IR 05000423/1980005
| ML19337B170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1980 |
| From: | Feil R, Mcgaughy R, Reynolds S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19337B167 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-80-05, 50-423-80-5, NUDOCS 8010010372 | |
| Download: ML19337B170 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-423/80-05 Docket No.
50-423 l
License No.
CPPR-113 Priority Category A
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Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Eneroy Company
P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
uly 18, 23, 24, 1980-T//3/ffO
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Inspectors:
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R,, Feil, Re ctor Inspector da e s'igned o/s e W Qs A
5. Reynolds, Re ctor Inspector date signed
"fu' Wt A J
b W. Sanders, Reactor Inspector
/datesigned Approved by:
,/M,Mh b f
/!fi R'. W. McGaughy,jhy, Projects Section, date/ signed RC&ES Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 18, 23 and 24, 1980 (Report No. 50-423/80-05)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, facility tour, pipe welding and polar crane testing.
The inspection involved 35 inspector hours on-site by 3 regional based inspectors.
Resul ts:
No items of noncompliance were observed.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8001010 37k
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)
- Mr. D. G. Dedrick, QA Manager
- Mr. K. W. Gray, Jr., Supervisor CQA Mr. H. R. Nims, Director, Generation Construction
- Mr. S. Orefice, Superintendent New Site Construction
- Mr. J. L. Peterson, Senior Project Technician
- Mr. S. R. Toth, System Supt / Generation Construction Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W)
Mr. W. B. Anderson, Assistant Supervisor FQC
- Mr. J. G. Kappas, Superintendent of Construction
"Mr. W. Mackay, Resident Manager
- Mr. M. R. Matthews, Assistant Superintendent, FQC Mr. A. M. Prusi, Resident Engineer Mr. W. W. Orr, Senior Engineer FQC Mr. J. D. Sininons, Rigging Supervisor
- Mr. F. S. Sullivan, Resident Engineer
- Mr. G. G. Turner, Superintendent, FQC
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
The inspectors conferred with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/79-05-02): Measurement of delta ferrite in austenitic stainless steel production welds.
The NRC inspector reviewed Regulatory Guide 1.31, Revision 3 and reviewed the filler metal supplier's certified test reports representing approximately 30 purchase orders of austenitic filler metals.
Revisions 2 and 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.31 delete the requirements for production weld ferrite determinations, however, they require prior-to-production-use ferrite determinations by magnetic methods for SMAW and require ferrite calculations for GTAW.
The aforementioned review of austenitic SMAW and GTAW filler metal certifications indicates that both magnetic measurements (magna gage and/or severn gage) and Schaeffler calculations indicating ferrite in the 5-20% range are being made per S&W filler metal specifications which meets Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.31.
(Closed) Unresolved item (423/79-05-04):
RESAR-3, Part 5.2.5 specifies Westinghouse Specifications to be given to Stone and Webster and to be
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audited.
Specifications were not given to the site or to the corporate office.
The inspector verified that the following process specifications which comply with ANSI N-45 connittee specification were available on site as specified.in RESAR-3, Part 5.2.5, Austinetic Stainless Steel.
PS Number 82560HM Requirements for Pressure Sensitive Tapes for use on Austenitic Stainless Steels.
Rev. C, dated 2/14/75.
83336KA Requirements for Thermal Insulation Used on Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping and Equipment.
Rev. 13, dated 7/14/77.
83860LA Requirements for Marking of Reactor Plant Components and Piping.
Rev. C, dated 5/7/79.
84350HA Site Receiving Inspection and Storage Requirements for Systems, Material and Equipment.
Rev. 2 dated 5/11/79.
84351NL Determination of Surface Chloride and Fluoride on Austenitic Stainless Steel Materials.
Rev. 3, dated 6/15/79.
85310QA Packaging and Preparing Nuclear Components for Shipment and Storage.
Rev. 5, dated 8/10/77.
292722 Cleaning and Packaging Requirements of Equipment for Use in the NSSS.
Rev. 9, dated 4/27/79.
597756 Pressurized Water Reactor Auxiliary Tanks Cleaning Procedures.
Rev. C, dated 7/6/72.
597760 Cleanliness Requirements During Storage Construction, Erection and Start-up Activities of Nuclear Power Systems.
Rev. 5, dated 5/10/79.
The inspector reviewed reports by Westinghouse representatives and verified that Westinghouse conducts reviews on a monthly basis of long-term storage conditions of Westinghouse supplied NSSS equipment on site in accordance with RESAR-3, Part 5.2.5.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (423/79-05-08): Weld rod requirement to differen-tiate between safety and non-safety related applications.
Further review was made by the NRC inspector of filler metal procurement and certification.
This review indicated that all austenitic stainless steel filler metals are purchased to S&W ME 103C, ME 104C and ME 105C specifications regardless of end usage (safety or non-safety related weldments).
All material cer-tifications reviewed met current Regulatory Guide 1.31 procurement require-ments and the S&W position on Regulatory Guide 1.31 (R3/1) dated 6/1/78
for ferrite control.
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3.
Facility Tour The inspectors observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the facility during the course of the inspection.
Presence of quality control inspectors, quality control records, conformance with procedural requirements and equipment preser-
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vation was observed. The inspectors conferred with craft personnel, s.uper-vision and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
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The inspectors specially observed portions of the setting of the reactor vessel on cribbing in the containment building in preparation for the set-ting of the reactor vessel.
Welding of some Class II piping was observed in the containment building.
No ite:u of noncompliance were observed.
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NUSCO Staff The inspectors were informed that a Level III NDE person had been added to the site staff of NUSCO.
The inspectors verified through a record checks that the individual was certified in liquid penetrant, magnetic particle and radiography in accordance with SNT-TC-IA and NUSCO requirements.
5.
Reactor Vessel
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The inspector reviewed field construction procedures (FCPs) for the reactor vessel installation and the final setting and alignment of the reactor vessel.
PFCP-288, Reactor Vessel Installation, dated June 25, 1980 delineated the responsibilities, prerequisites, and detailed rigging instructions for the installation of the reactor vessel, including transport from storage to con-tainment, upending and setting onto the reactor vessel supports of the neu-tron shield tank.
FCP-289, Final Setting and Alignment of Reactor Vessel, dated June 24, 1980, describes the installation of the vertical restraint plate onto the reactor vessel, and final setting, leveling and positioning of the reactor vessel onto the neutron shield tank.
The inspector noted that the procedures were prepared and documented in
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accordance with the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation QA manual requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Visual Observation of Welds (Other Safety Related Piping)
The following completed field welds in piping outside the reactor coolant pressure boundary were visually examined for conformance to the applicable codes, standards, specifications and licensees / contractor welding proce-dure requirements.
SIL-160-FWO3 SIL-157-FWO3 The welds were 10" OD pipe to valve welds in the safety injection system.
The weld surface finish and appearance, transition between wall thickness (1" to 1.72"), finish grinding, and welder serial numbers were observed. The blending from pipe to valve was excellent with ideal contour for minimiz-ing stress concentrations.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Observation of Welding Activities (Other Safety-Related Piping)
The NRC inspector observed intermediate pass welding on pipe to safety injection system valve welds S.L-157-FWO2 and SIL-160-FWO2.
These welds are 10" 0D dissimilar austenitic (304 pipe to 316 valve) stainless steel welds with a change in section (1.0-1.72").
The filler metal selection is in accordance with S&W E&DCR FM2390 changes to the basic welding specifi-cation W12F.
Either 308 or 316 filler metals are permitted.
E316-16 3/32" diameter electrodes were being used for the intermediate pass welding.
The NRC inspector observed weld fitup, GTAW tack welds on consumable insert, root pass and intermediate and cover passes for P8 to P8 RSS-502B FWO9.
This weld utilized an ER308 EB and ER308 filler metal for the remainder of the weld.
The pipe was 10" 00 x 0.365" wall welded to another pipe which forms a penetration.
Welding was conducted with a traveler, weld identification and location as specified, welding procedures and WPS in accordance with drawing and ASME Code requirements, welding technique as required, weld geometry as required, proper electrodes, gas shielding (per history record), proper shielding gas, welding equipment in good condition, preheat and interpass
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temperature per requirements, and weld history records adequate.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Welding Material Control The NRC inspector reviewed the welding filler metal control system.
The procedure for purchasing welding filler metals to meet ASME Code reqirements
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was reviewed. This includes S&W QA and QC Manual for ASME Section III i
Fabrication, Section D (Rev. 4), S&W Quality Standards Manual QS-8.11
Rev. A Change Notice 1 section on Welding Material Control and S&W CMP-6.4.
The S&W filler metal specifications applicable to the Millstone site were also reviewed.
A total of 30 purchase order material test cer-tifications were reviewed for conformance to ME103C, ME104C, an i ME105C including those filler metals utilized in welding observation activities.
Welding Filler Metal Issue Station was inspected for proper filler netal
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marking, review of current weeks issue slips, storage of baie and coated
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filler metals, storage oven control for low hydrogen coated electrodes, calibration of storage ovens, and marking of bare filler metal.
It was noted that the bare GTAW carbon steel filler metal was stored at ambient temperatures after removal from the shipping tube.
The proximity of the GTAW storage bins to the storage ovens keeps the bare filler metal above ambient temperatures essentially eliminating chances for temperature gradient condensation and attendant pitting corrosion.
The GTAW filler metals examined showing either no indication of corrosion or negligible amount.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Potential Deficiency of Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzle Safe-Ends The inspector reviewed a report regarding the potential deficiency of the reactor vessel outlet nozzle safe ends.
Combustion Engineering (CE) manu-facturer of the reactor vessel, informed Westinghouse (!!) in March of 1980 that the required 1/2 inch minimum length of stainless steel safe-end could not be guaranteed on the outlet nozzles of 4-loop reactor vessels fabri-cated after a design change in 1970.
Due to tolerance stack ups in the new design, the stainless steel forging /inconel attachment weld interface may be located too far from the vessel centerline to permit meeting of both the centerline-to-end prep dimension and the 1/2 inch minimum length of stainless steel.
A program of checking the reactor vessels shipped before the problem was discovered was initiated by W.
The checking of the reactor vessel at Millstone III was scheduled Yor the week of June 9,1980.
Because the schedule for n.oving and installing the reactor vessel conflicted with the inspection schedule date, S&W requested W to postpone the inspection.
The
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inspection is now scheduled in August 1980.
The inspector informed the licensee that the failure to notify the NRC of a potential defect in the reactor vessel outlet nozzle was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e<).
The inspector was informed that the licensee had not been officially notified of the problem,' that W had not
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provided any details of the problem to the licensee.
The information had been submitted to S&W.
The inspector informed the licensee that this item would remain an open item pending resolution of the potential deficiency of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles (80-05-01).
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10.
Polar Crane An inspection was made to observe the load proof tests performed on Polar Crane SW3Mhr-CRN1 installed in the primary containment structure.
The inspector noted that the specification FCP-290 Rev. O required each of the two main hoists to be proof load tested at 271 ton or 105% of its con-struction rating of 258 ton which results in a total load rating of 516 tons for the bridge.
Prior to the proof tests procedure CMP No. 10.3-12.79
" testing of overhead cranes and monorails" was examined for technical completeness and obvious noncompliances with regulatory requirements.
After the completion of the tests a review was made of the tests results certified and listed on CMP No.10.3, Attachment 1.4.1 pages 1 thru 7 and comprise the technical data for Certification Report No. 9.
No item of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompli-ance or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 9.
12.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee's representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on July 24, 1980.
The inspectors sum-marized the findings of the insrfction.
The licensee acknowledges the inspectors comments.
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