Information Notice 2013-21, Welding Problems During Fabrication of Reactor Plant Components

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Welding Problems During Fabrication of Reactor Plant Components
ML13150A405
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/21/2013
From: Michael Cheok, Kokajko L
Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Beaulieu D
References
IN-13-021
Download: ML13150A405 (5)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 November 21, 2013 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2013-21: WELDING PROBLEMS DURING FABRICATION

OF REACTOR PLANT COMPONENTS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard

design certification, standard design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.

All contractors and vendors that supply basic components to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) licensees under 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and

Utilization Facilities or 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear

Power Plants.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of examples of welding problems that occurred during the fabrication of reactor

plant components. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions

contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Three instances are described below where welding problems which required significant repair

occurred during the fabrication of large reactor plant components. Weld repairs on reactor

coolant system components are generally undesirable due to the introduction of residual tensile

stresses, a contributor to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC).

Weld Defects in the Flamanville 3 European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) Vessel Head (France)

In November 2010, during fabrication inspections of the new Flamanville 3 EPR reactor vessel

head, AREVA detected defects in several reactor head penetration nozzle welds. In April 2011, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued an Information Notice outlining the location of

ML13150A405 the defects and the proposed corrective actions. In June 2011, during repairs of the penetration

nozzle weld defects, AREVA discovered that there was also insufficient buttering thickness for

some of the welds due to excessive grinding during nozzle weld repairs. See ASN Information

Notice 2012-13 for more details.

The design of the EPR vessel head includes over 100 penetrations. This relatively large

number of penetrations restricts access to the penetration welds which makes in-process

cleaning, nozzle welding, and weld repairs more difficult. Also, the welding process was

changed compared to previous (non-EPR) reactor head fabrication. Changes in welding

practices compared to manufacturing of previous vessel closure heads included filling the weld

in sequences of three layers instead of two layers, and cleaning operations at the end of the

welding sequences were performed by brushing instead of grinding. The combination of poor

accessibility to weld sites, and the changes in the weld cleaning process led to several weld

defects.

The removal of an excessive amount of buttering material during repair of the reactor head

welding defects was, in part, due to slight deformation of the vessel head which occurred during

the final heat treatment. This deformation is expected, but was not appropriately taken into

account when grinding was performed during penetration nozzle weld repairs. This resulted in

an excessive amount of buttering material being removed.

Lessons learned from the EPR reactor vessel head repairs have led to several improvements in

AREVA welding processes. These included making specific weld procedure acceptance criteria

more stringent, performing more frequent weld checks during welding operations, and

increasing the use of ultrasound inspections on nozzle adapter welds.

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Vogtle) Unit 3 AP-1000 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Weld Issues -

Doosan Heavy Industries, South Korea

After welding the Vogtle Unit 3 reactor vessel nozzles at Doosan Heavy Industries in the

Republic of Korea, ultrasonic testing revealed several indications in the Alloy 52M inlet

nozzle-to-safe end welds. Some indications were in excess of the allowable limits of the

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, and

therefore were determined to be defects that required repair. The primary cause for the

indications was loss of weld shielding gas during welding operations due to the ventilation

configuration in the vicinity of welding. Corrective actions included revising procedures to better

control ventilation configurations to ensure that the correct weld shielding gas is maintained, repairing the welds by excavating the defects from the inside diameter, and re-welding.

Additional information appears in Southern Nuclear Operating Companys public meeting notes

presented to the NRC on October 4, 2012. They can be found on the NRCs public Web site in

the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No.

ML12277A349. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 AP-1000 Containment Vessel Weld Cracking

In April 2012, licensee contractors discovered cracks in four welds in the lower ring of the

Vogtle Unit 3 containment vessel. The cracks were located in the welds joining 1-7/8 inch

SA-738 grade B alloy steel plates. Corrective actions included modifying the fit-up procedure to

reduce fit-up stresses and modifying the post weld heat treatment procedure to distribute heat

during post weld heat treatment over a larger area.

Additional information appears in Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 - NRC Integrated Inspection Reports 05200025/2012-003, and

05200026/2012-003, dated August 2, 2012, on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under

Accession No. ML12220A476.

BACKGROUND

Related NRC Generic Communications

NRC IN 2010-08, Welding and Nondestructive Examination Issues, dated April 9, 2010,

alerted addressees to several instances of welding and nondestructive examination human

performance errors and ASME code non-compliances. (ADAMS Accession No. ML091670177)

NUREG-1425, Welding and Nondestructive Examination Issues at Seabrook Nuclear Station:

An Independent Review Team Report, dated July 28, 1990, describes lessons learned

regarding licensee radiographic and welding programs. (ADAMS Accession No.

ML090300351).

DISCUSSION

This IN provides examples of recent welding issues that involved inadequate procedures to

control critical welding parameters, inadequate quality checks, or inadequate technical

evaluation of welding conditions. In each of the examples, the affected welds were removed

and completely re-welded, or the welds were repaired. However, weld repairs in contact with

reactor coolant are generally not preferred due to the introduction of residual tensile stresses on

the surface of the weld in contact with reactor coolant. This can potentially contribute to weld

degradation mechanisms such as PWSCC. The implementation of adequate procedures, training, and quality oversight is necessary to avoid these types of welding issues. Specifically,

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel

Reprocessing Plants: (1) Criterion VII requires that measures be established to adequately

control contractor materials and services, and (2) Criterion IX requires a licensee to establish

adequate measures to ensure the control of special processes, including welding, heat treating, and nondestructive testing, and (3) Criterion XVI requires that measures be established to

assure that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of New Reactors (NRO) or

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.

/RA/ /RA Sher Bahadur Acting for/

Michael C. Cheok, Acting Director Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director

Division of Construction Inspection Division of Policy and Rulemaking

and Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contacts: Robert Davis, NRO Phil OBryan, NRO

301-415-4028 E-mail: Phil.OBryan@nrc.gov

E-mail: Robert.Davis@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library.

ML13150A405 TAC MF0922 OFFICE PM:DCIP/NRO Tech Editor: DE/NRO BC:CIB/DE/NRO

NAME POBryan CHsu RDavis DTerao

DATE 05/31/13 e-mail 06/14/13 e-mail 05/31/13 e-mail 9/23/13 e-mail

OFFICE BC:IGCB/DCIP/NRO D:DE/NRO LA:PGCB/NRR

NAME BAnderson MShuaibi CHawes CMH

DATE 9/24/13 e-mail 10/29/13 e-mail 11/04/13 e-mail

OFFICE PM:PGCB/NRR BC:PGCB/NRR (A) D:DCIP/NRO D:DPR/NRR

NAME DBeaulieu SStuchell MCheok S. Bahadur for

LKokajko

OFFICE 11/04/13 11/4/13 11/8/13 11/21/13