IR 05000160/1978005
| ML19263B342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1978 |
| From: | Dance H, Wessman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263B336 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-160-78-05, 50-160-78-5, NUDOCS 7901180074 | |
| Download: ML19263B342 (7) | |
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Report No.:
50-160/78-5 Docket No.:
50-160 License No.:
R-97 Category:
F Licensee: Georgia Institute of Technology College of Engineering Atlanta, Georgia 30332 Facility Name: Georgia Institute of Technology Research Reactor (GTRR)
Inspection at: Nuclear Research Center Inspection conducted: November 29 - December 1, 1978 Inspector:
R. H. Wessman Approved by:
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/1[ff/78 H. C. Dance, Chief
' Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on November 29 - December 1, 1978:
(Report No. 50-160/78-5)
Areas Inspected:
Review of licensee logs and records; review of surveillance activities; followup previous inspection items; review recent operational and maintenance activities; and facility tour.
The inspection involved 16 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in four areas orid two apparent items of noncompliance were found in one area (infraction - failure to meet charcoal cartridge analysis surveillance interval (78-05-01)
paragraph 5; deficiency - failure to complete and docu-ment rod worth surveillance (78-05-02) - paragraph 5).
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 I-1 DETAILS I Prepared by:
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R. H. Wessman, Reactor Unspector iia te~
Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: November 29 - December 1,1978 Reviewed by: k b drlwt_v
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H. C. Dance; Chief D' ate Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Georgia Institute of Technology
- M. V. Davis, Director, Nuclear Research Center
- R.
S. Kirkland, Reactor Supervisor R. Boyd, Radiological Safety Of ficer L. D. McDowell, Senior Reactor Operator A. Cox, Reactor Operator W. Downs, Reactor Operator
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
Noncompliances (Closed) Infraction (78-03-01): Failure to employ written proce-dures for the use of experimental facilities. The licensee has issued Procedure No. 3101 entitled " Operation of Experimental Facilities" dated September 7, 1978. This procedure was reviewed by the inspector. Although the procedure is silent concerning use of the diffractometer, it appeared satisfactory in that diffractormeter operation is governed by procedural steps covering horizontal port operation.
(0 pen) Infraction (78-03-02): Missed the June 1978 monthly Shim Safety Rod Drop Surveillance.
The inspector determined that monthly rod surveillance have been completed for July - November, 1978. The licensee's response (dated September 11, 1978) to the Notice of Violation stated that "... a more vigorous management review and followup of scheduled work..." would be implemente.
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 I-2 In that this program has not been effective, as evidenced by the identification of two additional noncompliances relating to surveillances, this infraction remains open.
(Closed) Infraction (78-03-03):
Failure to conduct prestartup surveillance tests.
The licensee has revised Procedure No. 2003
" Daily Startup Checklist" on September 7, 1978 to incorporate these tests.
The inspector noted that a s.ubsequent revision, dated October 23, 1978, to Procedure No. 2003 added the daily checks of various area radiation and process radiation monitors to the checklist. Additionally noted was the licensee's program for retention of executed startup, checklists thus fulfilling the requirements of Technical Specification 6.5.a.
(Closed) Infraction 77-3-E:
Failure to utilize procedures for fuel element handling. This item was partially rectified by the issue of Procedure No.1502, " Fuel Handling In the Core". However, as indicated in Region II Report 50-160/78-1, requirements for neutron counter operability and criteria for interrupting fuel handling were omitted. The September 7,1978 revision to Procedure No.1502 incorporates these two items, closing this noncompliance.
b.
Unresolved Items (0 pen) Unresolved Item (78-03-04): Nuclear Safeguards Committee audits incomplete. The licensee had made audit assignments to four individuals at the September 7, 1978 Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) meeting.
In that two of these individuals have not completed their assigned audits, this item remains open. The inspector noted the relevance of audit findings recently made and encouraged the licensee to disseminate them to the operators.
The licensee plans to distribute these audit findings to affected personnel when the NSC audits are complete.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (78-03-05):
Facility drawings do not reflect recent modifications. Drawing updates have not been made although this item was discussed at the September 7, 1978 NSC meeting. The inspector reminded the licensee that timely update of facility drawings is required to comply with Technical Speci-fication 6.5.b(5).
3.
Unresolved Items No new unresolved items were identified during this inspectio,
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 I-3 4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on December 1, 1978. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings concerning the two noncompliances relating to surveillances (paragraph 5).
In that meeting surveillance requirements continue to b'e a problem at the GTRR, the inspector recommended that the licensee increase management attention in this area and consider the imposition of NSC audits of surveillance activities. The licensee stated that the addition of one administrative person to the GTRR staff should facilitate timely surveillance followup.
The inspector also discussed the licensee's recent identification of a primary shield water cooling system leak (paragraph 6). This item was determined to be an appropriate candidate for a licensee Event Report (LER) by the inspector. To meet Technical Specification requirements this report should be submitted by December 14, 1978. The licensee agreed to report this item and to include their intentions for correc-tive action in that report.
5.
Conduct of Surveillance Activity The inspector reviewed selected surveillance activities for compliance with Section 4.0 of the Technical Specifications. Surveillance records generated between March and November 1978 were reviewed. The following surveillance functions were reviewed:
- Shim - safety rod worth and shutdown margin annual measurement
- Charcoal cartridge sampler on containment exhaust radioisotopic analysis
- Primary cooling tritium measurement
- Secondary cooling tritium measurement
- Calibration of area radiation monitors, cooling water gamma monitor, moving filter particulate monitor, GM gas monitor, and Kanne exhaust gas monitor
- ECCS Operability Test
- Rod drop time measurement
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 1-4
- Primary coolant system radionuclide analysis The inspector identified discrepancies in two areas:
the charcoal cartridge sampler surveillance and the shutdown margin calibration.
Technical Specification 4.2,e requires an radioisotopic analysis of the charcoal cartridge sampler on the containment building exhaust be performed at biweekly intervals The inspector identified four
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intervals that were in excess of this specification: (6/9/78 - 6/28/78 for 19 days, 8/17/78 - 9/7/78 for 21 days, 9/7/78 - 9/26/78 for 19 days and 9/26/78 - 10/20/78 for 24 days). The failure to perform this surveillance at the required frequency has been identified as an inf raction in the Notice of Violation (78-05-01).
The second discrepancy identified by the inspector related to the measurement of shim-safety blade reactivity worths and shutdown margin calculation, as required annually by Technical Specification 4.1.a.
(The licensee has previously been cited for failure to perform this surveillance in 1975 and subsequent to core alterations in April 1977.
Region II Report No. 50-160/77-3 refers). This measurement was made July 15, 1977 and not accomplished again until November 18, 1978. The licensee had measured rod worths as part of a nuclear engineering laboratory class September 26 and 28, 1978 but had failed to document completion of this measurement and perform data analysis until November 18.
This item has been identified as a deficiency in the Notice of Violation (78-05-02).
6.
Thermal Shield Cooling Water System Leakage The licensee identified to the inspector a recent prcblem encountered with the thermal shield cooling water system.
During high power operations (4.75 megawatts) on November 13-14, 1978 a 30 gallon water loss in the shield cooling water system expansion tank was obse rved.
Additionally, water leakage from the graphite reflector region was identified subsequent to the high power operations. This water was detected via the carbon dioxide (or helium) purge outlet line, which by its location could act as a drain for water in the graphite.
The thermal shield cooling water system consists of trains "A" and "B" each having 10 cooling coils. One train at a time is operated to cool the lead thermal shield surrounding the graphite reflector.
The licensee had encountered leakage in this system A-train) in the Fall of 1975.
Subsequently it was determined that the source of water leakage was from the thermal shield cooling system (Reported by the licensee to the Region II of fice in a letter dated January 6,1977).
The licensee had shif ted to and operated the B-train of that system since that tim '
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 I-5 The licensee believes this leakage is not a source of hazard to either the facility or personnel and is seeking to more closely identify the location of the leak. The inspector stated that pursuant to Technical Specification 6.5.b.(2) a written report of this event would be due to the Region II Office by December 14, 1978. The inspector also stated that the licensee's report should address:
(a) his program f or leakage monitoring and investigation; and (b) any guidance imposed upon operators for facility operations at power levels in excess of 1 megawatt (since the leakage generally only occurs in conjunction with higher power operations).
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's actions relating to this item (78-05-03).
7.
Review of Operations, Logs and Records The inspector reviewed various aspects of facility daily operating activities for compliance with Technical Specification requirements and to de te rmine that facility procedural requirements were being implemented Documents reviewed included:
Console logs for the July 5 to November 28, 1978 period Scram Reports generated during the July 5 to November 28, 1978 period Daily Startup Checklist (Procedure No. 2003) for the October - November 1978 period.
The inspector discussed with the licensee a group of seven scrams that occurred during the operations of August 7-8, 1978. Three were due to operator error (Failure to establish thermocouple reference leg tempera-ture on the Deuterium High Temperature Scram Sensor caused two scrams; an operator error committed while adjusting the flux amplifier range scaler caused the other). Licensee corrective actions appeared appro-priate in these cases. The other four scrams related to a loose / worn connector on the magnet amplifier. This connector has been temporarily modified to tighten its connection. The licensee committed to initiate procurement of a new connector or make a permanent wiring modification by January 31, 1979 (78-05-04).
The inspector discussed other observations of a minor nature with the licensee. All questions were resolved.
8.
Conduct of Experiments The inspector reviewed two experiments recently conducted for confor-mance to Technical Specifications Section 3.4, FSAR Section 5.3 and the procedural controls of Procedure No. 3101, " Operation of Experi-mental Facilities" The inspector reviewed Experiment No. 78-55,
" Reactivity Measurements in V-21" and Experiment No. 77-60, " Boric Acid and Wood Spacer".
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RII Report No. 50-160/78-5 I-6 According to the October 26, 1978 console log, Experiment 78-55 was to be performed. Subsequent log entries and discussion with the licensee revealed that Experiment 77-60 was actually performed. The inspector noted that the procedural steps of 77-60 were detailed and evidence of that procedure being employed on October 26 was unavailable.
The inspector also noted that Experiment 78-55 had very brief proce-dural steps (two sentences) and did not reference any other facility procedures The inspector stated that minor experiments should be conducted using Procedure No. 3101 to assure procedural control over facility manipula-tions.
Where the experiment contains specific procedural steps, the experiment procedure should also be used Also facility management and the reactor operations personnel should know which experiment is being conducted.
The licensee stated that facility administrative controls do assure the foregoing and that the October 26 log entry of experiment numbers was in error.
9.
Maintenance and Modification Actions The inspector reviewed two maintenance and modification activities for conformance with Technical Specification requirements and facility administrative controls. The inspector reviewed actions taken concerning the Bio-Medical Facility Shutter maintenance and the Air-Lock Air Pump modification.
The inspector reviewed job plans, nuclear safeguards committee minutes, and retest log entries relating to these activities and had no further comments.
10.
Facility Tour The inspector toured the facility to observe implementation of health physics controls and housekeeping practices.
No discrepancies were identified.