IR 05000128/1997201
| ML20197H097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000128 |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197H096 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-128-97-201, NUDOCS 9812110209 | |
| Download: ML20197H097 (20) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION l
l Docket No:
50-128-l
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License No:
R-83 Report No:
50-128/97-201 Licensee:
Texas A&M University Facility:
Texas Engineering Experiment Station Nuclear Science Center Location:
College Station, Texas Dates:
November 3-5,1997 and November 2-5,1998 Inspector:
Stephen W. Holmes, Reactor inspector Approved by:
Seymour H. Weiss, Director, Non-Power Reactors and Decommissioning Project Directorate t
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9812110209 981208
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PDR ADOCK 05000128 j.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
This combined reactive and routine, announced inspection consisted of the review of selected conditions and records since the last inspection, verification of corrective actions previously committed to by the licensee, review of licensee actions pertaining to two j
reportable occurrences, and related discussions with licensee personnel. The inspection
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was conducted in accordance with the guidance of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Inspection Manual.
f The reactor operations and security programs were being implemented as required by licensee and applicable regulations. Reactor surveillances, maintenance activities and internal audits were acceptably tracked and controlled by use of an extensive computer scheduling program. Reactor staffing and training satisfied license and regulatory l
requirements. Staff response to a stuck control rod October 30,1997 and subsequent licensee procedure and operational changes were acceptable. Licensee proactive investigation of all scram circuits and subsequent modifications to the systems to prevent l
failure similar to that experienced by another research reactor was commendable. Eight previous violations were closed and one Non-Cited Violation was issued for operating without functioning air monitoring systems required by section 3.5.1 of the Technical Specifications.
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status During the inspection the reactor was operated daily to support experiments, training, and service work. Normal periodic maintenance and operational checks were being performed.
Material shipping and receiving operation were ongoing.
1.
Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Reactor Staffing a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)_
The inspector reviewed reactor staff qualifications, operations logs and records, selected events, and interviewed staff. Also, shift turnovers for both shifts were observed, b.
Observations and Findings Operators consisted of the Nuclear Science Center Director (NSCD), the Assistant Director (NSCAD), the Operations Manager (NSCOM), and in excess of ten Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) and Reactor Operators (RO). The reactor staff satisfied the training and experience required by the TS. Operation logs and records confirmed that shift staffing met the duty and on-call personnel requirements.
c.
Conclusions The operations staffing of the NSC reactor satisfied TS requirements.
01.2 Control and Performance of Experiments a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed approved experiment records, reactor logs, experimental data, Reactor Safety Board (RSB) minutes and interviewed staff. The inspector also observed the removal, surveying, and packaging of an iridium seed experiment.
b.
Observations and Findings Each experiment had been reviewed and approved by the reactor staff or was referred to the RSB as required. Review of the experiment procedures and
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2-reactor log books, interviews with staff, and observation verified that experiments were constrained as required by the TS and experiment authorization. The experiments were also installed, performed, and removed as outlined in the experiment authorization and procedures. The RSB review of experiments ensured evaluation for unreviewed safety questions or TS changes.
Observation of an iridium seed experiment confirmed that experiments conformed to TS, pertinent requirements, and that there were safety constraints for the identified hazards. During the retrieval one of the cans became stuck in the transfer tube from the irradiation tube to the shipping cask. The two person team responded without hesitation and, with tools prepared for such a circumstance, extricated the can and inserted it into the shipping cask. Tre use of handling tools, shielded work chambers, and a team approach demonstrated that the ALARA concept was followed by the staff, c.
Conclusions Control and performance of experiments met TS and licensee requirements.
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01.3 Reactor Operations
a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
Reactor operations logs, fuel logs, scram logs, and periodic checkout, start-up and shutdown checklists were reviewed. Start-up, steady state power operations, experiment retrievals, end shutdowns were observed.
b.
Observations and Findings Reactor operations were carried out following written procedures and TS.
Observations by the inspector confirmed that information on operational status l
was recorded in log books and checklists as required by procedures and TS. Use l
of maintenance and repair logs satisfied pertinent requirements. Significant problems and events noted in the operations log were reported and quickly resolved as required by TS and administrative procedures.
c.
Conclusions Operational activities were consistent with applicable requirements.
01.4 Fuel Handling a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
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Reactor operations and fuellogs, and periodic checkout, start-up and shutdown f
checklists were reviewed.
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Observations and Findings Procedures for refueling, fuel shuffling, and TS required inspections and surveillances were extensive and detailed, ensuring controlled operations. Fuel movement, inspection, log keeping, and recording followed the facility's procedures. Data recorded for fuel movement was clear and cross referenced in fuel and operations logs. Radiological controls and procedures conformed to health physics (HP) ALARA principles.
c.
Conclusions Fuel handling activities and documentation were as required by TS and facility procedures. No safety concerns were identified.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed reactor equipment, evaluated the physical plant, and observed the facility and equipment during a tour.
b.
Observations and Findings Equipment was accessible with little extraneous clutter. All required equipment and facilities' observed by the inspector were operational.
'A Grove Mantift purchased to replace the crane lift elevator for the irradiation cell was in house.
c.
Conclusions
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Reactor and support facilities were operational as required.
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Operations Procedures and Documentation a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 09001)
The inspector reviewed operating procedures and updates, reactor operating records and logs, license amendments and RSB minutes. Observations included the use of procedures during operations.
b.
Observations and Findings i
Written procedures required by the TS were available and used by the facility j
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staff. Adherence to the procedures was acceptable. Procedures were routinely updated as needed. Minor changes were authorized by the NSCD or his designee while other changes were referred to the RSB as required. Current facility procedures had been reviewed and approved by the RSB as required by TS.
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License Amendment No.14 modified the amount, type, and use of radioactive material possessed by the NSC reactor to allow greater flexibility in performing research and development activities. Violation 50-128/9701-07 for possession of radioactive material for an unlicensed activity is closed.
Records of power level, operating periods, unusual events, calibration and maintenance proceduret, installed experiments, and start-up and shutdown checks were being kept. The facility's logs and records were clear, concise, and legible. The annual reactor operating reports, logs, and records acceptebly documented reactor operations activities. Reactor operations and testing were documented as required by the TS.
Scrams wrre identified in the logs and records, and were reported and resolved as required before the resumption of operations under the authorization of a
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SRO.
c.
Conclusions Facility operational procedures satisfied TS requirements. Reactor operating records and logs were being maintained as required by TS. Significant problems and events identified in the logs and records were reported and resolved as required.
05 Operator Training nr.d Qualification Program a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed requalification program records, NRC license, training records and interviewed staff, b.
Observations and Findings All operators and senior operators were participating in the ongoing training as required by the NRC approved requalification plan. Lectures were conducted and training given for ebnormal and emergency procedures as required. The lecture outline for the reactor operator requalification program included appropriate subject material and a comprehensive written examination. Training records contained the documentation required by the requalification program.
The facility had one individual responsible to track and coordinate all required TS surveillances, checks, testing, training, audits, etc. Operator hours were tracked to ensure that performance requirements were met. Checklists were used for tracking requalification requirements and ensuring that the plan elements were accomplished.
The inspector verified that formal classes / lectures were given every four months, that the operators attended them as required, and that biennial physicals had been performed as required.
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Violation 50-128/9701-01 for failure to schedule lectures within a 4-month interval as required by the NRC approved requalification program is closed.
Violation 50128/9701-02 the failure of individuals to attend requalification lectures as required by the NRC approved requalification program is closed.
Violation 50-128/9701 03 the failure of operators to have physical exominations every 2 years as required by 10 CFR 55.21 is closed.
c.
Conclusions The requalification program was being acceptably implemented. TS and l
NRC-approved requalification plan requirements were met.
Organization and Administration
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Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed organization, staffing and administrative controls, and interviewed management and staff.
b.
Observations and Findings TS section 6.0 prescribes the line management organization structure for the NSC reactor. The Deputy Director Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES),
the NSCD, the SRO on duty, and the operating staff comprise level 1 to 4 management. A radiation safety officer (RSO) and the RSB make up the rest of the organization. All positions were filled with qualified personnel. No changes have been made in the TS required structure, c.
Conclusions Organizational and administrative controls remain consistent with TS and license requirements and commitments.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed RSB minutes, annual reviews, audits, and interviewed staff.
b.
Observations and Findings RSB membership satisfied TS requirements and the Committee's procedural rules. The RSB had meetings as required. Review of the minutes showed that the RSB provided guidance, direction, safety oversight, and ensured suitable use of the reactor.
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The committee's reviews of experiment authorization E-25-a change to the Iridium seed production - and the new l 125 experiment proposal, were detailed and comprehensive. The RSB reviews of two reportable occurrances, a stuck
fuel rod, and operating in violation of a limiting condition for operation (LCO) and l
the subsequent approvals of procedure and facility changes demonstrated that the RSB was actively performing its duties.
Evaluation of the committee's review and approval of proposed changes to the l-reactor's scram circuits additionally verified that the RSB was performing its review duties as required l
Required audits of reactor facility activities and procedures, equipment changes, proposed tests or experiments, had been performed and documented.
Deficiencies identified by the audits were evaluated by the NSC staff and corrective actions taken as needed. RSB audits were effective. Violation 50-128/9701-04 the failure to perform audits as required by TS is closed.
c.
Conclusions The RSB performed its review, audit, and approval duties as required by license, TS, and administrative criteria.
Miscellaneous Operations issues l
08.1 Reportable Occurrence-Stuck shim safety No.2 a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed reactor logs, RSB minutes, facility procedures, maintenance logs and records, the FSAR, as built drawings, interviewed staff and attended a root cause analysis meeting held November 4,1998, by the NSC staff.
b.
Observations and Findings On Thursday, October 30,1997, during an evening lab, Shim Safety No. 2 (SS2)
became stuck in a withdrawn position. Subsequently the rod failed to scram and had to be inserted using the control rod drive. The licensee identified this as a reportable occurrence according to their TS and made a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification by telephone and e-mail, followed by letter dated November 11,1997, Final Report of The Reportable Occurrence of October 30,1997.
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The Inspector initially visited the facility November 3 5,1997, to investigate and evaluate the stuck rod / scram failure. Follow-up was done during the scheduled inspection November 2-5,1998.
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During withdraw of SS2 for a 500kW run, rod status lights provided conflicting indications as to its position. This occured a number of times while stabalizing i
rod position. After visually verifying that SS2 was raised, the SRO attempted to scram the rod. Although status lights indicated SS2 had disengaged, it did not
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scram, indicating a stuck rod. The SRO then directed shutdown of the reactor and made notifications as required by procedures.
On Friday, October 31,1997, after pool water sampling identified no contamination, the NSCD and NSCAD partially unloaded the core, inspected for damage, investigated the cause of the failure, corrected the identified cause, reassembled the core, performed rod drop tests, and authorized reactor operation t
in accordance with TS.
The apparent cause of the failure was a mise!igned hold down foot, whose design allowed for a 0.125 inch clearance. The facility procedure called for
"approximately" 0.250 inches to allow for expansion. Since previous rod drop
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tests in early mid September and early October,1997 were normal, it is believed
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that the rod drive was most likely " bumped" out of alignment during its recent
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change out for annual maintenance.
The staff, at the November 4,1998, root cause analysis meeting attended by the inspector, found that the operators made the correct responses to the indications of a stuck rod and that the responses followed faculty procedures, meet TS requirements, and the ALARA philosophy. Additionally, they determined the cause to be incorrect spacing of the rod hold down foot, which allowed the foot to be bumped out of alignment. Corrective action, as approved by the RSB, was to modify the procedure to measure this height prior to disassembly, then on assembly adjust the clearance to between 0.125 and 0.250 inches and remeasure the height to ensure it is within 1/16 inch of the initial height.
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The inspector confirmed that the responses by the operators were acceptable, procedures and TS were followed, and that the reactor was safely shutdown as required. Notifications to licensee staff and the NRC were made on time and
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followed procedures, TS, and applicable regulatory requirements. The inspector verified that the procedure changes had been made as reviewed and approved by the RSB and that the initial rod drive heights had been measured for future comparison.
c.
Conclusions Licensee actions regarding the reportable occurrence of stuck shim safety No.2
were acceptable.
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Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed reactor logs, staff and RSB meeting minutes, facility procedures, thermal column air monitor charts, logged radiation area monitor (RAM) readings, maintenance logs and records, and interviewed NSC staff.
b.
Observations and Findings During the afternoon / evening of August 26,1998, the reactor was run for approximately eight hours with no facility air monitoring (FAM) or replacement system operative, a violation of TS 3.5.1 Radiation Monitoring. The licensee identified this as a reportable occurrence according to their TS and made a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification by telephone, followed by letter dated September 8,1998, Reportable Occurrence at Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center on August 26,1998.
On the morning of August 26,1998, the TS required FAM # 4 became
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inoperative and, as allowed by TS, the NSCAD, NSCOM, and the reactor
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administrative assistant decided to use FAM #2 as a temporary replacement.
The duty HP (DHP) did this rerouting by adjusting air flow valve line-ups and detector alarm set points at the detector station in the tunnel area. Tag-out; were used but no second check was performed on the valve line-up The rec.or continued to operate for appruximately eight hours.
The next morning the DHP identified to the NSCOM that the count rate on the FAM was extremely low. Subsequent investigation determined that the valving was improperly configured and that an end cap was missing from a sample line, rendering the system incapable of monitoring Wulate or gaseous effluents.
A staff meeting was held August 27,1998, to discuss and determine the cause and make recommendations for corrective actions. These were evaluated and approved by the RSB on October 29,1998. The contributing factors were that there were no written normal or abnormal valve line-up procedures, no second checks were performed on the valve line-up, that low FAM readings were not identified as a system failure, and that a broken end cap had not been replaced, leaving one sample port open to the air in the tunnel. The corrective actions were to write procedures and provide staff training on valve line-ups, revise tag-out procedures to include second checks, label valves to correspond with their drawings and written procedures, and to replace the missing end cap to ensure all sample ports will be sealed during operations.
Notificrtions to licensee staff and the NRC were made on time and followed procedures, TS, and applicable regulatory requirements. The inspector verified
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During the time the FAM was inoperative, facilityaAMs as well as the thermal column air monitor were operative. Both, though not as quickly, would have detected elevated gaseous or particulate effluents during the eight hour run. The inspector verified that logged RAM readings, thermal column air monitor chart readings, and subsequent facility contamination surveys were normal, indicating no airbome releases while the FAM was inoperative.
c.
Conclusions Licensee actions regarding the reportable occurrence of operations witho~ut facility air monitoring syst::r" were act epteble.
This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-128/97-201-01 Reactor operating with no FAM or replacement system operative as required by TS 3.5.1 Radiation Monitoring.)
11. Maintenaace c
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Surveillances and Limiting Conditions for Operation a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed selected surveillance records, data sheets and records of tests, licensee procedures, reactor logs, checklists, periodic reports, and interviewed staff.
b.
Observations and Findings Daily and other periodic checks, tests, and verifications for TS required LCOs were performed as required. Surveillance and LCO verifications were completed on schedule as required by TS and applicable procedures. A number of the surveillances and LCO verification were performed at intervals more frequent than required by TS. All were within prescribed TS and procedure parameters and in close agreement with the previous surveillance results.
The facility had one individual responsible to track and coordinate all required TS surveillances, checks, testing, training, audits, etc. The computer program was used to provided tracking, reminders, schedules, and checklists to staf.. -
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This provided clear and concise control of the reactor operational tests and surveillances. Use at the facility was comprehensive and timely.
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Conclusions The licensee's program for surveillance and LCO confirmations satisfied TS i
requirements.
M2 Maintenance of Facilities and Equipment
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a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed maintenance and reactor logs, RSB minutes, repair records, the computer tracking program records, observed facility and equipment
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during an accompanied tour and interviewed staff.
b.
Observations and Findings
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Routine / preventative maintenance was controlled and documented in the
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computer system and/or reactor maintenance and operations logs or files.
Unscheduled maintenance or repairs were submitted on a facility work / modification request and were reviewed to decide if they were safety
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related and thus would need a changs evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59.
Verifications and operational systems checks were performed to ensure system operability before return to service. Trends were identified and problems resolved as required.
In discussion with the inspector the reactor staff stated the surveillance /LCO and maintenance tracking systems were to be combined to enhance control of facility maintenance, c.
Conclusions Maintenance logs, records, performance, and 50.59 reviews satisfied TS and procedure requirements.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
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The records pertaining to the year 2000 (Y2K) concerns were reviewed.
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Observations and Findings As with most research reactors, the NSC reactor has few systems using digital computer controls or date functions that could be affected by Y2K problems.
NSC memorandum 006 98, dated Fsbruary 12,1998, from the facility computer
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manager to the NSCD reported on : heir evaluation of the potential Y2K effects.
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With one exception, the Canaber.a counting equipment, there would be no
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problems due to Y2K. Canaberra was in the process of checking its software for Y2K compliance and the NSC was tracking their progress.
c.
Conclusions Y2K concerns were being addressed.
lil. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering, Design Changes a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed selected design change packages, associated procedures and drawings, logs, records, staff meeting records, and RSB files. The inspector also interviewed staff, b.
Observations and Findings Changes were controlled by requiring a facility staff review and a committee review, and were recorded and tracked individually. Facility work / modification requests were used for this process.
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The packages 98-0024 and 98-0014 for the scram reset circuit and quick disconnects for reactor bridge modifications were reviewed. The evaluations
were acceptable with supporting documentation and'information. RSB
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involvement was also comprehensive. Post installation verification testing of the systems was thorough. Procedure and drawing changes were included and were consistent with the observations by the inspector.
The proactive response of the NSC staff in investigating a potential failure of a protective safety system, previously experienced and reported by the Oregon State University Research ' Reactor, was commendable. (Letter date March 18, 1998, from NSCD to USNRC, subject: Potential Reactor Safety System Failure Discovered with Reactor Shutdown) This resulted in the above noted corrective modification 98-0024.
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Conclusions
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Design changes satisfied TS and regulatory requirements.
t IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Environmental Surveys a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed procedures, survey records, toured the exterior of the waste storage building, and interviewed staff.
b.
Observations and Findings Radiation surveys of the interior and exterior of the waste storage building were being performed. Surveys were sufficient and reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels and potential radiological hazards present. Violation 50 128/9701-05 the failure to perform radiation surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501(a) is closed.
The licensee had erected a new fence between the main fence surrounding the NSC and the front of the waste storage building. This provides a controlled area accessible only by authorized persons. The radiation monitors were then relocated to this fence line to monitor unrestricted area exposures. Review of the exposures and the licensees calculations for occupancy factors confirmed that the licensee met the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1301 for annual dose to the public. Violation 50-128/9701-06 the failure to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public as required by 10 CFR 20.1302(b) is closed.
c.
Conclusions Radiation surveys of the interior and exterior of the waste storage building were being acceptably performed. Doses to the public satisfied license, TS, and regulatory requirements.
R8 Radioactive Material Transfer a.
inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector observed transfer of irradiated material to a commercial licensee, reviewed transfer checklists, shipping records, and interviewed staff
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Observations and Findings Radioactive materials produced by the reactor for use by the university staff or outside organizations were tracked as required. The reactor staff properly packaged, surveyed, and released materials to on campus investigators, and to entities outside the university. Transfer documentation was kept on file as required.
The inspector observed the retrieval, packaging, and shipment of an Iridium seed activation. Proper clothing and dosimetry were worn by the staff performing the operation. Acceptable radiation surveys were performed before, during, and after the retrieval. Shielding, stand off tools, and efficient timc use during the procedure verified that the ALARA concept was heeded.
One can became stuck during its retrieval from the vent tube. The staff responded in concert using pre position tools and contingency procedures to free the can and continue the packaging process, c.
Conclusions Radioactive material was retrieved, packaged, transferred, and shipped in accordance with licensee procedures, TS,10 CFR 49 and 10 CFR 20 requirements.
P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities and Staff Training a.
Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The emergency plan (EP) procedures and drill records for the reactor were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findings The facility drills were being conducted annually as required. The exercises were conducted s :ording to, and fulfilled, the requirements stipulated in the EP. Key emergency.osponse personnel demonstrated that they could respond to emergencies as required. Offsite responses by security, law enforcement, and other responders were acceptable for the scenarios involved. Items identified by individual critiques were addressed, evaluated, and then incorporated when appropriate. Violation 50-128/9701-08, the failure to conduct annual emergency drill, is closed.
c.
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14-S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed the NRC approved security plan, toured the facility, reviewed security logs, reports, and security related documents, and interviewed reactor staff, b.
Observations and Findings Unescorted access was controlled as outlined in the NRC approved security plan.
Reactor test / verification of the security systems were performed as required.
Related key control activities also satisfied plan requirements. University police provided security as required by the plan. The inspector verified that University police security checks were performed, tracked, and corrective actions taken when required. Communication between the reactor staff and the University Police was ongoing.
During the inspection security system communications failed. The resulting response by university and reactor staffs was immediate, followed plan
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procedures, and acceptably mitigated the temporary disruption in communications.
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Conclusions
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Conduct of security activities satisfied the NRC approved plan.
S2 Status of Security Facilities, Equipment, and, Procedures.
a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed the NRC approved security plan, toured the facility, reviewed security logs, reports, and security related documents, and interviewed reactor staff.
b.
Observations and Findings The inspector verified that the security system was as described in the NRC approved plan. The system provided detection and assessment of unauthorized access or removal of special nuclear material frorn the facility. The inspector verified that the alarms, devices, and procedures were edequate to allow the university police to detect and respond to unauthorized activities. Response rosters and emergency phone lists were current and poste.
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Conclusions Security facilities, equipment, and, procedures satisfied plan requirements.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed the NRC approved security plan, toured the fac;lity, reviewed security logs, reports, and cecurity related documents, and interviewed reactor staff, b.
Observations and Findings The plan was properly secured against release to unauthorized individuals. The plan had been reviewed and properly updated as required. Changes to the plan had been forwarded to the NRC within the required time frame The periodic audit of the plan had been completed as required.
The inspector verified that the records required by the security plan to be retained on file were being maintained, c.
Conclusions Security procedure documentation satisfied plan requirements.
S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification a.
Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure 69001)
The inspector reviewed the NRC approved security plan, toured the facility, reviewed security logs, reports, training records and security related documents, and interviewed reactor staff, b.
Observations and Findings Security training was provided to the reactor staff as part of the requalification program. Annual training was provided to the university police as required by the plan. Site tours were also provided to the police biennially.
c.
Conclusions Security procedure documentation satisfied plan requirements.
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V. Menecoment Meetings
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X1 Exit Meeting Surnmary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
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at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5,1998. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. Asher Operations Manager, NSC T. Fisher Reactor Maintenance Supervisor, NSC
- S. O' Kelly Assistant Director, NSC
- T. Parish Member, RSB
'D. Reece Director, NSC
"F. Sanchez Reactor Administrative Assistance, NSC L. Vasudevan Radiation Safety Officer, NSC INSPECTION PROCEDURE (IP) USED
'
IP 69001:
CLASS 11 NON POWER REACTORS ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened
.
none
,
Closed
.
NCV 50-128/97-20101 Reactor operating with no FAM or replacement system operative as required by TS 3.5.1 Radiation Monitoring VIO 50-128/9701-01 Failure to follow reactor requalification program VIO 50-128/9701-02 Failure to attend requalification lectures
,
VIO 50128/9701-03 Failure of operators to have physical examinations every 2 years.
VIO 50-128/9701-04 Failure to audit as required by TS VIO 50-128/9701-05 Failure to survey VIO 50-128/9701-06 Failure to demonstrate compliance with dose limits for individual members of the public 20.1302(b)
VIO 50-128/9701-07 Possession of radioactive material for an unlicensed activity VIO 50-128/9701-08, Failure to conduct an annual emergency drill
..
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o l
I e
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PARTIAL LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l
DHP Duty HP EP Emergency Plan j
FAM Facility Air Monitoring j
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report l
HP Health Physics l
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation -
!
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
NSCAD Nuclear Science Center Assistant Director l
NSCD Nuclear Science Center Director i
NSCOM Nuclear Science Center Operations Manager l
RO Reactor Operators I
'
RSB Reactor Safety Board I
RSO Radiation Safety Officer
SS2 Shim Safety No. 2 l
SRO Senior Reactor Operators
!
TEES Texas Engineering Experiment Station
)
TS Technical Specifications j
Y2K Year 2000 j
i
!
I J
i l
1