IR 05000280/1995018
| ML18153A543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1995 |
| From: | Payne D, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153A542 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-95-18, 50-281-95-18, NUDOCS 9512110066 | |
| Download: ML18153A543 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos. : 50-280/95-18 and 50-281/95-18 Licensee:
Vi rgi ni a Electric and Power co*mpany Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Accompanying Personnel:
Baldwin Approved.by:
~
Thomas Al Peebles, Chief
Operator Licensing & Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor S~fety SUMMARY ScopE;:!: *
This routine, announced inspection.was conducted in the area of the license operator requalification program during the period October 30 - November 3, 199 The purpose of the inspection was to verify that the licensee's requalification program ror reactor operators (ROs) and* senior reactor operators (SROs) ensures safe power plant operation by evaluating how well the individual operators and crews had mastered training objectives. Activities observed included licensee conduct of the dynamic simulator and walk:-through portions of the operating test, as well as licensee implementatiori 6f security measures to prevent exam compromis Results:
Good Practices The inspectors identified two examination development aspects of the licensee's requalification program which were considered to be good practice In the first case the inspectors found that, during dynamic simulator examination development, the training staff modified the scenarios used in a particular simulator set to establish similar initial conditions and to eliminate testing of similar malfunction In the second case, the inspectors 9S12110066 9S1130 SDR ADOCK OS000280 PDR
found that the training staff incorporated the results from the facility's Individual Plant Evaluation into the dynamic simulator examination (paragraph 2.b(2)).
Areas Needing Improvement The inspectors identified that some tasks in the Job Performance Measures (JPMs) bank were too simplistic, too narro~ in scope, or lacked sufficient depth to be meaningful evaluation tools for licensed operator requali.ficatiqn examinations (paragraph 2.b(I)).
The inspectors found that the criteria used to judge*satjsfactory operator performan<::e. in several crit i ca 1 tasks were not adequately defined to identify the action(s) necessary to prevent direct adverse consequences or significant degradation of the mitigative capability of the plant (paragraph 2.b(3))..
During simulator JPMs, the inspectors observed inappropriate cueing of the operators when the simulator booth operator automatically acknowledged annunciators which did not pertain to the JPM (paragraph 2.c(l)).
The inspectors noted several instances during the walkthrough and simulator tests where followup questioning of an operator regarding conduct of a task would have been appropriate but was not done (paragraph 2.c(2)).
The inspectors observed during the dynamic simulator tests that the operators'
comm~nications often were not in accordance with VPAP-14b7, "Verbal*
Communications" (paragraph 2.c(3)).
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Overal 1 The inspectors concluded that the licensee's requalification program for ROs and SROs complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 50-54(i-l) and was adequate to ensure safe power plant operations.
ENCLOSURE I
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- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- M. Biron, Specialist Nuclear Oversight
- R. Blount, Superintendent Maintenance
- A. Brown, Supervisor Nuclear Training (Operations)
- B. DeLamorton, Supervisor Nuclear Training (Simulator)
B. Garbe, License Specialist
- D. Llewellyn, Superintendent Nuclear Training
- C. Lovett, Supervisor Licensing
- J. McCarthy, Assistant Manager Operations
- H. McCallum, Supervisor Operations Training
- S. Sarver, Superintendent Operations
- R. Simmons, Instructor Licensed Operator Requalification Program
- J. Spence, Lead Instructor Licensed Operator Requalification Program
- B. Stanley, Director Nuclear Oversight
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor Station Nuclear Safety dther licensee employees contacted included training department instructors, licensed operators, and office personne NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector D. Kern, Resident Inspector K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation (71001) Summary The NRC conducted a routine, announced inspection of the Surry licensed operator requalification program in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71001 during the period October 30 -
November 3, 199 The licensee administers their requalification program for licensed operators in accordance with corporate and sfte specific procedure Furictional Implementation Guideline (FIG) 01, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program" defines the process at Surr The purpose of the inspection was to verify that the licensee's requalification program for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators {SROs) ensures safe powe~ plant operation by evaluating how well the individual operators and crews had mastered training objective Due to the licensee's requalification schedule, the inspector observed only the dynamic simulator and walk-through portions of the operating test. The written test, required by 10 CFR 55.59(a) to be administered every two years~ was administered and evaluated during the week of October 3, 1994 (see IR 50-280,281/94-20).
During the conduct of
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Report Details
these tests, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the.
licensee's examination security process and the fidelity of the simulator facilit Based on a review of records, interviews of selected plant personnel, and observation of examinations, those activities appeared to be satisfactorily conducte Examination Development (I)
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
The inspectors identified several areas where licensee performance could be improve The inspectors identified that inplant JPMs tested only Unit 2 equipm~nt during the week of inspectio The inspectors noted that.JPMs were in the bank for both units and interviews with training supervision determined that Unit I JPMs have been utilized in the pa~ The inspectors concluded that the consistent performance of JPMs on both units would be appropriat This action would help assure operator familiarity with equipment locations and changing plant condition The inspectors noted that some JPM steps did not parallel the requirements of the procedur For example, one JPM was noted *as requiring actions by the operator beyond the intent of the procedur Also, cues to the operator, in response to actions taken, were not comprehensive nor listed in the manner in which they were intended to be give Inappropriate cueing by the evaluator could resul The inspectors evaluated the appropriateness of the tasks included in the licensee's JPM ban While some latitude is necessary in defining the scope of a given operator task, discretion is also necessary to define meaningful performance measurement tools. The*
inspectors concluded that several JPMs used during the inspection week were small parts (in one JPM simply one step) of a larger procedure or tas As such, these JPMs were too simplistic, too narrow in scope, or lacked sufficient depth to be meaningfu evaluation tools for licensed operator requalification examination The inspectors concluded that little evaluative benefit was obtained in administering these JPM (2)
Dynamic Simulator Exam The simulator scenario bank consisted of 39 validated scenario Nine additional, invalidated scenarios were under developmen The scenarios.in the bank generally followed the format of an instrument/component failure, an AOP entry requirement and a major transient. This predictable event sequencing format could allow the operators/crew opportunity to anticipate the type and timing of each simulator malfunction and thus reduce the validity of the examinatio *
Report Details
The inspectors found that the licensee modified the scenarios used in a particular simulator set to establish similar initial conditions and to eliminate testing of similar malfunctions. This technique also allowed the licensee to test the operators in more areas thus ensuring a diverse examinatio The inspectors considered this a good practice. Also, the inspectors determined that exam development security was adequate as evidenced by an unpublished dynamic scenario examination bank that was maintain~d secure using password protectio *
The inspectors determined the licensee incorpoiated the facility's individual* plant evaluation (IPE) results into the development of one simulator scenario used during the inspection wee The event involved flooding in the turbine buildin The inspectors considered this a good practice. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's critical task (CT) associated with this even They found it was well defined, of appropriate importance, and met the facility's requirements for a CT~
The inspectors noted that this CT did not possess the weaknesses discussed in the paragraph belo (3)
CTs In general, CTs were identified for important tasks the crew had to perform to prevent or mitigate the degradation of the plant during transients. However, the inspectors found that the criteria used to judge satisfactory operator performance in several CTs was too vague, too broad, or not appropriat For example, during one scenario a stuck.open PORV occurred at 100%
powe The CT was "Shut PORV block valve before the next step in EOP requires it to be shut".
The first step in the EOP to direct the operators to shut the block valve was step 23 of E~o, "Rea.ctor Trip or Safety Injection". Of two crews observed, between 12 and 15 minutes were required to reach this step. Thus, the way the CT was defined, operation for up to 15 minutes with an unisolated, stuck open PORV was considered acceptable by the training staff from a CT perspectiv The intent of CTs was not met due to the inadequately defined performance criteria. Acceptable evaluation criteria establishes the specific operator or crew performanc necessary to prevent or mitigate degradation of plant safety given the circumstances of the even The inspectors identified the CT performance criteria as an area in need of improvemen No violations or deviations were identifie Examination Administration (1)
JPMs In general, the evaluators administered the JPMs well and consistently provided appropriate cues to the operators despite some misleading information in the JPM (see paragraph 2.b(l)
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Report Details
above).
No incorrect operator evaluations were made by the licensee evaluator The inipectors concluded that strong evaluator training in *examination administration techniques and evaluator preparation co~pensated for the minor weaknesses identified in the JPM During simulator JPMs, the inspectors observed that the booth instructor automatically acknowledged annunciators which did not pertain* to the JP Inappropriate cueing of the operator resulted when annunciators continued sounding until the operator recognized that the alarm must somehow pertain to his tas The inspectors noted one instance where followup questioning of an operator regarding conduct of the task would have been appropriate but was not don Also, the inspectors identified that two of the five JPMs administered during the inspection specified equipment nomenclature that was inconsistent with the procedure and the label on the equipmen No plant label/procedure discrepancies were note (2)
Dynamic Simulator Exams The inspectors observed the training department evaluators and licensed operators during dynamic simulator scenarios to determine if the scenarios were administered in accordance with procedural guidelines. Simulator crews consisted of five operators; two ROs, two SROs and a Shift Technical Advisor (STA).
Each of the ROs was the reactor operator or the balance of plant operator;.the two SROs were either the Shift Supervisor or the Control Room SR The STA position was manned by an actual STA or a stand-in training instructor. The inspectors observed three crews perform two scenarios eac *
The inspectors noted that the facility evaluators carefully observed and recorded crew performance and individual discrepancie Facility post-exercise debriefs were performed in accordance with FIG 0 During the debriefs the evaluators identified crew and operator weaknesse However, they did not conduct any follow-up questioning of the operators immediately following the debriefs to resolve concern On two occasions, the inspectors observed the evaluators make conclusions about why an operator took a particular action without obtaining or understanding all the facts of the circumstance. This practice of not asking follow~up questions did not allow a complete evaluation of the individual. * The areas where operator actions were not understood were instances that did not impact a pass/fail decisio The inspectors identified the evaluators' lack of follow-up questions during the dynamic simulator scenarios and the JPMs as an area in need of improvement.
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Report Details 5 (3)
Communications The inspectors noted during the performance of dynamic simulator scenarios that the operators' communications were not in accordance with VPAP-1407, "Verbal Communications."
The inspectors observed that the ROs, when directed by the SRO t perform or verify plant parameters/systems, would answer the SRO with simple responses of "YES" or "NO."
The SROs did not enforce the use of paraphrased*repeat backs as required by VPAP-140 The inspectors queried the evaluators concerning the apparent communications deficiencies exhibited by the crew The facility evaluators stated that the communications standards were attained and met all expectations of the training departmen The inspectors questioned the operations representative observing the scenarios about the adequacy of crew communication The representative stated the communications standard was not achieved and crew communications did not meet operations management expectation The inspectors noted that all three crews exhibited deficiencies in communications, though at times, the one crew with staff SROs adhered to the standard better than the other two shift crew The inspectors identified this as an area in need of continued emphasis and improvement.
No violations or deviations were identifie Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site visit, the inspectors.met with representatives of the plant staff listed in paragraph one to discuss the results of the inspectio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material provided to,.or reviewed by the inspector The licensee did not express any dissenting comments.
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