IR 05000387/1996010
| ML18026A469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1996 |
| From: | BYRAM R G PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| PLA-4538, NUDOCS 9612260046 | |
| Download: ML18026A469 (12) | |
Text
PennsylvaniaPower&.LightCompanyTwoNorthNinthStreet~Allentown,PA18101-1179~610/774-5151RobertG.ByramSeniorP7cePresident-Nuclear610i774-7502Fax:610i774-5019DEC171996U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskMailStopP1-137Washington,D.C.20555SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONREPLYTOANOTICEOFVIOLATION(50-387/96-10-02AND50-387/96-10-03;50-388/96-10-03)PLL4BB-DocketNos.50-387and50-388ThisletterprovidesPennsylvaniaPowerandLightCompany'sresponsetotheNoticeofViolation{50-387/96-10-02and50-387/96-10-03and50-388/96-10-03)containedinNRCInspectionReport50-387/96-10and50-388/96-10datedNovember12,1996.ViolationBconcerninghighradiationpostingswasanissueaddressedattheAugust29,1996,HealthPhysicsmanagementmeetingwithNRCRegionI.PP&LstatedatthemeetingthattheneedforenhancementstoSusquehannahealthphysicsprogramwasrecognized.Theradiationpostingprogramwasoneareaidentifiedasrequiringenhancements.PP&L'shealthphysicsplanwhichwasdevelopedtoimplementthenecessaryenhancementswillalsostrengthentheradiationpostingprogram.ThreeofthefourradiologicaleventsdescribedintheNOVoccurredpriortotheAugust29,1996managemen<meeting.Thecorrectiveactionsresultingfromtheevaluationsofthoseeventswerediscussedatthattime.Theremainingevent,onSeptember6,1996,waspromptlyidentified,andmitigated,astheresultofanindependentverificationrequiredbythehealthphysicsprogram.Thenoticerequiredsubmittalofawrittenreplywithinthirty(30)daysofthedateoftheletter.However,asdiscussedwithDr.WalterJ.PasciakofNRCRegionIonDecember12,1996,PP&LhasbeenauthorizedtodelaytheresponseuntilDecember16,1996.WetrustthattheCommissionwillfindtheattachedresponseacceptabl FILER41-2PLA-4538DocumentControlDeskIfyouhaveadditionalquestions,pleasecontactMr.R.D.Kichlineat(610)774-7705.Verytrulyyours,.G.ByAttachmentcopy:NRCRegionIMr.K.Jenison,Mr.C.Poslusny,NRCSr.ResidentInspectorNRCSr.ProjectManager C~ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538.Page1of8Xi~uM(387/96-10-02)Unit1TechnicalSpecification(TS)6.8.1,"Procedures,"statesthatthelicenseeshallestablishandimplementproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,includingitem9.c(2)proceduresforrepairandreplacementofcontrolroddrives(CRDs).SusquehannaSteamElectricStation(SSES)NuclearDepartmentAdministrativeProcedure(NDAP)-QA-0500establishedapprovedpracticesformaintenanceproceduresandworkplans.NDAP-QA-0500referstoMaintenanceProcedureMT-AD-501,MaintenanceProcedureProgram,whichestablishestheproceduraladherencerequirementsfordifferenttypesofSSESmaintenanceprocedures.Section6.2ofMT-AD-501,statesthatastep-by-stepconditionalprocedureprovidesspecificdetaileddirection.Itfurtherstatesthatstrictadherencetotheprocedure,exactlyaswrittenandinitsentirety,isrequired.Finally,itstatesthattheproceduremustbeinthefieldandonthejob.MaintenanceProcedureMT-055-001,CRDRemoval,isastep-by-stepconditionalprocedurethatcontrolstheremovalandreplacementoftheCRDmechanisms,includingtheidentificationofthecorrectmechanism,andcontrolstosecondpartyverifythecorrectmechanism.Contrarytotheabove,onSeptember26,1996,MT-055-001wasnotusedinastep-by-stepfashioninthefieldbytheforemandirectingtheCRDremovalactivitiesonUnit1.ThecorrectCRDwasnotidentifiednorsecondpartyverified.ThisfailureresultedinthewrongCRDbeingpartiallydisassembled,withthepotentialtonegativelyaffectthecoolingoffuelassembliesinthecoreandspentfuelpool;and/oraffectlocalreactivityconditions.MaintenanceprocedureMT-055-001,titled"CRDPumpDisassembly,InspectionandReassembly"asreferencedintheNoticeofViolationdoesnotperformtheevolutionforremovingaCRDfromthereactorvessel;however,MT-055-015titled"ControlRodDriveRemoval"doesperformthisfunc'tion.Therefore,thisNOVresponsediscussestheactionsassociatedwithprocedureMT-055-015andnotMT-055-001.'hecauseoftheeventwasahumanerroronthepartofworkersdoingtheCRDexchange.Duringtheconductofthework,theCRDremovalcrewremovedtheidentificationstreamer(identifiestheCRDtoberemoved)fromCRDmechanism38-55becauseofaconcernthatthestreamerlengthwouldallowittotangleintheCRDboltingremovaltool.Theequipmentplatformwasthenmovedtoenhanceworkersafety.TherepositioningoftheequipmentplatformplacedtheCRDboltingremovaltoolatthe J0 ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page2of8incorrectCRD.ThestepinMT-055-015priortotheactualremovaloftheboltsrequiresarecheckofthecorrectCRDlocation;however,itdoesnotstatetheprecisemethodtobeused.FollowingtherepositioningoftheequipmentplatformconfirmationthatthecorrectCRDwasbeingremovedwasperformedbyrelyingonthepositionoftheCRDhandlingsystem(equipmentplatform).ThisresultedinthepartialunboltingoftheincorrectCRD.Additionally,theundervessellocationofCRD's38-55and34-51issuchthatremoteverificationtoconfirmthatthecorrectCRDisbeingremovedcouldnotbeperformed.BaseduponthelessonslearnedfromthiseventitwasdeterminedthatMT-055-015,althoughutilizedcorrectly,couldbeenhancedtominimizethelikelihoodofarepeatoccurrenceundersimilarcircumstances.ThecorrectivestepstakentorestoreCRD34-51(boltsfromthisCRDincorrectlyremoved)toanoperablestatusincluded:retorquingthesixflangeboltsforCRD34-51,andperformingstroketimeandscramtimetestingontheCRD.TheresultoftheOperationalHydro,strokeandscramtimetestingforCRD34-51wereacceptable.MT-055-015hasbeenrevisedto:(1)providecleardirectiontoassurethattheidentificationstreamers,attachedtotheCRDandusedtoidentifythecorrectCRDtoberemoved,remainsontheCRDuntiltheCRDremovaltoolispositionedundertheCRDandtheinitialsixboltsareremoved;(2)requiresreconfirmationoftheproperCRDtobeworked,iftheequipmentplatformisrotated,and(3)providesspecificmethods,includingindependentverification,onrecheckingcorrectCRDlocationpriortounbolting.NoadditionalCRDhandlingeventsoccurredduringtheUnit1ninthrefuehnganinspectionoutage.MT-055-015aswellastheotherCRDexchangeproceduresprovidesubstantialdefenseindepthtopreventinadvertentreactivitychanges.MT-055-015wasalsosuQicientlydetailedtoimmediatelydetecttheCRDunboltingerrorpriortoamoreseriouseventoccurring.TheidentifiedproceduralenhancementswereimplementedpriortoresumingCRDremovalactivitiesstrengthenedtheperformanceoftheevolution.AmethodforsupervisiontoremotelyconfirmthatthecorrectCRDisbeingworkedisbeingdeveloped.ThisprocesswillbedevelopedforimplementationbyMarch15,1997.Basedupontheactiontakenin2above,PP&Lisinfullcomplianc ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page3of8~V'i~(387/96-10-03;388/96-10-03)UnitsI&2TS6.12,"HighRadiationArea,"requireseachhighradiationareatobebarricadedandconspicuouslypostedasahighradiationarea.Contrarytotheabove,thefollowinghighradiationareaswerenotbarricadedandconspicuouslypostedashighradiationareas.eOnMay5,1996,theentrancetotheUnit1TurbineBuilding676'levation"D"DeminRoomfromthe"E"DeminRoomwasnotpostedasahighradiationarea,andhaddoseratesof200mrem/h.~OnMay11,1996,theentrancetotheUnit1TurbineBuilding676'levation,SteamJetAirEjector(SJAE)RoomfromthespareSJAEroomwasnotbarricadedandpostedasahighradiationarea,andhaddoseratesof1200mrem/h.~OnJuly31,1996,anun-postedhighradiationareaof400mrem/hwasfoundoriginatingfromtheUnit2ReactorBuilding779'levationatresininletvalveHV-24511B.OnSeptember6,1996,thewestentrancetotheUnit2TurbineBuilding729'levationmoistureseparatorroomwasnotbarricadedorpostedasahighradiationarea,andhaddoseratesashighas800mrem/h.AttheAugust29,1996,HealthPhysicsmanagementmeetingwithNRCRegionI,PP&LstatedthattheneedforenhancementstoSusquehannahealthphysicsprogramwasrecognized.Theradiationpostingprogramwasoneareaidentifiedasrequiringenhancements.PP&L'shealthphysicspl~whichwasdevelopedtoimplementthenecessaryenhancementswillalsostrengthentheradiationpostingprogram.ThreeofthefourradiologicaleventsdescribedintheNOVoccurredpriortotheAugust29,1996managementmeeting.Thecorrectiveactionsresultingfromtheevaluationsofthoseeventswerediscussedatthattime.Theremainingevent,onSeptember6,1996,waspromptlyidentified,andmitigated,astheresultofanindependentverificationrequiredbythehealthphysicsprogra ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page4of8OnMay5,1996,oneentrancetotheUnit¹1TurbineBuilding676'levation"D"DeminRoomfromthe"E'eminRoomwasnotpostedasahighradiationarea,andhaddoseratesof200mrem/hr.TheeventoccurredasaresultofhumanerroronthepartoftheHPtechniciancoveringthejobandwasdiscoveredbytheFirstLineSupervisorduringaprocedurallyrequiredverificationwalkdown.OnMay11,1996,theentrancetotheUnit¹1TurbineBuilding676'levation,SteamJetAirEjector(SJAE)RoomfromthespareSJAEroomwasnotbarricadedandpostedasahighradiationarea,andhaddoseratesof1200mrem/hr.Theevaluationofthiseventidentifiedthefollowingthreecauses:(1)HumanPerformance-person(s)unknownenteredthecommonhallwaytogainaccesstothespareSJAEroom;(2)Design-thehallwaybetweentheCondenserBayandthespareSJAEdoesnothaveadoortopreventaccesstotheSJAEroom;and(3)InadequateChangeManagement-HPsupervisionunderestimatedthestaffingrequiredforadequateconstantcoveragewhenthepowerlevelatwhichwaterboxworkisperformed,wasincreased.OnJuly31,1996,anunpostedhighradiationareaof400mrem/hrwasfoundoriginatingfromtheUnit¹2ReactorBuilding779'levationatresininletvalveHV-24511B.Tworeasonsforthiseventwereidentifiedandinclude:(1)ThesystemhasvalveHV-24511Blocatedinageneral(radiological)accessarea.DuringunplannedRWCUDemineralizerSystemtransientsandsystemdrainingduringunpressurizedconditions,resincollectsinpipingadjacenttothisvalveandresultsinasignificantsourceofradiation;and(2)PlantproceduresforRWCUoperationdidnotidentifyactionstobetakenwhenunplannedoperatingconditionsresultedinresinbuild-upatinletvalveHV-24511B.OnSeptember6,1996,thewestentrancetotheUnit¹2TurbineBuilding729'levationmoistureseparatorroomwasnotbarricadedorpostedasahighradiationareaandhaddoseratesashighas800mrem/hr.Theprimaryreasonforthiseventwashumanperformance.AHPtechnicianwhoescortedworkersintothemoistureseparatorroomfailedtoadequatelyverifythatthedoorwasclosedandlockedbeforeleavingthearea.TheconditionofthisdoorwasfoundbyanotherHPtechnicianperformingthedailyhighradiationdoorverificationsrequiredbytheHealthPhysicsprogram.Acausalfactorforthiseventwasthetypeofdoorclosuremechanismthatwasinstalledonthedoor.Thismechanismallowedthedoortobeinadvertentlyproppedope ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page5of8Upondetectionofthisviolationtheunpostedentrancewasimmediatelypostedandbarricaded.Coachingandcounselingusinghumanperformancecausalfactortechniqueswasconductedfortheinvolvedindividual,Atopicconcerningstationpostingproblemswasaddedtothe1996Cycle¹3HPTechnicianContinuingTraining.Thisincidentisusedasanexampleinthetraining.HealthPhysicsprocedureswererevisedtoincludeaspecificrequirementtocompletetheverificaiiunwalkdownforregulatorypostingchangeswithin24hoursofnotification.Upondetectionofthisviolationtheunpostedentrancewasimmediatelypostedandbarricaded.AtemporarybarricadetotheSteamJetAirEjectorRoomandtheCondenserBaystairsleadingtoelevation699'sconstructedwhenworkingatpoweron676'ndbelow.ThistemporarybarricadehasbeenconstructedseveraltimessincetheMay11,1996,incident.Thesetemporarybarricadespreventunauthorizedaccesstotheseareaswithradiationlevelsgreaterthan1Rem/hr.TheHumanPerformanceconcernwasaddressedbytheissuanceofaRadSafetyNotetoallplantworkgroupsreinforcingthestationandregulatoryrequirementsregardingradiationboundarydoorsandtherequirementstokeepthemclose ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page6of8Thehighradiationareawasimmediatelypostedandbarricadeduntilasystemflushcouldbeperformedtoremovethesourceofhighradiation.Thesystemflushhassubsequentlybeenperformedandthehighradiationareanolongerexists.Aremotearearadiationmonitor(ARM)hasbeeninstalledonbothunitsonthemezzanineabovetheRWCUHoldPumpRoomentryalcove.ThisARMisutilizedtoalertpersonnelofelevatedradiationlevelsinthearea.HealthPhysicsinstructionshavebeenrevisedtospecifyactionstobetaken(i.e.survey,postasrequired,etc.)whenanalarmisreceived.Upondiscovery,thedoorwasimmediatelyclosedandverifiedlocked.TheincidentandlockingrequirementswerereviewedwiththeinvolvedHPtechnicianusingHumanPerformanceCausalFactorstechniques.Sincethetechnicianinvolvedwasacontractorwhowason-siteinsupportoftheUnitPloutage,amemorandumwasissuedtoallHealthPhysicspersonnelandcontractorsdescribingthiseventandreviewingtheHighRadiationPostingandBarricadingrequirements.ThedoorclosingmechanismonbothUnitPlandUnit02MoistureSeparatorroomsweremodifiedsothatthedoorcannotinadvertentlybeproppedope ATI'ACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page7of8The1996CycleP3HPTechniciantrainingprogramwhichcontainstrainingconcerningthiseventwillbecompletedbytheendofthefirstquarterof1997.Noadditionalactionsarerequiredtoprecluderecurrenceofthisevent.ThesystemdesignandoperatingprocedureswillbereviewedtodetermineiftheprobabilityofresinbackingupintotheprecoatlinetoinletvalvesHV-24511A(B)canbereducedbyoperationalchanges.Thisactionisscheduledtobecompletedbytheendofthefirstquarterof1997.2.Operatingprocedureswillbereviewedto:(1)determineifguidanceonevolutionsthathavethepotentialtoresultinHighRadiationlevelsatthislocationarerequired,and(2)instructthatOperationspersonnelalertHPtomonitortheareaforchangesinradiationlevelswhenperformingevolutionsthatmayincreasetheradiationlevelsinthearea.Thisactionisscheduledtobecompletedbytheendofthefirstquarterof1997.Noadditionalactionsarerequiredtoprecluderecurrenceofthisevent.Basedontheactiontakenin2.a.labove,PPEcLisinfullcomplianc ATTACHMENTTOPLA-4538Page8of8Basedontheactiontakenin2.b.labove,PP&Lisinfullcompliance.Basedontheactiontakenin2.c.1above,PP&Lisinfullcompliance.Basedontheactiontakenin2.d.labove,PP&Lisinfullcompliance.