IR 05000254/2008008

IR 05000254-08-008, 05000265-08-008, on 07/21/2008 - 08/08/2008, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2, Routine Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (Pi&R)

ML082560871
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	09/12/2008
From:	Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Pardee C Exelon Generation Co
References
IR-08-008
Download: ML082560871 (19)

Text

ber 12, 2008

SUBJECT:

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION 05000254/2008-008; 05000265/2008-008

Dear Mr. Pardee:

On August 8, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a routine biennial PI&R inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on August 8 with Mr. Tulon and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the corrective action program (CAP). Assessments, the use of operating experience, and monitoring of the safety conscious work environment were also adequate. There were some minor issues identified with CAP implementation such that continued attention to the program is appropriate.

Corrective actions for certain adverse trends were not initially effective. Therefore, your staff should be attentive to the significance and difficulty certain issues represent so that the corrective actions are more appropriately aggressive.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000254/2008-008; 05000265/2008-008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Plant Manager - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Regulatory Assurance Manager -

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations Senior Vice President - Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Manager Licensing - Clinton, Dresden and Quad Cities Vice President - Law and Regulatory Affairs D. Tubbs, Manager of Nuclear Associate General Counsel Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer, Illinois Emergency Management Agency M. Rasmusson, State Liaison Officer, State of Iowa Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission Chief Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section, Dept. Of Homeland Security

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000254/2008-008; 05000265/2008-008; 07/21/2008 - 08/08/2008; Quad Cities Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1 & 2; routine biennial problem identification and resolution inspection (PI&R).

This inspection was performed by three regional inspectors and the Quad Cities Senior Resident Inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Problem Identification and Resolution On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the CAP was generally good. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance. The team noted that the licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of licensee self-assessments and interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to raise safety concerns. The team observed that some significant adverse trends in human performance and equipment clearances and tagging were not initially identified and aggressively addressed for effective results. Subsequent efforts were more effective.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings No violations of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Completion of sections

.1 through .4 constitutes one biennial sample of problem

identification and resolution as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

.1 Assessment of the CAP Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Corrective Action (CA) program implementing procedures and attended CA program meetings to assess the implementation of the CA program by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CA program since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection in December 2006. The selection of issues ensured an adequate review of issues across NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self-assessment, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed issue reports generated as a result of facility personnels performance in daily plant activities. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Issue Reports (IRs) and a selection of completed investigations from the licensees various investigation methods, which included root cause, apparent cause, equipment apparent cause, and common cause investigations.

A five year review of the residual heat removal service water system was undertaken to assess the licensee staffs efforts in monitoring for system degradation due to aging aspects. The inspectors also performed partial system walkdowns of emergency AC and DC electrical systems.

During the reviews, the inspectors determined whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys corrective action program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors determined if licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CA program in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also determined whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings, including non-cited violations.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Overall, based on the number of IRs generated by all the plant departments, plant procedures that established a low threshold for reporting, and the types of issues in the program, the team concluded that the licensee was adequately identifying issues in the CAP. However, there were some minor issues not documented and several significant trends that were not identified in the program. Degradation of a safe shutdown makeup pump, a diesel fire pump oil leak leading to smoking insulation, and the adverse trend leading to a substantive cross-cutting issue by the NRC were issues not identified appropriately. In addition, during the inspection, the team identified that the failure of an emergency preparedness (EP) siren was not documented in the site CAP. This occurred because corporate EP staff handles siren repairs, but it prevented site staff, particularly operations staff, from being aware of a site equipment deficiency. The issue was minor in this case and an IR was initiated identifying the problem of coordination between organizations.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that issue resolutions, established and monitored through the ownership review committee and the management review committee, were correctly assigned significance and priority in accordance with station procedures. While evaluations were generally adequate, there were three non-cited violations identified over the two year inspection period where evaluations were lacking in knowledge or thoroughness. A leak in the standby liquid control tank was not correctly evaluated for design code requirements, a risk evaluation improperly took credit for manual operation of the reactor core isolation cooling system, and pump breaker failures were inadequately evaluated. These issues were addressed through the CAP when they were identified.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Although corrective actions reviewed by the team were effective in most cases, several examples where results were less than desirable were also observed. For example, the quality of containment closeout inspections was a repeat issue identified by the resident inspectors. A packing leak from an RHRSW valve onto an RHR pump motor was inadequately addressed, and resulted in wetting the motor twice. The licensees response to two significant trends was also lacking. The NRC identified an adverse trend in human performance and an adverse trend in clearance and tagging of equipment were not recognized by the licensee early on and, in both cases, the licensees response was not aggressive enough to be effective. At the time of the inspection, corrective actions were showing positive results.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing operating experience program procedures, attended CA program meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.

b. Assessment The team observed that the licensee was effectively receiving and processing operating experience reports from all sources. Operating experience was being incorporated into pre-job briefings and an initiative was underway to update and improve the way operating experience was put into work packages.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CA program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.

b. Assessment The programs for self-assessments and audits were scheduled and included a broad cross section of performance areas. Procedures for performing assessments were in place and implemented providing guidance and consistency. For the audits and assessments reviewed, observations were documented and for deficiencies that were identified, issue reports were written and corrective actions taken to address them.

Overall, self-assessment was adequately performed.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees safety conscious work environment through reviews of the facilitys employee concerns program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with coordinators of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results from a Safety Culture Survey performed in 2007.

b. Assessment The licensee had developed an anonymous survey for plant staff. Results for 2007 indicated no significant areas of weakness in a safety conscious work environment.

Inspectors noted that the survey was returned by only approximately 45 percent of the staff and did not include contractors with a long term site presence or contract security staff. Interviews by the team and the team review of the ECP program also concluded that the licensee staff was willing to raise safety concerns. The licensee has added management tools for monitoring the worker attitudes with procedures for allegations and an Employees Issues Advisory Committee.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On August 8, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tulon, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

Alguire, C. Engineering

Beck, W. Regulatory Affairs Manager

Cain, T. Nuclear Oversight

Colgan, J. Chemistry

Craddic, D. Maintenance Director

Darin, S. Engineering

Kronich, C. Operations/SOS

Morris, J. Corrective Action Program Manager

Peterson, T. Regulatory Assurance

Rice, M. Engineering

Scott, T. Online Work Control Manager

Tulon, T. Site Vice President

Wagner, M. Regulatory Assurance

Williams, A Radiation Protection

Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

C. Mathews

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. Cushman Reactor Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None Attachment