ML013520577
| ML013520577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/2002 |
| From: | Donohew J NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD4 |
| To: | Terry C TXU Electric |
| Donohew J N, NRR/DLPM,415-1307 | |
| References | |
| TAC MB3371, TAC MB3372 | |
| Download: ML013520577 (16) | |
Text
February 20, 2002 Mr. C. Lance Terry Senior Vice President
& Principal Nuclear Officer TXU Generation Company LP Attn: Regulatory Affairs Department P. O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES), UNITS 1 AND 2 -
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: EQUIPMENT HATCH OPEN DURING REFUEL OPERATIONS (TAC NOS. MB3371 AND MB3372)
Dear Mr. Terry:
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 93 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 and Amendment No. 93 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 for CPSES, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated November 8, 2001 (CPSES-200102356), as supplemented on December 14, 2001 (CPSES-200103029).
The amendments add the following to the TSs: (1) the phrase, or if open, capable of being closed, to Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.4 for the equipment hatch, during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment, and (2) the requirement to verify the capability to install the equipment hatch in a new Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.4.2. The previous SR 3.9.4.2 was renumbered SR 3.9.4.3, but not changed. Item (1) allows the equipment hatch to be open during the conditions stated above.
A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 93 to NPF-87
- 2. Amendment No. 93 to NPF-89
- 3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page
February 20, 2002 Mr. C. Lance Terry Senior Vice President
& Principal Nuclear Officer TXU Generation Company LP Attn: Regulatory Affairs Department P. O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES), UNITS 1 AND 2 -
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: EQUIPMENT HATCH OPEN DURING REFUEL OPERATIONS (TAC NOS. MB3371 AND MB3372)
Dear Mr. Terry:
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 93 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 and Amendment No. 93 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 for CPSES, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated November 8, 2001 (CPSES-200102356), as supplemented on December 14, 2001 (CPSES-200103029).
The amendments add the following to the TSs: (1) the phrase, or if open, capable of being closed, to Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.4 for the equipment hatch, during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment, and (2) the requirement to verify the capability to install the equipment hatch in a new Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.4.2. The previous SR 3.9.4.2 was renumbered SR 3.9.4.3, but not changed. Item (1) allows the equipment hatch to be open during the conditions stated above.
A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jack N. Donohew, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:
Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 PUBLIC G.Hill(4)
PDIV-1 Reading L.Hurley, RIV
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 93 to NPF-87 RidsNrrDlpmPdiv(SRichards)
- 2. Amendment No. 93 to NPF-89 RidsNrrDlpmPdivLpdiv1(RGramm)
- 3. Safety Evaluation RidsNrrPMDJaffe D. Bujol,RIV RidsNrrLADJohnson cc w/encls: See next page RidsRgn4MailCenter (KBrockman)
RidsNrrDripRtsb (WBeckner)
RidsOgcRp RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter JDonohew RBarrett JHannon Accession No.: ML013520577 OFFICE PDIV-1/PM PDIV-1/LA SPSB/BC SPLB/BC OGC PDIV-1/SC NAME JDonohew:as DJohnson RBarrett JHannon RHoefling RGramm DATE 01/28/02 01/29/02 01/31/02 02/05/02 02/12/02 02/20/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
April 2001 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station cc:
Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2159 Glen Rose, TX 76403-2159 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 Mr. Roger D. Walker Regulatory Affairs Manager TXU Generation Company LP P. O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043 George L. Edgar, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5869 Honorable Dale McPherson County Judge P. O. Box 851 Glen Rose, TX 76043 Office of the Governor ATTN: John Howard, Director Environmental and Natural Resources Policy P. O. Box 12428 Austin, TX 78711 Arthur C. Tate, Director Division of Compliance & Inspection Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Jim Calloway Public Utility Commission of Texas Electric Industry Analysis P. O. Box 13326 Austin, TX 78711-3326
TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-445 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 93 License No. NPF-87 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by TXU Generation Company LP1 dated November 8, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated December 14, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to read as follows:
1 The application and supplemental letter were submitted by TXU Electric which transferred ownership and operating authority to TXU Generation Company LP on January 1, 2002, pursuant to an Order dated December 21, 2002, issued by the Commission. By letter dated January 2, 2002, TXU Generation Company LP adopted all applications previously submitted to the Commission by TXU Electric.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 93, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Generation Company LP shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance, including the incorporation of the changes to the Technical Specification Bases as described in the licensee's application dated November 8, 2001.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 20, 2002
TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 93 License No. NPF-89 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by TXU Generation Company LP1 dated November 8, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated December 14, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to read as follows:
1 The application and supplemental letter were submitted by TXU Electric which transferred ownership and operating authority to TXU Generation Company LP on January 1, 2002, pursuant to an Order dated December 21, 2002, issued by the Commission. By letter dated January 2, 2002, TXU Generation Company LP adopted all applications previously submitted to the Commission by TXU Electric.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 93, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Generation Company LP shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance, including the incorporation of the changes to the Technical Specification Bases as described in the licensee's application dated November 8, 2001.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate IV Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 20, 2002
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 93 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87 AND AMENDMENT NO. 93 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 3.9-7 3.9-7 3.9-8 3.9-8
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 93 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87 AND AMENDMENT NO. 93 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89 TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated November 8, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated December 14, 2001, TXU Generation Company LP (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would add the following to the TSs: (1) the phrase, or if open, capable of being closed to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.4, Containment Penetrations, for the equipment hatch during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment, and (2) the requirement to verify the capability to install the equipment hatch in a new Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.4.2. The existing SR 3.9.4.2 would be renumbered SR 3.9.4.3, but would not otherwise be changed, to be consistent with the new SR. The proposed changes would revise item a. of LCO 3.9.4 to allow the equipment hatch with direct access to the outside atmosphere to be open during refueling operations with core alterations or irradiated fuel movement inside containment. The licensee clarified its application in the e-mail dated January 23, 2002.
The application dated November 8, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated December 14, 2001, was submitted by TXU Electric which transferred ownership and operating authority to TXU Generation Company LP on January 1, 2002, pursuant to an Order dated December 21, 2001, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). By letter dated January 2, 2002, TXU Generation Company LP adopted all applications previously submitted to the NRC by TXU Electric.
The supplemental letter dated December 14, 2001, and the e-mail dated January 23, 2002 (available at ADAMS Accession No. ML020290155), provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on December 12, 2001 (66 FR 64307).
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee has proposed to add the following: (1) the phrase, or if open, capable of being closed, to LCO 3.9.4, and (2) SR 3.9.4.2 requiring the verification of the capability to install the equipment hatch. The proposed changes to TS 3.9.4 are to allow the equipment hatch to be open during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment and to verify that the capability to close the hatch, if this is needed, is in place. This allowance would be used during refueling operations when the reactor is shut down, and there is 23 feet of water above the reactor flange in accordance with TS 3.9.7, "Refueling Pool Water Level."
The licensee stated that the equipment hatch provides a means for moving large equipment components into and out of containment during plant outages, such as a refueling outage. It is a large, welded steel assembly with a double-gasketed, flanged, and bolted cover, which is raised and lowered with a single dedicated hoist. Because it is part of the containment pressure boundary, the current TSs require that the equipment hatch is closed and held in place by bolts when (1) the containment must be closed and operable (this is in reactor Modes 1 through 4 in accordance with TS 3.6.1, Containment), and (2) there are core alterations or irradiated fuel movement in Mode 6 (this is in accordance with TS 3.9.4). The TS 3.9.4 requirement is to ensure that a release of radioactive material within the containment, because of fuel movements or core alterations, would be collected and filtered before being released from the containment to the environment.
The licensee explained that the proposed changes to TS 3.9.4 will allow it to optimize refueling outages by permitting planned outage work to proceed in conjunction with critical path activities, thereby shortening the outage. The proposed amendments will permit operations currently scheduled for early in the refueling outage, when there is no core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment and the containment may be open, to later in the outage when the reactor vessel is open and covered by 23 feet of water where the risk of severe core damage is lower. This the licensee stated could reduce the overall risk, duration, and cost of the outages.
In the e-mail dated January 23, 2002, the licensee clarified its application and explained that the equipment hatch is moved by a single dedicated hoist which is powered from a non-class 1E power supply. In the case of station blackout, the licensee stated that the hoist can be manually operated if power is lost by a handwheel on the hoist or with a battery-operated device on the hoist.
The postulated accidents that could result in a release of radioactive material through the equipment hatch would be as follows: (1) a fuel handling accident (FHA) inside containment, and (2) a loss of cooling to the core that leads to core boiling and uncovery. These are discussed in Section 2.3 below.
2.1 Administrative Controls If the licensee would open the equipment hatch in outages when there are core alterations or fuel movement inside containment, the licensee has proposed to have the equipment hatch under administrative controls. The equipment hatch would be maintained in an isolable condition (i.e., capable of being closed and bolted) and there would be procedures in place that would require the following:
Appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the containment (i.e., an open equipment hatch) during movement of irradiated fuel or core alterations.
Specified individuals are designated and readily available to close the equipment hatch following an evacuation that would occur in the event of an FHA.
Any obstructions (e.g., cables and hoses) that would prevent rapid closure of an open equipment hatch can be quickly removed.
A description of the administrative controls is given in the licensee's application and will be added to the Bases of the TSs.
In its supplemental letter of December 14, 2001, the licensee stated that it estimated the time to close the open equipment hatch is eight minutes, based on a demonstration of such a closure of the hatch during a refueling outage of CPSES, Unit 1.
2.2 Tornado Missiles In its supplemental letter of December 14, 2001, the licensee stated that the equipment hatch does not provide missile protection for the containment. This protection is provided by the equipment hatch missile shield which is located outside the containment. During Modes 1 through 4, when containment integrity is required, the missile shield covers the equipment hatch. For Modes 5 and 6, the licensee stated that the missile shield is not required because there are no essential targets between the equipment hatch and the inner missile barrier inside containment. The equipment hatch and its missile shield would not have to be put in place for a tornado in Modes 5 and 6. For a tornado missile to come through the equipment hatch opening in Modes 5 and 6, the licensee stated that there would be no damage to systems or components required to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, and the fuel and fuel handling equipment are protected.
In addressing what will happen at the site during refueling with severe weather, the licensee stated that procedures are in place to suspend all fuel handling activities if tornado or severe weather warnings are in effect. The licensee explained a warning means a severe thunderstorm or tornado has been sighted or detected by radar, and may be approaching.
2.3 Postulated Accidents The limiting event during refueling when there are core alterations or fuel handling inside containment is the FHA inside containment. The licensee has described this event in Sections 15.7.3 and 15.7.4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for CPSES and the NRC staffs acceptance criteria is given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 15.7.4 of NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
The FHA outside containment in FSAR Section 15.7.3 is considered by the licensee to represent the limiting case; therefore, no specific analysis of the accident inside containment is provided in FSAR Section 15.7.4.
The licensees and the NRC staffs calculated potential dose consequences for the FHA inside containment at the exclusion area boundary and the assumptions used for the calculated dose consequences are in the attached Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The NRC staffs calculated values of the potential dose consequences to the control room operators are also given in Table 1, and the assumptions are provided in Table 2. The acceptance criteria for the exposure of the control room operators is General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
The licensees dose consequences in Table 1 came from FSAR Section 15.7.4.3.1 (exclusion area boundary dose consequences for the FHA outside containment) and Table 15.6-8 (control room operator dose consequences for the large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), which bounds the FHA). The assumptions for the dose consequences are in Sections 15.7.4.3.1 (FHA outside containment) and 15.6.5.4 (item 4, dose to control room occupants)of the FSAR.
The NRC staffs dose consequences were reported in License Amendment Nos. 48 and 34, issued by NRC letter dated March 18, 1996, for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The potential dose consequences in License Amendment Nos. 48 and 34 were part of the basis of the NRC staff's approval to have both containment personnel airlock doors open during refueling with core alterations or irradiated fuel movement inside containment. The NRC staff's potential dose consequences for the control room operators in License Amendment Nos. 48 and 34 are based on the FHA inside containment. Therefore, for the control room operators, because the licensee's values for the potential dose consequences are based on the design basis LOCA and the NRC staff's values are based on the FHA inside containment, the NRC staff's values should be significantly smaller, compared to the licensee's values, because the accident on which the values are based is a significantly smaller accident in terms of radiological materials released from the fuel.
The requirement for a minimum of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay of the irradiated fuel in the core before any fuel movement is not changed by the proposed amendments.
Although the licensee demonstrated that the equipment hatch could be closed within minutes of an event inside containment, it has not used a time on the order of minutes to calculate the potential consequences of the FHA inside containment. Because both the licensee and the NRC staff (in its independent calculations) have assumed the two-hour release period in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.25, Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors, for the puff of radioactivity associated with radioiodines and noble gases from the damaged fuel to leave containment, the NRC staff concludes that the time to close the equipment hatch has been conservatively included in the calculation of potential dose consequences for the FHA inside containment.
Because the potential dose consequences, calculated independently by the licensee and the NRC staff in Table 1 for the FHA inside containment (for the case that the equipment hatch is not closed), are within the acceptance criteria given in SRP Section 15.7.4 and GDC 19, the NRC staff concludes that the potential dose consequences for the proposed amendments are acceptable.
For the case of a loss of cooling to the core, the licensee has stated that the eight minutes required to close the open equipment hatch is shorter than the time for the core to start boiling.
The licensee stated that the minimum time to core boiling is 6.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (at the beginning of fuel offload). The time to core boiling for reduced water inventory in mid-loop operation in a refueling outage is not applicable to this review because TS 3.9.7 requires 23 feet of water above the top of the reactor vessel flange during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not apply to mid-loop operations.
2.4 Conclusion Based on the administrative controls described in the licensee's application, which will be added to the TS Bases; the demonstrated short time to close the equipment hatch in the case of an accident inside containment; the acceptable potential consequences of the design basis FHA inside containment (including the doses to control room operators); and the protection of equipment needed to keep the plant safely shut down from tornado missiles during refueling with the equipment hatch open; the NRC staff concludes that the proposed addition to LCO 3.9.4 is acceptable.
The licensee also proposed to add SR 3.9.4.2 to the TSs to assure that the administrative controls to close the equipment hatch are in place when the hatch is open during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel inside containment. The licensee proposed the following: (1) a frequency of seven days for the periodic surveillance, and (2) a note that states SR 3.9.4.2 is only required when the equipment hatch is open. The licensee states in the proposed changes to the Bases for SR 3.9.4.2 that the surveillance interval of seven days was selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to the fuel handling operations and the note only requires that the surveillance be met when the equipment hatch is open. The proposed frequency is consistent with similar SRs in the CPSES TSs, and the surveillance needs only to be conducted when the equipment hatch is open. Also, the proposed SR is the same as that approved for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, on September 11, 2000, for the same amendments. Based on this and the fact that SR 3.9.4.2 is only necessary when the equipment hatch is open, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed SR 3.9.4.2 is acceptable.
With the new SR 3.9.4.2 being added to the TSs, the existing SR 3.9.4.2 will be renumbered SR 3.9.4.3, with no other changes being made to the SR. Because a new SR 3.9.4.2 is being added to the TSs and only the number of the existing SR 3.9.4.2 changed, the NRC staff concludes that the change to the existing SR 3.9.4.2 is acceptable.
Therefore, based on the above, the NRC staff further concludes that the proposed amendments to the CPSES TSs are acceptable.
The NRC staff has reviewed the description of the administrative controls in the licensee's application and has no disagreement with the description. In its supplemental letter, the licensee agreed to add this description to the TS Bases during the implementation of the amendments and that this will be a condition of the amendment to the operating licenses.
Therefore, when the amendments are incorporated into the TSs, the description of the administrative controls will become a part of the Bases of the TSs. Any changes to the description of the administrative controls will be controlled by Section 5.5.14 of the Administrative Section of the TSs.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes SRs.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 64307, December 12, 2001). The amendments also relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Attachments: 1. Table 1, Calculated Radiological Dose Consequences (Rem)
- 2. Table 2, Assumptions Used in Calculating Radiological Dose Consequences Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment Principal Contributor: Jack Donohew Date: February 20, 2002
TABLE 1 CALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES (REM)
Licensee Staff NRC Acceptance Criteria Exclusion Area Boundary Doses1 Doses2 SRP 15.7.4 Guidelines Whole Body 0.44 0.15 6
Thyroid 53.9 51.
75 Licensee Staff NRC Acceptance Criteria Control Room (operator)
Doses1 Doses2 GDC-19 Guidelines Whole Body 0.06 0.07 5
Thyroid 27.4 1.1 Equivalent to 5 rem whole body**
1 Doses from CPSES FSAR Section 15.7.4.3.1 for the radiological consequences at the exclusion area boundary for an FHA outside containment, and Section 15.6.5.4 for the control room operator doses for a large-break LOCA (which bounds the FHA inside or outside the containment).
2 Doses from License Amendment Nos. 48 and 34, issued March 18, 1996.
TABLE 2 ASSUMPTIONS USED IN CALCULATING RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT INSIDE CONTAINMENT Licensee Staff Parameters Value1 Value2 Power lever (MWt) 3565 3565 Number of fuel rods damaged 264 Total number of fuel rods 50,913 Number of assemblies affected 1.0 1.0 Shutdown time (hours) 100 100 Power radial peaking factor*
1.65 1.65 Fission product release duration (hours) 2.0 2.0 Release fractions:*
Radioiodine 10.0%
12.0%3 Noble gases 10.0%
10.0%
Krypton gases 30.0%
30.0%
Radioiodine forms:*
Elemental 75.0%
75.0%
Organic 25.0%
25.0%
Receptor Point Variables (per TID-14844)
Exclusion area boundary Atmospheric relative concentration, X/Q (sec/m3) 0-2 hours 1.6 x 10-4 1.5 x 10-4 Control room Atmospheric Dispersion, X/Q (sec/m3) 3.04 x 10-3 1.6 x 10-3 Control room volume (feet3) 4.23 x 10+5 4.2 x 10+5 Maximum filtration rate (feet3/minute) 7200 7200 1 CPSES FSAR Section 15.6.5.4, and Tables 15.6-12 and 15.7-7 on parameters (including control room and atmospheric dispersion factors) used in evaluating the accident analysis of an FHA inside containment.
2 Staff parameters from Amendment Nos. 48 and 34, issued March 18, 1996.
3 Higher extended burnup release fraction for Iodine 131 from NUREG/CR-5009
- NRC RG 1.25 Attachment 2