IR 05000315/1985031
| ML17321A970 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1985 |
| From: | Hehl C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17321A969 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-85-31, 50-316-85-31, NUDOCS 8511250376 | |
| Download: ML17321A970 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/85031(DRP);
50-316/85031(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licenses No.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
October 1,
1985 through October 28, 1985 Inspectors:
B. L. Jorgensen J.
K. Heller C.
L. Wolfsen Approved By:.. Hehl, hief Projects Section 2A Ins ection Summar 9'PS Dat Ins ection on October
1985 throu h October
1985 Re ort No. 50-315/85031 DRP '0-316/85031 DRP Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of operational safety verification; surveillance; maintenance; independent inspection activities; and licensee event reports.
The inspection involved a
total of 139 inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors including 36 inspector-hours off-shift.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
"M. G. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
- B. Svensson, Assistant Plant Manager
'T. Kriesel, Technical Superintendent
- Physical Science
- A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager
- K. Baker, Operation's Superintendent
- J. Stietzel, Quality Control Superintendent T. Bei lman, Planning Supervisor
- J. Allard, Maintenance Superintendent
- L. Gibson, Technical Superintendent
- Performance E. Murphy, Production Supervisor G. Caple, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - Quality Control Department.
- P. Leonard, Administrative Compliance Coordinator - Quality Control Department.
N. Baker, Quality Control Department The inspector also contacted a number of licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operation, technical and maintenance personnel during this period.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interview on October 31, 1985.
2.
0 erational Safet Verification Both Units completed seismic reparation of steam generator and pressurizer enclosure form plates during this inspection period.
Unit 1 is in the late stages of a ten year ISI outage, having entered Mode 3 on October 25, 1985.
Criticality has been estimated for early November, following completion of startup testing.
Unit 2 entered Mode 1 on October 23, 1985 and was maintaining approximately 30% power for secondary side chemistry at the end of this inspection.
The discrepancy involving the enclosure form plates is discussed in IE Inspection Report Nos.
315/85029(DRP);
316/85029(DRP)
and is the subject of a Licensee Event Report (LER 315/85045)
and remains
"Open" pending review by appropriate NRC specialists.
b.
The ihspector observed control room operation including manning, shift turnover, approved procedures and LCO adherence; and reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear and reactor protection systems, as applicable.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
Tours of the auxiliary building, Unit 1 containment, and screenhouse were made to observe accessible equipment conditions, including fluid
leaks, potential fire hazards, and control of activities in progress.
C.
A cleanliness tour of the Unit 1 lower containment was conducted on October 10, 1985.
The inspector observed progress in the removal of loose objects such as plastic sheeting, paper, metal, and plastic tubing, and various tools, and the securing of those items to remain in containment.
The licensee had not yet performed his own final inspection.
d.
The inspector met with the Operations Superintendent and a Shift Supervisor at their request, concerning the meaning of Technical Specification 4.5.3. 1 as to demonstration of residual heat removal (RHR)
pump operability in Mode 4 via the "applicable" surveillance of Technical Specification 4.5.2. Specifically, 4.5.2 (for Modes 1,
2, and 3) requires a
pump discharge pressure greater than or equal to 195 psi be demonstrated monthly "on recirculation flow".
The licensee's question concerned how to achieve Mode 4 with a fully tested RHR pump since it is not possible to operate either of the two RHR pumps
"on recirculation flow" while the plant is in Mode 5.
Such operation would require isolation of the RHR suction valves from the primary coolant system, contrary to Technical Specification 3.4. 1.3.
The inspector concluded that the portion of Specification 4.5.2 involving discharge pressure
"on recirculation flow" is not
"applicable" in the meaning of Specification 4.5.3. 1 and the licensee need not engage in violating one Specification (3.4.2.3)
to satisfy the testing "requirements" of another (4.5.3. 1).
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
a.
- 2 THP 6030 IMP.261 Saturation Meter Calibration b.
"~l THP 6030 IMP.076 Incore Thermocouple and Reactor Coolant System RTD Cross Calibration Test Procedure (Unit 1).
"~2 THP 6030 IMP.275 Incore Thermocouple and Reactor Coolant System RTD Cross Calibration Test Procedure (Unit 2).
The surveillance procedures of Item b.
above address and correct deficiencies in the licensee's calibration and time response testing
activities for the reactor-coolant system resistance temperature detectors (RTD).
The licensee had not previously been testing the RTD devices as part of these tests.
This deficiency in the licensee's testing program was identified during a special inspection (IE Inspection Report Nos. 315/85028; 316/85028)
conducted by an IE Headquarters Team on August 19 through 28, 1985.
A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL 315/85022-05; 316/85022-05)
dated August 30, 1985 confirmed the licensee's commitments regarding corrective action for these deficient tests.
Testing of the RTD devices were the subject of further discussion between the licensee and Region III on September 17 and 24, 1985 and a licensee response letter AEP:NRC:0947A was generated October 4, 1985 which contained preliminary analysis on means for performing this testing.
In a related matter, a letter dated May 6, 1985 (NS-NRC-85-3034)
from Westinghouse Electric Corporation had formally notified several licenses, including Donald C. Cook, of potential calibration anomalies in Westinghouse supplied RTD's manufactured by the RdF company.
A Westinghouse safety evaluation concluded that the errors would not represent a significant adverse plant safety condition; however, in response to findings of the IE Headquarters Team inspection, the licensee was requested to test these RTD sensors as well, even though a "current" calibration (factory) was on file-the "new" RdF detectors having been installed in Unit 1 during the current ten year outage.
Installation of "new" RdF's in Unit 2 is scheduled for that Unit's next outage in early 1986.
Surveillance testing/calibration has been completed on both the new RdF's in Unit 1 and the old RTD's (Rosemount)
in Unit 2 and all core exit thermocouples.
No problems were observed, and the licensee's actions in performing these surveillances were considered satisfactory.
Additional data evaluation and verification are still required, however, so the CAL item remains
"open".
A previous inspection report (50-315/85029(DRP);
50-316/85029(DRP))
discussed interaction among Target Rock pressurizer and reactor head vent valves when one valve is opened with a pressure differential across the seat.
The licensee issued an Operations Memo describing the phenomenon to plant operators.
The condition recurred during testing conducted in this inspection period and resulted in one case in dislodging a downstream tygon tube and spraying an operator with contaminated water.
This was discussed at the Management Interview.
The previous report (50-315/85029(DRP);
50-316/85029(DRP))
also discussed a violation involving the finding of the Unit 2 control room emergency ventilation system having a mispositioned damper.
The problem was identified during testing of the Unit 1 system, and shows the existence of certain dependencies between the two systems.
The dependency was discussed with licensee management to assure appropriate reviews of the matter are performed and factored into applicable procedures and operational controls.
The licensee
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exhibited a sensitivity and awareness of the implications of this problem, and stated appropriate procedural references and controls were already being developed.
No violations and no deviations were identified.
4.
Haintenance Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; and activities were accomplished using approved procedures.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Guide tube cutting and shipment, spent fuel pool building, Elevation 650 ft.
New fuel unloading, handling, inspection, and storage.
No violations and no deviations were identified.
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5.
Inde endent Ins ection Activities a.
The inspectors followed up through Region III and the licensee concerning a request from a union steward for information on requirements relating to licensee actions regarding whole body counting on completion of a Donald C.
Cook site assignment.
The licensee was in compliance with requirements.
b.
There have been numerous occurrences involving "ESF actuations" in the form of containment radiation monitor "alarms" (which actuate a
purge-isolation bistable).
The licensee appeared to be making too little effort to avoid these actuations.
This was discussed at the Management Interview.
The licensee indicated a specific study was underway to establish the validity of the actuations, document equipment reliability and human factors problems, and potentially support a request for Technical Specification relief in this area.
c ~
The inspector reviewed licensee actions concerning Westinghouse Technical Bulletin No. NSID-TB-85-13, which addressed potential misinterpretation of values listed in plant technical documents, such that some plants had erroneous (doubled) negative flux rate trip setpoints.
Though design margins were considered likely to be adequate even with the potential error, a plant-specific analysis had been done for only one plant.
Since the error involved doubling, the licensee halved the existing trip setpoints for both Units to assure -the potential error could not place the plant in a
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questionably analyzed category.
This matter is the subject of a Licensee Event Report (LER 315/85050)
which will be reviewed further.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Re ortable Events Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports were reviewed to determine that reportabi lity requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The following LERs are considered closed:
Unit
315/83131"00 315/83131-01 Fire hose Technical Specification surveillance period exceeded.
A review of Technical Specification surveillance requirements relative to fire protection was performed, and on August 22, 1985 the surveillance procedure (12 gHP 2270 FIRE.002) revision to reflect a three year test frequency for all plant fire hoses was completed.
Missed surveillance of Technical Specification fire hoses.(updated LER 315/83131-00).
Another review of Technical Specification requirements was performed to ensure that all data was entered correctly in the Nuclear Test Schedule (NTS) program.
Unit 2 316/83126-00 Fire hose Technical Specification surveillance period exceeded.
Corrective actions are described above for LER 315/83131-00.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Mana ement Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
above) following completion of the inspection on October 31, 1985.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described above.
The following were specifically addressed:
Concern over the dependency between Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room emergency ventilation systems was discussed with licensee management who exhibited sensitivity and awareness of the implications of the problem, and stated appropriate procedural controls were being developed (Paragraph 3.e).
b.
Recurrence of the interaction among pressurizer and reactor head vent valves during testing was discussed (Paragraph 3.d).
c.
The inspector indicated the licensee may need to demonstrate some concern over the number of ESF actuations received (Paragraph 5.b).
The inspector also di scussed the likely informational content of the report with respect to documents or processes reviewed.
The licensee was afforded the opportunity to identify any such documents/processes which might be proprietary, and none were so designated.