IR 05000245/1992031

Insp Repts 50-245/92-31,50-336/92-34 & 50-423/92-30 on 921207-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations.Primary Objective to Ensure That Facilities Operations Depts Conducted Activities in Safe Manner

ML20126H075
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/29/1992
From:	Conte R, Todd Fish NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126H064	List: IR 05000245/1992031 ML20126H062
References
50-245-92-31, 50-336-92-34, 50-423-92-30, NUDOCS 9301050059
Download: ML20126H075 (6)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No /92-31 50 336/92-34 50-423/92-30 Docket No Licensee: Northeast Utilities Corporation Facility Name: Millstone Units 1-3 Inspection Conducted: December 7-10,1992 Inspectors: Carl Sisco, Operations Engineer Larry Briggs, Sr, Operations Engineer Lead Inspector: O [ }i 9)

Todd Fish, Sr. Operations Engineer . Date -.

Approved by: 2 M D/9L Richard J. Conte, Chief Date BWR Section Operations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection from December 7-10,1992 (Report Nos. 50-245/92-31,-

50-336/92-34, 50-423/92-30).

Areas Inspected: The inspection was in the area of plant operations and (vas modeled after the techniques of major team inspections, but on a smaller scale. The primary objective was--

to ensure that the facilities' operations departments conducted activities in a safe manner and in accordance with both regulatory requirements and licensee-approved procedure Results: No violations were identified. Operations were conducted safely, in accordance with regulatory requirements, and in most instances in accordance with licensee-approved procedures. Where the inspectors noted operators not following facility procedures was primarily in certain areas of the administrative control of operator aids and clearances. The inspectors also uncovered outdated fire detector location maps in fire panels and monitored two surveillances which contained weak procedural guidanc PDR- ADOCK 05000245'

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'n 4-DETAILS PURPOSE OF INSPECTION The primary objective was to ensure that the facilities' operations departments conducted activities in a safe manner and in accordance with both regulatory requirements and licensee-approved procedure .0 SUMMARY OF PLANT ACTIVITIES Units 1 and 3 were at power; Unit 2 was in an outage to replace its steam generators. All-units were conducting other activities, such as surveillance testing and maintenanc .0 REVIEW OF FACILITY OPERATIONS f Scope 11ecause this effort was intended to be a performance-based inspection, the inspectors spent most of their time in the Units' control rooms observing plant operations. Observations were made during all shifts, with the majority of time spent covering day and after:'oon shift The inspectors reviewed work in progress and accompanied operators on their tours and wlille they performed surveillance .2 General Unit operators generally adhered to licensee-approved procedures.- No technical specification -

limiting condition for operations (LCOs) wcre discovered beyond what the Unit staffs had already identified. The operators were readily able to explain to the inspectors the status or cause of any alarm or clearanc Where the operators did not adhere to their procedures was in certain areas of administrative control of operator aids and equipment control clearances. Also, the inspectors noted instances of weak procedural guidance for two surveillances and uncovered outdated fire detection location maps in Unit I fire panels. These observations are discussed below, Operator Alds Operator aids for all Units are controlled by procedure OP-261. This procedure details what administrative information (such as who is responsible for approving / reviewing the aid) must be included on each operator aid in addition to the technical information itself. However, in Unit l's control room the inspectors found only one operator aid which conformed with OP-261; all other aids did not. For example, posted on back panels were copies of temperature

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-4 and radiation tables from the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) for secondary containment control. The inspectors noted that both postings reflected the current revision of the EOP from which they had been copied. However, since neither table was administratively controlled per OP-261, there was no assurance that a future revision made to -

the EOP would likewise be made to the posted table In the Unit 2 control room, numerous examples were noted where technical information or -

reminders to the operators of a component's status had been written on strips of yellow paper and attached to the panels. For example, next to the "B" auxiliary feedwater pump was '

strip of paper which had words to the effect that operators were to contact a particular _

individual prior to running the pump. Information on other strips included reminders that-certain gauges were either out of service, deenergized, or indicating improperly. This -

-informal method of providing the operators with information on a system's or component's status had no procedural basi .4 Equipment Control Sytten tagouts, or clearances, are governed by procedure ACP-QA-2.06A for all Units. In general, the operators complied with all aspects of this procedure. However, the inspectors noted what appeared to be isolated examples of nonconformance with the procedure step-governing panel tags for equipment switches.- For example, the "B" service water pump for Unit I lacked a red panel tag (or mini tag) for the control room pump control switch while its breaker was tagged open. There was no safety consequence for this apparent oversight because the pump's motor breaker was racked out: Had an operator inadvertently tried to start the pump using its control room switch there simply would have been no system :

respons The inspectors' observations in the areas of operator aids and equipnw.t control indicated that the operators followed most facility procedures. In the few instances where compliance was lacking, the safety consequences appeared to be negligible. Unit management responded to

- all of the observations and either took immediate corrective action (proper tags were hung) or -

committed to review these practice .5 Surveillance Testing The inspectors monitored two surveillances; a gas turbine generator surveillance on Unit 1 -

and a turbine generator overspeed test on Unit 3. While observing these activities, the inspectors noted areas within the respective procedures which contained weak procedural guidanc Prior to commencing the gas turbine surveillance at Unit 1, the operator reviewed its associated pre-start checklist. This checklist indicated that certain parameters were' expected to exist. For example, expected invertor output voltage was between 116 and-119 volts, and:

expected invertor output current was'between 3.3 and 4.1 amps. These conditions were

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referred to as " desired conditions." llowever, during his pre-start checks, the operator noted that actual values for these parameters were outside " desired condition" values; actual voltage indicated 115 volts, actual current 3.2 amps. What confused the operator was the lack of guidance for what action he should take: initiate action to establish " desired conditions" and then complete the surveillance or continue with the surveillance since a

"denrrd condition" might not necessarily be a tequircd condition. Because the phrase

" desired conditions" was confusing, the operator conferred with his shift management. He was told to take the necessary steps to establish expected conditions and then continue with the surveillance, in the case of the overspeed test at Unit 3, the operator noted that, because of maintenance on the moisture separator reheaters (MSRs), the system line up was abnormal. As a consequence, MSR drain tank level was higher than normal. The operator suspected that this level condition would interfere with the overspeed test. Since the test procedure lacked guidance for what to do if drain tank level was high, the operator contacted his management for help. The shift responded and attempted to adjust tank level, but their efforts were not completely successful. The operators then returned tank level to its original level, backed out of the test, and postponed its completion until a procedure could be developed which would resolve the conflic Overall, the inspectors concluded that the operators demonstrated appropriate sensitivity for when first-line management involvement was needed, in response to the above observations, licensee upper management stated that the ongoing procedure revisions, which incorporate guidance from a revised writers' guide, should climinate future confusion over what a desired condition is. Upper management also committed to establishing what actions they expected the operators to take when as-found plant conditions are thought to interfere with the performance of a particular tes ,6 Unit 1 Fire Panels

The last area where the inspectors noted problems with plant procedures involved Unit l's fire panels. Each fire panel contained a map of its associated room. On the map, the room was broken up into different zones (or areas). These zones each had their own annunciator on the fire panel. So, in the event of a fire m the turbine room, fire brigade members would go to that room's fire panel, read which zone was alarming (for example, zone 15), use the map to correlate the zone to a specific area in the turbine room, and then go directly to the scene of the fir While touring Unit 1, the inspector noted outdated maps in fire panels. One zone map was dated 1980. By itself, a twelve year old map was not significant, However, fire protection modifications made since 1980 had not been incorporated into the fire zone maps rendering parts of the maps obsolete. The result was that some zonc alarms existed on the panel but did not appear anywhere on the map. Conversely, some zones appeared on the map but had no corresponding alarm on the panel. The reason for the outdated map appeared to be that

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no department had been assigned responsibility for keeping the maps current with fire protection modification The inspector concluded that the outdated fire zone maps did not signify a safety concern in that a Gre would still have been detected, but its precise location within a particular room might not have been known. What these observations did signify was that attention to detail appeared to be lacking in ensuring the fire panel maps were updated. Facility inanagement committed to revising the maps for Unit I and to verifying that a similar problem did not exist with the other Unit .7 Summnry of Conclusions The operators performed their duties in accordance with NRC requirements and generally in accordance with licensee-approved procedures. Administrative controls of operator aids and clearances was deficient. Weak procedural guidance for two surveillances and outdated fire panel maps needed management's attention. No violations were identine .0 EXIT MEETING The inspectors met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on December 10, 1992. The inspectors summarized and discussed the findings and observations made during the inspectio .1 Persons Contacted Northeast Utilitics

• S. Scace Vice-Presidert, Millstone Station H. Haynes Unit 1 Director

• J. Keenan Unit 2 Director

• C. Clement Unit 3 Director

• F. Dacimo Director - Site Services

• P. Przekop Unit 1 Operations Manager M. Ross Unit 1 Operations Assistant

• J. Smith Unit 2 Operations Manager

• M. Pearson Unit 3 Operations Manager

• F. Perdomo Compliance Licensing K. Hannon Licensing Analyst

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HENucicar Regulatory Commission

• R. Conte Chief, llWit Section

• C. Sisco Operations Engineer

• T. Fish Sr. Operations Engineer a

• L.13riggs Sr. Operations Engineer

• J. Anderson Project Manager, NRit li. Kolaczyk Resident inspector

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• Denotes those present at the exit rnecting, e

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