IR 05000398/1993003
| ML20034H583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford, 05000398  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1993 |
| From: | Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034H579 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-398-93-03, 50-398-93-3, NUDOCS 9303190032 | |
| Download: ML20034H583 (13) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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Inspection Report: 50-382/93-03 Operating License: NPF-38 i
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Incorporated c
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P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
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Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana
- r Inspection Conducted:
January 10 through February 20, 1993
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Inspectors:
E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector J. L. Dixon-Herrity, Resident Inspector Accompanying Personnel:
D. M. Garcia, NRC Intern
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hC V 3hTk8 Approved:
Thomas F. Stetka,' Chief, Project Section D Datt
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Inspection Summary Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance observations, engineered
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safety feature system walkdown, followup on previous inspection findings, and review of licensee event reports (LERs).
Results:
Operator response to a turbine transient was quick and professional
(Section 2.1).
l A fire hose stttion was found visually obstructed by scaffolding and
items stored in the storage area adjacent to it (Section 2.1).
Separating the clean and potentially contaminated jobs was found to be a-
good as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) practice (Section 3.1).
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The peer quality control (QC) inspector program appears to be effective
in assuring proper completion of maintenance activities (Section 3.3).
A poor practice by a maintenance technician caused a control element-
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assembly (CEA) motor generator set vibration alarm (Section 4.1).
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9303190032 930315
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f The new labeling systems used in the switchgear rooms were found to be a
marked improvement over the previous system (Section 5.1).
The corrective actions taken in response to LER 91-018 were found'to be
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inadequate in that they did not address work packages already completed i
and awaiting closecut review (Section 8.3).
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Summary of' Inspection Findinos:
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Violation 382/9208-01 was-closed (Section 6.1).
- Violation 382/9208-02 was closed (Section 6.2)
Inspection Followup Item 382/9131-02 was closed (Section 7).
- License Event Reports91-005, 92-003, and 92-013 were closed
(Section 8).
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Attachments:
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Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS The plant was operating at full power at the beginning and at the end of this inspection period. On January 16, 1993, power was reduced to 92 percent for several hours to allow for surveillance testing of the main turbine inlet
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valves and an operability check on the emergency feedwater pump.
Power was reduced again on February 13, 1993, for surveillance testing of the main turbine inlet valves.
2 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and to ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation.
2.1 Plant Tours 2.1.1 Control Room Observation Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed control room activities and monitored plant status on a daily basis.
On January 10, 1993, the inspectors observed activities in the control room.
No surveillances were scheduled, which permitted the control room supervisor the opportunity to train (quiz) one of the auxiliary operators to prepare for an upcoming walkdown. This training was completed in the control room in a manner which did not interfere with operations or detract from the supervisor performing his duties.
The inspectors noted that the shif t supervisor had the option to call off-duty personnel in when it was necessary. This was a practice that had management's support and was utilized by licensee operators.
For example, on January 16, 1993, when problems developed during the testing of the turbine control valves, the shift supervisor exercised that authority-and called in an engineer and a planner to facilitate the repair of the valves. The shift supervisor was very knowledgeable on that particular problem and appeared to work closely with the perscnnel directly involved.
On January 23, 1993, an inspector observed an evening shift turnover. The evolution was completed in an orderly fashion. The operators who were not conducting turnover maintained the watch over the panels while others were turning over. One observation that was made by an operator was that the 12-hour watch schedule allowed for turnover continuity because the persnn being relieved would be your relief 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> late.
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On January 27, 1993, an inspector was in the control room when an unexpected
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switch of the main turbine control system from sequential to single valve mode
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of operation occurred. As a result of this mode switch, reactor power dropped 2 percent. The operators reacted quickly and professionally.
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i operators responded to the turbine control panel while two monitored the reactor's response. Once the plant stabilized, the shift supervisor and i
control room supervisor called the instrument and controls (I&C) technicians working in the digital electrohydraulic cabinet to determine if they may have
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i had a part in the transient. The technicians were reinstalling the.
electrohydraulic system digital voltmeter and, in the process, caused a short.
This caused a valve movement which, in turn, caused the turbine to switch
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automatically to single valve mode as designed. After discussing the problem,
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the shift supervisor determined that they could return to the sequential valve l
mode. They did not, however, allow the technicians to continue to work in the l
cabinet until the cause of the transient was identified. While. returning to i
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sequential valve mode, the plant again dropped an additional 2 percent in oower but stabilized and was returned to 100 percent power soon after. The 1&C maintenance department implemented the recently developed condition report system and wrote Condition Report CR-93-001 to document the event, determine the root cause, and ensure that corrective actions would be taken to prevent
recurrence.
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On February 17, 1992, the inspector observed a control room supervisor
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briefing to personnel on shift of an event that occurred the previous day.
Maintenance personnel had been tasked to work on Spent Resin Tank Dewatering
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Valve RWM-1251. While opening the valve, resin moved in the system causing
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the radiation level to go from less than 2 mrem /hr to greater than 2 rem /hr.
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Maintenance and health physics personnel reacted quickly by shielding the valve and exiting the area. The job was delayed to allow planning for the new radiological conditions. The total exposure for the maintenance activity was
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approximately 350 mrem. The briefing was provided to make watchstanders on duty aware of how quickly plant conditions could change. The same briefing was given to the oncoming watch the following day.
2.1.2 Plant and Site Tours
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During late January and early February, several thorough, detailed walkdowns were done in the turbine building and nonvital switchgear areas with no significant probicms noted.
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On January 23, 1993, while touring the reactor auxiliary building, the inspectors noted that items in the storage area by the waste drumming station on the +21 foot level were encroaching into a fire hose station. The area was partially blocked by scaffolding and the view of the hose was obstructed by
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the radwaste dumpster that was stored there. The inspectors informed a technician on duty of this observation. During a subsequent inspection, the
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inspector found that the area had been cleared and that there was a clear path l
to the hose.
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On February 3,1993, the inspectors completed a tour of all areas of the site which contained radioactive materials or were designated as high radiation The inspectors measured radiation readings outside marked areas and areas.
containers to ensure their label correctly reflected the reading and that the boundary was conservatively placed. Nc problems were identified.
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inspector questioned the licensee about a marked radioactive trash dumpster in a storage area outside the drumming station on the +21 foot level of the
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reactor auxiliary building. Using an NRC radiation monitor, the inspector
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obtained readings as high as 13 mrem /hr at the outside of the dumpster.
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i licensee's dumpster survey indicated that the contents measured less than
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2 mrem /hr.
In response to the inspectors' observation, a' technician' assigned to the area surveyed the dumpster and found the -same readings but explained'
that the dumpster was surveyed and the reading recorded several times a day.
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However, between the readings, people deposited radioactive trash in the dumpster, and, therefore, finding readings'different from those taken earlier was not unusual or unreasonable. Discussions with the supervisor. responsible i
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for the area corroborated the discussion with the technician that there was no problem. The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure RW-002-200, Revision 8, " Collection and Packaging Radioactive. Solid Waste for Disposal,"
and Radwaste Department Technical procedure RW-2-100, Revision 5, " Waste Material Collection and Handling," and found no discrepancy with the
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explanation given by the licensee.
i 2.2 Conclusions Operators reacted quickly and professionally to a turbine transient.
- A fire hose station was found visually obstructed by scaffolding and
items stored in the storage area adjacent to it.
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3 MONTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703)
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and components listed below were observed and documentation reviewed to ascertain
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that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved work authorizations (WAs), procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes or standards.
3.1 Preventive Maintenance Outage for Charging Pump AB l
On January 13, 1993, the inspectors observed preventive maintenance being conducted on Charging Pump AB.
Three WA packages were in progress when the j
inspector arrived at the job site. WAs 01104467, 01101819, and 01103361, respectively, reworked pump oil leaks, changed the lube oil and cleaned the strainer, and changed the gear reducer lube oil. The work packages were in order and present at the' job site. Work was being done in accordance with the procedures. The work being completed while the inspector was present were those jobs that did not involve contaminated systemr.
Upon completion of these tasks, the work area was to be roped off by health physics in preparation for opening contaminated systems. The floor had already been
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covered with plastic material in preparation for this task. This separation i
of the clean and contaminated jobs was observed to be a good practice.
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One of the individuals involved in the job was a peer quality control (QC)
inspector. The peer QC inspector program was implemented to assume'many of p
the QC tasks. The program places the emphasis on the quality of the job being
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done. Maintenanct personnel involved in this program are required to complete t
training and become qualified as QC inspectors before they are permitted to
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inspect in the field.
The rationale behind the development of the program was to have personnel qualified to perform the task, inspect the quality, and critique their peers' work. These personnel continue to perform maintenance in the field, but also act as peer QC inspectors for other teams when
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assigned. The individual assigned to this work package appeared to do a thorough job.
In addition to being present at the quality assurance hold l
points as required, he observed the complete job and occasionally assisted the j
work crew.
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3.2 Troubleshooting of Turbine Control Valves j
On January 16, 1992, the licensee reduced power to 92 percent to complete i
Surveillance Procedure OP-903-007, Revision 6, " Turbine Inlet Valve Cycling i
Test." This procedure required, in part,-that the governor valves be i
repositioned to sequential valve positions. This portion of the procedure was l
successfully completed. The next activity required each valve to be cycled.
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separately while in the valve test mode. This portion of the surveillance was
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not successful as no valve movement occurred.
Procedure progress was stopped j
to allow I&C personnel time to research the problem and a planner was called
in to assemble a work package to effect this research and repair.
j Before the work package was completed, I&C technicians requested that the i
operators repeat the test to allow them to gather data from the computer.
This practice of gathering data from installed equipment has been used in the
past without a work package. However, the I&C technicians were not allowed to install additional equipment (voltmeters for example) to take data without the WA. The operators performed the test under the direction of the technicians
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i to allow information to be gathered and, as a result, the technicians identified a malfunctioning card, which was subsequently replaced utilizing
the new work package.
t 3.3 Replacement of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B Air Start
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Compressor Breaker 2
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On January 20, 1992, the inspectors observed an electrical technician replace the EDG B Air Start Compressor Breaker 2 utilizing WA 01105075. The breaker
f had previously failed to meet the maintenance test requirement in Maintenance Procedure MI-07-002, Revision 8, " Molded-Case Circuit Breakers."
The original manufacturer no longer supplied a qualified breaker for this
application.
A qualified breaker from a different manufacturer was obtained, which was a like-for-like replacement. The breaker bucket, that fit into the
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t switchgear, was modified because the new breaker was larger and had a flip l
switch instead of a rotating knob.
The new style of switch appeared to be an
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improvement because the old style knobs could become loose after time, allowing the breaker condition to be misread. A peer QC inspector inspected the breaker internal connections in the shop prior to installation.
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addition, peer QC inspector reviewed the work package and verified that each wire was reterminated properly after the technician installed the breaker in
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the cabinet.
The inspectors reviewed the package and found that it was
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complete and that all sign-offs were completed as required.
3.4 Conclusions
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Separating the performance of clean and potentially contaminated jobs
was found to be a good ALARA practice.
t The peer QC inspector program appears to be effective in assuring proper
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completion of maintenance activities.
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l 4 BIMONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (61726)
l The inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and
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components listed below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance with the licensee's programs and the Technical Specifications.
4.1 CEA Testing
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i On January 16, 1993, the inspectors observed the performance of Surveillance
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Procedure OP-903-005, Revision 7, " Control Element Assembly Operability Check." The procedure was revised prior to conducting this surveillance, due t
to the problem with CEA 38 (discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/92-27)
so that each assembly was inserted and withdrawn two steps prior to inserting it the required steps in accordance with the procedure.
This maneuver
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permitted the operator to ensure that the assembly could be withdrawn prior to
inserting it, thus preventing undesirable entry into a TS action statement.
- This additional step was considered by the inspectors to-be a conservative action.
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The operator moved the rods while the shift technical advisor monitored and recorded the data. They followed the procedure step by step and the surveillance progressed without incident with the exception of one alarm.
While moving a rod, the CEA motor generator vibration alarm annunciated. The
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control room operators stopped the procedure and directed auxiliary operators to check the CEA motor generator set. On the next assembly move, the CEA motor generator annunciator alarmed again.
The auxiliary operator informed the control room operators that a maintenance technician working on a portion of the fire protection system had been standing on the motor generator, causing the alarm to annunciate. The shift supervisor directed this individual to report to the control room and the operators repeated testing on the two assemblies that had alarmed. These two assemblies then tested j
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satisfactorily. The technician was admonished and given remedial instruction.
This activity by the maintenance technician was considered to be a poor work l
practice.
4.2 Safety Verification of High Pressure Iniection Pump AB r
On February 2,1993, the inspectors observed the completion of Surveillance
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Procedure OP-903-30, " Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification on the-i High Pressure Safety Injection Pump." The procedures were performed twice,
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once with Revision 8 of the procedure and once with Revision 9.
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performance was done to ensure that there was no significant change in
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vibration data since the last surveillance and the second performance to
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establish baseline data for Revision 9, which added several new data points.
j The inspectors observed the first surveillance in the control room and the second surveillance at the pump. Two temporary gauges had been installed to
measure the pump suction and discharge pressure. One of these had a slight
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leak. The health physics technician on duty conducted a thorough clean up of
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the area.
Perscanel performing the surveillance followed the procedure,
signing off steps as required. Maintenance and operations personnel worked
together in completing the surveillance. The inspector noted that there was good communication between the auxiliary operators and technicians at the pump and the control room.
The pump met all the acceptance criteria.
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4.3 Conclusions
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alarm to annunciate by standing on the CEA motor generator set.
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5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM WALKDOWN (71710)
During this inspection period, the inspectors performed a detailed procedure and drawing review and walkdown of the safety-related portions of the i
electrical distribution system to determine overall system condition and
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operational readiness.
The inspectors conducted a physical walkdown of the safety-related portions of the electrical distribution system.
Housekeeping was considered good.
During the last refueling outage, all components in the electrical distribution i
system had been relabeled with easier to read tags.
This was considered to be
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a marked improvement over the previous labelling system.
Over several i
inspection periods, the inspectors observed the interior of the cabinets as i
opportunities allowed and found that the interiors were free of debris and any evidence of rodents and that the cables were labeled. The inspectors i
determined that the buses were correctly aligned and would perform their
design safety function. The inspector compared the physical plant to i
Drawings LOU 1564 G-285, Revision 7, " Main One Line Diagram," and l
LOV 1564 G-286, Revision 10, " Key Auxiliary One Line Diagram," and found no
discrepancies.
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'The inspectors observed approximately 10 condition identification. tags on different components in the system, but found no indication of backlogged
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maintenance. Only one tag was dated prior to September 1992.
The inspectors
reviewed Operating Procedure OP-006-001, Revision 7 " Plant Distribution (7KV,
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4KV, and SSD) Systems;" Off-Normal Operating Procedure OP-901-403/4,
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Revision 0, " Loss of 4160 Safety Bus A/B;" and Maintenance
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Procedures ME-004-004, Revision 5, "Isophase Bus Maintenance and Inspection "
and ME-004-121, Revision 5, "4.16KV Switchgear Maintenance." When compared
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with the drawings and physical plant, no di.screpancies were identified.
5.2 Conclusions The new labeling systems used in the switchgear rooms were found to be a
marked improvement over the previous system.
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6 FOLLOWUP ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS (92702)
6.1 (Closed) Violation 382/9208-01:
Failure to Follow Procedures for Hold Points
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This violation involved the failure of personnel to meet a hold point in
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WA 01092496.
The licensee found that the root cause for this-failure was personnel error resulting from lack of familiarity with ' aspects of the WA
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process and independent verification program.
The supervisor at the job. site
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eliminated a hold point with good reason but did not fulfill the
administrative requirements associated with bypassing the hold point. The i
i radwaste department does not use the WA process on a regular basis and had limited experience with a few aspects of the independent verification program.
The corrective action to prevent repeat occurrencer was to provide radwaste
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department personnel with training on independent verification and certain aspects of the WA process. This training was c npleted on September 3, 1992.
6.2 (Closed) Violation 382/9208-02:
Failure of Surveillance Procedure to Adecuately Implement Technical Specification Reouirement
This violation involved the failure of Surveillance Procedures OP-903-115, Revision 0, " Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator / Engineering Safety
Features Test," and OP-903-Il6, Revision 0, " Train B Integrated Emergency
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Diesel Generator / Engineering Safety Features Test," to fully verify that the
" turning gear engaged" lockout feature prevented the diesels from starting as
required by Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.d.12(a).
The procedure called l
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for isolating the control air, which would prevent the diesel from starting whether the lockout feature was functional or not. This procedure was l
developed to allow testing of the feature without having to attempt starting the diesel with the turning gear engaged due to the damage that would be
caused if the feature did not work. The licensee revised the procedure to require the operator to engage the turning gear and verify that the " turning.
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gear engaged" annunciator came on.
Engaging the turning gear causes Valves EGA-303 and -304 to isolate control air from the annunciators causing them to actuate, and the starting air solenoids prevent the diesel from
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receiving starting air. This procedure revision allows the " turning gear engaged" lockout feature to be tested as required by the' T5.
7 FOLLOWUP (92701)
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7.1 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 382/9131-02:
Followup on Special Test t
Required in Response to Maintenance on EDG A
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This item was opened to follow up on the results of a special pressure test the licensee intended to do in an attempt to identify the source of moisture emitting from the crankcase vent on EDG A on January 16, 1992. The licensee i
later observed water leakage around one of the two cylinder head studs on the
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exhaust side of the head.
It was determined that left Cylinder 5 was the
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source of the leakage. The licensee replaced the cylinder head using WA 01086706. This resolved the moisture problem, making the pressure test
unnecessary. The leaking cylinder head that was removed was sent to Cooper-Bessemer for analysis. Cooper-Bessemer determined that the cause of
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leakage was a leaking water jumper on the head close to the stud in question.
8 ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
i 8.1 (Closed) LER 382/91-005:
Shutdown Cooling Malfunction due to Ineffective WorL Controls A Notice of Violation (VIO 382/9117-01 and -02) was issued in respons' to this event.
The licensee took satisfactory corrective action and appropriately reported the event in this LER. The violations were closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/92-26 based on the licensee's response to the Notice of
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Violation.
8.2 (Closed) LER 382/92-003:
Surveillance Interval Exceeded as a Result of Inadeauate Administrative Control
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This report. addressed the licensee exceeding the surveillance interval for the broad range gas detection system channel calibrations specified by i
TS 4.3.3.7.3.
The root cause was determined to be inadequate administrative control. The licensee's corrective action was to assign the responsibility
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for tracking the completion of weekly surveillances to the duty I&C maintenance superintendent and to require that the completion of weekly TS surveillances be tracked by the control room staff in accordance with Operations Procedure OP-903-001, Revision 13, " Technical Specification Surveillance logs." The first action was completed in October 1992, the latter in January 1993.
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i 8.3 (Closed) LER 382/92-013:
Inadeauate Procedure and Repair Lead to Operation Outside the Design Basis a
On September 30, 1992, while performing a closeout review on.the repair of the manually operated test connection on the Safety Injection Tank 1B outlet check
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valve, 51-3291B, the licensee determined that the valve was replaced with an
ASME Class 3 valve instead of the required Class 1 valve.
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occurred on April 3, 1991. Operation with the replacement valve represented a
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condition outside the design basis of the plant. The root cause, an
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inadequate maintenance procedure, was found to be the same as that identified ~
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for LER 91-018. Administrative Procedure MD-001-022,Section XI, " Repairs and Replacements," did not adequately address the preimplementation work package
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review for ASME Section XI class requirements for replacement parts.
LER 91-018 identified this deficiency in August 1991 as a result of finding an
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ASME Class 3 wafer disc installed in a valve instead of the required ASME
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Class 2 disc during a closeout review.
Procedure HD-001-022 was revised in
October 1991 as part of the corrective actions taken'to prevent a repeat
occurrence.
The revision added a requirement that an ASME Section XI
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suitability evaluation report be performed before Section XI repairs or replacement are authorized. The corrective actions taken were inadequate in that they did not address work packages already completed and awaiting
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closecut review. _The SI-3291B replacement package fell into this category when the corrective actions that were taken for LER 91-018 went into effect.
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This event had low safety significance as the valve, although ASME Class 3 and
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purchased as a 600 pound component, had certification records which showed that it had been hydrostatically tested to S400 pounds per square inch by its
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manufacturer.
Because of this, its use in a 1500 pound application posed no risk to the health and safety of the public. ASME Section XI closecut reviews were completed on all work packages that had not received a detailed
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pre-implementation review as a result of LER 92-013. With these' reviews complete, the corrective actions taken in response to LER 91-018 should prevent the event from being repeated.
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1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
- R. E. Allen, Security and General Support Manager
- R. G. Azzarello, Director, Design Engineering T. J. Gaudet, Operational Licensing Supervisor J. G. Hoffpauir, Maintenance Superintendent
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T. R. Leonard, Technical Services Manager A. S. Lockhart, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. F. Packer, General Manager, Plant Operations R. D. Peters, Electrical Mcintenance Superintendent R. G. Pittman, Instrumentation & Controls Maintenance Superintendent
- J. A. Ridgel, Radiatien Protection Superintendent R. S. Starkey, Operations and Maintenance Manager D. W. Vinci, Operations Superintendent
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the above personnel, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
2 EXIT MEETING The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 24, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during this inspection.