IR 05000322/1986005
| ML20202F596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1986 |
| From: | Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202F592 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-86-05, 50-322-86-5, NUDOCS 8604140184 | |
| Download: ML20202F596 (8) | |
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REPORT NO.
50-322/86-05 DOCKET NO.
50-322 LICENSE NO.
NPF-36 LICENSEE:
Long Island Lighting Company P. O. Box 618 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Wading River, New York 11792 INSPECTION AT: Wading River, New York INSPECTION CONDUCTED: February 1-28, 1986 INSPECTORS:
John A. Berry, Senior Resident Inspector Clay C. Warren, Resident Inspector APPROVED:
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fl. Strosnider, Chief, Reactors Projects Date Signed Section 18, Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY:
Routine, resident monthly inspection.
i This inspection involved 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of inspection by the Senior
. Resident Inspector and Resident Inspector. Additional activities by the inspectors during this period are detailed in
Special Inspection Report No. 50-322/86-03.
No unacceptable conditions were identified during the inspections described in this report.
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i tf604140184 860404 PDR ADOCK 05000322 O
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DETAILS 1.
Review of Facility Operations 1.1 Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper shift manning, use of and adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Control panel instrumentation and recorder traces were observed and the status of annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system status were examined. Radiation monitoring instrumentation, including in plant Area Radiation monitors and effluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and observed for indications of trends.
Electrical distribution panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emergency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specification.
The inspector. reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator logs for adequacy of review by oncming watchstanders, and for. proper entries.
Periodic reviews of Night Orders, Maintenance Work Requests, Technical Specification LCC Log, and other control room logs and records were made. Shift turnovers were observed on a periodic basis.
The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access controls to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted.
The inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, "Shif t Operations" and 21.004.01, " Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel".
1.2 Plant and Site Tours The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of plant and site throughout the inspection period. These included:
the
. Turbine and Reactor Buildings, the Rad Waste Butiding, the Control Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Building.
During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic
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inspection of fire suppression equipment; Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels;
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Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary
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measures for installed equipment, as applicable;
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QA/QC Surveillance - Pertinent activities were being surveilled
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on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel; Component Tagging - Implementation of appropriate equipment
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tagging for safety, equipment protection, and jurisdiction; Personnel adherence to Radiological Controlled Area rules,
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including proper Personnel frisking upon RCA exit; Access control to the Protected Area, including search
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activities, escorting and badging, and vehicle access control; Integrity of the Protected Area boundary.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.
License Reports 2.1 In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC to verify that details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up. The following LERs were reviewed.
LER NUMBER TITLE 86-001 Procedural Error in Primary Containment Air Sampling
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86-002-Late Firewatch Patrol in the LPCI MG Set Room III 86-003 Bomb Threats j
86-004 Security Guard Failure to Log Personnel in Vital Area LER 86-003 discussed two separate events which precipitated activitation of the licensee's emergency plan with the declaration of an unusual event. At 0040 and 0903 on February II, 1986, bomb threats were made against the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
In both cases the licensee entered the plant emergency plan and conducted investigations to determine the validity of the threats.
In both cases the threats were determined to be without substance and the unusual events were terminated.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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3.
Monthly Surveillance and Maintenance Observation 3.1 Maintenance Activities The inspector observed the performance of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection period. During this observation, the inspector verified that; maintenance activities were conducted within the requirements of the plant administrative procedures and technical specifications, proper radiological controls were implemented and observed, proper safety precautions were observed, and that activities which have the potential to impact plant operations are properly coordinated with the control
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l room.
Activities related to the reference leg replacement outage maintenance and modification work were observed by the inspector.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.
Review and Followup of I&E Notices, Bulletins and Generic Letters
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4.1 I&E Notices The inspector reviewed notices issued by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement during the inspection periodi Review was to determine; if the subject of the notice was applicable to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, and if followup of the licensee's action was required by the inspector.
The following I&E Notices were received and reviewed during the inspection period:
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86-06 Failure,of Lifting' Rig Attachment While Lifting the Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie, Unit 1.
86-07 Lack of Dr, tailed Instruction and Inadequate l
Observance of Precautions During Maintenance and l
Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors.
l 86-08 Licensee Event Report (LER) Format Modification.
86-09-
. Failure of Check and Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions.
86-10 Safety Parameter Display System Malfunctions.
86-13 Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valves Failure to Fire.
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84-69 Supplement 1 Operation of Emergency Diesel Generators.
I&E Notice 86-06 relates'to an event at a Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactor and does not apply to Shoreham. The licensee's resolution of the problems addressed by I&E Notice 86-09 are detailed in Inspection No. 50-322/86-01. The licensee is not required to have the Safety Parameter Display System operational until the first fuel cycle is complete, therefore I&E Notice 86-10 is not applicable.
IE Notice 86-08 is administrative in nature.
The licensees actions on the information in Notices 86-07 and 84-69 Supplement I will be reviewed as part of future inspection activities.
In response to I&E Information Notice 86-13, the inspector conducted a review of the licensee's Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valve wiring configuration including the valves supplied by the Conax Corporation.
The seven valves referenced in the I&E Notice have all been accounted for by the licensee. Serial Numbers 635 and 636 are currently installed in the Standby Liquid Control System, Serial Numbers 639 and 668 are in storage and Serial Numbers 638, 640 and 637 have been fired.
Investigations conducted by the licensee reveal that the pin assignment of the valves on site is the same as those that failed to fire at Vermont Yankee during the performance of their 18 month SLC system suveillance. (See I&E Information Notice 86-13 for further details.) The pin to bridgewire grouping for all Shoreham valves is pins 1 and 2 for one resistance wire and pins 3 and 4 for the other i
bridgewire. Unitke Vermont Yankee, Shoreham's plant wiring configuration is compatible with either of the two available pin to bridgewire configurations, I and 4 and 2 and 3 or 1 and 2 and 3 and 4, and the valves will fire in either pin grouping.
In addition to confirming that the plant installed wiring configuration was compatible with the primers in question, the licensee also verified primer pin to bridgewire configuration through the use of Station Procedure SP 35.123.02. Shoreham Station Procedure SP 35.123.02 also verifies bridgewire continuity after primer installation.
The inspector had no further questions. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Failure of a Residual Heat Removal System Test Connection On Feburary 24, 1986 the licensee discovered a leak on a 3/4 inch test line sockolet weld located on the Residual Heat Removal System Shutdown Cooling Suction Line.
The test connection is located in the reactor building downstream of the outboard containment isolation valve.
On April 26, 1982 a similar failure occurred on the same sockolet fitting. After the first failure, the component was removed from the system and sent to an independent metallurgical laboratory for determination of failure mode. Analysis of the failed component showed the failure to be fatigue induced.
The original installation drawings showed no pipe support on the failed line and this lack of support allowed relative motion to exist between the small bore and large bore pipe during system operation. This relative motion caused the stress which led to the fatigue failure. A support was added to the system to suppress the relative motion between the small and large bore pipes and minimize the chance of further fatigue induced failure.
The inspector reviewed all available documentation in an effort to ascertain if there are any trends linking the present failure with the April 1982 failure.
Review of the available documentation revealed the following:
The 3/4 inch pipe used to repair the April 1982 failure and the
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3/4 inch pipe used in the origin 11 installation were drawn from different heats.
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The welding wire used in the original installation was from a different lot than the wire used to make the repair.
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Fabrication of the original assembly and the repair made in April 1982 were completed by different welders and final QC inspections were performed by different inspectors.
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All QC documentation was in order and visual inspection and liquid l
penetrant tests were performed satisfactorily on both the original i
installation and the April 1982 repair.
While the April 1982 failure occurred at the pipe / weld interface and was fatigue induced, this most recent failure occurred at the socket / weld
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The failure mechanism has been determined not to be fatigue l
or stress related but instead related to lack of sufficient weld penetra-l tion.
Investigation of the doc.umentation available indicates no connec-l tion between the two failures. A third failure of the sockolet occurred i
on March 15, 1986. Because all the facts in the third failure are not yet
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available, this will be designated Inspector Followup Item 86-05-02.
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6.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Reference Leg Replacement Outage During the period covered by this inspection report, the licensee reached several milestones and all major modifications planned during this outage have been completed.
The completion of work on the reference leg modification was followed by a lowering of vessel level to verify proper operation of the level instrumentation at atmospheric pressure. All level instrumentation is currently reading within the required tolerances and testing will continue during the next reactor heatup and pressurization.
All work has been completed in the Corium Ring modification and the installation now satisfies the design requirements that were used in calculating the source term for the specific probabilistic risk assessment used by Shoreham.
All 18 month surveillance items have been satisfactorily completed by the licensee and are now current through June 1,1986.
In preparation for the upcoming startup, the licensee has installed the vessel internals and reactor vessel head and is currently making preparations for vessel hydro and drywell head assembly.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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7.
Increase in Eddy Current Readings on EDG-102 The NRC Resident Inspector was contacted by the licensee on February 24, 1986 concerning the results of eddy current testing on EDG-102.
(See t
facility operating license NPF-36 Attachment 3 for clarification).
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During the performance of eddy current testing between the number 5 and
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number 6 cylinders, a significant increase in readings above the baseline was obtained.
Instrument calibration was confirmed and backup readings taken which also showed an increase in the eddy current reading.
It must
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be noted that the readings remain within specification at this time.
Visual and Fiberoptic inspection of the area in question show some casting porosity and a minor surface scratch. The surface scratch is believed to be the tource of the increased reading and the scratch has been postulated to have been formed while preparing the area for testing.
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path.
The inspector went to the field and observed the area in question,
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i interviewed the inspector who performed the test and is satisfied with the licensees evaluation of the condition.
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EDG-102 was run and eddy current testing performed again on March 4, 1986. Results of this test, using the same equipment, shows a slight decrease in the eddy current readings. The inspector had no further questions.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
FEMA Full Scale Exercise l
On February 13, 1986 the licensee conducted a FEMA graded full scale exercise. The inspectors and NRC Region I personnel observed the conduct of the delli from the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and Emergency News Center. Details of this exercise will be the subject of future reports issued by NRC Region I and FEMA.
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Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are discussed in Sections 4.0 and 5.0.
10. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report, and discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does l
not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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The inspectors also attended entrance and exit interviews for inspections conducted by region-based inspectors during the period.
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