LIC-16-0095, Transmittal of Revised Overall Integrated Plan for Fuel Permanently Removed from the Reactor Vessel to the Spent Fuel Pool in Response to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events
| ML16307A209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2016 |
| From: | Marik S Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16307A208 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-12-049, LIC-16-0095 | |
| Download: ML16307A209 (46) | |
Text
Security-Related Information Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.54(f)
EA-12-049 Ll C-16-0095 October 31 , 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn : Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Fort Calhoun Station (FCS), Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
Omaha Public Power District's Revised Overall Integrated Plan for Fuel Permanently Removed from the Reactor Vessel to the Spent Fuel Pool in Response to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events
References:
See page 4 By letter dated August 12, 2016 (Reference 1), the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) requested relaxation of the implementation date for compliance with Order EA-12-049 to August 31, 2017, based on plans to remove all fuel from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) to the spent fuel pool (SFP) by December 31, 2016. The new Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) for Fuel Permanently Removed from RPV to SFP is enclosed as discussed in Reference 1. As stated in Reference 2, the OIP includes an assessment of the reevaluated flooding hazards applicable to FCS with all fuel in the SFP and the capability to mitigate these re-evaluated flooding hazards.
The following are key aspects of the OIP with all fuel in the SFP:
- The Seismic and Flooding External Hazards have been updated consistent with OPPD's responses to the 50.54(f) letter Reference (6).
- The Storms , Hurricanes, High Winds and Tornadoes External Hazard has been revised to be consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to reflect the changes made in Amendment 272.
- SFP temperature and boil off calculations use a decay heat level corresponding to 60 days after shutdown for fuel removed from the RPV to the SFP.
- Sequences of Events are provided for two limiting flooding scenarios in addition to the extended loss of alternating current (ac) power (ELAP) Sequence of Events.
- The bases for time constraints have been established.
- Guidance documents have been developed and validated.
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444 South 161h Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247
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Open Items The NRC staffs review of the FCS OIPs , as supplemented , and as augmented in the audit process (Reference 3) , identified the items in Table 1 currently under NRC Staff review that require OPPD input. The following input is provided for each Audit Item.
Cl 3.2.4.2.C As discussed in the enclosed OIP, only the Spent Fuel Pool Instrument (SFPI) is used to monitor conditions in the mitigating strategies. The SFPI includes a stand-alone battery backup and the batteries housed in the battery room are no longer required to implement the mitigating strategies. Therefore, it is recommended this item be closed .
AQ.19 The FLEX safety injection refueling water tank pump is replaced with submersible pumps in the OIP mitigating strategies. Therefore, it is recommended this item be closed.
SE.14 As discussed in the attached OIP, no equipment in the containment is relied upon during an ELAP. Therefore , it is recommended this item be closed.
SE.17 The overall flooding strategy is discussed in the enclosed OIP. No open items are associated with the enclosed OIP.
Milestones The following will be completed by December 31, 2016:
Installation of the SFPI Installation of the standpipe between Rooms 81 and 69 Training and issuance of procedures and guidelines Procurement of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps FLEX equipment staged in either the safety-related plant structures or in the FLEX Storage Building.
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Staffing Assessment OPPD provided the Fort Calhoun Station Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report in Reference 4 showing that the minimum on-shift staffing necessary to implement the mitigating strategies. In accordance with Reference 5, the required on-shift staffing will be reduced from 13 people to 8 people with the plant in a permanently defueled condition. This reduced on-shift staffing is sufficient to perform the required emergency response functions and implement spent fuel pooling cooling requirements.
No commitments to the NRC are made in this letter. If you should have any questions regarding this submittal or require additional information, please contact Mr. Bradley H.
Blome at 402-533-7270.
-~~P~ Fot--
Shane M. Marik Site Vice President and CNO SMM/epm : Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Coping Strategies Overall Integrated Plan Appendix A: External Flood Hazard Assessment c:
K. M. Kennedy , NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV P. J. Bamford, NRC Senior Project Manager C. F. Lyon, NRC Senior Project Manager S.M. Schneider, NRC Senior Resident Inspector T. V. Govan, NRC Project Manger Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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References:
- 1. OPPD letter (S . Marik) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), Request for Relaxation of March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated August 12, 2016 (LIC-16-0048)
- 2. OPPD letter (S. Marik) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), Revision to Response to Request for Information Regarding Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident- Fort Calhoun Station Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated September 14, 2016 (LIC-16-0078) (ML16258A364)
- 3. NRC Letter (P. Bamford) to OPPD (S. Marik), Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC NOs. MF0969 and MF0968), dated March 8, 2016 (ML16064A077)(NRC-16-0024)
- 4. OPPD letter (S. Marik) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Enclosure 5, Recommendation 9.3 , Emergency Preparedness- Staffing, Requested Information Items 1, 2, and 6- Phase 2 Staffing Assessment, dated May 27, 2016 (LIC-16-0041) (ML16146A545)
- 5. OPPD letter (S. Marik) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), License Amendment Request (LAR) 16-02: Revise the Fort Calhoun Station Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition, dated September 2, 2016 (LI C-16-0076) (M L16246A321)
- 6. NRC letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340) (NRC-12-0021)
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Table 1 Mitigation Strategies/Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Safety Evaluation Audit Items:
Audit Items Currently Under NRC Staff Review and Requiring Licensee Input Audit Item Item Summary Description Licensee Input Needed Reference - -- - -- --*---
Cl 3.2.4.2.C Equipment Cooling (Ventilation) - Confirm the Provide an analysis of the battery rooms to show that acceptability of the battery room temperatures (extreme the batteries will not be adversely affected as a result hot or extreme cold) on battery performance. of loss of ventilation in extreme hot (loss of ventilation) and extreme cold (loss of heating) conditions. The analysis should address maintaining temperature below/above the design limit for an indefinite coping.
AQ .19 Portable Pump capability Provide a procedural control mechanism for minimum Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) level to maintain consistency with the
- -_---- - -- hydraulic analysis for the f.LEX SIRWT pump
-SE.14 Provide a discussion/analysis on the ability of electrical Provide a discussion/analysis on the ability of equipment (i.e., valve solenoids, instruments, relays, etc.) electrical equipment (i.e., valve solenoids, located within containment and other areas of the plant instruments, relays, etc.) located within containment (i.e., ADV rooms, switchgear rooms, etc.) that is relied and other areas of the plant (i.e. , ADV rooms, upon during an ELAP to function in the expected switchgear rooms, etc.) that is relied upon during an environmental conditions for the duration of the ELAP ELAP to function in the expected environmental event (i.e., indefinitely). conditions for the duration of the ELAP event (i.e.,
indefinite!~} .
SE.17 Provide a description of where/when equipment needed Provide an overall flooding strategy that includes the to support Phase 2 and Phase 3 operations will be requested detail.
deployed , staged and connected to plant systems during flood !~vels_~_ to and including the design-basis flood. ----
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 1 Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)
Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Coping Strategies Overall Integrated Plan October 2016 Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information .
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Page2 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissionin Overall Inte rated Im lementation Plan 1 General Integrated Plan Elements (Ft. Calhoun Station)
Applicable Extreme External Hazard 1
1 The applicable extreme external hazards for Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) with all fuel stored in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) are seismic, external flood , high winds, snow, ice, cold temperatures and high temperature as detailed below:
Seismic Hazard Assessment The FCS design basis seismic hazard is described in Reference 1. In response to Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) submittals, the NRC determined (Reference 2) that FCS screens out of conducting a seismic risk evaluation because the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) demonstrates plant seismic capacity to levels higher than the ground motion response spectra (GMRS) in the 1-10 Hertz (Hz) range. NRC concurred OPPD demonstrated that the IPEEE-related screening criteria in the NRC-approved industry guidance was met (Reference 2) The NRC staff determined that OPPD provided the necessary information requested in Enclosure 1, Items ( 1) - (7) of the 50 .54(f) letter (Reference 3) . Further the NRC concluded :
Contingent upon the NRC staff's review and acceptance of OPPD's spent fuel pool evaluation (i.e., Item (9) of the 50.54(1) letter) and the full- scope Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) relay chatter review (requested to meet the criteria for using an IPEEE program) to demonstrate that a seismic risk evaluation (Item 8) is not merited for FCS, the Seismic Hazard Evaluation identified in Enclosure 1 of the 50 .54(1) letter will be completed .
The NRC concluded OPPD's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation (Reference 4) met the SFP Evaluation Guidance for Fort Calhoun and therefore, OPPD responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the NRC's 50 .54(1) letter.
By letter dated August 25, 2016 (Reference 5) , OPPD provided formal notification to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(b)(8) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) certifying that it plans to permanently cease power operations at FCS on October 24, 2016 . FCS plans to remove all fuel from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) to the SFP by December 31, 2016. Because Ft. Calhoun will be ceasing operation and based on the seismic hazard discussion in SECY-15-0081 , OPPD is not proceeding with IPEEE relay chatter review. OPPD concludes the FCS site screens in using the design basis seismic hazard.
External Flood Hazard Assessment See Appendix A Storms. Hurricanes. High Winds and Tornadoes The following information is per USAR [Ref. 8, Chapter 2.5]:
The physical design parameters of tornado protection systems are such that designated SSCs are able to maintain their necessary capabilities in the event of a Design Basis Tornado (DBT) . Amendment 272 revised the DBT and associated tornado missiles for Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) to that defined in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.76, Revision 1.
The spectrum of hypothetical missiles used for the design basis analysis are [Ref. 8, Table 5.8-2 :
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 3 Fort Calhoun Station DecommiSSiomng Overall Integrated Impl ementation Plan I
I l
Item Weight (lbs) Horizontal I Velocity, fps Sched 40 Pipe I 287 135 I i (6.625" dia x 15' lg)
I Automobile 4000 135 i
(16.4'x6.6'x4 .3' Solid Steel Sphere 0.147 26 (1" dia.)
, Thus the FCS site screens in for an assessment storms, high winds and tornadoes. The FCS 1
site screens out for hurricanes because it is located several hundred miles from the nearest sea coast.
Snow, Ice Storms and Cold The hazard remains the same as assessed , audited and described in References 1, 6, and 7.
Per USAR [Ref. 8, Table 2.5-4], the max1mum snow and 1ce accumulation 1n and around FCS 1 in any 24-hour period was 18.3 inches. The lowest recorded temperature from National Weather Service data in Omaha is -32 °F. Thus the FCS site screens in for snow, ice storms and cold.
Extreme Heat The hazard remains the same as assessed , audited and described in References 1, 6, and 7. The extreme temperature recorded at the site is 114°F, per USAR [Ref. 8, Table 2.5-5]. Thus the FCS site screens in for extreme heat.
References:
- 1. Letter from OPPD (L. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Omaha Public Power District's Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013 (ML13064A298) (LIC-13-0019).
- 2. NRC Letter (D. Dorman) to OPPD (L. Cortopassi), Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 -
Screening and Prioritization Results of Information Provided Pursuant to Title1 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 , Section 50.54(f) , Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated September 22, 2014 (ML14224A526).
Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title1 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50 .54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated December 8, 2015 (ML15329A181).
- 4. NRC Letter (F. Vega) to OPPD (S . Marik), Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 - Staff Review of Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Associated with Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2 .1, dated August 4 ,
2016 ML16182A361 .
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ll C-16-0095 Page4 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan
- 5. OPPD letter (T. Burke) to USNRC (Document Control Desk), "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations," dated August 25, 2016 (LIC-16-0067)(ML16242A127)
- 6. NRC Letter (P . Bamford) to OPPD (S. Marik), Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC NOS.
MF0969 AND MF0968), dated March 8, 2016 (ML16064A077)(NRC-16-0024)
- 7. NRC Letter (P. Bamford) to OPPD (S. Marik), Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC NOS.
MF0969 AND MF0968), dated March 8, 2016 (ML16064A077)
- 8. Fort Calhoun Station Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)
Key Site assumptions
- SFP temperature and boil off calculations are based a decay heat level corresponding to 60 days after shutdown for fuel removed from the RPV to the SFP. To minimize the response time available, conservatively high values were selected for decay heat and conservatively low values were selected for initial pool and tank levels. The only SFP heat losses assumed were from the latent heat of evaporation.
- Initial conditions assumed for events other than beyond design basis flooding are consistent with References 1 and 2 with the following exception
is no secondary cooling.
References:
I 1. Letter from OPPD (L. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Omaha Public Power District's Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013 (ML13064A298) (LIC-13-0019).
- 2. NRC Letter (P. Bamford) to OPPD (S. Marik), Plan for the Onsite Audit Regarding Implementation of Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC NOS. MF0969 AND MF0968), dated March 8, 2016 (ML16064A077)
Extent to which the guidance, JLD-ISG-2012-01 Revision 1 and NEI12- 06 Revision 2, are being followed. Identify any deviations to JLO-ISG-2012-01 Revision 1 and NEI 12-06 Revision 1.
The guidance of JLD-ISG-2012-01 Revision 1 and NEI 12- 06 Revision 2 is followed for developing the mitigating actions and is limited to the impact of the extended loss of alternatin current ac ower ELAP event on the fuel in the SFP.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 5 Fort Calhoun Station Decomm*ss*omn_g_ Overall Integrated Im_mementation Plan Sequence of events and time constraint Sequence of events are provided for three required for success including the scenarios technical basis for the time constraint. 1. ELAP not associated with beyond design basis flooding.
- 2. ELAP due to beyond design basis flooding with no antecedent
. conditions I
1
- 3. ELAP due to beyond design basis flooding with antecedent conditions Sequence of Events for ELAP not associated with beyond design basis flooding The following sequence of events is applicable to ELAP due to causes other than a Beyond Design Basis flood. The time constraints identified discussed are based on site specific I calculations.
- A timeline is provided in Attachment 1.
- The technical bases for the time constraints listed in this section and Attachment 1 are provided in this section.
Deployment strategies for actions have been validated in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 12-06 Revision 2.
T=O Initiation of Station Blackout (SBO).
T+1 min: 125 VDC/120VAC buses powered from station batteries. Operators enter abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), transitioning to SBO procedure. Key actions within procedures include:
- Verification of system response to ensure safety functions is satisfied.
- Attempting alternate methods of starting/loading station Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
T+15min: Initial shedding of non-vital loads to extend battery life.
T +1 hr: Initial actions taken under AOP direction complete. Operations personnel survey plant for damage and evaluate likelihood of EDG recovery within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> T+2 hr: Assessment of EDG status indicates recovery not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. ELAP declared. Operators implement FLEX support guideline (FSG) .
T+6 hr: Operators open door in roof of Auxiliary Building to establish path to vent steam and water vapor from the Auxiliary Building. (Time Constraint from GOTHIC analysis of Auxiliary Building environment.)
T+8 hr: Operators open door between the Radwaste Building and the Auxiliary Building to establish air inlet flow path to vent steam and water vapor from the Auxiliary Building. GOTHIC analysis demonstrates that with this ventilation path , operator access to mitigating equipment is maintained throughout the event.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Page 6 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissionin Overall Inte rated Im lementation Plan T +24 hr: Establish Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling by starting SFP makeup. Assuming ELAP initiation 60 days after shutdown, the SFP reaches 200 °F in approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and boiling will start. The water level would reach 12'-
6" above the top of the active fuel in in 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />. Additional boil off from SFP will result in SFP level reduction to top of active fuel in approximately 129 hours0.00149 days <br />0.0358 hours <br />2.132936e-4 weeks <br />4.90845e-5 months <br />. Makeup flow rate will be established to maintain SFP level within the desired band . Makeup flow rates of approximately 20 gpm, assuming ELAP initiation 60 days after shutdown , are needed to maintain the SFP level. The strategy ensures that makeup flow, in excess of the boil off rate, is initiated prior to reaching Level 2 (well within 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />). Using only the SIRWT as the source for makeup water, there is adequate inventory to maintain the SFP water level above Level 2 for more than 12 days.
T+ 5 days Establish makeup to Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) from an alternate source of water (ultimate heat sink- Missouri River). Based on makeup needs to the SFP , using only the SIRWT as the source for makeup water, and using conservative assumptions for available water from the I SIRWT, the SIRWT will be depleted in approximately 12 days.
Sequence of Events for ELAP caused by a Beyond Design Basis flood with no 1 antecedent conditions j The following sequence of events is applicable to ELAP caused by a Beyond Design Basis i flood in which the timeline begins with the dam break. This sequence of events is for the I Oahe Sunny Day dam failure as discussed Appendix A. As will be discussed next, hydraulic I dam failures involve antecedent conditions that initiate actions. A timeline is provided in j Attachment 1. No time constraints are identified for this scenario.
I Deployment actions have been validated in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 12-06 Revision 2.
T-72 hr River level at FCS is forecasted to stay below elevation 1004' and current river level is less than 1000'.
T-71.5 hr. Dam break occurs at Oahe.
T-71 hr. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers notifies OPPD that an upstream dam or dams have failed with flooding expected in the Fort Calhoun area.
T-70 hr. Operations enters AOP-01, "Acts of Nature," and begins flooding preparations T-60 hr. River level is predicted to exceed 1014 feet and FSG-04 , "Response to Beyond Design Basis Flooding" is implemented. Operations deploys pumps, portable FLEX Diesel Generators (DGs), valves, hoses and portable SFP level indicator per FSG-04.
T-48 hr. Equipment deployment complete and Operations ventilates the Auxiliary Building per FSG-04.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 7 Fort Calhoun Station Decommtsswnmg Overall Integrated Imp em entation Plan T-36 hr. Ventilation of the Auxiliary Building per FSG-04 complete.
T-4 hr. Based on Missouri River gauge data and forecasts the Missouri River level is expected to exceed El. 1014' within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Operations induces Dark Plant Condition per FSG-04. (Dark Plant Condition is defined as no installed AC or DC power available to the site.)
T-2 hr. Dark Plant Conditions established . Operations maintains the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04.
T=O Missouri River level exceeds El. 1014'.
T+ 5 days Operations maintains the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04. When the river level exceeds El. 1014, the SIRWT remains full for the duration of the flood until water level recedes to <1 014; no SIRWT makeup is needed during this period .
Sequence of Events for ELAP caused by a Beyond Design Basis flood with antecedent conditions The following sequence of events is applicable to ELAP caused by a Beyond Design Basis flood in which the timeline begins with the identification of conditions in the Upper Missouri Reservoirs such that if a dam break were to occur the storage locations for portable equipment could be flooded. This sequence of events is for the Oahe Hydrologic dam failure as discussed Appendix A. A timeline is provided in Attachment 1. No time constraints are identified for this scenario .
Deployment actions have been validated in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI12-06 Revision 2.
T-14 days The National Weather Service or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecasts that river level will exceed 1004 feet. Operations enters AOP-1 and implements Flood Protection Actions.
T-13.5 days Operations enters FSG-04 based either
- The pool level at either Ft. Peck or Garrison is greater than the maximum operating pool elevation or
- The river flow out of Oahe is sufficient that road access to the plant could be lost due to flooding when this flow reaches FCS in approximately 3 days as reported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Daily River Bulletin T-11.5 days One DG and the valve skid are moved to the Auxiliary Building roof (Elevation 1057') and tested per FSG-04.
T-61 hr. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers notifies OPPD that an upstream dam or dams have failed with flooding expected in the Fort Calhoun area .
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Page 8 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissionin Overall Inte rated Im lementation Plan T-60 hr. River level is predicted to exceed 1014 feet and FSG-04, "Response to Beyond Design Basis Flooding," is implemented. Operations deploys pumps, DGs, valves, hoses and portable SFP level indicator per FSG-04.
T -48 hr. Equipment deployment complete and Operations ventilates the Auxiliary Building per FSG-04.
T-36 hr. Ventilation of the Auxiliary Building per FSG-04 complete.
T-4 hr. Based on Missouri River gauge data and forecasts the Missouri River level is expected to exceed El. 1014' within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Operations induces Dark Plant Condition per FSG-04. (Dark Plant Condition is defined as no installed AC or DC power available to the site.)
T-2 hr. Dark Plant Conditions established. Operations maintains the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04 .
T=O Missouri River level exceeds El. 1014'.
T+ 5 days Operations maintains the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04. When the river level exceeds El. 1014, the SIRWT remains full for the duration of the flood until water level recedes to < 1014; no SIRWT makeup is needed during this period.
Identify how strategies will be deployed with plant in decommissioning status FCS has defined the storage and deployment locations of FLEX equipment. Deployment paths have been identified and are illustrated in Attachment 3. To ensure deployment can be I achieved within the time constraints for strategies, FLEX equipment necessary to accomplish those strategies will be stored in a robust structure (Auxiliary Building) within the plant power I block. Equipment stored within the power block is depicted on the drawings in Attachment 3.
Milestone Schedule See attached milestone schedule Attachment 2.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 9 F ort C a lh oun statlon D ecommiSSionm~ 0 vera IIInte~rate dl mpJementa f Ion PI an Programmatic Controls FCS has implemented an administrative program for FLEX to establish responsibilities, and testing and maintenance requirements . A plant system designation is assigned to FLEX. This establishes responsibilities, maintenance and testing requirements for all components
, associated with FLEX. Unique identification numbers are assigned to all FLEX components included in the system. Equipment associated with these strategies is procured as commercial equipment with design, storage, maintenance, testing, and configuration control as outlined in JLD-ISG-2012-01 , Revision 1, Section 6 and NEI12-06, Revision 2, Section 11 . Installed structures, systems and components pursuant to 10 CFR 50 .63(a) will continue to meet the augmented quality guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout.
Standard industry PMs have been developed to establish maintenance and testing frequencies based on type of equipment using the EPRI guidelines. There are some exceptions to the EPRI guidelines consistent with the length of time available to implement the FLEX strategy for a permanently shutdown plant.
Training Training materials for FLEX have been developed for all station staff involved in implementing FLEX strategies . These programs and controls are implemented in accordance with the Systematic Approach to Training . The first rotation of training is complete and a second rotation will be completed prior to December 31, 2016.
Regional Response Center The FLEX mitigating strategy for FCS with all fuel stored in the SFP does not utilize the Regional Response Centers.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 10 F ortC a lh oun Sta f Ion D ecommissmnmg 0 vera II I negra t t ed I mp. em en t a f Ion PI an Maintain Spent Fuel Pool Cooling II I
Baseline coping capability l PWR Installed Equipment Phase 1: i Based on a site specific calculation, assuming an ELAP initiation 60 days after shutdown, I boiling in the SFP will start in approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and the water level would reach 12'-6" above the top of the active fuel in 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />. Additional boil off from SFP will result in a SFP II I
level reduction to top of active fuel in approximately 129 hours0.00149 days <br />0.0358 hours <br />2.132936e-4 weeks <br />4.90845e-5 months <br />. Makeup flow rate will be I established to maintain SFP level between within the desired band. Makeup flow rates of I approximately 20 gpm is needed to maintain the SFP level. There are no Phase 1 actions. !I Details:
Provide a brief N/A since there are no Phase 1 actions description of Procedures I Strategies I Guidelines !
Identify modifications N/A since there are no Phase 1 actions Key SFP Parameter A SFPI meeting the requirements of EA-12-051 is being installed.
PWR Portable Equipment Phase 2:
Based on a site specific calculation, assuming an ELAP initiation 60 days after shutdown, boiling in the SFP will start in approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and the water level would reach 12'-6" above the top of the active fuel in in 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />. Additional boil off from SFP will result in a SFP level reduction to top of active fuel in approximately 129 hours0.00149 days <br />0.0358 hours <br />2.132936e-4 weeks <br />4.90845e-5 months <br />. Makeup flow rate will be established to maintain SFP level between within the desired band . Makeup flow rates of approximately 20 gpm is needed to maintain the SFP level. Using only the SIRWT as the source for makeup water, there is adequate inventory to maintain the SFP water level above Level 2 for more than 12 days.
Details:
Strategies The strategy used to maintain spent fuel pool cooling is illustrated in Figure 1. Water to maintain the level in the SFP is supplied from the SIRWT via one of two submersible pumps.
The water from the pump is routed through a valve station to the SFP. Electrical power is supplied via one of two DG. The DG are located such that this strategy can be implemented for the worst case Sunny Day dam failure and adequate time is available to deploy equipment before flood waters arrive at the site. If conditions exist where a BOB flood could submerge the DG in their normal storage location, one DG is relocated to a higher elevation above the predicted level of a flood due to a hydraulic failure of one of the dams.
I II Procedures and The procedure flow chart is shown in Figure 2 and the Guidelines . procedures are listed in Table 1.
Modifications I A standpipe will be installed between Rooms 81 and 69.
Key SFP Parameter I A SFPI meeting the requirements of EA-12-051 is being installed. In cases of BOB flooding a portable SFPI is used.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L IC-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Page 11 F ortC a lh oun St a f 1on D ecommiSSiomng 0 vera ll I negra t t ed I mp1emen t a f 1on PI an Storage and Protection of Equipment FLEX portable equipment is stored either within the safety-related plant structures or in the FLEX Storage Building.
Seismic See the statement above.
Flooding See the statement above.
Severe Storms with High See the statement above.
Winds Snow, Ice, and Extreme See the statement above.
Cold High Temperatures 1 See the statement above.
Deployment (Attachment 3 contains the Deployment Sketches)
Strategy: 1 Modifications Protection of The following is a simplified description of 1 The standpipe connections the deployment strategies employed in the I betwee~ Rooms 81 Connections are FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) and the , and 69 IS to be appropriately capped Field Implementation Guidelines (FIGs) installed by while in storage.
that provide the equipment instructions to December 31, 2016. Connections are implement the FSGs. protected consistent with the guidance FSG-01 (Initial Assessment and FLEX provided in NEI 12-06 EguiQment Staging} Revision 2. Submerged
- Deploy FLEX Water Hoses from cables and connectors Room 81 to Room 69 are qualified to the appropriate depth of
connect to hoses
- Deploy FLEX Diesel Generators in I room 81
- Connect submersible SIRWT pump starter panel to the submersible SIRWT pump Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under I 0 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 12 F ortC a lh oun Sta t-ton DecommiSSIODID_g 0 vera II I negra t t e d I mp1emen t a f ton PI an PWR Portable Equipment Phase 3:
SFP cooling can continue to be provided indefinitely (The on-site OG fuel will last more than 30 days) using the Phase 2 strategy. Guidance is provided to provide fuel to the OG and to replenish the water in the SIRWT. This would be the case for BOB flooding where it is unlikely internal plant electrical buses could be restored . In the case of BOB flooding, a stand-alone self-powered heat exchanger would need to be installed and operated. Because of the large number of unknowns that would have to be addressed, additional guidance has not been developed for recovery from BOB flooding. For cases where the plant electrical busses can be restored, guidance is provided. I Details:
Procedures/Strategies/ 1 FSG-05, "Restoration of Vital Auxiliaries using Offsite Guidelines
- Resources," with associated FIGs, provides guidance for repowering internal buses using either a 4160 VAC power !
source or a 480 VAC generator. FSG-05 also provides guidance for using a portable pump to restore flow to the RW system.
Modifications No modifications are required I Key SFP Parameter A SFPI meeting the requirements of EA-12-051 is being installed. In cases of BOB flooding, a portable SFPI is used.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 13 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Figure 1: FLEX Strategy f::na:-1.!: ' !.'~r_-_~~::_**.~~'..~?:,iE> ! ~~ Flllcd prier t o flood or FH B within 24 hn of HEX event from f0- 1
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.. ~ f'. ............:J Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information, Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 14 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Figure 2: SFP Makeup Procedure Flow Chart i------* *--*-**-- -------:
,~* -"FioOdiilg-/ / SBO Occurs i
/ Predicted ! ;
~ ~ .......__ No .., ,.. . . ,.. Yes.
<.~ SBO? >--+< . ~LOLAi' .--..\ Perform OCAG*1
- ... -~-"'
Yes No Procedures and Guidelines for SFP Makeup during SBO/BDB Flooding (R~m to Norm~*",
\ Procedures )
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ll C-16-0095 Page 15 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Ta bl e 1 SFP Mak e up Proce d ures Procedure Number Title AOP-01 Acts of Nature AOP-42 Station Blackout AOP-36 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling EOP/AOP Att. FSG FLEX Support Guidelines Implementation EOP/AOP Att. DGE Diesel Generator ELAP Evaluation FSG-01 Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging FSG-02 Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling FSG-03 ELAP Electrical Bus Management FSG-04 Response to Beyond Design Basis Flooding FSG-05 Restoration of Vital Auxiliaries using Offsite Resources FSG-06 1 Transition from FLEX Equipment 1
FIG-LTA-01 Water Supply to the FLEX Valve Skid from Various Clean Water Sources FIG-LTA-02 Water Supply to the FLEX Valve Skid from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
FIG-LTA-03 I Filling the EFWST from an External Water Source FIG-LTA-04 Filling the SIRWT or SFP from the UHS FIG-LTA-05 Deployment of External Portable FLEX Pumps FIG-MIS-02 Emergency Portable Equipment FIG-MVA-01 Deploy and Operate 30 KW Portable DG FIG-MVA-02 Control Room Lighting/HVAC FIG-MVA-03 Power 480/4160 VAC Buses With Vendor Supplied Generator FIG-MVA-04 Establish Cooling Water Supply using External Resources FIG-MVA-05 Establish Instrument Air using Vendor Supplied Air Compressor FIG-SFP-01 Fill the SFP FIG-SFP-02 Venting the Auxiliary Building FIG-SFP-03 Setup and Operation of the BOB Spent Fuel Pool Level Indication System FIG-SFP-04 Water Supply to the FLEX Valve Skid from the Submersible SIRWT
. Pumps Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 16 Fort Calh
- ~- - - Station D 0 II Int ted I tation PI PWR Portable Equipment Phase 2 Use and (potential I flexibility) diverse uses Performance Criteria Maintenance r--List portable SFP Instrumentation Accessibility equipment FLEXSIRWT [200 gpm, 60 psia], See Programmatic Primary X Submersible Controls discussion Submersible above Pump (FSP)
FLEXSIRWT [200 gpm, 60 psia], See Programmatic Backup Submersible Controls discussion Submersible X above Pump FSP Primary 480 v [30 kW] See Programmatic I
DG X Controls discussion I above FSP Backup X X 480 v [30 kW] See Programmatic DG Controls discussion above FLEX Valve Flow indication 25-250 See Programmatic Skid (FVS)
X gpm ~ontrols discussion
~bove Diesel Skid [310 gpm, 50 psia] ~ee Programmatic Pumps (2) X ~ontrols discussion (B.S. b) ~bove I River Drafting [345 gpm, 50 psia] ~ee Programmatic X
Pump ~ontrols discussion (B.S. b) above Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 17
~'ort Calh Station D 0 II Int ted I m nemen tation PI Fire Brigade [1250 gpm, 150 psia] See Programmatic X Controls discussion Pumper Truck (B.S. b) above Diesel Fuel X (44 gpm, 142ft. of See Programmatic Transfer head) !Controls discussion Pumps {2) above DG to power X 5kw See Programmatic Diesel Fuel Controls discussion Oil Transfer above Pumps (2)
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 18 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan PWR Portable Equipment Phase 3 f----*----*****-****---~-- -- ~ - --
Use and (potential I flexibility) diverse uses Performance Criteria Notes List portable SFP Instrumentation Accessibility equipment Portable 4160 VAC generator will power one installed vital 480/4160 X X X 500 kw bus.
VAC Generator Self-powered (or provided Low Press. with necessary generator Pumps 1,200 gpm, 120 psi power).
X
-- --~---- ---* -.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ll C-16-0095 , Attachment 1 Page 19 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 1 Sequence of Events Timeline ELAP (Initial conditions in accordance with NEI 12-06 Revision 2)
Action Elapsed Action Time Remarks I Applicability item Time Constraint YIN 0 SBO occurs N All fuel in SFP 1 5 min. Operators enter AOP-42 , N AOP-42 replaces EOP-07 Station Blackout with all fuel in the SFP. See Note 1 2 15 min . Minimize DC loads per N See Note 1 AOP-42 3 30 min . Attempt to restore SFP N Approved procedure AOP-cooling per AOP-36 36 Attachment F 4 2 hr. Survey plant for damage, N See Note 2 determine status of DGs using FSG-01 5 6 hr. Stage portable DG, hoses and N See Notes 2 and 3 pumps for alternate SFP makeup using FSG-01 and FSG-02 6 6 hr. Open hatch in roof of Auxiliary y See Note 2 Building to establish path to vent steam and water vapor from the Auxiliary Building per FSG-02.
7 8 hr. Open door between the y See Note 2 Radwaste Building and the Auxiliary Building to establish air inlet flow path to vent steam and water vapor from the Auxiliary Building per FSG-02.
8 8 hr. Monitor SFP level using the N See Note 2 SFPI.
9 8 hr. Reestablish power to a DC N See Note 2 bus and restore CR lighting per FSG-03 Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 , Attachment 1 Page 20 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 1 Sequence of Events Timeline ELAP (Initial conditions in accordance with NEI 12-06 Revision 2) 10 12 hr. Align power to submersible N See Note 2 pumps 11 24 hr. Maintain the SFP level within N See Note 2 the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-02.
12 5 Establish makeup to SIRWT N See Note 2 days from an alternate source of water (UHS - Missouri River) per FSG-02.
Note 1 Procedures have been validated 1n accordance with plant procedure approval process. Procedures will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
Note 2 FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) and Field Implementation Guidelines (FIG) have been validated in accordance with Appendix E of NEI-12-06 Revision 2.
Guidelines will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
Note 3 A configuration change will install pipe connections between Rooms 81 and 69 to connect the SIRWT Pumps to the FLEX Valve Skid and to connect the FLEX Valve Skid to the SFP Standpipe Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ll C-16-0095 Page 21 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 1 Sequence of Events Timeline ELAP Due to Dam Failure Flooding (No Antecedent Conditions)
!Assumptions:
- There are no forecasts that river level will exceed 1004 feet.
- Local river level indication is less than 1000 feet.
Action Elapsed Action Time Remarks I item Time Constraint Applicability YIN 1 - 70 hr. Operations enters AOP-01 based N See Note 1 on notification by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that an upstream dam or dams have failed with flooding expected in the Fort Calhoun area.
2 - 60 hr. River level is predicted to exceed N See Note 2 1014 feet and FSG-04, Response to Beyond Design Basis Flooding is implemented .
3 -48 hr. Deploy pumps, DG, valves, hoses N See Note 2 and portable SFP level indicator per FSG-04.
4 - 36 hr. Ventilate the Auxiliary Building per N See Note 2 FSG-04.
5 - 4 hr. Missouri River level is expected to N Dark Plant Condition is exceed El. 1014' within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. defined as no installed Induce Dark Plant Conditions per AC or DC power FSG-04. available to the site. See Note 2 6 -2 hr. Dark Plant Conditions established.
Maintain the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04.
7 0 Missouri River level exceeds El.
1014' 8 + 5 days Maintain the SFP level within the N See Note 2 desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04.
Note 1 Procedures have been validated 1n accordance w1th plant procedure approval process . Procedures will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
Note 2 FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) and Field Implementation Guidelines (FIG) have been validated in accordance with Appendix E of NEI-12-06 Revision 2.
Guidelines will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ll C-16-0095 , Attachment 1 Page 22 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 1 Sequence of Events Timeline ELAP Due to Dam Failure Flooding (Antecedent Conditions)
~ssumption :
~he National Weather Service or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecasts that river level will
~xceed 1004 feet.
Action Elapsed Action Time Remarks I Applicability item Time Constraint Y/N
-14 days Operations enters AOP-01 The pool elevation at either based on Ft. Peck or Garrison is
- 1. the pool level at either Ft. greater than the pool level Peck or Garrison is greater assumed in the sunny day than the maximum operating dam failure analysis.
pool elevation See Note 1 OR
- 2. river flow out of Oahe is sufficient that road access to the plant could be lost due to flooding when this flow reaches FCS in approximately 3 days as reported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Daily River Bulletin.
-12 days One DG and the valve skid are See Note 1 moved to the Auxiliary Building roof (Elevation 1057') and tested per FSG-04.
- 61 hr. Notification by the U.S. Army N See Note 1 Corps of Engineers that an upstream dam or dams have failed.
- 60 hr. River level is predicted to N See Note 2 exceed 1014 feet and FSG-04, Response to Beyond Design Basis Flooding is implemented.
- 48 hr. Deploy pumps, DG , valves, N See Note 2 hoses and portable SFP level indicator per FSG-04.
- 36 hr. Ventilate the Auxiliary Building N See Note 2 per FSG-04.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 , Attachment 1 Page 23 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 1 Sequence of Events Timeline ELAP Due to Dam Failure Flooding (Antecedent Conditions)
-4 hr. Missouri River level is expected N Dark Plant Condition is to exceed El. 1014' within 4 defined as no installed AC hours. Induce Dark Plant or DC power available to Conditions per FSG-04. the site. See Note 2
-2 hr. Dark Plant Conditions established. Maintain the SFP level within the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04.
0 Missouri River level exceeds El.
1014'
+5 Maintain the SFP level within N See Note 2 days the desired band and filling the SFP as required per FSG-04.
Note 1 Procedures have been validated 1n accordance w1th plant procedure approval process. Procedures will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
Note 2 FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) and Field Implementation Guidelines (FIG) have been validated in accordance with Appendix E of NEI-12-06 Revision 2.
Guidelines will be issued prior to December 31, 2016.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 24 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 2 Milestone Schedule The following will be completed by December 31, 2016:
- Installation of the SFPI
- Installation of the standpipe between Rooms 81 and 69
- Training and issuance of procedures and guidelines
- Procurement of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps
- FLEX equipment staged in either the safety-related plant structures or in the FLEX Storage Building.
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Ll C-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches (Sketches, to indicate equipment which is installed or equipment hookups necessary for the strategies.)
Section A. Deployment Pathways Section B. Mechanical Drawings Section C. Electrical Drawings Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related infonnation.
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LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches Section A Deployment Paths Figure A-1. Deployment Paths from the FLEX Storage Building to the Plant Figure A-2. Deployment Paths, Basement 989' Level Figure A-3. Deployment Paths, Ground Floor 1007' Level Figure A-4. Deployment Paths, Intermediate Floor, 1025' Level Figure A-5. Deployment Paths, Operating Floor, 1036' Level Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches FigureA-1. Deployment Paths from the FLEX Storage Building to the Plant Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
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Ll C-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches
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Figure A-2. Deployment Paths, Basement 989' Level Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under I 0 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches 0
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Figure A-3. Deployment Paths, Ground Floor 1007' Level Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches 0 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ N. .
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Figure A-4. Deployment Paths, Intermediate Floor, 1025' Level Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches
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Figure A-5. Deployment Paths, Operating Floor, 1036' Level Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches Section B Mechanical Drawings Figure B-1. Pipe/Hose Deployment- Ground Floor Plan Figure B-2. Pipe/Hose Deployment - Floor Plan Figure B-3. Pipe/Hose Deployment- Operating Floor Plan Figure B-4. Pipe/Hose Deployment - South Elevation Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches i
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HARD PIPE PRIMARY FLEX IIBU: HOSE REF DW G. NO:
11 405-A-6 AL "T ERNATE F LEX~ BLE HOSE Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
Ll C-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches Ul"l"tl l:l:lllf'l EllCLO
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Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches
!FIGURE NO. B-3: PIPE/HOSE DEPLOYMENT-OPERATING FLOOR PLAN)
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00 HARD PIPE REFDWG NO:
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- PRIMARY FLEXIBLE HOSE 11405-A-8
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- ALTERNATE FLEXIBLE HOSE Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
Ll C-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches IFIGURE NO. B-4: PIPE/HOSE DEPLOYMENT-SOUTH ELEVATION I I
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Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches Section C Electrical Drawings FIGURE C-1. CABLE DEPLOYMENT- GROUND FLOOR PLAN FIGURE C-2. CABLE DEPLOYMENT - FLOOR PLAN FIGURE C-3. CABLEDEPLOYMENT-ABROOF FIGURE C-4. CABLE DEPLOYMENT -OPERATING FLOOR PLAN Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches ... -.... J.F' *
- PRIMARY POWER CABLE REFDWG. NO:
11405-A-6 ALTERNATE POWER CABLE Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Enclosure 1 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches Ul"l"f:
l:tM'I EIICLC
~
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~~ . ¢ Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.
LIC-16-0095 Fort Calhoun Station Decommissioning Overall Integrated Implementation Plan Attachment 3 Sketches IFIGURE NO. C-3
- CABL.E DEPLOYMENT. AB ROOF
$ Room 82 Roof Strategy Staging Area:
- C*lese<Generator
- routeci to Room 82 Roof
- ""' Stagir.g Area during Room 82 Strat~gy lmpi&:nentation ROOF PLAN PRIMARY POWER CABLE ALTERNATE POWER CABLE Security-Related Information- Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this Jetter is Decontrolled.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-16-0095 Page 41 IFIGuRe No:-c4:CAsL.eoEPL:6vMENT::OPERATINGFL:OOR PLAN- -,
I Cables via Room 8 11 Roof Blow out
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PRIMARY POWER CABLE REFDWGNO:
ALTERNATE POWER CABLE 11405-A-8 Security-Related Information - Withhold From Public Disclosure Under l 0 CFR 2.390 Appendix A contains security-related information.
Upon removal of Appendix A this letter is Decontrolled.