IR 05000269/1975007
| ML19308A633 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1975 |
| From: | Epps T, Long F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308A601 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-75-07, 50-269-75-7, 50-270-75-08, 50-270-75-8, 50-287-75-08, NUDOCS 7911270796 | |
| Download: ML19308A633 (19) | |
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UNITED STATES
a fJUCLE AR flECULATORY COMMISSION H E GIO'4 11 3 30 PE A C HT R E E ST R E ET, N. "1.
SUITE tit ATLAf47 A GEORCIA 30303 IE Inspection Report :os. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8 Licensee:
Duke Pcwcr Company Power Lullding 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 23201 Facility :ane : Oconee Units '., 2 and 3 Docket ::es. :
50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Ncs.:
DPR-33, 47 and 55 Category:
C, C and S2 Location:
Seneca, South Carolina Type of License:
36;1, PiR, 256S, Mw(t)
Type of Inspection : Routine, L'nannounced Dates of Inspection: :Sy 27-20 and June 3-6, 1975 Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 30 - Ma-f 2, 1975 d V, '/ - o f "
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[6 Principal Inspector :
T. N. Epps. Redep r Inspector Date Facilities Operations Branch Accompanying Inspectors:
H. L. '.ihitener, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch R. H. tiessnan, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Engineering Sectica Facilities Test and Startup Branch G. R. Jenkins, Radiation Specialist Reactor Facilities Radiological and Environnental Protection Branch m ---: % Q j
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Reviewed by:
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F. J. Long, Chief
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Facilities Operations 3 ranch oturic4 O
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n IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7,
-2-50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-3 SU'O!ARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Itens A.
Infractions 1.
Contrary to Technical Specifications 2.3, Tables 2.3-1A, 2.3-13, 2.3-lC; 5 of the 12 Reactor Protection System channels for Reactor Building High Pressure Trip for the three units were calibrated and left set in excess of the Limiting Safety System Setting of 4 psig.
The units were operating at essentially 100" of rated power under these conditions.
(Details II, paragraph 3)
This infraction had the potential for causing or
. contributing to an occurrence related to safety.
(Units 1,2 and 3)
2.
Contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.1, the licensee was not operating and maintaining the station in full accordance with the DPC System Health Physics l' nual.
(Details IV, paragraph 2)
a This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence related to health and safety.
(Units 1, 2 and 3)
3.
Contrary to 10 CFR 20.203, a radiation area was not conspicuously posted per 20.703(b), two high radiation areas were not posted per 20.203(c)(1), a high radiation area was not fully centrolled per 20.203(c)(2), and two high radiation areas were secured with padlock and chain such that an individual could be prevented frca leaving the area, contrary to 20.203(c)(3).
(Details IV, paragraph 3)
This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence related to health and safety.
(Units 1, 2 and 3)
II.
Licensee Action en Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
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A.
Infractions 1.
Licuid Effluent "onitor Setpoint (IE Inspection Report Nos.
50-269, 50-270, and 50-237/75-3, Iten I.A.1)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action as reported in DPC's letter dated April 11, 1975, and had no further questions.
This item is closed.
(Details IV, paragraph 4)
2.
Radiological Training (IE Insp<etion Report Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287/75-4, Iten I.A.1.)
Not inspected.
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IC 3pt. :os. 50-269/75-7,
-3-50-270/75-3 and 50-287/75-8 i
B.
Deficiencies 1.
Personnel Exrosure Records (IE Insoection Report Mos. 50-269,3 50-270, and 50-267/75-1, Item I.B.3)
The inspector discussed the licensee's corrective action in progress as reported in DPC's supplemental response dated iby 6, 1975. This item remains open.
(Details IV, paragraph 5)
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III.
New Unresolved Items 75-07, 08, 03/1 High pressure injection pump recirculation flow ori-fice and letdown block orifice erosion problem.
(Details III, paragraph 3)
75-07, 03, OS/2 Retention of operating procedures.
(Details II, paragraph 4)
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Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items Oconee-1 (50-269)
73-12/1 Calibration of Effluent Monitors DPC has provided status reports dated September 9,1974, February 14, 1975, March 26, 1975, April 30, 1975, and Iby 30, 1975.
This item remains open.
73-13/1 IJastewater Collection Ensin Modification Not inspected.
74-3/3 Training of Unlicensed Utility operators This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 2)
74-5/1 Incomplete Power Escalation Testing The controlling procedure has been completed.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
74-12/1 Incomplete Inservice Inspection Plan Not inspected.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7,
-4-50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8
Oconee-2 (50-270)
74-7/2 Activity in the Ccaponent Cooline System Not inspected.
74-7/4 LPI Valve Failure This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
Oconee-3 (50-287)
74-13/1 Preventive Maintenance Program for ES Systems This program has been established. The item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
74-13/2 Reactor Coolant Flow Anomaly This problem has been referred to the Office of Raactor Regulation (Licensing).
It remains open.
74-13/3 RFS Pressure Transmitter Check The licensee is checking calibration of these transmitters acnthly in the hot condition.
The item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
74-14/1 Deferral of Loss of Control Room Test Not inspected.
74-14/2 Ventilation Control Between Auniliary and Turbine Buildings This item remains open.
74-5/16 Ouality Assurance Records This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
75-2/4 Completien of Power Ascensica Testing For Ouonee 3 Not inspecte.
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IE ltpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7,
-5-50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-3 Oconee 1. 2 and 3 (50-269, 50-270 and 50-287)
74-10, 08, 11/2 Training Program for Mechanics and I&C Personnel This iten is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 8)
74-10, 08, 11/3 operator Reclacement Training This presran has not received final approval.
The iten remains open.
74-10, 08, 11/4 SRC Ouorun Not inspected.
74-10, 03, 11/5 Procedure Chances Not insp'ceted.
74-10, 08, 11/7 NSRC Review Capability Not inspected.
74-10, 08, 11/11 Non-Technical Specification Violations Not inspected.
75-2/2 Sensitivity of Reactor Coolcnt Pressure Soundary Leaka2e Detection Systens Not inspected.
75-3/1 Analysis of Liquid Waste Samoles This item remains cpen, pending evaluation of additional comparison measurenents.
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75-4/1 Procedure For Internal Body Eurden Analysis A procedure has been issued. This iten is closed.
(Details IV, paragraph 6)
V.
Other Sienificant Findings A.
The Oconee 1 core protection safety limit (Technical Specification figure 2.1-1A) for reactor outlet temperature versus core cutlet pressure is essentially the same as the protective systes maximum allowable set points defined in Technical Specification Figure 2.3-1A.
The licensee's procedure for setting the pressure
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-3 1-1
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DETAILS I Prepared by:.
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T. N. Epps, Reac,t'or inspector Date Facilities 0;/cratiens Branch Dates of Inspection: May 27-30 and June 3-6, 1975 r
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Reviewed by :
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F. J. Long, Chief
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Individuals Contacted Duke Power Cen,any (DPC)
J. E. Smith
"anc.ger, Ocenee Nuclear Station J. W. Hampton - Director, Adminis trative Services L. E. Schmid - Operating Superintendent O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent R. M. Koehler - Technical Services Superintendent T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer R. P. Bugert - Training Supervisor R. D. Nichols - Training Services R. N. Johnser - Preventive Maintenance Engineer R. Adams - I&C, Maintenance Operations Personnel 2.
Trainine of Unlicensed Utility Operators A licensee representative stated that utility operators would be included in the operator licensing progran at Oconee.
The progran has not been fully i=plemented for utility operators at this time.
This item retains open.
3.
Incomplete ?cuer Escalatien Testing l
The controlling procedure for Unit-1 power escalation testing received final review by the licensec's Quality Assurance department and was approved en May 23, 1975.
This item is closed.
LPI Val m Failures The guide pins in Valves 1 LP-12,1 LP-14, and 2 LP-14 have been recoved. On April 1, 1975, a starion modification for removing guide pins she*:ad that the pin was again missing f--a 2 LP-12.
The licensee has established a monitoring surveillance program to try and locate the nissing pin.
This is similar to a previous occurrence.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8 I-2 Removal of the pins is an interic measure until new valves can be installed.
This item remains open.
5.
Preventive Maintenance Program for Engineered Safeguards Systems The licensee has established a progran on the above subject.
A licensee representative stated that the subj ect maintencnce progran would be implemented during each refueling shutdown on all 3 Oconee units.
This item is clcsed.
6.
RPS Pressure Transmitter Check The inspector ravieved records confirming that the RPS pressure transmitters c.re being calib~ rated conthly in the hot condition according to a previous licensee co =itment.
Calibration records for the conths of.\\pril and :!ay,1975, were reviewed.
This item re=ains open pending final resolution of the problem.
7.
QA Records A fire protection system has been installed in the records storage area and a surveillance program has been established and implemented on that system.
This itec la closed.
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Training Progran for Mechanics and I&C Personnel The inspector verified that a training program for mechanics and ISC personnel has been implemented.
This item is closed.
9.
NSRC Meeting Frecuency The licensee's NSRC charter new reflects appropriate requirements on this s ubj e c t.
This item is closed.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8 I-3 10. Unusual occurrences a.
Infrsetiens Identified by Licensee (Unit-2)
(1) Oconee Technical Specification 3.3.l(a) requires that one reactor building spray pur.p be operable when reactor coolant pressure is 350 psig or greater or reactor coolant temperature
is 250 F or greater.
Contrary to the above on January 31, 1975, the Unit 2 reactor coolane system was elevated above 250 r and 350 psig without a reactor building spray train being operable.
Corrective action described in the licensee's abnormal occurrence report A0-270/75-4A were verified and there were no further questions.
(2) Ocence Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.b. requires operating rod group overlap to be 25% 1 5% between two sequential groups.
Contrary to the above on January 15, 1975, over.1.p between groups 6 and 7 was found to be 16%.
Corrective action dascribed in the licensee's abnormal occurrence report A0-270/75-2 was verified and the
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inspector had no further questions.
(3) Oconec Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.d. requires that power not be increased above the power level cutoff unless xenon reactivity is within 10 percent of the value for 100 percent of rated power.
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Contrary to the above on March 22, 1975, the power level cutof f was exceeded before the above condition was =et.
This was due to operations perscnnel error.
Corrective actions described in the licensee's abnormal occurrence report A0-270/75-8 were reviewed and there were no further questions.
(Unit-3)
(4) Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.b. requires operating rod group overlap to be 25% 1 5 between two sequential groups.
Contrary to the above on February 9,1975, control rod groups 6 and 7 were found to have an overlap of only 16%.
This was due to the operator f ailing to moniter the individual rod positions during recovery fro a runback.
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IC Rpt. "os. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8 I-4 Corrective actions described in abnormal occurrence report A0-270/75-3 were reviewed and there were no further questions.
(5) Oconee Technical Specification 3.7.2.b. requires that when one Kccuee unit is out of service the operable Keovee unit shall be connected to the underground feeder.
Contrary to the above on March 27, 1975, both Keowee units were isolated from the underground feeder and overhead transtissicn lines for five ninutes during a test.
Corrective actions, described in the licensee's abnormal occurrence report, A0-287/75-6, were verified and there were no further ques tions.
b.
Other Licensee Reported Occurrences Reviewed The inspector also revieked the following occurrences during this inspection.
1.
A0-269/75-1 RCS pressure buffer c plifier not responding 2.
UE-269/75-2 hot zero power ejected rod worth 3.
A0-269/75-3 fuel pin defect 4.
UE-269/75-4 inoperable personnel hatch interlocks 5.
A0-270/75-7 RCS pressure transmitter drift 6.
A0-270/75-6 R3 spray discharge valve failure 7.
A0-270/75-10 valve 2 LP-12 pin missing 8.
A0-287/75-4 LPI-ES logic buffer failure 11. Reactor Operations (Units 1, 2 and 3)
The inspector raviewed plant operations en all 3 Oconee units during this inspection. All 3 units were at or near 100% of rated pcwer. The inspector reviewed sanples of shif t supervisor's and control roca log bocks, log sheets, standing orders, out of normal log and incident reports.
Also included was a tour of the facility.
Questions raised by the inspector were satisf actorily answered by licensee personnel.
No noncompliance items were identified.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-8 1-5 s,
12. Reactor Buildinz Pressure Trio Setpoint The inspector verified that recalibratien of the high reactor building ES trip setpoints was carried out in a timely manner af ter being identified as viclating the maximum technical specification limit.
The inspector also verified that proper calibration procedure changes were made and that this item was reported as an abnormal occurrence.
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IE Report Scs. 50-269/75-07, 50-270/75-03, 50-287/75-08 DETAILS II Prepared by:
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Whitener, React $r I:.- pector Date Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup 3 ranch Dates of Inspection: May 27-30, 1975 and June 3-6, 1975
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Reviewed by:
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H. C. Dance, Senior Reactor Inspector
/Date Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Individuals Contacted J. E. Smith - Manager, Cconee Nuclear Station L. E. Schmid - Operating Superintendant O. S. Bradham - Maintc ance Superintendent T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer R. C. Adams - IEC Engineer J. Shaw - I&C Supervisor W. M. McClain - Assittant Operations Engineer R. J. Brackett - Assistant QA Engineer W. Broun - Technical Services, Staff Chemist H. Lcuery - Shif t Supervisor D. Patterson - Assistant Shift Superviser D. Phillips - Assistant Shift Supervisor 2.
Safety Limits, Limiting Safety Systen Settings and Limiting Conditions of Operation Facets of safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions of operation delineated in the Technical Specifications were reviewed for nine safety related reactor systems for each Oconee Unit.
Plant startup frca cold shutdewn and observation of system parameters, status, and aligntent for the three cperating units were selected for review to determine the licensee's ccepliance with Technical Specification requirenents.
The selected Technical Specification requirements were verified by review of facility operating records and by direct observation of systen status in the control roca and plant.
Records reviewed included preoperational tests, instrutent calibrations, periodic surveillance Tests, surveillance requirenent perfornance records, and cperation procedures and checklists. At least one Technical Specification requirement was rev1ewed for the following systens :
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-07,
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Reactor Building Spray b.
High Pressure Injection.
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Low Pressure Service Water d.
Reactor Coolant System (Safety Limits)
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ES Valve Operability f.
Pressuricer Safety Relief Valves
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ECCS Redundant Flow Paths h.
Secondary System Relief Valves 1.
Condensate Systen
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Reactor Protection System Limiting Safety System Settings i
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Keowee Hydro Units RPS Sypass control
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Shutdoun Bypass Control
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j Cne iten of nonco:pliance with, a limiting safety systen setting was
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identified and is-discussed in paragraph 4 of this Detail.
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Reactor Building '.lich Pressure Trip SetPoint l
Paragraph 2.3 and Table 2.3-1 A, B and C of the Technical Specifications state
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shall be 4 psig naxitun for units 1, 2 and 3.
During a calibration of this channel for un3t 2 on February 20, 1975, the trip setpoint was found to be 4.1 psig and was lef t at 4.1 psig which is in excess of the Technical Specifica-tion limit.
Review of the calibration procedure, IP/0/A/305/5C, showed that the error in setpoint and subsequent review and approval of the setpoint had occurred because of a poorly defined acceptance criteria. The pro-cedure specified a " Desired" setpoint of 4 psig with a tolerance of +0.1 psig.
Of the twelve Reactor Protective System reactor building high pressure trip channels (four channels for each of the three reactors) five channels were lef t with a trip setting of 4.02 to 4.1 psig as follous:
(1) two channels in unit 1 calibrated on November 11, 1974, (2) twc channels on unit 2 calibrated on February 20,1975, and (3) one channel in unit ' 3 calibrated on February 25, 1974. The licensee took prompt corrective action to place the effected. channels within the Technical Specification
limit and. to clarify the setpoint acceptance criteria in procedures-IP/0/A/305/5 A, B, C and D.
The revised procedures require a trip setpoint of 3.8 +0.1 psig.
Instructions added to the procedures also require the technician to report to supervision immediately if the setpoint is'found in excess of 4 psig.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection the inspector verfified. corrective action and had no -further question on this matter.
The incident was identified as-an item of nonconpliance at the
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management interview. The licensee concurred and stated an Abnormal.
Occurrence Report.was being subnitted.
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IE Ept. Mos. 50-269/75-07, 50-270/75-03, 50-237/75-OS II-3 4.
Retention of Operating Records Review of startup records in the reactor file revealed that records were on file as follows:
Unit 1 - File contained the last startup procedure frem cold shutdown, the last startup procedure fron hot conditions and a trip recovery procedure.
Unit 2 - File contained the last startup procedure frem hot (just critical)
conditions and a recent trip recovery procedure.
Unit 3 - File contained a back log of startup procedures.
By instructions from the operating Superintendent dated April 10, 1975, operations perscnnel are to retain on file only the last complete precedure for startup from cold and hot conditions.
In discussions of retention of operating records with the licensee, canage-cent confirmed that it was their position that only the last controlling startup procedura and associated preheatup and precritical check lists would be retained. The inspector stated that he considered records of normal startup and shutdown of a facility as a normal operating record.
Retention of only the last completed procedure did not appear to neet the standards specified in ANSI 45.2.9 Appendix A.6.
At the management interview the inspector stated that the natter of retention of cperating startup precedures was considered unresolved pending further IE review.
5.
Safety Linit and Limiting Safety Systen Setting in review of Technical Specification requiretents for Pressure vs. Ten-perature it was noted that unit 1 curves defining the variable pressure /
terperature relationship were essentially the sace ~or the safety linit
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(SL) and liciting safety system settings (LSSS).
In discussions, licensee management ccafirmed this condition.
The licensee representatives stated
that they recognized the potential problem of operating near a LSSS shich also represents a SL, and further, fully appreciated the significant i
action necessary if the SL is inadvertantly exceeded.
Management stated I
that this problem was under review. No cornittents were cade by the licensee at this time.
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g IE Rpt. No. 50-269/75-7 III-1 50-270/75-6 ani 50-237/75-3 l
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DETAILS III Prepared by: e' #
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'O dd>[M R. H. Wessman,VReactor Inspbetor Date Nuclear Engineering Section'
Facilities Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection:
May 28-30, 1975
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W. C. Seidle,(Acting Senior Inspector Date Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
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T. Barr - Technical Services Engineer J. Jackson - Assistant Plant Engineer W. Brown - Staff Chemist R. Adans - Instrunant and Control Engineer 0. Bradham - Superintendent of Maintenance J. Brackett-Assistant Quality Assurance Engineer L. Wilkie - Junior Engineer M. Susinno - Junior Engineer 2.
Station Design Changes and Modifications The inspector examined the licensee's program for making station design changes and =cdifications.
The program was reviewed for compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, Technical Specifications, and the FSAR.
The corporate Administrative Policy Manual and Station Administrative Procedures implement the station design changes and modifications program.
The following modifications were reviewed:
05-0375 - Anti-Reverse Rotation Pawls on Unit I, II RCP Motors 0N-0376 - Strengthen Tiedown on CRD AC Breaker Cabinet 0N-0388 - Move Particulate Filter Away " rom Iodine Filter on Reactor Building and Unit Vent ON-0395 - Replace HPI Punp Recirc Orifice 05-410 - Revise Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors05-417 - Modify Energency Hatches ON-418 - Modify Personnel Hatches 0-343-S - Modify Control Rod Grapple - Main Fuel Handling Bridge No deficiencies were identified in the above modification pacakages.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-209/75-7 III-2 N
50-270/75-5 and 50-287/75-3 3.
Ilich Pressure Injection Pumo Recirculation Flow Orifice and Letdewn Block Grifice Erosica The licensee has determined that the high pressure injection (HPI) pump recirculation flow orifice and the letdown block orifice may be st ject to erosien and degradation of wall thickness.
The Unit I letdoun bicch orifice has bcen replaced with cue of an improved design, as described in the Duke Power Ccmpany to Region II letter dated January 16, 1975.
Units II and III letdown block orifices and HPI pump recirculation flew orifices will be repl.ced on all three units when replacements are received onsite.
The licensee committed to provide the NRC a letter describing his progran for surveillance of the letdown and EPI recirculation flow orifices and the schedule for i=plementing replacement of these orifices.
This item is designated as an unresolved item.
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N IE Rpt. :os. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8, 50-287/75-8
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G. R. JenkinpI Radiation Specialist Reactor Fayflity Section Radiolodicaland Environnental Pretection Branch Dates of Inspecticn: May 28-30, 1975
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Reviewed by:A. F. Gibson, Senior Health Physicist Date Reactor Facility Section Radiological and Environnental Protection Branch All information in these details applies equally to Units 1, 2, and 3 except where information is identified with a specific reactor.
1.
Individuals Contacted Duke Pever Company (DPC)
J.E. Smith - Plant Manager C. L. Thates - Health Physics Supervisor C. T. Ycngue - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor M. G. Kriss - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor J. A. Long - Health Physics Labtan 2.
Nonecepliance with Health Physics Manual During a tour of the facility, the inspector noted the following exa ples of nonce pli4nce with the EPC Systen Health Physics Manual:
The Manual (Section J.3 and Section L.1.b) states that respirato ry pre-a.
tective equipment can be obtained in the persennel change roots.
Contrary to this, no respirators were available in either of the two main personnel change reors. Licensee representatives stated that the respirators were stored in the clean area of the decentarination roon, in order for health physics to have full control of the respirators, b.
The Manual (Section L.1.c) states that all tools and equipment being transferred from the reactor building or radiation control nones to the contaninated teol crib must be properly wrapped and tagged.
Cen-trary to this, a licensee representative stated that tools and equip-cent were not routinely wrapped and tagged for transfer to the contaminated tool crib.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8
and 50-287/75-8 IV-2 c.
The Manual (Section G.3) states that the portal nonitor at the entrance to the Restricted Area till serve as the final check of persens leaving the Restricted Area, to ensure that they are free of radioactive contaninatien.
Instructicas posted at the tonitor specify that persons will stop or pass slculy through the renitor.
Contrary to this, the inspector observed appror. irately fif teen persons exit the Restricted Area, and ncne stopped or slowed in passing through the nonitor.
The inspector stated that noncompliance with the Health Physics Manual constituted failure to follow established health physics precedures, which is noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.4.1.
The inspector also noted that the licensee's internal audit prograr had previously identified ncnce pliance with requirenents of the Health Thysics Manual, including improper use of the portal nonitor. Management repte-sentatives stated that corrective action and/or nanual changes would be rade by June 15, 1973, in order to correct the discrepancies.
3.
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g and Control of Radiation and High Radiatien Areas During a tour of the facility, the inspector noted the following enanples of noncocpliance with 10 CFR 20.203, " Caution signs, labels, signals, and cont rols":
10 CFR 20.203 (b) requires that each radiation area be conspicucusly a.
posted.
Centrary to this, the south entrance to Roon 329, Hot Chemistry Lab, had a radiation area sign posted en the outside f ace of the open door; therefore, the sign was not visible.
A licensee representative stated that this door will be kept closed in the future.
b.
10 CFR 20.203 (c) (1) requires that each high radiation area be con-spicuevoly posted.
Centrary to this, the "High Radiation Area" sign posted a. the entrance to Rcom 135, access roen to Unit 3 letdown storage tank, had the word "High" totally marked out, even thcush the sign indicated radia:icn levels up to 700 cren/ hour.
A licensee representative corrected the sign during the tour.
Also, a high rc.liati'n area within Roon 306, pipe chase, was fcund to be unmarked, with the rope and high radiatien area sign on the floor.
One end of the rope had apparently cone loose from the wall to which it had been taped.
A licensee representative stated at the canagement interview that this problem had been corrected by posting the sign en the entrance door tc the pipe chase area.
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IE Rpt. Tos. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 and 50-287/75-3 IV-3
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c.
10 CFR 20.203 (c) (2) requires that each entrance or access point to a high radiatf en area be controlled.
Centrary to this, the high radiation area at Rocn 207, drun stcrage area, cr. tended beycad the fence used to control access from the corridor.
During the tour, a licensee representative surveyed up to 120 nren/ hour at the fence at chest level and above.
Lead sheet was mounted on the lower part of the fence for shielding.
A licensee representative stated at the managenent interview that the druns of radioactive material had been rearranged such that the high radiation area was confined to the area uithin the fence, d.
10 CFR 20,203 (c) (3) requires that control of high radiation areas be established in such a way that no individual will be prevented fro:
leaving an area.
Contrary to this, Reca 111, portable demineralicer storage, and Eoca 104, L'ni I bleed holdup rank, were each secured with padloch and chain. The inspector stated that Room 104 would be particularly susceptible to a person becoming locked in the area, because inrediately af te entering the gate one descends a ladder to a lower level that is out of sight cf the entrance.
A licensee repre-sentative stated at the management interview that a priority 1 work request nad been prepared to install proper locks, and that, in the interin, signs would be posted to warn against locking personnel in the areas.
4.
Licuid Effluent 'bnitor Setocints During a prior inspecticn, apparent ner spliance with Technical Specificatier 3.9.7 was cited due to the liquid eff?
nonitor setpoint being based en detector background er tanh activity,.auier tnan 10 CFR 20 concentration values.
The licensee 's response, dated April 11, 1975, stated that a precedura change was uade which provides specific setpoints (numerical values) for each cetbination of discharge conditions. The inspectcr reviewed the change to procedure Op/152/A/1104/07, " Liquid Waste Dispeec1 Systen," and had no further questions.
5.
Fourth Cuarter, 1974, personnel Exposure "secords During a prior inspection, apparent noncenpliance with 10 CFR 20.401 was cited fer inaccurate e>.7osure records due to inconsistent application of a TLD correction factor.
in a supplemental response, dated May 5,1975, the lic ensee stated a review of all fcurth quarter records ras being perforned and, where dosimeters indicate significantly lower exposures than TLD results (at least 15T;), the recorded exposure would be reduced by 15 percent.
Licensee representatives stated that all perscnnel have been
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IE npt. "os. 50-269/75-7, 50-270/75-8 m
and 50-237/75-8 IV-4 identi ficd whose fourth quarter,1974, exposure records require correction.
They stated that reccrds of station persennel had been corrected; this was verified by a spot-check of the records by the inspecter.
They stated th at records of contractors and ether personnel vould scan be corrected, and that the necessary corrected reports to individuals and 2C uculd soon be isnued.
This iten renains cpen pending conpletion of those records and reports.
6.
Precedure for Internal Bcdy Eurden Analyses (75-4/11 During a prior inspection, an inspector noted that tb.-re was no written procedure detailing the requirenents and cethcd of araiyaiag perscnnel for internal radicactivity.
Since that tine, such a procedure has been issued.
The inspector re tiewed precedure IIP /0/E/1000/63, "Bedy-3arden Analysis Including Dadicicdine and Tritiun " and had no further c,uestiers.
7.
Review of !!ealth Physics Recordg The inspector revicued persernel e>gosure reccrds, personnel expocure histories,'ehole body count results, radioactive naterial shipnent records, source inventcry log, and source leak test log. There were no apparent discrepancies.
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