IR 05000004/1958090

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IR 05000458-090-08, on June 15, 2009 - July 10, 2009, River Bend Station Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems
ML092330466
Person / Time
Site: River Bend, 05000004 Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/20/2009
From: Greg Werner
NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/PSB-2
To: Mike Perito
Entergy Operations
References
IR-09-008
Download: ML092330466 (30)
v • d • e


Text

August 20, 2009

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2009008

Dear Mr. Perito:

On July 10, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection of the problem identification and resolution process at River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The team also interviewed a representative sample of personnel regarding the condition of your safety-conscious work environment.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. In addition, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspectors at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R E GI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gregory E. Werner, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000458/2009008 w/Attachments:

1. Supplemental Information 2. Initial Information Request 3. Final Determination of Significance

REGION IV==

Docket:

05000458 License:

NPF-47 Report:

05000458/2009008 Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

River Bend Station Location:

24 miles NNW of Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dates:

June 15 through July 10, 2009 Team Leader:

Harry A. Freeman, Senior Reactor Inspector Inspectors:

Douglas R. Bollock, Project Engineer Charles H. Norton, Resident Inspector Blake B. Rice, Project Engineer Approved By:

Gregory E. Werner, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

- 2 -

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2009008; June 15, 2009 - July 10, 2009; River Bend Station "Biennial Baseline

Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."

The inspection was performed by a regional senior reactor inspector, two regional project engineers, and a resident inspector. One non-cited violation of very low significance was identified during this inspection. Additionally, one licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance is documented in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process". Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team reviewed approximately 700 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. Overall, the team determined that the licensees program for identifying, prioritizing, and correcting conditions adverse to quality was effective. While there were deficiencies identified during the inspection period, a majority were the result of management decisions prior to or in the first half of the inspection period. Based upon insights gained through interviews with plant employees, the team concluded that renewed emphasis in and management oversight of the corrective action program in 2007 resulted in the improvement in performance over the inspection period.

The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by identification of similar issues by the team.

Based on interviews with approximately 50 individuals from different organizations across the site, observations of plant activities, and reviews of the corrective action and employee concerns programs, the team determined that site personnel were willing to raise safety issues without fear of retaliation. The team noted that employees indicated that they felt comfortable reporting concerns to the corrective action program, to their management, to the employee concerns program, or to the NRC.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings for twice failing to perform an adequate operability evaluation on the Division II diesel generator after the number 8 cylinder exhaust pipe cracked and later when two of four exhaust flange bolts failed.

The finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems responding to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that a Phase 3 significance determination was required because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to potential loss of safety function of a single train.

Region IV senior risk analysts performed a Phase 3 significance determination and determined that the issue represents a finding of very low safety significance (Green).

This violation has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically the licensee failed to properly prioritize and evaluate for operability a degraded Division II diesel generator Number 8 cylinder exhaust pipe and flange P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.5).

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and Condition Report CR-RB5-2009-00296 are listed in Section 4OA7.

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from June 15, 2007, to the end of the on-site portion of the inspection on July 10, 2009.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed approximately 700 condition reports, including associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, from approximately 13,000 that had been issued between June 15, 2007, through July 10, 2009, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensees efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessments results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended the licensees periodic Condition Review Group and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes when applicable. The teams review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems. The team conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.

The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.

The team considered risk insights from both the NRCs and River Bend Station risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the following risk significant systems: emergency diesel generators, and control building chillers. The samples reviewed by the team

focused on, but were not limited to these systems. The team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving the emergency diesel generators and control building chillers to determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team conducted a walkdown of these systems to assess whether problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.

b. Assessments

1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification

The team concluded that the licensee correctly identified deficiencies that were conditions adverse to quality and did enter them into their corrective action program in accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team determined that the licensee was identifying problems at a low threshold. The team did not identify any conditions adverse to quality that were not placed in the corrective action program.

2. Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The licensee generally performed adequate assessments of conditions adverse to quality during this assessment period. The team reviewed approximately 40 corrective action documents that involved operability reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability assessments. The team noted that the immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed were completed in a timely manner. The team did identify that two of the operability evaluations were performed either using inaccurate information or that had incompletely characterized the basis for the determination.

None of these errors affected the operability of the equipment. A total of six examples associated with ineffective or inadequate evaluations were identified during the inspection period and indicate an area where the licensee should focus attention.

  • The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings for twice failing to perform an adequate operability evaluation on the Division II diesel generator after the number eight cylinder exhaust pipe cracked and when two of four exhaust flange bolts failed.

As a result there is reasonable doubt on the operability of the of the Division II diesel generator from April 26, 2008, until May 15, 2009. (See Section 40A2.5)

  • The licensee based the operability of the standby gas treatment rooms under flooding conditions using incorrect data to calculate the volume of the rooms and incorrect characterization of the flooding source (Condition Reports CR-RBS-2009-0075 and CR-RBS-2009-03037).
  • The licensee incorrectly documented the basis for operability of a motor-operated-valve that may have been over-torqued by an out-of-calibration torque wrench based upon the ultimate shear strength of the material when they actually used a conservative value for the allowable shear strength (Condition Report CR-RBS 2008-05883).

Specifically, during control rod withdrawal a reactor engineer noted that reactor power, as calculated by a heat balance, was inconsistent with predicted power.

Although this inconsistency was identified, the reactor engineers and operators failed to fully evaluate this condition, as required by procedure, and continued with power ascension resulting in an automatic rod withdrawal block.

for the failure to follow procedures to evaluate conditions adverse to quality for impacts on the operability of safety-related equipment (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008006-06). Specifically, the licensee did not assess the impact on operability of previous steam leaks and motor-stall events on the corrosion of magnesium-rotors in safety-related motor-operated valves.

  • The NRC identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) when operators failed to perform an adequate risk assessment associated with a reactor start-up while performing troubleshooting, and during maintenance activities on the main turbine electro hydraulic control system (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008003-01). This resulted in unanticipated oscillations in reactor power and pressure.

3. Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program

Overall, the team concluded that the licensee generally developed appropriate corrective actions to address problems. However, the team identified five examples of conditions adverse to quality where the licensee failed to identify or take appropriate corrective action during the inspection period that indicates an area where the licensee should focus attention.

  • The NRC identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, design control measures for verifying the adequacy of design were not implemented (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008006-02). Specifically, the licensee did not recalculate suppression pool peak temperature response when a more severe single failure condition was identified.
  • A self-revealing finding was identified for the failure to properly repair condensate Demineralizer 1E tank liner prior to returning it to service (Finding 05000458/2008002-02).

Specifically, the corrective actions for condition report CR-RBS-2007-03034 were

inadequate to correct a condition in which an instrument was not treated as measuring and test equipment. The corrective action was proposed, but not implemented, and the condition report was closed.

  • A self-revealing violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to take adequate corrective actions in response to a condition adverse to quality resulting in repetitive failures of the standby service water switchgear room ventilation fans (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008004-02). Following failure of the switchgear fans in July 2008, the licensee found that inappropriate flow switch settings on the fans had been identified in a condition report in October 1999, but no actions had been taken to correct the condition. Subsequently, more failures of the standby service water switchgear room ventilation fans occurred, including nineteen in the past three and one-half years, many of which were attributed to flow switch issues.
  • The NRC identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to promptly identify magnesium-rotor motor-operated valve degradation (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008006-06). Specifically, the licensee did not identify magnesium-rotor degradation in May 2007 after failure of reactor inlet heater A outboard motor operated isolation valve, until after failure of main steam shutoff valve, in September 2007.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self-assessments. A sample size of 17 operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment period were reviewed to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notification for relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee had entered those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the issues. The team also reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating experience.

b.

Assessment

Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating industry operating experience for relevance to the facility. The team has determined that the licensee had adequately identified related industry operating experience and implemented corrective actions accordingly. Lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs were incorporating both internal and external operating experience. However, two specific findings were identified that occurred during the first half of the inspection period indicating that there were weaknesses in the program. No findings were identified that occurred during the second half of the inspection period.

The NRC identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for an inadequate procedure for securing a reactor feedwater pump (non-cited Violation 05000458/2008002-01). Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate internal operating experience into the procedure to prevent recurrence of reactor recirculation flow control valve runback.

  • A self-revealing violation of 10 CFR 50.65(A)(3) was identified for failure to incorporate internal and external operating experience into preventive maintenance activities to prevent industry known electrical circuit breaker deficiencies (non-cited Violation 05000458/2007005-05). Specifically, inadequate breaker maintenance, leading to grease hardening degradation, resulted in inadequate electrical fault protection on November 7, 2007.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample size of 13 licensee self-assessments, trend reports, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self-and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Assessment

The team concluded that the licensee effectively utilized the self-assessment process.

The Quality Assurance audits and self-assessments provided an appropriate evaluation of plant performance. For example, Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-3-2007-RBS-1 identified two deficiencies in which the licensee failed to follow procedures. The first deficiency was a failure to follow procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, in that the process for closure of corrective actions and condition reports to work orders had not been implemented with sufficient controls to ensure that work was completed as intended by the condition report and/or corrective action. The licensee entered the deficiency in the corrective action program as condition Report CR-RBS-2007-3538.

The team identified one additional example of this performance deficiency in that condition Report CR-RBS-2008-1056 was closed to work order WO137768, which was subsequently canceled without approval from the licensees condition review group.

The second deficiency identified in the Quality Assurance audit report was failure to follow procedure EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, in that the evaluators failed to follow the guidelines and requirements of the procedure. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program as condition Report CR-RBS-2007-3542. The team also identified four additional examples of this performance deficiency. Specifically, three apparent cause evaluations did not use an approved method of cause analysis as required by the procedure. The fourth example

involved the failure to follow EN-LI-118, Root Cause Evaluation Process, in that one of the evaluators did not meet the qualification requirements described in the procedure.

Specifically, the independent reviewer did not meet the qualification criteria as required by the procedure during the formulation of the root cause evaluation. The quality of the root cause evaluation was not adversely affected and the adequacy of the root cause determination and associated corrective actions were not adversely affected. The licensee entered these additional examples into the corrective action program under condition Report CR-RBS-2009-2787. The team noted that each additional example occurred either prior to the licensees identification of the deficiency or shortly thereafter and prior to the corrective actions becoming effective. No additional examples were identified that occurred during the 2008 or 2009.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team conducted focus group interviews with eight to ten individuals from five different organizations and individual interviews with six individuals from a sixth organization. The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor and frontline staff. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the safety-conscious work environment at River Bend Station.

b.

Assessment

The inspection team concluded that the licensee has maintained a safety-conscious work environment. Most individuals interviewed agreed that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved approximately 2 years ago with a change in senior management and that trend continues to the present. Employees believed that senior management was committed to safety and are encouraged by management to raise safety concerns. All individuals expressed a willingness to raise safety concerns as soon as they were recognized and indicated that they felt it was their duty to raise concerns to ensure the safety of the plant, their fellow employees, and the public. No individual expressed any fear of retaliation for raising safety concerns and most individuals identified that they had several options available to them. The options identified by the employees typically involved telling their supervisor and/or writing a condition report. Most employees also advised that their management has an open door policy and that they can go up the chain until their concern is addressed. Those interviewed also recognized that they have the option of taking their concern to the Employee Concerns Program or to the NRC, but none acknowledged that they had used or felt a need to use either method within the last 2 years. Those interviewed generally expressed a belief that safety concerns were appropriately prioritized and corrected in a timely fashion.

.5 Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection

a.

Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Evaluation for a Degraded Diesel Exhaust Pipe

Introduction:

The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for failure to follow the requirements of Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations, Revisions 2 and 3.

Specifically, the team identified two occasions where the licensee failed to document an adequate basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition existed.

Description:

Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations, is the procedure used by licensee personnel at River Bend Station to determine whether degraded or nonconforming conditions affects the operability of structures, systems or components.

Paragraph 4.5.1 requires in part that the basis for operability be documented when a degraded or nonconforming condition exists. Contrary to this requirement, the team identified two examples of operability determinations associated with the Division II diesel generator exhaust pipe failures that failed to adequately document the basis for operability.

After running for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> on May 15, 2009, the Division II diesel generator Number 8 exhaust pipe and supporting hardware unexpectedly failed and separated from the cylinder head exhaust port. The licensee shut down the diesel approximately 45 minutes later aborting a scheduled 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run. The licensee determined that a locked slip-joint between the Number 8 exhaust pipe flange and horizontal piping allowed thermal stresses to build and induce the failure. Prior to this event, the exhaust pipe had developed a through wall crack in the flange weld during a surveillance run on April 26, 2008. Additionally, during a surveillance run on January 21, 2009, two of four flange bolts fractured and were subsequently replaced. The licensees operability evaluations of these two events supported diesel operability, predicted further degradation unlikely, and evaluated that insignificant performance degradation would occur in the event of a worst case failure.

The operability evaluations following the April 26, 2008, weld crack event and the January 21, 2009, bolt fracture event contained non-conservative worst case assumptions that failed to bound the actual conditions exhibited during the failure that occurred during the May 15, 2009, Division II diesel generator surveillance run. The licensee had assumed that the exhaust pipe flange weld would crack circumferentially and the pipe would drop vertically 1 3/8 inches creating a small opening for exhaust gas to bypass the turbo-charger. On May 15, 2009, the pipe, the flange and two of four anchor bolts fractured. The pipe sprang free of the cylinder head and fell down and to the right resulting in a larger than assumed opening for exhaust gas bypass flow.

The licensee had assumed that only about half of the exhaust energy from the number 8 cylinder and a small percentage from the number one cylinder would bypass the turbo-charger leaving approximately 92 percent of the total exhaust energy available to the turbo-charger. Following the May 15, 2009, event all the exhaust energy from the

Number 8 cylinder and an un-quantified percentage of the energy from the other seven cylinders bypassed the turbo-charger.

The licensee had predicted that the average exhaust pipe temperature would increase from a normal of around 850oF. to a maximum of around 981oF, which is well below the turbo-charger maximum limit of 1200oF. Following the May 15, 2009, event, several cylinder exhaust temperatures increased to over 1000oF and at least one cylinder reached 1200oF which challenged the turbo-charger limits.

The licensee had predicted that any fuel consumption increase would not challenge the diesel generator minimum fuel supply. The actual fuel consumption rate following the May 15, 2009, event challenged the technical specification minimum stored fuel limit.

Analysis:

The team determined that the failure to adequately document the basis for operability was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems responding to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that a Phase 3 significance determination was required because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to potential loss of safety function of a single train for greater than the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time. Region IV senior risk analysts performed a Phase 3 significance determination and determined that the issue represents a finding of very low safety significance. The final determination of significance is included as Attachment 3 to this report. This violation has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution; associated with the corrective action program because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions. Specifically the licensee failed to properly prioritize and evaluate for operability a degraded Division II diesel generator Number 8 cylinder exhaust pipe and flange P.1(c) (Section 4OA2.5).

Enforcement:

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions procedures or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations, Revisions 2 and 3, requires that the shift manager document the basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition is identified. Contrary to this requirement, on April 30, 2008, and on January 28, 2009, the documented bases for operability for degraded conditions did not adequately support the operability position taken by the shift manager. Because this noncompliance is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-03055, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV05000458/2009008-01, "Inadequate Operability Determinations for a Degraded Diesel Exhaust Pipe."

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 10, 2009, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Michael Perito, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed with the licensee that no proprietary information was provided to the inspection team.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

Undocumented Field Change to the Division I Diesel Generator Turbo-Charger Drain Line

The licensee identified a non-cited annotated with a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control, associated with a field change performed on the Division I diesel generator turbo-charger drain line modification. The licensee had identified a crack on the turbo-charger oil drain line connection to the Division I diesel generator.

The licensee developed a modification to preclude recurrence of the leak. While installing the modification, the licensee performed an undocumented field change to route the drain line around a physical interference. The undocumented change placed the diesel generator in a degraded condition which if left uncorrected could have become a more significant safety concern. The licensee subsequently discovered the undocumented field change and took corrective action to restore the drain line to design specifications. The licensee documented the condition in the condition reporting process as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-002296.

ATTACHMENTS:

1.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

T. Bolke, Licensing Specialist, Licensing
T. Bordelon, CA&A Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessment
D. Burnett, Manager, Nuclear
G. Bush, Manager, Plant Maintenance
L. Coats, HP/Chemistry Specialist, Radiation Protection
M. Chase, Manager, Training and Development
J. Clark, Operations Manager, Operations
B. Cox, Manager, Operations
R. Crawford, Engineering Supervisor, Engineering
C. Forpahl, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components
B. Houston, Manager, Radiation Protection
K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist, Licensing
A. James, Manager, Plant Security
L. Kitchen, Manager, Planning & Scheduling - Outages
R. Kowaleski, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments
J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering
R. McAdams, Manager, System Engineering
J. McElwain, Manager, Human Resources
E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations
M. Perito, Vice President, Operations
S. Phillips, CA&A Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessment
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
J. Schlesinger, Supervisor, Engineering
A. Spencer, Maintenance Coordinator, Maintenance
C. Walker, Manager, Project Engineering
D. Wiles, Director, Engineering
D. Wells, Coordinator, Employee Concerns Program
L. Woods, Manager, Quality Assurance (Acting)

NRC Personnel

G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

05000458/2009008-001

NCV

Inadequate Operability Determinations for a Degraded Diesel Exhaust Pipe (Section 4OA2.5)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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