IR 05000413/2002009

IR 05000413-02-009 and IR 05000414-02-009 on 12/16-19/2002; Duke Energy Corporation; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Ti 2515/148, Verification of Compliance with Interim Compensatory Measures Order

ML030350449
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/31/2003
From:	Boland A Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Gordon Peterson Duke Energy Corp
References
EA-03-020 IR-02-009
Download: ML030350449 (10)

Text

ary 31, 2003

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-413/02-09 AND 50-414/02-09

Dear Mr. Peterson:

On December 19, 2002, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed special inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on December 19, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with an Order issued on February 25, 2002, which required your site to implement specific measures related to security of your facility. The inspection used Temporary Instruction 2515/148, Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures, to verify implementation of the Order as clarified in your responses dated March 18, May 1 and August 27, 2002. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, one finding of very low safety significance (green) was identified which was also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Catawba facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, without the enclosed Safeguards Information, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

TVA 2 DOCUMENT CONTAINS Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 Licenses Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report No.: 50-413, 414/2002-09 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Location: 4830 Concord Road York, SC 29745 Dates: December 16 -19, 2002 Inspectors: Jon H. Wallo, Senior Physical Security Inspector Jerry D. Ennis, Physical Security Inspector Eugene M. DiPaolo, Acting Senior Resident James L. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved by: Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000413-02-09; IR 05000414-02-09: Duke Energy Corporation; 12/16-19/2002; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, TI 2515/148, Verification of Compliance with Interim Compensatory Measures Order.

The report covered an announced inspection by two regional physical security inspectors, an emergency preparedness inspector, and the senior resident inspector. One non-cited violation (Green) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Physical Security

• Green. Failure to comply with Interim Compensatory Measure B.4.f A non-cited violation of Provision III.A of the February 25, 2002, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Catawba was identified.

The finding was more that minor because it was associated the Response to Contingency Events attribute and affected the objective of the Physical Protection Cornerstone to provide adequate assurance that the physical protection system can protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. It was determined to be of very low safety significance in that it involved a failure to meet regulatory requirements and represented a vulnerability in safeguards systems or plan; however, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the previous four quarters. (Section V.F)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations None DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .........................................................1 II. Waterborne Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II.A Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II.B Coordination With Maritime Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II.C Publicly Available Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 II.D Surveillance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 III. Vehicle Bomb Attack Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III.A Explosive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III.B Temporary Vehicle Barrier System Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III.C Vehicle Barrier System Checkpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III.D Limited Protected Area Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III.E Limited Unauthorized Train Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 III.F Escort of Vehicles with Hazardous Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 IV. Insider Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 IV.A Vital Area Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 IV.B Valid Failure to Meet Access Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 IV.C Credible Insider Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IV.D Controls for Personnel with Temporary Unescorted Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IV.E Hostage Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 V. External Land-Based Assault Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 V.A Minimum Number of Officers within Protected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 V.B Design, Construction and Placement of Defensive Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 V.C Armed Responders in Excess of Security Plan Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 V.D Spent Fuel Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 V.E Owner Controlled Area Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 V.F Armed Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 V.G Exterior, Ground Level Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 V.H Badging - Outside Protected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 V.I Integrated Contingency Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 VI. Mitigative Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 VI.A Evaluated Actions Needed for Terrorist Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED VI.B Strategies to Address Loss of Large Areas of the Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 VI.C Severity if Updated Safety Analysis Report Accidents Deliberately Caused . . . 19 VI.D Adequacy of Site Security And Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 VI.E Emergency Action Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 VI.F Computer System And Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 VII. Other Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 VII.A Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Attachments:

1. Supplemental Information 2. Partial Listing of Documents Reviewed DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS ii PAGE IS DECONTROLLED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION REMOVED DOCUMENT CONTAINS ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S) UPON SEPARATION THIS iii PAGE IS DECONTROLLED