ML020770296

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Revised Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures for Catawba, Units 1 & 2
ML020770296
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/2002
From: Gordon Peterson
Duke Power Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
Download: ML020770296 (53)
v • d • e


Text

P Duke Duke Power OrPower 4800 Concord Rd.

rk, SC 29710 A Duke Energ Cy an (803) 831-4251 OFFICE (803) 831-3221 FAx Gary R. Peterson grpeters@duke-energ. corn Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station March 4, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Please find enclosed for NRC Staff use and review the following Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures:

RP/0/A/5000/001, Classification of Emergency (Rev. 015)

RP/0/A/5000/015, Core Damage Assessment (Rev. 005)

These revisions are being submitted in accordance with 10CFR 50.54(q) and do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures or the Emergency Plan.

By copy of this letter, two copies of the above documents are being provided to the NRC, Region II.

If there are any questions, please call Tom Beadle at 803-831 4027.

Very rly yo s, Gary R. Peterson Attachments

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 4, 2002 Page 2 xc (w/attachments):

L. A. Reyes U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 (w/o attachments):

C. P. Patel NRC Senior Project Manager (CNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 H12 Washington, DC 20555-0001 D. J. Roberts Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Site

Page 1 of 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INDEX VOLUME I PROCEDURE TITLE RP/0/A/5000/001 Classification of Emergency (Rev. 015)

RP/0/A/5000/002 Notification of Unusual Event (Rev. 035)

RP/O/AI5000/003 Alert (Rev. 037)

RP/O/A/5000/004 Site Area Emergency (Rev. 039)

RP/O/A15000/005 General Emergency (Rev. 039)

RP/0/A/5000/06 Deleted RP/0/A/5000/006 A Notifications to States and Counties from the Control Room (Rev. 014)

RP/O/A/5000/006 B Notifications to States and Counties from the Technical Support Center (Rev. 014)

RP/0/A/5000/006 C Deleted RP/0/A/5000/007 Natural Disaster and Earthquake (Rev. 021)

RP/O/A/5000/08 Deleted RP/O/B/5000/008 Spill Response (Rev. 020)

RP/O/A/5000/009 Collision/Explosion (Rev. 006)

RP/O/A/5000/0 10 Conducting A Site Assembly or Preparing the Site for an Evacuation (Rev. 014)

RP/O/A/5000/l 1 Deleted RP/O/B/5000/ 12 Deleted RP/OIB/5000/0 13 NRC Notification Requirements (Rev. 029)

RP/O/B/5000/14 Deleted RP/0/A15000/015 Core Damage Assessment (Rev. 005)

RP/O/B/5000/0 16 Deleted RP/O/B/5000/17 Deleted February 28, 2002

Page 2 of 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INDEX VOLUME I PROCEDURE TITLE RP/O/A/5000/0 18 Emergency Worker Dose Extension (1/15/96)

RP/0/B/5000/019 Deleted RP/O/A/5000/020 Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation Procedure (Rev. 015)

RP/O/A/5000/021 Deleted RP/0/B/5000/022 Evacuation Coordinator Procedure (Rev. 004)

RP/0/B/5000/023 Deleted RP/0/A/5000/024 OSC Activation Procedure (Rev. 009)

RP/0/B/5000/025 Recovery and Reentry Procedure (Rev. 003)

RP/O/B/5000/026 Site Response to Security Events (Rev. 003)

"RP/0/B/5000/028 Communications and Community Relations EnergyQuest Emergency Response Plan (Rev. 001)

February 28, 2002

Page 3 of 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INDEX VOLUME II PROCEDURE TITLE HP/0/B/1000/006 Emergency Equipment Functional Check and Inventory (Rev. 053)

HP/0/B/1009/001 Radiation Protection Recovery Plan (Rev. 008)

HP/0/B/1009/003 Radiation Protection Response Following a Primary to Secondary Leak (Rev. 008)

HP/0/B/1009/004 Environmental Monitoring for Emergency Conditions Within the Ten-Mile Radius of CNS (Rev. 028)

HP/0/B/1009/005 Personnel/Vehicle Monitoring for Emergency Conditions (Rev. 016)

HP/0/B/1009/006 Alternative Method for Determining Dose Rate Within the Reactor Building (Rev. 008)

HP/0/B/1009/007 In-Plant Particulate and Iodine Monitoring Under Accident Conditions (Rev. 019)

HP/0/B/1009/008 Contamination Control of Injured Individuals (Rev. 015)

HP/0/B/1009/009 Guidelines for Accident and Emergency Response (Rev. 039)

HP/0/B/1009/014 Radiation Protection Actions Following an Uncontrolled Release of Radioactive Material (Rev. 008)

HP/0/B/1009/016 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release (Rev. 011)

HP/0/B/1009/017 Deleted HP/1/B/1009/017 Deleted HP/2/B/1009/017 Deleted HP/0/B/1009/018 Deleted HP/0/B/1009/019 Emergency Radio System Operation, Maintenance and Communication (Rev. 010)

HP/O/B/1009/024 Implementing Procedure for Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post Accident Conditions (Rev. 002)

February 28, 2002

Page 4 of 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INDEX VOLUME II PROCEDURE TITLE HP/O/B/1009/025 Deleted HPlO/B!1009/026 On-Shift Offsite Dose Projections (Rev. 003)

SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections (Rev. 001)

SH/O/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions (Rev. 002)

OP/O/A/6200/021 Post Accident Liquid Sampling System II+ (Rev. 034)

SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure for Public Affairs Response to the Emergency Operations Facility (Rev. 003)

SR/OfB/2000/002 Standard Procedure for EOF Services (Rev. 002)

SR/0/B/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (Rev. 008)

SR/O/B/2000/004 Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility (Rev. 004)

February 28, 2002

(l1O4-M1 Duke Power Company (1)ID No. RP/O/N5o0o/015 PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 5 3AD AT'rllT 2 Station CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure Title Core Damaae Assessment (4) Prepared By 'JJA" Date -214 z ..

(5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

El Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes)

ONo (Revision with minor changes)

U No (To incorporate previously approved changes)

(6) Reviewed By -- /I/*.1- _za4 (QR) Date Zi - 6--z Cross-Disciplinary Review By (QR) NA _4 Date. Lz Reactivity Mgmt. Review By (OR) NA __Date__ _

Mgmt. Involvement Review By (Ops. Supt.) NA_!§L__Date. 2-/2 1/k2,,

(7) Additional Reviews

(P Date Z- -Z*O "-ef Reviewed By 64-1-4 L-

  • L.
  • Reviewed By Date (r Temporary Approval (if necessary)

Bv t'l "By I OSM/QR) Date By QR) Date I

(9) Approved By (V- aj - Date -- 2_'- o2z.

PERFORMANCE (Compare with control copy every 14 calendar days while work is being performed.)

(10) Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy n +

(11) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLETION (12) Procedure Completion Verification

[] Yes 0 N/A Check lists and/or blanks properly initialed, signed, dated, or filled in N/A, as appropriate?

O Yes 0l N/A Required enclosures attached?

O Yes El N/A Data sheets attached, completed, dated, and signed?

0I Yes 0l N/A Charts, graphs, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?

El Yes 0l N/A Procedure requirements met?

Verified By By Verified fl tc Daten

(. -rocedure Completion Approved Date (14) Remarks (attachadditionalpages, if necessary)

I Duke Power Company Procedure No.

Catawba Nuclear Station RP/O/A/5000/015 Revision No.

Core Damage Assessment 005

--E.P.I.P-Continuous Use Electronic Reference No.

CN005GNY J ______________________________________________________________

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 2 of 12 Core Damage Assessment

1. Symptoms NOTE: This procedure will normally be performed by Nuclear Engineers while in the Technical Support Center (TSC) to provide a means of determining the status of the core based on various parameters.

1.1 1(2) EME 53, "Containment Radiation Monitor" in alarm.

1.2 High Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) readings.

1.3 Low Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) levels.

1.4 High containment hydrogen concentrations.

1.5 Any condition in which failed fuel is suspected.

2. Immediate Actions None
3. Subsequent Actions 3.1 Identify Current Plant Status 3.1.1 Complete the following table based on current plant data.

Time of data, (mm/dd/yy hh:mm)

Time of Reactor Shutdown, To Hours (CET)

Core Exit Thermocouples (GD ERORXG, P0828) Deg F RVLIS (GD ERORXG, P0180 or P0181)  %

Containment Radiation Monitors 1(2)EMF 53A or B R/hr (GD ERORXG, A1308 or A1314)

RP/0/A/5000/015 Page 3 of 12 3.1.2 Determine possible status of reactor core using table below:

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 4 of 12 Figure 1 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for RCS Release 10 cc 0 1 0

E 0.

0.1 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Time After Shutdown, hours IgContainment Time for Radiation RCS Release Level vs.

Time After Containment Dose Rate Shutdown (hrs) (Rad/hr) 0.5 9.1808 1 8.8621 2 8.3792 8 7.0574 16 6.2611 24 5.7672 100 3.8545 240 2.3002 720 0.41169

RPIOtAI50001015 Page 5 of 12 Figure 2 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 1% Fuel Overtemperature Release 1.OOE+04 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIII I I I

U' ThTh

,. 1.00E+03

-1ý "OA I - *i -

1 M'rft-'ftM6..

-I-I-----f- -I - 4 -= -, i 4 4- -I 4 4 4 4 4 - .1- I - 4 4- I jj71 o 1.00E+02 Ii 0

4.!

L4 r 4

-- 141~ l f1

- I - ___________

III1*111 7*

E ifi 0

C m

Ji.

1.00E+01 L4 '# L 4-4-.

44 i-I 1.OOE+00 0

S. . . . I 100

' ' ' LII:>

200

, ]

i 300 I

400 I

500 I T I 600 I

  • I I 700 I

800 Time After Shutdown, hours

-- RCS Press < 1600 psig, no spray 4-RCS Press < 1600 psig, withpay Pe >1r-RSPress>

1600 pg spray

ý:RCS Press > 1600 psig, no spray -"-*-RCS Press > 1600 psig, with sprayl Fure 2 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 1% Fuel Overtemperature Release Time After RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure Shutdown < 1600 psig, < 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, (hrs) no Spray with Spray no Spray with Spray (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) -(Rad/Hr (Rad/Hr) 0.5 5.30E+03 5.07E+03 2.23E+03 2.21 E+03 1 4.39E+03 4.20E+03 1.85E+03 1.84E+03 2 3.16E+03 3.02E+03 1.32E+03 1.31 E+03 8 1.13E+03 1.06E+03 4.32E+02 4.29E+02 16 6.45E+02 5.97E+02 2.30E+02 2.27E+02 24 5.15E+02 4.79E+02 1.84E+02 1.82E+02 100 2.90E+02 2.76E+02 1.08E+02 1.07E+02 240 1.54E+02 1.45E+02 5.11E+01 5.06E+01 720 3.49E+01 3.13E+01 5.44E+00 5.26E+00

RP/O/A/5000/0 15 Page 6 of 12

_ 3.1.3 IF status of core is "no core damage", exit this procedure and continue to monitor plant conditions. If conditions warrant, re-run this procedure.

IF status of core is "possible fuel rod cladding damage", proceed to Step 3.2.

IF status of core is "possible fuel overtemperature damage", proceed to Step 3.3.

3.2 Clad Damage Assessment NOTE: EMF 53 may not be useful to assess core damage for containment bypass sequences (e.g.,

S/G tube ruptures).

3.2.1 Record 1(2)EMF 53 reading and other data:

R/hr at hours after shutdown.

Containment Spray: LI ON EL OFF RCS Pressure: psig 3.2.2 Determine "Predicted Containment Radiation Level at 100% Clad Damage" using Figure 3.

Predicted Containment Radiation Level at 100% Clad Damage:

R/Hr

__ 3.2.3. Estimate clad damage:

% Clad DamagecRM = (EMF 53 + Predicted Cont. Rad Level at 100%)

  • 100

% Clad DamagecRM = ( + )*100=  %

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 7 of 12 Figure 3 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Clad Damage Release 1.OOE+05 I--

ft IA .4 -MMM -

1.OOE+04 I f I- 1- - - -

I

- f<, t I I I

- + 4 I-- I I 4=

I-4 44Zz44

. =:I

-I 6 1.OOE+03 7ý7 ý111 ý!I M

0 E 1.00E+02 I

= 1 0 -

0 F 4-4 1.OOE+01 i

1.OOE+00 I

-4 0 100 200 300 400 --

500 600 700 800 Time After Shutdown, hours

--- RCS Press < 1600 psig, no spray ---- RCS Press < 1600psig. with spray

RCS Press> 1600 psig, no spray -RCS Press> 1600 psig, with spray Figure 3 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Clad Damage Release Time After RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure Shutdown < 1600 psig, < 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, (hrs) no Spray with Spray no Spray with Spray (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) 0.5 3.37E+04 2.91E+04 1.11 E+04 1.1OE+04 1 2.78E+04 2.42E+04 9.24E+03 9.17E+03 2 2.03E+04 1.75E+04 6.58E+03 6.52E+03 8 8.09E+03 6.25E+03 2.17E+03 2.13E+03 16 4.96E+03 3.48E+03 1.15E+03 1.12E+03 24 3.98E+03 2.68E+03 9.24E+02 8.98E+02 100 2.19E+03 1.30E+03 5.40E+02 5.22E+02 240 1.29E+03 6.23E+02 2.57E+02 2.44E+02 720 4.22 E+02 6.54E+01 2.81E+01 2.10E+01

RP/0/A/5000/015 Page 8 of 12

-3.2.4 Record number of available core exit thermocouples(CETs)(GD EROCOREI(2,3)):

3.2.5 IF RCS pressure is greater than 1600 psig, record number of CETs greater than 1400 TF:

3.2.6 IF RCS pressure is less than 1600 psig, record number of CETs greater than 1200 TF:

-3.2.7 Estimate clad damage:

% Clad DamagecET = (3.2.5 OR 3.2.6 ÷ 3.2.4)

  • 100

% Clad DamagecET = ( + _)* 100=  %

.3.2.8 Confirm reasonableness of clad damage estimates using expected responses below:

"* RVLIS less than 54% AND greater than 39%

"* Hot Leg RTD greater than Tsar AND less than 650TF

"* Source Ranges greater than 104 cps

"* Difference in clad damage estimates from Containment Radiation Monitor (EMIF 53) and CETs less than 50%, using:

L %Cl ABSF %CladDamagecRM - %Cladna

%CladDamagec1 amagecJ IL %CladDamagecRM 3.2.9 IF the expected response is not obtained, determine if the deviation can be explained from the accident progression

"* Injection of water to the RCS

"* Bleed Paths from the RCS

"* Direct radiation to the containment radiation monitors OR from conservatism in the predictive model

  • fuel burnup
  • fission product retention in the RCS
  • fission product removal from containment

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 9 of 12 3.2.10 Report estimate of clad damage to TSC Engineering Manager and to EOF Reactor Physics.

3.3 Fuel Overtemperature Damage Assessment

_ 3.3.1 Record 1(2)EMF 53 reading and other data:

R/hr at hours after shutdown.

Containment Spray: 11 ON 11 OFF RCS Pressure: psig 3.3.2 Determine "Predicted Containment Radiation Level at 100% Overtemp Damage" using Figure 4.

Predicted Containment Radiation Level at 100% Overtemp Clad Damage:

R/Hr

_ 3.3.3 Estimate core damage:

% Core DamagecRM = (EMF 53 + Predicted Cont. Rad Level at 100%)

  • 100

% Core DamageCRM=( = )* 100 =  %

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 10 of 12 Figure 4 Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Fuel Overtemperature Release 1.OOE+06 i I 4 - -4. -- 11111

- Ft U

o 1.OOE+05 "U

ao{0 1.00E+04

? k-C E

c T Th I-0 I.UU00-HU

'ThI I

$-lA-I >4 dI Li4 -4 v 1.OOE+02

'I* -4 j 4

-I I

1 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Time After Shutdown, hours P--0RCS Press < 1600 psig, no spray -- RCS Press < 1600 psig, with sprayl

--*f-RCS Press> 1600 psig, no spray -- '-RCS Press> 1600 psig, with sprayj Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Fuel Overtemperature Release Time RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure RCS Pressure After < 1600 psig, < 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, > 1600 psig, Shutdown no Spray with Spray no Spray with Spray (hrs) (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) (Rad/Hr) 0.5 5.30E+05 5.07E+05 2.23E+05 2.21 E+05 1 4.39 E+05 4.20E+05 1.85E+05 1.84E+05 2 3.16E+05 3.02E+05 1.32E+05 1.31 E+05 8 1.13E+05 1.06E+05 4.32E+04 4.29E+04 16 6.45E+04 5.97E+04 2.30E+04 2.27E+04 24 5.15E+04 4.79E+04 1.84E+04 1.82E+04 100 2.90E+04 2.76E+04 1.08E+04 1.07E+04 240 1.54E+04 1.45E+04 5.11E+03 5.06E+03 720 3.49E+03 3.13E+03 5.44E+02 5.26E+02

RP/0/A/5000/015 Page 11 of 12 3.3.4 Record number of available core exit thermocouples(CETs)(GD EROGROUP 1(2,3)): _

3.3.5 Record number of CETs greater than 2000 'F:

3.3.6 Estimate core damage:

% Core DamagecEr = (3.3.5 - 3.3.4)

  • 100

% Core DamagecEr = ( -)* 100 =  %

3.3.7 Confirm reasonableness of core damage estimates using expected responses below.

  • Hot Leg RTD greater than 650TF
  • Source Ranges greater than 104 cps
  • Difference in core damage estimates from Containment Radiation Monitors (CRM) and CET's less than 50%, using:

ABS[ % Core DamagecRI - % Core Damagecz

% Core DamagecRM j 3.3.8 IF the expected response is not obtained, determine if the deviation can be explained from the accident progression

  • Injection of water to the RCS
  • Bleed Paths from the RCS
  • Direct radiation to the containment radiation monitors OR from conservatism in the predictive model

"* fuel burnup

"* fission product retention in the RCS

  • fission product removal from containment 3.3.9 Report estimate of core damage to TSC Engineering Manager and to EOF Reactor Physics.

RP/O/A/5000/015 Page 12 of 12

4. Enclosures None
5. References 5.1 Duke Power Calculation DPC-1229.00-00-0006, "Estimated Sample Dose and CDAG Setpoint Calculations in Support of PASS Removal", Rev 0, 6/01/01.

5.2 WCAP-14696-A, " Westinghouse Owners Group Core Damage Assessment Guidance",

Revision 1, November, 1999.

5.3 Unit Data Book.

5.4 MNS procedure RP/O/A/5700/019, Core Damage Assessment.

(R04-OI)

Duke Power Company (1) ID No. RP/OA/5000/001 PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 015 P' "'ARATION (2)-Station Catawba (3) Procedure Title CIlassification of Emergencv (4) Prepared By & ea-ff- " , - " Date Z'z c*2-(5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

[] Yes (New procedure or revision with major changes)

El No (Revision with minor changes) li No (To incorporate previously approved changes (6) Reviewed By (QR)

Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By __(QR) NA__ Z- -11 Date Mgmt. Involvement Review By (Ons. Sunt. NA&"" Date (7) Additional Reviews Reviewed By Date Reviewed By Date (8) Temporary Approval (if necessary)

By OSM/QR) Date By (i Approved By Date

-Z) 2T /0 -,

PERFORMANCE (Compare with control copy every 14 calendardays while work is being performed.)

(10) Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy Date Compared with Control Copy Date (I1) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLETION (12) Procedure Completion Verification:

El Yes El NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA. as appropriate?

El Yes El NA Required enclosures attached?

El Yes El NA Data sheets attached, completed, dated, and signed" El Yes El NA Charts, graphs. etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?

El Yes El NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified By Date (13) Procedure Completion Approved Date (14) Remarks (Attach additionalpages, if necessary)

Duke Power Company Procedure No.

Catawba Nuclear Station RPIO/A/5000/001 Revision No.

Classification of Emergency 015 Multiple Use Electronic Reference No.

CN005GNK L CNOO5GNK

RP/O/A/5000/001 Page 2 of 3 Classification of Emergency

1. Symptoms 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs.

1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

1.4 General Emergency 1.4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

1.4.2 Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

2. Immediate Actions 2.1 Determine operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response of the event.

__ 2.2 IF the plant was in Mode 1-4 and a valid condition affects fission plrodLuct barriers, proceed to Enclosure 4. 1.

RP/O/A/5000/001 Page 3 of 3 2.3 IF a General Emergency is NOT declared in Step 2.2 OR the condition does not affect fission product barriers, review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one the categories shown.

2.4 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Levels listed, then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

2.5 Implement the applicable Emergency Response Procedure (RP) for that classification and continue with subsequent steps of this procedure.

Notification of Unusual Event RP/O/A/5000/002 Alert RP/O/A/5000/003 Site Area Emergency RP/O/A/5000/004 General Emergency RP/O/A/5000/005

3. Subsequent Actions 3.1 To escalate, de-escalate, or terminate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosures 4.1 through 4.7.

3.2 Refer to enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declaration Guidelines, as needed.

4. Enclosures 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 System Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power 4.6 Fires/Explosions and Security Events 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety 4.8 Definitions/Acronyms 4.9 Emergency Declaration Guidelines 4.10 Radiation Monitor Reading for Enclosure 4.3 EALs

Enclo( ý 4.1 RP/O/A/I '001 Fission Barrier Matrix Page 1 of 5 Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all 3 barriers. Classify according to the table below.

Note 1: This table is only applicable in Modes 1-4.

Note 2: Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Note 3: When determining Fission Product Barrier status, the Fuel Clad Barrier should be considered to be lost or potentially lost if the conditions for the Fuel Clad Barrier loss or potential loss EALs were met previously during the event, even if the conditions do not currently exist.

Note 4: Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained. The STA should be consulted to affirm that a CSF has been validated and the appropriate functional restoration procedure has been implemented prior to the CSF being used as a basis to classify an emergency.

EAL # Unusual Event EAL # Alert EAL # Site Area Emergency EAL # General Emergency

4. I.UI Potential Loss of 4. I.A.I Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1.S.1 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.I.G.1 Loss of All Three Barriers Containment of of Both Nuclear Coolant System Nuclear Coolant System AND Fuel Clad 4.1.U.2 Loss of Containment 4. I.A.2 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1 .S.2 Loss 4. I.G.2 Loss of Any Two Barriers of AND AND Fuel Clad Potential Loss Potential Loss of the Third Combinations of Both Nuclear Coolant System AND Fuel Clad
4. I.A.3 Potential Loss of 4.1.S.3 Loss of Containment Containment AND AND Loss OR Potential Loss Loss OR Potential Loss of Any Other Barrier of Any Other Barrier

( Enclon B.. e 4.1Ma Fission Barrier Matrix RP/O/A/5f '001 Page 2 of 5 NOTE: If a barrier is affected, it has a single point value based on a "potential loss" or a "loss". "Not Applicable" is included in the table as a place holder only, and has no point value assigned.

Barrier Points (1-5) Potential Loss (X) Loss (X) Total Points Classification Containment 1 3 1- 3 Unusual Event NCS 4 5 4-6 Alert Fuel Clad 4 5 7-10 Site Area Emergency Total Points 11 -13 General Emergency

1. Compare plant conditions against the Fission Banrier Matrix on pages 3 through 6 of 6.
2. Determine the "potential loss" or "loss" status for each barrier (Containment, NCS and Fuel Clad) based on the EAL symptom description.
3. For each barrier, write the highest single point value applicable for the barrier in the "Points" column and mark the appropriate "loss" column.
4. Add the points in the "Points" column and record the sum as "Total Points".
5. Determine the classification level based on the number of "Total Points".
6. In the table on page I of 6, under the "classification" column, select the event number (e.g. 4. I.A. I for Loss of Nuclear Coolant System) that best fits the loss of barrier descriptions.
7. Using the number (e.g. 4.1.A. 1) select the preprinted notification form and complete the required information for Emergency Coordinator approval and transmittal.

EncIos"e 4.1 C RP/O/A/5( too I Fission Batk. er Matrix Page 3 of -

4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAE BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS (I Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

Ip

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status Containment-RED
  • Not applicable NCS Integrity-Red Not applicable Core Cooling Core Cooling-Red Orange
  • Core cooling-RED
  • Heat Sink-Red Path is indicated 6 Heat Sink-Red for >15 minutes
2. Containment Conditions 2. NCS Leak Rate 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level

" Containment

  • Rapid unexplained Unisolable leak GREATER THAN 6 Not applicable
  • Coolant Activity Pressure > 15 PSIG decrease in exceeding the available makeup GREATER THAN containment capacity of one capacity as 300 ILCi/cc Dose

" H2 concentration > pressure following charging pump in indicated by a loss Equivalent Iodine 9% initial increase the normal of NCS subcooling. (DEI) 1-131 charging mode

" Containment

  • Containment with letdown pressure greater than pressure or suMp isolated.

3 psig with less than level response not one full train of NS consistent with and a VX-CARF LOCA conditions.

operating.

CONTINUED CONTINUED CONTINUED

( Enckr 4.1 RPIO/A/4 '001 Fission Barrier Matrix Page 4 of 5 4.1.C CONTAINM ENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS (I Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

II im

3. Containment Isolation Valves Status After 3. SG Tube Rupture 3. Containment Radiation Monitoring Containment Isolation Actuation Not applicable Containment Primary-to
  • Indication that a Not applicable
  • Containment isolation is Secondary leak SG is Ruptured and radiation monitor incomplete and a rate exceeds the has a Non-Isolable 53 A or 53 B release path from capacity of one secondary line fault reading >117 R/hr containment exists chargino pump in the normal
  • Indication that a charging mode SG is ruptured and with letdown a prolonged release isolated. of contaminated secondary coolant is occurring from the affected SG to the environment
4. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary-to- 4. Containment Radiation Monitoring 4. Emergencv Coordinator/EOF Director

[ I II Secondary Leakage Judgement Not applicable

  • Release of 0 Not applicable 0 Not applicable Any condition, including inability to monitor secondary side to the barrier, that in the opinion of the the environment Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director with primary to indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of secondary leakage the fuel clad barrier.

GREATER THAN Tech Spec allowable END CONTINUED CONTINUED

RP/O/A/5  %'/O01

( Enclo7,'"e 4.1 Fission Bait .er Matrix Page 5 of 4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CL AD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS LOSS (I Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

Imll roll

5. Significant Radioactive Inventory In 5. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Containment Judgement Containment Rad. 6 Not applicable Any condition, including inability to monitor Monitor EMF53A or the barrier, that in the opinion of the 53B Emergency Coordinator /EOF Director Reading @ time since indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of shutdown: the NCS barrier.

>470 R/hr @ 0-0.5 hr

> 170 R/hr @ 0.5-2 hr

> 125 R/hr @ 2-4 hr

> 90 R/hr @ 4 - 8 hr

> 53 R/hr @ > 8 hr END

6. Emergency Coordinator /EOF Director Judgement Any condition, including inability to monitor the barrier, that in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of the containment barrier.

END H

C Encdosur, RP/O/A/5000/001 (

System Malfunctions Page I of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a END Shutdown Within Technical Safety System Annunciation or Significant Transient in Specification Limits. Indication in Control Room Progress.

With Either (1) a Significant OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required Indicators Unavailable.

operating mode within Technical 4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions Specifications LCO Action Statement OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 exist:

Time.

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist: Loss of most (>50%)

4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety Annunciators associated with System Annunciation or Indication in Unplanned loss of most (>50%) safety systems.

the Control Room for Greater Than annunciators associated with safety 15 Minutes. systems for greater than 15 minutes. AND OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3, 4 AND A significant plant transient is in progress.

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist: In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency AND Unplanned loss of most (>50%) Coordinator/EOF Director, the annunciators associated with safety loss of the annunciators or Loss of the OAC.

systems for greater than 15 minutes. indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift AND AND compliment) to safely operate the unit. Inability to provide manual AND monitoring of any of the In the opinion of the Operations Shift following Critical Safety Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF EITHER of the following: Functions:

Director, the loss of the annunciators

  • subcriticality or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift "* core cooling compliment) to safely operate the unit.
  • Loss of the OAC. "* heat sink

"* containment.

CONTINUED END END

( (

Enclosur I RP/O/A/5000/001 System Malfunctions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3:*

4.2.U.3-1 Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than the Technical Specifications allowable limit. (*Mode 3 with TAV >5000 F) 4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS)

Leakage.

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 4.2.U.4-1 Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage > 25 gpm 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offisite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

END

( Enclosure(

RP/O/A/5000K,..

Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 1 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose or Liquid Radioactivity to the of Gaseous or Liquid Resulting from an Resulting from an Environment that Exceeds Two Radioactivity to the Actual or Imminent Actual or Imminent Times the SLC Limits for 60 Environment that Release of Release of Minutes or Longer. Exceeds 200 Times the Radioactivity Exceeds Radioactivity that SLC limits for 15 100 mRem TEDE or Exceeds 1000 mRem OPERATING MODE: ALL Minutes or Longer. 500 mRem CDE Adult TEDE or 5000 mRem Thyroid for the Actual CDE Adult Thyroid for 4.3.U.1-1 A valid Trip 2 alarm on radiation OPERAT 'ING MODE: ALL or Projected Duration the Actual or Projected monitor EMF-49L or EMF-57 for > 60 of the Release. Duration of the minutes or will likely continue for > 60 4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on Release.

minutes which indicates that the radiation monitor EMF- 49L OPERATING MODE: ALL release may have exceeded the or EMF-57 of > 1.2E+05 cpm OPERATING MODE: ALL initiating condition and indicates the for_> 15 minutes or will likely 4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on need to assess the release with continue for >15 minutes, radiation monitor EMF 4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on procedure HP/O/B/ 1009/014. which indicates that the 36L of> 2.7E+06 cpm radiation monitor EMF release may have exceeded sustained for_> 15 36H of> 8.3E+03 cpm 4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation the initiating condition and minutes. sustained for> 15 monitor EMF- 36L of > 3.OOE+04 indicates the need to assess minutes.

cpm for > 60 minutes or will likely the release with procedure 4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team continue for Ž-60 minutes, which HP/O/B/ 1009/014. calculations indicate dose 4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team indicates that the release may have consequences greater calculations indicate dose exceeded the initiating condition and than 100 mRem TEDE or consequences greater indicates the need to assess the release 500 mRem CDE Adult than 1000 mRem TEDE with procedure SHI/0/B/2005/001. (Continued) Thyroid at the site or 5000 mRem CDE boundary. Adult Thyroid at the site (Continued) boundary.

(Continued)

(Continued)

( Enclosur 4 RP/O/A/500,.I Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 2 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released 4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on 4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey 4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for> radiation monitor EMF- 36L results or field survey results or field survey 60 minutes as determined by RP of> 5.4E+05 cpm forŽ> 15 samples indicates dose samples indicates dose procedure. minutes or will likely consequences greater consequences greater continue for Ž--15 minutes, than 100 mRem TEDE or than 1000 mRem TEDE 4.3.U.1-4 Liquid effluent being released exceeds which indicates that the 500 mRem CDE Adult or 5000 mRem CDE two times SLC 16.11-1 for> 60 release may have exceeded Thyroid at the site Adult Thyroid at the site minutes as determined by RP the initiating condition and boundary. boundary.

procedure. indicates the need to assess the release with procedure Note 1: These EMF readings are Note 1: These EMF readings are Note: If the monitor reading is sustained for SH/I/B/2005/001. calculated based on average calculated based on average the time period indicated in the EAL annual meteorology, site annual meteorology, site AND the required assessments 4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being boundary dose rate, and boundary dose rate, and (procedure calculations) cannot be released exceeds 200 times design unit vent flow rate. design unit vent flow rate.

completed within this time period, the level of SLC 16.11-6 for Calculations by the dose Calculations by the dose declaration must be made based on the > 15 minutes as determined assessment team use actual assessment team use actual valid radiation monitor reading. by RP procedure. meteorology, release meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow duration, and unit vent flow (Continued) 4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released rate. Therefore, these EMF rate. Therefore, these EMF exceeds 200 times the level of readings should not be used if readings should not be used SLC 16.11-1 for> 15 dose assessment team if dose assessment team minutes as determined by RP calculations are available. calculations are available.

procedure.

Note 2: If dose assessment team Note 2: If dose assessment team Note: If the monitor reading is calculations cannot be calculations cannot be sustained for the time period completed in 15 minutes, then completed in 15 minutes, then indicated in the EAL AND valid monitor reading should valid monitor the required assessments be used for emergency reading should be used for (procedure calculations) classification. emergency classification.

cannot be completed within this time period, declaration END END must be made based on the valid radiation monitor reading.

(Continued)

( Enclosure(

RP/O/A/5000/uo Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 3 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Radiation or Airborne Irradiated Fuel or Loss Concentration. of Water Level that Has or Will Result in OPERATING MODE: ALL the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside 4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water level the Reactor Vessel.

decrease of greater than 6 inches in the reactor refueling cavity with all OPERATING MODE: ALL irradiated fuel assemblies remaining 4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip covered by water. 11alarm on any of the following radiation 4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of monitors:

greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal with all Spent Fuel Building irradiated fuel assemblies remaining Refueling Bridge covered by water. IEMF-15 2EMF-4 4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area EMIF reading, increases by a factor of 1000 over Spent Fuel Pool normal levels as shown in Enclosure Ventilation 4.10. IEMF-42 2EMF-42 END Reactor Building Refueling Bridge (applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only)

IEMF-17 2EMF-2 Containment Noble Gas Monitor (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only)

IEMF-39 2EMF-39 I

(Continued)

(

f Enclosure( RP/O/A/5000,.,.

Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 4 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level <95% after initiation of NC system make-Lup.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or" reactor vessel.

4.3.A.2-4 Spent Fuel Pool or Fuel Transfer Canal level decrease of >2 feet after initiation of makeup.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being fully lowered into the spent fuel pool racks or transfer canal fuel transfer system basket.

(Continued)

/"

( Enclosure( RP/O/A/5OOO ..

Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 5 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.3.A.3-1 Valid reading on EMF-12 greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mR/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

4.3.A.3-3 Valid radiation monitor reading exceeds the levels shown in Enclosure 4,10, END

( Enclosure (

RP/O/A/ 5 000,,J.

Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY END 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System Protection System Protection System to Instrumentation to Complete Instrumentation to Complete Complete an Automatic Trip or Initiate an Automatic or Initiate an Automatic and Manual Trip was NOT Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Trip Once a Successful and There is Reactor Protection System Reactor Protection System Indication of an Extreme Setpoint Has Been Exceeded Setpoint Has Been Exceeded Challenge to the Ability to and Manual Trip Was and Manual Trip Was NOT Cool the Core.

Successful. Successful.

OPERATING MODE: 1 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3 OPERATING MODE: 1 4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist: 4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

Valid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip signal received or required and received or required and received or required and automatic reactor trip automatic reactor trip automatic reactor trip was not successful.

was not successful. was not successful.

AND AND AND Manual reactor trip from the Manual reactor trip from the Manual reactor trip from the control room was not control room is successful and control room was not successful in reducing reactor reactor power is less than 5% successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and and decreasing. power to less than 5% and decreasing.

decreasing.

(Continued) AND (Continued) EITHER of the following conditions exist:

"* Core Cooling CSF-RED

"* Heat Sink CSF-RED.

END

Enclosure( RP/O/A/500g o

Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function in Cold Shutdown. Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: 5,6 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of ND and/or RN and/or KC. 4.4.S.2-1 Subcriticality CSF-RED.

AND 4.4.S.2-2 Heat Sink CSF-RED.

One of the following: 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or

"* Inability to maintain Will Uncover Fuel in the reactor coolant temperature Reactor Vessel.

below 200'F OPERATING MODE: 5,6

"* Uncontrolled reactor 4.4.S.3-1 Failure of heat sink causes loss coolant temperature rise to of cold shutdown conditions.

> 180'F. AND Lower range Reactor Vessel END Level Indication System (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.So3-2 Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Reactor Coolant (NC) system mid or wide range level less than 11% and decreasing after initiation of NC system I

makeup, (Continued)

( Enclosure RP/O/A/500- 1 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.S.3-3 Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

END

( Enclosure(.., (

RP/O/A/5000/001 Loss of Power Page I of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.I Loss of All Offsite 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All Power to Essential Power and Loss of All Power and Loss of All (Offsite and Onsite) AC Busses for Greater Than Onsite AC Power to Onsite AC Power to Power.

15 Minutes. Essential Busses During Essential Busses.

Cold Shutdown Or OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 Refueling Mode. OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all 4.5.U.1-1 The following conditions OPERATING MODE: 5, 6, No 4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and offsite and onsite AC exist: Mode onsite AC power as power as indicated by:

indicated by:

Loss of offsite power to 4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and Loss of power on essential essential buses ETA and onsite AC power as Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for ETB for greater than 15 indicated by: buses ETA and ETB. greater than 15 minutes.

minutes.

Loss of power on essential AND AND AND buses ETA and ETB.

Failure to restore power to Standby Shutdown Both emergency diesel AND at least one essential bus Facility (SSF) fails to generators are supplying within 15 minutes. supply NC pump seal power to their respective Failure to restore power to injection OR CA supply essential busses. at least one essential bus 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC to Steam Generators.

within 15 minutes. Power.

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6, No AND Mode (Continued) OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 At least one of the (Continued) following conditions (Continued) exist:

Restoration of at least one essential bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely (Continued)

( Enclosure( RP/O/A/5000(

Loss of Power Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.1-2 The following conditions 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions

  • Indication of exist: busses reduced to a exist: continuing Loss of offsite power to single power source for degradation of core essential buses ETA and greater than 15 minutes Unplanned loss of both cooling based on ETB for greater than 15 such that an additional unit related busses: EBA Fission Product minutes. single failure could and EBD both <112 Barrier monitoring.

result in station VDC, and EBB and EBC AND blackout. both <109 VDC. END One emergency diesel OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 AND generator is supplying power to its respective 4.5.A.2-1 The following condition Failure to restore power to essential bus. exists: at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes 4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of AC power capability has from the time of loss.

Required DC Power been degraded to one During Cold Shutdown essential bus powered END or Refueling Mode for from a single power Greater than 15 source for > 15 min. due Minutes. to the loss of all but one of:

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 4.5.U.2-1 The following conditions SATA SATB exist: ATC ATD D/G A DIG B.

Unplanned loss of both unit related busses: EBA END and EBD both <112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

END

( Enclosure(

RP/O/A/5000 I Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.1 Security Event in a Plant 4.6.G.1 Security Event Resulting in Boundary Not Extinguished the Operability of Plant Vital Area. Loss Of Ability to Reach and Within 15 Minutes of Safety Systems Required to Maintain Cold Shutdown.

Detection OR Explosion Establish or Maintain Safe OPERATING MODE: ALL Within the Protected Area Shutdown. OPERATING MODE: ALL Boundary. 4.6.S.1-1 Intrusion into any of the OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4,5,6 following plant areas by a 4.6.G.1-1 Loss of physical control of the OPERATING MODE: ALL hostile force: control room due to security 4.6.A.I-1 The following conditions exist: "*Reactor Building event, 4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the following (Non-security events) "*Auxiliary Building areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

"*Diesel Generator Rooms

"*Control Room 4.6.G.1-2 Loss of physical control of the SSF and ASP due to security I

notification or verification of a "* Reactor Building "*RN Pumphouse event.

control room fire alarm. "* Auxiliary Building "*SSF

"* Diesel Generator Rooms "*Doghouses END

"* Reactor Building "* Control Room "*CAS

"* Auxiliary Building "* RN Pumphouse "*SAS.

"* Diesel Generator Rooms "* SSF

"* Control Room "* CAS 4.6.S.1-2 Security confirmed bomb

"* RN Purnphouse "* SAS discovered/exploded in a vital

"* SSF "* FWST area.

"* CAS "* Doghouses (Applies in

"* SAS Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 only). 4.6.S.1-3 Security confirmed sabotage in

"* Doghouses a plant vital area.

"* FWST AND

"* Turbine Buildino END

"* Service Building One of the following:

"* Interim Radwaste Building

"* Equipment Staging

  • Affected safety system Building. parameter indications show

"* Monitor Tank Building degraded performance (Continued) (Continued)

( Enclosure( .

RP/O/A/5000u1 Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of Plant personnel report an unanticipated explosion visible damage to within protected area boundary permanent structures or resulting in visible damage to equipment within the permanent structure or specified area required to equipment. establish or maintain safe shutdown within the 4.6.U.2 Confirmed Security Event specifications.

Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Note: Only one train of a system Safety of the Plant. needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this OPERATING MODE: All condition.

4.6.U.2-1 Security confirmed bomb 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting device discovered within plant the Operability of Plant Protected Area and outside Safety Systems Required to Vital Areas. Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

4.6.U.2-2 Hostage situation/extortion OPERATING MODE: No Mode 4.6.U.2-3 A violent civil disturbance within the owner controlled 4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist:

area. (Non-security events)

Fire or explosion in any of the 4.6.U.2-4 A credible terrorist threat as following areas:

determined by security. "* Spent Fuel Pool

"* Auxiliary Building.

END "* RN Pumphouse AND One of the following:

  • Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded performance (Continued)

( Enclosuir RP/O/A/50g3 Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent str1uctures or equipment supporting spent fuel pool cooling.

4.6.A.3 Security Event in a Plant Protected A rea.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.6.A.3-1 Intrusion into plant Protected Area by a hostile force.

END

( Enclosure(

RP/0/A/5000,uj 1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 1 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Plant Which in the Judgement of Protected Area. Plant Vital Area. Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established. Coordinator/EOF Director OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL Warrant Declaration of OPERATING MODE: ALL General Emergency.

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on 4.7.A.1-1 Valid "OBE Exceeded" Alarm the "strong motion on IAD-4,B/8 4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions OPERATING MODE: ALL accelerograph". exist:

4.7.A.1-2 Tornado or high winds: 4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which 4.7.U.1-2 Tremor felt and valid alarm on Control Room evacuation has in the Judgement of the the "Peak shock annunciator", Tornado striking plant been initiated per Emergency Coordinator/EOF structures within the vital area: AP/1 (2)/A/5500/017 Director indicate:

4.7.U.1-3 Report by plant personnel of tornado striking within 0 Reactor Building AND (1) actual or imminent protected area boundary. 0 Auxiliary Building substantial core degradation 0 FWST Control of the plant cannot be with potential for loss of 4.7.U.1-4 Vehicle crash into plant 0 Diesel Generator Rooms established from the ASP or containment structures or systems within 0 Control Room the SSF within 15 minutes.

protected area boundary. 0 RN Pumphouse OR 0 SSF 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing 4.7.U.1-5 Report of turbine failure 0 Doghouses Which in the Judgement of (2) potential for uncontrolled resulting in casing penetration S CAS the Emergency radionuclide releases. These or damage to turbine or 0 SAS. Coordinator/EOF Director releases can reasonably be generator seals. Warrant Declaration of Site expected to exceed OR Area Emergency. Environmental Protection (Continued) Agency Protective Action sustained winds _Ž74 mph for OPERATING MODE: ALL Guideline levels outside the

> 15 minutes. site boundary.

4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which (Continued) in the Judgement of the END Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

END

( Enclosure RP/O/A/5000/uo 1 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 2 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.1-3 Turbine failure generated Flammable Gases Deemed missiles, vehicle crashes or Detrimental to Safe other catastrophic events Operation of the Plant. causing visible structural damage on any of the OPERATING MODE: ALL following plant structures:

"* Reactor Building 4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or "* Auxiliary Building flammable gases that could "* FWST enter within the site area "* Diesel Generator Rooms boundary in arnounts that can "* Control Room affect safe operation of the "* RN Pumphouse plant, "* SSF

"* Doghouses 4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or "* CAS State Officials for potential "* SAS evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing (Continued)

Which in tile j udgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.U.3-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

END

( Enclosure(. RP/O/A/5000QI Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 3 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentra tions that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for the above EALs:

"* Reactor Building

"* Auxiliary Building

"* Diesel Generator Rooms

"* Control Room

"* RN Pumphouse

"* SSF

"* CAS

"* SAS (Continued)

/ f SEnclosure RP/O/A/5000, Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 4 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/I (2)/A/5500/017.

4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

END

Enclosure 4.8 RP/O/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page I of 3

__ ALERT- Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

ALL (As relates to Operating Mode Applicability) - Modes 1,2,3,4,5,6 and No Mode (Defueled)

BOMB- A fused explosive device.

CARF - Containment Air'Return Fan.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

CREDIBLE THREAT - A threat should be considered credible when:

"* Physical evidence supporting the threat exists.

"* Information independent (law enforcement) from the actual threat message exists that supports the threat.

"* A specific group or organization claims responsibility for the threat.

EPA PAG - Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for exposure to a release of radioactive material.

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment (e.g., a steamline or feedwater line break) that imparts energy sufficient to potentially damage or creates shrapnel to actually damage permanent structures, systems or components. An electrical breaker flash that creates shrapnel and results in damage to other components beyond scorching should also be considered.

EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.

FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. An electrical breaker flash that creates high temperatures for a short duration and merely localized scorching to that breaker and its compartment should be considered a fire.

FUNCTIONAL - A component is fully capable of meeting its design function. It would be declared INOPERABLE if unable to meet Technical Specifications.

GENERAL EMERGENCY- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

Enclosure 4.8 RP/O/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 2 of 3

__ HOSTAGE - A person or object held as leverage against the site to ensure demands will be met by the site.

HOSTILE FORCE - One of more individuals present in a protected area without authorization that may have or have threatened to use force in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

IMMINENT - Expected to occur within 1-3 hours.

INOPERABLE - A component does not meet Technical Specifications. The component may be functional, capable of meeting its design.

INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER - Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOSS - A component is INOPERABLE and not FUNCTIONAL.

PROLONGED - a duration beyond normal limits, defined as "greater than 15 minutes" or as determined by the judgement of the emergency Coordinator.

PROTECTED AREA - Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence.

RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the following: (1)

Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection, (5) Thermal power oscillations >10%.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occunred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the protected area, in which Duke Power Company has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments.

Enclosure 4.8 RP/0/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 3 of 3 SECURITY EVENT - A security related emergency situation for which prompt response by the Security Force, immediate action by plant personnel, and/or assistance from offsite agencies may be required to apprehend intruders and mitigate the effects of or prevent radiological sabotage.

SUSTAINED - A duration of time long enough to confirm that the CSF is valid (not momentary).

TERMINATION - Exiting the emergency condition.

TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE) - The sum of external dose exposure to radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.

chlorine).

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNUSUAL EVENT- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or "monitoringare expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (I ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due 1 to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment important for nuclear safety. Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been authorized to be in that area.

Enclosure 4.9 RP/O/A/5000/001 Emergency Declaration Guidelines Page 1 of 2 THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS TO BE USED BY THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR IN ASSESSING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

"* The Emergency Coordinator shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.

" The BASIS Document (located in Section D of the Catawba Nuclear Site Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

" Emergencies are declared for the site. If an event results in multiple emergency action levels on a unit or different emergency action levels on each unit, then the emergency declaration shall be based on the higher classification. Information relating to the unit with the lesser classification will be noted as additional information on the Emergency Notification Form (ENF).

" If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

" The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at (Mode 1-4) hot shutdown or higher. An event that is recognized at cold shutdown or lower (Mode 5 or 6) shall not be classified using the fission product banier matrix. Reference would be made to the other enclosures that provide emergency action levels for specific events (e.g. severe weather, fire, security).

"* If a transient event should occur, the following guidance is provided.

i. Some emergency action levels specify that a condition exist for a specific duration prior to declaration.
a. For these EALs, the classification is made when the Emergency Coordinator assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e. condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),

whichever is sooner.

b. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower Severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.
2. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g. as a result of routine log or record review) and the condition no longer exists, an emergency shall NOT be declared.

Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow-up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the "condition was more severe than earlier believed.

Enclosure 4.9 RP/O/A15000/001 Emergency Declaration Guidelines Page 2 of 2

3. If an emergency classification is warranted, but the plant condition is corrected prior to declaration and notification, the Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g. Failure of Reactor Protection System or earthquake) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on-shift personnel via activation of the Emergency Response Organization. The following action shall be taken:
a. For UNUSUAL EVENTS, the condition shall be declared and notifications made. The event may be terminated in the same notification or in a follow-up notification.
b. For ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, and GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.

DETERMINATION OF "EVENT TIME" (TIME THE 15 MINUTE CLOCK STARTS)

I. If plant conditions require implementation of EP/t or 2/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), increased emphasis shall be given to evaluation of plant conditions for determination of EAL(s) when "kickout" of the diagnostic procedure occurs. "Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined.

2. If plant conditions do not require implementation of EP/I or 2/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), and conditions of a specific EAL are met, the "Event Time" is the time at which the EAL(s) is determined.
3. The time the event is classified shall be entered on the emergency notification form.

MOMENTARY ENTRY INTO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION If, while in an emergency classification, the specified EALs of a higher classification are met momentarily, and in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator are not likely to recur, the entry into the higher classification must be acknowledged. Acknowledgment is performed as follows:

If this condition occurs prior to the initial notification to the emergency response organization and off site agencies, the initial message should note that the site is currently in the lower classification, but had momentarily met the criteria for the higher classification. It should also be noted that plant conditions have improved and stabilized to the point that the criteria for the higher classification are not expected to be repeated.

/ /

( Enclosure( RP/O/A/5004 .

Radiation Monitor Readings for Enclosure 4.3 Page 1 of I Note: These values are not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g. incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

Detector Elevation Column Identifier Unusual Event Alert mRad/hr mRad/hr IEMF-1 522' FF, 57 Auxiliary Building Corridor 500 5000 IEMF-3 543' GG, 55 Unit I Charging Pump Area 100 5000 IEMF-4 543' GG, 59 Unit 2 Charging Pump Area 100 5000 IEMF-7 560' NN, 55 Unit I Auxiliary Building Corridor 1500 5000 1EMF-8 560' NN, 59 Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Corridor 500 5000 IEMF-9 577' LL, 55 Unit I Aux. Building Filter Hatch 100 5000 IEMF-10 577' LL, 58 Unit 2 Aux. Building Filter Hatch 100 5000 IEMF-22 594' KK, 53 Containment Purge Filter Area 100 5000 2EMF-9 594' KK, 61 Containment Purge Filter Area 100 5000

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