team members walked down the fire protection

water supply system in selected areas to assess the adequacy of the system material

condition, consistency of as-built configuration with engineering drawings, and

operability of the system in accordance with applicable administrative procedures and

NFPA standards.

The team examined the adequacy of installed fire protection features in accordance with

the separation and design requirements in Appendix R, III.G.2. The team walked down

accessible portions of the fire detection and alarm systems in the four selected fire

areas to evaluate the engineering design and operation of the installed configurations.

The team also reviewed engineering drawings for fire detector spacing and locations in

the four selected fire areas for consistency with the licensees FPR and the

requirements in NFPA 72E, Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors, 1974 Edition. Team

members walked down the selected fire areas with sprinklers to assure proper

placement and spacing of the sprinkler heads and the lack of sprinkler head

obstructions. The team examined design calculations to verify that the required fire

hose water flow and sprinkler system density for each protected area were available.

The team reviewed a sample of manual fire hose lengths to determine whether they

could reach the SSD equipment. Additionally, the team observed placement of the fire

hoses and extinguishers to assess consistency with the fire fighting pre-plans.

The team reviewed the adequacy of the design and installation of the carbon dioxide

(CO2) fire suppression system for fire area FAC-009. This review included CO2 fire

suppression system controls to assure accessibility and functionality of the system, as

well as associated ventilation system fire dampers. The team also examined licensee

design calculations, vendor certifications, and pre-operational test data to verify the

required quantity of CO2 for the area was available. Additionally, the team reviewed

engineering drawings, schematics, flow diagrams, and evaluations associated with the

area floor drain system to determine whether systems and operator actions required for

ASD would be inhibited by potential leakage from CO2 fire suppression activities.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

11

.11

Compensatory Measures

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed several licensee identified PERs which dealt with maintaining one

redundant train of systems, structures, or components (SSCs) free from fire damage in

accordance with Appendix R, III.G.2. The review was performed to determine if the risk

associated with the adverse conditions was properly assessed and if compensatory

measures adequately considered IPEEE risk insights.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.12

Identification and Resolution of Problems

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of licensee identified PERs related to fire protection and

protection of SSCs for SSD in accordance with Appendix R, III.G, III.J. and III.O to

determine if items were captured in the licensees corrective action program in

accordance with SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Rev 4. The items selected were

reviewed for classification and whether the corrective actions adequately resolved the

issues. The team reviewed self-assessments and audits related to the fire protection

and SSD programs to assess whether the licensee was performing comprehensive

audits of these programs in accordance with the requirements set forth in Appendix A of

BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Dennis Koehl, Plant Manager, and

other members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on

March 29, 2002, and on April 24, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings

presented. No proprietary information is included in this report.

12

40A7

Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are

violations of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC

Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as NCVs.

NCV Tracking Number

Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

50-327,328/02-03-03

10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.J states that emergency lighting

units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be

provided in all areas needed for operation of safe

shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes

thereto. The licensee identified during a self-assessment

that the need for emergency lighting for valves 1(2)FCV-

63-001 had not been provided. Manual operation of these

valves is required in the event of a severe fire in

accordance with licensees shutdown procedures. The

failure to provide adequate illumination of manual actions

required for safe shutdown is identified as a Non-Cited

Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.J. The licensee

documented the violation in PER 02-00550 (Green).

50-327,328/02-03-04

10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.G. 2. states that except as

provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables

or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that

could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot

shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant

trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot

shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area

outside of primary containment, one of the following

means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free

of fire damage shall be provided: (a) separation of cables

and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of

redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.

(b) separation of cables and equipment and associated

non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal

distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening

combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and

an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in

the fire area; or (c) enclosure of cable and equipment and

associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a

fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire

detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall

be installed in the fire area. The licensee identified during

a self-assessment, that as a result of inadequate

protection of control and/or power cables, a spurious

closure signal to the VCT level control valves was credible.

The power cables for the refueling water storage tank

(RWST) suction valves were in the same fire area and

13

were not protected. The licensee identified an

unacceptable interaction such that the suction from the

VCT and RWST could be lost. The licensees failure to

provide adequate protection to prevent the operation or the

maloperation of cables or equipment necessary to achieve

and maintain hot shutdown is identified as a Non-Cited

Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, III.G.2. The licensee

documented the violation in PER 02-00576 (Green).

14

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Bajraszewski, Licensing Engineer

J. Beasley, Site Quality Manager

J. Bible, Maintenance and Modifications Manager

P. Boulden, Engineer

D. Craven, TPS-TOM Service Manager

T. Davis, Fire Protection Supervisor, Watts Bar

B. Dukes, Engineer

R. Egli, Fire Protection Systems Engineer

K. Frazier, Systems Engineer

E. Freeman, Operations Manager

R. Gladney, Electrical Design Manager

J. Gomez, Lead Electrical Engineer, Watts Bar

R. Goodman, Training Manager

O. Hayes, Operations Support Superintendent

P. Johnson, Fire Operations

D. Koehl, Plant Manager

D. Lundy, Engineering Manager

J. Patrick, Senior Specialist

J. Pierce, Engineer

D. Porter, Operations

R. Proffitt, Nuclear Engineer

J. Reynolds, Nuclear Assurance

R. Rogers, Engineering Design Manager

P. Salas, Licensing and Industrial Affairs Manager

B. Simril, Fire Protection Specialist

J. Smith, Licensing Manager

J. Thomas, Mechanical/Nuclear Engineering Supervisor

E. Turner, Electrical Engineering Design

J. Wilkes, Operations Superintendent

NRC

C. Payne, Team Leader, RII

R. Tellson, Resident Inspector

15

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, and DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

50-327/02-03-01

NCV

Failure to Provide Adequate Protection for Cables to

Redundant SSD Components (Section 1R05.02)

50-327, 328/02-03-02

NCV

Inadequate Procedure Guidance for Implementing

Abnormal Operating Procedures for Plant Fires (Section

1R05.05)

50-327, 328/02-03-03

NCV

Inadequate Emergency Lighting for the RWST Suction

Valve (Section 4OA7)

50-327, 328/02-03-04

NCV

Failure to Provide Adequate Protection for Cables to the

VCT Suction Valves (Section 4OA7)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

16

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC

-

Alternating Current

ACR

-

Auxiliary Control Room

AOP

-

Abnormal Operating Procedure

APCSB

-

Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch

ASD

-

Alternative Shutdown

BTP

-

Branch Technical Position

CCP

-

Centrifugal Charging Pump

CFR

-

Code of Federal Regulations

EDG

-

Emergency Diesel Generators

ELU

-

Emergency Lighting Unit

ERCW

-

Essential Raw Cooling Water

FHA

-

Fire Hazards Analysis

FPR

-

Fire Protection Report

HVAC

-

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IPEEE

-

Individual Plant Examination for External Events

kV

-

Kilovolt

LOOP

-

Loss of Offsite Power

JPM

-

Job Performance Measure

MCC

-

Motor Control Center

MCR

-

Main Control Room

MOV

-

Motor Operated Valve

NCV

-

Non-Cited Violation

NFPA

-

National Fire Protection Association

NRC

-

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PER

-

Problem Evaluation Report

RCP

-

Reactor Coolant Pump

RCS

-

Reactor Coolant System

RG

-

Regulatory Guide

RSDP

-

Remote Shutdown Panel

RWST

-

Refueling Water Storage Tank

SCBA

-

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDP

-

Significance Determination Process

SER

-

Safety Evaluation Report

SSA

-

Safe Shutdown Analysis

SSC

-

Systems, Structures, or Components

SSD

-

Safe Shutdown

SQN

-

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

TS

-

Technical Specifications

UFSAR

-

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

V

-

Volt

VCT

-

Volume Control Tank

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures:

0-AR-M-29, Annunciator Response Fire Detection System, Rev 8

0-PI-OPS-000-708.0, 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance Verification, Rev 3

0-PI-FPU-317-299.W, Attachment 4, Operations Fire Protection Weekly Inspection, Rev 10

0-SI-FPU-031-001.R, Visual Inspection Fire Dampers, Rev 2

0-SI-FPU-410-703.0, Inspection of FPR Required Fire Doors, Rev 0

0-SI-234.6, Functional Test of Fire Protection Report Required Detectors, Rev 32

1-AR-M5-B, Annunciator Response CVCS Seal Water and RCP, Rev 28

1-SO-77-4, System Operating Instruction for Auxiliary Reactor Building Floor and Equipment

1-PI-OPS-000-010.A, Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches, Rev 0, Completed

11/13/2001

AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room, Rev 4

AOP-N.01, Plant Fires, Rev 14

AOP-N.08, Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev 0

FPI-0102, Appendix C Active Permits (Impairments), dated March 26, 2002

SPP-9.3, Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control, Rev 6

SPP-10.7, Housekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control, Rev 0S2

SSP-10.10, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev 1

SSP-10.11, Control of Ignition Sources, Rev 1

SMI-0-317-18, Special Maintenance Instruction - Appendix R - Casualty Procedures, Rev 6

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-00, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690- 0, Rev 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-01, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690- 0, Rev 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-690-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 690- 0, Rev 5

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-00, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734- 0, Rev 2

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-01, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734- 0, Rev 4

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734- 0, Rev 3

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-734-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 734- 0, Rev 4

Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-685-00, Control Building, Elevation 685- 0, Rev 3

Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-732-00, Control Building, Elevation 732- 0, Rev 4

Job Performance Measures (JPMs) and Lesson Plans:

Lesson Plan OPL273C0202, Appendix R Fires (AOP-N.01, AOP-N.08, AOP-C.04), Rev 0

PERS, Audits, and Self-Assessments:

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Biennial\\Triennial) No. SSA0101

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Annual) No. SSA0001

Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Audit (Triennial) No. SSA9802

Self Assessment Report, SQN-OPS-01-007

Self Assessment Report, SQN-OPS-09-001, Rev 1

PER 00-011423, Sequoyah Does not Perform Periodic Functional Testing on Alternate

Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls, dated 12/15/2000

PER 01-009956, Handswitches Had to be Cycled to Pass Continuity Checks During

Performance of Procedure 0-PI-OPS-000-010.A, dated 11/2/2001

2

Attachment

PER 01-010214, Discrepancies During Performance of Procedure 1-PI-OPS-000-010.A,

dated 11/8/2001

Calculations

SQN-26-D054/EPM-ABB-IMPFHA, Sequoyah Fire Hazards Analysis Calculation, Rev 31

SQN-SQS4-0127, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R,

Rev 1

SQN-APPR-1, Analysis of AC/DC Instrument and Control (I&C) Power Systems to Identify

Associated Circuits - 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sheets (Shts) 16A, 16B, 16C, 17, 37, 46, 54, 76

& 79C of 131, Appendix R Common Power Supply Analysis, Rev 7 [Coordination 125 VDC

Vital Battery Board I, II, III & IV]

SQN-APS-003,480V APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 2, Sht

C-6, Rev 15 [480 V shutdown boards]

SQN-APS-003,480V APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 3, Sht

C-7, Rev 12 [480 V reactor mov boards]

SQN-APS-003,480V APS Class 1E Load Coordination Study, Time-Current Curve # 8, Sht

C-13, Rev 28 [480 V ERCW PMP STA MCCs ]

Drawing Numbers

1-45E890-104-1, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Pressure Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1,2,4,5,6&9, Rev 4 [conduit and tray plan for charging pump cables in FAA-029]

1-45E890-103-1, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 & 9, Rev 3 [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-45E890-103-2, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 & 9, Rev 1 [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-45E890-102-2, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R RCS Inventory Control Operational & Spurious CA

Keys 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 & 9, Rev 1 [Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1-47W809-1, Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev 64

1-47W811-1, Unit 1 Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, Rev 57

1-47W610-3-3, Mechanical Control Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev 17

1-47W610-92-1, Mechanical Control Diagram Neutron Monitoring System, Rev 3

2-47W809-1, Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev 64

2-47W811-1, Unit 2 Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, Rev 48

1(2)-47W810-1, Units 1 and 2 Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram, Rev 39

1(2)-47W813-1, Units 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Rev 49

1(2)-45N767-1, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-1 Rev 26

1(2)-45N767-2, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-2 Rev 31

1(2)-45N767-3, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-3 Rev 23

1(2)-45N767-4, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-4 Rev 20

1(2)-45N767-5, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Diesel Generators Schematic Diagrams Sht-5 Rev 15

1(2)-45N765-1, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-1,

Rev 14 [6900 V Shutdown board 1A-A normal feeder breaker 1718]

1(2)-45N765-2, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-2,

Rev 16 [6900 V Shutdown board 1A-A emergency feeder breaker 1912]

3

Attachment

1(2)-45N824-7, Conduit & Grounding Floor Elevation 690.0 Ceiling Plan, Rev 2 [conduit plan for

62-90 & 91 valve cables]

1(2)-45N824-16, Conduit & Grounding Floor Elevation 690.0 Details - Sht-4, Rev 0 [conduit plan

for 62-90 valve cables]

1(2)-45N826-8, Conduit & Grounding Floor Elevations 706.0 & 714.0 Ceiling Plan, Rev 2

[Routing of pressurizer level circuits]

1(2)-45N812-5, Conduit & Grounding Floor 685.0 Details - Sht 3, Rev 1 [Routing of cables for

diesel generator start button]

1(2)-45N765-16, Wiring Diagrams 6900 V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-16,

Rev 17 [Centrifugal charging pumps]

1(2)-15E500-1, Key Diagram Station Aux Power System, Rev 22

1(2)-45N779-11, Wiring Diagrams480V Shutdown Aux Power Schematic Diagram Sht-11,

Rev 24 [MOV LCV-62-132]

1(2)-45N662-1, Wiring Diagrams Chemical & Volume Cont Sys Schematic Diagram Sht-1,

Rev 10 [AOV LCV-62-85]

1(2)-47A381-111, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning Dampers, Rev 3

1(2)-47A381-113, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning Dampers, Rev 2

1(2)-47W494 series, Fire Protection Fire Cells, Rev 6

1(2)-47W600-250, Mechanical Instruments and Controls Fire Detectors, Rev 5

1(2)-47W600-254, Mechanical Instruments and Controls Fire Detectors, Rev 2

1(2)-47W610 series, Control Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Rev 21

1(2)-47W611 series, Logic Diagram Fire Detection System, Rev 12

1(2)-47W849-1, Flow Diagram Hydrogen System for Generator Cooling, Rev 31

1(2)-47W850-2, Flow Diagram Fire Protection, Rev 25

1(2)-47W850-6A, Connectivity Diagram Fire Protection System, Rev 0

1(2)-47W866-2, Flow Diagram Heating & Ventilation Air Flow, Rev 11

1(2)-47W866-4, Flow Diagram Heating & Ventilation Air Flow, Rev 32

1(2)-47W880-26, Conduit and Grounding Cable Tray Fire Stop, Rev 2

1(2)-48W990-1, Miscellaneous Steel Fire Protection Reactor Coolant Pump Hood, Rev 3

1(2)-48W991-1, Miscellaneous Steel Fire Protection Reactor Coolant Pump, Rev 6

1(2)-47W920-8, Mechanical Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning, Rev 3

Person / Time
ML021260583
Site:	Sequoyah (DPR-077, DPR-079)
Issue date:	05/03/2002
From:	Ogle C Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-003
Download: ML021260583 (29)
v • d • e

ML021260583

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