L-81-511, Forwards Comments on SER,NUREG-0843

Forwards Comments on SER,NUREG-0843

ML17266A531
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/04/1981
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0843, RTR-NUREG-843 L-81-511, NUDOCS 8112100212
Download: ML17266A531 (30)

Text

REGULATORY xNFORt~dT ION DISTRIBUTION SY EM (R IDS)

"AOCESSION NBR:8112100212 DOC ~ DATE: 81/12/04 NOTARI'ZED:

NO FACIL:50-389 St> Lucie Planti Uni1t 2< Florida Power I Light Co.

AUTH ~ NAtiiE AUTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGg R ~ E ~

Florida Power 8 Light Co ~

~REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION EISENHUT,D,G.

Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

Forwards coma'ents on SERrNUREG"0843.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

B001S;COPIES RECELVED:LTR

~

ENCL ISIZE:,

TITLE: PSAR/FSAR AMDTS and Related Correspondence NOTES:

DOCKET 05000389 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ACTION:

A/D LICENSNG LIC BR 03 LA INTERhAL: ELD IE/DEP/EPDB 35 MPA NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/HGEB 30 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/DHFS/OLB 34 NRR/DS I/AEB 26 NRR/DSI/CPS 10 NRR/DS I/ETSB 12 NRR/DS I/PS 8 19

/RSB 23 EG F IL 04 EXTERN','AL:

ACRS 41 FEMA-REP DIV 39 NRC PDR 02 NTIS

.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

0 1

0 1

0 1

1 1

0 3

3 2

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

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1 16 16 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LIC BR 03 BC NERSESgV 01 IE 06 IE/DEP/EPLB 36 NRR/DE/CEB 11 NRR/DE/GB 28 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/QAB 21 NRR/DE/SEB 25 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 NRR/DHFS/PTRB20 NRR/DS I/ASB 27 NRR/DS I/CSB 09 NRR/DS I/ICSB 16 NRR/DSI/RAB 2?

NRR/DST/LGB 33 BNL(AMDTS ONLY)

LPDR 03 NSIC 05 COPIES LT'TR ENCL 1

0 1

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1 ITOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

L'TTR 63 ENCL 58

h

.O. BOX 629100MIAMI,FL 33152

<<y>licit'trwA FLORIDAPOWER & LIGHT COMPANY December 4, 1981 L-81-511 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Nr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,-

D. C.

20555

Dear Hr. Eisenhut:

Re:

St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Safety Evaluation Report FPL Comments Attached for your review and comment are Florida Power 8 Light (FPL) comments regarding the St. Lucie Plant Unit No.

2 Safety Evaluation

Report, NUREG-0843, dated October 1981.

FPL would be pleased to discuss any of the comments at your convenience.

Very truly yours, ge,N~

Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology REU/DME/ah Attachments cc:

J.

P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II (w/o attachments)

Victor Nerses (w/attachments)

Harold F. Reis, Esquire (w/o attachments)

Bii2i002i2 Bii204 PDR *DOCK 05000389 E

~PDR PEOPI.E SERVING PEOPLE-'j

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REHARKS 1-1 1.11/1-9 3rd paragraph in 1.11.(2):

The annulus is maintained at negative pressure relative to atmospheric pressure during normal operation and this pressure remains negative over the course of an accident.

The annulus is maintained at atmospheric pressure during normal operation and is maintained at a negative pressure over the course of an accident.

Refer to FSAR Subsection 6.2.3.

Both fans start on CIAS or high-radiation from FHB.

1-2 1.11/1-9 4th paragraph in 1. 11.(2):

Following an accident, there is an initial draw-down period of single pass filtration followed by a filtered re-circulation mode during which there is a filtered and diluted release to the atmosphere.

Following an accident, the annulus pressure is rapidly drawn down by the SBVS and maintained at a negative pressure relative to atmospheric pressure..

Exhausted air is filtered prior to release to the atmosphere.

Vacuum control for the annulus and cooling air for the filters is pro-vided by the use of makeup cooling air lines located outside the annulus upstream of the filter train.

The annulus air is not recirculated.

Refer to FSAR Subsection 6.2.3.2.2 and Figure 6.2-51.

1-3

1. 11/1-9 (1)

Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater System.

(3)

Condensate Storage Pool and Refueling Water Storage Pool.

(4)

Plant Computer.

Delete items (1), (3), (4)

Items (1), (3), and (4) are not unique plant features and should be removed.

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 3-1 3.3.2/3-4 3-2 3.4/3-5 "The simultaneous atmospheric pressure drop was assumed to be 3 psi in 3 seconds.

"The probable maximum surge from the probable maximum hurricane, not including the wave runup, is 16.7 feet MSL."

"....3 psi in 2 seconds."

"....is 17.2 feet MSL."

Refer to FSAR Subsection 3.3.2.1.

Refer to FSAR Section 3.4.

3-3 3.5.3/3-10

.3rd paragraph in 3.5.3:

...Other areas involve the support struc-ture for exhaust fans or shielding hoods for exhaust fans or intake areas.

These structures are located on the auxiliary building, and the condensate storage tank.

....support structure for missile barriers for exhaust fans.

These structures are located on the in-take structure and the condensate storage tank enclosure.

Actual areas to be streng-thened.

(September 3,

1981 Letter L-81-384).

3-4 3.9.3.1/3-24 The applicant, states that all Class 1,

2 and 3 piping in essential

systems, i.e., those...

The applicant states that all Class 2 and 3 Austenitic pipe bends and elbows in essential systems, i.e.,

those...

Revising statement to agree with MEB Question 210A.36.

3-5 3.11/3-31 (Top of Page, 1st Paragraph)

The Conmission Memorandum and Order,...

requirements for St. Lucie Unit 2 are in Category I of NUREG-0588.

(Delete first sentence and add on to the second sentence as shown)

The applicable requirements for St.

Lucie Unit 2 are in Category I of NUREG-0588 as described in the applicant's FSAR.

The Memorandum and Order and the "Guidelines" refer-red to in the paragraph address o eratin reactors and are there ore not applicable to St. Lucie Unit 2.

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE 4-1 4.1/4-1 4-2 4.2/4-2 4-3 4.2.1.1/4-6 4-4 4.2.1.2/4-6 STA N

A (Second paragraph)

The units nuclear steam supply system is supplied by Combustion Engineering and is designed to operate at a maximum core thermal output of 2560 megawatts.....

(Second paragraph)

This objective implements General Design Criteria 10 (Ref 3) and the design limits that accomplish this are called Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits (SAFDLs).

(First paragraph)

When these failure threshholds....

interpretation of General Design Criterion 10 REVISE TO

....is supplied by Combustion Engineering and is being licensed to operate at a maximum core thermal output of 2560 megawatts....

Delete this sentence.

(Add statements to this section as follows)-

(k)

~Claddin Overheatin......

(i.e.,

The ONBR SAFOL (I)

Fuel Pellet Overheatin...

~e.,

tlie ue temperature SAFOL)

Delete this sentence.

REHARKS 2560 megawatts is the licensing power level, not the design maximum.

This covalent is generated from the belief that SAFDLs as required by GDC 10 are incorrectly being defined by the NRC staff.

As used by the staff in the St. Lucie 2 SER, SAFDLs would include limits on many additional parameters (e.g., cladding stress; cladding strain, fission gas pressure).

Since GDC 20 requires that the RPS be designed specifically to ensure that SAFOLs are not violated during anticipated transients, the staff's broader definition of SAFOLs is likely to lead to costly design changes without improving plant safety.

It is recomnended that the SAFDLs be presented as damage criteria.

(See comnents on Item 4-2).

The reference to SAFDLs in this sentence is inappropriate.

(See remarks on Item 4-2).

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE 4-5 4.2.1.2/4-7 4-6 4.2.2.2/4-12 4-7 4.2.3.2/4-17 4.2.3.3/4-17 (a)

STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER (c)

Overheatin of Claddin

....overheating is t at t ere will be at least 95 percent probabality at a 95

percent confidence level that departure from nucleate bailing (DNB) will not occur on the limiting fuel rods during normal operation or any transient conditions ar ising from faults of moderate frequency.

The specific DNB limits and methods of analysis are reviewed in Section 4.4.

(d)

~Frettin near (Second paragraph from the end of this Section)

Though the use of fuel assembly....

wear surface.

Consequently, outage......... lifetime from CEAs.

REVISE TO (c)

Overheatin of Claddin

....over eating is that DNB will not occur...........

DNB methods of anlaysis are reviewed in Section 4.4.

(d)

~Fretttn iiear (Start the second paragraph from the end of the Section by the following)

The use of fuel assembly sleeve inserts has precluded guide tube wear.

The use of these sleeves will not affect CEA clad wear because the contact of the CEA with the sleeve is at the top of the CEA which is solid inconel.

Nonetheless, outage surveillance has been conducted........

to achieve the 10 year design life-time from CEAs.

REMARKS It is felt that the failure criterion for cladding overheating is incorrectly defined and that the revised reconmended change more accurately reflects the proper definition.

The revised version of this paragraph more accurately reflects CEA wear due to sleeves.

The sections referenced for LOCA analysis are incorrect.

Reference to section 15.6.5 should be changed to 15.10.3.

SER ITEM SECTION/PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 5-1 5.4.3/5-18 5-2 5.4.3/5-20 (Second paragraph)

The confirmation in Item (2) on natural circulation cooldown is provided in Appendix 5.28 of the FSAR.

The requested information on feedwater volume required to cooldown without RCS void-ing was provided in Appendix 5.28 of the FSAR.

SER ITEN SECTION/PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 6-1 6.1.2/6-2 6-2 6.1.3/6-3 6-3 6.2.1/6-4 6-4 6.2.1.2/6-7 2nd paragraph In the FSAR the applicant indicates that the coating systems used on exposed surfaces inside the containment have been qualified in accordance with ANSI N101.2, "Protective Coatin'gs (Paints) for light water-nuclear reactor containment facilities, "American National Standards Institute (1972), 5.12,

. Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry, "American National Standard Institute (1972),

and ANSI 51.2, "Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry", American National Standards Institute (1974).

4th sentence in 6.1.3 The borated water will dissolve in 1480 Kilograms....

....The reactor containment is completely enclosed by a shield building with an annual region between the structures.

4th paragraph on p6-7:...............

The applicant identified the rupture of a main steam line occurring at 102K power, with one of the spray trains and one of two air recirculation coolers inoperable,.................

In the FSAR the applicant indicates that the coating systems used on exposed surfaces inside the containment have been qualified in accordance with ANSI N101.2, "Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light Water-Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities, "American National Standards Institute (1972),

ANSI N101.4, "guality Assurance for Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Facilities", American National Standard Institute (1972),

and ANSI N512, "Protective Coatings (Paints) for the Nuclear Industry, "American National Standards Institute (1974).

The borated water will dissolve in 1665 kilograms....

....The reactor containment is completely enclosed by a shield building with an annulus region between the structures.

The applicant identified the rupture of a main steam line occurring at 102$ power with one of the spray trains and two (2) of four (4) air recirculation coolers inoperable, FSAR Section 6.1.2 cites the revision.

Revised to correct total weight of TSP (9 baskets) x (185 kg/Basket

=

1665 kg Typo As identified in FSAR p 6.2-10 for main steam line breaks the peak containment pressure is calculated to occur following the DBA 102K power MSLB.............

with the failure of one of the trains of the Containment Heat Removal System.

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE 6-5

. 6.2.3/6-12 6-6 6.2.5/6-15 6 -7 6.3.2/6-18 6 -8 6 '/6-24 STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER 2nd paragraph in Section 6.2.3:.........

Each train will consist of a recirculation fan an exhaust fan, a moisture eliminator,

~2nd ara ra h:

A post accident vent system is also provided for post accident cleanup of the containment atmosphere.

5th paragraph in 6.3.2 There are two motor o crated isolation valves in series in the rec rculation lines of each ECCS train.......

4th paragraph in Section 6.4:

...After an accident, isolation occurs automatically in response to the accident si nal safet in ection or the h h

aseous radioactivit

~si na or in et air.......

REVISE TO Each train will consist of an exhaust

fan, a moisture eliminator,.......

A post accident vent system is also available for post accident H2 purge of the containment atmosphere.

There are two one motor o crated and one so enoid o crate isolation va ves in series in t e recircula-tion lines of each ECCS train.....

...After an accident, isolation occurs automatically in response to a contain-nant isolation actoation si a~acr a

hi h ra iation si na or inlet air...

REMARKS See FSAR.Figure 6.2-51 See FSAR section 6.2.5.2.3 See FSAR Figure 6.3-1a.

Isolation of the control room occurs automatically in response to "a contain-ment isolation actuation signal or a high radiation signal".

6 -9 6.4/6-24

...air is supplied through charcoal adsorbers while 2000 cfm is recirculated through redundant.....

....air is supplied through charcoal Refer to FSAR-Subsection adsorbers while 1550 cfm is recirculated 6 '

3 through redundant.....

6 -10 6.5.2/6-26 6 -11 6.5.3/6-26 1st paragraph on p6-26

...Trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate is present in the containment sump..."

3rd paragraph p6-26 The boric acid solution in the contain-ment sump is buffered by TSP, which is stored in open baskets in the sump..."

2nd paragraph in 6.5.3:

...The SBVS is designed to vary its flow automatically, by means of dampers, from exhaust to recirculation within the shield building in order to assure negative pressures....

...Trisodium...is present in the vicinity of the containrrant sump..."

...is stored in open baskets in the vicinity of the sump..."

...by means of dampers and outside air makeup lines, to assure negative pressure...

TSP is not stored in the sump itself.

Refer to FSAR Subsection 6.5.2.

Same as above Shield Building air is not recirculated.

Refer to FSAR Subsection 6.2.3.2.2.

SER ITEM SECTION/PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 6-12 6.5.3/6-27 2nd paragraph on p6-27

...A containment isolation actuation Correction

...A containment initiation activation signal signal (CIAS), either before or...

(CIAS), either before or....

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE 8-1 8.3 '/8-5 STATENENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER

....AB loads are connected to the same division at all times.

However, we require the Technical Spec-ifications to include the requirement that these tie breakers be locked open (except for the normally closed breakers) during plant operation.

Onsite emergency power is supplied....

REVISE TO

...AB loads are connected to the same division at all times.

Onsite emergency power is supplied by two diesel.....

RENARKS Delete; "However, we require-the Technical Specifications in-clude the require-ment that these tie breakers be locked open (except for the normally closed breakers) during plant operation.

FPEL did not commit to this.

8-2 8.3.1.1/8-6 1st Paragraph in Subsection 8.3.1.1

....through an individual transformer/volt-age regulatory from separate 480-volt Class IE buses for use....

...through an individual transformer/

voltage regulator from separate 480-volt Class IE buses for use....

Typo 2nd Paragraph in Subsection 8.3. 1. 1

....The four redundant divisions of the emergency power and distribution system are....

...The redundant divisions of the emergency power and distribution system are...

Discussion is about A and B divisions..

8-3 8.3. 1.2/8-8 3rd Paragraph on p.8-8

....motor control centers of redundant load

...motor control centers of redundant groups are located in separate rooms of..

~

load groups are generally located in separate rooms of...

Not all Class lE switchgear, load centers and motor control centers of redundant load groups're located in separate rooms.

Those that are not, are separated by distance.

8-4 8.4.1/8-12 1st Paragraph in Subsection 8.'4.1:

....channel or load group.

Nameplates of appropriate color background are provided for all equipment.

The applicable channel or load group designation is marked on each nameplate....

...channel or load group.

Nameplates are provided for all equipment.

The applicable channel or load group designation is marked on each name-plate.

In addition, appropriate color marks are provided for all equipment.

Name plates are not color coded.

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 8-5 8.2.1/8-2

... the 4. 16 kilovolt power to both St. Lucie 1

... the respective transformer of the and 2 is paralleled to facilitate continued oper-unaffected unit is capable of supplying ation of both units.

the required loads on both units.

8-6 8 4 2/8-13 5th Paragraph in Subsection 8.4.2 The applicant has ceanitted to modify the design to (1) disconnect 4 kilovolt loads on detection of a safety injection signal and (2) provide two isolation devices in series for those nonsafety loads that are...

The applicant has conmitted to modify the design to disconnect 4

kilovolt loads and selected 480V loads on detection of a safety injection signal.

The applicant has also comnitted to provide dual fault current interruption devices for 480V and below nonsafety loads that are...

Refer to FSAR I)uestion 430A.3 (provided in Amend-ment 7) and Subsection 8.3.1.2.

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE 9-]

9.4.1/9-19 9-2 9.5.1.2/9-25 STATEHEHT AS IT APPEARS IN SER 2nd Paragraph on p. 9-19

...high radiation signal or safety injection signal automatically isolates the normal outside air intake and exhaust, opens the recirculation dampers, and aligns the CRECS into the CRACS air flow path.

1st Paragraph in B.

...include the following:*

a)

1. Fire Area 6-Steam Trestle Area

2. Fire Area 8-Diesel Generator Bldg. 2A

3. Fire Area 9-Diesel Generator Bldg. 28

4. Fire Area 19-RAB East Hallway and Hiscellaneous Equipment Areas

5. Fire Area 20-RAB East-West Comnon Hallway

6. Fire Area 22-RAB Electrical Penetra-tion Area

7. Fire Area 23-RAB Electrical Penetra-tion Area

8. Fire Area 34-Zone I-RAB Electrical Equipment Room

9. Fire Area 39-RAB HVAC Equipment Room

10. Fire Area 51-RAB Ceiling and Hallways b)...stations are equipped with 25 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven.....

REVISE TO

....high radiation signal or contain-ment isolation actuation signal auto-matically isolates the normal outside ait intake and exhaust, opens the filtration dampers, and aligns the CRECS into the CRACS air flow path for recirculation mode.

a) include the following:*

1. Fire Area 8-Diesel Generator Building 2A

2. Fire Area 9-Diesel Generator Building 28

3. Fire Area 19-RAB East Hallway

4. Fire Area 20-RAB.East-West Column Hal 1way

5. Fire Area 22-RAB Electrical Penetration Area

6. Fire Area 23-RAB Electrical Penetration Area

7. Fire Area 34-ZONE I-RAB Electrical Equipment Room

8. Fire Area 39-RAB HVAC Equip-ment Room

9. Fire Area 51-RAB Ceiling and Hallways b)...stations are equipped with either 100,75, or 50 feet of l-l/2 inch woven...

REHARKS Correct initiation signal and operation of the CRACS and CRECS system (e.g.

isolation of control room is on CIAS and not SIAS.

Refer to FSAR Subsection 9.4.1.2.1.

a) Delete "Fire Area 6-Steam Trestle Area" as having water suppression system.

Comnitamnt was made to provide smoke detection system for this area and not water suppression system.

Refer to FPL letter L-81 369 (August 25, 1981),

item H (Attachment 8).

Delete "and Miscellaneous Equipment Areas" from number 3.

b) Revise 25 feet of hose to either 100, 75 or 50.

Refer to FPL letter L-81-369 (August 25, 1981).

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE 9-3 9.5.1.3/9-27 9-4 9.5.1.3/9-27 (Fire Doors 5

Dampers) 9-5 9.5.1.5/9-27 (Control Room) 9-6 9.5.1.5/9-28 (Cable Spreading Room)

STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER

...Also, the applicant, by letter dated September 21,

1981, has coranitted to provide 3-hour fire-rated penetration seals in fire rated assemblies....

...installation instructions.

The applicant has, by letter dated September 21, 1981, conmitted to providing fire-rated dampers for ducts penetrating fire-rated assemblies.

NRC will verify that this coranitment has been met.

Based on these comnitments, we......

...ceilings/floors assemblies.

The ventil-ation ducts that penetrate fire barriers will have 3-hour fire-rated dampers.

HVAC

labs, and kitchen areas.....

...walls and floor/ceiling assemblies.

Three-hour fire-rated dampers are provided for all ventilation ducts that penetrate the walls.

Automatic fire suppression....

REVISE TO

....Also, the applicant, by letter dated September 21, 1981 has committed to fire rated sealing media for penetrations of fire barriers separating redundant com-ponents necessary for safe shutdown to be the same as the fire barrier fire rating.....

... instal 1ati on instructions The applicant cormitted to provide dampers for non-safety related ducts only and to study the effect of dampers in safety 'related ducts as it pertains to the continued safe operation of the plant.

Where the applicant could satisfactorily demonstrate that such a damper was detrimental, the applicant would request exception from install-ation of the damper in question.

Based on these comnitments, we...

....ceilings/floors assemblies.

The dampers for the control room will be resolved after the study indicated in Section 9.5.1.3.

Fire Door & Dampers HVAC labs, and kitchen areas.....

....walls and floor/ceiling assemblies.

The dampers for the Cable Spreading Area Room will be resolved upon completion of the study indicated in Section 9.5.1.3, Fire Door II Dampers.

Automatic fire suppression.....

RENARKS Refer to letter dated September 21, 1981 (L-81-413).

Also refer to letter of August 25, 1981 Item H, Attachment A, Iiuestion 2.

Refer to letters dated August 25, 1981 Item H, Attachment A, I)uestion 9

and September 21 1981 Refer to letter dated August 25, 1981 Re'fer to letter dated August 25, 1981.

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE STATENENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO RENARKS 9-7 9.5.1.6/9-29

...Section III.G of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50.

The applicant agreed to install an automatic water suppression system in all areas where redundant safe shutdown systems are not separated by 2-or 3-hour fire-rated barriers.

In addition, where-ever.....

The SER indicates all areas where redundant safe shutdown systems are not separated by 2 or 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated barriers will be pro-vided with automatic water suppression and detection.

The appli-cant has been specific in outlining areas protected with water suppression systems and think the catch-all phrase may be trouble-some.

9-8 9.5.1. 7/30 The applicant has committed, by letter dated August 25, 1981 to install an alter-nate shutdown system for the control.....

The applicant has an alternate shutdown system for the control..

The SER indicates that where separation of redundant safety related equipment or cables is less than 20 ft., one division will be comp-letely enclosed in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier.

This is correct under the assumption that all safety related areas have water suppression systems.

Where this is not the case, 3-hour barriers are used, unless mitigated by plant specific conditions.

Refer to letter dated August 25, 1981.

The HSDP is considered as the alter-nate shutdown system.

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REHARKS 9-9 9.5.3/9-35 1st Paragraph on p.9-35

...lighting fixture assemblies that are capable of providing a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of lighting.....

....lighting fixture assemblies that are capable of providing a minimum of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> s of lighting.....

Refer to coamitment made in SER Section 9.5. 1.4.

FSAR will be revised in a later amendment.

(Ref. L-81-369, 8/25/81 Item H, I)n. f3) 9-10

p. 9-39, 9-41, Statement with regards to compliance 9-43, 9-45.

to ANSI 831.1.

Refer to revised FSAR for compliance.

FSAR has been revised with regards to ANSI 831.1.

(Amendment 7).

Refer to FSAR Subsection 9.5.4.2, 9.5.5.1, 9.5.6.1 and 9.5.7.1.

9-11 9.5.8/9-46 Air intake and exhaust system piping and components up to the diesel engine interface, are designed to seismic Category I, ASHE Section III, Class 3

(I)uality Group C) requirements and meet.....

Air intake and exhaust system piping Air intake and exhaust system and components up to the diesel engine piping are only required to interface, are seismically supported be seismically supported.

and meet......

Failure of piping system will not have an adverse effect on safe shutdown operation.

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO RENARKS 10-1 10.3.4.3.f/10-9 describes themethod for control of secondary-describes the method for control of site water chemistry.....

secondary-side water chemistry....

Typo 10-2 10.4.1/10-9 10-3 10.4.2/10-10 10-4 10.4.9.1/10-16 10-5 10.4.F 1/10-19 3rd paragraph:

The main condenser is designed to accept full load exhaust steam from the main turbine and reactor feedwater pump turbine upto 45K of the main steam flow

. from the turbine bypass

system, and other cycle steam flows.

First paragraph in 10.4.2

....two fogging ejectors....

4th paragraph on Page 10-16:

.....the unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST2) contains a dedicated volume of water for Unit 2 (150,400 gallons) in the event of..... The low level alarm is set at the minimum dedicated water volume of 300,800 gallons.....

Paragraph j:

.....A minimum of 150,400 gallons of water is reserved by Technical Specification in the condensate storage tank.

The main condenser is designed to accept full load exhaust steam from the main turbine and upto 45K of the main steam flow from the turbine bypass

system, and other cycle steam flows.

....two hogging ejectors....

....The unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST 2) contains a dedicated volume of water for Unit 2 (149, 600 gallons) and a dedicated volume for Unit I (125,000 gallons)in the event of.........

The low level alarm is set at the minimum dedicated water volume of 307,000 gallons.

....A minimum of 307,000 gallons of water is reserved by Technical Specifications in the condensate storage tank.

The St. I.ucie Unit 2 feedwater pumps are motor driven.

See FSAR Subsection 10.4. 1 and 10.4.7.

Typo See FSAR Section 10.4.9.

See FSAR 10.4.9.3 (Am. 6) identifies the CST volume required for various purpose.

10-6 10.4.9.3/10-25 Paragraph B.I

.....A low level alarm indicates the water level in the tank is at the Technical Specification limit of 300,800 gallons.....

....A low level alarm indicates that See FSAR 10.4.9.3 (Am 6) the water level in the tank is at the identifies the CST volume Technical Specification limit of required for various 307,000 gallons....

purpose.

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REHARKS 11-1 11.2/11-2 2nd paragraph in 11.2

...The equipment and floor drain subsystem processes waste originating from containment floor drains, and auxiliary building, rad-waste building, and turbine building equip-ment and floor drains.....

....The equipment and floor drain subsystem processes waste originating from containment floor drains, and auxiliary building, turbine building equipment and floor drains....

There is no radwaste building at the St.

Lucie site.

11-2

11. 2/11-3 11-3 11.4/11-6 11-4 11.4/11-6 1st paragraph page 11-3

...The bottoms of the waste concentrator is collected in one of two 2,300 gallon capacity waste concentrator bottom tanks...

1st paragraph 11.4

...The SWS, including a drum storage

area, and the contractor's portable solidification unit are located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, which is...

1st paragraph in 11.4:

..."Wet" solid waste consisting of spent demineralizer resins and evaporator bottoms are combined with cement to form a solid matrix...

...The bottoms of the waste concentrator is collected in a waste concentrator bottoms tank...

...The SWS, including a drum storage

area, and the contractor's portable solidification unit are located in or adjacent to the Reactor Auxiliary Building respectively, which is...

..."Wet" solid waste consisting of spent demineralizer resins and evapor-ator bottoms are combined with a solidification agent (e.g.,

cement or cement plus sodium silicate or dow binder) to form a solid matrix...

Neither the number, nor the size of the waste concentrator bottom tank(s) has (have) been determined at this time.

Reference response to NRC question 460. 11 which states that:

"The contractor's mobile solidification unit equip-ment will be located in or adjacent to the drurming storage area..."

Reference response to NRC question 460. 16 which states that the solidification agent is not yet established.

However, the solidification agent will most probably be cement, cement plus sodium silicate or Dow binder.

SER ITEN SECTION/PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REHARKS 12-1 12.3.4/12-5 1st paragraph, 2nd sentence In order to meet these objectives, the applicant plans to use 39 area monitors....

In order to meet these objectives, applicant plans to use 41 area monitors....

See FSAR Table 12.3-2.

SER ITEM SECTION/PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 14-1 14/14-4 f6 Testing was added to demonstrate that, for hot containment penetrations where coolers are not used, concrete temperatures do not exceed design limits.

The applicant demonstrated in response to question 640.12 that testing for hot containment penetrations where coolers are not used is not required due to test results from St. Lucie Unit 1.

See response to question 640.12.

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REHARKS 15-1 15.11/15-35, 36 X/I) values 37, 38 0-8 hours at 1610 meters (low population zone)

= 6.3 E-5 X/(} valu'es Ref:

SER 2.3 0-8 hours at 1610 meters (low population zone)

= 6.7 E-5 15-2 15.5/15-8 15-3 15.1/15-2 Table 15.1 15-4 15.10.1/15-14 15-5 15.10.1/15-15 15-6 15.10.4/15-20 15-7 15.11.3/15-27 If the DNBR for any fuel pin falls below the 1.19 minimum DNBR limit then cladding perforation should be assumed (1st paragraph)

Assuming that all the fuel pins which experience a

DNBR of less than 1.19 fail, then 3.7% of the fuel pins are predicted to fail during this event.

(1st paragraph)

This event, however, did not result in a

DNBR below 1. 19 and thus fuel damage was not predicted to occur.

(3rd paragraph)

The equilibrium fission.......

to create a primary coolant activity of 1.0 uCi/g Dose Equivalent I-131.

If DNB occurs cladding perforation should be assumed.

As a result, 3.7% of thefuel pins are predicted to fail during this event.

This event, however, did not result in the occurrence of DNB and thus fuel damage was not predicted to occur.

The equilibrium fission.......

to create a primary coolant activity of 5.0 uCi/g Dose Equivalent I-131.

The proposed change more adequately defines the cladding failure criterion.

Change Core Power, B Units from "% of 2570 Hwt + 18 Hwt RCP input", to

"% of 2560 Hwt + 18 Hwt RCP input" The 3.7% fuel failure is based on the DNB convolution technique, not the DNBR of 1.19.

Fuel failure is based on the DNB convolution technique, not the DNBR of 1.19.

All references to the CESEC code should be changed to CESECII to enable differen-tiation from the CESECIII code.

The assumed primary coolant activity should be the expected technical specifi-cation value of 5.0 uCi/g, consistent with the assumption in 15.11.1 page 15-25 and 15.11.4 page 15-28.

SER ITEN SECTION PAGE 15-8 15.11.7/15-31 15-9 15.11.3/15-35 STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO RENARKS Change Table 15.3 reference to Table 15.5 and Table 15. I to Table 15.3.

Item 5 of Table 15.6 should be 5 uCl/g.

(See Cogent 15-7).

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE 17-1 17.2/17-1 STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER General Conment 1st two paragraphs of Section 17.2 need to be revised to conform to FPL's letter of September 28, 1981 (Uhrig to Haass L-81-430)

REVISE TO REMARKS 17-2 17.2/17-1 3rd par agraph, 3rd sentence The gA organization, which verifies the effective implementing....

The I)A organization, which verifies the effective implementation...

Typo 17-3 17.5/17-4 17-4 Table 1/17-5 Under Regulatory Guides Add R.G. 1.8 Hissing Add:

la) 1.28 I)A Program Require-Hissing (Typo) ments (Design and Construction) 17-5 Figure I/17-6 Revise Figure 1, Use revised figure.

Updated figure is attached.

SER ITEM SECTION PAGE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO REMARKS 22-1 II.F.1(2d)/22-22 The St. Lucie Unit 2 plant design will not include two separate.....

The St. Lucie Unit 2 plant design will Typo include two separate.....

22-2 II.F.2/22-24

~in ut Pressurizer Pressure Cold Leg Temperature Hot Leg Temperature Maximum UHJTC Temperature (from HJTC Processing)

~Ran e 0-300 psia 0-710 F

0-710 F

100 -1800 F

~in ut

~Ran e

Pressurizer Pressure 0-3000 psia Cold Leg Temperature 50-710 Hot Leg Temperature 50-710 Maximum UHJTC Temperature 200 -2300 F

of top three sensors (from HJTC processing)

Ref:

L-81-468, 10/27/81

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE STATEHENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER REVISE TO R HARKS 23-1 23/23-1 Construction of the St. Lucie Steam Electric Station, Unit ho. 2. proceeded and there ss reasonable assurance that it wi11 be substantially completed, in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-103,...

Construction of St. Lucie Unit 2 proceeded, and there is reasonable assurance that it will be substantially completed, in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-144,...

Improper name for St.

Lucie.

Improper CP number.

Before an operating license will be issued to the applicant for operation of St.

Lucie Steam Electric Station, Unit No.

2....

....for operation of St. Lucie Unit 2,....

This is the proper name.

SER ITEH SECTION PAGE C-I Ap.c/C-20 STATEMENT AS IT APPEARS IN SER References*

American Societ of Testin Materials S ecs

>catsons:

ASTH A36-70a ASTH A522-70a REVISE TO American Societ of Testin Materials Typo ASTH A36-70a ASTH A572-70a REMARKS

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