IR 05000002/1981003
| ML20010E247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Michigan |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, Janke R, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010E242 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-002-81-03, 50-2-81-3, NUDOCS 8109030236 | |
| Download: ML20010E247 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0 fit!ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEt!ENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-002/81-03 Docket No.50-002 License No. R-28 Licensee:
University of flichigan Phoenix flemorial Laboratory Ann Arbor, FII 48105 Facility Name:
Ford Nuclear Reactor Inspection Conducted: July 27, 1981 0$
Inspectors:
K. R.
idgway I- /[_k
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jk'h?<j'b R. C. Janke (9 - d' 4/
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, n abs D.Y.Boyd,f OU' cCO -b'/
Apprcved By:
Chief Reactor Projects Section 1A Inspection Summary Inspection on July 27, 1981 (Report No. 50-002/81-03)
Areas Inspected:
Special announced inspection of an occurrence (exceeding the licensed power level) which occurred on.Iune 9, 1981 and was reported to Region III by telephone and telegraph on June 9, 1981 and by a written l
report on June 23, 1981.
This inspection involved a total of 17 inspector-
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hours (12 onsite) by two (2) NRC inspectors including zero inspector-hours l
onsite during offshifts.
Results:
One item ct noncompliance was identified (the licensed power level was excieded).
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8109030236 810821
PDR ADOCK 05000002 G
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DETAILS l
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1.
Personnel :ontacted i
- G. Cook, Assistant Reactor Manager
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? B. DuCamp, Supervisor of Reactor Operations
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N. Burgard, Reactor Operator
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P. Simpson, Reactor Operator
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ADenotes those present at the exit interview.
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General
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On June 9 and June 23, 1981, the licensee reported to NRC Region III
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that the licensed power limit of 2.0 Megawatts (MW) ha i been exceeded
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by ten percent (2.2 MW) for about 20 minutes during a startup following
an outage between cycles 199A and 199B. This is censidered to be a j
violation of license condition 2.C.(1) which states:
"The licensee is
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authorized to operate the facilit: at steady state power levels not in excess of two Megawatts (thermal).
The licensee attributed the incident te operator failure to follow procedures during the startup.
i Maiatenance work carried out during the outage between cycles 199A and
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1998 included the inspection of the linear level detector and associated leads. This required the removal of the compensated ion chamber and in
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j this case, replacement of the leads and connectors.
The linear level channel is used to automatically control the reactor power since it is the most precise and accurate neutron flux measuring instrument.
In normal operations it is the most observed power level indication and requires close attenticn and many range changes during power escalations to keep the recorder on scale. The only automatic
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j feature of the linear channel is the rod run back at 115 percent power,
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i The liacar level channel is not a part of the reactor safety circuit, I
but is considered a safety related instrument. As such it is required I
by Technical Specifications to be operable before the reactor is made l
I critical.
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l Following the maintenance work, prestartup checks of the linear level channel were carried out in accordance with OP-102, Reactor Startup which i
includes the FNR Control System Startup Checklist "A" and the Cycle
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Operation Checklist.
The surveillance included in the above checklists j
are operational tests of the automatic control annunciators, test of the j
automatic runback features and verification that the last electronic j
ca?ibration (May 27, 1981) was still valid. Records indicated the above t
checks had been carried out and were normal.
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i If maintenance work has been carried out on or the nuclear instruments have been replaced, the startup procedure requires the power escalation to be stopped at 500 KW.
At this point indicated power of the four nuclear instruments are compared and should be within specified ranges.
l These readings are logged.
i The startup was stopped at 500 KW and the operators recorded the instrument readings in the log book, as required. At this point the operators over-
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looked the discrepancy between the linear level safety channels both reading
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about 750 KW (digital readout 0.75) and the log n period channel which indicated about 750 KW (chart 40%).
Both of the safety channel reading-i
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O.75 were above the maximum specified in the procedure (0.6) and the log n-chart reading of 40% was on the upper limit.
Both of these deviations went unnoticed by the operators.
r following the recording of the power level data a: 500 KW, the startup t
continued by procedure to the 80% power level (1.6 MW) using the linear level power instrument. At 80% the power was automatically held constant for a required calorimeter run using OP-306, Power Level Determination.
At the conclusion of the calorimeter run which took about 20 minutes,
the operators noticed the overpower condition (the calorimeter power level agreed with the two level safety channel indicators and the log i
i n period channel). The power level was immediately reduced to less than 2.0 MW and the linear level chamber adjusted to agree with the calori-meter run using OP-306, Power Level Determination.
The inspectors determined that both power level safety channels were operational during the startup an( would have automatically shutdown the i
reactor before the limiting safety system setting of 2.4 MW or the safety
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limit of 3.1 MW required by the Technical Specifications were exceedco.
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The licensee has taken the following actions to prevent occurrences of
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this type:
a.
The operators involved during the occurrence were reinstructed in the use of the Reactor Startup Procedure, OP-102 and were required to take written examinations. The event was publicized so that all
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j operators are knowledgable of the cause.
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b.
The Reactor Startup Procedure was revised to clearly require that at the 500 KW power level check, the power level will be established on an instrument system that has not undergone maintenance.
c.
A log book stamp has been utilized to remind the operators of the
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upper and lower ranges of all four nuclear instrument channels at the s90 KW 1evel as specified in OP-102.
d.
The stirtup procedure has been modified so that the calorimeter power level detcrmination will be carried out at the one megawatt
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ievel.
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During this special inspection, the inspectors intervieweil facility j
personnel anil revieweil logs, checksheets, proccelures an<l charts to l
conf i rm the reporte<l inf ormation.:act to verif y that the repo rt eil i
corrective actions hail been taken anil were appropriate.
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3.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (<lenoteil in Pa ragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the special inspection. The abnormal event anel
corrective actions taken hy the l icensee were <liscusse<i.
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