IR 05000456/1992025

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Insp Repts 50-456/92-25 & 50-457/92-25 on 921201-930119. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review, Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation & Rept Review & Meetings
ML20128K256
Person / Time
Site: Braidwood  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/03/1993
From: Farber M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128K208 List:
References
50-456-92-25, 50-457-92-25, NUDOCS 9302180113
Download: ML20128K256 (7)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-REGION 111

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Reports ho. 50-456/92025(DRP); 50-457/92025(ORP)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West 111 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:

Braidwood Station, Units 1 'nd 2 Inspection At:

Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

December 1, 1992 through January 19, 1993 Inspectors:

S. G. Du Pont J. R. Roton f

U Approved By:

M. Farb

, Ch ef Reactor Projects Section lA Dat6 /

Inspection Summary

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Jnspection from December 1. 1992 throuah January 19. 1993-(Recorts No. 50-

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456/9t015(DRP): 50-457/92025(DRP))

Areas insoected:

Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on pr',iously identified items; licensee event report review; operational safety verification; monthly-maintenance

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observation; monthly surveillance observation; report review and meetings.

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Results:

One viclation was identified in one of the five areas inspected.

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l the remaining areas, no violations were identified.

The following is a summary of the licensee's performance during this inspection period:

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_lant Operations P

I The licensee's performance in this area continues to.be good.. Shift L

briefings for the it..plementation of the steam generator molar ratio chemistry control were noted as being very good.

The response of Unit 1 L

personnel to the January 7, 1993 reactor trip was outstanding.

Radioloaical Controls -

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the three violations issued in Inspection Report 456/92023; 457/92023. The inspectors noted

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the responses as being thorough with sufficient corrective actions _taken to preclude. recurrence.

9302180113 930204

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Safety Assessment /Ouality Verificatiqn A violation was issued due to the licensee's failure to take timely corrective action.

In this case, a corrective action item committed to in LER 90-014 remains open some two-and-one-half years later.

The inspectors feel the importance of the corrective action warrants more aggressive pursuit of it's implementation.

fnoineerino and Technical Support

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Performance in this area continues to improve. The licensee's troubleshooting of the Unit I reactor trip is e solid example of the involvement of the technical staff in the day-to-day tctivities of the pl ant.

Eaintenance and Surveillance The licensee's performance in maintenance and surveillance activities during this inspection period was good.

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DETAILS I

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Persons Contacted-Commonwealth Edison Comoant (CECO)

K. L. Kofron, Station Manager G. R. Masters, Project Manager

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  • G. E. Groth, Maintenance Superintendent
  • D. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent D. E. Cooper, Assistant Superintendent - Operations R. J. Legner, Services Diractor

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A. D. Antonio, Nuclear Quality Program Superintendent

  • R. Byers, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning
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G. Vanderheyden, Technical Staff Supervisor S. Roth, Security Administrator

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  • K. G. Bartes, Nuclear Safety Supervisor A. Haeger, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
  • J. Lewand, Regulatory Assurance
  • D. J. Skoza, Enginter
  • Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on January 21, 1993.

The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees.

2.

Licensee Action on Previously identified Items (92701. 92702)

a.

Unresolved item (Closed) 456/92017-04: 457/92017-04:

Failure to Adequately Control Work Which Involves Systems / Components Important to safety.

In assessing the licensee's response to this item, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions committed to in Licensee Event Report (LER) 456/90014, dated September 11, 1990,

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Corrective Action, item number 436-200-90-03201,. states that a

" formal methodology will be developed to facilitate restoration of-components to operable status where completion of the work package must be deferred until a later date." The inspectors noted that-this corrective action remains open.

In their response to the unresolved item,.the licensee stated that

" systems in place adequately maintain control of work which involves systems / components important to safety." This response is inadequate in that it fails to address the issue of deferred work and the operability of components left "as-is" pending completion of deferred work packages.

The methodology committed to as a corrective action for LER 456/90014 would provide the system to ensure adequate control.

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Because the significance of the corrective action warranted prompt resolution, the failure to implement the corrective action

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identified in LER 456/90014, in a timely manner, is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI (50-456/92025-01(DRP); 50-457/92025-01(DRP)).

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Violatiqni (Closed) 456/92023-01: 457/92023-01:

Failure to comply with'

radiological postings LClgspd) 456/92023-02: 457/91023-02:

Addition of sulfur hexaflouride to the Unit I condensate system without a written procedure.

LClosed) 456/92023-Q3: 457/91_C23-021 Failure to perform a 10 CFR

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50.59 evaluation prior to adding sulfur hexaflouride to Unit 1 as an experiment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation which cited these three Severity Level IV violations.

The inspectors found the response to be thorough with sopropriate corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence.

One violation was identified.

3, Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700.1 LERs were reviewed and closed based on the following criteria:

Reportability requirements were met.

  • Immediate corrective actions were accomplished.
  • Corrective actions to prevent recurrence has been or will be

initiated per technical specifications.

-No violations or deviations were identified.

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The inspectors reviewed the following LERs and have determined that the-corrective actions appear appropriate to prevent similar events:

(Closed) 456/92007: Reactor Trip due to Main Generator-Heutral Ground Back-up Relay Trip.

(Closed) 456/92011: _ Inadequate Testing Frequency for Auxiliary Feedwater-Pump Start on Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Undervoltage.

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(Closed) 455/920121 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Start Due to Low-2 Steam Generator Level as a Result of Leakage Past IFWO79A.

(Closed) 456/92013: Spurious Safety Iniection Signal Due to Unknown Causes.

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LCigjied) 456/92014:- - Inadequate Snubber Testing Program Due to Personnel Error.-

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Operational Safety Verification-(71707)'

The inspectors verified that the facility was being_ operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the -

licensee's management control system was affectively 1 carrying out'itsi responsibilities for safe operation.-

The following activities were observed, evaluated, or reviewed:

Unit 1 Reactor Trip While Performing Reactor Coulant' Pump -

Underfrequency Surveillance.

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Unit 1 Steam Generator Molar Ratio _ Chemistry Control.

  • Unit 1 Reactor Trip While Performing IBwVS 3.1.1-6,. " Reactor Coolant Pumpi Underfrequency Quarterly Surveillance.". On January 7,' 1993,-Unit-1-

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tripped from 100% reactor power. The trip was'causeo by a component-failure on the 215 Universal -Logic Card, which is the' decision maker for the two out of four logic in the Reactor Coolant Pump Under-Frequency (RCP-UF) circuit. At-the time of the trip, technicalfstaff personnel?

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were performing IBwVS 3.1.1-6, ' Unit One Reactor Coolant Pump _

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Underfrequency Quarterly Surveillance." The RCP-UF: surveillance performs verification of the trip actuating device for the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) bus underfrequency input to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). - The RCP underfrequency trip coincidence _ logic' is twol out of four -

buses with permissive P-7.

Each RCP bus contains an A-train and B-train UF relay. Testing is performed on each relay; independently with'

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verification of-control room annunciation and: reset.- This sequence-is-repeated for all-four of the RCP buses in IBwVS 3.1.~1-6.

Testing-had been completed satisfactorily' on bus-156,,157,-and bus-158 A--

train relays.

Upon actuation-of-the bus 158 B-train relay,.a trip' signal-was generated resulting in a reactor trip -'and a' trip _ of all four RCPs.

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Procedure 18wEP-0, " Unit One Reactor Trip / Safety} Injection," was _ entered.

J The relay was reset and surveillance stopped.m 0perations immediately_

dR proceeded to stabilize the plant and_re-start the 10.RCP on bus-159.

The response of Control-Room personnel was excellentiand all safety-

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systems responded normally. - After the plant stabilized in Mode 3, RCP-UF:

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surveillance was performed ~in an effort to recreate the failure and =

collect more data. The' surveillance was performed satisfactorily indicating an intermittent = 1ogic problem.--

Troubleshooting identified the failed 215 Universal Logic Card _to'be-the:-

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cause of-the trip. Additional l troubleshooting-was completed to-expose -

any other degraded or' questionable components which could have -

contributed to the event.

These actions verified the failure found ini

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the SSPS bi-n.6nthly test and completed the troubleshooting action plan.

The failed Universal Logic Card was sent to the vendor for a detailed failure analysis.

Unit 1 Steam Generator Molar Ratio Chemistry Control. On December 2, 1992, the licensee implemented a change to the Chemistry Control Program for Unit 1.

The intent of this new program is.to establish a chemically neutral steam generator crevice environment to orevent cracking of the tubes.

From the hideout return data over the last three cycles, it has been determined that sodium and chloride are the dominant impurities remaining in solution in the crevice. The irc. balance of sodium to chloride has caused the formation of sodium hydroxide, or caustic, in the crevice and would explain the cracking of the tubes.

The Malar Ratio Control Program was implemented using the following actions:

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The parts-per-billion (PPB) ratio of sodium to chloride in the steam generator blowdown water is being maintained between 0.2 and 0.5.

This is being accomplished in three steps:

First, one blowdown domineralizer with only cation resin at 200 parts-per-million is in operation.

This selectively removes sodium allowing chloride to return to the secondary system; Second, a second blowdown demineralizer with the normal ratio of cation to anion resin is operated intermittently as the chloride concentration increases (similar to the way the cation demineralizer is used in the chemical-volume and control system to remove lithium); Third, if the chloride concentration remains too low, a condensate polisher will be placed'

on line at about 1000 gallons-per-minute to leak chlorides into the system, b.

In order to determine the effects of the chemistry change on the device environment, a prompt hideout return study needs to be performed 6 to 12 weeks after implementation. This will require a Mode 3 entry for 8 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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Continue to maintain a feedwater flydrazine concentration of 100 PPB to minimize iron transport and reduce the carrosion potential in the steam generator.

The inspectors reviewed the special procedure and safety evaluation used to control and approve the implementation of this program.

The procedure and evaluation were thorouch.

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Monthly Maintenance Observa1 ion (62703l Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed-by the inspectors to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance-with approved procedures, regulatury guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.

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The -following items were also considered during-this -review:

approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning coinponents or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were dCComplished by qualified personnel.

The following mtincenance activities were observed and reviewed:

Nuclear Work Request (NWR) A58545; "1ES007, Extraction Steam supply

Valve to 15 A and B Low Pressure Heaters Stuck Closed."

NWR A57970; "2FWOIAB. 278 Heater Divider Plate Repair."

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6.

fjpftibly_levjtillance Observaljon (61726)

The inspectors observed several of the surveillance testing required by technical specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly resolved.

The following surveillance activities were observed and reviewed:

IBwVS 3.1.1-6, " Reactor Coolant Pump Underfrequency Quarterly

Surveillance."

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Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for December 1992. The inspector confirmed that the information prcvided met the requirements.of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.!G.

The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for November 1992.

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No violations or deviations were identified..

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Exit Int;rview (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives' denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and' at the conclusion of the inspection on January 21, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.

The licensee. acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in. nature.

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