JPN-93-010, Describes Actions Taken by Util in Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001,Suppl 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Util Has 97 Rosemount Model 1153,Series B Transmitters in safety-related Sys
| ML20034G885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1993 |
| From: | Ralph Beedle POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| IEB-90-001, IEB-90-1, JPN-93-010, JPN-93-10, NUDOCS 9303120050 | |
| Download: ML20034G885 (31) | |
Text
.
123 Main street Wrute Plains, NewYork 10001 i
914 681.6846 I
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4 NewYorkPbwer i
n.,,o 4# Authority
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March 5,1993 JPN-93-010 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Response to NRC Bul'letin No. 90-01, Supplement 1 Loss _of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount-
References:
1.
NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1, " Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," dated December 22,1992.
2.
NYPA letter, R. E. Beedle to the NRC, dated July 19,1990, ~
(JAFP-90-0549), " Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01."
3.
NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, " Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount," dated March 9,1990.-
Dear Sir:
This letter describes the actions taken by the New York Power Authority in response to NRC Bulletin No. 90-01, Supplement 1 (Reference.1) at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The Bulletin addresses Rosemount transmitters, Models 1153 Series B,' 1153 Series D, and 1154,_used in safety-related or ATWS mitigation systems, that have experienced a history of failures resulting from a loss of fill-oil.' The Bulletin requests either replacement or an enhanced surveillance monitoring program of those transmitters that fail to satisfy the screening criteria presented in the Bulletin.
' Status of FitzPatrick Transmitters.
The James A. FitzPatrick' Nuclear Power Plant has ninety-seven (97) Rosemount i
transmitters, Model 1153 Series B, that are used in safety-related systems or systems installed to meet to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (the ATWS rule). There are no Rosemount transmitters Model 1153 Series D or Model 1154 installed at the plant. The status i
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JPN-93-010 March 5,1993
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Page 2 of 3 of the installed transmitters is presented in Attachment 1. Seventy-four (74) of these transmitters are excluded from additional monitoring requirements by meeting the Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 exclusion criteria as follows:
Twenty-three (23) transmitters were refurbished after July 11,1989, or replaced with a transmitter manufactured after July 11,1989.
Twenty-nine (29) transmitters have normal operating pressures of less thhn 500 psig.
Twenty-two (22) transmitters require an additional twelve days of exposure to normal operating pressure to reach the 60,000 psi-month maturity threshold. For the purposes i
of this submittal, they are designated as mature.
The once per operating cycle calibration drift monitoring program, described in
!, will continue for the above transmitters with normal operating pressures of less l
than 500 psi and those that have not reached the psi-month maturity threshold criterion (51 total) for at least the next two operating cycles to assure that a high degree of confidence is -
l maintained for detecting potential failures caused by a loss of fill-oil in these transmitters.
Proposed Actions i
The remaining twenty-three (23) Rosemount transmitters, Model 1153 Series B, have a i
normal operating pressure between 500 psig and 1500 psig, and do not meet the Rosemount l
psi-month maturity threshold criterion. These transmitters are subject to Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, preventive measures; i. e., replacement with a post July 11,1989 transmitter, or subject to a monthly enhanced surveillance monitoring program. The Authority will subject these twenty-three (23) transmitters to the existing enhanced suweillance monitoring program as described in Attachment 2. The enhanced surveillance monitoring program consists of four checks / tests: the daily operational instrument check, the weekly operational verification check, l
the response time test, and once per cycle drift monitoring using calibration data. This -
surveillance program has been effective, based on past performance, in detecting degradation caused by the loss of fill-oil.
i The Bulletin permits an extension in the frequency of the enhanced surveillance program from monthly to once per every refueling cycle, but not exceeding 24 months, provided sufficiently high reliability for the applicab!e safety function exists. The last test listed above (drift monitoring) is performed once per cycle. This frequency is justified by the high level of reliability for the safety functions provided by the redundancy and diversity of i
applicable instrumentation and control systems. Attachment 3 describes the reliability of the safety functions associated with the twenty-three transmitters subject to the enhanced surveillance. Additionally, as described in Attachment 2, calibrating these transmitters at i
power exposes the plant to a possible transient which could challenge safety systems.
I
4 i
March 5,1993 Page 3 of 3
[
The program described above for the Rosemount transmitters conforms with the f
actions requested by the Bulletin and meets the objectives of assuring the' continued reliability.
of safety-related transmitters. This conclusion is based on the effectiveness of the enhanced i
surveillance program ' described, the need to avoid risks associated with inadvertent operational transient initiations (scram) and the reliability of the associated safety functions.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr.
t Very trul yours, j
- 4W$0Y hV i
Ralph E. Beedle i
STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER l
Subscribed and swom to before me this fd day of%M993.
f i
Notary Public l
MINA HOLDEN NOTARY PuBuc, state o1 New York Westchener County i
NoA8?9150 My commission Exp;res Aug.31,1993 Attachments cc:
Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendste Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Office of the Resident inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, NY 13093 Mr. Brian C. McCabe Project Directorate I-1 l
Division of Reactor Projects-l/ll Mail Stop 14 B2 Washington, DC 20555 i
l l
ATTACHMENT 1
~
RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 90-01, SUPPLEMENT 1 ROSEMOUNT MODELS 1151 & 1153 TRANSMITTERS INSTALLED AT THE JAMES A.
FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SEE NOTES AT END OF TABLE.
MONTHS ID NO.
FUNCTION MODEL SERIES RANGE SERIAL SERVICE PRES AT PSI (Note 8)
TYPE CODE NO.
DATE (PSIG) PRES MONTHS MATUR STATUS (Note 3)
(Note 7 )
(Note 1,2) 02-3LT-57B ESF ll53DB5RC B
5 410053 860501 1000 50 50010 83 ES 02-3LT-58B ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 414000 860728 1000 48 47660 79 ES 02DPT-116A ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410559 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-116B ESF ll53DB7RC B
7 410560 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-116C ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410561 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-116D ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410562 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-117A ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410563 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-117B ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410570 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-117C ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410564 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-117D ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 409987 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-118A ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 409988 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-118B ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 409998 851106 1000 55 55630 42 ES 02DPT-118C ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 409990 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-118D ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410565 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-119A ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410566 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-119B ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410567 850301 1000 60 59600 46-ES 02DPT-119C ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410568 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02DPT-119D ESF 1153DB7RC B
7 410569 850301 1000 60 59600 46 ES 02PT-134A ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 416738 890807 1000 20 20030 33 ES 13DPT-83 ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 417481 860904 1000 46 46450 77 ES 13DPT-84 ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410582 901229 1000 8
7270 12 ES 23PT-68B ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 416737 900129 1000 15 14980 25 ES 23PT-68D
'ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 416297 870904 1000 38 38100 64 ES 02-3LT-101B RPS 1153DB4RC B
4 409979 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3LT-101C RPS 1153DB4RC B
4 410553 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE
2A-s JPN-93-010 Page 2 of 5 MONTHS ID NO.
FUNCTION MODEL SERIES RANGE SERIAL SERVICE PRES AT PSI (Note 8)
TYPE CODE NO.
DATE (PSIG) PRES MONTHS MATUR STATUS (Note 3)
(Note 7)
(Note 1,2) 02-3LT-72C ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410575 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3LT-72D ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410576 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3LT-79 ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410577 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3LT-83A ESF 1153DB4RC B
4 410555 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3LT-83B ESF 1153DB4RC B
4 410556 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-102A ATW 1153GB9RC B
9 409968 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-102C ATW 1153GB9RC B
9 409970 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE-02-3PT-52A ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 409972 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-52B ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 409973 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-52D ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 409975 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-55B RPS 1153GB9RC B
9 409977 850301 - 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02-3PT-55C RPS 1153GB9RC B
9 410540 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02PT-134C ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410545 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 05PT-14B ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410047 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 13PT-87C ESP 1153GB9RC B
9 410040 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 13PT-87D ES2 1153GB9RC B
9 410041 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 23DPT-76 ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410579 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 23DPT-77 ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410580 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 23PT-68A ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410042 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 23PT-68C
~ ESP 1153GB9RC B
9 410044 850301 1000 60 59600 99 MATURE 02PT-250A 1ST 1151GP7B22 P
7 20239 740101 1000 NA NA NA MODEL 02PT-250B 1ST 1151GP7B22 P
7 20238 740101 1000 NA NA NA MODEL 19-4DPT-26 FPO 1151DP6E22-P 6
843547 870805 0
NA NA NA MODEL 19-4FT-26 FPO 1151DP5J12 P
5 691420 870805 0
NA NA NA MODEL 33PT-100A CVA 1151DP5G22 P
5 1044893 890726
(-)14 NA NA NA MODEL 33PT-100B CVA 1151DP5G22 P
5 1046929 890727
(-)14 NA NA NA MODEL 33PT-155A CVA 1151DP5G22 P
5 1046930 890724
(-)14 NA NA NA MODEL 33PT-155B CVA 1151DP5G22 P
5 1042354 890725
(-)14 NA NA NA MODEL 01-125FT-106 SBG 1153DB3RA B
3 420401 881001 0
NA NA NA PRESS 05PT-12A RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 503491 920215 2
NA NA NA PRESS 05PT-12B RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 409877 850301 2
NA NA NA PRESS 05PT-12C RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 416804A 920313 2
NA NA NA PRESS 05PT-12D RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 410590A 920213 2
NA NA NA PRESS
- -. ~.
JPN-93-010 Page 3 of 5 MONTHS ID NO.
FUNCTION MODEL SERIES RANGE SERIAL SERVICE PRES AT PSI (Note 8)
TYPE CODE NO.
DATE (PSIG) PRES MONTHS MATUR STATUS (Note 3)
(Note 7)
(Note 1,2) 10FT-136A ESF 1153DB5RA B
5 420396 881019 0
NA NA NA PRESS 10FT-136B ESF 1153DB5RA B
5 420397 881019 0
NA NA NA PRESS 10FT-137A ESF 1153DB5RA B
5 420398 881019 2
NA NA NA PRESS 10FT-137B ESF 1153DB5RA B
5 420399 881019 2
NA NA NA PRESS 10PT-101A RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 410591A 920406 2
NA NA NA PRESS 10PT-101B RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 410587 850301 2
NA NA NA PRESS 10PT-101C RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 416296A 920413 2
NA NA NA PRESS 10PT-101D RPS 1153GB5RC B
5 410589 850301 2
NA NA NA PRESS 27FET-664 PAS 1153DB3PBN B
3 407456 841113 0
NA NA NA PRESS 27FT-102 CAD 1153DB4RC B
4 416547 870403 0
NA NA NA PRESS
' 27PT-101A IND 1153GB6RA B
6 417189 900430 0
NA NA NA PRESS 27PT-101B IND 1153GB5RA B
5 500950 900430 0
NA NA NA PRESS 27PT-101B1 IND 1153GB6RA B
6 417190 900430 0
NA NA NA PRESS 27PT-117 IND 1153GB7RC B
7 417222 870317 0
NA NA NA PRESS 29PT-201A MSL 1153GB5RA B
5 417117 870309 0
NA NA NA PRESS
?
5 417116A 920427 0
NA NA '
NA PRESS 33PT-135A ESF 1153AB5RC B
5 409999 850301
(-)14 NA NA NA PRESS 33PT-13FB ESF 1153AB5RC B
5 410000 850301
(-)14 NA NA NA PRESS 33PT-13SC ESF 1153AB5RC B
5 410001 850301
(-)14 NA NA NA PRESS 33PT-135D ESF 1153AB5RC B
5 410002 850301
(-)14 NA NA NA PRESS 46FT-101A1 ESW 1153DB4PG B
4 420505 881026 200 NA NA NA PRESS 46FT-101A2 ESW 1153DB4PG B
4 420506 881026 200 NA NA NA PRESS 46FT-10181 ESW 1153DB4PG B
4 420507 881026 200 NA NA NA PRESS 46FT-101B2 ESW 1153DB4PG B
4 420508 881026 200 NA NA NA PRESS 02-3LT-72B ESF 1153DB5RC-B 5
410583A 930228 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02 -3 LT-73 ESF 1153DB5RC B-5 410089A 930228 1000 NA-NA NA SER NO 02-3LT-101A RPS 1153DB4RC B
4 412287A 920423' 1000 NA
.tUL NA SER NO 02-3LT-101D RPS 1153DB4RC B
4 416335A 920511 1000 NA NA.
NA SER NO 02-3LT-57A ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 416442A 920504 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3LT-58A ESF 1153DB5RC B
5 410054A 920502 1000 NA NA-NA SER NO 02-3LT-72A ESF'1153DB5RC B
5 416440A 920429 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3LT-83C ESF 1153DB4RC B
4 500016 891001 1000 NA NA NA-SER NO 02-3LT-83D ESF 1153DB4RC B
4 500017 891001 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 4
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Page 4 of 5 l
MONTHS ID NO.
FUNCTION MODEL SERIES RANGE SERIAL SERVICE PRES AT PSI (Note 8)
TYPE CODE NO.
DATE (PSIG) PRES MONTHS MATUR STATUS (Note 3)
(Note 7)
(Note 1,2) 02-3LT-94 RWL 1153DB5RC B
5 416443A 921030 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3PT-102B ATW 1153GB9RC B
9 414007A 920203 1000 NA-NA NA SER NO 02-3PT-102D ATW 1153GB9RC B
9 500742 900618 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3PT-52C ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 416275A 920205 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3PT-55A RPS 1153GB9RC B
9 410551A 920404 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02-3PT-55D RPS 1153GB9RC B
9 410548A 920401 1000 NA NA NA-SER NO 02PT-134B ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 416736A 920211 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 02PT-134D ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 417418A 930129 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 03DPT-211 CRD 1153DB8RA B
8 500259 900330 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 05PT-14A ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 409971A 920314 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 05PT-14C ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410043A 920318 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 05PT-14D ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410547A 920317 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 13PT-87A ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 410543A 920129 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 13PT-87B ESF 1153GB9RC B
9 417225A 920413 1000 NA NA NA SER NO 03PT-210 CRD 1153DP7N22 P
7 420447 881115 1000 NA NA NA' SERIES 06FT-50A FDW 1153DP6G22 P
6 1217668 900129 1000 NA NA NA
. SERIES 06FT-50B FDW 1153DP6G22 P
6 1217669 900129 1000 NA NA NA SERIES 19PT-104 FPO 1153GP8E22 P
8 268611 870805 0
NA NA NA SERIES 23LT-201C SPO 1153DP3A22 P
3 100595 770824 2
NA NA NA SERIES NOTES:
1)
Status column lists the exemption nomenclature (i.e.,
Pressure " Press", Serial Number-
"Ser No",
Maturity, or Model) which meet the exempt requirements of NRC Bulletin No.
90-01, Supplement 1.
2)'
ES status: Transmitters subject to the enhanced surveillance program are labeled "ES".
3)
Transmitter serial number ending with a suffix of "A"
is a unit rebuilt with a sensing module manufactured after July 11,1989.
4)
Range code 3,4 & 5 for dif ferential transmitters ' require 60,000 psi-month for exclusion based on service life.
JPN-93-010 Page 5 of 5 5)
Range code 6,7 & 8 for dif ferential transmitters require 130,000 psi-month for exclusion..
based on service life.
6)
Range-code 6,7,8,9 & 10 for' gage & absolute transmitters requires 60,000 psi-month for exclusion based on service life.
7)
Psi-month history was computed by totaling the plant on-line time from the installation date of the transmitter through February 25; 1993.
8)
Function codes: ATWS (anticipated transient without scram), CAD - (containment atmosphere dilution system), CVA (condenser vacuum), ESF'(engineered safety features), FPO'(spent
. fuel pool), IND indicator), MSL (main steam line leakage collection system), RPS (reactor protection system), RWL (reactor water level), SBG (standby gas treatment.
system),- SPO (suppression pool monitoring), ist (main turbine system), FDW (feedwater),
PAS (post accident sampling system).
. ~...
.~....
ATTAQtiMENT 2 ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE MONITORING PROGRAM Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 Loss of Fill-Oil in Rosemount Transmitters James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant The twenty-three (23) Rosemount transmitters, Model 1153 Series B, that have a normal operating pressure between 500 psig and 1500 psig, and do not meet the Rosemour.t psi-month maturity threshold criterion, will be subject to the enhanced surveillance monitoring program until the maturity (psi-month) threshold criterion is reached. This enhanced surveillance monitoring program, currently in effect, consists of the following:
Daily operational instrument check: During the daily rounds, the operator reads, records and compares the instrument reading with previous readings and readings from instruments in the same functional group to identify trends or abnormalities. If the reading is abnormal or out of the specified tolerance, a review is performed by the Operations Department, then referred to the I & C Department for further investigation.
Weekly operational verification check: The I & C Department monitors transmitter output signals by calibrated plant computer points, and compares each signal with the mean output signal of the same instrument group. Further investigation is performed for transmitter output deviations of greater than two standard deviations from the mean.
Adverse trends are also identified by the check Response time testing: Response testing of the transmitters by step impulses will detect large losses of fill-oil, and will be used as an aid in confirming abnormal surveillance indications.
Once per cycle drift monitoring: Calibration data is analyzed by comparing instrument performance to theoretical acceptance limits; i. e., the difference between the "as-found" and the previous "as-left" calibration values are compared to calculated calibration uncertainties. Anomalies at both ends of the span are investigated for oil loss conditions.
The once per cycle frequency for the last test listed is justified by the high level of reliability for the safety functions provided by the redundancy and diversity of applicable instrumentation and control systems. Attachment 3 provides an assessment supporting this conclusion.
The transmitter calibrations are performed on a once per cycle frequency to avoid the i
risks associated with performing instrument calibrations on-line. During power opera $ons, hydraulic transients in instrument sensing lines, coupled together by common piping, are j
known to cause safety function actuations or trips when instruments are valved in and out of i
i l
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JPN-93-010 Page 2 of 2 service at operating pressure (1000 psig). Calibrating these instruments at power exposes the plant to a possible transient, which could challenge safety systems.
Some of the transmitters subject to the enhanced surveillance monitoring program may r
be considered for replacement with post July 11,1989 transmitters in the future; in which i
case, the surveillance program would be modified to reflect their new status.
For transmitters not subject to the replacement or enhanced surveillance requirements of Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, the Bulletin requires that a high degree of confidence be maintained for detecting transmitter failure caused by a loss of fill-oil. This involves the transmitters exposed to normal operating pressures below 500 psig and those that have reached the maturity (psi-month) threshold criterion. Accordingly, the once per operating cycle calibration drift monitoring program, described above, will continue for these two groups of transmitters (51 total) for at least the next two operating cycles to assure that a high degree of confidence is maintained for detecting failures caused by a loss of fill-oil. Any decision to discontinue this surveillance program beyond the next two operating cycles, would be based on a conclusion that adequate reliability has been established and will be maintained.
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ATTACBMENT_3 CONFIRMATION OF SAFETY FUNCTION RELIABILITY Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 Loss of Fill-Oil in Rosemount Transmitters James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Twenty-three Rosemount transmitters which are subject to the preventive measures of NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, are not scheduled for replacement. Continued reliability of the safety functions associated with these transmitters will be assured by the enhanced sunteillance program described in Attachment 2, and the design of the safety function instrumentation as described below.
High Main Steam Line Flow Transmitters Total Number: 16 Instrument No:
02DPT-116 A thru D 02DPT-117 A thru D 02DPT-118 A thru D 02DPT-119 A thru D Model No:
1153DB7RC Safety Function:
ESF - Provides a main steam line flow signal for generating a Group 1 containment isolation signal on high steam flow. A Group 1 isolation trip closes valves on the main steam containment penetration. High flow is indicative of a main steam line break.
Redundancy:
There are four main steam high flow transmitters monitoring flow on each of the four main steam lines (16 total). There are four channel, two channels for each of two logics. One of the two channel must trip to effect a logic trip. Both logics must trip to initiate isolation. Each of the four transmitters on a main steam line provides an input to each of the four channels.
Any two main steam high flow channels is capable of generating a Group 1 containment isolation signal. A failure of one of the subject transmitters will neither prevent nor initiate a l
Group 1 isolation.
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JPN-93-010 Page 2 of 5 Diversity:
Two other independent ESF signals provide the same safety function as the Main Steam flow transmitters; i. e., initiate Group 1 isolation in the event of a main steam line break. These i
signals are main steam tunnel high temperature and reactor low water level. The instrumentation and methodologies are diverse from the main steam line high flow trip system.
Sixteen temperature sensors feed four main steam tunnel high temperature channels. Four
]
reactor water level sensors, two in each of two independent logic channels, will initiate Group i
1 isolation on low reactor water level.
Main Steam Line Pressure Transmitter -
Total Number 1
)
instrument No:
Model No:
1153GB9RC -
Safety Function:
ESF - Provides a main steam line steam pressure signal for generating a Group 1 containment isolation trip on low pressure. A Group 1 isolation closes valves on the main steam containment penetration. Low pressure is indicative of a turbine pressure regulator failure.
i Redundancy:
There are four main steam line pressure transmitters, two in each of the two independent trip
~
logic channels. Trip of either instrument will trip the logic channel. Main steam isolation requires a trip of both logic channels. Failure of one transmitter will neither prevent nor initiate 4
a Group 1 isolation. The other three transmitters (02PT-134B,02PT-134C,02PT-134D) are l
not subject to the preventive measures of Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1.
2 Other Considerations:
Used as a pressure transmitter, a postulated high side pressure sensor oil loss will result in a lower than actual pressure signal, and a postulated low side pressure sensor oil loss will result in no change in the pressure signal. The most likely side for a failure to occur is the high side since that side is exposed to operating pressure. This worst case failure due to loss of fill-oil would result in a lower than actual pressure signal which will neither prevent or initiate an isolation on low steam pressure. The failure would result in a premature trip of one of the two logic channels. ' Actuation of the safety function would not occur until the other logic channel j
trips.
i
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JPN-93-010 Page 3 of 5 Reactor Water Level TransmitteI Total Number. 2 instrument No:
02-3LT-57B 02-3LT-58B Model No: 1153DB5 Safety Function:
ESF - Provides a reactor water level signal for generating a Group 1 containment isolation signal when level decreases below the level 1 setpoint.
i Redundancy:
i There are four reactor water level transmitters, two in each of two independent trip logic channels.- Trip of either instrument will trip the logic channel. Group 1 isolation requires a trip of both logic channels. The subject transmitters feed separate logic channels. Failure of one transmitter will neither prevent nor initiate Group 1 isolation. The other two transmitters associated with this trip system were refurbished after July 11,1989.
j Diversity:
A Group 1 isolation wouid be effective in conserving reactor coolant inventory only if there is a main steam line break. Other detections systems (main steam line high flow, and main steam area high temperature) are also utilized for effecting a Group 1 isolation in the event of a main steam line break, in addition, depressurization due to a break in the reactor coolant system will initiate a Group 1 isolation on low steam pressure.
l l
RCIC Steam Flow Tansmitter Total Number: 2 r
Instrument No:
13DPT-83 i
13DPT-84 Model No:
11153DB5RC Safety Function:
ESF - Provides a RCIC steam flow signal for generating an isolation of the RCIC turbine steam line on high steam flow. Indicative of a breach in the RCIC steam line.
1-I
-mn e
,v.
JPN-93-010 Page 4 of 5 Redundancy:
Each transmitter provides an input signal to an independent trip channel. The tripping of either of these two channels initiates isolation of the RCIC turbine steam line.
Diversity:
Two other independent ESF signals provide the same safety function; i. e., initiate closure of the RCIC turbine steam line in the event of a breach in the RCIC steam line. These are the 1
RCIC turbine steam supply line low pressure, and area high temperature. The instrumentation and methodologies are diverse from the high flow isniation trip system. Four low pressure 4
transmitters provide signals to two independent steam line isolatio,1 trip channels. Each trip channel will initiate an isolation when both transmitters within the channel sense low pressure.
None of these transmitters are subject to the preventive measures of Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1. There are eight high temperature sensors, four sensors in each of two independent channels, feeding the high temperature isolation trip system. Any one of the four high temperature sensors within a channel will initiate isolation.
HPCI Steam Line Low Pressure Transmitter Total Number: 2 Instrument No:
23PT-68B 23PT-68D Model No:
1153GB9 Safety Function:
ESF - Provides a HPCI steam line low pressure signal for generating HPCI isolation and turbine trip signal on low HPCI steam line pressure.
Indicative of a breach in the HPCI steam line.
Redundancy:
1 There four HPCI steam line pressure transmitters providing input to two trip logic channels.
Both logic channels must trip to effect isolation and turbine trip. _ Each channel receives inputs from two pressure transmitters, either one of which can trip the logic channel. The subject transmitters feed the same logic channel. Failure of one transmitter will neither prevent nor initiate isolation. The other two transmitters (23PT-68A and 23PT-68C) are not subject to the preventive measures of Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 (exceed maturity threshold).
JPN-93-010 Page 5 of 5 Diversity:
Two other independent ESF signals provide the same safety function; i. e., initiate closuia of the HPCI turbine steam supply in the event of a breach in the HPCI steam line. These are HPCI steam line high flow, and area high temperature. The instrumentation and i
methodologies are diverse from the low steam pressure trip system. Four low pressure transmitters provide signals to two independent steam line isolation trip channels. Each trip channel will initiate an isolation when both transmitters within the channel sense low pressure.
Neither of these transmitters are subject to the preventive measures of Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1. There are sixteen (16) area high temperature sensors, eight in each of two 1
independent channels, feeding the high temperature isolation trip system. Any one of the eight high temperature sensors within a channel will initiate isolation.
Other Considerations:
Used as a pressure transmitter, a postulated high side pressure sensor oil loss will result in lower than actual pressure signal, and a postulated low side pressure sensor oil loss will result in no change in the pressure signal. The most likely side for a failure to occur is the high side since that side is exposed to operating pressure. This worst case failure due to loss of fill-oil would result in a lower than actual pressure signal which will neither prevent nor initiate an isolation on low HPCI steam pressure. The failure would result in a premature trip of one of the two logic channels. Actuation of the safety function would not occur until the other logic channel trips.
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