IR 05000275/1983019
| ML20024C328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1983 |
| From: | Carlson J, Kirsch D, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024C316 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0675, RTR-NUREG-675, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-TM 50-275-83-19, 50-323-83-15, NUDOCS 8307120522 | |
| Download: ML20024C328 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-275/83-19 and 50-323/83-15 License No. DPR-76 and CPPR-69 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection conducted: May 1 - 28, 1983
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gr 8/fg//87 Inspectors:
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J D. Carlson Sr. Resident Inspector Da(e Signed
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Approved by:
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F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects Section Dat'e Signed l
No. 3 Summary:
Inspection during May 1 through May 28, 1983 (Report Nos. 50-275/83-19 and 50-323/83-15)
Areas Inspected: Unit No. 1: Routine, resident inspection of plant operations, surveillance testing, maintenance, a TMI item, emergency preparedness, followup items. Additionally, the inspectors followed up on several Regional Office requests and independent inspection items. The inspection involved 80 inspector-hours by two inspectors. Unit No. 2:
Routine, resident inspection of preoperational testing and results and plant tours. This inspection involved 23 inspector-hours.
General: The inspection included a management meeting to discuss reportability and licensee interface with NRC. The total inspection time involved 131 inspector-hours.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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PDR ADDCK 05000275 C
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted l
- R. C. Thornberry,_ Plant Manage'r~
- R. Patter' son,' Plant Superintendent
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- J. M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer.
- D.'B. Miklush, Supervisor of Maintenance.
- J. A. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations
- J. V. Boots, Supervisor of Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- W. B. Kaefer, Technical' Ass'istant to the Plant Manager
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- R. G. Todaro, Security Supervisor'
R. T. Twiddy, Supervisor ef; Quality Assurance
- *R. M. Luckett,. Regulatory Compliance. Engineer
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- J. W. Shryock,_ Assistant Project Completion Manager M. N. Norem, Lead Startup Engineer i
'The inspectors also interviewed:several'other licensee employees including shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, quality
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assurance personnel and members of-General Construction.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview of May 27, 1983.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
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During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify'the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis,~the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications. Logs, instrumentation,-
. recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. Shift turnovers were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information on plant status was relayed.
During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the
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facility to observe the following:
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General Plant and equipment conditions
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Maintenance activities and repairs. (See Paragraph 3)
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Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment-d.
Ignition sources and: flammable material control-e.
. Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the licensee's
- administrative' controls and approved procedures f.
- Interiors of electrical and control panels
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Implementation of selected portions of the licensee's physical security plan-
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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The inspectors talked with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the involved work activities.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
taintenance (Unit 1)
3.
j Corrective maintenance activities on the component cooling water system were observed. A leak was observed during modification and subsequent repair efforts were observed.
Observations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals were obtained, and that system clearance and tests of redundant equipment were performed, as appropriate, prior to conducting maintenance on safety related systems or components. The inspectors verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance and used properly reviewed and approved maintenance procedures. Replacement parts were examined to verify the proper certification of materials, workmanship and tests.
Also, during the actual performance of maintenance activities, the inspectors verified proper fire protection controls and housekeeping.
Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspectors verified the component was tested prior to return-to-service.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance (Unit 1)
Surveillance testing of station battery pilot cell voltage and specific gravity (STP M-11A) was observed and reviewed by the inspectors. During observation of this surveillance the inspector found that the technicians did not have a copy of the procedure with them for specific gravity measurements. The low activity complextty and technician's knowledge of this measurement do not lead to a concern that the surveillance was performed incorrectly on this non-required component.
However, this potential does exist for more complex procedures.
Similar incidents have been observed on 480 Volt breaker preventive maintenance and on a SI recovery. These incidents were discussed with involved personnel (technicians, or operatora and their foreman) by department management. The repetitive nature of the previously mentioned incidents has been discussed with plant management.
Corrective actions have included written directions to QC personnel to include verification of the presence of appropriate procedure (s) in their inspection plans and verbal directions to all department heads to infore their personnel of the need to have and use procedures in the accr,mplishment of task performance.
Interviews of QC personnel and the department heads indicates that most have satisfied these directions and that all plan to do so.
This topic is part of normal inspection program and will be followed up in the accomplishment of that program.
Additional observations by the inspectors included verifications that test instrumentation was calibrated and that the tested system or component was properly removed from service, as required, by the test
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procedure. Upon completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met specified acceptance criteria and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel. Also, the inspcetors verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status, consistent with the technical specifications and/or plant procedure requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Management Meeting - General a
A meeting to discuss the licensee's organization and interfaces, both internal and with the NRC, was held on May 25, 1983. The licensee discussed revisions to administrative controls for followup of potentially reportable items that improve communications within and between the licensee's organizations. Regional management indicated that flow of information on potentially reportable items should be directed to the cognizant inspector.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Fuel Storage (Unit 2)
The inspectors reviewed the Special Nuclear Material license requirements (SNM-1667) for fuel storage considerations and found that licensee procedures and implementation were consistent with these requirements, including security, cleanliness and damage control measures. Finally, the licensee's provisions for reporting under 10 CFR 70.52 were discussed to assure acceptable understanding.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Clearance Training Program Two incidents, one on AC instrumentation and another on a CCW heat exchanger, resulted from or were contributed to a failure to provide or obtain appropriate clearances by General Construction (GC) and contractor personnel. The licensee has initiated a program to provide additional information and training on clearance procedures to all GC and contractor personnel on site.
In addition, specific training in this area has been conducted and documented for the General Construction Startup Department, which was involved in the CCW heat exchanger problem. Also, disciplinary action was ef fected for one involved individual. Finally, clearances and procedares will be a topic of a contractors tailboard session and at contractor's meetings. This area will be examined during a future inspe~ction.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Electrical Termination Errors - General On two separate occasions, electrical instrumentation mistakes resulted in a loss of annunciation and instrumentation on Unit 1.
The licensee
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has established a group of experienced personnel who are specifically trained to do terminations to avoid these types of problems in an operating environment. A list of qualified electricians for work on
vital equipment will be maintained. This will be followed in the normal inspection program.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Non-Licensed Operator Training The inspectors reviewed the development and implementation of the non-licensed operator training program. The licensee has established this program, along the lines of INP0's assistance recommendations and training program, and has detailed two parts in their program. The first is a formalized qualifications program where plant system familiarizations and watch station checkouts are performed on-the-job and verified by oral and written examinations. This part has been implemented. The second part consists of classroom sessions on nuclear plant fundamentals and is currently scheduled for completion of the development portion by the end of November 1983.
Implementation will be some time after this date. This will be followed up as an open item (50-275/83-19-01) to verify acceptable development and implementation.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Radioactive Waste Volume Minimization The licensee currently is developing a training program for this topic.
This development will be followed as open item (50-275/83-19-02).
Further, the normal radiation protection inspection program will review the licensee's efforts on this topic.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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11.
Operating Staff Training (Unit 2)
The operating staff for Unit 2 is the same as has been accepted for Unit 1.
The inspectors have and will continue to observe requalification training. For the appropriate personnel (Reactor and Auxiliary Operators) the slight differences between Units 1 and 2 have been part of the requalification program. The inspectors have verified that this training is acceptable for Unit 2, and the licensee's examinations address the differences between the units. Thus, no further inspection, other than the normal operations training inspection program, will be conducted explicitly for Unit 2.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Dresser Safety Valve Problems The inspectors, in the review of the Power Reactor Events report for September-October 1982, found that, for a particular Dresser Safety Valve (31739A), ring settings could result in an increased blowdown (rapid depressurization). Steamline safety valves are supplied by
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Dresser and there may be other safety related valves that are supplied by Dresser. The licensee has been made aware of the problem. This will be examined during a future inspection (50-275/83-19-03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Potential Generic Issue Regarding Spurious Safety Injection (SI) at Low Temperature and Pressure By memorandum of March 25, 1983, the Director, Division of Project and Hesident Programs, RII, forwarded information on a "Potentially Generic Deficiency of Operating Procedures for Westinghouse PWRs".
This information showed that by procedure, RCS pressure is to be raised when SI occurs at low pressure conditions such that (1) pressure differential across the steam generator tubes could be beyond design limits, or (2) a PORV could lift, if the low temperature overpressure protection system was activated. This has been identified to the Supervisor of Operations who plans to annure that appropriate timely generic resolution is achieved through Wectinghouse. This will be carried as an open item (50-275/83-19-04) for verification.
No items of noncompiiance or deviatio.s were identified.
14.
Emergency Preparedness The plant staff and portions of General Construction participated in an emergency drill. Upon hearing the site emergency signal, the persounel assembled at assigned areas and participated in personnel accountability. A drill critique was held. An inspector observed portions of this drill.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
15.
Undervoltage Device DS-416 Problems The subject problems were discussed in a notification from Westinghouse of a potential unreviewed safety question (letter from Rahe to DeYoung, dated March 31, 1983). Discussions with the vendor established that the problems are basically due to manufacturing tolerances that cause breaker non-operability. The licensee has been informed and determined that no DS-416 UV device is in use at Diablo Canyon.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
16.
Preoperational Test Program (Unit 2)
The inspectors interviewed the licensee's Lead Startup Eagineer and verified his detailed understandings of the preoperational test program,
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program implementation, and his responsibilities.
The inspectors have, in the observation of preoperational tests, verified test personnel qualifications and their understanding of the test program and procedures. Additionally, the inspectors verified that specified controls for test documentation, design changes, maintenance, and equipment were followed and implemented.
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o No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
17. THI Task Action Plant Item II.B.2 Plant Shielding (Unit I and 2)
Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0675 Supplement No. 14, concluded that
"No shielding construction or modifications, except those committed for
January 1,1982 under item II.B.2 of this supplement for postaccident sampling are needed at Diab 1v Canyon. -Onsite inspection of the Diablo Canyon shielding and access provisions will be conducted during routine inspections." Item II.B.3"will be followed by a Reactor Radiation Protection Inspector. Therefore, this item will be closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
18.
Operating Procedure Reviews As a followup of a regional request, the inspectors reviewed two operating procedures (B-1A:I, Chemical and Volume Control' System:
Prepare for Service, and B-2:1, Residual Heat Removal System: Make
Available) giving particular attention to valve identification and positioning. The results of this review indicate that there were several l
errors in valve identification on each procedure that could have resulted in a problem (delays or incorrect valve manipulation). Additionally, an error in a controlled copy of the P& ids was noted.
Some of the errors are typographical, and some are due te poor drawing quality for valve number designation.
These problems were identified to the Supervisor of Operations. The procedures that were reviewed, although they were the current, controlled copies, were from the 1977 to 1979 time frame. The Supervisor of Operations' pointed out that there is a program underway to update all operating procedures. The procedures that were being updated were provided to the inspectors for comparison to the current procedure. This review showed that the revised procedures were accurate. On this basis the inspectors, the Plant Superintendent and the Supervisor of Operations agreed that all operating procedures would be appropriately reviewed or changed before they are to be used for operation or prior to January 1,1984, which ever occurs first.
Additionally, the inspectors were provided a status of procedures required for refueling and cold shutdown modes.
This will be examined during a future inspection (50-275/83-19-05).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
19.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on May 27, 1983, and discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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