L-88-386, Forwards Summary of mgt-on-shift Weekly Rept Per 871019 Order

Forwards Summary of mgt-on-shift Weekly Rept Per 871019 Order

ML17345A379
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/31/1988
From:	Conway W FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
L-88-386, NUDOCS 8809190171
Download: ML17345A379 (109)

Text

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ACCESSION NBR:8809190171 DOC.DATE: 88/08/31 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CONWAYiW.F.

Florida Power a Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION GRACE,J.N.

Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards summary of mgt-on-shift repts per NRC 871019 order.

Plant supervisor nuclear shift repts also encl.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

D036D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL l

SIZE:

TITLE: Turkey Point Management Onshift Pxogram NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME DRP/ADR-2 PD2-2 PD INTERNAL: AEOD NRR DEPY NRR MORISSEAUgD NRR/ADT 12-G-18 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS2 RGN2 FILE EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DRP-1/2 EDISONiG DEDRO NRR DIR NRR/ADP 12-G-18 NRR/DLPQ/PEB NRR/DRIS DIR 9A OE LIEBERMAN,J EG 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 2

2 1

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1 1

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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 23 ENCL 23

P. 0 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 3340B-0420

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AUGUST) 3 1 i988 L-88-386 Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

Re:

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

Docket Nos.

50-250 and 50-251 Mana ement-on-Shift Weekl Re ort Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19,

1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

The Plant Supervisor-Nuclear Shift Reports are also being submitted..

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours, W. F.

Conway Senior Vice President Nuclear WFC/SDF/gp Attachment cc:

J.

Lieberman, Director, 'Office of Enforcement, USNRC Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager,

NRR, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant R.

E. Talion, President, FPL mos001 8809i 90i7i 88083i PDR ADQCN 05000250 R

PNU 1(

Diaz 6 an FPL Group company

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MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMARY REPORT WEEK STARTING.

08/19/88 PAGE 1

QF 2

Six MOS Observers were on shift:

Richard Coulthard, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (08/19-21/88, days);

Andrew P.

Drake, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (08/19-22/88, nights);

Sidney

Brain, Chairman, Independent Safety Evaluation

Group, St.

Lucie Nuclear Plant (08/22-25/88, days);

Joseph P.

Brannin, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing, Juno Beach (08/22-26/88, nights); John

Evans, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Document Control Supervisor (08/19-23/88, nights); and Don Haase, Chairman, Safety Engineering Group, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (08/23-26/88, nights).

Unit 3 operated in Mode 1 for the duration of the reporting period.

Unit 4 tripped at 2120, 8/19/88, due to steam generator low-low level.

Unit 4 was returned to Mode 1 at 0022, 8/22/88.

No immediate safety problems were noted by any observer during the reporting period.

The independent observers did not note any questionable work practices.

They did note fourteen areas for improvement, as follows:

Three recommendations for improving procedures.

Two comments on communications.

Three comments on attention to detail.

Four comments on hardware deficiencies.

Two comments on inconsistent practices.

The Turkey Point observers did not note any questionable work practices.

They did note four areas for improvement, as follows:

Three recommendations for procedure improvement.

A determination that a reactor control operator was unaware of the effect of hand-held radios on a chart recorder.

ATTACHMENT'OS DAILY REPORTS

l yht

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMARY REPORT WEEK STARTING:

08/19/88 PAGE

~

OF One questionable work practice was noted by a Plant Supervisor Nuclear (PSN) regarding failure of I&C specialists to perform independent verifications of lineups. It has since been determined that only qualified operators willverify equipment on Control Room panels.

The PSNs also noted nine areas for improvement, as follows:

Four comments on procedures, one of which resulted in six specific recommendations.

A recommendation to upgrade the weir pit for the fossil units as has been done for the nuclear Units.

A recommendation to provide training to maintenance personnel on the Plant Clearance Order Network (PCON).

A recommendation regarding apparent miscalculation of releases.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

I)r~-".e 08/19 88 Shift Report Oift Shift Management Anderson Singer NWi':

Vetrom lie A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None p

AUG 27 1%8 B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken In the last couple of days we have been trying to do our releases and have been tripping R-14 several times.

Each time the release permit is terminated and re-sampling or re-evaluation is done to create another permit in which allows the release to go out.

This is very time consuming.

Recommend:

Troubleshoot and find the root cause of miscalculated releases and if it is a procedure problem correct the procedure.

If it is a sampling problem, correct the sampling method.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations Reviewed Bg Date

~ I hotionsCompleted Date

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4 Date 08 19 88 Shift Report Peak

,0 Shift Management Schimkus Reese Spence A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken On 8/18/88 and 8/16/88 (peakshift) the PSN and APSN needed to contact the Nuclear Energy Duty Officer (NEDO) for procedurally required notifications or in the case of yesterday when the System Dispatcher was causing a potential load threat to all four of the Turkey Point units, by re-closing a faulted breaker.

Due to the timing of the incidents, the NEDO was in his car.

We could not contact because the car phone was not upgraded to receive calls outside of Dade County.

The NEDO carries a beeper and the PSN is given a list of five beeper numbers for various cities from Miami to Stuart.

The PSN is not given a location of residence for various NEDOs.'If an NEDO lives in Stuart and is driving home from Juno, his beeper won't work until he is in Stuart.

When an event is occurring, the PSN must go through a Russian roulette method of going through the various beeper numbers, office number, home number, car phone number and this usually takes from 15 - 20 minutes for each cycle until the NEDO is reached.

Recommendations:

2.

3.

Have a call transfer number at the Miami General Office for not only the NEDOs home number but also the car phone (would automatically search for NEDO location).

Have a call transfer number programmed into the Miami G.O. for the Duty NEDO beeper number.

As a backup, change the PSN duty call NEDO list to include beside each NEDOs name:

a.

His "own" beeper number b.

City he resides in c.

Also include the current phone numbers listed on the Duty Call list As a last resort - allow the PSN to call the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) directly if NEDO contact has not been made within 30 minutes of an occurrance on off business hours.

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Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Reviewed BP hetions Com pie<<d Da<<

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Page 2

Week Beginning

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'CI 08'/01/88 DCS P. W. Hughes NEDO C. M. Wethy g/~ /4M-P/rW ORM g e~ ~~~~

08/08/88 DCS D. W. Haase NEDO J. P. Lowman ornae geeggl l

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~~M+ m<a-v/~C, Sn 694-4229 Home ele hone 246-2883 255-1785 MNa 40V-5VS-OV21 08/15/88 08/22/88 08/29/88 09/06/88 09/12/88 09/19/88 09/26/88t 10/03/88 10/10/88 10/1V/88 10/24/88 10/31/88 11/07/88 11/14/88 11/21/88 DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DC>

NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO DCS NEDO J. C. Strong J. Scarola R. h. Longtemps D. h. Sager J. Arias J. L. Danek W. R. Williams J. J. Hutchinson J. C. Balaguero P. L.'Pace J. E. Crockford J. K. Hays D. J. Tomaszewski J. E. Moaba T. h. Finn H. E. Yaeger V. A. Kaminskas R. J. Acosta J. A, Labarraque W. J. Waylett L. C. Huenniger C. M. Wethy F. H. Southworth D. h. Sager P. W. Hughes H. N. Paduano D. W. Haase J. Scarola J. C. Strong J. P. Lowman 617V 694-4425 6495 694-4188 600V 694-4213 6455 694-4211 6008 694-ASi 6253 694-3592 6158 694-4216 6121 694-4189 6090 694-3656 6151 694-421V 6171 tH~4Q4 ~m- &34 6185 694-4188 6195 694-4190 6077 694-4425 61VV 694-4229 24-7132 407-534-4663 248-V996 or 245-7747 407-334-6776 382-6806 40V-Z47-V8VO 245-0264 407-694-2507 238-4072 40V-694-1398 251-5255 40V-'546-1V61 248-7756 407-627-4483 248-7481 552-0980 595-6845 40Z-V98-3861 382-7480 40V-626-8930 248-5671 255-1785 253-0172 407-334-6V76 246-2883 407-575-0152 665-6149 40V-334-4663 245-7132 40Z-575-0V21

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DCS Beeper Instructions~

h touch tone phone must be used.

Dial beeper phone number 882-4800.

hEter completion of the tone, dial the phone number that the Duty Call Supervisor should call In order to obtain any necesssry message.

Then dial a 5 sign and hang up.

The phone number dialed will be indicated on the beeper.

NEDO Beeper Instructions:

The NEDO carries an FPL Beeper which uses different access numbers for various geographical areas.

Those numbers are listed below.

lami Ft. Lauderdale Delray Beach West Palm Beach Stuart 8-118-1418 8-106-418 8-631-418 8-444-418 8-630-418

/+de CC,(I )64ICM To deliver a message to the NEDO, the caller should dial the appropriate number and speak following the tone.

The spoken message willbe heard on the beeper.

NOTE:

Indi uals shoul w

s m t o contact the DCS or NEDO via the a

ropria e o ce or home tele hone num r

r or o us e be er us ness

ours, e

may also cellular phone number (305) 343-8964.

contact at 4

at In accordance with EP-20101, "Duties of Emergency C

inator," the Emerg cy Control Officer must be notified of all Emergency Plan activa g events.

The designate ECO's and their phone numbers are listed below.

e Primary Alternate 1

Alternate 2 Alternate 3 Alternate 4 Alternate 5

!flee J. W. Dickey 694-4223 D. A. Sager 694-4188 J. K. Hays 694-3592 R. J. Acost 694-3SSS H. N. Pa o

694-4190 NEDO sted on NEDO Schedule Home 475-1279 (Ft.L) 407-334-67V6 407-546-1761 407-798-3861 407-5V5-0152 Cellular

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Phone 40V 343-8965 Any questions regard g the DCS or NEDO schedule should be referred to Lew La arde at Extension 6226.

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l)ate 20 Shift Report Jones Shift Management A )~SN Haley NNE A.

Questionable Vork Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations

/Actions Taken Step 5.2 of 4-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Standby had the operator go to Step 5.23 following a reactor trip - by doing this the Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSR) are not removed from service and lined up for restart.

PUP needs to address this issue.

Also taking a clearance on generator disconnects is passed over.

C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed The NTO (Hobson) noticed the MSRs had not been realigned. Procedure 4-OP-72.1, Moisture Separator Reheater was performed to realign system.

Reviewed B Date ~ ~ )/hctionaCotnpleted Date

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4 l>ate os zo/ss Shift Report hift Da Harpel Shift Management AI'N Singer Vetromile A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine Operations Reviewed B hctions Completed

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Date 08/20 88 Shift Report Shift Management Schimkus AiiSN Reese Spence A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed While performing Turbine Trip test, a plug (1$ ") on the underside of the west turbine stop valve blew out, flooding the high pressure turbine housing with oil.

The oil immediately started sifting onto hot piping on the mezzanine deck and onto the floor to the 18 foot elevation.

The APSN/NWB/RCO/NTOs took immediate corrective actions to stop the oil leak, notify Maintenance and station fire watches.

The real hero was the Maintenance Foreman (Clark Boggs) who immediately pulled together a team of personnel to contain the oil preventing an oil release.

The cleanup effort was superb with few noticeable traces of oil in any area affected.

Reviewed B Date J ~ d d hotions Completed Date

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ia l)ate 08 21 88 Shift Report Harpel Shift Management AI'N Singer Vetromile A.

Questionable Vork Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken I

None C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Reviewed Bg r

Date d ~2 J hctions Completed Date

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'8/22/88 Shift Report Mid Jones Shift Management Al'SN Haley NPatuszewski A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations Reviewed Bg Date ~ P hctionsCuu plated

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0-ADM-019 M~gement on Shift (MOS) ~

MOS DAILYREPORT Pege To:

Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/19-20/88 From:

J. D. Evans bseruer)

Shift:

Q Day Qx Night Plant Pvolutions Observed Unit 3 at 100% power, Unit 4 trip at 2120 IGC testing Unit 4 Steam Generator (SG) low level alarms Stabilization of Unit 4 Formation of Emergency Response Team (ERT)

Valve watch stations B.

Immediate Safety Problems None C.

Questionable Vora'ractices None D.

Areas for Improvement As identified by RCO on shift and by a previous MOS Observer, there is no logical reason for the stamp (verify O.T.S.C. prior to use) to exist on ONOP and EP procedures used/contained in the Control Room.

Primarily due to the current methodology requiring the "Hand-writing" of O.T.S.C.'s to the actual section effected alleviates the application or intent of the stamp.

The masters maintained in the SDC files are stamped and will therefore require the Procedure Upgrade (PUP) Department to regenerate the cover page for each of the procedures described above.

SDC staff will issue a non-stamped replacement to the Control Room as soon as the master file is corrected.

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0-ADM-019 anagement on Shift (MOS)

MOS DAILYREPORT Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Within minutes of the reactor trip on Unit 4, the NWE, operators and APSN responded extremely efficiently with excellent continuity and coordination.

Everyone

involved, both inside the Control Room and outside acted very professional while remaining very calm.

Overall shift turnover and assistance to the ERT very informative and constructive.

Good communication between valve watch stations and ROs.

Security stations well manned and organized.

Completed By:

J. D. Evans server Date: 08/19-20/88 Reviewed By:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Management Review By:

M-te ae

• Miami I IllllliM 08/19-20/88

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0-'ADM-019 Magement on Shift(MOS) ~

MOS DAILYREPORT To:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date:

08/19-20/88 From:

Andrew P. Drake bserver Shift:

Q Day Qx Night Plant Qvolutions Observed Units 3 and 4 at 100% power, normal operations and logs Unit 4 trip (peak shift) Steam Generator (SG) B low-low level Unit 4 implementation of Emergency Procedures E-0 and ES-0.1 Unit 4 Significant Event Notification Unit 4 post trip recovery and Emergency Response Team (ERT) meeting Peak to mid shift turnover Mid shift briefing B.

Immediate Safety Problems None observed C,

Questionable Work Practices No comments at present D.

Areas for Improvement The unit Reactor Control Operators (RCOs) are not consistently informed of clearances issued that the Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE), Assistant Plant Supervisor Nuclear (APSN) or Plant Supervisor Nuclear (PSN) have suspended.

When a clearance is given to the unit RCO to hang, he assigns the clearance to an outside operator (TO, NLO, etc.) to be hung. If the clearance is then suspended, the TO, NLO, etc.,

who is performing it is called by the

PSN, APSN or NWE, but the unit RCO is not always informed.

The unit 'RCOs should be kept informed of any and all changes in the performance of clearances.

2.

R-1 1, containment activity monitor, is out-of-service (OOS) again.

When both R-11 and R-12 are OOS, Technical Specifications requires the Control Room ventilation to be placed in the recirculation mode.

However with only one OOS, this is not required.

Some shifts place the system into recirculation if either is out and then a later shift puts it back to normal.

So far this week the system has been switched back and forth at least 2 cycles.

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0-ADM-019 Mtitgement on Shift (MOS) ~

MOS DAlLY RE I'0RT I'age.

To Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

os/zo/ss From:

Richard Coulthard bseruer)

Shift:

g)

Day

~ Night A.

Plant Evolutions Observed Unit 3 at 100% power Unit 4 at Hot Standby 0735 and 1535 start of shift meetings 1345 Event Response Team (ERT) meeting on 8/19/88 reactor trip B.

Immediate Safety Problems None C.

Questionable Work Practices None D.

Areas for Improvement I reviewed previous MOS reports on Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger cleaning criteria and discussed this issue with the STA.

The current sequence is to clean the heat exchanger, return it to service, performance test the heat exchanger to calculate a new limit based on the "worst" fouling rate we have ever experienced and then take the heat exchanger out-of-service (OOS) based on intake Cooling Water temperature.

Heat exchanger performance (differential temperatures, etc.) are not measured to make a decision to take the heat exchanger OOS.

Heat exchangers have been cleaned many times only to discover no fouling had occurred.

See response to MOS item 88-1700 of 7/18/88.

The above suggestion may result in additional performance testing of heat exchangers and associated manpower; but I think has the potential to significantly reduce the number of times heat exchangers are taken OOS.

This would make a corrsesponding reduction in number of LCOs entered into as well as demands on operators, heat exchanger cleaning crews, Quality Control inspectors, tube wear, etc.

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0-A0 M-019 anagement on Shift (MOS)

MOS DAILYREPORT I'age B.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments l.

Day crew made a

good effort to determine and complete all items necessary to return Unit 4 to criticality and power.

2.

Several members of the Event

Response

Team (ERT) put in long days analyzing the events associated with the trip.

Completed By:

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Reviewed By:

perati ons Superintendent-Nuclear Date:

Management Review By:

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XOS ACTION ITBM CTRAC

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Tracker Descri mv Implementor Designee Short Term Corrective Action:

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Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Repl pared by:

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Name (Print)

Department Bxt. ¹

. Signature Concurrence:

b rz Implementor t

Note:

Please ohtaln concurrence from the Implementor, then return orfglnal to MOS Coordinator (Room 1630) with any supporting documentation attached.

Call Extensfon 1221 lf you have any questions.

THANKYOU!

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Note:

Please obtain concurrence from the Implementor, then return original to MOS Coordinator (Room 1630) with any supporting documentation attached.

Call Extension 1221. if you have any questions.

THANK YOU!

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fO.ADM-O>9 Ma~i,ement on Shift (MOS)

&OS l)AILYREPORT Date:

08/20-21/88 From:

John D. Evans bseruer)

Shift:

p Day px Night.

Plant Evolutions Observed Unit 3 at 100% power, Unit 4 in Hot Standby Oil spill in Turbine Fire watch notification Continuation of Steam Generator (SG) channel alarms by I&C Volume control tank purge Shift turnover B.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement A Unit 3 RCO was not aware of radio transmission causing spurious alarms at the reactor coolant pump temperature chart recorder.

The use of a radio within approximately 3 or 4 feet will cause alarm.

Unit 3 RCO is now aware of situation.

Assure other RCOs are made aware of this problem.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Good quiet shift overall.

Good response from Maintenance staff and Operations (TOs and NOs) on oil spill. Firewatch and Security well manned and alert.

Completed By:

John D. Evans seruer Da te; 08/20-21/88 Reviewed By:

V perations uperintendent-Nuclear anagement Review By:

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~ate 08/20-21/88

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-A@M-019 1

Management on Shift (MOS) ifOS l)AlLYREPORT Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear J

Date:

08 20-21 88 From Andrew P. Drake

(

bseruer)

Shift:

Q Day gx Njght Plant Evolutions Observed

. Unit 3 at 100% power Unit 4, Mode 3, Hot Standby Normal operations and logs Peak to mid shift turnover Mid shift briefing Intermediate Range surveillance Volume Control tank purge, Unit 3 4

Unit 4, Turbine trip test and subsequent oil leak on left stop valve B.

C.

Immediate Safety Problems None'bserved Questionable Work Practices None observed Areas for Improvement 1.

Mechanical Maintenance and Instrumentation and Control (IGC) were not in attendance at the mid shift meeting.

2.

The last few days the peak and mid shifts have had trouble logging onto the Nuclear Job Planning System (NJPS).

This makes it diffucult to approve hot jobs that come up since they cannot be approved nor can work authorization (WA) numbers be given out to the crews.

3.

For the last several days the turbine gantry crane has been parked right in front of the south end stairs making passage extremely difficult.

No work goes on during the peak or mid shift involving this crane.

A good operating practice would be to park this crane out of the way unless work is ongoing.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Quiet, smooth night on both units.

Completed By:

Andrew P. Drake server Reviewed By:

anagement Review By:

perations upe nntendent-uclear I

2Z ate ate ate 08/20-21/88

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O-P.DM-oi9 Meagement on Shift (MOS) ~

MOS DAILYREPORT Page To: '

Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/21/88 From:

Richard Coulthard M

bserver Shift:

px Day Night A.

Plant Evolutions Observed Unit 3 at 100'!o power operations Unit 4 at Hot Standby 0715 Special Sunday Plan of the Day meeting 1535 shift turnover meeting Feedwater Regulating Valve testing per 4-GOP-301 B.

Immediate Safety Problems None C.

Questionable Work Practices none D.

Areas for Improvement None B.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Very quiet shift.

Completed By:

Richard Coulthard server Dt:~

Reviewed By:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Management Review By:

AMID I ell o7'ee z

te

/ slc Date 08/Zl/88

0

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, O-A,DM-O)9 Management on Shift (MOS)

%LOS DAlLY R E PO RT Opera tions Superintendent

- Nuclear Date.

08/21-22/88 From:

John D. Evans

(

seruer)

Plant Evolutions Observed Shift:

Q Day

~x Night Unit 3 at 100%, Unit 4 Mode 3 to Mode 1

Turbine Trip test and Turbine Valve test Diesel oil recirculation valve watch Turbine deck all elevation tour Health Physics facility check B.

C.

D.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Vork Practices None Areas for Improvement None Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments During the Turbine valve and Turbine trip tests, the non-licensed groups both peak and mids deserve recognition for a job well done in their support of these evolutions.

Operations brought the unit up through the mode changes very systematically and without incident.

Good shift turnover and the peak shift stayed with the startup into the mid shift to maintain thorough continuity.

Completed By:

John D. Evans seruer Date:

08/21-22/88 Reviewed By:

perations uperi ntendent-uclear Management Review By:

/

te ae ate 08/21-22/88

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0-'A,DM-019 Magement on Shift (MOS) ~

MOS DAILYREPORT To:

Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/21-22/88 From:

A.

Andrew P. Drake (M

server Plant Evolutions Observed Shift; Q

Day Qx Night Unit 3, 1000 power normal operations/logs Unit 4, Reactor Startup, Turbine Trip test, Turbine roll Unit 4 Sync to grid, power increase to 50% power Peak to mid shift turnover Mid shift briefing (short due to Unit 4 startup)

Completion of Unit 4 stop valve repairs Reviewed Emergency

Response

Team (ERT) report on Unit 4 trip of 8/19/88 B.

Immediate Safety Problems None observed Questionable Work Practices None observed Areas for Improvement 1.

Auto sync circuit on Unit 4 Turbine startup did not work as smoothly as it did for the startup on 8/16-17/88.

Further investigation may be warranted.

2.

The Control Room access gates (3 of 5) are broken again.

These gates have been frequent items on MOS reports.

They should be removed as quickly as possible.

The one at the Nuclear Watch Engineer's (NWE) station was a safety hazard with the end protruding out into the walkway.

It was finally removed.

3.

Why do some IGC Specialists require a PWO to be submitted to change the recording tape on the Metal Impact Monitor (MIMS) recorder and others do not?

This is a fairly regular operation and should not require a PWO to be performed.

a N(ki t ad olt01lee

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0-ADM-019 anagement on Shift (MOS)

MOS DAILYREPORT B.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Unit 4 reactor startup went very well.

The operators were cognizant of plant conditions at all times and frequently questioned the trainee performing the startup to ensure he understood the current plant conditions.

A job well done by the entire peak shift.

2.

The week of June 6,

1988, the new Control Room ventilation system was placed in service.

During the startup testing a problem was discovered with the test switches on the Control Room Normal Air Intake Rad Monitor Channels A and B (RAI-6642/6643).

If these switches were released too fast an inadvertant Control Room isolation signal would occur and a significant event would result.

The "Short term" fix was to place caution tags on these switches to alert the operators to this problem.

The operators on shift at the time, were assured by plant management, that they too saw this an unacceptable solution and these switches would be "Hot Items" to fix.

The board operators frequently point this out as a

case for "new management philosophy" (i.e., do it right the first time) to disprove the old style (put it in and fix it right later).

What is the status on these switches?

Provide feedback to the operation personnel on "Hot Items'obs" that directly effect their jobs.

This feedback will help them feel they are a part of the team and not just a bench warmer.

Completed By:

Andrew P. Drake M

server D

Reviewed By:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Management Review By:

D e

ae

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Date 08/21-22/88

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)ate shift Report S ift Shift Management Jones/Ander+PSN Singer N+f:

Vetrom lie A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations Reviewed B Date S 28 I hctions Completed Date

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0-ADM-019 Managementon Shift(MOSj MOS DAlLYREPORT To:

Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/22/88 From:

Sidney G. Brain

(

bserver Plant Evolutions Observed Shift:

Qx Day Q Night Unit 3 at 100% power

'nit 4 at approximately 65% power, ramped to approximately 84% power Manipulation of Unit 3 Volume Control Tank (VCT) press to stabilize seal leakoff ONOP 1108.l and 3-OP-047.1 0740 phone call Individual Reactor Operator (RO) turnovers B.

Immediate Safety Problems None C.

Questionable Vork Practices None D.

Areas for Improvement None E.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Good communications between RO and APSN during the VCT pressure changes to stabilize "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff.

Procedures were used and discussed.

2.

Valve watch radio checks were crisp and clear.

Personnel in Control Room whose reason for being there was not known to RO's were challenged.

They were there to take switch/escutcheon measurements.

Completed By:

Sidne G. Brain bserver Date:

08/22/88 Reviewed By:

perations Superi ntendent-Nuclear Dat-28 I Management Review By:

M-ate C

/

D te ate 08/22/88

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0-A13M-019 Maement on Shift (MOSj ~

MOS DA)LY REPOR'F Opera tions Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/22-23/88 From:

J. P. Brannin seruer)

Shift:

Q Day Qx Night Plant Evolutions Observed Reduction in power from approximately 80% to approximately 23%

Unit 4 Main Turbine Trip test Peak to mid turnover Mid shift briefing Increase in power from approximately 23% to approximately 60%

B.

Immediate Safety Problems None observed C.

Questionable Work Practices None observed D.

Areas for Improvement None at this time.

Professionalism. Summary of Shift, Comments A good discussion was held prior to plant evolutions.

Good use of procedures.

Completed By:

seruer Date:

2-23 88 eviewed By:

Management Review By:

perations upe rintendent-uclear ate te ate 08/22-23/88

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'0-A'DM-019 Ma~gement on Shift (MOS) ~

MOS DhILYRh'.PORT Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date 08/22-23/88 From:

h.

John D. Evans

(

seruer)

Plant Evolutions Observed Shift:

D Day Qx Night Unit 3 at 100% power Unit 4, power ascension from 85% to 20No Turbine trip test Shift turnover, peak to mid C.

D.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement Procedure 4-OSP-200.3, Secondary Plant Periodic

Tests, step 7.2.17 timing of the actual reading of P.I. 3658 vs actual green light indication caused a

lot of concern for the results as recorded on record copy (see attached) 170 psig actual recorded.

Recommendation:

The acceptance criteria should be reviewed.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Very good shift turnvover meeting.

Overall smooth shift, good support from the NLO's and other support groups.

During my general walkthrough, Security and Firewatch crews were very alert, courteous and helpful.

Completed By:

n D. Evans seruer Date:

08/22-23/88 Reviewed By:

Management Review By:

perottons uperintendent-Nuclear te te Dat: Ia3 ote 08/22-23/88

C 4

Procedure No.:

4-OSP-200.3 Proced tie Secondary Plant Periodic Tests Page:

ApprovalDate:

7/19/88 INIT 7.2.15 7.2.16 7.2.17 7.2.18 7.2.19 7.2.20 7.2.21 g

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Close the Low Vacuum TripTest valve.

While monitoring the Turbine Auto Stop PI-3658, position and hold the Trip/Reset lever to the Reset/Latch position.

When the green Reset light comes On, record the pressure indicated at Turbine Auto Stop PI-3658.

psig (140 to 160 psig increasing)

Verifyannunciator E-5/3, CONDENSER LOWVACUUM,is clear.

Slowly release the Trip/Reset lever.

Verifythe Trip/Reset lever returned to the Normal position.

Estab'lish communications with the control room and request prompt notification of the actuation of annunciator E-2/1, TURBINE

. BEARINGOILLOWPRESSURE.

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NOTE I

l a In the followingsteps the Test handle shall be held in the To Test position until the controls are reset as indicated by the green Reset light at PI-4-3658. Ifthe test must be discontinued for any reason other than a Turbine Trip and the controls are not reset, proceed to Step 7.2.28 to ensure adequate restoration of the turbine controls.

7.2.22 Continue to hold the test handle to the To Test position.

7.2.23 While monitoring the Low Brg Oil Press Trip Test PI-3612, slowly throttle open the Low Brg Oil Press TripTest valve.

7.2.24 When notified by the control room that annunciator E-2/1, TURBINE BEARING OIL LOW PRESSURE, is actuated, record the pressure indicated at Low Brg OilPress TripTest PI-3612.

sig (7 to 9 psig decreasing)

. 7.2.25

. Continue to monitor the Low Brg Oil Press Trip Test PI-3612 until actuation ofthe trip lever at the turbine front standard.

7.2.26 When the trip lever actuates, record the pressure indicated at Low Brg OilPress TripTest PI-3612.

~sig (4 to 6 psig decreasing) a/1: 2/3RM/dt/Id/vm

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shift Report Snift Shift Management Anderson A l>Slits Singer Vetromile A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken None Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations teviewed 8 Date

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hctions Colpleted Date

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V li l)ate 08/24/es

~Shift Report S ift Mid I'N Shift Management Schimkus A I~SN Reese Spence A.

Questionable Vork Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendation None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions'Taken A possible Unit 4 shutdown was at handtonight, dependent on Component Cooling Water (CCW) efficiency testing followig 4B CCW Heat Exchanger cleaning.

The STA called out the designated Test Engineer at 0005.

At 0145, the PSN noticed no testing activity in progress on 4B CCW Heat Exchanger.

The PSN contacted the STA.

The STA informed that the Test Engineer could not be reached, The PSN requested STA call out an alternate to accomodate the test ativity. The originally contacted Test Engineer arrived on site at 0221 and started test activity Note:

He lives approximately 30 minutes away.

Recommend:

a.

Have a Test Engineer on site continually.

b.

Find out why we are experiencing such extensive time lags occassionally to accomodate these tests.

2.

Tonight (peaks/mids) dispute arose concerning actions to be taken in the event Intake temperatures exceeded the allowable temperature for CCW Heat Exchangers to remove design basis

accident, heat load.

Current Technical Specifications allow a

Heat Exchanger out-of-service for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Intake Cooling Water (ICW) JCO dictates the operability of the CCW system is dependent on Intake temperature vs CCW Heat Exchanger efficiency (cleanliness).

ADM-021 informs that if Intake temperatures reach 95 F, the unit enters a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO and an engineering study must be performed to ensure the ICW system can mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

If the CCW Heat Exchanger cleanliness curve dictates that a unit shutdown must

commence, Technical Specification 3.0.1.

applies.

Additionally, EP-20101 dictates that loss of any equipment in current Technical Specification 3.4 requiring a plant shutdown shall be reported as an Unusual Event if:

The system can't be made operable or we are unable to take compensatory measures within the time limits of the Technical Specification.

Reviewed B hctiune Completed Date

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Date 8 24 88 Shift Report Page Continuation Page "

Actions:

Complying to Technical Specif ication, ADM-021, Ep-20102 and ICW JCO

'imultaneously until a good solid interpretation or EP-20101 procedure change exists which deletes requirement for Unusual Event.

Recommend:

Change EP-20101 to read that a loss of both redundant trains of equipment listed in section 3.4, requiring a plant shutdown and inability to make either or any train operable shall constitute an Unusual Event only if the LCO action statements and applicable time limits are exceeded or can't be met.

Need licensing to research this possibility if it is not in violation of requirements.

C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations

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EMERGE CY CLASSIFICATIONTABLE 01 2.5 10/3/85 25.

LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES/FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS UNUSUALEVENT 1)

Anyone of the followingthree:

a)

Loss of any equipment listed in Tech. Spec. Section 3.4 requiring plant shutdown.

OR b)

Loss of any fire protection systems listed in Tech Spec section 3.5 requiring plant shutdown.

OR c)

Loss of any fire protection systems listed in Tech Spec.

Section 3.14 ANO 2) lnabihty to make ~ny systems addressed above operable OR To provide compensatory measures within the specified time limitsof the appiicable Tech. Spec NOTE An UNUSUAl. EVENT shall be declared when actual load reduction begins ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTION i.nmplete actions listed in Step 8.4, Complete actions listed in Step 8.5, le 28 e40 Complete actions listed in Step 8.6, e53 Complete actions listed in Step 8.7, a e60

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0-ADM-019 Management on Shift (MOS)

MOB DAII.YREPORT To:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date:

08 23 88 From:

Sidne G. Brain bseruer Plant Evolutions Observed Shift:

Qx Day Q Night 0715 Plan of the Day meeting Unit 4 continued power escalation to 100% power Calorimetric OSP-059.5 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Gain Pots adjustment 4-OSP-059.5 Unit 3 Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS) tests 11204.1

)530 shift meeting B.

C.

D.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement Procedure 11204.1 ARMS - periodic test on page 3, step 8.2.3 calls for a PWO to be issued to IGC if the low or high setpoint tests do not meet the acceptance criteria.

The high setpoint acceptance criteria are stated; the low setpoint acceptance criteria are not.

The RO's are aware of the low setpoints.

Recommend the procedure be modified to include the low setpoint acceptance criteria.

B.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Unit 4 RCO held power escalation until INC worked on Control bank D H-12 Rod Position Indication (RPI), which was showing approximately 12 steps out to avoid going into a LCO.

Solid routine shift performances.

Completed By:

Sidne G. Brain bseruer D

Reviewed By:

Management Review By:

perations Superintendent-Nuclear ate Date 08/23/88

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0-ADM-019 4

Management on Shift (hiOS)

MOS DAILYREPORT To:

Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date:

08/23-24/88 From:

Joseph P. Brannin bseruer Shift:

Q Day Qx Night A.

Plang Bvolutions Observed Discussion of Intake temperature and Component Cooling Water (CCW) situation Misaligned rod on Unit 4 B.

C.

D.

B.

Immediate Safety Problems None observed Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement See section E Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments During the peak shift Rod Cluster Control Assembly H-12 on Unit 4 was found to be misaligned.

The operators used three documents in dealing with this situation.

They are:

1.

Current Technical Specifications 2.

Interim Technical Specifications (0-ADM-021) 3.

Procedure 4-ONOP-028 Reactor Control System Malfunction I have attached copies of the pertinent pages.

The current Technical Specifications refer to a misaligned control rod as one being "...more than 12 steps out of alignment with it s bank..."

The Interim Technical Specifications discuss alignment as being "...positioned within 12 steps (indicated position) of the REFERENCE POSITION corresponding to the group demand counter position..."

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0-ADM-019 e

Management on Shift (MOS)

MOS DAILYREPORT Pet ge The ONOP discusses, under a section entitled symptoms, Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment as the two Technical Specifications mentioned above but adds a further "symptom", that is, "Bank RPI (Rod Position Indication) highest to lowest difference of greater than 12 steps."

This is not a Technical Specification requirement.

This practice causes unnecessary delays and work. It also opens up some interesting questions.

If this is a valid way of determining Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment then since Rod H-IZ was greater than 12 steps away from Rod H-4 Rod 4 was greater than IZ steps away from Rod H-12, and we therefore had two Rod Cluster Control Assemblies misaligned.

There is no way of knowing which rod was misaligned until the proper checks were performed.

This being the case we should take action in accordance with the Technical Specifications for two misaligned rods.

Upon discussing this with the PSN I was informed that this was not the first time this had occurred or was handled in this way.

I believe this ONOP symptom of Rod Control Cluster Assembly Misalignment to be non-useful, it's misused when it does

occur, and it adds to complications in operations.

It is not required by the Technical Specifications as they make no reference to comparing highest to lowest Rod Control Cluster Assembly position.

In tonight's situation neither rod was misaligned more than 12 steps (9 steps was maximum) from its bank.

Due to this ONOP sympton Reactor Engineering was called in to perform a flux map and ISAAC was diverted from other efforts to reset the indic'ators.

The flux map found both rods in agreement with the bank position.

I recommend deletion of this step from the ONOP.

If the step is not deleted we should formalize the determination of the rods being misaligned.

Comparing one rod to another and then saying only one is misaligned implies that the other is known to be aligned and can be proven so.

This is not true.

Problems were handled well by both shifts.

Both shifts very persistent in seeking solutions.

Completed By:

Jose h P. Brannin server Dt:~

perati ons uperi ntendent-Nuclear Management Review By:

te'te state 08/23-24/88

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f Qcept for low power phys fcs tests g the shutdown margfn wfth allo"ance for a stuck control rod shall exceed the appl fcable yalue shown on Ffgu e 3.2 2

under all steady>>state operatfng condf-tfons from zero to <<11 powers fn ludf"g power dfstrfbutfon ~

The shutdown aargfn as used here fs deffned as the amount by whfch the reac-tor core would be subcrftfcal at hot shutdown condftfons (S40~F) ff all con trol rods vere trfpped, assumfng that.

the hfghest worth control rod remafnecf fully wfthdrawn, and assumfng no changes fn xenon',

boron concentratfon or part-1 ength rod po s ftfon.

Qurfng physfcs tests and control rod exercfses, the fnsertfon lfmfts need not be met, but the r equfred shutdown mar gfn, Ffgure 3.2-2 aust be mafntafned or exceeded.

2.

MISALINED CONTROL ROD If a. part length or full length control rod fs sore than l2 steps out of alfgnmcnt wfth ft's bank, and fs not corrected wfthfn 8

hours, power shall be reduced so as not to.

exceed 75" of fnterfm powe~ for 3 loop or.

45 or fnterfm power for two loop operatfon, unless the hot channel factors are shown to be no greater dan allowed by Sec.fon 6a of Specfffcatfon 3.2 3.

ROD DROP TIME

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ater than 2.4 seconds at full flow and no greater operatfng temperature from the beg g

innfn of..

rod motfon to dashpot entry.

4.

INOPERABLE CONTROL RODS a.

Ho more than one fnoperable control rod shall be permftted durfng sustafned power operatfon, except ft shall not be.

permftted ff the rod has a potentfal th rods no longer applfes af.er the part-Any ze erence.to part-eng ro s

length rocfs are remoyed from the reactor.

Thfs amendment effectfve as of stirtup, Cycle 10, Unft 4.

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3o 2~Z Amendment Nos'. g8 and

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date of fssuance for Unft. 3 and date of

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INTER IM REACTIVI TY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/i-1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES GROUP HEIGHT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rods, shall be OPERABLE and positioned within x 12 steps (indicated position) of the REFERENCE POSITION corresponding to the group demand counter position within one hour after rod moti on.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1>> and 2>>.

ACTION:

a.

b.

With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being fnmovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrfppable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 fs satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With one full rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or misalfgned from its REFERENCE POSITION by more than 12 steps (indicated position),

POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either:

The rod is restored to OPERABLE status withfn the above alignment requirements, or The remainder of the rods in the bank with the fnoperable rod are aligned to within ~ 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-1; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3. 1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or 3.

The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.

POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

<<See Specia Test Exceptions

3. 10.2 and 3. 10.3.,

3/4 1-15

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INTERN REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION Continued:

a.

A re-evaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 fs performed wfthfn 5 days; this re-evaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these 'accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions.

b.

The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.l.l.l fs determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c.

A power dfstributfon map fs obtained from the movable fncore detectors and Fn(Z) and FIH are verified to be within thefr lfmfts wfthfn 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

d.

The THERMAL POMER level fs reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within one hour and within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the high neutron flux trip setpofnt is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

THERMAL POWER shall be maintained less than or equal to 75%

of RATED THERMAL POWER until compliance with ACTIONS 3.1.3.1.b.3.a'nd 3.1.3.1.b.3.c above are demonstrated.

e.

Within 4 weeks determine the rod worth of the inoperable rod.

If the rod fs determined to have a potential reactivity insertion of greater than 0.3% ak/k upon ejectfon at rated power, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c.

Mith more than one rod trfppable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a.

above, POMER OPERATION may continue provided that:

1.

Mithin one hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank(s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within ~

12 steps of the inoperable rods while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-1.

The THERMAL POWER Level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent i

operation, and 2.

The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

d.

With more than one rod misaligned from its reference position by more than

+ 12 steps (indicated position),

be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

3/4 1-16

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INTERIN REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE IREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full rod shall be determined to be within 12 steps (indicated position) of the REFERENCE POSITION corresponding to'he

'roup demand position at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (allowing for one hour thermal soak after rod motion) except during time intervals when either the rod position deviation monitor or the power range channel deviation alarm is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or after a load change of greater than 10% power.

If both alarms are inoperable for two hours or more, the nuclear overpower trip shall be reduced to 93% of RATEO THERHAL PO'HER.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full length rod not fully inserted which is inserted fn the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 14 days.

3/4 1-17

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proctau<t Ho 4-ONOP-028 procedvie Tiae Reactor Control System Malfunction

~IBAD 4 pprovil Oate 10I20/87 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 This procedure provides instructions to be followed in the event of a Reactor Control System Malfunction due to:

1.1.1.

1.1.2.

1.1.3 1.1.4 1.1.5 1.1.6 1.1.7 A rod cluster control assembly (RCC) that is misaligned with its bank Failure of an RCC to move due to being untrippable, CRDM failure, or rod control power supply failure Failure of an RCC control bank to insert following a change in turbine load or in boron concentration with reactor control in automatic Failure of the individual rod position indicators (RPI) or the group demand step counters Dropped RCC Continuous insertion ofan RCC control bank Continuous withdrawal ofan RCC control bank 2.0 SYMPTOMS 2.1 RCC Misali ment 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 Power range nuclear instrumentation variation of greater than 8 percent difference between any two detectors at the same elevation Axial flux difference indicators difference of 3 percent between any two channels Significant axial power shape difference from symmetric assemblies, as determined by the Reactor Supervisor Rod position indicator (RPI) vs. group demand step counter difference ofgreater than 12 steps 1.

A difference of greater than 12 steps between RPI and group demand step counter is acceptable for power operation below 50 percent power.

2.

The position indication difference may be caused from transferring RPI power supplies.

2.1.5 Bank RPI highest to lowest difference ofgreater than 12 steps 2.1.6 Difference ofgreaCer than 1 step between the group step counters for the same bank 2.1.7 Core exit thermocouple difference of 10'F relative to symmetric thermocou les

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0-ADJS-01 9 Menement on Shift {MOS) ~

MOS l)hlLYREPORT I'ngv Operations Su peri ntendent - Nuclear Date:

08/23-24/88 From:

D. W. Haase seruer)

Shift:

Q Day Night Plant Evolutions Observed Steady state operation on Unit 3 at 100o'o Leveling out at 100% power on Unit 4 Control Rod deviation off normal procedure - Unit 4 Discussions with plant management and engineering on Component Cooling Water

{CCW) Heat Exchanger operability concerns due to increasing circulating water temperatures Accmulator level periodic - Unit 4 Tour of nAn and nBn Motor Control Centers - Units 3 and 4 B.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement None Professionalism, Summary of shift, Comments None Completed By:

eviewed By:

.aJ D. W. Haase bseruer Date:

08/23-24/

Management Review By:

perations uperintendent-uclear te ate 0 e 08/23-24/88

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e 08 25 8 Shift Report Mids Shift Management Schimkus Reese N~E Spence A.

Questionable Pork Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None I3.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken The Senior Reactor Control Operator (SRO) informed the PSN that it is becoming apparent that many of the Maintenance Foremen and Supervisors are lacking training on the Plant Clearance Order Network (PCON).

They are continually asking operators/NWE to originate their work requests or releases because of lack of training in how the system works.

This creates an extra work load for Control Room staff.

Recommend:

PCON training for Maintenance Foremen and Supervisors.

C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed Routine operations.

Reviewed By J

actions Com pleted Date

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4 i>4'

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l>ate 08 24 Shift Report Peaks l

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Shift Management AIlderson A)7SN Dallau Fernandez A.

Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations None B.

Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken Today we sent a Turbine Operator (TO) to manipulate valves as per procedures for the secondary efficiency test on Unit 4.

The TO then called back to inform us that the procedure had no guidance for opening the valves that needed to be opened.

It just stated to install test equipment.

Recommend:

All procedures used infrequently be proofread prior to using to avoid interruption of the evolution to fix the procedure.

C.

Good Practices/Professionalism Observed I would like to comme a Nuclear Operator (NO) (Gerald Johnson) in finding several existing problems on his rounds and professionally troubleshooting these problems in a very timely manner and correcting them.

Some of these were:

I.

Finding the Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) at a higher than usual temperature and finding the throttling valve on the SFP heat exchanger was throttled too much.

2.

While troubleshooting the existence of standing water in the 2 ft. elevation of the Auxiliary Building, he had the foresight to check the electrical plug for the sump pump and it was not inserted in the socket properly.

3.

While investigating the sudden increase in sump level of Unit 3 Containment, he immediately found the switch for the drain from the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) to containment sump in the open position.

Gerald was very expedient in finding the cause of all these problems.

Reviewed Bg hctiona Completed Date

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'I P,A@M-oi 9 Management on Shift (MOS)

%4OS l)AlLYREPORT I'age

'o:

~ " Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear Date:

08/24-25/88 From:

Joseph P. Brannin t'seruer)

Shift:

Q Day Qx Night Plant Evolutions Observed Shift turnover Shift briefing Toured Turbine Building B.

Immediate Safety Problems None observed C.

Questionable Work Practices None observed D.

Areas for Improvement While the Turbine building appearance is improving, there are still indications that we have a long way to go in finishing up a job. I found cleaning gear and trash hidden behind the Unit 4 4A Low Pressure Feedwater Heater.

In ac'.dtion to that there were a couple of pieces of wood in different locations left in the overhead after work had been completed.

I also noticed what I consider to be a lot of temporary wiring strung about the plant.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments Good teamwork by Operations in the Control Room on both shifts.

Completed By:

seruer Date; Reviewed By:

Management Review By:

perations uperintendent-Nuclear ate VI 08/24-25/88

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i.9.ADM-019 p

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Managementon Shift(MOS) dOS DhlLYREPORT '.

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operations Superintendent

- Nuclear e

a Date:

08/24-25/88 From:

D. W. Haase seruer)

Shift:

Q Day Qx Night A.

Plant Evolutions Observed Units 3 and 4 steady state operation at 100% power Unit 4 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) monthly valve cycling periodic test procedure Portions of maintenance work on cleaning and closing up 4C Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Investigation of No.

1 seal leakoff flow increase in 3A Reactor Coolant Pump B.

C.

Immediate Safety Problems None Questionable Work Practices None Areas for Improvement In response to the increase in No.

1 seal leakoff flow on the 3A Reactor Coolant

Pump, the Off-Normal Procedure 1108.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal Conditions, was consulted.

This procedure gives very little guidance for deteimining if the increase in flow can be proven real.

A good cross-check on an increase in flow would be to determine if the thermal barrier differential pressure decreased accordingly.

Recommend that such a

cross-check be incorporated into this off-normal procedure.

B.

Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments The shift responded promptly to a sudden increase in the No.l seal leakoff flow on the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump.

The off-normal procedure was implemented, the STA retrieved relevant data from the Safety Assessment System (SAS) computer, appropriate parameters were monitored, and plans for subsequent actions were discussed.

Completed By:

bseruer Date:

Reviewed By:

perations uperintendent-Nuclear Date:

cP 2 cP Management Review By:

te ate mr m

08/24-25/88

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