IR 05000254/2010006

Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection 05000254-10-006; 05000265-10-006

ML102590632
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	09/16/2010
From:	Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR-10-006
Download: ML102590632 (20)

Text

ber 16, 2010

SUBJECT:

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION 05000254/2010-006; 05000265/2010-006

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On August 27, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a routine biennial Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 27 with Mr. Gideon and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the corrective action program (CAP). Assessments, the use of operating experience, and monitoring of the safety-conscious work environment were also adequate. There were some minor issues identified with CAP implementation such that continued attention to the program is appropriate.

Therefore, your staff should be attentive to the significance and difficulty certain issues represent so that the corrective actions are more appropriately aggressive. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000254/2010-006; 05000265/2010-006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III==

Docket Nos: 50-254, 50-265 License Nos: DPR-29, DPR-30 Report No: 05000254/2010-006 and 05000265/2010-006 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Cordova, IL Dates: August 9, 2010, through August 27, 2010 Inspectors: C. Moore, Project Engineer, DRP D. Jones, Reactor Inspector, DRS B. Cushman, Quad Cities Resident Inspector, DRP A. Shaikh, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) Inspector Approved by: M. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000254/2010-006; 05000265/2010-006; 08/9/2010 - 08/27/2010; Quad Cities Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1 & 2 routine biennial problem identification and resolution inspection (PI&R).

This inspection was performed by three regional inspectors, the Quad Cities Resident Inspector, and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Problem Identification and Resolution On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally good. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance. The team noted that the licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of licensee self-assessments and interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to raise safety concerns. The team observed that some corrective actions were not fully implemented in a timely manner.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings No violations of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Completion of sections

.1 through .4 constitutes one biennial sample of problem

identification and resolution as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

.1 Assessment of the CAP Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Corrective Action (CA) program implementing procedures and attended CA program meetings to assess the implementation of the CA program by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CA program since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection in July -

August of 2008. The selection of issues ensured an adequate review of issues across NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self-assessments, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed issue reports generated as a result of facility personnels performance in daily plant activities. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Issue Reports (IRs) and a selection of completed investigations from the licensees various investigation methods, which included root cause, apparent cause, equipment apparent cause, and common cause investigations.

During the reviews, the inspectors determined whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys corrective action program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors determined if licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CA program in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also determined whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings, including non-cited violations.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Overall, based on the number of IRs generated by all the plant departments, plant procedures that established a low threshold for reporting, and the types of issues in the program, the team concluded that the licensee was adequately identifying issues in the CAP. However, there was one instance during the course of a root cause investigation the licensee failed to identify an unmonitored release path to the environment. The root cause investigation performed following the explosion of the Floor Drain Surge Tank vestibule is the root cause evaluation in question. The root cause report failed to identify that an uncontrolled and unmonitored release of radioactivity had occurred on multiple occasions prior to the explosion of the Floor Drain Surge Tank vestibule when its ventilation fan and the Max Recycle ventilation fans were out-of-service and the Floor Drain Surge Tank was being filled. Since the licensee was able to show that the radiation released was less than one percent of the total annual gaseous effluent released, this violation of 10 CFR 20.1501, Radiological Surveys and Monitoring, is considered of minor significance. This NRC-identified issue was subsequently entered into the CAP.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that issue resolutions, established and monitored through the Ownership Review Committee and the Management Review Committee, were correctly assigned significance and priority in accordance with station procedures.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Although corrective actions reviewed by the team were effective in most cases, several examples where results were less than desirable were also observed. While corrective actions were generally adequate, the team identified five issues that were not resolved in a timely manner. The team found that a lack of technical rigor resulted in repeat equipment issues with the Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump and Containment Air Monitor operation and parts evaluations did not provide the intended solution. Two consecutive Personnel Contamination Events during Rad Waste Filter work and repeated problems associated with leaking Turbine Building Heating Coils were also noted. A lack of technical rigor also resulted in a problem with the Met tower not transferring information to the Plant Process Data System (PPDS), but this was not a repeat issue. In all of these cases, the licensees response was not aggressive enough to be effective. At the time of the inspection, corrective actions were showing positive results.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing operating experience program procedures, attended CA program meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.

b. Assessment The team observed that the licensee was effectively receiving and processing operating experience reports from all sources. Operating experience was being incorporated into pre-job briefings and the performance of daily activities was generally effective in preventing repeats of previous industry events.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CA program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.

b. Assessment The programs for self-assessments and audits were scheduled and included a broad cross-section of performance areas. Procedures for performing assessments were in place and implemented, providing guidance and consistency. For the audits and assessments reviewed, no deficiencies were identified. Overall, self-assessment was adequately performed.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees safety-conscious work environment through reviews of the facilitys employee concerns program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with coordinators of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports.

b. Assessment The inspection team interviewed 49 plant employees. The interviews were conducted with 19 First Line Supervisors and 30 bargaining unit employees. The individuals interviewed were from the Maintenance, Operations, Stores, Work Control, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Security, and Engineering Departments. Through our interviews with selected staff members, we did not identify any concerns that would indicate an adverse safety-conscious work environment. The team determined that employees are willing and able to raise safety concerns. However, once an issue is raised, its resolution is not always communicated to affected individuals. An example of this was when an individual reported what he thought was mold inside several Bullet Resistant s (BREs). The licensee investigated the issue and determined a course of action but did not adequately inform the entire security force, who had become aware of the issue, and were concerned for their health. This type of miscommunication can lead to safety-conscious work environment challenges. Security is evolving to correct this issue, and two new Action Tracking Items (ACITs) were generated for Issue Report (IR)1099935 as a result of the teams interviews.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On August 27, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Gideon, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report inputs discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

Beck, W. Regulatory Affairs Manager

Neels, V. Chemistry

Summers, P. Maintenance Director

Darin, S. Engineering

OShea, K. Operations

Morris, J. Corrective Action Program Manager

Peterson, T. Regulatory Assurance

Gideon, R. Site Vice President

Williams, A Radiation Protection

Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

C. Mathews

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. McGhee, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None.

Attachment