GO2-82-672, Forwards marked-up FSAR Pages Submitting Addl Info Re Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment),Per 820528 Commitment.Info Closes Outstanding SER Issue 2, NUREG-0892

Forwards marked-up FSAR Pages Submitting Addl Info Re Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment),Per 820528 Commitment.Info Closes Outstanding SER Issue 2, NUREG-0892

ML17276B599
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/12/1982
From:	Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0892, RTR-NUREG-892 GO2-82-672, NUDOCS 8208240332
Download: ML17276B599 (30)

Text

REGULATO NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S fEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8208240332 DOC ~ DATE: 82/08/12 NOTARIZED:

YKS DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Projects Unit 2i Washi.ngton:Public Powe 05000397 AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BO'UCHEYiG,D, Washington Public Power Supply System

'"RBC IP i NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SCHNENCERiA ~

Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT:

Forwards marked-up FSAR pages submitting addi info re internally generated missiles (outside containment)iper 820528 commitment

~ Info closes out outstanding SER Issue 2f NUREG 0892

'ISTRIBUTION CODE:

B001S

.COPIES RECEIVED:LTR NCL SIZE ~

TITLE: PSAR/FSAR AMDTS and Related Correspondence NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME A/D LICENSNG LIC BR 02 LA INTiKRNAL: ELD/HDS2 IE/DEP EPDS 35 NRR/DE/CEB 11 NRR/DE/GB 28 NRR/DK/MEB 18 NRR/DE/QAB 21 NRR/DE/SEB 25 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 NRR/DHFS/PTRB20 NRR/DS I/ASB 27 NRR/DSI/CSB 09 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 NRR/DSI/RAB 22 NRR/DST/LGB 33 RGN5 EXTERNAL: ACRS 41 DMB/DSS (AMDTS)

LPDR 03 NSIC 05 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

0 1

0 1

0 1

1 1

2 2

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

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16 16 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIP IENT ID CODE/NAME'IC BR 02 BC AULUCKiR~

01 IE FILE IE/DEP/EPLB 36 NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/HGEB 30 NRR/DK/MTEB 17 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/DHFS/OLB 34 NRR/DS I/AEB 26 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 NRR/DS I/ETS8 12 NRR/DSI/PSB 19 SB 23 K

04 RM/DDAMI /MIB BNL(AMDTS ONLY)

FEMA~RKP DIV 39 NRC PDR 02 NTIS COPIES LTTR ENCL 0

1 1

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3 3

3 3

2 2

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

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1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 64 ENCL 59

~

+

~

'r tl kl II H

A E

ll o

'I

Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000 August 12, 1982 G02-82-672 SS-L-02-CDT-82-091 Docket No. 50-397 Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.

2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Reference:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.

2 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES (OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

Letter G02-82-492, G.D. Bouchey (SS) to A. Schwencer (NRC), "Internally Generated Missiles

( Inside Containment)",

dated May 28, 1982 Per our commitment in the referenced letter, attached are sixty (60) copies of the marked-up FSAR pages submitting additional information on internally generated missiles (outside containment).

This submittal closes out Outstanding Issue No.

2 from the WNP-2 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0892).

These marked-up pages will be included in Amendment No.

27 to the WNP-2 FSAR.

Very truly yours, G.

D. Bouchey Deputy Director, Safety and Security CDT/jca Attachment cc:

R Auluck -

NRC WS Chin

- BPA R

Feil NRC Site goo/

8208240332 820812 PDR ADOCK 05000397 E

PDR

WNP-2 AMENDMENT.NO.

27 August 1982 3

5 MISSILE-PROTECTION The WNP-2 missile protection design basis conforms to 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power'Plants; Criterion 4, Environmental and Missile Design Bases.

The objectives of missile protection design are to ensure that the plant can be brought to and kept in a safe shutdown mode and to prevent offsite radiological consequences assuming an additional single component failure.

Design against generated missiles involves an initial selec-tion proce'ss to define postulated missiles, an evaluation of postulated missile credibility, then a damage assessment to evaluate the effects of credible missiles, and finally, if necessary to ensure safe

shutdown, the provision of barriers or physical modifications of systems and components to preclude damage.

Structures housing systems and components essential for safe shutdown are designed'o'ithstand externally generated missi-les so that essential systems and components are not damaged by such missiles or by the secondary effects of such missiles.

3."5.1 MISSILE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIONS 3.5. 1. 1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment) 3.5.1.1.1 Systems Available for Safe Shutdown Systems available outside containment to facilitate safe shut-down include:

high pressure core spray (HPCS),

low pressure core spray (LPCS), residual heat removal (RHR), standby ser-vice water (SSW), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)<

control rod drives (CRD) and the reactor feedwater system (RFW).

These systems and their function are described in 7.3.

The calculation of credible. missile kinetic energies, missile target deteaninations, and target and barrier damage eva-luations are covered in 3.5.3.

Figures 3.5-1 through 3.5-15 illustrate the location of these systems.

Seismic categories, quality group classifications, and FSAR reference sections are provided in Table 3.5-1.

3.5. 1.1. 2 Missiles Due to'otating Equipment Failure The systems located outside the primary containment have been reviewed to identify potential rotating equipment missiles.

The design ~bjective is to prevent the generation of missiles and their effects.

3.5-1

AMENDMEAT NO.

27 August 1982 All rotating equipment (e.g.,

pumps, turbines,

fans, and compressors) outside the primary containment have been eva-luatod to deternine missile generation potential (postulated missiles), missile credibility, and an analysis of credible miss>le effect All ECCS rotating equipment outside the primary containment are grouped by division in different rooms or areas of the plant, separated by walls or barriers, so that a sinqle missile cannot Ramage redundant systems.

The RCXC turbine is prevented from reaching a runaway speed>

where component failure could occur, by overspeed tripping devices In adRition, as with the FCCS systems, the RCIC tur-bine is located in a separate compartment.

3.5.1.1.3 Missiles Due to Pressurized Component Failure The potential of the following equipment to generate missiles was investigated:

a.

High Fnergy Pipina pressurized piping in systems where the service temperature exceeded 200 F and/or the service pressure exceeded 275 psig was evaluateR for potential generation of missiles.

High energy piping pipe whip is Riscussed in 3.6.

b.

Valve Ponnets 1.

Pressurized Seal Donnets Valves with an AtlSI rating of 900 psig and above are pressurized seal bonnet type

valves, constructed in accordance with the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code,Section III.

Valve bonnets, on pressure seal bonnet type valves, are prevented from becoming missiles by the retaining ring, which would have to fail in shear, and by the yoke, which would capture the honnet or reduce bonnet energy.

The honnet bolts preload the pressure seal gasket to seal the valve initially.

When pressurized, the valve 'is sealed by process fluid pressure and the bonnet bolts are under no load.

All ASME III, Class I, 900O bonnet seal type valves were analyzed per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code,Section III requirements.

Valve design pressures used in

3. 5-2

WNP-2.

AMENDMENT.NO 27 August 1982 these analyses were given by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Figure NB-3545.1-2 for weld-end valves.

Using a typical pressure seal valve, the total thrust load on the retaining ring and valve body was calcu-lated.

The results demonstrated that both the retaining ring and valve body meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, NB-3227 requirements for pressures much higher than the normal operating pressure of the valve.

The majority of valves inside containment have massive valve operators which are sup-ported by the yoke.

For these valves, the valve operators act as an additional limita-tion to the yoke becoming a missile.

For 'a yoke clamp to fail, it must be assumed that the retaining ring fails completely and instantaneously so that the bonnet could strike the yoke.

The yoke is normally under no load and complete failue of the yoke clamp is not considered credible.

Because of the highly conservative design of the retaining ring of these valves, bonnet ejection is highly improbable,

and, hence bonnets are notconsidered credible missiles.

Bolted Bonnets Most valves of ANSI rating 600 psig and below are valves with bolted bonnets.

Valve bon-nets are prevented from becoming missiles by limiting stresses in the bonnet-to-body bolting material by requirements set,forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code,Section III, and by designing flanges in accordance with applicable code reauirements.

Even if bolt fa'ilure were to occur, the like-lihood of all bolts experiencing simultaneous

. complete severance failure is remote.

A study of bolted valve bonnets was made in

'which 25% of the connective bolts in the circular pattern were assumed missing.

The stresses occurring under operating conditions with these bolts missing were found to be within acceptable limits.

The widespread

3. 5-3

NNP-2 tAMENDMENT NO 27 August '1982 use of valves with bolted bonnets and the ~

historical incidence of complete severance failures of bonnets confirms that bolted valve bonnets need not be considered credible missiles.

3.

Screwed-Typed Bonnets Some valves in the 1-inch to 1-1/2-inch size range have coarse threaded bonnets which screw into 'the valve body.

These valves were analyzed and found to have low stress inten-sities in the bonnet retaining threads.

The valve design stress intensities were found to be a minimum of 4.5 times and stress inten-sities that will be experienced by the valves.

Because of the highly conservative design of these valves, they are not con-sidered credible missiles.

c.

Valve Stems Valve stems are not considered credible missiles if at least one feature in addition to the stem threads is included in their design to prevent ejection; for example, valves with backseats.

d.

Thermowells and Sample Probes Temperature or other, detectors installed on piping. or in wells are evaluated as potential missiles if a single circumferential weld would cause their ejection.

This is highly improbable, since a complete and sudden failure of a circum-ferential weld is needed for a detector to become a missile.

These circumferential welds were ana<<

lyzed and found to have design stress intensities at least 18, times the stress intensities that will be experienced in service.

Because of their highly conservative

design, thermowells and sample probes are not considered credible missiles.

e.

Nuts and Bolts Nuts, bolts, nut and bolt combinations, and nut and stud combinations are unlikely to fail because of the low stress intensities for these parts.

The ASME and ANSI Codes limit the allowable stresses in bolts and studs to 20 to 30

3. 5-4

WNP-2 MENDMENT NO. 27; August 1982 percent of yield.

These low stress intensities are assured by measuring the torque of all bolts,

studs, and nuts during installation.

Because of their highly conservative

design, nuts and bolts are not considered credible missiles.

f.

Blind Flanges Bolted blind flanges are not considered credible missiles because of the extermely unlikely occurrence of all bolts experiencing simultaneous complete severance failure as discussed in Item b.2 above.

g.

Nitrogen Tanks and Bottles 3.5.1.1 4

Nitrogen tanks and bottles in the reactor building provide nitrogen for CRD drives, charging of main steam safety/relief valve, iso-lation valve accumulator

tanks, and instrument nitrogen inside containment.

These tanks and bottles have design pressures considerably in excess of their operating pressures.

Because of their highly conservative

design, nitrogen tanks and bottles are not considered credible missiles.

QADI 7 Evaluation of Postulated Missiles a.

Assessment of Postulated Missile Credibility Postulated missiles are analyzed to determine if a credible failure mode resulting in a missile exists.,

Failure modes determined to be credible are then assessed for impact on plant safe shutdown.

b.

Assessment of Potential Credible Missile Damage The ability of the plant to achieve safe shutdown is assumed by physical separation and redundancy of safety-.related systems.

The adequacy of the physical separation and redundancy of safety-related systems was evaluated using the following procedure:

1.

Target Determination Based on the missile location and orien-tation, the target areas are predicted.

Trajectories are selected to encompass the 3

~ 5-5

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO 27 August 1982 most adverse conditions.

The essential systems within that region are assumed damaged and not available for a safe shutdown.

2. 'valuation'of System Damage The essential systems which are available after the worst postulated missile accident and the most critical additional single failure are determined.

An evaluation is then made to determine whether these remaining systems are sufficient to achieve safe reactor shutdown.

3.

Protection of Systems When the separation and redundancy of the essential systems is not adequate, or when a

redundant system is not available, one or more of the following measures are taken to ensure safe shutdown:

a.

The orientation of the credible missile is changed so that systems necessary for safe shutdown are,not damaged.

b.

Missile barriers are provided.

c.

Xt is shown that the essential components will not be damaged by the credible missile.

c.

Determination of Missile Energies

\\

One of the following methods is used to calculate the extent of the damage caused by a credible missile:

1.

Piston-Type Missiles The velocity of a piston-type missile is calculated by assuming that the work done will be converted into kinetic energy of the missile wi'th no losses of energy due to fric-

'tion or air resistance.

Work is the integral of force times displace-ment, while the kinetic energy of the missile is one-half the product of the missile mass 3.5-6

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO ~ 27 August 1982 times the square of the missile velocity.

Assuming the applied force constant (PAo),

the kinetic energy is equated to the work done (Reference 3.5-1).

Subsequently, the missile velocity is obtained by the expression:

2 PA L 0

1/2 (Reference 3.5-1) where:

1 -

V Vf where:

V ~ the initial velocity at the end of a piston stroke (ft/sec)

P = pressure of the fluid (psi)

Ao = cross-sectional area of the piston (in2)

L = length of the stroke in ft.

m ~ mass of missile (lb-sec2/ft)

2. Jet Propelled Missiles The velocity of this type of postulated missile is estimated by (Reference 3.5-1):

K K1 2

No+

X Tan B

Loge 1 -.

V Vf Postulated jet propelled missiles propelled by fluid escaping from a pressurized system in which there is essentially no lateral containment of the fluid.

The escaping jet will not only impinge on the missile, but will~ also flow around and past the missile.

K1 Loge 1 -

~V

+

~K Vf No m ~

(Tan B)

V = missile velocity at distance X (fps) 3'-7

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO 27 August 1982 Vf = jet velocity

=(fps)

No ~ radius of throat (ft)

Pf = density of the jet fluid (lb-sec2/ft4)

X = distance travelled (ft)

B = angle of jet expansion, degrees from normal

<o = initial velocity of missiles Ao = throat area (ft2)

Am = cross-sectional area of missile (ft2) m = mass of missile (lb-sec2/ft) 3.

Stored Strain Energy Missiles Stored strain energy missiles are assumed to convert all the strain energy at which they fail into kinetic energy.

The velo-ce.ty is calculated from the following for-mula

( Reference

3. 5-1 ):

1/2 S

where:

missile velocity

( ft/sec) modulus of elasticity (lb/ft2)

W = specific weight of missile (lb/ft3) ultimate'stress in the missile before failure (lb/ft2) acceleration of gravity (ft/sec2) 4.

Rotating Machinery A variety of missiles from rotating machi-nery can be treated by considering each as a rotating block.

Because it is part of a rotating structure, the block is con-sidered to be initially rotating about its axis of revolution at a speed<<

radians per second.

The r

3 5-8 7l P

~ w WIr e-q,

~ ~

~

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO ~ 27 August'.

1982 structures in their paths.

Motor generator set modification to eliminate or contain the flywheel missiles was evaluated, but a feasible modifica-tion was not practical.

The flywheels were, therefore, credible missiles.

b.

Assessment of Potential Credible Missile Damage The flywheel missiles were postulated to exit the motor generator sets along a plane perpendicular

'to the motor generator set, with the missile exiting a maximum of ten degrees from the per-pendicular plane.

1. Target Determination The potential targets for the flywheel missi-les were determined by reviewing the appli-cable drawings and visual inspection of the tart[et area in the switchgear rooms.

It was determined that safety-related cables in these rooms could potentially be damaged.

2. Evaluation of System Damage The safety-related cables which could be damaged by the flywheel provide DC power to instrument panels in the control room and to isolation valves inside conntainment.

Damage to these cables was determined to be unacceptable.

3. Protection of Systems It was determined that there was not a feasible method of proving that the cables would not be damaged by the flywheel missi-

.les.

In order to preclude damage to the safety-related

cables, the following alter-natives were investigated:

'a)

The motor generator sets were analyzed to determine if a change in orientation was feasible.

This was not a feasible altern'ative.

b) The feasibility of constructing a barrier around the flywheel was investigated.

This was a feasible alternative.

3 5-10

NNP-2 AMENDMENT'O~ 27 August 1982 c.

Barrier Design A missile barrier proved to be the only feasible alternative.

The barrier was designed to contain the. highest energy missile that could be produced by the flywheel.

The barrier was constructed of steel and energy-absorbing aluminum honeycomb material and firmly anchored to the concrete floor.

This eliminated the effects of the credible missile.

~~a,rW y4

<<)

<<A 3.5.1.2 Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment) 3.5. 1.2. 1 Systems Available for Saf e Shutdown Figures

3. 5-16 through 3. 5-32describe the mechanical and instrumentation locations of systems available for a safe shutdown.

Each system (LPCS,

HPCS, RHR,

ADS, CRD, and primary containment) is color.coded to specify the location of struc-

tures, systems, or components.

In addition, the reactor pro-tection system and isolation valves inside containment are available for safe shutdown of the plant and to prevent off-site radiological consequences.

Information pertaining to applicable seismic category, quality group classification, reference sections in the FSAR, where these systems are described, is provided in Table 3.5-2.

The evaluation of credible missile kinetic energies and missile target deter-minations is covered in 3.5.1.1.4.

Target and barrier damage evaluations are covered in 3.5.3.

3.5.1.2.2 Missiles Due to Rotating Equipment Rotating equipment inside containment consists of the following:

a.

Recirculation Pump and Motor The most substantial piece of NSSS rotating machinery is the recirculation pump and motor.

This potential missile source is covered in detail in Reference 3.5-4.

It is concluded in Reference 3.5-4 that destruc-tive pump overspeed is highly improbable.

If it occurred, it could result in failure of certain pump and motor components having the potential to become missiles.

A careful examination of the pump and motor structure shows that rotor or shaft failure will not result in ejection of motor generated

missiles, and impeller missiles

3. 5-11

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO. 27 August 1982 cannot penetrate the pump case.

Reference 3.5-4 concludes that in the unlikely event of impeller failure resulting in ejection of missiles through ruptured pipe, penetration of containment by missile fragments is highly improbable.

Evaluation of the effects on safety-related systems of impeller fragments which might be ejected from openings in ruptured pipe is not evaluated because of the extreme improbability of this event, and because the effects would'ot be more severe than the assumed consequences of jet impingement due to pipe breaks inside containment as discussed in 3.6.

b.

Fans as Potential Missiles 3.F 1.2.3 The fans inside primary containment are designed.

such that the casing will restrain any possible missile.

Therefore, fans and parts thereof are not considered as possible sources of missiles.

Missiles Due to Pressurized Component Failure

~ A discussion of the potential for missile generation from the failure of pressurized components, e.g., valve stems, valve

bonnets, and temperature element assemblies, is presented in 3.5.1.1.3.

That discussion is also applicable to pressurized components inside containment.

In addition, safety/relief valve and main steam isolation valve accumulators are par-ticular to inside containment:

Pressurized ASME XXX vessels such as SRV and MSXV accumulators are not considered credible missiles.

These accumulators are operated at a maximum pressure and temperature of 150 psig and 150'F.

These vessels have low stresses and operate in the "moderate energy" range and, therefore, any failures would be a crack-type and not of concern for'missile generation.

All potential sources of postulated missiles inside the pri-mary conntainment were analyzed to determine missile crdibi-lity utilizing the criteria discussed above and in 3.5.1.1.3 as required by General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Basis." It -was determined that all postulated missiles inside the primary containment incorporated design features that eliminated their credibility as potential sour-ces of missiles.

3.5-11a

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO. 27 August 1982 3.5.1.2.4 Falling Objects Structural elements, equipment, and components inside contain-ment which could be considered as potential falling objects are supported to satisfy Seismic Category I requirements.

The only exceptions to this are the monorail hoists inside con-tainment which are not analyzed for Seismic Category I loading conditions, but are chained in place while not in use to ensure that they do not become falling objects which could damage safety systems.

On this basis, falling objects are not postulated mi:ssiles.

The physical separation and redundancy of safe shutdown systems also assures that falling objects do not present a threat to these systems.

3.5.1.2.5 Secondary Misiles Generated by Postulated Credible Primary Missiles Secondary missiles are not considered credible missiles due to their low probability of occurrence and their low kinetic energy levels.

The p'robability of damage due to a secondary missile is the probability of occurrence of a primary missile times the probability of hitting a part tht can become a

secondary missile times the probability that the part will actually become a missile.

This probability is very low.

The level of stored kinetic energy in a secondary missile will be low because of the large energy required to produce a secon-dary missile.

In addition, no reliable method to predict secondry missile characteristics is known, other than those characteristics in common with primary missiles.

3. 5-11b

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO. 27 August'982 f.

All openings for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system fresh air intakes (FAX) and exhausts (EXH), in buildings housing safety-"..

related equipment, are protected against exter-nally generated missiles by means of shield walls as indicated in Table 3.5-6.

Examples are the louvered openings above the floor elevation 572'-0" in the north and south walls of the reac-tor building.

These openings are protected by a labyrinth of missile shield walls immediately inside'he opening.

3 ' '

BARRIER DESIGN PROCEDURES bar river ly pl The design op'jectives emphasize missle containment and struc-tural integrity without secondary missle generation.

3.5.3.1 Concrete Barriers Concrete missile barriers are designed in accordance with the modified Petry equation (Reference 3.5-2).

In all cases f except for barriers exposed to turbine missiles, a concrete thickness of twice the penetration thickness determined for an infinitely thick slab-is provided to prevent perforationg spalling, or scabbing.

For discussion of turbine generated miss iles see 3.5. 1.3.

3.5.3.2 Steel Barriers The Ballistic Research Laboratories Formula (Reference 3.5-1) is used to determine penetration depths of missiles into steel barriers.

The overall response of barriers subject to impact are investigated by the use of general energy equations given in "Introduction to Structural Dynamics," J.

M. Biggs (Reference 3.5-9).

Upon determination

'of penetration depth and duration of impact, an effective dynamic force is computed.

The addi-tional calculation of the natural period of the target struc-ture and the selection of a ductility ratio facilitates the determination of the required structural resistance.

In this manner, missile impact is translated to an equivalent static load in an effort to quantify bending moments and shear.

The detailed method used for predicting the overall response of missile barriers,

~ including the forcing function method of determining ductility in structural elements and the basis for the ductility ratios used in the calculations, is provided in Appendix C of the report Protection Against Pipe Breaks Outside Containment" (Reference 3.5-13) that was presented to and approved by the NRC.

3 '-24

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO ~ 27 August 1982 3.5.3.3 Earth Barriers When the protective barrier is of earthen origin, the soil penetration studies are based on alternate techniques.

Buried safety-related piping and electrical systems required for a safe shutdown are ensured adequate protection from tornado genexated missiles.

Analysis of potential damage is performed using the "Tornado Design Considerations for Nuclear Power Plants" by Bates and

Swanson, 1967 (Reference 3.5-8).

The analysis procedure neglects soil interlocking under a suddenly applied load and ignores lateral soil resistance.

A five-foot 1

embedment depth is calculated to be acceptable to ensure pipe integrity.

3.5.3.4 Applications Examples of barrier design are as follows:

Steel covers for manholes containing cabling for safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown are designed to withstand tornado generated missile impact and associated wind pressure.

These 2'-9" circular steel plates are designed using conventional elastic analysis and design methods for determining stress and strain.

The design adopted uses two 1-1/8-inch plates of ASTM A 514 steel plate to prevent penetration and blowout.

The reactor building railroad airlock exterior doors and the standby service water pumphouse exterior equipment doors are designed and certified by the manufacturer to withstand the effects of tornado generated exterior missiles as described in 3

5 1.4 All other doors in Seismic Category I and safety-related 1

structures are not designed to withstand the effects of the missiles described in 3.5.1.

These doors are backed up, wherever missile protection. is required, with reinforced concrete walls forming a labyrinth behind the door.

Similarly, louvers in exterior walls, which are vulnerable to missile penetration, are backed up by reinforced concrete pie-1 nums or walls.

Based upon the selection and description of missiles cited in 3.5.1, the interaction of missiles with structural elements is determined and the results 'are given in Table 3.5-5.

The tabulations assume the missiles to impact at the most vulverable point of a structure or component (e.g.,

at the center of a slab).

3.5-25

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO. 27 August 1982 The reactor protection system motor generator sets flywheels located in the critical DC switchgear rooms at elevation 467'-0" in the radwaste building were analyzed and determined to be credible missile sources, with the potential consequen-ces affecting the safe shutdown of the plant.

Barriers were constructed around these flywheels of steel and aluminum honeycomb material, which were designed to contain the cre-dible missiles (see 3.5.1.1.5).

3 5-25a

Insert A (Page

3. 5-2):

was completed.

Credible missiles outside containment, missile sources, safety-related systems requiring protection (if any),

and the extent of damage to safety-related systems (if any) are listed in Table 3.5-7.

Insert B

(Page 3.5-2):

The walls or barriers are designed to contain all missiles.

Insert C

(Page 3.5-2):

However, the RCIC turbine, similar to all plant rotating equipment, is also evaluated for credible missile generation at normal full speed operation.

Insert D

(Page 3.5-5):

No credible missiles are in a position to impact any of the nitrogen tanks or bottles.

Insert E

(Page 3.5-11):

A tabulation of plant systems protected by missile barriers is provided in Table 3.5-8.

Insert F

(Page 3.5-11a):

The recirculation pump and motor are, therefore, not considered to be credible missile sources.

TABLE 3.5-7 AMENDMENT NO, 27 August 3,982 Page 1 of 6 Missile Equipment Ne.

Number INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

$ <~Saic.

Description equality

'esolution Class ass...Code Notes..

f-7 F-9 F-11 F-27 F-33 F-35 F-37 F-39 f-41 F-43 F-57 F-59 F-61 F-62 P-1 P-3'-5 P-6 P-7 P-9 P-10 P-11 P-12 P-13 P-14 P-15 P-16 RRA-FN-6 RRA-FN-2 RRA-FN-7 RRA-FN-16 REA-FN-2A REA-FN-2B REA-FN-1A REA-'FN-1B ROA-FN-lA ROA-FN-1B RRA>>FN-3 REA-FN-15 RRA-FC-19 RRA-FC-20 LPCS-P-2 HPCS-P.-3

,CRD-P-1A CRD-P-1B RHR-P-3 COND-P-3 RCIC-P-4 RCIC-P-2 RCIC-DT-1 RCIC-P-1 COND-P-4 COND<<P-5 RCIC-P-3 RCIC Pump Room Fan Coil Fan MS Fan,Coil Fan I

I II II II II II II II II I

II I

I I

I II II I

p II I

I I

I Pump II II II RR Lock Fan Coil Fan Air.Cond Unit Fan Exhaust Fan Exhaust Fan Exhaust Fan Exhaust Fan Supply Fan Supply 'Fan RHR Pump Rm Fan Coil Fan Exhaust Fan FPC HX.and Pump Rm Cooler FPC HX and Pump Rm Cooler

,LPCS Water Leg Pump HPCS Mater Leg Pump CRD Pump C12-C001A CRD Pump C12-C001B RHR Water Leg Pump RX Bldg Condensate Supply Pum RCIC Condensate Pump RCIC Vacuum Pump RCIC Turbine Drive RCIC Pump Radwaste Building Cond Supply Cond FD Backwash Pump RCIC Water Leg Pump I

I II II II II II II II II I

II I

I I

I II II I

II I

I I

I II II II C

C A

C A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

D E

E E

E D

E 3.5-35

HNP-2 TABLE 3.5-7 iENDHENT No.

27 August 1982 Page 2 'of 6

Missile No.

Equipment Number INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)

MC5 wlt~

Description guality Siesmic Resolution Class Cl.ass.,

Code. Notes P-17 P-18 P-19 P-20 P-21 P-24 P-25 P-26 P-27 P-28 P-29 P-30 P-31 P-32 P-33 P-34 P-35 P-36 P-37 P-38 P-39 P-40 F-70 R

FPC-P-3 RHR<<P-2A RHR-P-2B RHCU-P-lA RMCU-P-1B RCC-P-1A RCC-P-1B RCC-P-1C RCC-P-2 FPC-P-1A FPC-P-1B PWC-P-4A PWC-P-4B EDR-P-5

~

FDR-P-lA FDR-P-1B FDR-P-2 FDR-P-3 FDR-P-4A FDR-P-4B ROA-P-1A ROA-P-1B DEA-FN-51 RPS-M/GEN-1 Suppression Pool Cleanup Pump RHR Pump RHR Pump Clean-up Circulation Pump Clean-up Circulation Pump RBCC Hater Pump RBCC Mater Pump RBCC Mater Pump RBCC Chem Metering Pump Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Potable Mater Pump Potable Water Pump R Bldg Equip DR Sump Pump R Bldg Floor Dr Sump Pump R Bldg Floor Dr Sump Pump R Bldg Floor Dr Sump Pump R Bldg Floor Dr Sump Pump R Bldg Drywell Floor Sump Pump R Bldg Drywell Floor Sump Pump Air Masher Pump Air Masher Pump Fan (In MS Tunnel)

RPS Motor Generator Set II I

I II II II II II II II II G

G II II II II II II II II II I

II II I

II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II I

II A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

F

3. 5-36

1 MNP-2 NDMENT HQ.

27 August 1982 TABLE 3.5-7 Page 3 of 6 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)

Missile Equipment No.

Number Description

~l guality Sksmic Resolution Class Class Code. Notes R-2 F<<71 F-72 R-5 R-6 R-7 R-8 R-9 R-10 R-11 R-12 R-13 R-14 R-15 R-16 R-17 R-18 R-19 F-73 F-74 F-75 F-76 F-77 RPS-M/GEN-2 RRA-FN-8 RRA-FN-9 DSA-C-1C DSA-C-2C DSA-C-1A1 DSA-C-1A2 DSA-C-181 OSA-C-182 DLO-P-3A1 DLO-P-3A2 OLO-P-381 DLO-P-382 DO-P-3A1 DO-P-3A2 DO-P-381 00-P-382 DO-P-6 OEA-FN-13 OEA-FN-23 DEA-FN-33 DEA-FN-32 OEA-FN-aZ F-78 OEA-FN-22 RPS Motor Generator Set II MS Tunnel Fan Coil Fan I

MS Tunnel Fan Coil Fan I

Starting Air Compressor HPCS DG I

Starting Air Compressor HPCS DG I

Starting Air Compressor DG-A1 I

Starting Air Compressor OG-AZ I

Starting Air Compressor DG-81 I

Starting Air Compressor DG-82 I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump DG-A1 I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump'G-A2 I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump OG-81 I

Motor.Driven Lube Oil Pump DG-82 I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump I

Motor Driven Lube Oil Pump I

OC Motor Driven HPCS Fuel Pump I

Exhaust Fan Loop A Pump Rm I

Exhaust Fan Loop 8 Pump Rm I

Exhaust Fan HPCS Oil Pump Rm I

Exhaust Fan Day Tank Rm I

Exhaust Fan Day Tank Rm I

Exhaust Fan Day Tank Rm I

II I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

F A

A A

A 8

8 8

8 A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

3.5-37

- ~ -

~

HVP-2 NDNENT NO.

27 August 1982

'ABLE 3 57 Page 4 of 6 INTERNALLY GENERATEO MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)

Missile No.

Equipment Number Oescr iption C I guali ty Semi c Resolution

. Class

. Class Code.Notes.

F-79 F-80 F-81 F-82 F-83 F-84 F-85 F-86 F-87 F-88 F-89 F-90 OEA-FN-34 ORA-EUH-11 DRA-EUH-21 ORA-EUH-31 ORA-EUH-32 DRA-EUH-33 DMA-AH-32 OMA-AH-12 OMA-AH-22 DEA-FN-11 DEA-FN-21 DEA-FN-31 Exhaust Fan DG Rm I

Elec Unit Htr Loop A Oil Pump Rm II El=" Unit Htr Loop B Oil Pump Rm II Elec Unit Htr HPCS Oil Pump Rm II Elec Unit Htr Fire Deluge Equip Rm II Elec Unit Htr Fire Deluge Equip Rm II Air Hndlg HPCS DG Rm I

Air Hndlg Div I DG Rm I

Air Hndlg Div II DG Rm I

Exhaust Fan Div I DG Rm I

Exhaust Fan Oiv II OG Rm I

Exhaust Fan HPCS DG Rm I

I II II II II II I

I I

I I

I A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A A

A 3.5-38

MNP-2 TABLE 3.5-7 NDHENT NO.

27 August 1982 Page 5 of 6 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)

RESOLUTION CODE NOTES:

A.

These postulated missiles were determined to be credible.

A safe shutdown analysis was performed, which determined that the failure of all equipment in the missile path envelope would have no effect on the ability of the plant to safely shutdown in the event of an accident.

B.

C.

D.

These postulated missiles originate from the air compressors that provide starting air for the diesel generator sets.

These four compressors are 'of the reciprocating three-cylinder piston type.

The three cylinder heads cover the upper portion of the crankshaft, and preclude any missile exiting the compressor from the upper ha'if of the crankcase.

Credible missiles were postu-lated to exit out the bottom half of the crankcase.

A sa e

shutdown analysis was preformed, which determined that the fail-ure of all equipment in the missile path envelope would have no effect on the ability of the plant to safely shutdown in the event of an accident.

1 These postulated missiles originate from air conditioning fan coil units.

These fan coil units are contained in housings capable of containing any potential fan missile.

The air outlets have grating installed to prevent potential missiles from exiting via this route.

The air inlets are into the fan impeller eye and thus the fan inlets are not a missile exit path.

Missiles originating from this equipment cannot get beyond the protective housing.

These postulated missiles are impeller fragments originating from the Reactor Building Condensate Supply Pump, the Radwaste Building Condensate Supply Pump, and the Condensate Filter Demineralizer Backwater Pump.

These missiles were assumed to be credible.

A safe shutdown analysis was performed, which deter-mined that the failure of all equipment in the missile path would have no 'effect on the ability of the plant to shutdown in the event of an accident, with the xception of impacts on one 18-inch and one 20-inch Standby Service Mater pipe, with stand-ard (3/8 inch) wall thickness.

A worst case missile, which would transmit the maximum energy to a point of contact with the nearest Standby Service Mater pipe was analyzed.

3.5-39

WNP>>2 TABLE 3.5-7

>DNDMENT NO.

27 August 1982'age 6 bf 6 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)

Resolution Code Notes (Continued)

This worst case missile and impact could not penetrate the Standby Service Water pipes.

The target pipe would sustain acceptable deformation in which the pressure integrity of the target pipe is not affected.

This analysis demonstrated that these pumps could not generate a

missile capable of compromising the safe shutdown functions of the service water pipes.

E.

These postulated missiles are pump impeller fragments originat-ing from four RCIC pumps, and turbine blade fragments originat-ing from the RCIC Pump Turbine drive.

A safe shutdown analysis was performed, which determined that the failure of all equip-ment in the missile path>>ould have no effect on the ability of the plant to shutdown in the even of an accident, including missile impacts on the 20-inch RHR-LPCS cross-tie.

As a result of the WNP-2 missile study, this cross-tie utilizes normally removed spool pieces at both the RHR and LPCS connection points.

Thus the impacted cross-tie piping remains unpressur-ized during normal and off-normal plant conditions.

Since the impacted section of the cross-tie is not pressurized, these postulated missiles will have no effect on the ability of the plant to shutdown in the event of an accident.

These postulated missiles are flywheel fragments from the RPS Motor-Generator Sets.

A safe shutdown analysis was performed which showed critical Division 1 and 2 electrical power and control cables were in the potential missile path that were required to safely shutdown the plant in the event of an acci-dent.

Missile barriers were designed and installed around both motor-generator flywheels.

These barriers ensure that potential missiles originating from the motor-generators will have no effect on the ability of. the plant to shutdown in the event of an accident.

3. 5-40

21ENDIKNT NO.

27 August 1982

'ABLE 3.5-8 PLANT SYSTEMS PROTECTED BY MISSILE BARRIERS The Missile Barrier for RPS Motor-Generator Set No. 1, located in the Division 1 Essential Switchgear Room in the Radwaste Building, Elevation 467'-0", protects electric power and control cables servicing the following equipment:

Critical Division 1 Power Distribution Panel OP-Sl-lA Critical Division 1 Power Panel PP-7A-F Critical Division 1 Inverter IN-3 Critical Division 1 Motor Control Center MC-Sl-10 Critical Division 1 Motor Control Center MC-7A Critical Division 1 Power Panel PP-7A Critical Division 1 24V DC Power Supply System OP-SO-A The Missile Barrier for RPS Motor -Generator Set No. 2, located in the Division 2 Essential Switchgear Room in the Radwaste Building, Elevation 467'-0", protects electric power and control cables servicing the following equipment:

Critical Division 2 24V DC Power Supply System PP-DP-SO-8 Critical Division 2 125V DC Power Distribution Panel OP-Sl-2D Ct itical Division 2 125V DC Power Distribution Panel DP-Sl-2E Critical Division 2 125V OC Power Distribution Panel OP-Sl-2A Critical Division 2 125V DC Power Distribution Panel MC-Sl-20 Critical Division 2 Motor Control Center MC-SA Critical Division 2 Motor Control Center MC-SF Critical Division 2 Instrument and Control Power Panel PP-8A-F Critical Critical Division 2 Instrument and Control Power Panel PP-8A-E Division 2 Motor Control Center MC-SB 3.5-41