IR 05000029/1980020
| ML19350B304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1981 |
| From: | Foley T, Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350B299 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-80-20, 50-29-80-20, NUDOCS 8103200236 | |
| Download: ML19350B304 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-29/80-20 30-29/80-11-27 Docket No. 50-29 License flo. DPR-3 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name:
Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe)
Inspection at:
Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection conducted. December 1-December 31, 1980 Inspectors:
h j Sw of)W)2
/2/l l T. F.'Foley, R dent Idspector
[f date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
//h r/
T. T. Martin, Chief, RPS No. 3,
~ date signed
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RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
l Inspection on December 1-December 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-29/80-20)
Areas Inspected: Routine onsite inspection by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of
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operational events; operational safety verification; followup of selected IE (
Bulletins; review of facility annual emergency drill; review of leakage inside
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containment (T/I 2515/47); and review of emergency procedures with respect to l
ATWS (T/I 2515/46). The inspection involved 44 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified during this inspection.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
b103200 M,
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DETAfLS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Army, Technical Assistant H. Autio, Plant Superintendent G. Babineau, Engineering Assistant W. Billings, Chemistry Supervisor T. Danek, Operations Supervisor B. Drawbridge, Associate Engineer L. French, Engineering Assistant T. Henderson, Technical Assistant D. Holsinger, Senior Engineer, NSD K. Jurentkuff, Day Shift Supervisor L. Laffond, Assistant Training Coordinator P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor J. MacDonald, Radiation Protection Manager, NSD N. St.Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. Randall, Engineering Assistant J. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent J. Trejo, Plant Health Physicist D. Vassar, Assistant Operations Supervisor F. Williams, Engineering Assistant Commonwealth of Massachusetts W. Bell, Assistant Radiological Health Engineer J. Tocci, Assistant Radiological Health Engineer The inspector also. interviewed other licensee employeds during the inspection, including members of the Operations, Health
Physics, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security and General Office staffs..
2..
Status of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (29/79-16-01); The inspector witnessed the inventory of one energency kit, sampled other emergency kits and discussed with radiological control technicians whether.the full complimont of equipment was in each energency kit. The inspector ob;erved no inadequacies.
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This item is closed.
3.
Shift Logs and Operatir.o Recorde a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the. licensee established administrative requirements in each area in preparation for review of various logs and records.
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AP-0001, Plant Procedures and Instructions,
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Revision 8.
AP-2002, Operations Department Personnel Shift
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Relief, Revision 10.
AP-2009, Control Room Area Limits for Control
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Room Operators, Original.
AP-2010, Control Room Access During Accidents
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and Operations Transients, Original.
AP-0017, Switching and T.3ging of Plant Equipment
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Revision 5.
AP-0018, Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper
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Control Log, Revision 7.
AP-2007, Maintenance of Operations Department
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Logs, Revision 7.
- :AP-0216, Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control, Revision 1.
AP-0042, Housekeeping for Maintenance and
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Modifications, Revision 1.
Rules Governing In-Plant Tagging Procedures
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Local Control Rules, Revision 3.
The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972," Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants,"and 10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the acceptability of the logs and records reviewed.
b.
Shift Logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
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Control Room logs and shift surveillance sheets
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are properly completed and that selected Technical Specification limits were met.
Control Room log entries involving abnormal
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conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration.
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Log Book reviews are being conducted by the staff.
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Operating and Special orders do not conflict with
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Technical Specifications requirements.
Jumper (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing
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discrepancies with Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers are properly approved and installed.
C.
The following plant logs and operating records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Control Room Log: December 1-December 31, 1980
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Plant Operations Review Comittee minutes:
80-66 thru 80-74
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Special Orders: 494, 495, 496, 491, 489
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Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Comittee minutes:
No. 80-6-R
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Safety Related Maintenance Requests: 80-1007,80-995, 80-1181,
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80-1175, 80-1173, 80-1164, 80-1157 Plant Audit Discrepancy Status Reports: 80-02, 80-08, 80-10,
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80-11, 80-13,80-16A Radio Log: November 1 thru December 31, 1980
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Manager of Operations Directives 80-01 thru 80-03
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Plant Information Reports: 80-11, 80-12, 80-13
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No inadequacies were identified.
4.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant in-cluding the Vapor Container, the Primary Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Safety Injretion Building, Switchgear Room, Diesel Rooms, Control Room, Spent Fuel Building, and HP Control Point Areas.
Details and findings are noted below:
a.
Monitoring Instrumentation and Annunciators
.On several occasions during the inspection, control board-annunciators were checked for abnormal alarms. The following monitoring instrumentation was checked to verify operability and where applicable, values indicated were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specification requirements:
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Pressurizer pressure, level and temperature.
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Charging flow path.
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MCS Temperature.
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SI tank level.
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PWST and DWST levels.
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Batteries 1,2, and 3 bus voltage.
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Megawatt electrical output.
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Stack gas radiation monitor.
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Containment air particulate radiation monitor.
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No abrormal annunciators were energized. No inadequacies were identified.
b.
Radiological Controls.
Radiation controls established by the licensee, including:
posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step-off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and OP-8100, " Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas," and OP-8101, " Plant Radiological Surveys."
No inadequacies,were identified.
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Plant Housekeeping Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all areas toured.
Housekeeping and cleanliness were acceptable.
No inadequacies were identified.
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d.
Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations Systems and equipment in all-areas toured were observed for the existence of f.luid leaks and abnormal piping vibration..
No inadequacies were identified.
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Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints Pipe hangers and restraints installed on various piping systems through the plant were observed for proper installation and tension.
No inadequacies were identified.
f.
Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover Control Room Manning was reviewed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and technical Specifications. The inspector verified, several times during the inspection,that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times. Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were noted to be thorough and orderly.
No inadequacies were identified.
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5.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that the results were reviewed by persennel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel. The following surveillances were reviewed by the inspector:
OP-9208 Sampling and Analysis of Diesel Fuel Oil
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OP-4225 Turbine Control Valve Exercise
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OP-4601 Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Functional Test
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-- OP-4225 Turbine Throttle and Control Valve Surveillance Test OP-4700 Vapor Container Continuous Leak Rate Monitoring
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OP-4204 Monthly Test or Special Operation of the Safety
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Injection Pumps OP-4232 V.C. Inspection
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No inadequacies were identified.
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6.
IE Bulletin Followup _
For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified the following:
that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the infomation required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on infoma-tion presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that infomation discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response. The following bulletins were reviewed:
IEB 80-24 Prevention of Da. mage Due to Water Leakage Inside
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Containment IEB 80-20 Failure of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return
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to Neutral Control Switch IEB 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System Operability
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IEB 80-11 Masonry Wall Design
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IEB 80-05 Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical
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Volume Control System Holdup Tanks With the exception of the below, and the inspector survey results of IEB 80-24 response noted in detail 11. of this report, the inspector had no further concerns in this area.
The licensee's response to IEB 80-11 appears to adequ_aje][ address the requirements of the bulletin; however, the present schedule for re-evaluation of the adequacy of certain block walls will not be completed until sometime in the spring of 1981. This re-evaluation will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection (29/80-20-01).
7.
Facility Annual Emergency Drill The licensee conducted a radiation emergency drill on December 16, 1980. Local, town, state and federal agencies participated in the drill.
The inspector participated in the drill and made detailed observations of the following activities:
Control room actions concerning detection and response to
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the simulated emergency conditions; -
Notification of plant personnel and offsite agencies;
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Environs monitoring;
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Communications;
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Plant evacuation; and,
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Coordination and control of respense activities.
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The inspector determined that:
The licensee's response was generally in accordance
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with existing procedures; The response was orderly;
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The licensee used qualified persons to evaluate the
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organizational response; A critique was held shortly following the drill;and,
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The drill results and observer comments (including
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those of the inspector) were documented for evaluation and the initiation of appropriate corrective actions.
Facilities and Equioment The inspector examined facilites, equipment and instrumentation to verify that the items specified in the licensee's Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures were available for use and maintained in an operable state. The inspection included examination of:
emergency equipment kits; the emergency control center and associated equipment; a selection of emergency communications equipment; radioactive release monitoring instruments - process monitors, and meteorological instruments.
No inadequacies were identified Coordination with Offsite Agencies The inspector reviewed records, procedures and agreements relating to the licensee's coordination of emergency planning with agencies listed in the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. The inspector discussed this subject with licensee representatives. These discussions verified that the existing-agreements between the licensee and these agencies remain in effect and that these agencies had been able to maintain an adequate response capability through the licensee's contact and coordination efforts.
No inadequacies were identified
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Operational Safety Verification A detailed review of the High Pressure Safety Injection System was conducted to verify that the system was properly aligned
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and fully operational in the standby mode. Review of the above system include the following:
verification that each accessible valve in the flow path was
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in the correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication verification that power supplies and breakers were properly
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aligned for components that are required to actuate upon receipt of a safety injection signal visual inspection of major components for leakage, proper
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lubrication, cooling water supply, general condition and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements verification by observation that the instrumentation essential
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for system actuation and performance was operational.
The inspector identified no inadequacies.
9.
Inspector Followup of Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements.
The following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:
observations of plant parameters and systems important to safety
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to confim operation within normal operational limits; description of event, including cause, systems involved, safety
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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety
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features equipment;
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details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive
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material and exposure to radioactive material; l
verification of correct operation of automatice equipment;
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verification of proper manual actions by plant personnel;
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verification of adherence to plant procedures;
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verification of confomance to Technical Specification LC0
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determination that root causal factors were identified
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and that corrective actions, taken er planned, were
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appropriate to correct the cause;
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verification that corrective action taken was appropriate
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to prevent recurrence; determination whether the event involved operation of
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the facility in a manner which constituted an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2), or
in such a manner as to represent an unusual hazard to health and safety of the public and environment; determination whether the event involved continued operation
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of the facility in violation of regulatory requirements or.-license conditions; and, evaluation of whether applicable reporting requirements
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were met.
The operational event reviewed during this inspection period is discussed below.
Air Control System Malfunction On November 27, 1980, water levels in numbers 1, 3, and 4 Steam Generators (SG's) began decreasing in succession.
The Reactor Operators took manual control of the feed water system and maintained level in the respective steam generator. Shortly thereafter steam pressure indication in
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Steam Generators Nos. 3 and 4 dropped to zero. Instrument and Control and maintenance personnel determined that the Control Air System was water saturated from a failure of
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an air dryer to automatically switch filters after one filter became saturated, leading to a buildup of water in the
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Biiley steam flow relays and steam piessure transmitters.
The Balley relTys were lit 6 ten dry ~,~an~d thTControl~ AiF
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System was switched to a redundant air dryer assembly. Level and pressure indicators 'in each SG subsequently returned to normal. During this transient two'of the redundant 2400V
busses were intentionally crosstied in preparation for a
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reactor scram. These busses were returned to a normal lineup one hour and ten minutes later. The licensee submitted a 30 day Licensee Event Report (LER 80-22) concerning the busses being crosstied. The inspector questioned licensed.
t-reactor operators in regard to the crosstying of the 2400 volt electrical busses. The-inspector noted that the applicable
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provisions of the technical specifications action statement were met during the time that the electrical system was in a
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l condition less conservative than the least conservative l
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aspect of the limiting ccndition for operation,and that a maintenance request was initiated to correct the air control systen deficiency.
The inspector had no further concerns in this area.
10. Adequacy of Emergency Procedures During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's operational emergency procedures for coping with Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) events.
This review was performed in response to a survey)of all operating reactors (Temporary Instruction 2515/46. The inspector reviewed the licensee operating emergency procedures with respect to the following plant conditions:
- Failure to scram when required.
- Failure to complete scram when initiated automatically or manually.
- Inability to move or drive control rods.
- Failure to automatically scram when a parameter exceeds I
its trip value.
- Criteria for use of Standby Liquid Control System or Emergency Boration System.
- Reactor trip or stram.
- Anticipated transient without scram.
The inspector also reviewed the authorities and responsibilities of operators governing the use of the Emergency Boration System.
The inspector used the following acceptance criteria as guidance in determining the adequacy of the emergency procedures with respect to anticipated transients without sceam events:
If an automatic scram should have occurred and has not, the licensee should:
Depress manual scram button immediately.
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If rods still do not move, begin immediate emergency boration and attempt to drive rods in.
c. ~If rods fail to move, have power disconnect switch or breaker to rod holding coils opened.
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Continue efforts to effect shutdown.
The operator should have complete authority to commence emergency baration, and he should be responsible for doing this when the situation requires it.
F.xceptJ s,no_ted below,_the inspe_c_to M nti7iida o j
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n inadequacies.
The licensee's emergency procedures appear to adequately address all of the plant conditions stated above with the exception of specific reference to Anticipated Transient W1thout Scram, and Failure to Automatically Scram when a parameter exceeds its trip value. Additionally, the actions required should an automatic scram not have occured are not consolidated in.any single emergency procedure and the authority to activate the Emergency Boration System is not specifically detailed. The above deficiencies 9:ere discussed with the licensee's_ representative who stated that OP-3000, Emcrgency Shutdown From Power, woula be revised to incorporate the above concerns. The licensee further stated that this revision would be completed by February 28, 1981. This revision will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection (29/80-20-02).
11. Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment During the inspection period, the inspector responded to a survey of all operating reactors to determine the acceptability of the licensee's plant equipment and the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 80-24 (TI 2515/47).
The inspector performed an inspection on December 30, 1980, of Vapor Containment (VC) Air Coolers, the Service Water System inside the VC, the VC sump and the Primary Drain Tank.
The inspector also interviewed operations and health physics personnel and reviewed a preliminary draft copy of the licensees'
response to IE Bulletin 80-24.
During the review of the licensee response the inspector noted that some aspects of the licensee's response appeared to be lacking in the detail required to adequately describe the conditions surrounding some of the topics addressed in the bulletin. These deficiencies were discussed with the licensee representative drafting the formal response to the bulletin. Additionally the inspector informed the licensee that additional information supplementing the basic response to the bulletin should be provided in order to fully address all aspects of concern in the bulletin.
The above information and specific data in regard to water systems leakage history, surveillance procedures and leak
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detection systems as required by'the temporary instruction (TI 2515/47) was forwarded to IE Headquarters. The inspector will review the licensee's formal response during a future inspection (29/80-20-03).
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12.
Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspector, t
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