IR 05000280/1998002
| ML18153A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153A379 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-98-02, 50-280-98-2, 50-281-98-02, 50-281-98-2, NUDOCS 9803120421 | |
| Download: ML18153A380 (15) | |
Text
Docket Nos:
License Nos:*
Report Nos. :
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I 50-280. 50-281 DPR-32. DPR-37
- 50-280/98-02 and 50-281/98-02 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station. Units 1 and 2 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 January 26-30. 1998 W. Stansberry, Safeguards Specialist Accompanying Personnel:
R. Albert. Safeguards Branch. NRR B. Cox. Contractor. NRR D. Orrik. Safeguards Branch. NRR A. Qualantone. Contractor. NRR F. Vangel. Contractor. NRR Approved by:
G. Belisle. Chief. Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9803120421 igg55~90
~DR ADOCK PDR EN"O.DSURE
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Surry Power Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos: 50-280/98-02 and 50-281/98-02 This inspection included aspects of licensee plant suppor The report covers a one week period of an announced routine inspection by a regional safeguards inspector and selected personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio The specific areas evaluated were the Physical Security Program for Power Reactor Plant Support
Through performance testing and observation of activities in progres the inspectors determined that the licensee's access control equipment and personnel. intrusion detection equipment. assessment abilities. and alarm station operations met the requirements of the licensee's Physical Security Pla One vulnerability in the protected area access control area and two vulnerabilities in the protected intrusion detection system were found The licensee's response strategy was good and weapons employment was adequate to meet the NRC design basis threa *
The inspectors concluded through observation and interviews of security force personnel. and reviews of procedures that the security force had the requisite knowledge to cope with the design-basis threat described in 10 CFR 73.l(a).
(Section S4.l)
The inspectors verified that responses by the security organization to security threats. contingencies. and routine response situation including drills. were consistent with the security procedures and the approved Physical Security Plan and Security Contingency Pla (Section S4.2)
The inspectors concluded through observation and interviews of securit force personnel. and document reviews that the security force was being trained in a superior manner and according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirement This area of the security program was considered a strength by the inspector (Section S5.l)
The inspectors determined that the level of management support of the licensee's security program was good. (Section S6.l)
- The inspector's evaluation of the effectiveness of licensee management related to the administration of the~security program was found to be superior and considered a strength to the security progra (Section S6.2)
The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the Physical Security Pla One full-time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an inciden (Section S6.3)
The licensee's overall effectiveness of controls for identifying, analyzing. and resolving problems was found superior. The.licensee's adequacy of corrective actions to prevent recurring problems was found superior als The inspectors determined that there were strengths in the controls for issues that could enhance plant operations or safet No weaknesses were found that could degrade plant operations or safet (Section S7.4).
- Report Deta i. ls i
I Pl ant Support Areas:
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.7 Performance Assessment of Security Inspection Scope (81700) Performance testing was conducted to determine the capability of the licensee's access control equipment and personnel to detect unauthorized items. using the X-ray and metal detection equipmen Additionally, the licensee's perimeter intrusion detection system. assessment and response capabilities. and Central and Secondary Alarms Station operations were
- reviewe Observations and Findings Cl)
Access Control - Personnel and Packages The inspectors observed the access control officers and equipment to determine if the officers and equipment were performing according to the Physical Security Plan (PSP) and implementing procedures. Tests of the protected area access control equipment were conducted using the licensee's test equipmen The inspectors observed tests in which a weapon was attempted to be introduced into the protected are The X-ray operators detected the weapon during each test and took the prop~r actions to control the individual and the weapo The same testing was accomplished with metal detectors. All tests of the metal detectors using the licensee's testing procedures resulted in the weapon being detecte However. a vulnerability was found using a technique that was not within the scope of the licensee's testing procedure The licensee immediately established compensatory measures and created a work order to correct the identified vulnerabilit The licensee indicated that their testing procedures would be reviewe (2)
Perimeter Intrusion Detection (PIO)
While reviewing the currently installed protected area detection aid the inspectors conducted 26 performance tests. The inspectors conducted crawling. walking, shuffling. laddering. wheelbarreling. rolling and leaping tests to attempt to penetrate undetected the protected area
- barrier and isolation zon The intrusion detection system consisted of several different detection aids. some in tande Detection equipment employed were microwaves. in varying configurations using QOth mono-static and bi-static microwaves. and E-Field The PIO detected an individual moving through. over. or under the system in a 11 zones except tw The first vulnerable zone had been identified by the licensee during a previous test and a compensatory measure was in effect for that zone at the time of the test. The second vulnerable zone was found during a crawl test. This zone had been previously tested by the licensee and no deficiencies were identified at that tim This zone was retested by the licensee and failed to detect a crawling office An immediate compensatory measure was instituted. and a work order to repair the detection device was initiated. However. in all the tests. the personnel testing the sensors were clearly visible to a security officer in one of the four defensive positions. The licensee informed the regional inspector the following week of February 3. 1998 that the vulnerabilities had been correcte The inspectors considered the installation and operation of the perimeter intrusion detection system to be superior except for the two vulnerabilities foun (3) Assessment Aids The licensee currently has four defensive positions (DP) in place to provide alarm assessment for the exterior and interior areas of the protected area barriers. Closed circuit television was used to monitor and assess.interior protected area barri.er The DPs were visited to evaluate the abilities of the security officers to asse.ss PIO al arms inside and outside the isolations zone The inspectors reviewed the assessment capabilities of the closed circuit television asse~sment systems in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations. This evaluation determined that positive assessment could be made throughout the protected area isolation zones and barriers using closed circuit television and DP (4) Alarm Stations Discussions with security management and observation of alarm station activities confirmed that the alarm stations were operating as required by the PS Both alarm stations were equipped with alarm. surveillanc and communication equipmen The inspectors verified that the alarm stations were independent and provided redundancy and diversity so that both alarm stations were independen * (5) Response Capabilities Several tabletop time-line drills were conducted using previously identified safety related target sets as defined by the licensee and the NR Shift supervisors and response team leaders participated in the*
tabletop drills. They were responsible for directing the security force to counter the adversaries whose tactics and movements were controlled by the inspector The benchmark for these drills was the NRC design basis threat. Time-line drills showed a consistency in the site protective strategies. The tabletop drills validated that the licensee could interdict the adversaries with a sufficient number of armed personne The defense in depth and weapons employment was considered adequate to prevent the adversaries from attaining their targets. The inspectors discussed with the licensee several items of enhancement for the licensee to consider to improve their response capabilities. The licensee said that they would review the enhancements for integration into their strategie Conclusions Through performance testing and observation of activities in progres the inspectors determined that the licensee's access control equipment and personnel. intrusion detection equipment. assessment abilities. and alarm station operations met the requirements of the licensee's PS One vulnerability in the protected area access control area and two vulnerabilities in the protected intrusion detection system were foun The licensee's response strategy was good and weapons employment was adequate to meet the NRC design basis threa S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4.1 Security Force Requisite Knowledge Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they possessed adequate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. which included response procedures. use of deadly force. and. armed response tactics.
4 Observations and Findings The inspectors interviewed approximately 20 security personne including supervtsors. and witnessed approximately 34 others in the performance of their dutie Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities. response commitments and procedures. and armed response tactics. The inspectors determined that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR Part 7 Conclusion The inspectors concluded through observation and interviews of security force personnel. and reviews of procedures that the security force had the requisite knowledge to cope with the design-basis threat described in 10 CFR 73.l(a).
S4.2 Response Capabilities a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors verified that responses by the security organization to security threats. contingencies. and routine response situation including drills. were consistent with the security procedures and the approved PSP and Safeguards Contingenty Plan (SCP). Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the following critical tasks of the SCP:
No. 11. Deadly Force No. 12. Clean-up Operation Search No. 15. Response Officers No. 18. Central and Secondary Alarm Station Operators Response personnel were required to complete these critical tasks before performing response dutie As stated in Section 2.7 and 4.1 of this report. response personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and duties indicated in these critical task The licensee had conducted at least 72 response drills/exercises since the beginning of 199 The inspectors reviewed 16 drill critiques. The critiques stated the number of adversaries and their objectives in each drill. The performance of each response member was indicated and any
- strengths or weakness were indicated, The Classroom Training Evaluation Summary Report. that covered response triining conducted from June 23-July 22. 1997 was reviewe The report indicated that 30 security officers strongly agreed and 41 agreed that training was worthwhile and would enhance their job performanc No one disagreed or strongly disagree c. *
Conclusions The inspectors verified that responses by the security organization to security threats. contingencies. and routine response situation including drills. were consistent with the security procedures and the approved PSP and SC S5 SECURITY SAFEGUARDS STAFF TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION S5.l Security Training and Qualification Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors reviewed the security training and qualification program to ensure that the licensee was complying with the criteria in the Security Personnel Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP). Observation and Findings The inspectors interviewed security non-supervisory perso~ne supervisors. and witnessed other security personnel during the performance of their dutie Members of the security force were knowledgeable of their responsibilities. plan commitments and procedure Documentation and equipment inspected was found as committed to in the approved T&Q The inspectors verified that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR Part 7 The inspectors reviewed training focused toward the response capabilities and performance of the security personnel. and found the following training classes had been conducted:
Security Field Team Leader (SFTL) Program This program was developed in response to reorganization of the Security Departmen Each shift has a SFTL to provide training to the shift member With a SFTL on each shift. the training needs were readily addressed as the needs were identified. The SFTL also provides an oversight function for the shift as well as "on the spot" coaching of personnel concerning day to day operations and practice Smith & Wesson Firearms Instructor Academy Each SFTL and at least two officers from each shift attended this training. This training was geared at providing instructional techniques and shooter problem recognitio Each graduate had to pass a written examination and a pistol and shotgun marksmanship proficiency test before becoming a certified firearms instructo Pressure Point Contact Tactics CPPCT)
This was a defensive tactics instructor course conducted at North Anna Power Statio Each SFTL attended this trainin Each participant was required to complete a written exam and a proficiency test involving 21 different physical techniques before becoming a certified PPCT defensive tactics instructo Joint Operations Security - Local Law Enforcement Agencies Exercise A joint exercise was conducted with site security force personne appropriate Federal and county enforcement agencies. and the State police bomb technician On and offsite emergency personnel were involved in the communications and coordination portion of the exercis Continual Training Mode A continual training mode was conducted in one day increments with approximately four officers attending each da A total of 73 officers attended the* classes. Topics covered were from the response plan to ethics and sensitivity. The critiques indicated high interest and value in the mode of training and the subject *
- Arson Bomb Unit Training The State police bomb unit provided training at North Anna Power Station on bomb recognitio Each SFTL attende On the Job Training-Task Performance Evaluation Training Each SFTL attended this training at the Surry site. This class was designed to teach the SFTLs how to do job performance measure evaluations effectively. Attendees meeting the course objectives were certified as job performance measures evaluator Computer Based Training Course on Tampering. Vandalism. or Malicious Mischief CTVMM)
In response to the increased TVMM events. the licensee developed and produced a computer training course based on the summaries in Information Notice 96-7 This course also identified active Virginia Power documents that address TVMM situations.
These classes have enhance the individual security officers. their response capability and improved the site security progra Conclusion The inspectors concluded through observation and interviews of security force personnel. and document reviews that the security force was being trained in a superior manner and according to the T&QP and regulatory requirement This area of the security program was considered a strength by the inspector S6 *
Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Management Support Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors determined the level of management support of the licensee's security program. *
Observations and Findings Corporate. site and security management support was thorough in identifying. reviewing. and analyzing the root cause of problem prioritizing for corrective actions and. in most cases. correcting identified problems in a timely manne The upgrading of the security computer system was still not accomplishe The inspectors reviewed the Security Event Logs. Licensee Event Reports. and internal and external audits and Self Assessment Report The results of these reviews were documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-280. 281/97-03 and 97-1 During this evaluation period. the inspector found other examples of superior management support to the security program and security personne Security Plan Consolidation North Anna and Surry Power Station's Physical Security and Safeguards Contingency Plans were merged into one consolidated generic documen In addition. the Training and Qualification Plans for both stations were consolidated. This reduced the NRC commitment documents from six to two commitment document Security Program Improvements Organizational improvements included the creation of SFTL positions on each shift: security officer and security control systems operator positions were combined to make all security officers qualified to do all shift duties: and established Designated Shift Leader positio Long term strategies in the Nuclear Security Transition Plan were implemented to change their culture and enhance job performance. A Commonality Task Team was
- formed to identify the operational differences between the two nuclear sites and make a recommendation to management of the best operating practice Internal and external benchmarking were conducted between the two stations and five other external industrial security organization Station Access Authorization and Badging Station access levels to protected and vital areas had been reduced from more than 15 to The Badge Management/Nuclear
- Human Resource Systems and Clearance System had been integrated to make it easier and quicker to is;ue and reissue one badge to personnel at Surry. North Anna. and Corporat Lock and Key Core Program This program had been converted to a data base that allowed improved tracking and inventory of all key cores and lock Security Events-Incident Reports-Deviation Reports Incident Reports and Deviation Reports submitted by the security department were established in a Network Window's progra Safeguards Event Log (SEL) entries are desensitized and converted to a Deviation Repor These deviating conditions now receive visibility by site management and were tracked and trended for corrective action at a higher management leve Conclusion The inspectors determined that the level of management support of the licensee's security program was goo S6.2 Management Effectivenes Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of licensee management related to the administration of the security progra Observations and Findings Corporate. station. and security management established policy. along with setting organizational goals and objectives ne(essary to determine where the organization should be going and how it will get there. This was found in the Long Term Strategies of the Nuclear Security Transition Plan mentioned in Section S Management had ensured that responsibility for all necessary activities were assigned to qualified subordinates. This was found in the Security Plan Consolidation. the organizational improvements. and SEL-Deviation Report-Incident Report integration mentioned in Section S This effectiveness was also found in the security training improvements described in Section S5.1.
Management's review and follow-up of the performance of delegated
- responsibilities were done by personal observations. formal channel for feedback from subordinates. internal and external audits. management's follow-up system of the tracking and trending of the Deviation Report and the Commonality Task Team recommendations. as mentioned in Sections S5.1 and S6.1 abov The positive effectiveness of management's support and administration of the security program from Corporate. station and security managers was superio * Conclusion The inspector's evaluation of the effectiveness of licensee management related to the administration of the security program was found superior and considered a strength to the security progra S6.3 Staffing Level a. Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the PS The inspectors also verified that one full-time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an inciden Observations and Findings The licensee had an onsite physical protection system and security organization. Their objective was to provide assurance against an unreasonable risk to public health and safet The security organization and physical protection system were designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.l(a). At least one full-time manager of the security organization was always onsite and had no duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This individual had the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the organizatio The four shifts had the number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements and commitments of the PS * Conclusion The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately* available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the PS One full-time member of the security organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an inciden S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.4 Effectiveness of Management Control Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the overall effectiveness of the licensee's controls for identifying. analyzing. and resolving problem The inspectors determined the adequacy of corrective actions to prevent recurring problem The inspectors also determined whether thefe were strengths or weaknesses in the controls for issues that could enhance or degrade plant operations or safet Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed documented security* issues. events. and problems to ascertain the adequacy of the licensee's controls and effectiveness in performing the following: initial identification of the problem:
elevation of the problems to the proper level of management for resolution: root cause analysis: disposition of operability problems:
implementation of corrective actions: and expansion of the scope of corrective actions to include applicable related systems. equipmen procedures. and personnel action The inspectors also reviewed documented security issues. events. and problems to determine the strengths or weaknesses in the licensee's controls. These areas have been addressed in Sections S2.7. S4.l. S5.l. S6.l. S6.2. and S These reviews revealed an exceptional overall effectiveness of controls from all levels of management and support organization Conclusions The licensee's overall effectiveness of controls for identifyin analyzing. and resolving problems was found superio The licensee's
'I
adequacy of corrective actions to prevent recurring problems was found superior als The inspectors determined that there were strengths in the controls for issues that could enhance plant operations or safet No weaknesses were found that could degrade plant operations or safet V. Management Meetings Xl Exit Meeting Summary The regional inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 3.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presente Partial List.of Persons Contacted Licensee R. Blount. Assistant Station Manager. Nuclear Safety & Licensing D. Christian. Station Manager W. Henry. Superintendent. Operations C. Luffman. Security Manager W. Runner. Manager. Nuclear Security and Administrative Services R. Savedge. Security Supervisor B. Stanley. Supervisor. Licensing R. Musser. Senior Resident Inspector Inspection Procedures Used IP81700:
- Physical Security Program for Power Reactors Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed None