IR 05000305/1980002
| ML19323A971 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1980 |
| From: | Heishman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Mathews E WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005090044 | |
| Download: ML19323A971 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES c[' , i' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005090 k[ '- '- r REGION 111 g [[ 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
0, GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 be ..... April 17, 1980 . Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. E. R. Mathews Vice President Power Supply and Engineering P. O. Box 1200 Green Bay, WI 54305 Gentlemen: Thank you for your letter dated April 7,1980, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the noncompliance identified in our letter dated March 13, 1980. We will examine your corrective action during a future inspection.
In regard to your request in attachment B of your April 17, 1980, letter to withhold certain information in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790, we are in agreement this should be withheld from public dis-closure. We have revised the subject pae,e accordingly as shown on the enclosure.
Your ooperation with us is appreciated.
Sincerely, ' r- . F. Heishman, Chief Reacter Operations aul Nuclear Support Branch Enclosure: Pg 8 of IE Inspection Report 50-305/ 80-2 cc w/ enc 1: . D. C. Hintz, Plant Manager Mr. John J. Duf fy, Chief Central Files Boiler Inspector Department Reproduction Unit NRC 20b of Industry, Labor and PDR Human Relations Local PDR NSIC TIC -- - ... ... ~. - - -. -......, ~... -. . ,
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ENCLOS,URE - n a.
It is highly probable the IB emergency diesel generator was . ~~ inoperable without anyone knowing it from about 10:00 p.m.
on d g/ Janua ry 17, 1980 until sometime in the afternoon of January 18, a 1980.
This apparently does not violate the letter of the Technical Specification, but is serious considering that only One of the two sources of offsite power was available during " " ' this time period.
b.
No procedure or instructions existed specifying where to add oil to the IB diesel during operation or with the diesel shut-down. This resulted in addition of five barrels of oil to the air box of the diesel, apparently rendering it inoperable and subject to damage if started.
Failing to add oil without following a procedure or instruction is contrary to Technical Specification 6.8.1 and Section 5.1.6.1 of ANSI 18.7, 1972.
Normally adding oil would be within the skills of mainten-ance personnel without a procedure; however, for adding oil to the diesel it is evident that a procedure or instruction was needed.
c.
There was an apparent breakdown in communication between plant personnel who were aware of the amount of oil added and manage-ment personnel who were aware of an oil consumption problem.
' d.
NRC personnel who responded to the event were not informed by the licensee of any diesel generator problem.
ll 4.
Lessons Learned . From this event several important lessons were learned as described below.
The licensee's internal communication system was not powered by a.
the safeguards power supply and was lost for approximately four
hours until power was restored to the non-safeguards bus. The licensee intends.to connect the internal communications systems to safeguards power supplies.
b.
The plant should have a weeks supply cf lubricating oil on site ' as well as diesel fuel for the emergency diesel generators to provide for long term operation.' The licensee intends to have this much oil onsite as a minimum.
- c.
d.
The air motor starting' system for the diesel generators should
have a speed interlock which shifts the starting air to the
- Preprietary information deleted.
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